

A Military History of **AFRICA**



*The Precolonial Period:
From Ancient Egypt to the Zulu Kingdom
(Earliest Times to ca. 1870)*

Timothy J. Stapleton

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Volume 1

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Egypt to the Zulu Kingdom
(Earliest Times to ca. 1870)**

Timothy J. Stapleton



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*To Anna M. Stapleton, Berthe Kayitesi,
and Oceane Kayitesi-Stapleton*

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Contents

Introduction	ix
Chapter 1 North Africa to ca. 1870	1
Chapter 2 West Africa to ca. 1870	67
Chapter 3 East Africa to ca. 1870	111
Chapter 4 Central Africa to ca. 1870	161
Chapter 5 Southern Africa to ca. 1870	199
Notes	261
Selected Bibliography	273
Index	281

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Introduction

The reconstruction of precolonial African military history involves tackling many of the same problems that emerge when trying to understand other aspects of Africa's more distant past. Since most African languages were put into written form at the advent of the colonial era in the late nineteenth century or sometimes later, most evidence for earlier periods is derived from oral traditions passed from generation to generation and recorded long after the events they describe. Though much debated, historians of precolonial Africa generally recognize that these oral accounts have often changed over the years and can supply fairly accurate information for only around the past 250 years. Archaeological evidence and written sources by early literate visitors such as Portuguese or Arabs can be important but are limited and usually nonexistent for most places. This creates an unbalanced account as historians of North Africa, the only region of the continent with a wealth of documentary sources for the earlier periods, can discuss specific events that happened 4,000 years ago, while those of the East African interior can go back no more than two centuries.

Relatively recent creations imposed by colonial conquerors, the contemporary states of Africa—both in terms of national borders and political structures—have existed for just over a century and despite the use of historic names such as Ghana or Zimbabwe have little relation to precolonial history. The process of colonization frequently

divided people with a common history, political system, language, and culture. Because the colonial historians of Africa were interested mostly in the history of Europeans and colonial development, and they usually rejected African oral tradition, the study of precolonial African history did not take off until the independence era of the 1960s, with a flurry of scholarship during the 1970s and 1980s. Unfortunately, the study of precolonial Africa has declined over the past 20 years as oral traditions become harder to find given westernization, and historians of Africa—often based in Europe or North America—are drawn to the more easily accessible colonial and postcolonial archives. In addition, the general trend toward studying social and cultural history is difficult to pursue with regard to precolonial Africa, as oral evidence tends to reflect political and military topics such as prominent leaders and wars. In some ways, this makes examining precolonial African warfare easier than, for example, the study of precolonial fashion or entertainment.

In most of precolonial Africa, military structures—like many political and religious institutions—were not very distinct from the rest of society. Those who formed armies when needed also had productive duties such as growing crops, clearing land, tending livestock, or building shelters. Leaders during war often had judicial, ritual, and other responsibilities. Though there were notable exceptions, most precolonial African states and societies did not have professional militaries in the Western sense of a standing force meant to be constantly ready for conflict. African rulers and subordinate rulers usually maintained a small core of specialist warriors at their residence and during times of war men would be called to leave their farms or fishing villages to form an army for a specific purpose. Failure to respond to the call would usually result in some type of sanction or punishment, and those who participated in a campaign were usually compensated for their service with a share of any loot such as livestock, captives, and trade goods. As historian John Thornton has pointed out, environment determined the type of military employed by African states.¹ In West Africa the large empires of the open Sahel favored cavalry—though they also had large numbers of dismounted spearmen and archers—while the smaller states of the coastal forest belt employed infantry and some marine forces for river crossings. Except for North Africa, significant naval forces were almost entirely absent from the continent, though fleets of war canoes became important on the Great Lakes, and canoes were used by armies to cross rivers. Ceremony and

etiquette were central as African armies were usually ritually prepared in accordance with local beliefs before setting out on a campaign and upon return were often purified. Men who had distinguished themselves in the fighting were acknowledged. In warrior cultures great emphasis was placed on praise names gained in battle and adornments that signified the killing of an enemy. Although spiritual beliefs were honored, the precolonial African approach to warfare was pragmatic, with spies and scouts used to gain intelligence, attempts made to frighten an enemy into running away, and battlefield tactics centered on outflanking an adversary and looting resources. Military logistics was underdeveloped, with armies living off the communities through which they marched, which caused famine among friends and enemy alike. In different times and places, imported foreign technology involving transport or weapons was readily adopted and changed the nature of warfare. Finally, despite many common features, precolonial African military structures and cultures were constantly evolving and were incredibly diverse.

With the exception of a few topics such as the Zulu Kingdom, African military history is generally underdeveloped. Historians of Africa, particularly those from Europe and North America, tend to come from a leftist, activist, and/or development studies background and frequently see military history as inherently conservative and glorifying violence. At the same time, today's African countries usually lack a strong group of serving and former military officers, that is, the type of people who usually form a nucleus of academic military historians in other continents. This is partly related to lack of resources in Africa, such as the absence or small size of staff colleges and military academies, but also to the secretive, politicized, and internal security-oriented nature of African military culture. However, this is beginning to change, and some African military officers have become military historians. Broadly, military history is a popular field with a busy publishing industry, many documentary films, highly enrolled university courses, and large academic conferences. In this context, the emphasis on Europe and North America, and a fascination with military technology, means that Africa is often and wrongly dismissed as marginal and backward.

The regional organization of this volume presents some challenges. Although Africa is commonly discussed in terms of its north, west, east, central, and southern regions, there are many overlapping areas that are difficult to categorize. Is present-day Zambia in Southern or

Central Africa, and is Rwanda in Central or East Africa? As such, the historic connections between people living in what are now considered to be regional borders become obscure. For example, communities living just north and south of the Zambezi River were close neighbors with a long history of interaction but, in the regional context, they are divided between the chapters on Southern and Central Africa. Although the cut off year of around 1870 represents the eve of colonial conquest for most of Africa, certain parts of the continent, such as South Africa's Western Cape and parts of Angola, experienced much earlier colonial intrusion and rule. The volume is not restricted to Africa in that it looks at the experience of African soldiers sent to fight in other parts of the world such as the Egyptian expeditionary force in Greece in the early 1820s and Sudanese troops in Mexico in the 1860s. Given space limitations, however, this volume does not cover the military history of Africans who were shipped to other parts of the world as slaves and their descendants who rebelled in places such as Brazil and Haiti or who fought in conflicts like the American Revolutionary and Civil Wars.


Chapter 1

North Africa to ca. 1870

Stretching from the Atlantic coast of present-day Morocco and the western Sahara in the west to the Red Sea coast of Egypt and Sudan in the east, the vast and hyperdry Sahara Desert divides North Africa from the rest of the continent. Bordered on the north by a long Mediterranean coast, this region of Africa has strong historical connections with southern Europe and the Middle East. In places, the Mediterranean shore is separated from the Sahara by dry scrublands and forest. The western portion of North Africa, called the Maghreb, consists of today's Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Morocco. In the northwest, the Atlas Mountains spread from the Atlantic coast of Morocco across Algeria to the Mediterranean coast of Tunisia. Flowing north from Lake Victoria in East Africa through today's Sudan and Egypt, the Nile River dominates the eastern portion of North Africa and creates a narrow fertile belt. Given the availability of written and archeological evidence, much is known about the military history of North Africa extending back to antiquity.

ANCIENT KINGDOMS

Permanent settlements of full-time farmers developed along the Nile Valley between around 5000 and 4000 BCE. A series of states emerged and by around 3500 BCE, they combined into two kingdoms, Upper



and Lower Egypt, north of the Nile's first cataract. Around 3100 BCE, the ruler of Upper Egypt, called Narmer, conquered the Nile Delta of Lower Egypt to create what is known as the first dynasty of ancient Egypt, a civilization that would last for the next 3,000 years. Called pharaohs, the rulers of ancient Egypt were considered divine and represented the center of a highly organized government that collected agricultural produce as tax depending on the level of the Nile, and mobilized massive labor forces for the construction of gigantic stone temples and pyramid tombs as well as irrigation systems. Boats on the Nile gave administrators and traders easy access to most of the inhabitants of this long and narrow kingdom. Although there were ultimately 30 dynasties, the history of ancient Egypt is usually divided into three broad periods: the Old Kingdom (2685–2200 BCE), the Middle Kingdom (2040–1785 BCE), and the New Kingdom (1570–1085 BCE). These eras were separated by times of crisis and instability.

Although Old Kingdom Egypt had a central pharaoh and royal court, each local ruler maintained a military to control strategic resources and trade routes. It appears full-time military service was not prestigious and became an option for men without enough wealth to enter other trades. One in every 100 Egyptian men was required to perform military service every 10 years under their local rulers. The best men went to the army, where they were led by a small number of professional officers; others were assigned to labor units. While the initial period of conscription is unknown, it appears that after it was completed, men remained with local militia units for some time. Conscripts also garrisoned frontier forts and provided labor for public projects. In addition, Nubian mercenaries were employed. While the pharaoh needed a national military to counter raiders from Libya in the west and Nubia in the south, and to quell internal rebellions, he maintained a small standing force of only a few thousand household guards. During emergencies, the pharaoh called on local rulers to provide contingents that would form the national army. The availability and numbers of these troops depended on the political relationship between the pharaoh and his subordinates. The earliest Egyptian army was an infantry force. The most frequently used weapon was a simple bow and arrow, with a flint or copper head, but men also fought with wooden clubs and throwing sticks, stone-headed maces, daggers and spears with copper blades, and hide shields. Little is known about the organization and size of the Old Kingdom army. There were specialists in desert warfare and transportation,

quartermasters and scribes, and military titles such as overseer of arsenals, overseer of desert blockhouses and royal fortresses, and caravan leaders. In 2345 BCE, an army commander recorded that he led tens of thousands of men. Around 2200 BCE, Egypt built a series of mud and brick forts to protect its southern frontier with Nubia, each of which required 3,000 men to garrison. This meant that the border forts could have been protected by an army of 60,000 men, which is not unrealistic considering that Egypt had a total population of 2 million.

With the drying out of the Sahara, Middle Kingdom Egypt extended the cultivation of the Nile Valley and expanded southward to the Nile's second cataract, conquering part of the kingdom of Nubia. The military became more involved in securing borders from raiding and protecting trade routes. Although it is possible that better records provide more information, it seems that Middle Kingdom armies became more organized as Egypt experienced anarchy and the decline of central authority. The pharaohs maintained their small standing armies supplemented by contingents of conscripts from local rulers and Nubian mercenaries. The pharaoh personally led the national army during major campaigns, and generals were placed in charge of frontier security and logistics. With greater differentiation among junior officers, titles emerged for commanders of shock troops, recruits, instructors, and royal bodyguards. A junior officer began his career by commanding a section of 7 men, progressed to a company of 60, and finally had a unit of 100. A formal intelligence service was created and led by the master of the secrets of the king in the army. Organized on the basis of experience and age, companies and units acquired distinct names. Records contain terms for archers, military police patrols, military judges, district officers, and garrison soldiers.¹

The first major foreign invasion of Egypt took place just before the advent of the New Kingdom and led to a military revolution. Around 1650 BCE the Hyksos, a people from western Asia with superior military technology, conquered the Nile Delta of Lower Egypt. The Hyksos employed horse-drawn chariots, which gave them greater mobility than the Egyptian infantry. Previously, horses were rare in Egypt, and their military employment was limited to mounts for a few senior commanders. Gaining an advantage in firepower, Hyksos chariot archers shot a composite bow with a range 200 meters longer than the simple Egyptian version. The bronze helmets, armor, and weapons of the Hyksos gave them an advantage over the Egyptians'

softer copper weapons and near-naked infantry protected by simple hide shields. The Hyksos fought with socketed narrow-bladed penetrating axes that were more deadly than the broad and curved Egyptians ones, and they employed sickle-shaped swords for which the Egyptians had no answer. In addition, the Hyksos were well trained and experienced in the use of these technological innovations. The Egyptians were caught between two enemies—the Hyksos in the north and the Nubians in the south. The Hyksos dominated the delta for about a century until expelled by the rulers of the new Theban dynasty, Kamose and Ahmose, who established the New Kingdom. While it is tempting to explain the Egyptian recovery in terms of their adoption of Hyksos military technology, it appears that this happened some 50 years after the invaders had been driven out. Traditional Egyptian infantry armies, similar to those of the Middle Kingdom, defeated the Hyksos and opened Egypt up to the Asian knowledge and resources it needed to begin serious military reform.

The New Kingdom military revolution began with the establishment of a professional standing army. Amenhotep, Ahmose's son, began awarding land to successful military leaders, which their families could retain if at least 1 son joined the military. This created a professional officer corps as the foundation for a new expanded and centralized national army in which the pharaoh assumed direct authority over local militias and conscripts. The number of conscripts was increased to 1 in every 10 men, and local rulers could no longer refuse to send contingents to the national force. Over the subsequent three decades, the Egyptian military adopted and to some extent improved Hyksos-style equipment and weapons. The Egyptians made the two-horse chariot faster by moving its axle to the rear, using a six-spoke wheel that ran more smoothly than the Hyksos eight-spoke one and developing a flexible U-shaped joint to connect the yoke pole to the cab. This made Egyptian chariots faster and more maneuverable than those used in the Middle East. On the march, the light Egyptian chariots—weighting about 34 kilograms each—were disassembled and carried by porters and donkeys. Previously, chariots were used as slow moving platforms for archers. The only weapon of the ancient world employed in all phases of war, the Egyptian chariot engaged the enemy at long range with bows and arrows, delivered a shock charge with axes and javelins, and pursued fleeing adversaries. The chariot's mobility offered a capability new to military history. The Egyptians also adopted the Hyksos composite bow, which

was combined with chariots, bronze armor, penetrating axes, and sickle swords. The pharaoh remained as the commander in chief and led his forces in major battles, and there was also a minister of war and a council that served as a general staff. The largely conscript army was led and trained by a professional cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers trained at a number of military schools. The army was organized into divisions of roughly 6,000 men each and represented a combined fighting force of chariots, infantry, archers, and support personnel.

When Thutmose III, ancient Egypt's greatest military leader who ruled during the mid-1400s BCE, shifted the military from primarily defensive to offensive, there was a need to reform and expand the navy. Egypt could not control the resources and knowledge of Canaan and Syria by entirely land-based forces because the 560-kilometer march would deplete an army and took too long, which removed the element of surprise and required huge logistical support. While boats had been used to transport Egyptian land forces up and down the Nile, Thutmose III moved the Egyptian navy into the Mediterranean Sea and used larger ships to transport army expeditionary forces—including their horses and chariots—to the Canaan (today's Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon) and Syrian coasts where they established logistical bases and marched inland against the city-states of that region. These were the first amphibious operations in military history. A large logistical army and naval base along with a shipyard was established at Perunefer on a branch of the Nile leading to the ocean, and it supported operations on the Middle Eastern coast.

The two main components of New Kingdom armies were chariots and infantry. Chariots were organized into squadrons of 25 vehicles each, and larger units of 50 to 150 could be formed when needed. It was common to design a unit for a specific mission. Support units were present to acquire and train horses as well as repair chariots. Usually depicted as led by the pharaoh himself, the chariot service achieved an elite status and formed the primary strike force. Infantry were formed into platoons of 50 men under a leader, and 5 of these formed a 250-strong company under a commander, quartermaster, and scribe. Each company specialized in the use of particular weapons—spears and swords, axes, or bows. Companies were formed into brigades of 1,000 each and commanded by a senior officer equal in rank to a fortress commander. A typical Egyptian division consisted of three heavy infantry brigades and two archer brigades. Meant to

protect the chariots from hostile charges, the infantry platoons fought 5 men deep and 10 men wide. Divisions also contained special units of proven veterans called king's braves who were given difficult assignments. Archers and spearmen wore textile armor, while elite infantry and charioteers wore armor made of bronze plates attached to a leather jerkin. The bronze helmet, favored by the Hyksos and the people in Syria, was not adopted (probably because it became too hot). In addition, the division contained 500 chariots driven by 1,000 horses with another 250 in reserve along with 700–900 support personnel. Logistically, the horses for a division's chariots needed 5,400–6,800 kilograms of grain and 9,400–15,100 litres of water per day. A system of storage cities, supply depots, donkey trains, porters, and ships maintained the army in the field. While each division was commanded by a royal prince or other important personality, day-to-day operations were supervised by a professional general officer. Before a battle, a commanders' council was held in which plans were openly criticized and reworked. In battle, chariots and infantry archers moved ahead of the infantry to screen them and inflict casualties on the enemy. When the enemy was close, the foot archers withdrew through the infantry or around the flanks and from there continued indirect fire. The chariots sought vulnerable enemy formations to charge and breakthroughs to exploit, and they functioned as a mobile reserve. If the enemy was broken, the chariots pursued; if surprise had been achieved, the chariots raced to engage an unprepared enemy; and if the Egyptians were defeated, the chariots withdrew quickly. The Egyptians did not use cavalry in battle, though they employed mounted scouts to collect intelligence. "In its day," according to historian Richard Gabriel, "the army of imperial Egypt was the largest, best-equipped and most successful fighting force in the world."²

With its new military capability, New Kingdom Egypt established an empire by conquering Canaan and Syria to the northeast and Nubia, up to the Nile's fourth cataract, to the south. More professional soldiers were needed to garrison frontier forts and foreign conquests. The capital was moved from Lower Egypt's Memphis, which had been attacked by the Hyksos, to Thebes in Upper Egypt. Trade in ivory, gold, and hardwood expanded as far south as Somalia. Under Thutmose III, New Kingdom Egypt fought the first recorded battle in military history. Possibly in 1457 or 1479 BCE, a coalition of rebels in what is now Israel seized the city of Megiddo (sometimes called Armageddon) in the Jezreel Valley, which was an important transit

point between Egypt and Syria. The recently crowned 22-year-old Thutmose III left Egypt with a 20,000-strong army supported by various machines and animals, and marched 400 kilometers across the Sinai Desert in 10 days. This rapid approach was facilitated by a series of roads, supply depots and wells that the Egyptians had begun to create some 50 years earlier to assist campaigns against invaders from the east such as the Hyksos. Since the Megiddo campaign began in April, newly harvested crops in Egypt and Palestine fed the massive Egyptian force. During the approach to Megiddo, the Egyptians donned armor and weapons as they anticipated rebel attacks. But these attacks never came—the rebels had no idea where Thutmose's army was. Against the advice of his experienced officers who feared ambush, Thutmose personally led his army down a long and narrow mountain path toward Megiddo. While the first Egyptian units were deploying on the floor of the Jezreel Valley, the tail of the long column was still up in the mountain camp. This put his force behind the rebel army that was guarding several major roads that were obvious approaches to the city. The next morning the Egyptians, divided into three strike forces, attacked the rebels. The left force moved northwest of the city to cut off the enemy's escape route to Syria, and the right force moved southeast to prevent rebels in the city from reinforcing the main rebel army. The center force, consisting of infantry and 1,000 chariots led by Thutmose riding his own gold and silver machine, shot arrows as they approached the enemy and charged, which caused the rebels to flee, abandoning their camp and almost 1,000 chariots. Some ran into the fortified city and after a seven-month siege, they surrendered, took oaths of loyalty, and sent tribute and hostages to the pharaoh. This victory, together with a series of subsequent annual campaigns over the next decade, re-established Egyptian control over Palestine; during Thutmose's reign, Egypt reached its imperial zenith. About nine years after the Battle of Megiddo, perhaps in 1446, Thutmose led the only Egyptian army to cross the Euphrates River into Mesopotamia, where it defeated the Mitanni kingdom, which had been assisting rebels in Palestine. Perhaps in 1429, Thutmose led an Egyptian army that pushed the Nubian kingdom of Kush south of the Nile's fourth cataract. This represented Egypt's furthest southerly advance to that time.³

Rameses II, who ruled for 66 years during the 1200s BCE, sought to re-establish Egypt's external buffer zones that had characterized Thutmose III's period and gain foreign tribute to finance ambitious

building projects. He organized Egypt into 34 military districts to facilitate conscription, training, and supply. In the 1270s, Rameses's campaigns to the northeast clashed with the expanding Hittites based in what is now Turkey. In 1274, these Mediterranean superpowers clashed at the Battle of Qadesh, which was one of only two Bronze Age battles (the other was Megiddo) for which details were recorded and was likely the largest battle fought up to that point. Rameses led an army of 4 infantry divisions, some 20,000 men, as well as a division of 3,000 chariots. Commanded by King Muwatallis II, the Hittites numbered 37,000 infantry and 3,500 chariots. Carrying three men, Hittite chariots were larger, stronger, and slower than Egyptian ones. After leaving Egypt, Rameses's force covered 800 kilometers in 30 days as they headed for Qadesh, a city on the Orontes River and important vassal of the Hittites. Unknown to Rameses, the Hittite army was concealed in a nearby valley, and Muwatallis sent several spies posing as deserters to tell the pharaoh that his force had moved north. Rameses then led his army across the Orontes River and, lulled into a false sense of security, failed to dispatch scouts or prepare for attack on the march. Rameses accompanied the leading Amon division as the Ra, Ptah, and Seth divisions lagged behind. While the Amon division was establishing a camp west of Qadesh, the Hittites, spearheaded by 2,500 chariots, attacked the Ra division before the Ptah and Seth divisions had crossed the river. After the Ra division was quickly driven off, the Hittites turned on the unprepared Amon division, which fled, abandoning their pharaoh. According to Rameses's own account, he alone faced the massive Hittite army and charged it several times with his chariot, which inspired the Egyptians to regroup just as the Ptah and Seth divisions arrived from the south. In addition, Canaanite mercenaries arrived from the north and slaughtered the Hittite charioteers who had stopped to loot the Egyptian camp. Although Muwatallis committed his 1,000 reserve chariots to the fight, he could not overcome the Egyptians who, having been badly mauled, quickly withdrew south. In 1261, the Egyptians and Hittites concluded history's first known peace treaty in which they agreed that Egypt would dominate Palestine and southern Syria, and the Hittites would control northern Syria. Rameses then focused on other conquests. To the west, he pushed back the Libyans and built forts along the Mediterranean coast beyond El Alamein. To the south, he pushed Kush past the Nile's fifth cataract and constructed a colossal

monument, four statues of himself that served as a warning for the Nubians to stay away and continue paying tribute.⁴

After around 1100 BCE, Egypt's empire declined as it was attacked from the desert in the west and the Mediterranean in the north, which allowed Canaan and Nubia to re-establish independence. Between around 1100 and 700, the use of the chariot on the battlefield waned as a new larger breed of horses emerged that could carry a man longer and were cheaper, easier to support, more mobile, and better for frontal charges. Egypt lagged behind in the spread of iron metallurgy in the eastern Mediterranean because it did not have enough timber to make the necessary charcoal for smelting and continued to rely on bronze weapons. As discussed later, the Nubian state of Kush conquered Egypt around 750 BCE and founded a new dynasty. In 670 and 663 BCE, the Assyrians, based in northern Mesopotamia, invaded Egypt and used their iron weapons to drive its Nubian rulers back south. The Assyrians withdrew, leaving behind a new vassal Egyptian dynasty called the Saite kings who, by the 650s, became independent Assyrian allies. After the fall of the Assyrian Empire in 612, the Saite kings staged campaigns in Asia Minor and Nubia that depended on Carian (Turkish), Greek, and Phoenician mercenaries who brought the first Greek influences to Egypt and rebuilt the Egyptian navy. After several attacks by the Babylonians around 600, Egypt was invaded by the Persian Empire in 525. The Persians hired Greek mercenaries who had previously worked for Egypt and were assisted in crossing the Sinai Desert by Arabs who brought them water. At a battle fought near Pelusium, a city in the eastern Nile Delta, a numerically superior Persian army routed the Egyptians who were led by the inexperienced Psamtik III and slaughtered perhaps 50,000 of them. With the capture of Memphis, Persian ruler Cambyses II assumed the title of pharaoh and appointed a governor to rule Egypt, Cyprus, and Phoenicia as a province. Stirred by the Greek victory over the Persians at Marathon in 490, the Egyptians launched a series of rebellions that eventually expelled the Persians in 404 and re-established Egyptian rule. However, in 343 BCE, the Persians returned and overthrew Nectanebo II, who would be the last Egyptian to rule Egypt until 1952 CE.

In 332 BCE, after storming a fortress in Gaza, Alexander the Great's Macedonian and Greek army entered Egypt, where they were greeted as liberators from Persian occupation. When Alexander died nine years later, his empire was divided among his generals. Egypt was given to Ptolemy, who established a new dynasty that would endure

until the Roman conquest of 30 BCE. During the third and second centuries, Ptolemaic Egypt and the Seleucid Kingdom, another successor state of Alexander centered on Persia, fought a series of six wars for control of Syria. The early Ptolemaic standing army consisted primarily of Greeks and Macedonians forming a central phalanx of long spears. Egyptians were restricted to military support roles, the navy (which protected Cyprus, Crete, and the Aegean Islands), and a corps of North African war elephants that were smaller than the Indian ones used by the Seleucids. An exception to this was the large Egyptian levy that formed part of Ptolemy's invasion of Syria that was turned back at Gaza in 312. The main military problem for the Ptolemaic dynasty was the small size of the local Greek population from which to recruit soldiers. Attempts to provide land in exchange for military service created a new class of landowners but insufficient manpower. The extensive employment of mercenaries by the wealthy Ptolemys did not bring their force up to the large numbers available to the Seleucids, whose army was also centered on the Greek phalanx but was supported by many auxiliary troops that included heavy cavalry and horse archers from central Asia. Therefore, as part of general military reforms in preparation for a fourth war in Syria, the Ptolemaic army trained and armed 20,000 Egyptians for the phalanx, and they played a major role in the Ptolemaic victory over the Seleucids at the Battle of Raphia in Gaza in 217. With Egyptian military confidence strengthened, some men of this corps along with exploited peasants rose up against foreign rule and fought a guerrilla war in the Nile Delta, which was finally crushed in 185. The ultimately unsuccessful wars over Syria, which also resulted in the loss of islands in the Aegean, weakened Egypt and left it vulnerable to takeover by Rome. After defeating the alliance of Roman general Mark Antony and Cleopatra VII, the last Ptolemy, at the naval Battle of Actium in the Ionian Sea in September of 31 BCE, Roman general Octavian—who later became Emperor Augustus—annexed Egypt as a Roman province. While Egypt became an essential supplier of grain for Rome, the limited invasion routes along the Sinai and up the Nile meant that it could be held with a relatively small force. In the early years of occupation, Rome stationed two legions and a dozen auxiliary units in Egypt that totalled around 22,000 troops. By the second century CE, this had been reduced to 11,000 to 16,000 mostly locally recruited soldiers. The Romans also built fortresses at Alexandria, Syrene (Aswan), and Babylon (south of present-day Cairo). Roman soldiers in Egypt were

employed primarily for policing but occasionally put down internal revolts against taxation and were sent to participate in the empire's campaigns in the east.⁵

The people of Nubia, the area of the Upper Nile that is in today's southern Egypt and northern Sudan, exported gold, ivory, ostrich feathers, and ebony to Egypt as far back as the Old Kingdom. Around 1500 BCE, as stated earlier, New Kingdom Egypt conquered Nubia beyond the Nile's fourth cataract to gain control over regional trade. During the next five centuries, many Egyptian towns and temples were built in Nubia, and the area's elites adopted Egyptian language, religion, and writing. While little is known about the Nubian military, it appears that around this time, their armies were similar to those of Egypt. Depictions of Nubian troops show them armed with maces or javelins with stone or copper tips, simple bows and arrows with fire-sharpened tips, and hide shields. It seems the Nubians did not employ the long infantry spear. Since Nubia lacked the tin required to manufacture bronze and the post-Hyksos Egyptians avoided exporting bronze metallurgy, Nubians did not have many bronze weapons. They also did not use horses in warfare. Following the post-Hyksos Egyptian invasion of the upper Nile, the Mejay of Nubia became allies of the pharaohs and supplied elite units of heavy infantry equipped with bronze-penetrating axes. Other Nubian mercenaries in the New Kingdom armies were equipped with long bronze-tipped spears. During the New Kingdom period, chariots and composite bows gave the Egyptians a significant advantage over Nubian armies.⁶

From around 1000 BCE, following the Egyptian withdrawal, the independent Kush state developed in Nubia with indigenous rulers who were culturally Egyptian and retained trade links with Egypt. Around 750 Kush invaded and occupied Egypt and established the Egyptian 25th (or Ethiopian) dynasty, which lasted for 60 years. The Assyrian invasion of 670 BCE forced the Nubian rulers of Egypt to withdraw south of the Nile's second cataract, where they established a new state. In 593, an Egyptian army attacked the Nubian capital of Napata near the fourth cataract, prompting the Nubians to move their capital further south to Meroe between the fifth and sixth cataracts. With plentiful supplies of iron ore and timber, Meroe began to focus on the production of iron tools and weapons that allowed more land to be cleared for cereal agriculture and more effective defense. In addition to trading with Egypt and the Middle East to the north, Meroe also exported ostrich feathers, leopard skins, gold, and ivory east to

the Red Sea coast from where they went to India and East Asia. Professional hunters armed with stone-, copper-, and iron-tipped arrows were important to the Meroe economy and likely formed the professional nucleus of the army. The Meroe military trained and employed war elephants and exported them to Ptolemaic Egypt. Although little is known of Meroe's military structure, inscriptions mention titles such as fortress commander and a chief of archers. It appears that the Meroe army specialized in archery and employed some cavalry armed with lances. Expanding north of the second and first cataracts, Meroe clashed with the new Roman rulers of Egypt during the first century BCE. Around 25 BCE, a 30,000-strong army from Meroe attacked and looted the Roman frontier settlements of Syrene, Elephantine, and Philae. Among the trophies brought back was a bronze head of Roman Emperor Augustus, which was discovered by archeologists in the early twentieth century. In response, a Roman legion of 10,000 infantry and 800 cavalry led by Gaius Petronius, prefect of Egypt, marched south, defeated a Nubian force, sacked Napata, and returned to Egypt with several thousand captives who were sold as slaves. According to the account of Greek geographer Strabo, the Meroe army was poorly organized and equipped with hide shields, axes, and some spears, swords, and bows. The Meroe army then failed in an attack on the Roman garrison that had been left behind at Premnis (Qasr Ibrim). Subsequently, the Romans and Nubians concluded a treaty that established a buffer state between the first and second cataracts, exchanged ambassadors, and enjoyed several centuries of peaceful trade. Recovering quickly from war with Rome, Meroe, during the reign of Netekamani from 12 BCE to 12 CE, reached the height of its power and dominated a long swath of territory from the Ethiopian foothills in the south to the first cataract in the north. Meroe declined around 300 CE as the extensive use of timber for charcoal caused erosion that hampered agriculture, its main trade partner of Roman Egypt declined, and it was eclipsed by the rise of Aksum in the south (which is discussed in Chapter 3). In 350 CE, the Christian ruler of Aksum, Ezana, led an invasion that finally destroyed Meroe.⁷

Around 1000 BCE, seafaring Phoenicians from what is now Lebanon began to establish a chain of trade outposts and settlements around the Mediterranean. By roughly 800 BCE, they had founded the settlement of Carthage on the coast of present-day Tunisia. These Phoenician settlers, eventually called Carthaginians, built towns and introduced iron to the local bronze-using Berber farmers. Within two

centuries, Carthage had become a major regional power through exporting goods obtained by the Berbers from south of the Sahara. The trans-Sahara trade, as discussed in Chapter 2, began to expand with chariots carrying goods from oasis to oasis that stretched to the Niger River bend and along the western Atlantic coast. Salt, cloth, beads, and metal items from North Africa were traded for gold, ivory, and slaves from West Africa. Ruled by a commercial oligarchy, Carthage expanded and took over the inland Tunisian plain, which provided food and Berber recruits for the army; much of the western coast of North Africa; southern Spain and Mediterranean islands such as Sardinia and Corsica; and part of Sicily. The Carthaginian army consisted primarily of foreign mercenaries—including Gauls and Spanish—and levies from conquered territories. Forces operating outside Africa tended to have more mercenaries, while those operating within Africa had more local militias. Highly mobile Numidian light cavalry, Berbers riding small horses without saddles and equipped with javelins and small shields, represented an important feature of the Carthaginian military. The Carthaginians also utilized elephants trained for war that were meant to literally add weight to frontal assaults or discourage enemy cavalry attacks. Up to 300 elephants, though more commonly less than 100, could be employed in a Carthaginian force. Around 300 BCE, Carthage had the largest navy in the Mediterranean and unlike its multiethnic army, the navy consisted primarily of skilled Carthaginians sailors who gained wealth from oceanic trade. The Carthaginians supplemented their large triremes with smaller vessels that used hooks against the oars of enemy ships and fire against their hulls.

Carthaginian attempts to take over Greek cities ignited a series of three Punic (another word for Phoenician) wars with the emerging Roman Republic. During the First Punic War (264–241 BCE), Rome defeated Carthage at sea and forced it to withdraw from Sicily. Carthage then sent an army under Hannibal to conquer part of Spain that had mineral resources and manpower. During the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE), Hannibal famously led an army, including war elephants, across southern Gaul and over the Alps into Italy. The Romans initially fought a hit-and-run campaign against the Carthaginian supply lines. However, in 216 BCE, a massive Roman army of 86,000 men, including 6,400 cavalry, confronted Hannibal's 40,000 heavy infantry; 6,000 light infantry; and 10,000 cavalry at the Battle of Cannae. Forming his infantry into a crescent, Hannibal withdrew

his center in the face of a Roman advance, which meant that his flanks encircled the enemy who were also attacked in the rear by the Carthaginian cavalry. In the subsequent disaster, 70,000 Romans were killed and 10,000 captured. The Romans then changed strategy by attacking the Carthaginians in Spain and landing troops near Carthage itself, which prompted Hannibal's return to North Africa. In 202 BCE, at the Battle of Zama fought just south of Carthage, a Carthaginian army of 45,000 infantry; 6,000 cavalry; and 80 elephants clashed with a Roman force of 34,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry. After a frontal attack by Hannibal's elephants passed harmlessly through preorganized lanes in Roman lines, the two armies clashed, and the Romans gained the upper hand when their allied Numidian cavalry attacked the rear of the Carthaginian infantry line. While 20,000 Carthaginians were killed and 20,000 captured, the Romans suffered only 2,500 dead. Roman commander Scipio Africanus was given his surname in honor of this North African victory. The subdued Carthage was obliged to surrender Spain and all its islands, acknowledge the ruler of Numidia as a Roman ally, pay Rome annual tribute for 50 years, and surrender its elephants and warships. Resentful of Carthage's eventual recovery, Rome launched the Third Punic War (149–146 BCE) with the excuse that the Carthaginians had not obtained permission before embarking on operations against Numidian raiders. After a two-year siege, the Romans completely destroyed Carthage in 146, killed or enslaved its inhabitants, and annexed all its territories. Rome replaced Carthage as the dominant power along the western Mediterranean coast of North Africa. With Octavian's annexation of Egypt just over a century later, the Mediterranean became a Roman lake. During the first century CE, the Romans rebuilt Carthage, which became the second largest city in the western part of the empire.⁸

THE FALL OF ROME AND THE RISE OF ISLAM

As part of the barbarian invasions that caused the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, a Germanic group called the Vandals under King Genseric crossed from Spain to the Roman province of Africa in 429 CE. The perhaps 15,000- to 20,000-strong Vandal army advanced east to besiege the coastal city of Hippo Regius, which is located in what is now Algeria and was home of the dying Saint Augustine. The city was starved into submission after 14 months. Although a treaty with Rome gave the Vandals control of the Numidian (Algerian)

coast in 435, four years later, Genseric resumed his eastward offensive and took Carthage without a fight, making it the new capital of his North African kingdom from where he acquired ships and staged the occupation of Corsica, Sicily, Sardinia, and the Balearic Islands. After a Western Roman expedition against the Vandals stalled at Sicily, another treaty in 441 confirmed Genseric's rule of the coast of present-day Algeria, Tunisia, and western Libya. The Vandals developed a large fleet to raid the Mediterranean coast and in 455, they famously sacked Rome. This prompted the Western and Eastern Roman empires, during the 460s, to send their navies against the Vandals, who captured the Western fleet and used fire ships to defeat the Eastern one. During the 470s, both Rome and Constantinople, the respective Roman capitals, made peace with the Vandals. Inland from the North African coast, the Berbers resisted Vandal expansion and between 496 and 530 inflicted two serious defeats on them.

With the Vandals distracted by a rebellion in Sardinia, a Byzantine (Eastern Roman) fleet of almost 600 ships landed an army at Caputvada on the coast of modern Tunisia in early September 533 as part of Emperor Justinian I's efforts to recover the territory of the fallen Western Empire. Commanded by the experienced General Belisarius, the expeditionary force consisted of 10,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, including heavy cavalry and mounted archers. The Vandals, on the other hand, could muster perhaps 30,000 to 40,000 light cavalry with few ranged weapons. Belisarius's army began a 240-kilometer march north along the coast toward Carthage with the fleet following offshore. Ten days later in mid-September, at Ad Decimum (which marked the last 10 kilometers before Carthage), the Vandal army of King Gelimer tried to ambush the advancing Byzantines but failed to coordinate their efforts and suffered a devastating defeat by Belisarius's horsemen. The Vandals retreated west, and Belisarius's force occupied Carthage, where they were welcomed by the Romanized inhabitants and rebuilt the city's ruined walls. Reinforced by the army from Sardinia, Gelimer's Vandals regrouped and moved east toward Carthage. In mid-December, the Vandals were again defeated by the Byzantines in a primarily cavalry engagement at Tricamarum. Belisarius advanced west to occupy Hippo Regius without a fight. Here he captured a Vandal treasure ship about to embark for Spain, dispatched contingents to take the Mediterranean islands, and besieged Gelimer and his remaining forces at Medeus on Mount Papua until hunger forced their surrender in March 534. While many Vandals fled to Europe, Belisarius

returned to Constantinople with Gelimer, who became a notable landowner, and five Vandal cavalry regiments incorporated into the Byzantine army.

Almost immediately, the Berbers of Byzacena (Tunisia) and Numidia (Algeria) rebelled, with the latter defeated in battle near Mount Bourgaon in early 535 and the former continuing its resistance despite the construction of Byzantine forts along borders and roads. Suppression of the Berbers was delayed by a large mutiny over lack of pay within the Byzantine army in 536, which threatened Carthage until the brief return of Belisarius convinced the mutineers to flee west to Numidia, where more troops joined them. The next year, at Scalae Veteres, a loyalist force under Germanus defeated the mutineers and restored military discipline. Another Berber rebellion broke out in Byzacena in 544 in which the Byzantine general Solomon was killed in battle at Cillium, which prompted the Berbers of Tripolitania (western Libya) to rise up. In late 546, John Troglita, a veteran of the 533 Vandal campaign, arrived at Carthage with experienced horse archers and heavy cavalry, rallied the demoralized garrison, and embarked on a southward offensive that relieved beleaguered towns and defeated the Byzacena Berbers in a long and bloody battle east of Sbeitla. Although a third of his veteran cavalry were sent to fight in Italy, Troglita led his army to confront the Tripolitanian Berber rebels at Marta in what is now eastern Tunisia in 547 but was defeated when his own Berber allies fled. As Troglita's demoralized force withdrew to the Laribus fortress in western Tunisia to regroup and resupply, the emboldened Byzacena Berbers renewed their uprising. The next year Troglita, who had recruited a massive number of Berber allies, pursued the combined rebel force of Tripolitanian and Byzacena Berbers south to a plain called the Fields of Cato. Troglita besieged the rebel camp and compelled them to attack his camp, where they were defeated in a close run battle in which many of the Berber rebel leaders were killed and the remainder surrendered. While the Byzantines maintained peace with the Berbers by giving their leaders pensions and building more forts, another brief uprising took place in 563 after the murder of a Berber leader by Byzantine officials and was suppressed by an expeditionary force under the emperor's nephew Marcian. During the early 570s, the Romanized Christian Berber kingdom of Masuna in Mauretania (present-day western Algeria and Morocco) began eastward attacks on Byzantine territory that killed three Byzantine generals. Since Constantinople was facing invasions

elsewhere and the Romanized Berbers had a standing army, General Gennadius was dispatched to North Africa to deal with this serious threat, and in 577 and 578 he led a brief campaign that subdued Masuna and killed its king (Garmul). Later, around 585, Constantinople made Gennadius the first exarch (viceroy) of Africa, comprising modern Algeria and Tunisia, combining supreme administrative and military command in one semiautonomous position. In the late 590s, he put down further Berber rebellions.⁹

When the Roman Empire split in the fourth century, Egypt came under the Eastern (Byzantine) Empire based at Constantinople, which adopted Christianity. As an important source of food and manufactured goods, Egypt was garrisoned by Byzantine soldiers and foreign mercenaries, with Egyptians playing almost no military role. In 608, Heraclius the Elder, exarch of Africa based in Carthage, staged a rebellion against Emperor Phocas in which he sent an army with many Berber allies under his nephew Nicetas overland to invade Byzantine Egypt. This invasion denied the emperor important resources. A large loyalist army under the ruthless Bonosus advanced from the east but twice failed to storm the defenses of Alexandria and withdrew by sea. At the same time, a fleet under the exarch's son Heraclius sailed to Constantinople, where he seized power and later became emperor. With the Byzantine Empire distracted by trying to reconquer parts of the former Western Empire and destabilized by civil war, Persia launched a series of invasions from the east and occupied Egypt in 619. In the context of an aggressive counteroffensive led by Byzantine emperor Heraclius, the Persian general Shahrbaraz withdrew his forces from Egypt in 629 and returned home to seize the Persian throne and make peace with Constantinople. Although the Byzantines reoccupied Egypt, their control had been fatally weakened.¹⁰

Within a century of the Prophet Muhammad's death in 632 CE, adherents of Islam had expanded from the Arabian Peninsula and ruled from the Atlantic coast of Morocco to the Indus River in South Asia. Arabs were skilled horsemen with a long history of warfare and trade. In December 639, a 4,000-strong Arab army led by 'Amr ibn al-'As, a former companion of the Prophet, marched from newly conquered Syria to Egypt and in February 640, after a two-month siege, stormed the eastern city of Pelusium. Reinforced by Bedouin from the Sinai, the Arabs continued southwest to take the town of Bilbeis in March after a short siege. In May, the Arabs arrived at the massive and well-defended fortress of Babylon, where they waited for

12,000 reinforcements who arrived a few weeks later. An Arab siege of Babylon would be difficult because it was located on the Nile, near the site of present-day Cairo, and could be supplied by boat. However, in July, the Byzantine governor Theodore, who had neglected to attack the small Arab force when it first arrived or to intercept the reinforcements, finally decided to act and led his 20,000-strong army out of Babylon to attack the Arab camp at nearby Heliopolis. Amr positioned most of his 15,000 troops to block the Byzantine advance but concealed two small flanking detachments, which surprised Theodore's force (which had not deployed scouts) and threw it into chaos that resulted in only the governor and a few others escaping death or capture. Bypassing Babylon, the main Arab army advanced northwest toward Alexandria in February 641, pushing back several Byzantine forces meant to delay it. While the Arabs did not have the numbers or siege weapons to overcome the mighty walls of Alexandria, which were topped by catapults, Byzantine sorties were driven back by the Arabs, and the death of Emperor Heraclius meant that a seaborne relief force was not sent from Constantinople. The demoralized Byzantine garrisons at Babylon and Alexandria surrendered in April and November 641, and within a few months, the Arabs had occupied the rest of Egypt. Egyptians welcomed the Arabs because they imposed low taxes, the payment of which excused them from military service. The Byzantines had persecuted local Coptic Christians, but the Arabs did not initially force conversion to Islam. Threatened by the Byzantine navy, which briefly recaptured coastal Alexandria in 645, the Arabs moved their capital inland to the head of the Nile Delta, where they built the city of Cairo.

In 642, an Arab force of 20,000 under Uqba ibn Nafi raided south of the Nile's first cataract into Nubia, where the three dominant states had converted to Christianity in the 500s. Avoiding large battles, the Nubians employed their many archers and fast cavalry in numerous hit-and-run attacks and in one engagement, 250 Arabs lost their eyes to Nubian arrows. Uqba declared the country not worth conquering and withdrew north. In 651, another Arab army, 5,000 strong and led by the governor of Egypt, Abdullah ibn Sa'ad, tried to subdue the Nubian kingdom of Makuria by besieging its capital of Dongola. Since the Arabs again took heavy casualties from Nubian arrows, they negotiated a treaty called the Baqt in which the Nubians agreed to send 360 slaves to Egypt every year in exchange for Egyptian agricultural produce. With some exceptions, the agreement produced almost seven

centuries of generally peaceful coexistence and trade. Given the Arab threat from Egypt, the Christian Nubian states merged into the kingdom of Dongola around the turn of the seventh and eighth centuries. However, between around 750 and 950, the Nubians withheld slave payments and their armies raided places in Upper Egypt such as Kom Ombo and Edfu.¹¹

The Arab conquest of the Maghreb was more difficult than that of Egypt. Immediately after the surrender of Alexandria, 'Amr ibn al-'As led an unauthorized campaign west from 642 to 645 that easily subjugated the coastal Byzantine cities in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, including Tripoli, though permanent rule was not imposed. Around the same time, Uqba ibn Nafi led an Arab raid on the Zawila oasis in the Libyan interior. In 647, Abdullah ibn Sa'ad led 20,000 Arab cavalry west of Egypt toward Carthage, where Byzantine exarch Gregory had recently declared independence from Constantinople. Gregory's army, including Berber allies, clashed with the advancing Arabs near Sufetula (Sbeitla) in what is now north central Tunisia, where they were defeated and their leader killed. Although he could have taken the prosperous olive-growing province of Byzacena, Abdullah knew that the Byzantine navy dominated the coast and withdrew to Egypt after receiving a large tribute. For over a decade, internal conflict in the Muslim caliphate delayed the conquest of the Maghreb, though Arab armies from Egypt raided southern Tunisia three times between 654 and 665. In 655, the new Arab navy gained its first major victory against the Byzantine fleet at the Battle of the Masts off the coast of modern Turkey, which facilitated new Muslim conquests in the Mediterranean. When Muawiya, founder of the new Umayyad dynasty, came to power in 660, he moved the caliphate's capital from Medina in Arabia to Damascus in Syria, which put it into more direct conflict with the Byzantine Empire for control of the Mediterranean in which the Maghreb represented an important part. He also favored the Arab warriors who had conquered the caliphate's new territory by granting them regular pay, land, and tax exemption. In 670, Uqba ibn Nafi was appointed to lead a new Arab offensive in which his army advanced west into modern Tunisia, where he established the settlement of Kairouan (Qayrawan) as a base for further operations against the inland Berbers and coastal Byzantine cities. Five years later, Uqba was replaced as commander by Abdul-Muhajir Dinar, who negotiated an alliance with the local Christian Berber leader Kusayla, who converted to Islam. In 682, Uqba returned to his former post, resumed a

hostile policy toward the Berbers, and led a military expedition that famously reached the Atlantic coast of Morocco, where he lamented the lack of further lands to conquer. While returning from the west, Uqba was ambushed and killed by Kusayla's Berbers who occupied Kairouan. Zuhayr ibn Qay, the Arab leader who had ordered the abandonment of Kairouan, quickly returned from Egypt with reinforcements and drove the Berbers west to the mountains where they were defeated and Kusayla killed in a major battle near Mems Kusayla. During this Arab-Berber conflict, the Byzantines reoccupied some of their coastal enclaves, and Zuhayr was killed around 688 trying to expel them from Cyrenaica.

A 40,000-strong Arab army under Hassan ibn Numan was assembled in Egypt and in 693 marched west through Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, bypassing the Byzantine enclaves; seized Carthage; and defeated a Byzantine army blocking the way to the port of Bizerte. However, the Arab army was defeated at the Nini River and again at the coastal oasis of Gabes by a confederation of Berber groups led by the priestess Al-Kahina. They were forced back to Cyrenaica, which enabled the Byzantine navy to recapture Carthage in 697. That year, with reinforcements from Damascus and 12,000 Berber allies, Hassan again led his force west, overcame the Berber army at the Second Battle of Gabes, and pursued Al-Kahina to Tubna in what is now eastern Algeria, where she was killed in a last stand. Although he retook Carthage in 698, Hassan thought it vulnerable to seaborne attack and, therefore, established nearby Tunis located slightly inland on a hill overlooking a lagoon that was turned into a port by digging a canal to the ocean. Importing Egyptian shipbuilders, Hassan built an Arab navy at Tunis and used it to seize remaining Byzantine ports along the North Africa coast as the Byzantine fleet evacuated many Christians to Mediterranean islands. Dominating the 145-kilometer-wide Strait of Sicily, the Arab navy at Tunis began to gain control of the western Mediterranean. From 704 to 710, the Arab army, now under Musa bin Nusayr and still headquartered at Kairouan, marched across the Maghreb, accepted the submission of Berber groups, and established key military bases at Tlemcen in western Algeria, Tangier in northern Morocco, and the trans-Saharan trade center of Tafilaleet in southeastern Morocco—most of which were garrisoned by Berber troops. In 711, some 7,000 Berber cavalry, under Tariq ibn Ziyad, crossed into Spain to defeat the Visigoth army at the Barbate River and with the help of the Arab navy impose Muslim rule. Within a

few years, Arab-led Berber warriors crossed the Pyrenees into southern France, but their advance into Europe was halted in 721 when the Muslim army besieging Toulouse was destroyed by a Christian relief force. Although the many Berbers who joined the Arab army converted to Islam, they were treated as inferiors and paid less than Arabs, which led to dissatisfaction. In 720, the Maghreb's new Arab governor, Yazid ibn Abi, was killed by his Berber bodyguard after ordering them to tattoo his name on their left arms to signify they were his possessions. The continued enslavement of Berbers prompted a rebellion in southern Morocco in 739 and 740 that was suppressed by an Arab expedition which seized prisoners and gold.¹²

During the 700s and 800s, a number of Muslim Berber states, frustrated by Arab oppression and influenced by Muslim dissidents such as the Shi'ites and Kharijites, resisted the authority of the Arab-dominated caliphate, the capital of which had shifted to Baghdad. By 950, the Fatimid dynasty, claiming descent from Muhammad's daughter Fatima, had seized most of what is now northern Tunisia and Algeria, and in 969 occupied Egypt and declared independence from Baghdad. The Fatamids invaded Egypt with a small but effective Berber army that transformed into a landed aristocracy that taxed local farmers. The Fatamid rulers imported slaves to replace the Berbers in the army. The main element of the army was cavalry that consisted of free Berbers and Turkish slaves called Mamluks; the infantry were mainly black Sudanese slaves from south of the Sahara. By the mid-1100s, with the collapse of the taxation system because of corruption, the Fatamids could not pay their army, which regularly pillaged the countryside. In addition, violence between Mamluks, Berbers, and Sudanese disrupted trade and agriculture and weakened royal authority.

During the 1160s, Egypt was threatened by Christian European crusaders who had established kingdoms in nearby Palestine. Salah al-Din ibn Ayyub (called Saladin in the West), a Kurd from what is now Iraq and leader of a small group of professional soldiers, reorganized the Egyptian army and drove off the crusaders. In 1169, Salah al-Din became military ruler of Egypt and crushed a rebellion by black Sudanese soldiers and other units allied with the declining Fatamid dynasty. Later that year, a fleet from Crusader Jerusalem and the Byzantine Empire attacked the Egyptian port of Damietta but was defeated by Salah al-Din's forces. When the last Fatamid ruler died in 1171, Salah al-Din established the Ayyubid dynasty and during

the 1170s and 1180s, he directed expansion into Palestine and Syria, fighting both Muslims and crusaders. In 1172 and 1173, Nubian armies, supplemented by Armenian refugees and other fugitive soldiers, twice threatened the border town of Aswan, at the Nile's first cataract, but were driven off by Egyptian reinforcements. An Egyptian army advanced south and captured the Nubian town of Qasr Ibrim between the first and second cataracts for two years. In 1187, Salah al-Din's forces recaptured Jerusalem for Islam, prompting western Europe's third Crusade. Although the crusaders under England's King Richard the Lionheart defeated Salah al-Din's army at the Battle of Arsuf in 1191, they could not retake Jerusalem, which led to a treaty that continued Muslim rule of the holy city but gave access to Christian pilgrims. Under Salah al-Din, landed estates were taken over by the Egyptian state and administered by Mamluk officers, who used income from peasant taxes to provide the army with full-time soldiers. The recruitment of young Mamluk slaves from Turkey was revived, and the Egyptian army became centered on these light cavalry armed with bow and arrow, and curved sword. Through success in battle, Mamluk soldiers could win their freedom and become commanders.¹³

The Mamluks became a military and landed elite in Egypt. In 1250, they expelled a French crusader expedition, which had intended to link up with Nubian and Ethiopian Christians in the south, from the port of Damietta. Subsequently, the Mamluks took over Egypt and established two successive dynasties that ruled for the next 250 years. The Mamluk rulers imported more military slaves from Turkey and southern Russia, expanded further into Palestine and Syria, imposed protection over the Arabian holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and defeated the Asian Mongols in 1260 and European crusaders in the 1270s. Cairo became a center of trade and Islamic scholarship, and a regular stopping off point for pilgrims from the Maghreb or West Africa going to Arabia. Turning Christian Nubia in a puppet state, the Mamluks selected a Muslim Nubian prince to become king in 1315, and the Nubian Christian cathedral at Dongola was turned into a mosque three years later.¹⁴ During the 1400s, the Mamluk elites began to treat their land grants as hereditary property and stopped contributing to the Egyptian military. As a result, the sultan increased tax on trade to finance the army, which led to a decline in Mediterranean and Indian Ocean commerce. Since Portuguese mariners had pushed the Egyptians out of the Indian Ocean trade system, the Mamluk rulers had little wealth with which to pay their soldiers, who had

to supply their own armor, weapons, and mounts. Mamluk garrisons began to loot the communities they were meant to defend. Maintaining their reliance on bow- and sword-armed cavalry, the Mamluk army failed to respond to the emergence of firearms and cannons in warfare. To challenge the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, the Mamluks, with assistance from Venice (which was also shut out of the Asian trade) created a fleet of seven large warships armed with cannons. In 1507, near Bombay in India, this Mamluk fleet was supported by 100 small local vessels armed with light cannons and defeated a Portuguese fleet. The Portuguese commander, Lourenco de Almeida, lost his leg to a cannonball and strapped himself to a mast to continue directing the action until he was killed by another projectile. In 1509, at the strategic Indian port of Diu, the Portuguese defeated the Mamluk-led naval coalition recently augmented by Persian ships. Catching the Muslim ships at anchor, the Portuguese vessels moved up and down their line firing cannons. With Portuguese ships in control of the South Asian coast, the Mamluks in Egypt asked the Muslim Ottomans in what is now Turkey to help rebuild their navy. In 1514, Ottoman Admiral Salman Ra'is and 2,000 Ottoman shipbuilders were in Suez. Under Ra'is, the fleet that left Egypt in 1515 had more Ottoman than Mamluk personnel and while it conquered Yemen, it failed to dislodge the Portuguese from the Indian Ocean. This marked the end of Egypt as a world power.¹⁵

In the 1040s, a Muslim revitalization movement known as the Almoravids united the Berber nomads in the western Sahara. The Almoravid leaders Abdallah ibn Yasin, and brothers Yahya ibn Umar and Abu-Bakr developed a large army that compensated for poor discipline with speed and religious zeal. The Almoravid army consisted primarily of infantry armed with javelins in the front ranks and pikes behind to form a phalanx supported by horsemen and camel riders on the flanks. Waging a jihad (holy war) against unbelievers, the Almoravids, in the mid-1050s, captured Sijilmasa (which was the most important northern terminus of the trans-Sahara trade routes) and Awdaghust in the south (which gave them control of gold coming from old Ghana). In 1056, they conquered southern Morocco. Some of the initial Almoravid unity was lost when two of their important leaders were killed in battle—Yahya in 1057 and Abdallah in 1059. Although Abu-Bakr became the nominal leader, the Almoravid Empire was far too vast to be ruled by one person. Abu-Bakr went south to lead the continuing struggle against the Soninke of Ghana;

Ysif ibn Tashfin, his cousin, went north across the Atlas Mountains to lead the conquest of Morocco and southern Spain. The Almoravids took over Fez in 1069 and built a citadel there to serve as an important military base. During the 1070s they expanded into present-day Algeria and by 1082 controlled the area up to Algiers. In 1086, they sent an army to Spain at the invitation of existing Muslim rulers who needed assistance against local Christian kingdoms. That same year, Tashfin, now 80 years old, commanded the Almoravid army at the Battle of Zallaqa, where it inflicted a serious defeat on the Castilians and their allies. Within a few years, the Iberian Muslim states that had called for Almoravid help had been conquered by them. Tashfin expanded the Almoravid military by acquiring captives from south of the Sahara and Spain; introduced drums and flags for improved communication, morale and psychological impact; and transformed a mixed force of desert nomads into a heterogeneous imperial army. By 1100, the Iberian Christians began to gain the advantage in their conflict with the Almoravids. For the Almoravids, there was no distinction between military and administrative leadership. Utilizing Berber tradition, military service was a privilege and not a duty. Lamtuna Berbers formed the core of the army and occupied most important positions. In addition, the Almoravids sometimes employed Christian mercenaries—particularly cavalry—which were most commonly used to collect taxes from remote groups.

The northern Almoravids eventually lost their religious zeal, and their military prestige was undermined by defeats in Spain. As such, from 1125, they were challenged by the rise of another Berber Muslim revitalization movement that originated in the Atlas Mountains, was inspired by Abdulla Muhammad ibn Tumart, and was called the Almohads. Since the bulk of the Almoravid army consisted of cavalry, it could not operate easily in the narrow passes of the Atlas. Attempting to contain the rebellion, the Almoravids built forts on the northwestern slopes of the mountains and brought in more Christian cavalry, which undermined their status as champions of Islam. The city of Marrakesh, which had been founded by Tashfin (who did not see a need to fortify it) was walled after an Almohad attack in 1129. During the 1130s, the new Almohad leader Abdul Mu'min enlarged the army by recruiting and making alliances with Berber groups. This enabled the Almohads to extend their influence in the Atlas and Rif Mountains of northern Morocco, and eventually challenge the Almoravids on the open plains. Many Berbers began to desert the

Almoravids. In 1144, near Tlemcen, the Almohad army routed an Almoravid force supported by a Christian contingent. The Almohads then captured the main towns of Morocco—Oran in 1145, Fez in 1146, and Marrakesh in 1147—and demolished Almoravid mosques and palaces. Shortly after their occupation of Marrakesh, the Almohads sent an army to Spain, where it occupied southwestern Andalusia. However, the 1148 seizure of the North African ports of Mahdiyya, Gabes, and Sfax by Christian Norman knights based in Sicily—who had previously taken Tripoli and Jirba Island—prompted the Almohads to redirect their military efforts from Spain to the eastern Maghreb. In 1151, Mu'min led a major Almohad expedition, originally destined for Spain, eastward where it seized Algiers and defeated the forces of local Muslim princes in a battle on the plain of Sitif in April 1153. After suppressing rebellion in Morocco in the late 1150s, Mu'min once again advanced east with a massive army marching overland and a naval fleet sailing parallel along the coast. By 1160, the Almohads had conquered Tunisia and driven the Normans out of North Africa. Although the Almohads maintained a governing council with representatives of the original Berber groups who had started the movement, Mu'min was protected by a guard from his own Kumya group and appointed his sons to senior military positions. He also created a class of professional administrators who, as young men, underwent training in the law, scholarship, horsemanship, archery, swimming, and athletics. By the late 1100s, the Almohads could field a force of 20,000 cavalry and ruled an empire spanning from the Atlantic coast of Morocco to Tripoli in what is now Libya. It also included southern Spain. However, in the 1200s, internal disunity, rebellion in the eastern Maghreb, and the success of Christian Iberian kingdoms Aragon, Castile, and Portugal caused the Almohad Empire to split into three rival states—Marinid, Hafsid, and Zayyanid.¹⁶

ARRIVAL OF THE OTTOMANS

In August 1516, at Marj Dabiq in Syria, the Mamluk Egyptian army confronted a force from the expanding Ottoman Empire. Half a century earlier, the Ottomans had ended the Byzantine Empire by seizing Constantinople, which became their capital of Istanbul. Although the Mamluks had acquired gunpowder weapons, they did not recognize their importance. Mamluk artillery was placed in trenches from where it was very difficult to move, and firearms were restricted to a

rebellious unit of slaves from the Maghreb. The Mamluks themselves remained mounted and armed with bow and arrow, and sword. The core of the Ottoman army was firearm-equipped infantry flanked by cavalry and cannons mounted on wagons. At the heart of the Ottoman force were military professionals known as Janissaries—originally Christian boys who had been captured, converted to Islam, trained intensively as shock troops, and tied to military service until retirement at age 45. After repeated Mamluk cavalry charges were repelled by Ottoman firepower, the Mamluks withdrew, and the Ottomans captured their immobile artillery. The Ottomans then invaded Egypt. At Radiniyya, on the approach to Cairo, the Mamluks constructed a defensive position with stake-lined ditches, artillery positioned behind stone walls and—in recognition of Ottoman success—a mobile unit of wagon-mounted light cannons. When the Ottoman army moved around the Mamluk defenses and attacked from the rear, the latter responded with a traditional cavalry charge that was cut down by Ottoman shooting. The Mamluk cannons, mostly old, burst when fired. Ottoman victory was complete in less than an hour. After occupying Cairo in January 1517, the Ottoman army crossed the Nile on a boat-bridge and inflicted a final defeat on the Mamluks near the pyramids. An Ottoman governor was imposed on Egypt, and Ottoman rule expanded across much of North Africa's Mediterranean coast.¹⁷

Although the Ottomans initially killed Mamluks who had been captured, their military value was quickly realized, and they were reincorporated into the Egyptian army. Slaves from the Caucasus region became Mamluks and continued to form part of the Egyptian army until the Russians conquered that area in the mid-1800s. In 1522, some Mamluks, supported by Bedouin allies, rebelled and were defeated by an Ottoman force that killed some 500 of them. In 1523, Ottoman governor Ahmad Pasha, who had originated from the Caucasus, led another Mamluk revolt, massacred Ottoman Janissaries in the Cairo Citadel, and declared himself sultan of Egypt. A counter coup by loyalist Ottomans and Mamluks drove Ahmad Pasha out of Cairo, where he attempted to rally Arab supporters. However, a punitive expedition of 2,000 men and 8 cannons was sent from Cairo, which caused the Arab and Mamluk rebels to flee. Ahmad Pasha was captured and executed. This rebellion prompted Istanbul, in 1525, to send Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha to Egypt to reform the legal and military systems. Under a new code of law, the army was forbidden from extorting the peasantry, recruitment of peasants was prohibited, and

Mamluks and Janissaries were, with one exception, formed into separate units. The reorganized army consisted of seven corps: garrison Janissaries, Anatolian infantry, feudal Ottoman cavalry called Sipahi, Sipahi cavalry with firearms, the viceroy's bodyguard (which was the only mixed Janissary and Mamluk unit), state envoys, and Mamluk cavalry led by an Ottoman. The army was paid for entirely by Egyptian taxes and customs duties. Recognizing that previous Mamluk rebellions had been caused by interruption of salaries, the Ottomans paid them promptly and regularly. In this postconquest period, the Ottoman garrison of Egypt numbered around 10,000 men who enforced the governor's rule and protected trade caravans and pilgrims on their way to Mecca. Egypt, with its plentiful supply of women, young boys, alcohol, and hashish, became a favorite Ottoman military posting, and desertion plagued units ordered to other parts of the empire.

During the 1500s, the Funj (nomadic pastoral horsemen from somewhere between the floodplains of the Upper Nile and the eastern foothills of the Ethiopian highlands) extended their influence over the Nubians of the Blue Nile as far north as its junction with the White Nile near present-day Khartoum. By 1600, the Funj had converted to Islam, lived in towns with their capital at Sennar on the Blue Nile, and possessed large herds of cattle. They used a small but effective standing army to collect tribute from Nubian farmers along the river who were left under their own chiefs. Based in a series of forts throughout the territory, the Funj army relied on heavy cavalry recruited from nobility who were equipped with chainmail armor and broadswords, and mounted on horses with quilted armor and copper headgear. The Funj infantry were also armored and carried swords. The Funj essentially replaced the last Christian Nubian kingdom of Alwa. In the early 1600s, the Funj Sultanate extended north to the Nile's third cataract. In the north, Ottoman Egypt invaded Nubia in the early to mid-1500s and established a chain of fortifications around the second cataract. In 1611 and 1612, the Funj army inflicted a crushing defeat on the local Abdallahi Arabs, which confirmed their subordinate status. In the south, the Funj clashed with the Shilluk, who used a fleet of war canoes that usually operated in flotillas of 30 to 40 vessels, to control trade on the White Nile. After three decades of warfare, the Funj and Shilluk entered an alliance in the 1630s to counter the arrival of Jii-speaking people called Dinka. To the east, the Funj competed with Ethiopia, with serious frontier battles

in 1618 and 1619. In 1744, a large Ethiopian army led by Iyasu II invaded Funj territory but was routed in a pitched battle at the Dindera River. To the west, the Funj often fought the Darfur Sultanate over trade in Kordofan, which lay between them. Darfur had been established in the mid-1600s by warrior leader Sulayman Solong, who transformed the small Fur state into a multiethnic sultanate by conquering other groups such as the Masalit and Zaghawa, and using the Jabal Mara Mountains as a defensive stronghold. While Sulayman defeated the similarly expanding Wadai state to his west, warfare between Darfur and Wadai continued throughout the 1700s. From the 1690s to 1710s, the Funj sultan Badi III built up a large slave bodyguard under his command, which provoked resistance among local nobles. The last effective Funj ruler, Badi IV, dealt with rebellious nobles by sending them on an extended campaign in neighboring Kordofan where, in 1747, they were initially defeated by the Darfur army but ultimately won a decisive victory. Muhammad Abu Likaylik, the army's commander, governed Kordofan for the next 14 years and then returned home, deposed the sultan with the support of nobles, and established himself and his hereditary successors as the power behind the Funj throne. Subsequently, the sultanate was embroiled in warfare between rival factions. A similar process took place around the same time in Darfur, where a series of centralizing sultans developed a slave army of spearmen and fought nobles who relied on local levies. The decline of the Funj from the early 1700s saw a consequent rise in the power of the Shilluk in the south.¹⁸

With the capture of Granada in 1492, Christian forces ended almost 800 years of Muslim rule in southern Spain. In the late 1400s and early 1500s, Christian Portuguese and Spanish who were seeking to continue their campaign against Islam took over North African ports such as Tangier, Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis. Turkish pirates then recaptured some of these ports and used them as bases from which to raid Christian ships in the western Mediterranean. In the subsequent warfare, Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers changed hands several times. Defeated by Christian European forces at the siege of Malta in 1565 and the Battle of Lepanto off the coast of Greece in 1571, the Ottomans lost control of the Mediterranean. However, during the 1600s and 1700s, Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers continued to serve as Ottoman naval bases that threatened Christian shipping, and these cities became wealthy from looted cargo. In the North African hinterland of the Maghreb, Ottoman-led armies inhabited towns and periodically

raided the herders and farmers of the countryside. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Ottoman Turkish rulers of Tripoli developed strong trans-Sahara trade links with Borno, which imported firearms, horses, armor, and military advisors and exported slaves.¹⁹ When surveying the military history of North Africa from the late medieval period onward, it becomes useful to employ the structure of today's countries.

MOROCCO

During the 1400s and 1500s, the Portuguese occupied ports along Morocco's Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts such as Ceuta in 1415, al-Qasr al-Saghir in 1458, Arzila and Tangier in 1471, Safi in 1481, Agadir in 1505, Mogador in 1506, Agouz in 1507, and Mazagan in 1514. Based in these coastal towns, Portuguese expeditions raided hinterland communities. Consequently, the nomadic Muslim Saadian clan, claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad's daughter Fatima, led a series of holy wars to unify Morocco and drive out the Christian Portuguese. The Portuguese enclaves of Agadir, Safi, and Azemmour fell in 1541, and al-Qasr al-Saghir and Arzila succumbed in 1550. The Saadian defeat and killing of the last Berber sultan of Fez in the Battle of Tadla (1554) marked the rise of Muhammad al-Shaikh as the first of ruler of Morocco's Saadian dynasty. The rise of the Saadians, who briefly allied with the Christian Spanish as discussed later, also prevented Morocco from being taken over by the Ottomans from the east.

In 1578, the Portuguese invaded Morocco to secure it from the Ottomans who would interfere with their Atlantic trade. With 500 ships and under the leadership of 24-year-old King Sebastian, the Portuguese landed at Arzila with an army of 18,000 that included 2,000 Spanish volunteers; 3,000 Flemish and German mercenaries; and 600 Italians originally recruited for a proposed invasion of Ireland. They were joined by an army of 6,000 local allies under Abu Abdallah Mohammed II, who claimed the Saadian throne. Sultan Abd Al-Malik rallied a massive army, including 10,000 cavalry, for jihad against the Christian invaders. Since the Ottomans had assisted Al-Malik in attaining the throne, his army included Turkish officers and troops, and was organized along Ottoman lines. When the two forces met at al-Ksar Kebir, they initially exchanged cannon fire and then Al-Malik's cavalry, led by the sultan himself, encircled and overwhelmed the enemy. The Portuguese and their Moroccan allies

suffered 9,000 dead and 16,000 wounded. Almost all Portugal's nobility were killed, including Sebastian, who fell leading a charge. This led to a power vacuum in Portugal, which prompted Spanish intervention. None of the kings who fought this "Battle of the Three Kings" survived, as Abu Abdallah drowned in a river while attempting to flee and victorious Al-Malik perished from illness.

Al-Malik was succeeded by Ahmad al-Mansur, who brought Morocco to the height of its power. Attributing victory at al-Kasr Kebir to Turkish assistance, al-Mansur began a sweeping reform of the Moroccan army. Ironically, he used Turkish methods and advisors to build a stronger military to stave off control by the Ottoman Turks. To expand the use of firearms and artillery by the Moroccan army, al-Mansur brought in mercenaries from Algeria who, despite being called Turks, were usually people of diverse origins who had embraced the Turkish lifestyle and Islam. Turkish military titles and terms were adopted, such as the senior rank of "pasha" and the cavalry designation of "Sipahi." The "Turks" worked as instructors and advisors, and did not control the Moroccan military, which retained distinct regiments for local groups such as Sus and Sharaqa. Other foreign mercenaries, such as Andalusian lancers and European renegades, formed the sultan's guard, were paid before other troops, and were appointed to senior positions. With this powerful army, al-Mansur united Morocco under his authoritarian but efficient rule. In 1591, al-Mansur directed the invasion and conquest of Songhay, a major empire on the south side of the Sahara, to acquire slaves for his army and gain control of the gold trade. The timing of the invasion was determined by the 1588 destruction of the Spanish armada in the English Channel, which reduced the Christian threat from the north. As detailed in Chapter 3, the expense of conquest and continued counterinsurgency meant that control of Songhay was never profitable for Morocco. Following al-Mansur's death in 1603, Morocco fell into civil war between the rival centers of Fez and Marrakesh.

Moroccan unity was re-established in the late 1660s with the rise of Mawlay al-Rashid, founder of the new Alawid dynasty, which came from the interior with a reputation as holy warriors. Rashid built an army by making alliances with Arab groups that had been excluded from power. In 1666, Rashid's army took Fez and killed various faction leaders; in 1668, he destroyed Dila; and in 1669, he massacred dissidents in Marrakesh and built a series of forts to control the country. He also reopened trade between the Mediterranean and

trans-Saharan network, and promoted Muslim scholarship. Unwilling to depend on the allegiance of one group, Mawlay Ismail, who ruled from 1672 to 1727, established a new capital at Miknasa (he did not want to be seen as favoring any of the existing cities) and developed a national army loyal to him. The new army was paid for by taxation and economic extortion of elites. Local warriors were detached from their groups and molded into a regular army based at Fez and Miknasa. This predominantly Arab force was called the Wadaya army after a group that lived around Marrakesh, the old capital, and formed its nucleus. Ismail also established a large army of slave and free black troops that numbered 150,000 by the end of his reign and were encouraged to marry and have children. The boys, from the age of 10, received three years of training in carpentry and other trades, and five years of instruction in riding and military skills. The girls were trained in domestic arts at the royal palace. At age 18, the boys were formally enlisted in the Abid (black) regiments and given wives from among the girls. About 70,000 of these black soldiers were stationed near Miknasa as a reserve. Ismail built a chain of fortifications on the eastern frontier with Algeria and in the Middle Atlas Mountains. Arab troops garrisoned the more remote border forts to keep them away from the center of power, which was defended by black regiments supposedly loyal to the ruler. After crushing a number of Turkish-backed rebellions during the 1670s, Ismail dispatched armed expeditions into Algeria in 1679, 1682, and 1695 to deter the Turks from interfering in Moroccan affairs. Attempting to revive the western trans-Saharan trade that had declined after Morocco's invasion of Songhay, Ismail seized the salt mine at Taghaza in 1694 and sent an expedition to support the Emir of Trarza, in present day Mauritania, in an attack on the French on the Senegal River in 1724. Furthermore, Ismail embarked on a campaign to remove European control of Moroccan ports. He drove the Spanish out of al-Ma'mura in 1681, Larache in 1689, and Arzila in 1691. After a six-year siege, the English abandoned Tangier in 1684. Ismail also sponsored Moroccan piracy against European ships. He owned about half of the pirate ships himself and taxed all pirates to gain about 60 percent of their profits.²⁰

After Ismail's death, the Abid regiments, once a source of stability, became kingmakers and from 1727 to 1757, they deposed seven of his sons. During the 1740s, Mawlay Abdullah used the Arab Wadaya army and Berber allies to exert control over the Abid regiments. With their political decline, many Abid soldiers deserted and returned to

the groups that had once held them in slavery. Coming to power in 1757, Mawlay Sidi Muhammad III brought an army recruited from around Marrakesh, where he had been governor, to the capital and reorganized the Abid soldiers as an elite core. He used this new force to subjugate rebellious elements within the Wadaya army who saw themselves as the center of power and objected to the enlistment of Berbers. At Fez, in 1760, Sidi Muhammad turned the rest of his army on the Wadaya, and many of them were killed. He then reduced the Wadaya to just 1,000 men under new officers and stationed them at the capital. Beginning in 1775, Sidi Muhammad reduced the power of the Abid by dispersing them around the country, which led to a period of rebellion and famine from 1779 to 1782 that reduced Morocco's population from 5 to 3 million. Sidi Muhammad finally broke the Abid by recruiting Arab groups, particularly the Banu Hasan, for the army. After Sidi Muhammad's death in 1790, there was a period of civil war until Mawlay Sulayman came to power in 1798 with the help of Berbers and Abid soldiers. Sulayman continued the policy of recruiting military auxiliaries from the Arabs of the Banu Hasan, Sharaqqa, and Awlad Jamma groups; maintained the Abid at 2,000 troops; and increased the Wadaya to 3,000, which alienated the Berbers and led to a major though ultimately unsuccessful rebellion from 1819 to 1822.²¹

Mawlay Abderrahman, Sulayman's successor, briefly restored state-sponsored piracy to pay for government expenses. This prompted the Austrian naval bombardment of the Atlantic port of Larache in 1828. The French occupation of Algiers in 1830 cut off Morocco from the rest of Muslim North Africa and raised concerns about further European invasions that the deteriorated Moroccan army had no hope of challenging. While Abderrahman sent a Moroccan army into western Algeria in 1830, French threats and British advice caused him to withdraw it in 1832. To secure their strategic position at the Straits of Gibraltar, the British began to diplomatically support Morocco. Abd al-Qadir bin Muhyi al-Din, son of a religious leader, led resistance against the French in western Algeria, established a small state centered at Mascara, and called himself the Moroccan governor of the area. In 1842, the French forced Abd al-Qadir across the Moroccan border, many Moroccans joined his army, and Abderrahman—faced with potential rebellion—permitted him to establish a base of operations. Frustrated by continual raids, the French in 1844 occupied Oujda just inside Morocco and used warships

to bombard Tangier and Essaouira (Mogador). During the only major battle of this Franco-Moroccan War, Sidi Mohammed, the sultan's son, led a 30,000-strong army that was defeated by a French force of 11,000 commanded by Marshall Thomas Robert Bugeaud at the Isly River near Oujda on August 14, 1844. This disaster sparked rebellion within Morocco, and the sultan sued for peace. Under the subsequent Treaty of Tangiers, France abandoned Oujda, and Morocco agreed to what would eventually become its modern border with Algeria. This military embarrassment encouraged rebellion within Morocco.

Recognizing that he had to challenge the French to maintain legitimacy, Abderrahman reformed the Moroccan military using European organization, training, and weapons, and ordered the construction of coastal defenses. However, it proved easier to import European weapons than train Moroccan soldiers. In 1847, rebels led by Abd al-Qadir easily defeated the new army. In October 1859, a minor incident at the Spanish enclave of Ceuta gave a weak government in Madrid an opportunity for foreign success by going to war with Morocco. In what the Spanish would call the War of Africa, it took almost a month to transport the expeditionary force, commanded by Prime Minister Leopoldo O'Donnell, across the 13-kilometer-wide Strait of Gibraltar. By the end of November, it was assembled at Ceuta. It then took another month for the army to advance 33 kilometers from Ceuta to the Moroccan city of Tetuan. The Spanish military culture of emphasizing personal bravery over tactical adaptation caused problems, as just 40 or 50 Moroccans could tie down a Spanish battalion. Gradually, the Spanish began deploying long chains of skirmishers to prevent envelopment by spread-out Moroccan lines and conducted their own flank attacks. In February 1860, the Spanish army took Tetuan, which was the first time in 200 years that Europeans had occupied part of Morocco. During the campaign, more Spanish soldiers were killed by cholera than the enemy, and 38,000 of a total force of 55,000 had been hospitalized. In April, with British mediation, the conflict ended with a treaty that enlarged the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, gave Spain new territory in the south of Morocco, and forced the sultan to pay a large indemnity in return for Spanish withdrawal from Tetuan. Sidi Mohammed IV, who inherited power in 1859, put Morocco into debt to pay the indemnity and continue efforts to westernize the military. Mawlay Hassan, who succeeded his father Sidi Mohammed in 1873, transformed the military from a collection of local contingents to a national standing army. On each major city, he imposed a fixed

levy of conscripts who were enlisted into new regiments. Rifles were imported from Belgium, coastal batteries from Britain and Germany, and field artillery from France. The Moroccan army grew from 3,000 infantry and some artillery in 1869 to 16,000 infantry; 9,000 cavalry; and 1,000 artillery pieces in 1893. Until his death in 1894, Hassan used the army to impose central authority in remote areas and suppress rebellions to the imposition of a new uniform tax system. To maintain diplomatic stability, instructors were imported from Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, and Spain; they worked more for the benefit of their home governments than Morocco. In 1876, British officer Harry MacLean, who adopted an Arab-style uniform and learned Arabic, was appointed chief instructor, provoking the French to insist that their mission under Jules Erckman take over artillery training. As a result, the late nineteenth century Moroccan army, though expensive, was ill disciplined, fragmented, and ineffective.²²

ALGERIA

In 1510, the Spanish, conquering enclaves along the North African coast, seized the island of Penon just off Algiers, where they intimidated local rulers and built fortifications. In 1516, the Greek-Turkish pirate leader Uruj and his brothers captured Algiers and repelled two Spanish naval expeditions sent to retake it. After Uruj was killed fighting the Spanish in 1518, his brother Khayr al-Din took command of the pirates and invited assistance from the Ottoman Empire. Local forces led by religious leader Ahmad bin al-Qadi occupied Algiers from 1520 to 1525, when Khayr al-Din recaptured the city and gained Ottoman recognition. Algiers quickly became a major naval base with a sizable fleet that the Ottomans considered their western navy and engaged primarily in piracy against Spanish and other vessels from Christian countries. With local rulers acknowledging the supremacy of Khayr al-Din and the Ottomans, Algiers developed into the capital of a semiautonomous coastal province that stretched from Mostaghane in the west to Jijel in the east. In 1533, Khayr al-Din visited Istanbul, where he was appointed admiral of the Ottoman fleet and ordered to take Tunis from the ruling Hafsid family, which he did the following year. Since ships based at Tunis could easily block shipping between North Africa and Sicily, the Spanish, in 1535, sent 300 ships and 30,000 men to occupy that port, which Khayr al-Din quickly abandoned. From 1536 to 1544, Khayr al-Din commanded the

Ottoman fleet, which was allied with the French, in a Mediterranean naval campaign against the Spanish. Algiers became the main Ottoman base of operations against Christian Spanish forces in the western Mediterranean. In October 1541, a massive Spanish expedition landed at Algiers. It consisted of 500 ships; 24,000 soldiers; and 12,000 marines. It was personally led by Emperor Charles V and included conqueror of Mexico Hernan Cortes. However, bad weather, which the Spanish had hoped would prevent the intervention of the Ottoman navy, and local resistance led to the loss of a third of the Spanish fleet. Charles, who almost lost his life in the fighting, ordered a withdrawal after just three days. In July 1542, Hasan Agha, governor of Algiers, ordered a retaliatory attack on the Spanish enclave of Oran to the west. During the 1530s and 1540s, the Spanish and Ottomans fought over the interior town of Tlemcen in the west near the modern border with Morocco. After the Spanish failed to capture the western port of Mostaghanem in 1543 and 1547, Oran became an isolated and besieged outpost, and Tlemcen fell under Ottoman control. Although an army from Morocco captured Tlemcen in 1551, it was quickly expelled by Ottoman Janissaries and local allies. The Ottoman occupation of Fez in 1554, capture of Bijaya from the Spanish in 1555, and siege of Oran in 1556 motivated a Moroccan-Spanish alliance against Ottoman Algiers. In 1556, the Moroccans occupied Tlemcen, which led to an indecisive battle with Ottoman forces in 1558 after which both sides withdrew. In August 1558, a Spanish expedition of 11,000 men landed at Oran and then attacked Mostaghanem, where they were repulsed. With an Ottoman army approaching overland from the east and local forces closing in from all sides, the poorly supplied Spanish began to withdraw on August 25, but the landing of another Ottoman force on the coast the next day meant that they were surrounded. Half of the Spanish, including their commander Count Alcaudete who had led Spanish forces in the region since the 1530s, were killed; the other half were taken to Algiers as captives. This effectively ended the Moroccan-Spanish alliance against Algiers; in 1580, the Spaniards and Ottomans agreed to refrain from attacking each other's territories.

The Ottoman soldiers in Algeria were recruited almost entirely from Anatolia and retained their distinctively Turkish character. While the progeny of Turkish troops and Algerian women, called *kulughlis*, were also recruited into the Janissary corps and given important positions, local Algerians were excluded until the early nineteenth century.

The number of Janissaries in Algeria remained relatively small and gradually declined, with 12,000 in the 1600s; 7,000 in the 1700s; and 4000 at the beginning of the 1800s. Compared to local forces, the Janissaries possessed superior military skills (particularly with firearms), discipline, and unity. Another element of the Ottoman military in Algeria was ethnically mixed sailors that included adventurers from around the Mediterranean and Christian captives who converted to Islam. In Ottoman Algeria, the state gained wealth and religious prestige by monopolizing piracy. This was different than in Ottoman Tunisia, where pirates equipped their own vessels. The legendary military heroes of Ottoman Algeria were pirate captains such as Murad of the 1580s and Hamidu of the turn of the nineteenth century, who staged daring attacks on Christian ships and brought significant prizes back to Algiers. In 1659, the commander of the Janissaries seized power in a military coup with the excuse that the Ottoman governors (pashas) were corrupt and undermined the state's relations with European powers. Following the destruction of seven of Algiers's best ships by an English squadron under Sir Edward Spragge, the pirate captains led a rebellion in 1671 that overthrew the Janissary commanders and placed a military officer with the title of dey in power. Istanbul continued to send governors to Algiers, but they were powerless figureheads and in 1711, the title of pasha was bestowed upon the dey. Algeria became a military republic under the nominal authority of the Ottoman Empire. A political-military hierarchy developed in which the dey, although a military officer, was detached from the military, the first in the line of succession was the treasurer who had been the head of the military, and the second in the line of succession was the head of the army and administrator of the capital. Progressing through these positions gave military officers experience of civilian administrative before taking up the top position. The other key officers of state were the commander of cavalry, the commander of marines, and four senior secretaries. A military council, which theoretically held supreme political authority, existed but after the 1671 rebellion had little real power. While the regime of the deys controlled the towns where they were supported by military garrisons, the countryside was dominated by local rulers and religious leaders who accepted the nominal supremacy of Algiers. The dey retained the allegiance of certain rural groups by granting them tax exemptions and then using them as auxiliary forces to help the military governors and regular army collect tax.

Barred from Christian Mediterranean ports during the 1600s and much of the 1700s, Muslim North Africans did not develop much of a merchant fleet and continued to rely on piracy. In Ottoman Algeria, ships and weapons captured by pirates became state property, prisoners and loot were sold, and the wealth was shared among the pirates who had taken them. Inhabitants of Algiers bought captives and ransomed them, they traded in stolen goods, and the dey gained protection money from European powers seeking to avoid pirate attacks. However, by the mid-1700s, Algeria began to decline as a naval power. In the early 1600s, Algiers had around 75 ships; but by the mid-1700s, there were less than 20, which meant that European powers were less willing to pay the deys for protection. In 1770, Spain initiated a war against Algeria to liberate 10,000 Spanish captives, among a total of 18,000, held in Algiers. In July 1775, a Spanish expedition of 48 ships and 20,000 men under Irish mercenary Alexander O'Reilly attempted to seize Algiers but was repelled by a large army that had been recruited from the interior, as Muslim merchants had forewarned of the coming attack. The conflict stalemated and resulted in a 1785 treaty that facilitated prisoner exchange and the withdrawal of the Spanish from Oran in 1792. In 1785, Algerian pirates captured a schooner from Boston off the coast of Portugal and since the newly independent United States had no navy at the time, it paid protection to the deys. During the early 1800s, with Europe preoccupied by the Napoleonic wars, Algerian pirate activity temporarily increased with the famous Hamidu capturing, in 1802, a Portuguese brig with 44 cannons and 282 crewmen. The expulsion of American ships from the Mediterranean by the British navy during the war of 1812 prompted the Algerians to resume attacks on American vessels and declare war on the United States for failure to pay tribute. As a result, in 1815, a U.S. naval squadron of 10 ships under Commodore Stephen Decatur Jr. sailed to Algiers and along the way captured two Algerian vessels. During subsequent negotiations, prisoners were exchanged, the Americans surrendered the captured vessels, and the Algerians paid \$10,000 in compensation and promised the United States full shipping rights without payment. However, upon the departure of the American vessels, Dey Omar bin Muhammad repudiated the agreement. In 1816, a combined British and Dutch naval squadron under Viscount Exmouth bombarded Algiers, which forced the dey to agree to a prohibition on taking Christian captives and the repayment of ransoms. Following this Second Barbary War (see below for the first),

there was no warfare between European powers in the Mediterranean, which allowed them to unite against North African piracy. Loss of income from piracy meant that the deys increased taxes, which led to a series of rebellions across the country that were often led by the Sufi brotherhood, adherents of a mystical form of Islam, in the 1770s and early 1800s. Demoralized by years of counterinsurgency and economic decline, in Algiers in 1805, Turkish soldiers massacred 200 Jews that they blamed for exporting wheat during famine and assassinated seven deys between 1805 and 1816. Ottoman Algeria became destabilized and vulnerable to foreign invasion.²³

In mid-June 1830, a French expedition of 34,000 troops that was transported by 600 ships and led by Marshall Louis-Auguste-Victor Count de Ghaisnes de Bourmont landed near Algiers and fought a three-week campaign that used superior artillery and organization to defeat an Algerian force of 7,000 Janissaries; 19,000 Algerian soldiers; and 17,000 Berber auxiliaries. In early July, the dey surrendered, the French occupied and plundered Algiers, and the Janissaries embarked for Turkey. The French invaded Algeria because monarchists sought to glorify the royal army, King Charles X desired a military victory to undermine antimonarchist liberals, and merchants wanted access to Algerian trade. Despite the successful conquest, the liberal opposition won the elections, forcing Charles to abdicate. Although Bourmont wanted to lead his men home to restore the king, the lower ranks were unwilling to cooperate. The new government in Paris decided to retain control of Algiers to suppress piracy and slavery. During the 1830s, the French exercised "limited occupation" of Algeria, meaning that they occupied the main towns and relied on local or Ottoman rulers to govern the rest of the country. This policy failed because of local resistance and the ambitions of French settlers. In the mid-1830s, a garrison of 6,000 French troops was stationed at Blida. To the east, the quasi-independent Ottoman ruler of Constantine, Ahmad Bey, became a symbol of Muslim defiance. In November 1836, a French expedition led by Marshall Bertrand Clausel, who was denied reinforcements by the French government, advanced on Constantine but encountered such distress, including snowstorms, that some soldiers committed suicide. After two failed attacks on the city, the French force retreated, forsaking its baggage and wounded. In July 1837, an attempt by the Ottoman navy to relieve Constantine was blocked by a French squadron. In October of that year, the French captured Constantine and Ahmad Bey fled into the desert. To the west,

Abd al-Qadir appealed to the sultan of Morocco for assistance and built a standing army of some 10,000 men supplemented by auxiliaries from various groups. These traditional forces were better suited for surprise attacks than sustained warfare.

Resistance led by Muslim scholar Abd al-Qadir, including his 1839 advance on Algiers, prompted the French to assume total occupation. During the 1840s, the French army under Bugeaud destroyed villages, seized cattle, burned fields, cut down trees, and sometimes burned Muslims who had taken shelter in caves and offered to surrender. A determined French campaign drove al-Qadir into Morocco in November 1843. A rebellion against the French in Dahra in 1846 provided al-Qadir with an opportunity to return to Algeria, but he was quickly driven back to Morocco. The strengthening of French forces along the border prevented another return. Defying orders from the French government, Bugeaud, in May and June 1847, led an expedition into Grand Kabylia that destroyed villages, looted markets, and subjugated six local rulers. He took full responsibility for the operation and then resigned. Embroiled in conflict with the Moroccan sultan, al-Qadir surrendered to the French in December 1847 and despite promising to give him safe passage to Egypt or Palestine, they held him until 1852. Bugeaud believed that only the army could effectively govern Algeria and that the country should be settled by military veterans who could better protect themselves. As a result, he clashed with French civilian settlers, numbering around 109,000 in 1847, who wanted freedom from military control, access to new land, and the extension of French political rights to themselves. With the French revolution of 1848, the settlers gained the right to elect representatives to the Chamber of Deputies, Algeria was placed under the direct control of civilians in Paris, and it was declared French territory. A dual administration was created in which the settlers had a French civilian system and Muslims were governed by the French military. Considered French subjects but not French citizens, Muslims lost land to settlers, and Muslim leaders were usurped or co-opted. This led to a series of Muslim rebellions from the late 1840s to the mid-1860s, that were brutally suppressed. French defeat against the Prussians in 1870 and 1871 led to the supremacy of civilian settlers in Algeria and another series of Muslim rebellions.²⁴

French military units formed in Algeria during the conquest period quickly became a mainstay of the entire French Army. In 1831, the French organized indigenous Algerian light cavalry units under the

Ottoman term “Spahi” and several infantry battalions of Zuwawa Berbers called Zouaves. The French broadened the recruitment of indigenous light infantry (Tirailleurs) in 1841, and there were three such regiments by the mid-1850s. With the formation of the Arab and Berber Tirailleurs, the Zouave units were transformed into elite European infantry with a distinctive Turkish-style uniform, and by the 1870s, they were made up of local French settler conscripts. Formed in the 1830s, the Chasseurs a’Afrique (Huntsmen of Africa) were European light cavalry that also became dominated by French settler conscripts. In 1873, the indigenous Spahi and Tirailleur, and settler Chasseur and Zouave units in Algeria (and later Tunisia and Morocco) were organized into the new 19th Army Corps (Army of Africa), which was separate from colonial forces serving in other parts of Africa and Asia. These North African soldiers participated in all France’s major military campaigns, including the Crimean War (1853–1856), the Franco-Austrian War (1859), the French intervention in Mexico (1860s), the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), many colonial conflicts in Africa and Asia, and the world wars. Following later French colonial conquest, similar Spahi, Tirailleur, and Zouave units were formed in Tunisia in the 1880s. Spahi, Tirailleur, and Goumier (indigenous mountain troops) units were formed in Morocco during the early twentieth century.²⁵

TUNISIA

In 1535, the Spanish occupied Tunis to prop up the failing local Hafsid dynasty, which was threatened by another chiefly family in the south of present-day Tunisia and the Ottomans in Algiers. The authority of the Hafsid sultans in the north depended entirely on the presence of the Spanish garrison. After their navy was destroyed at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, the Ottomans quickly rebuilt a fleet of 200 vessels to counter European supremacy in the Mediterranean. An Ottoman fleet commanded by Grand Visier Sinan Pasha sailed to Tunis and seized the fortified Spanish position at Halq al-Wadi in August 1574. Before leaving, Sinan Pasha organized a new administration under an Ottoman-appointed pasha and a military commander called a bey who was responsible for maintaining control of the interior and collecting taxes. The Ottomans stationed 4,000 Janissaries in Tunis divided into units of 100 under junior officers called deys. Initially, Ottoman Tunis was governed by a council of senior Ottoman military

officers and local elites. However, in 1591, the Ottoman soldiers rebelled because of mistreatment by their senior officers (several of whom were killed) and imposed a new administration in which the deys appointed one of themselves to control law and order in the capital and command the military. The pasha sent from Istanbul became a figurehead. During the early 1600s, the deys gained control of the rebellious military, built a new fortress and barracks in Tunis, and extended their rule over parts of the south that had been in revolt for a century. With a fleet of 17 ships and several brigantines, piracy became their main source of revenue. Maintaining their legitimacy through an ideological link with Istanbul, the deys of Tunis made the Ottoman soldiers of fortune of Turkish or Mediterranean Christian origin into a self-perpetuating ruling caste. The limited military strength assigned to the bey meant that he had to recruit local soldiers to control and tax the interior.

In the late 1600s, Tunisia was divided between the deys of Tunis who symbolized foreign rule and the bey of the interior, a position dominated by the Murad family, who came to represent local Tunisian identity. In 1705, Husayn bin Ali, the new bey of mixed Greek-Turkish and local origin, organized the entire male population of Tunis and the indigenous warriors of the interior to defeat an invasion from Algiers. Gathering a large indigenous army, he then seized Tunis from the dey Muhammad al-Asfar, who was unable to pay soldiers without taxes from the interior. Husayn established a new quasi-national ruling dynasty, the Husaynids, which would remain in power until 1957. During the 1700s, the office of dey was downgraded to police chief of the capital and although the Turkish soldiers no longer constituted a ruling caste, they remained at the center of the military. A new regular army was created that, by the late 1700s, numbered 5,000 Turks and kulughlis, and 3,000 Algerian Zuwawa (Zouave) cavalry. The beys used Turkish troops to collect taxes and assert control over remote areas. Local support was fostered by appointing indigenous elites and religious leaders to important administrative positions. During civil wars in the 1730s and 1740s, Ali Bey I, a nephew of Husayn, came to power. He disbanded the kulughlis section of the army because it had supported his uncle in a failed bid for power, recruited more Turkish soldiers, and restored the authority of their officers.

With the support of an Algerian army that looted Tunis, Husayn's sons seized control in 1756 and built a strong dynasty based on agriculture and commerce, support of religious leaders, and a disciplined

Turkish military. Although remaining nominally part of the Ottoman Empire, Husaynid Tunisia functioned as an independent state and did not send tribute to Istanbul. Tunisian ships participated in Ottoman wars in the east, but this was motivated by Muslim solidarity and not political subservience. During the reign of Hammuda Bey (1782–1814), Tunisia became a Mediterranean power by using the threat of piracy to force European countries to pay tribute. Hammuda increased the number of Turkish soldiers, cultivated close relations with their officers, and tried to reduce their contact with local Tunisians. A sense of Turkish nationalism among the soldiers was encouraged by the use of Turkish language, not Arabic, in the military, including inscriptions at the gateways to forts and barracks. Beginning in 1806, Turkish soldiers were given free rations instead of having to buy their own. However, following a rebellion by Turkish troops in 1811, Hammuda expanded the army's Zuwawa contingent. In the first decade of the nineteenth century, Tunisian attempts to reduce Algerian economic exploitation resulted in conflict. The Tunisian army besieged Constantine in January 1807 but was driven off in May. The Algerians invaded by land in July 1807 and June 1808 and by sea in 1811 but were consistently repulsed.

After the death of Hammuda in 1815, Tunisia became destabilized by conflicts within the ruling family and increasing European intrusion. In 1830, the French signed a treaty with Husayn Bey in which he undertook to suppress piracy, which led to Tunisian support for the French invasion of Algeria. The Tunisians, aspiring to gain Algerian territory, sold cattle to the French army and prevented the sale of gunpowder to the Algerians. Tunisia tried to balance the French colonial presence in Algeria to the west against a resurgent Ottoman presence in Libya to the east. During the 1830s, the Tunisian army's elite troops were placed under French instructors, and French warships visited Halq al-Wadi. In 1836, nine Tunisian merchant ships carried soldiers to Tripoli to participate in the Ottoman intervention, and in the mid-1850s, Ahmed Bey sold his royal jewels to equip a 4,000-man contingent to join the Ottoman army in the Crimean War. Coming to power in 1837, Ahmed founded a military academy at Bardo and built a larger and more professional military of 26,000 men that was primarily loyal to Tunis rather than Istanbul. However, military reforms, an ambitious building program, and the failure of a new tax system put the country into considerable debt to the Europeans who were increasingly involved in its economy. In

1871, European countries recognized Tunisia as an Ottoman province as France was weakened by losing a war to Prussia and Britain wanted to limit French control in North Africa.²⁶

LIBYA

In 1510, the Spanish under Pedro Navarro seized Tripoli, built a fortified Christian settlement, and expelled the Muslim population. Tripoli became a Spanish coastal enclave surrounded by hostile Arab groups. In 1535, it was occupied by the Knights of Saint John, an order of Christian crusaders that had evolved into a Mediterranean navy based in Malta. Like the Spanish, the knights were also surrounded by Muslim enemies and to make matters worse, in 1531, expanding Ottoman forces had taken Tajura just 20 kilometers east. In 1536, the Ottomans besieged Tripoli but withdrew because of an outbreak of plague. Since the knights' pleas for assistance from European Christian powers were ignored, an Ottoman fleet seized Tripoli in 1551. Tripoli became the capital of an Ottoman province and an important base for Mediterranean piracy. In 1558 Dragut, a pirate captain and Ottoman governor of Tripoli, directed a fleet that sacked the Italian town of Reggio on the Straits of Messina and took most of the inhabitants as slaves. This provoked the Spanish to send an expedition to seize Tripoli, but it was destroyed at nearby Jirba Island. Around the same time Dragut, who was killed in an Ottoman attack on the knights in Malta in 1565, used the firearms and cannons of Ottoman troops to subjugate hinterland communities who then paid tribute to Tripoli, though they were left to govern themselves. While Tripoli was ruled by a series of pashas sent from Istanbul who were assisted by a military council, the most powerful position was the bey, who commanded the Janissary contingent. In the late 1500s and early 1600s, inland rebels under Yahya al-Suwaydi seized the coastal towns of Misurata and Tajura and besieged Tripoli but were defeated when the Ottomans recruited another local group to attack them. Shortly after taking Tripoli, the Ottomans began to exert control over the trans-Sahara trade, which prompted them, in 1577, to send a military expedition south to the Fezzan region of the Sahara. Though this expedition failed to conquer the local Banu Mohammad group, it did force them to pay tribute in gold and slaves. Although the Ottomans in Tripoli rejected a request for military assistance from Idris Aloma, ruler of sub-Saharan Borno, Turkish mercenary musketeers ventured south to work for him.

In 1711, Ahmad Qaramanli, leader of kulughli cavalry, staged a coup in Tripoli when the pasha was visiting Istanbul. He had 300 Janissary officers killed, appointed his son as military commander (bey), and was recognized by the Ottomans as head of a quasi-nationalist dynasty under their nominal authority. Ahmad Qaramanli made kulughlis the core of his army and used their skill with firearms to suppress local groups that were also incorporated into the military. He sponsored pirates to gain wealth and international Muslim prestige, and avoided involvement with European powers. In 1716, 1717, and 1731, Ahmad sent expeditions south to impose his direct authority over Fezzan. Under Ali Pasha, Ahmad's grandson who ruled from 1754 to 1793, pirate captains were publically feted as national heroes, and European countries paid to secure the safety of their merchants. During a conflict between rival members of the Qaramanli family, the Ottoman Empire attempted to regain control of Tripoli in 1793 by authorizing Ali Burghul, a former marine captain in Algiers, to take 300 Turkish, Greek, and Spanish mercenaries by ship to seize the port. Ali Burghul looted Tripoli and extorted money from its Jewish community, which was threatened with annihilation. Concerned about potential Ottoman intervention in the area, Tunisia intervened by landing 4,000 soldiers to take Jirba Island from a contingent of Burghul's men and send an army overland to link up with Libyan groups and seize Tripoli in January 1795. The Tunisians installed Ahmad Qaramanli as pasha of Tripoli and his brother, Yusuf, as military commander.

Within a few months, Yusuf seized power and during his reign (1795–1832), the Libyan fleet was rebuilt. In addition, the threat of piracy and hostage-taking was used to extort money from Christian countries such as the United States, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, and Naples that lacked the naval strength in the region to protect their merchant vessels. In 1797, Istanbul recognized Yusuf by sending him a gift of two warships and by 1805, the Libyan fleet consisted of 24 warships that were mostly captured vessels converted with naval equipment and weapons obtained through ransoms. Many of Tripoli's pirates were actually European renegades and Turkish mercenaries such as Scotsman Peter Leslie, also known as Murad Ra'is, who in 1795 was appointed admiral of the navy. In May 1801, Yusuf declared war on the United States because it had delayed the payment of ransom for a U.S. ship captured a few years earlier. The U.S. Navy then blockaded Tripoli and began plotting with Ahmad

Qaramanli, exiled in Tunis, to muster an army that would restore him as pasha. However, the blockade proved ineffective as the pirates, in 1803, were able to capture the USS *Philadelphia*, the largest U.S. ship involved, along with its 307-man crew. Furthermore, Yusuf's army, with local auxiliaries, besieged the port of Darna, where Ahmad was raising his force. Ahmad's army that had initially occupied Darna had included a small contingent of eight U.S. Marines, who were the first to fly a U.S. flag over foreign soil. In 1804, Stephen Decatur, then a naval lieutenant, led a party of marines in a captured ketch that burned the *Philadelphia*, thereby denying it for the enemy. Marine participation in the conflict led to the inclusion of the line "from the shores of Tripoli" in the Marine Hymn and the tradition of Marine officers carrying a "Mamluk sword." The Americans made a treaty with Yusuf in which they agreed to withdraw from Darna; pay a \$60,000 ransom for captured sailors; and release Libyan prisoners. Victory in this "first Barbary war" enhanced Yusuf's international standing and internal legitimacy. Yusuf reorganized and expanded the army which, by 1802, had 1,500 Turkish infantry and 12,000 local cavalry and could call on a host of local auxiliaries. Yusuf exerted more direct rule over the eastern Cyrenaica region and the southern area between Sirte and Fezzan. In 1811, Yusuf's army captured the Fezzan capital of Murzug and replaced the Banu Muhammad dynasty with Yusuf's son Muhammad al-Mukri, who funnelled trans-Saharan trade straight to Tripoli.

Having driven the French out of Malta in 1800 and Egypt in 1801, the British became the primary Mediterranean naval power and, as such, Yusuf maintained good relations with them. However, after 1810, the British began to interfere with Yusuf's sources of revenue. They ended his monopoly on selling livestock to the Royal Navy in Malta, sold "passes" that guaranteed protection from pirates to ships of other countries, and in 1816, British warships under Lord Exmouth visited Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli and forced local rulers to sign treaties that banned piracy and freed hostages. Piracy ended after the 1818 Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in which European countries agreed to pressure North African rulers to stop the practice and French ships joined the British in patrolling the Mediterranean. In 1817, on the request of Muhammad al-Kanemi who was leading Borno resistance against Fulani jihads (see Chapter 2), a Libyan military expedition from Murzug led by Muhammad al-Mukri raided Baghirimi and returned with considerable loot, including many slaves. When Yusuf received 1,300 of these slaves as tribute, he began to think that

controlling Borno would enable him to expand the slave trade as a way of replacing revenue formerly gained through piracy. However, Yusuf did not have enough money to raise the necessary invasion force and the British government, keenly aware of anti-slave trade sentiment at home, turned down his request for a loan. In 1820 and 1821, another Libyan army from Murzug supported al-Kanemi's forces in defeating Baghirimi and returned with 6,000 captured camels and the same number of slaves. The expense of sending two ships to help the Ottomans in Greece that same year and British rejection of another loan request in 1824 contributed to Yusuf abandoning his plan to conquer Borno. Consequently, in 1825, Yusuf rebuilt the Libyan fleet and returned to using piracy to extort money from European countries with which he did not have treaties. This proved futile as in August 1830, a French squadron commanded by Admiral Claude Charles Marie du Campe de Rosamel arrived at Tripoli and forced Yusuf to sign a treaty in which he agreed not to assist forces resisting the French occupation of Algiers, to curb piracy, and to limit the size of the Libyan fleet. In the early 1830s, French and British demands that Yusuf repay debts prompted him to impose a special levy on the population, which led to rebellion. After Yusuf's 1832 abdication, the British and French sponsored rival Qaramanli claimants to power. In 1835, an Ottoman fleet commanded by Tahir Pasha landed an army at Tripoli that, after showing off its artillery to the inhabitants, deposed the Qaramanli dynasty without resistance. Though it was an isolated outpost in their declining empire, Libya was once again under direct Ottoman rule. Since locals resisted the Ottomans, who they regarded as foreign occupiers, Ottoman authority did not extend much beyond towns, including Murzug in the south, garrisoned by Turkish troops. With the abolition of the slave trade in Tunisia in 1846 and Algeria in 1848 given British pressure, slave exports from Tripoli to the Ottoman Middle East increased and continued after Istanbul ordered them stopped in 1857 and slavery was ended in Turkey in 1889.²⁷

EGYPT

After the Portuguese took the Indian port of Diu in 1535, the ruler of Gujarat appealed to the Ottomans for assistance, and the governor of Egypt was delegated to send a fleet into the Indian Ocean. In 1538, an Ottoman fleet from Egypt seized Aden in southern Yemen, but lack of assistance from a new Gujarati ruler meant that they besieged Diu

for just 20 days before returning home. To counter the Portuguese who entered the Red Sea in 1540 and 1541, the Ottomans seized the East African port of Massawa in 1557. Between 1517 and 1550—the exact date is uncertain—Ottoman Egypt pushed south into Nubia, where they occupied Sai Island and Qasr Ibrim. Hungarian troops in Ottoman service were stationed at various posts along the Nubian Nile where, through intermarriage, their descendants became indistinguishable from Nubians, though they were still referred to as Bosnians or Magyars. The Ottomans had ancient Nubian structures torn down to use the stone for building forts. During the 1560s, Ottoman forces from Egypt were involved in grueling mountain warfare against firearm-equipped Shi'ite rebels in Yemen. In 1630, an 8,000-strong Ottoman-led force from Egypt landed in Yemen to put down another rebellion but was compelled to withdraw six years later. In the Egyptian countryside, the dominant Sipahi cavalry conflicted with the Ottoman governor over the right to tax Egyptian peasants. This led to a Sipahi revolt in 1604 that was suppressed by a new governor, Muhammad Pasha, who rallied the rest of the army and Bedouin allies. Some 4,000 captured Sipahi rebels were sent to Yemen, where they would fight as “expendables.” In the mid-1600s, the Egyptian military split into two factions—the Faqaris associated with Ottoman interests, and the Qasimi identified with Mamluks. Antagonism between these two groups dominated Egyptian politics between 1640 and 1730, leading to a series of plots and assassinations that diminished the authority of the Ottoman governors.

In 1760, Ali Bey al-Kabir, head of the Mamluks in the Egyptian army, led a Mamluk rebellion against Ottoman rule. By recruiting foreign mercenaries and local allies such as the Bedouin, al-Kabir expanded his army to 25,000 and dispatched expeditions against the Ottomans in Arabia, Palestine, and Syria. Rejecting traditional Mamluk military arrogance, al-Kabir imported European artillery experts and opened Egyptian ports to Western trade. Mamluk ranks were expanded through incorporation of prisoners from the Russian-Ottoman War of 1768 to 1773. In 1773, al-Kabir was deposed and killed by his Mamluk son-in-law Muhammad Abu al-Dhahab, who sent another expedition against the Ottomans in Palestine and Syria. When the new Mamluk leader died in 1775 while on campaign in Syria, his army—which included two English artillery advisors—returned to Egypt. In 1786, an Ottoman fleet under Admiral Ghazi Hassan landed a largely Muslim Albanian expeditionary force at Alexandria.

The Ottomans defeated the Mamluk leaders Murad and Ibrahim at al-Rahmaniya in the Nile Delta. Ghazi Hassan imposed administrative reforms that weakened the Mamluks, restricted their access to slave markets where they acquired manpower, and reintroduced constraints on Christians and Jews that had been lifted by al-Kabir. Gazi Hassan launched attacks against the Mamluk strongholds in southern Egypt, which caused Murad and Ibrahim to withdraw their forces into Nubia. After Ghazi Hassan was recalled by Istanbul in 1787 to help with a war against Russia and his successor died in 1791, Murad and Ibrahim regained control of Egypt.

Inspired by the ancient exploits of Alexander the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, a leading general in revolutionary France, convinced his superiors that the occupation of Egypt would protect French trade and cut Britain off from access to India via the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. That this would lead to a French conflict with the Ottoman Empire seemed of little concern. On July 1, 1798, the French landed near Alexandria. Although the weakly defended city was easily captured, harassment by local snipers incited the French to massacre civilians. Napoleon issued a statement saying that he was not against Islam and vainly appealed to embryonic Egyptian nationalism by emphasizing the Eurasian roots of the ruling Mamluks. On July 21, on their march toward Cairo and about 15 kilometers from the pyramids, the 25,000-strong French army was confronted by a Mamluk force of 21,000 that was led by Murad and Ibrahim. At this "Battle of the Pyramids," the French advanced with each of their five divisions formed into large hollow infantry squares with cavalry and supplies in the center of each. Charging the French squares, the Mamluk cavalry were cut down by close-range musket and cannon fire. Many fleeing Mamluks drowned trying to swim across the Nile. While the French lost 29 men, about 3,000 Mamluk horsemen and an unknown number of infantry were killed. Murad led some survivors south, where he conducted a guerrilla campaign against the pursuing French for about a year until he capitulated. Napoleon entered Cairo a few days after the Battle of the Pyramids and personally commanded a force that drove Ibrahim's Mamluks out of Egypt and into Syria. At the beginning of August, the British fleet under Admiral Horatio Nelson finally discovered the hitherto elusive French ships on the Egyptian coast. At the "Battle of the Nile," half of Nelson's ships slipped between the French vessels and the shore, which meant the British could attack them from both sides. Eleven out of 13 French line

ships and 2 out of 4 frigates were captured or destroyed, and the remaining vessels fled. The French expeditionary force was now stranded in Egypt.

Although Napoleon established an administration and attempted to conciliate the Egyptian people, the levies he imposed to support his army and hatred of foreign occupiers motivated hit-and-run attacks against the French. Compensating for lack of reinforcements from France, Napoleon pressed 16- to 24-year-old slaves into military service and transformed 3,000 French sailors into marines. In October, Napoleon put down a major rebellion in Cairo and ordered French cannons to fire on the Great Mosque, which had been fortified by insurgents. Upon learning of the French naval defeat, the Ottomans initiated a two-pronged offensive against the French in Egypt. Under the command of Jezzar Pasha, a force of 30,000 set out from Syria to approach Egypt overland. Another Ottoman contingent under Mustafa Pasha, 8,000 men based on the island of Rhodes, would be landed on the Egyptian coast. In January 1799, Napoleon led a 13,000-strong army into Syria in the hope of defeating the Ottomans there before the arrival of the seaborne contingent. After capturing several fortified towns along the coast, including Jaffa where 4,000 prisoners were executed, the French failed to capture Acre after repeated assaults and returned to Egypt in May. Napoleon arrived in Cairo having lost 1,200 men in battle and 600 to plague, and there were about 1,800 wounded. In July 1799, Mustafa's expeditionary force landed near Alexandria and established a fortified beachhead. The French attacked quickly, overwhelmed the first line of incomplete defenses, and used a cavalry attack to penetrate the second line. The French cavalry commander Joachim Murat personally captured Mustafa in his tent and severed two of his fingers with a sabre. Many Ottomans drowned trying to swim to the safety of British warships. At this Battle of Abukir, the Ottomans suffered around 8,000 casualties and the French 1,000. In August, Napoleon returned to France, where he plotted to seize power. His successor, General Jean Baptiste Kleber, led the French to victory over a 30,000-strong Ottoman amphibious force at the Battle of Heliopolis in March 1800 and suppressed a rebellion in Cairo. Kleber was assassinated by a Syrian student in June 1800. In August 1801, the French, continuously harassed by Anglo-Ottoman forces and suffering disease, surrendered to the British and under agreed terms were returned home on British ships.²⁸

Among the Ottoman force that reoccupied Egypt after the 1801 French withdrawal was Muhammad Ali, who had been born in Macedonia and was second in command of an Albanian unit. In subsequent violence between Ottomans and Mamluks, Muhammad Ali and his Albanian troops supported both sides and built a power base among Egyptian elites. In 1805, after directing the two-month siege of the city of Minya that ended in the total collapse of the Mamluks, he was appointed viceroy and initiated reforms that would transform Egypt into a modern state with a professional civil service and army. He abolished the system in which Mamluk leaders raised and controlled contingents for the army in return for which they received landed estates where they taxed peasants. Muhammad Ali took over the estates, and peasants paid taxes directly to the central government and were subject to military conscription. All goods had to be first sold to the state, which sold them again for profit. Concerned about the possibility of another French occupation of Egypt and committed to supporting the Mamluks, the British, in March 1807, landed a 5,300-man expeditionary force at Alexandria, which was captured after a four-day battle. Subsequent British attempts to take the Nile Delta met with determined Egyptian resistance. Entering the port of Rosetta, a British force under Major General Patrick Wauchope occupied an apparently empty town, but suddenly Egyptian defenders opened fire from upper-story windows, killing 185 (including the general). Although Muhammad Ali realized he could not drive the British out of Alexandria and offered them grain for their army, generous trading rights, and access to India, the British continued the war. The failure of another British attempt to take Rosetta in April, when thousands of Turks and Albanians were landed by boat and slaughtered a British-led Swiss-German regiment, and the signing of a treaty between France and Russia prompted a British withdrawal from Egypt in September. Among the 50 British prisoners left behind because they had converted to Islam was a Scot named Thomas Keith who took the name Ibrahim Agha and eventually became an accomplished cavalry commander under Tussun, Muhammad Ali's son, and was killed fighting in Arabia.

The Mamluks rebelled in 1810 and were once again defeated by the viceroy at the Battle of the Bridge of al-Lahun. In 1811, Muhammad Ali invited Mamluk leaders to a celebration in the Cairo Citadel during which they were trapped and killed. In the 1810s the viceroy, on behalf of the Ottoman Empire, sent several military expeditions to

Arabia, where they attempted to suppress rebellion by the Saud family recently converted to a new Muslim purification movement called Wahabbism. Muhammed Ali sent Albanian soldiers to Arabia as expendable troops and replaced them with more disciplined Egyptian soldiers of a new army. The Arabian expeditions, requiring the projection of power across the Red Sea, also prompted the re-creation of an Egyptian navy, which was difficult considering the country had almost no wood to build ships. Importing materials from other Mediterranean countries, Egyptian ships were built at Alexandria and carried in pieces overland to the port of Suez at the top of the Red Sea. The Egyptians built two types of warships—a 200-ton corvette with 50 guns that could be stripped down to serve as a floating mortar platform for bombarding coastal fortifications and a smaller brig with 20 guns. The pasha of Tripoli donated some obsolete slave-rowed galleys that proved more maneuverable than the new vessels.

In 1811, an Egyptian force of 15,000 infantry landed at the Arabian port of Yanbu, and 2,000 cavalry traveled overland along the Red Sea coast. Led by 17-year-old Tussun, this army was successfully ambushed by 10,000 Arabs in a mountain pass but by January 1812 had taken Medina and Mecca. In September 1813, Muhammad Ali personally led reinforcements to Arabia, where the Egyptians were facing a tenacious guerrilla war led by Ghaliyah, widow of an Arab leader. After a failed attempt to take the city of Taraba, an Egyptian force under Tussun was routed by Arab attacks, and 700 of its 2,000 men died during a disorderly retreat through the desert. An Egyptian force landed at the port of Qunfidah was attacked and lost most of its men, guns, horses, camels, and supplies. Ships were ordered to leave while survivors were swimming out to them. In late 1814, Albanian soldiers, caught sleeping in their camp by the Arabs, abandoned their weapons and supplies, and many perished during the retreat. In January 1815, Muhammad Ali led an Egyptian force, supplemented by Libyan cavalry, from Mecca to deal with the Arabs of the interior who engaged them with hit-and-run attacks and ambushes. After shelling the town of Biselah, the Egyptians withdrew in confusion and were pursued by the Arabs. However, this was a trap because the Egyptian cavalry, led by the viceroy, ambushed the Arabs (who fled in disarray). Muhammad Ali's men presented him with 5,000 Arab heads for which he paid a bounty of six Austrian dollars each. Although the Egyptian expedition then captured Taraba, the base of Ghaliyah (who escaped), and Qunfidah, it returned to Mecca

with only 1,500 out of its original 5,000 men. Before returning to Cairo, Muhammad Ali had 300 Arab prisoners who were originally promised mercy impaled at various places around Arabia, including 50 at the gates of Mecca. Repudiating a treaty signed between Tussun and Arab leader Abdullah ibn Saud, the viceroy sent another expedition of 8,000 men (mostly Turks, Circassians, Albanians, North Africans, and Bedouin irregulars) under his son Ibrahim to Arabia which landed in September 1816. Ibrahim recruited 6,000 Arab mounted infantry that, together with the Bedouin irregulars, formed the vanguard of his advance through the desert toward the Wahabbi capital of Dariya. In July 1817, near the wells of Mawiyah, one of Ibrahim's columns led by Auzun'Ali clashed with 10,000 camel-mounted Arabs under Abdullah ibn Saud. The massed Arabs were devastated by Egyptian artillery and driven off by cavalry. Ibrahim's force then besieged the town of Rass for three months, suffered 900 dead and 1,000 wounded in unsuccessful assaults, and withdrew after the town leaders promised to remain neutral. After a slow advance during which they took a number of small towns, the Egyptians arrived at Dariya in April 1818 and bombarded the town. Though an accidental explosion of the Egyptian ammunition dump delayed operations for two months as replacement shells had to be delivered by camel, Ibrahim's men stormed Dariya and drove Abdullah ibn Saud and his 200 surviving followers into the citadel, which was finally taken in September. The Egyptians completely destroyed Dariya and sent Saud and other Wahabbi leaders to Istanbul, where they were tortured and killed. While the Wahabbi Arab rebellion had been suppressed, the many problems and disasters encountered by the Egyptians further encouraged Muhammad Ali to reform his army.²⁹

Muhammad Ali's invasion of Sudan was directly related to his reorganization of the Egyptian army, which needed gold to cover expenses and black slave soldiers who would be loyal to him. In 1820 and 1821, the viceroy's son Ismail led a 4,000-strong force south, where it occupied Dongola beyond the Nile's third cataract. The "Egyptian" invasion force consisted of Turkish infantry and cavalry, Egyptian Arab irregulars, Bosnian infantry, volunteers from the Maghreb, and "Bashi Bazouk" auxiliaries who were a mix of Albanians, Kurds, Slavs, and Circassians. Commanding a battery of 12 guns was U.S. Muslim convert George Bethune English, a Harvard graduate and former U.S. Marine officer, who pioneered the use of camels to pull artillery and tried unsuccessfully to reintroduce the ancient scythe-wheeled war

chariot. The remaining Mamluks who had fled to this area scattered, and many were killed by local Shaiqiya Arabs who then rejected Ismail's demand that they surrender their weapons and horses, and take up farming like their Nubian subjects. On November 4, 1820, near the town of Kurti, an army of Shaiqiya Arab cavalry and vassal Nubian infantry faced Ismail's invaders. Seeing war as sport, a typical Shaiqiya Arab horseman was equipped with two lances, a straight sword and hippopotamus hide shield. Besides the antique pistols carried as symbols of rank by their leaders, the Shaiqiya Arabs did not employ firearms. While an impressive Arab cavalry charge dispersed Ismail's skirmishers, the Egyptian firearms cut down the Arab horsemen and Nubian infantry, many of whom appeared to be drunk and carrying bottles of liquor. Fifty Shaiqiya and 600 to 800 Nubians were dead. The Egyptian artillery did not participate, as it was still being transported by boat. After the battle, Ismail promised his soldiers a bounty for each pair of ears taken from the enemy, which led to the mutilation and killing of many civilians. Ismail saved 600 earless women by sending them to an island in the Nile. The Shaiqiya Arabs then withdrew to Jabal Daiqa across the Nile, which Ismail's force crossed with 150 boats. Since the Shaiqiya Arabs had lost most of their infantry at Kurti, they conscripted peasants who were given confidence by holy men who covered them with sacred dust said to render bullets useless. On December 2, 1820, on the slopes of Jabal Daiqa, the charging Shaiqiya army was slaughtered by Egyptian artillery—some made it to the mouths of the cannons only to be killed by point-blank fire—and finished off by Ismail's cavalry. In late February 1821, Ismail's army, with reinforcements and supply camels from Cairo, began a march across the Bayuda Desert to Berber on the Nile. News of Egyptian firepower encouraged many local groups to surrender without resistance. The Shaiqiya Arabs surrendered in May 1821 and agreed to provide a cavalry corps for the Egyptian army in Sudan.

Advancing further south, the Egyptians arrived at the confluence of the Blue and White Nile Rivers, where they established their administrative center of Khartoum, in late May 1821 and shortly thereafter occupied Sennar, capital of the declining Funj state, without a fight. The Egyptian army suffered badly from tropical and venereal disease, and there was little the medical staff could do because the expedition's medicine had been corruptly sold in Cairo. In June, Muhammad Ali, needing to send soldiers to help the Ottomans suppress rebellion in Greece, sent his son Ibrahim to replace Ismail (who he thought was

taking too long to conquer Sudan). The Egyptians raided for slaves to the west and east, particularly in the Nuba Mountains, and among the Dinka pastoralists in the south. Male slaves were sent to Egypt to form a new army bound for Greece, and female and child slaves were sold in Arabia to raise money to equip the force. Although gold was not found, the Egyptians engaged in the ivory trade. In August 1821, an Egyptian force of 3,000 men and 13 guns under Khusraw, the viceroy's Turkish son-in-law and treasurer, headed west to invade Kordofan, which was then a province of the Darfur kingdom. At the Battle of Bara, the medieval army of Darfur, armed with swords and spears, was gunned down by the Egyptian force, and Khusraw offered his men rewards for enemy ears, sacks of which were sent to Cairo. The Darfur army lost 1,500 men. In addition, some of its leaders, upon fleeing home, were executed for failure. In Kordofan, the Egyptians extorted money from merchants and confiscated slaves. Within Darfur, further to the west, a counterattack was delayed by internal conflict. Egyptian demands for slaves and money prompted a widespread rebellion by Arabs along the Nile in 1822, which was ruthlessly crushed with the help of the Shaiqiya Arabs and 500 mercenaries from Darfur. Men were impaled, families burned in their houses, and children branded and sent to Cairo as slaves. Many rebels took refuge in Ethiopia. In the early 1840s, Egyptians overcame resistance from the Shilluk on the Upper Nile and gained access to ivory-rich southern Sudan.

Although a military training center for slaves was established near Aswan, the creation of Muhammad Ali's slave army was hampered by the death of many Sudanese slaves during the march to Egypt and the necessity of sending many black slave soldiers back to Sudan as the Turks, Albanians, and Circassians of the occupation army often deserted or died of disease. The viceroy purchased slaves from Darfur caravans, but this was expensive. As a temporary solution, Muhammad Ali recruited 4,000 Egyptian peasants for a three-year term of service and after training, they were sent to Sudan. This was the first attempt to turn the Egyptian peasantry, previously forbidden to carry weapons, into a regular army and within a year, the number was expanded to 30,000. Two military schools were founded near Aswan to train young Mamluks as officers for a new modern army. French and Italian Napoleonic war veterans were hired to train officers and in 1825 the French sent an official military mission. Employing Bedouin irregulars not subject to conscription, Turkish recruiting officers

seized young Arab-speaking men from farms along the Nile, which damaged agricultural production. In 1827, the introduction of national registration passports and a census facilitated universal conscription. Village leaders were responsible for ensuring young men were available when recruiters visited, conscripts were tattooed to make them identifiable, and lists of deserters were circulated. While the provision of pay and rations to the whole army was meant to reduce looting and discipline problems, it did not work because an inefficient system meant soldiers often did not receive their pay for up to two years. Resentment of conscription led to rebellion in the Nile Delta in 1823 and 1824, which was suppressed by the new conscript army. The first test of the conscript force came in 1823 when a contingent of 2,500 men was sent across the Red Sea to the Arabian town of Azir, where they successfully subdued a rebellion by 25,000 Wahhabis. The dominance of the Turkish-speaking elite in the military was preserved as Arabic-speaking Egyptians were barred from senior positions and the language of command remained Turkish.

The Egyptian conscript army engaged in slave raiding in Sudan. Although the Egyptians had firearms and artillery, the Dinka used poisoned arrows and serrated spears to put up ferocious resistance. The Shilluk employed long canoes to raid Muslim villages along the Nile and in 1826 and 1830 drove Egyptian expeditions out of their area. In 1831, Khurshid Pasha led a 6,000-strong force east to raid the Hadendowa, who were part of the Beja confederacy. When the Hadendowa withdrew into a forest, the Egyptians followed only to fall into an ambush in which they lost all their cavalry. The infantry dispersed during the three-day return to Khartoum, and all the Egyptians' field guns were captured but eventually recovered. Fifteen hundred Egyptians were lost. The 1837 killing of an Ethiopian Christian priest by Egyptian tax collectors in Sudan led to conflict. An Ethiopian army of 20,000 advanced down from the mountains and onto the Sudanese plain. At the town of al-Atish, the likely target of the Ethiopian attack, the Egyptians added 600 regulars, 400 Berber irregulars, and 200 Shaiqiya cavalry to the garrison of 300. Since the Egyptian commander, Ahmad, was a civilian who did not order his men to form a defensive square or make use of their overwhelming advantage in firepower, the Ethiopians won a major victory and withdrew.

In 1821, Greek nationalists rebelled against the Ottoman sultan who called on Muhammad Ali's Egypt for assistance. By this point, the Egyptian navy and army were superior to their Ottoman counterparts.

The French had built many Egyptian warships and trained their crews. Muhammad Ali was not yet strong enough to defy the sultan and wanted Egypt to expand into the northern Mediterranean before the Russians intervened on behalf of Greece. The Ottoman sultan wanted to use Egyptian military power to subdue the revolt while at the same time weakening it to undermine emerging Egyptian autonomy. In 1821, Egyptian warships joined Algerian and Turkish ones in the Gulf of Corinth, where they resupplied beleaguered Turkish garrisons, captured 30 rebel ships, and bombed the town of Galaxidi. The most successful Greek naval tactic of the war was the use of fire ships, vessels rigged to explode into flames upon closing with enemy ships, which spread panic among Ottoman crews and caused naval forces to break lines. In 1824, Egypt sent an army of 17,000 men to Greece. Egyptian admiral Ismail Gibraltar's first objective was to clear pirates who threatened the army's transport ships. An expedition of 3,000 Albanian-Egyptian soldiers was landed on the island of Karos, where they killed 500 pirates and took 2,000 women and children as slaves. With the sea-lanes secure, in July 1824, an initial force of 8,000 men and 1,000 horses led by the viceroy's son Ibrahim embarked for Greece in 100 transports escorted by between 25 and 50 warships. Harassment by rebel vessels delayed its arrival and in November 1824, the expedition seized Crete as a staging area for the main landings.

In February and March 1825, an Egyptian army of 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry supported by artillery landed at Methoni on the southern tip of Greece's Morea Peninsula. The Egyptians chose a winter landing because the bad weather hindered the smaller Greek vessels but did not worry the larger Egyptian ones. During the Greek campaign, the Egyptian army tended to outperform its Ottoman allies and inflicted series defeats on the rebels. Moving north, the Egyptians suffered heavy casualties when taking the fortress of Old Navarino. Although the Greeks had massacred Turkish prisoners at Navarino when they captured it in 1821, the Egyptians freed the Greek garrison. In an amphibious assault, 3,000 Egyptians seized the island of Sfaktira from 500 Greek defenders. In a fierce attack on the Egyptian fleet in Navarino Bay, Greek fire ships destroyed 3 frigates, 3 corvettes, and 15 transports. Of the 3,000 Greeks assembled to defend the village of Maniaki, over half deserted upon seeing the approaching Egyptian army and in the ensuing battle, one third of the remainder were killed and many ran. Although their army was poor, the Greeks mobilized a

force to oppose the Egyptian northward advance. During May and June 1825, Greek ships in the Mediterranean attempted to cut Egyptian lines of supply and communication. Ibrahim led his force in an assault on the food supply center of Lerna and was opposed by 500 defenders who vowed to fight to the death. Two Greek ships fired on the Egyptians as they advanced along the coast toward Lerna. Although the Egyptians breeched the town's wall, they were repelled and then ravaged the surrounding countryside. In July 1825, 2 Greek warships along with 3 fire ships surreptitiously flying Egyptian colors, raided the Egyptian port of Alexandria, and only a sudden change in the wind saved the Egyptian fleet. In February 1826, Ibrahim's force joined the Turks in besieging Missalonghi, northwest of the Morea Peninsula, which was subjected to artillery bombardment. After two days of failed attacks, Ibrahim led amphibious operations that seized Greek fortifications in nearby swampy lagoons. In mid-April, an attempt by Greek ships to relieve Missalonghi failed. On April 26, the Greek defenders tried to break out of the city, but the Egyptians discovered their plans and slaughtered them. The Egyptians and Ottomans collected 3,000 heads. Two thousand Greeks remaining within the city were either enslaved or killed. With only 5,000 men left, Ibrahim's army moved back to Morea to wait for reinforcements from Egypt. They drove the Greek population into the mountains, seizing crops and livestock. In 1827, the same year the Turks took Athens, Britain, France, and Russia (all of whom tended to sympathize with the Greeks) agreed to impose a naval blockade on Morea to force the belligerents to make peace. However, the allied commander, Sir Edward Codrington, who was a veteran of Trafalgar, provoked the Ottoman fleet into a major engagement. The allied navy allowed Greek ships to attack Ottoman vessels. While Muhammad Ali opposed fighting the technologically superior European navies with their bigger guns and better-trained crews, 43 of his ships (including French- and American-built vessels) were part of the combined Ottoman-Egyptian fleet trapped at Navarino. On October 20, 1827, at the Battle of Navarino, the allied fleet of 12 ships of the line and eight frigates annihilated three quarters of the Egyptian-Ottoman fleet. Only one Egyptian ship survived, and none of the allied vessels were sunk. Six thousand Egyptians and Ottomans were killed compared to only 172 Europeans. This disaster caused Muhammad Ali to lose interest in Greece and in the subsequent Convention of Alexandria, he agreed to withdraw Egyptian forces. However, Ibrahim, now at the head of

20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry in Morea, did not want to leave. After 14,000 French troops landed at the end of August 1828, the Egyptian expeditionary force finally left in September and October. Russia eventually declared war on the Ottoman Empire, which led (in 1829) to the independence of Greece and to Russian expansion into Georgia.³⁰

After the Greek campaign, Muhammad Ali renewed efforts to return Syria to Egyptian rule as it had been during the Mamluk period. Although Ottoman sultan Mahmud II had promised Egypt territory in Syria in return for military assistance in Greece, this had not been forthcoming. Muhammad Ali embarked on mass conscription to rebuild the army, and French naval engineer Louis Charles de Cerisy supervised the construction of a modern Egyptian navy that included a 60-gun frigate built in Venice. By 1832, Egypt had 12 ships of the line, 12 frigates, and many lesser vessels. French officers were prominent and commanded some ships. A naval academy was established at Ras al-Tin with 1,200 students who were taught entirely by French instructors. With the Ottoman sultan engaged in Bosnia and Albania, Muhammad Ali used the excuse of fugitive conscripts to invade Syria. In October 1831, Ibrahim led 30,000 men into Syria and, within eight months, took Jerusalem, Acre, Damascus, and Aleppo and defeated an Ottoman army. In late May 1832, Acre was captured after a long siege after which only 400 out of an original garrison of 6,000 survived. The sultan, in April, declared Muhammad Ali a rebel. During the campaign, Ibrahim imposed discipline on Egyptian army officers who were still appointed through nepotism and favoritism. Ibrahim dispatched a force under his nephew Abbas to invade Anatolia, and the sultan sent an army of 53,000 men to stop him. At the Battle of Konya, on December 21, 1832, a highly trained and professional Egyptian force of 15,000 defeated the disorganized Ottomans. A key factor was heavy fog that rendered Ottoman artillery ineffective and allowed Egyptian infantry and cavalry to charge and break their enemy's isolated left flank. Ibrahim led his forces toward Istanbul until he was stopped by an order from Muhammad Ali, who feared conflict with Russia, which had, on the invitation of the sultan, sent ships into the Bosphorus Strait, where they landed 5,000 soldiers. Through British mediation, a treaty was concluded between the sultan and Muhammad Ali in which Egypt gained control of Syria and the Adana region of Anatolia, which became a source of wood for Egyptian ships. Although the Syrians initially celebrated their liberation from the Ottomans,

Egyptian rule became oppressive with conscription, taxation, forced labor, and disarmament. This led to a rebellion that was brutally suppressed by Ibrahim's force.

With the expense of Egyptian naval operations in Greece, 2,000 Albanian troops in Arabia were not paid for months. This contributed to the outbreak of a rebellion in 1832 in the Red Sea coastal town of Jiddah that was led by Mamluk Turce Bilmez. Assisted by Arabian Wahhabis of the Asir group, the rebels seized Egyptian ships and other towns. Egyptian troops from Mecca drove the rebels south into Yemen. After the Egyptian navy cleared the Red Sea of rebel vessels, Muhammad Ali sent conscript infantry, cavalry, and artillery by ship to the Yemeni port of Mocha followed by another 4,000-strong contingent that consisted mostly of cavalry, with equipment and supplies carried overland by camels. In turn, Turce Bilmez fled on a British ship. By 1834, Egyptian troops, commanded by Muhammad Ali's nephew Kucuk Ibrahim, controlled the coast of Yemen but were poorly supplied and faced stiff resistance from the Asir ensconced in the mountains. After an Egyptian force was ambushed in the mountains, the survivors scattered, and many were lost in the desert as they fled to the coast. Muhammad Ali then dispatched two regiments of black Sudanese soldiers to Yemen, but hundreds perished on the march from the Nile to the African Red Sea port of Suakin, and 500 died on the transport ships. During 1836, the Egyptians made little progress in fighting the Yemeni insurgency. The arrival of fresh troops and leadership in 1837 turned the tide for the Egyptians, who recaptured towns along the Arabian Red Sea coast and penetrated and pacified the Yemeni mountains. Around this time the British, concerned about the rise of Egypt with a 130,000-man army, seized the port of Aden to secure the sea route to India. In early 1838, the old Wahhabi leader Khalid ibn Saud, detained in Cairo for 20 years, was released and placed at the head of an Egyptian army under Khurshid Pasha that marched east through central Arabia to the Persian Gulf coast. The Egyptians occupied Bahrain in April 1839 and pushed down into northern Oman, which greatly worried the British, who were beginning to see the Persian Gulf as their sphere of influence. However, a rebellion against Egyptian taxation in central Arabia caused the Egyptian army to withdraw west. The threat of war with the Ottoman sultan over Syria prompted Muhammad Ali to withdraw most Egyptians soldiers from Arabia and in 1839, tensions with Britain led to an Egyptian evacuation of Yemen.

In 1839, Ottoman sultan Mahmud II dispatched an army into Syria to drive out the Egyptians. Led by Hafiz Pasha and advised by Prussian officers, the Turkish force was an undisciplined horde compared to the Egyptian conscript army commanded by Muhammad Ali's son Ibrahim. After the Turks skirmished with the fringe of his army, Ibrahim sent a message to Hafiz that they should meet in open battle. On June 24, 1839, the Egyptians advanced on the main Turkish camp at Nezib south of the Euphrates River. Following a 90-minute artillery duel, the advancing Egyptian infantry repelled waves of attacks by Turkish cavalry. As the Egyptian cavalry pursued the fleeing Turks, Ibrahim entered Hafiz's abandoned tent and discovered the Ottoman plans for the campaign. At this battle, Turkish artillery had been commanded by Prussian Captain Helmuth Von Moltke, who would design the strategy Prussia would use to defeat France in 1870 and 1871. Just after the battle, Sultan Mahmud died and was succeeded by his inexperienced 16-year-old son Abdul Mejid, which caused instability in Istanbul. As a result, the Ottoman admiral Ahmed Fawzi took 8 ships of the line and 12 frigates into Alexandria and surrendered to the Egyptians. European powers intervened to end the Turkish-Egyptian conflict because they were concerned that an Ottoman collapse would lead to Russian expansion in the Middle East and eastern Europe. Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia demanded that the Egyptians leave Syria, Adana, and Crete and return the Turkish fleet. They also demanded that the sultan proclaim Muhammad Ali a hereditary ruler. During October 1840, a British-Austrian naval squadron under British commodore Charles Napier expelled Egyptian garrisons from the Syrian coast, and Druze conscripts in the area began to desert their Egyptian units. In early November 1840, Napier's ships bombarded Acre, the last Egyptian-held port, where Egyptians guns fired high and the Egyptian ammunition magazine exploded, killing 1,100 men. Subsequently, British troops landed and occupied the city as the Egyptians fled. In late November, Napier visited Alexandria, where he forced Muhammad Ali to agree to withdraw from Adana and Syria in return for the sultan's recognition of him as the founder of an Egyptian royal dynasty. Harassed by rebels, Ibrahim led a fighting retreat from Syria in which thousands died from thirst and starvation. In 1841, Muhammad Ali formally became a hereditary ruler; the Egyptian army was limited to 18,000 men; military uniforms and insignia were of Ottoman pattern; and new ships could be built only with the sultan's permission. Istanbul now had to

pay for the administration of the southern Ottoman Empire, Syria, and Arabia, which had previously been controlled by Egypt. After 1841, Egyptian relations with Britain and the Ottomans improved. The smaller army meant that Egyptian peasants were less pressured by taxation and conscription, and many Turko-Georgian officers became unemployed. Ibrahim ruled briefly in 1848 before his death, and the elderly Muhammad Ali returned to power until he died in August 1849.

Invaded by Russia in 1853, the Ottoman Empire called on Egypt for assistance in what would be called the Crimean War. Egyptian ruler Abbas Hilmi I responded by sending six regiments and a fleet of three ships of the line, four frigates, three corvettes, and a number of transport vessels. Most of the Egyptian navy was outdated. While the Egyptian army numbered only 9,000 men, a contingent of 15,000 was raised by conscripting veterans of previous conflicts, some of whom cut off their forefinger or gouged an eye in vain attempts to avoid war. Turkish and Egyptian soldiers were involved in spirited fighting that halted the Russian advance across the Danube River. Egyptian ships were split up among the Ottoman navy in the Black Sea. Russian destruction of the Ottoman fleet prompted Britain and France, in March 1854, to intervene on the side of Istanbul. During May and June 1854, Egyptian troops distinguished themselves by defending the earthwork fort of Arab Tabya on the Danube. On the night of May 29, four Egyptian battalions and 500 Albanian irregulars, under heavy shelling, held off an assault by 9 Russian battalions. When the Russians dug mines to blow up the defenders from below, they found the Egyptians had withdrawn to a new position. In June, the Russians were driven from the Danube by Ottoman counterattacks. Almost half of the first Egyptian expeditionary force died. Another contingent of 9,000 Egyptians fought in Ottoman-ruled parts of Greece that had rebelled. An Egyptian column was ambushed at Kalabocca and suffered heavy casualties. In mid-June 1854, fresh Egyptian troops, 4 battalions of infantry, lancers, and artillery were landed at the Ottoman port of Varna on the west side of the Black Sea, where they experienced cholera, crime, looting, drunkenness, and fire. From August to October, this force participated in the Allied landings on the Crimean Peninsula on the north side of the Black Sea, where they suffered through a miserable winter of dysentery and typhoid. In late October, 1,000 Egyptian sailors were lost when a battleship and frigate went down in a Black Sea storm. At the request of the British and French,

the Ottoman Danube army, consisting of 60,000 men; 12,000 horses; and 18 artillery batteries, was landed at the northwestern Crimean port of Eupatoria from December 1854 to April 1855. In February 1855, a Russian army of 30,000 infantry; 3000 cavalry; and 50 guns attacked Eupatoria but was repulsed with the help of fire from British gunboats. Eupatoria became one of the most formidable Allied positions in the Crimea, threatened Russian lines of communication with the southern positions of Sevastopol and Balaclava, and served as a base for raids by Ottoman cavalry. In September and October 1855, Egyptian and Tunisian troops were among the 45,000-strong Ottoman Danube army that landed at the Caucasian port of Sukhum-Qal'a on the east side of the Black Sea. The Ottomans advanced on the Ingur River, where they overwhelmed Russian defenses. However, the continued offensive was troubled by rain and mud, and by December, the disorganized Danube army, harassed by Georgian militia, was retreating to the coast (from which it was evacuated by sea). In a campaign that became synonymous with military incompetence, Ottoman officers sold supplies for personal profit, British and French commanders used Ottoman soldiers as laborers, and the Ottoman fleet was poorly employed.³¹

After the Crimean campaign, the Egyptian military declined further. Manpower shortage led to the conscription of Coptic Christians and Bedouin, the latter of which had traditionally volunteered as irregular cavalry. This prompted a Bedouin rebellion that was viciously suppressed. With a financial crisis in the early 1860s, the Egyptian army was reduced to a few infantry regiments and some Bedouin horsemen. The Russian takeover of Circassia between 1862 and 1864 caused the exodus of Muslims in that area to the Ottoman Empire and ended the traditional though declining practice of Egyptian military recruiting. The Egyptian Ministry of the Navy was closed.

In 1862, during the American Civil War, France invaded Mexico and installed the Hapsburg Archduke Maximilian as a puppet emperor. Because white French troops in Mexico suffered from yellow fever, the French emperor Louis Napoleon asked Egyptian ruler Muhammad Said for a loan of black Sudanese soldiers, who were thought to have more immunity to tropical disease. In January 1863, a Sudanese battalion of 447 men, mostly from Kordofan and south Sudan, left Alexandria on a French ship. When they arrived in Mexico, most had typhoid. The only man in the unit to die of yellow fever was

its Syrian commander, who was replaced by Muhammad Bey Almas, a Dinka officer. The Sudanese fought Mexican republican insurgents for four years. By March 1867, with Louis Napoleon concerned about a resurgent United States and the Prussian threat at home, the French left Mexico and the Sudanese troops, after a parade in Paris, were sent home, where they were promoted and spread out among the entire Egyptian army, which hoped to gain from their experience.

An Egyptian brigade participated in the Ottoman suppression of a rebellion in Crete between 1866 and 1869. Greek volunteers had landed to assist rebels, and the Ottomans responded with terrible atrocities against civilians. Used as cannon fodder by the Ottomans, the Egyptian brigade made a frontal attack on a Greek fortification at Vafe and took heavy casualties before the defenders escaped. At the Arkadi monastery, Turkish soldiers used their bayonets to force an Egyptian unit to assault a breeched gate, that succeeded at great loss. The winter of 1866 to 1867 was particularly hard for Egyptian troops with linen summer uniforms, and pneumonia spread through the ranks. Ottoman officers ordered the looting of already surrendered villages, which resulted in torture, rape, and murder. By November 1867, most of the Egyptians had returned home and within two years, the rebellion petered out.

In 1863, Ismail Pasha came to power in Egypt and initiated a series of reforms that included reconstructing Cairo, increasing farmland, exercising an independent foreign policy, and rehabilitating the military. These programs were supported by large foreign loans that would eventually undermine Egypt's autonomy. Ismail dismissed French military advisors who seemed to support French interests in Egypt and sought out U.S. officers because the United States had no local ambitions. After the Civil War, many unemployed army officers worked as military advisors in other countries. In recommending American officers for service in Egypt, U.S. Army Commander General William Tecumseh Sherman removed potentially disloyal former confederates and dissatisfied federal veterans. In 1869, former federal general Charles Pomery Stone, a West Point graduate who had organized the defense of Washington early in the Civil War, was put in command of the U.S. contingent sent to Egypt. Former confederate General Henry Hopkins Sibley, a veteran of Indian wars in the American West, took over Egyptian artillery. At this time, the 18,000-strong Egyptian army was disorganized; most soldiers were illiterate; each unit commander reported directly to the Ministry of War; there were

no logistical, intelligence or signals elements; artillery was obsolete; and there was a shortage of ammunition. Stone implemented improvements that included literacy for all ranks; the creation of a staff college and training center for each arm; the establishment of a noncommissioned officers' school to teach uniform drill; free education for soldiers' children; the increase of manpower to 60,000; the purchase of 600 modern German-made Krupp artillery pieces; and the development of libraries for maps and military science, along with factories to manufacture firearms, gunpowder, and munitions. By the mid-1870s, Egypt once again had the best military in the Middle East.³²

CONCLUSION

The military history of North Africa is very different from the rest of the continent. Forming the southern Mediterranean coast, naval warfare—including piracy, amphibious landings, large naval battles, and shipbuilding—was much more important in North Africa and stretches back to ancient times. Closely linked to southern Europe and the Middle East, North Africa was long dominated by foreign military forces such as Phoenicians, Macedonians, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Mamluks, Ottomans, Spanish, French, and British. As such, North Africa experienced an early and constant influx of external military technology such as ancient chariots and bronze weapons, and later artillery and firearms. North Africans also had a long history of involvement in military campaigns in other parts of the Mediterranean, such as Hannibal's men crossing the Alps to invade Rome, the Muslim conquest of Iberia, and Muhammad Ali's contribution to the Ottoman campaign in Greece. The military was important in the development of North African coastal cities into the emerging national states of the nineteenth century, but modernizing their forces to counter European intrusion put them in debt, which undermined autonomy.


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Chapter 2

West Africa to ca. 1870

West Africa consists of three long east-west environmental belts. Bordering on the gradually expanding Sahara Desert in the north, the Sahel represents arid grassland covering large portions of present-day Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad. In the middle is the western Sudanian savanna, which is dominated by semiarid grassland with some trees and small forests. It covers much of present-day Senegal, southern Mali, almost all of Burkina Faso, part of Guinea, the northern portions of Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, and most of Togo and Benin. Along the southern coast, a wet tropical rainforest is divided in two by a gap where the savanna dips down around present-day Togo and Benin. The forest takes up most of present-day Sierra Leone, all of Liberia, parts of Guinea, and the southern regions of Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Cameroon. Another important geographic feature of West Africa is the 4,000-kilometer Niger River that flows from the highlands of southeastern Guinea northeast through the Sahel and Sahara, bends south through Mali and Nigeria, enters the tropical forest, and flows into the Atlantic Ocean at the Niger Delta.

The precolonial history of West Africa was characterized by the rise and decline of two great intercontinental trade systems in which warfare and military structures were central. Limited north-south trade across the Sahara Desert, the trans-Saharan trade, started in ancient



times with horses and oxen as transport. By around 400 CE camels, well suited to desert conditions with wide padded feet and the ability to travel long distances without water, had been introduced to the Sahara from Arabia by either Romans or Berbers. With this superior method of transportation, trans-Saharan trade expanded, with the inhabitants of each geographic belt contributing specific products or skills not widely available elsewhere. The people of the forested coast exported kola nuts (a stimulant), slaves, and gold to the north. Savanna farmers exported grain crops throughout the region. In the Sahel, particularly along the bend of the Niger River, which was also used to transport goods by canoe, trading centers such as Jenne, Gao, and Timbuktu developed into thriving towns. The nomadic people of the Sahara, such as the Tuareg, exported salt and specialized in transporting goods across the desert in large camel caravans. From the North African coast, indeed all the Mediterranean region, goods such as textiles, swords, horses, glass, and books were sent southward. After the seventh-century Muslim conquest of North Africa, Islam spread south along the desert trade routes into West Africa, encouraging literacy and cultural change among elite merchants and rulers, though ordinary farmers retained their traditional beliefs and sometimes synthesized them with elements of Islam. Employing highly mobile cavalry armies to control and tax the trans-Saharan trade, vast territorial empires emerged on the Sahel and savanna, such as Ghana, Mali, and Songhay. During the 1400s, when the trans-Saharan trade reached its zenith, Portuguese vessels began exploring the West African coast and attempted to obtain gold from forest communities. With the colonization of the Americas in the 1500s, European sailors acquired increasing numbers of slaves along the West African coast and shipped them across the Atlantic, where they were forced to work, often to death, on sugar and other plantations. Gradually, many West African forest states, supported by infantry armies with imported firearms, became embroiled in the growing trans-Atlantic slave trade, which led to a slow decline of the interior trans-Sahara system.

THE SAHEL AND SAVANNA: HORSES AND JIHADS

The military use of the horse in West Africa can be divided into two periods. Before roughly 1300 CE, small locally bred horses, introduced from North Africa during ancient times, were ridden without stirrups

or saddles. Employed primarily for scouting and harassment, these light cavalry fought mostly with missile weapons such as javelins. Horses were also symbols of prestige for rulers and their entourages. Infantry, particularly archers, dominated the West African battlefield. From the start of the fourteenth century, larger breeds of horses were imported from North Africa via the developing trans-Saharan trade, and eventually the Portuguese supplied some via the coastal trade of the western savanna. Although some Sahelian and savanna people began breeding larger horses, this was difficult because tropical disease like tsetse fly-carried trypanosomiasis sharply reduced horse life expectancy, and generations of horses reproduced in this environment usually became progressively smaller. Some southern savanna states became entirely dependent on imported horses acquired through increasing slave exports. Along with larger horses, stirrups and saddles were introduced, which led to the development of heavy cavalry armored with imported chainmail or padded coats and armed with lances and swords. They would charge into combat and fight hand-to-hand. Given the open and flat ground of the Sahel and much of the savanna, which favored horse mobility, cavalry became a central element of armies in this area, though coordination with infantry and archers remained important. The emergence of this cavalry tradition was linked to influences from North Africa and the Middle East, where cavalry had long been important, and the spread of Islam to West Africa. Besides their limited use in tropical forests further south, the main problem of cavalry warfare was that rulers found it hard to maintain large standing armies. Because large numbers of horses in a concentrated area were difficult to feed, kings usually distributed them to subordinate rulers who would be called together in time of war.¹

By around 700 CE, a combination of factors led to the emergence of the ancient kingdom of Ghana (also called Wagadou) in the western Sahel between the Senegal and Niger Rivers, which is today southern Mauritania and Mali. Soninke-speaking farmers in that area had produced iron swords, spears, and arrowheads since around 400 and acquired horses through trade with Saharan nomads. These military advantages enabled them to conquer land from less organized neighbors. As the Sahara dried out, Sanhaja Berbers raided agricultural communities to the south, which motivated the Soninke to band together for mutual defense. Given their position between salt-producing Taghaza in the desert and the gold-producing Bambuk area

along the upper Senegal River, the Soninke became intermediaries in the expanding trans-Saharan trade and exported their grain surplus. As North African Arabs became more involved in the gold trade during the 800s and 900s, the desert Berbers converted to Islam and became the main organizers of camel caravans going to and from ancient Ghana. At the capital of Kumbi-Saleh, the Soninke ruler became wealthy collecting a tax in gold on imports and exports of salt and gold, and he received tribute in food and hunting products from neighboring vassal Soninke chiefs. The king brought in Muslim Arab-speaking interpreters, scribes, and merchants, who lived in a distinct part of the capital and built mosques. Since the king's main duty was to protect the people from raids by desert nomads, he could call on subordinate rulers to send him young men for military service. Ghana did not maintain a standing army, but an eleventh-century Arab account claimed that the kingdom could assemble a 200,000-man force including over 40,000 archers. This figure is most likely exaggerated but does reveal something about the nature of Ghana's military. While the presence of gold-adorned small horses among the ruler's entourage is mentioned, the omission of cavalry suggests that Ghana's army was primarily an infantry force. Ghana expanded and around 1050 CE conquered the Berber trading center of Awdaghust. Although historians once believed that the Almoravids, Muslim Berber horsemen who embarked on a holy war (jihad) against infidels, conquered Ghana in 1076 and imposed Islam on its inhabitants, recent research has cast doubt on the reliability of that account. It now seems likely that the rulers of Ghana converted to Islam in the late 1000s through a combination of trade and intellectual contact. During the early 1200s, two factors led to the collapse of ancient Ghana. First, it became difficult for large settled farming communities to live in that part of the Sahel as the Sahara Desert expanded southward into Ghana's territory in a process facilitated by the overgrazing of Berber livestock. Second, new trade routes were opened east of Awdaghust, and a new source of gold at Bure in the southern savanna woodland enabled the southern Soninke of the Sosso Kingdom, led by Sumaguru, to take over much of Ghana and conquer neighboring Malinke states. Around 1224, a Sosso army sacked Kumbi-Saleh, which was then abandoned. Its former inhabitants moved south and west.

Oral tradition relates much about the military history of the Mali Empire. Organizing resistance to Sosso raids in the early to mid-1230s, Sundjata brought a number of Malinke groups under his

leadership. The campaign began with Sundjata's army, the core of which was composed of cavalry from Mema, advancing on the southern town of Tabon, where the local ruler was expected to join their cause. When a large force of Sosso footmen blocked the valley that led to Tabon, Sundjata reportedly laughed and declared, "Yes, but no mere infantrymen can halt my course toward Mali." Sundjata then personally led a cavalry charge, which surprised the Sosso infantry (who assumed the battle would take place the next day) and drove them off. According to oral tradition:

Sundiata was in the middle of the Sossos like a lion in the sheep-fold. The Sossos, trampled under the hooves of his fiery charger, cried out. When he turned to the right the smiths of Soumaoro (Sumaguru) fell in their tens, and when he turned to the left his sword made heads fall as when someone shakes a tree of ripe fruit. The horsemen of Mema wrought a frightful slaughter and their long lances pierced flesh like a knife sunk into a paw-paw.²

Sumaguru then personally led a large army that intercepted Sundjata's growing force, which now included a Tabon contingent, at Negueboria in present day Guinea. Sumaguru deployed his men along a narrow valley with the flanks occupying both slopes. Organizing his men into a square formation with cavalry at the front and archers in the rear, Sundjata led a ferocious charge against the Sosso line, which initially held but after some hand-to-hand fighting appeared to buckle. On Sumaguru's order, the Sosso flanking units swept down into the valley, attempting to encircle the enemy. However, Sundjata had predicted this, and his prepared army quickly changed formation from square to rectangle, the ends of which intercepted the Sosso flankers. After volleys of arrows inflicted serious casualties on the Sosso, Sundjata's cavalry counterattacked up the hill and pursued Sumaguru's now fleeing men. Oral tradition maintains that at this point in the battle, Sundjata threw a spear that bounced off Sumaguru's chest, and the Sosso leader caught an arrow shot at him before using magic to disappear. That night, the Sosso launched a surprise attack on Sundjata's camp that was repelled by volleys of flaming arrows. At the climactic Battle of Kirina, fought on a plain near present-day Bamako in 1235, Sundjata's army inflicted a decisive defeat on the Sosso. Sundjata, after discovering that the evil sorcerer Sumaguru's totem was a rooster, fashioned an arrow out of a cock's spur. Although the engagement began well for Sundjata as his

charging cavalry broke the horsemen at the center of the large Sosso force, Sumaguru deployed his large reserve, which began to push back the Malinke. At this critical moment, Sundjata shot this arrow at Sumaguru, who was distinguished from his men by a tall headdress, which nicked his shoulder, drained his magical powers, and caused him to flee the battlefield never to be seen again. The demoralized Sosso army then panicked and ran off with Sundjata's force in pursuit. Shortly after this victory, Sundjata's army assaulted and sacked the Sosso capital, using ladders to scale its walls and flaming arrows to ignite its thatched roofs.

Solidifying the Malinke alliance, Sundjata asserted authority over all the Soninke people who had once been part of Ghana. With his new capital at Niani, located in the southern savanna of the upper Niger near gold-producing Bure, Sundjata directed the expansion of the Mali Empire and became its "mansa," or spiritual and political leader. To acquire horses, an army under Tiramaghan Traore was sent west to conquer the Jolof, former allies of Sosso, in what is now Senegal and also established the tributary state of Kaabu in present-day Guinea-Bissau. Another army under Fakoli Koroma went south to conquer the upper Senegal River and the area bordering the forest. After Sundjata's death around 1255, his son and heir Mansa Ouali extended the empire east by conquering the important trading center of Gao on the Niger River.³

Mali developed a standing army, rare in precolonial Africa, centered on nobles who commanded cavalry armed with lances, swords, and bows and regional infantry units equipped with spears and bows. According to Arab sources, at the height of its power in the early to mid-1300s, Mali maintained an army of 100,000 men, including 10,000 cavalry, at the capital and garrison towns across the empire. Early in Mali's history, cavalymen would bring their slaves on campaign to provide logistics but forbade them to fight. Later, slaves were increasingly mobilized as bow-armed light infantry who employed poisoned and flaming arrows and were adept at fighting in swamps and forests where cavalry were useless. Mali's military command was divided into northern and southern regions. The military's purpose was to keep tributary states in line and protect the trans-Saharan trade from which the mansa collected tax. After a civil war in the 1270s, Mansa Sakura, a former slave turned military strongman, took over the empire, reasserted its authority over rebellious vassals such as Gao, and expanded west by conquering the Takrur Kingdom

in what is now Senegal and Mauritania. He also expanded north by subjugating the Tuareg-ruled copper-producing town of Takedda in present-day Niger. By Sakura's death around 1300, Mali ruled a vast empire stretching from the Atlantic coast in the west to the Niger bend in the east. In 1325, Mansa Musa undertook a pilgrimage to Mecca with a massive entourage that included 100 camels carrying gold. Musa brought back Arab scholars and architects who established mosques and centers of Muslim learning in Jenne, Timbuktu, and Gao, where yet another rebellion was crushed in 1325. Historian Robin Law has speculated that Musa's pilgrimage may have stimulated the growth of a cavalry tradition in the region as he brought back larger breed Egyptian horses equipped with saddles and bridles.⁴

During the late 1300s and early 1400s, the Mali Empire was weakened by a series of succession disputes that prompted tributary states to break away. In 1360 the Jolof Kingdom in the west regained independence. The Mossi, horsemen from states south of the Niger bend in present-day Burkina Faso, raided Mali's towns during the late 1300s and early 1400s. In the 1370s, a Mali army was sent to suppress rebellion in the east. It subdued Takedda but failed to retake Gao. During the 1430s, Mali lost control over much of the trans-Saharan trade when the desert Tuareg captured Timbuktu and Walata, and Jenne became independent. In the 1440s and 1450s, seaborne Portuguese began slave raids along the coast of present-day Senegal and Gambia, and were defeated by vassals of Mali who employed poisoned arrows and shallow draught boats to intercept Portuguese long boats. In 1456, the Portuguese sent a peace emissary to the Mali capital and restricted themselves to coastal trade.

By the ninth century, fishermen along the middle Niger River had adapted canoes for military use, engaged in trade, and established the early Songhay state with its capital at Kikiya. Links with Arab and Berber merchants at Gao prompted Songhay elites to convert to Islam during the early 1000s and move their capital to that trading town. Although Mali ruled Gao and western Songhay during the 1300s, the eastern part of Songhay stayed independent. During the 1400s, with the weakening of Mali, Songhay asserted itself and under the Sonni dynasty developed a large army of horsemen and war canoes that extended its territory westward along the Niger bend. Led by Sonni Ali, Songhay's armies advanced west, capturing Timbuktu from the Tuareg in 1468, taking Jenne in 1480 after a seven-year siege, pursuing the Tuareg north into the desert, and pushing

Mossi raiders south of the Niger in the 1480s. Muhammad Turi, one of Sonni Ali's generals who took over after his death and became known as Askia the Great, strengthened administration and Islam within the empire, revived the trans-Saharan trade, and conquered vast new territories. In 1498, he launched a major raid against the Mossi, which produced slaves for export and was justified as jihad. Continuing the wars against the Saharan Tuareg, Songhay captured Air in the east and the salt-producing town of Taghaza in the north. Additionally, Songhay expanded to the southeast, subjugating the Hausa states of Gobir, Katsina, and Kano in what is now northern Nigeria. An army marched as far west as Takrur near the Atlantic coast. In turn, Songhay became the largest empire in African history. As new areas were conquered, local rulers were replaced by nonhereditary provincial governors appointed by the Songhay king. Songhay did not have a standing army, and each governor was responsible for raising a force for the collection of tribute and tax. According to Leo Africanus, a Moroccan who visited Songhay in the 1510s, the Timbuktu governor:

rides upon a camel which is led by some of his noblemen. He travels likewise when he goes to war and all his soldiers ride upon horses. Attending him he has always three thousand horsemen, and a great number of footmen with poisoned arrows. They often have skirmishes with those that refuse to pay tribute, and as many as they take they sell (as slaves) to the merchants of Tombuto (sic). There are very few horses bred here, and the merchants and courtiers keep certain little nags which they use to travel upon; but their best horses are brought from Barbarie (North Africa). And the king, as soon as he hears that any merchants have come to town with horses, he commands a certain number to be brought before him, and choosing the best horse for himself he pays a most liberal price for him.⁵

Although Askia the Great was overthrown by his sons in 1528 and there was a short period of internal conflict, Songhay remained stable and continued to control the trans-Saharan trade for most of the 1500s.

Further dynastic struggles within Songhay in the 1580s enticed the Kingdom of Morocco, under Ahmad al-Mansur, to launch a long-distance invasion. In October 1590, an expeditionary force of 1,500 mounted lancers; 500 mounted gunmen with arquebuses (early muzzle-loading firearms); 2,000 infantry with arquebuses; 6 cannon and other small artillery pieces; and a supply train of 8,000 camels;

1,000 packhorses; 1,000; servants and 600 engineers left Morocco and followed the long desert trade routes southeast to Songhay. While the lancers were from Morocco, most of the other soldiers and artillerymen were European or Turkish mercenaries. Although the Moroccan army lost many men and animals crossing the Sahara, the Songhay leadership did little to prepare, as an invasion from the north was considered impossible because of harsh desert conditions. At the start of 1591 the Moroccans, led by Spanish-born former captive Judar Pasha, captured Taghaza and in February reached the Niger River. It was only at this late stage that the Songhay rulers began to prepare their defenses. Messengers sent to instruct nomads to fill in desert wells were intercepted by the Moroccans. Small groups of Songhay fighters paddled up the Niger River by canoe to harass the invaders. Lacking boats and with no timber to build them, the Moroccans were unable to attack the Niger River towns that had been located on islands as protection from Tuareg raids. A Songhay army, consisting of 12,500–18,000 cavalry and 10,000–30,000 infantry, none of whom had firearms, waited just north of Gao. It appears that the Songhay cavalry were armed mostly with lances, and the majority of the infantry were archers. When the two armies clashed on March 12, 1591, in what would be called the Battle of Tondibi, Moroccan firearms devastated Songhay forces. The Songhay army attempted to screen its advance by driving a herd of cattle at the well-drilled Moroccans, who then simply opened gaps in their ranks through which the animals passed. The fight began with cavalry clashes on each flank of the formed infantry lines. Desperately, elite Songhay archers, each with a single leg bent and tied together so that they could not flee, shot at the advancing Moroccans until they were all killed. Encouraged by an official who was secretly working for the enemy, Songhay ruler Askia Ishaq fled the battlefield, causing the remainder of his army to rout. Lack of canoes meant that the Moroccans could not pursue the fleeing Songhay force across the Niger.

Although the Moroccans seized and looted Gao and Timbuktu, they did not find the amount of gold they were expecting, and within a short time lost 400 men and many transport animals to tropical disease. Although he remained as an officer in the Moroccan army, Judar Pasha was removed from command for not acquiring enough gold and failing to crush Songhay resistance. Mahmud Pasha, another Spanish or Portuguese slave who replaced him, had his men construct boats from all the wooden doors and door frames in Timbuktu. After

the Moroccans once again defeated the Songhay army at Bamba, they were able to pursue the fleeing enemy across the Niger. During the confusion, Askia Ishaq was killed by Tuareg raiders. Although the Moroccans attempted to appoint a puppet Songhay king, he was not accepted. Askia Nuh, Ishaq's successor, rallied a new army. Nuh understood that Moroccan firepower would always give them an advantage in large battles fought on open ground. Therefore, Nuh took his army south into the forests of Borgu, where he recruited local allies armed with poisoned arrows and fought a guerrilla campaign of ambushes and hit-and-run attacks against the Moroccans, who came after him and suffered terribly from the area's tropical disease. Jenne submitted to the Moroccans but avoided being sacked by giving them a large payment of gold. The arrival of 2,000 reinforcements from Morocco saved the small garrison at Timbuktu from being overwhelmed by Tuareg and Sanhaja desert nomads. In 1593, after another 1,500 cavalry; 1,500 infantry; and 500 spare horses arrived from Morocco, Mahmud withdrew his exhausted army from the Borgu forests, garrisoned Gao, and concentrated at Timbuktu. Nuh then relocated his Songhay forces to the Hombori Mountains, which served as a sanctuary from which to raid Timbuktu. Both Mahmud and Nuh were killed in subsequent fighting. Judar was once again placed in command and eventually returned to Morocco in 1599 with 30 camels loaded with gold, 120 with spices and other valuables, and many slaves. Remnants of the Songhay army and desert nomads continued to engage the Moroccans in years of guerrilla fighting. Morocco's Songhay campaigns during the 1590s and early 1600s cost it the lives of 23,000 soldiers, many of whom died from disease after returning home. Morocco's occupation of Songhay was not sustainable because it failed to acquire enough gold to pay for protracted military operations that depended on extremely long and vulnerable supply lines. In the 1610s, Morocco broke off direct rule, and its Niger town governors developed into autonomous and fractious rulers. As a result of the Moroccan invasion, the Songhay Empire broke into many small states, and the disrupted trans-Saharan trade shifted further to the east.⁶

By around 1000 CE, the Kanem state, originating with pastoral nomads who gradually converted to Islam, had developed as a powerful force north of Lake Chad. Dominating the eastern trans-Saharan trade routes, Kanem imported horses from North Africa and exported slaves captured in the south. Between 1210 and 1248, Kanem ruler

Dunama Dibalami commanded an army with 40,000 cavalry that controlled the trade as far north as Fezzan and used jihad to justify slave raids against non-Muslims south of Lake Chad. The drying out of their area and internal conflicts prompted the rulers of Kanem, around 1400, to move their capital to the tributary state of Borno southwest of Lake Chad. Borno established trade with the Hausa states to the west, supplying them with horses and salt in exchange for gold from Akan in modern Ghana. During the 1500s, Borno rulers taxed local farmers, who rose in a number of rebellions that were suppressed by jihads. In the late 1500s, at the same time that Songhay was invaded by Morocco, Borno ruler Idris Aloma modernized his army by importing firearms, and Turkish mercenaries and military advisors from Ottoman-ruled Tripoli in North Africa. He expanded the use of cavalry, employed a camel corps for long distance expeditions, developed a fleet of ferries for river crossing and logistics, built fortified camps, and practiced a form of scorched earth warfare. These military innovations, together with the collapse of Songhay, allowed Aloma to direct a series of campaigns to impose his authority around Lake Chad to the east; conquer the Tuareg state at Aïr to the northwest, which secured the trans-Saharan trade; and expand southwest at the expense of the Hausa states, though he failed to capture the city of Kano. This extended period of warfare increased the quantity of slaves exported north and, in turn, more horses were imported for military purposes. The increasing local use of slaves is illustrated by one of Aloma's campaigns to subjugate Kanem, Borno's former center, when his army captured 1,000 female and 2,000 male slaves who were divided among the soldiers. A further 400 free male captives were executed because Islam forbade their enslavement. Frequently, Aloma ordered all male prisoners executed, and women and children prisoners were sold as slaves. Aloma also reformed Borno's legal and administrative systems, and strengthened Islam by building mosques, encouraging pilgrimages, and importing Muslim scholars. In either 1603 or 1619, Aloma was assassinated while leading another military campaign. Borno maintained its slave and horse trade with Tripoli for a century.⁷

During the eighteenth century, nomadic raiders took advantage of the absence of a large territorial empire in the Sahel and savanna as well as frequent civil wars in the smaller states. In 1737, the Tuareg moved south to capture Timbuktu and dominate the Niger bend. With the decline of Borno in the early 1700s given drought and famine, the Tuareg state at Aïr reasserted itself and seized the salt-producing

center of Bilma in 1750. As a result, Borno would no longer control, though it would still participate, in the eastern trans-Saharan trade.

Between the eleventh and sixteenth centuries, Fulani pastoralists settled much of the West African Sahel and savanna. They lived among but remained distinct from settled agricultural communities. Through links with Arab traders in towns and Tuareg desert nomads, the Fulani converted to Islam, which encouraged their common identity and provided an alternative legal system. Beginning in the 1500s, Fulani moved into Futa Jalon in what is now Guinea, where they were taxed by local farmers. In 1725 the Fulani, supported by Muslim merchants, launched a jihad against the traditionalist farmers and in 1750 established an Islamic state. Located in the middle Senegal River, the area of Futa Toro had been controlled by the Takrur state during the tenth and eleventh centuries, which subsequently declined because of internal conflicts and competition over resources. From the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, the nominally Muslim rulers of Futa Toro provided slaves to first the Portuguese and then the French on the coast, and they were victims of Moroccan raids aimed at capturing gold and slaves. In 1763 Nasr el Din, a Muslim scholar from present-day Mauritania, led a jihad against nomads to the north and Jolof to the south. He was supported by people threatened by slave raiding. Although this jihad was defeated with the help of the French, Nasr el Din's followers established the Bundu state on the upper Senegal River and inspired future Muslim revitalization. Between 1769 and 1776, Fulani and Tukolor, inspired by events in Futa Jalon and buoyed by people frustrated with the inability of the Denanke rulers to protect them from raids by desert nomads, fought a jihad in Futa Toro and created a new Muslim state that expanded west and southeast until defeated by the Wolof state of Kajoor around 1797.

By the late eighteenth century, the Hausa states of today's northern Nigeria had long been involved in the trans-Saharan trade, yet their often violent competition led the nominally Muslim rulers to illegally enslave fellow Muslims and oppressively tax their subjects. Hausa rulers built their armies from contingents of light and heavy cavalry sent from vassals who were, in turn, granted privileges such as the right to tax their subjects. During the late 1700s, Fulani Muslim scholar Usman dan Fodio, who wanted to rejuvenate and purify Islam, travelled throughout Hausa territory and built a network of supporters and allies. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, he had gathered a large following of Fulani and others dissatisfied with the Hausa ruler

of Gobir, who was weakened by wars with other Hausa states. The rebellion began in 1804 when Dan Fodio's adherents, harassed by Gobir's new Sultan Yunfa, fled the area and embarked on jihad. Confining himself to religious matters, Dan Fodio appointed family members and close associates as "flag bearers" with authority to raise and command armies. The rebel army lacked cavalry and consisted of bow-armed light infantry who could move quickly but were susceptible to being caught in open country by fast-moving horsemen. As Yunfa assembled his main army, the jihadists defeated a small Gobir force and captured the towns of Matankari and Konni. Pursuing the rebels into western Gobir, Yunfa's army was much larger and consisted of 100 armored cavalry, hundreds or thousands of light horsemen, Tuareg camel riders, and several thousand infantry with bows, javelins, spears, battle-axes, and a few firearms. Yunfa declined to attack Dan Fodio's well-defended camp and decided to prevent their retreat by positioning his forces near Lake Kwotto. Spurred on by their previous success, Dan Fodio's men marched through the night and at daybreak on June 21, 1804, surprised the Gobir army. Initially deployed in a long line between the shore of the lake and a forest, which secured their flanks from cavalry attacks, the rebels charged straight toward the larger enemy force. Although Yunfa's cavalry collapsed the jihadist flanks, the tightly formed center square resisted cavalry charges and used mass archery to inflict heavy casualties on the Gobir army, which fled. With this victory, more followers joined Dan Fodio's army, including Fulani and Tuareg motivated by religious conviction along with Hausa peasants angered by taxation. Attempting to attack Gobir's fortified capital of Alkalawa, the rebels suffered a major defeat at Tsuntua in December 1804, where they lost 2,000 men. The rebels then divided their force into two: a field army and a force to guard their camp. In 1805, they captured the town of Kebbi and seized important supplies. Fighting a guerrilla war, the rebels lived off cattle herds, which were more mobile than Yunfa's baggage train; they often moved to high ground to avoid Gobir's cavalry; and Dan Fodio's years of preaching across Hausa country had gained him many supporters. As they acquired more horses through capture and arrival of mounted allies, the rebels established a growing cavalry wing that initially conducted reconnaissance and foraging in small groups but eventually deployed on the battlefield to harass enemy flanks and engage in shock charges. In other words, the insurgent jihadist armies eventually developed into combined

infantry and cavalry formations similar to the Hausa states. The rebels cut off communication between the Hausa towns to prevent a coordinated response and captured them one by one. During several days of fighting at the town of Gwandu in 1806, the Gobir army, operating in the open (which favored its horse and camel riders), killed 1,000 rebels. This encouraged the jihadists to withdraw into rough terrain, where they bested the enemy cavalry. Dan Fodio's followers then improved Gwandu's fortifications and used it as a staging area for subsequent operations; several other jihadist armies were raised in other parts of Hausa territory. From 1808, rebel commanders began to use more coordinated tactics such as in October of that year when three converging columns took Gobir's fortress capital of Alkalawa and Yunfa was killed. By the end of 1808, all the major Hausa states had been subdued, including those to the east that had been dominated by Borno. In 1809, Dan Fodio established a new Islamic caliphate with its capital at Sokoto. By 1812, the old Hausa rulers had been replaced by Fulani emirs who owed allegiance to the caliph.

When Dan Fodio died in 1817, his son Muhammad Bello, who had been an important military leader during the jihad, became caliph and ruled for the next 20 years. Islam was strengthened and expanded among the elite, inter-Hausa wars became less frequent, and the use of slave labor on plantations increased. Sokoto became the largest African empire since Songhay and by the mid-1800s, it stretched from modern Burkina Faso in the west across northern Nigeria to what is now Cameroon in the east. The Sokoto Caliphate's military organization remained similar to the previous Hausa states. While the caliph did not maintain a standing army, he kept military professionals at his court who were in charge of organizing and leading forces when needed. Each emir retained a group of heavy cavalry, often slaves in padded armor, and their subordinate rulers could also raise cavalry forces. Infantry were usually peasants or townspeople equipped with spears or bows who volunteered for specific expeditions in the hope of gaining loot. It appears that units of 50 men under a leader were the norm, with those from the same area and with similar equipment grouped together. According to the account of a British explorer, a Sokoto army raised in 1826 consisted of 50,000–60,000 men, of whom 10 percent were mounted and only 42 were armed with muskets.⁸

A similar Fulani jihad began in Borno in the early 1800s, supported by invading armies from Sokoto. In 1808, Fulani jihadists destroyed Ngazargamu, the Borno capital. Defeated by a Sokoto army in 1809,

Borno ruler Dunama was toppled by his own nobility in 1813. Mobilizing forces that returned the king to power, Muslim religious leader Muhammad al Kanemi, originating from nomadic Saharan peoples, was rewarded with an enlarged fiefdom. This enabled him to build up a personnel army centered on contingents of slave heavy cavalry supplied by himself and vassal rulers. Kanemi reorganized Borno forces, placing greater emphasis on nomads such as Kanembu infantry spearmen and Shuwa Arab light cavalry, and successfully resisted the Fulani jihad and Sokoto invasion. He wrote to the Sokoto rulers to question their right to support jihad in Borno, which he argued had long been a Muslim state. By the 1820s, Kanemi had become the real power in Borno and reduced the king to a figurehead. He reformed Borno's legal and administrative systems along Muslim lines, and he established a new capital at Kukawa. During the 1820s, a British explorer observed Kanemi's army on campaign, noting that it consisted of 30,000 cavalry and 9,000 Kanembu spearmen. Although cavalry dominated the savanna battlefield at this time, one encounter illustrated the potential of firearms, which were beginning to come into the area across the Sahara and from the coast. On March 28, 1824, near the town of Angala, Kanemi's army confronted an invading 5,000-man cavalry force from neighboring Baghirimi. Some of Borno's Shuwa Arab horsemen and 40 slaves were equipped with flintlocks, and visiting Briton Dixon Denham provided two small cannon. The Baghirimi charged toward the center of the Borno line, but the fire from flintlocks and cannon compelled them to veer toward one flank. After intense hand-to-hand combat in which both sides suffered badly, the Baghirimi withdrew, leaving behind 480 horses and 200 women. They were pursued by Borno cavalry. When Kanemi died in 1837, his son Umar took over the role of shehu (or sheikh). In 1846, Umar and his supporters defeated an army led by Ibrahim, who was trying to re-establish, with the help of the neighboring Wadai state, his royal authority. The erstwhile ruler was executed, which ended the dynasty that had ruled Borno for a millennium. Borno was now a shadow of its former self, as it had lost much of its western territory to Sokoto and was cut off from trans-Saharan trade to the north. By the 1850s, Borno's ability to muster an army had declined, and one German visitor observed a force of around 10,000 cavalry, 500 of whom were armored, and a larger number of infantry.⁹

During the 1840s Umar Tall, a Muslim scholar from the Tukolor people of Futa Toro who had lived in Sokoto and recently returned

from pilgrimage to Mecca, rallied a jihadist army in Futa Jalon. The first target of this jihad was the traditionalist Kaarta state, established in the 1700s and ruled by pagan kings backed up by age regiments of slave soldiers, which controlled the area's trans-Saharan trade. In the early 1850s, Tall's forces captured the gold-producing Bambuk region and in 1855 took Nioro, the capital of Kaarta, which became Tall's headquarters. He armed his followers with European firearms acquired through exporting non-Muslim slaves and other resources to the coast. Conquered areas were secured by a network of garrisoned fortresses. Though Tall's army eventually consisted of recruits from various origins, it would be dominated by leaders from Futa Toro who commanded their own contingents. The jihadist forces supplied themselves from loot, of which Tall was supposed to receive one fifth. Tall then led his jihad west to his Futa Toro homeland, where it clashed with the French based at Saint Louis on the coast, who had built a chain of forts inland along the Senegal River. In 1856, the French constructed another river fort, protected by steep walls and a small garrison with cannon and muskets, at Medine, which was strategically placed in the middle of Tall's conquests. In April 1857, Tall mounted several assaults on the French fort with an army of 15,000 men, which was repelled with heavy casualties. The jihadists then besieged the fort for two months but were obliged to withdraw by the arrival of a French relief force of two gunboats and several hundred soldiers. After a French force destroyed one of Tall's fortresses in northern Senegal, he negotiated a settlement with them and concentrated on campaigns to the east.

Defeated by the French in the west, Tall directed his jihad to the east, advancing along the upper Niger River toward the states of Segu and Masina. During their siege of the fortified Segu town of Woitala in September 1860, Tall's army numbered 15,000 and employed several cannon captured from the French a few years before. After the town was taken in one of the bloodiest battles of the war in which 300 of Tall's men were killed in the initial assault, some Segu chiefs defected to the jihadists, which increased their military strength. In February 1861, at Tio, Tall's forces surrounded and defeated a combined Segu and Masina army and in March, the reorganized Masina force was driven off once again. Now in control of Segu, Tall ordered the destruction of traditional religious symbols and moved his capital there. Continuing their eastward drive, the jihadists invaded Masina in late April 1862, won a series of hard-fought victories (facilitated

by the defection of an important local ruler who knew the country), and occupied the strategically important Niger River trade center of Jenne. This jihad was harder to justify because Masina's rulers were Muslims. After the Masina army failed to counterattack at a critical point when the jihadists were short of ammunition, Tall's forces took Masina's unfortified capital of Hamdallahi in May. The next year, exiled Masina elites, backed by fighters from neighboring Timbuktu, started a rebellion against Tall's occupation. Driven from Hamdallahi in February 1864, Tall, his sons, and some military leaders were trapped in a cave and burned to death by the rebels. Tijani, Tall's nephew, assumed leadership and defeated the insurgents and their supporters, who were plagued by internal divisions. The Tukolor Empire, as this Muslim military theocracy would be known, now stretched from the Senegal River in the west to the Niger River bend in the east.¹⁰

THE COASTAL FOREST: SLAVES AND FIREARMS

Portuguese seaborne exploration of the West African coast during the 1400s was motivated by a desire to outflank the Muslims of northwest Africa and find an eastern route to the rich trading grounds of Asia. At first, the main commodity that the Portuguese wanted to acquire from West Africans was gold. During the mid- to late 1400s, the Portuguese established a chain of small enclaves and island colonies along the West African coast. In the 1470s, they built El Mina (the mine) castle on the coast of modern Ghana, where they exchanged copper, brass, and European textiles for gold from Akan just to the north. Around the same time, the Portuguese conquered the small islands of Sao Tome and Principe, establishing sugar plantations worked by slaves obtained from the mainland state of Benin. Because the Portuguese ships were larger and faster, and could travel further than local boats, the West African coastal trade expanded, and commodities that once went north over the Sahara now went south. The Portuguese became carriers of local goods and after 1500, when they entered the Indian Ocean, they brought prized cowrie shells into the West African market. After 1492, Europeans colonized the Americas, where they established a plantation system based on that of Portugal's West African islands. As indigenous Americans died from imported European diseases or fled into the interior and European indentured servants succumbed to tropical disease, African slaves became the main labor

force for these plantations. Beginning in 1532 when the Portuguese first shipped African slaves from Sao Tome to Brazil, a trans-Atlantic trade in slaves gradually developed, with other oceanic European powers such as the Dutch, British, and French becoming involved and establishing often poorly garrisoned coastal forts designed more to counter attacks from their competitors' ships rather than hinterland Africans. During a 300-year period, from 1532 to the mid-1800s, at least 12 million Africans were shipped across the Atlantic, with perhaps 2 million dying during the infamous Middle Passage and many more worked to death in the Americas. European slave traders usually remained on the West African coast where African rulers brought them captives. Initially, these slaves were by-products of wars fought between African states over power, territory, tribute, or trade. However, during the late 1600s and 1700s, African rulers became dependent on the increasing numbers of firearms they were acquiring from Europeans, with the result that control of coastal trade routes and capture of slaves became more prominent features of warfare in the area. During the early 1800s, Britain banned the trade in slaves and used its naval power to intercept slaving vessels operating along the West African coast. The ban was motivated by the rise of the abolitionist movement, which saw slavery as morally abhorrent; the development of industry and free wage labor in Britain; and the expense of slave rebellions at sea and in the colonies. By the 1850s, in what the British called legitimate commerce, West Africa's main oceanic export had shifted from slaves to raw materials such as palm oil used in growing European industries. Ironically, this led to an increase in the use of slaves within West Africa because local rulers needed additional labor to harvest the new exports used to continue the acquisition of firearms. The Western presence along the coast increased with freed slave settlements in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and missionaries seeking to spread Christianity and suppress slavery. This section of the chapter will explore the history of warfare along the West African coast during the slave trade and legitimate commerce periods, beginning with the area of present-day Sierra Leone and proceeding east along the coast to the Niger Delta.

With the decline of Mali and its loss of control over the trans-Saharan trade in the 1400s, Mandinka (Malinke) traders and soldiers began to move south to acquire salt and kola nuts, and to engage in coastal exchange with European seafarers. Most accounts claim that the Mane (Mandinka-Malinke) first invaded what is now Liberia and

then advanced northwest up the coast in canoes, conquering the local and loosely organized Sapes people in present-day Sierra Leone during the mid-1500s. However, one historian claims the Mane invasion of Liberia was a separate event and took place in the late 1500s and early 1600s. The Mane leaders employed as military allies previously subjugated people called Sumba, whose reputation for cannibalism generated fear among local communities. The small bows and arrows of the Mane gave them an advantage because they could shoot longer captured arrows, but the larger bows of their enemies could not shoot the short Mane arrows. Mane fighters looked fierce as they stuck numerous feathers into their loose knee-length shirts, carried large reed shields that covered their entire body, and were each equipped with two knives, a bow, and two quivers of arrows. The Sapes's response was divided, with some groups surrendering and others attempting an ultimately futile resistance. However, several communities in the inland north halted the Mane advance. The Limba and Djalonkes burned their homes and withdrew to caves from where they mounted guerrilla attacks on the Mane. Refusing to submit, the Susu retired and left behind poisoned food that the Mane subsequently consumed, resulting in many deaths. The Mane then built a defensive position that the Susu successfully stormed with the help of some Fula (Fulani) horsemen who represented a new feature in local warfare. The attack was so swift that Salvador da Costa, a Portuguese mercenary working for the Mane, could get off only one shot from his firearm before he was forced to flee. The Susu then pursued the Mane and killed many of them. Despite these setbacks, the Mane established four coastal states: Bullum in the north; Loko, which was centered on Port Loko; Boure, which was just south of the Sierra Leone channel; and Sherbro, which was furthest south. The Mane conquest militarized present-day Sierra Leone. Adopting Mane methods, local communities began fielding large units of archers with the characteristic large Mane shields, and building Mane-style fortifications with three or four layers of 4- to 6-meter-high wooden fencing surrounded by a ditch, and watched over by towers manned by archers. The Mane rulers forced the Sapes into labor on plantations producing millet, rice, root crops, and palm wine, much of which was sold to visiting European ships. Some Sapes staged unsuccessful rebellions in the 1570s, and others escaped to the Portuguese-controlled Cape Verde islands.¹¹

During the abolitionist period, the freed slave settlements of Sierra Leone and Liberia were created largely through a process of military

conquest. In the 1790s, Nova Scotia black loyalists, slaves who had gained their freedom by siding with the British during the American Revolutionary War, were settled on the Sierra Leone peninsula. Adult male settlers were seen as free citizens who had an obligation to participate in the defense of the community through part-time service in a militia. Given the global conflict of the time, in 1794, a French naval force destroyed the settlement, which was then rebuilt. Immediately following the French attack, the settler militia was reorganized and elected its own leaders. The result was that white colonial officials often served under black leaders who had military experience. In 1800, the British brought in 550 Jamaican Maroons, escaped slaves who had fought against colonial authorities in the Caribbean, to suppress a rebellion by black settlers over lack of access to freehold land. Led by their own General Montague James and a hierarchy of officers, the Maroons maintained a distinct military organization and discipline. Around this time, the British stationed 50 regular white soldiers, mostly convicts, of the newly created Royal African Corps (RAC) in Sierra Leone. In 1803, newly arrived governor William Day, a retired naval captain, established the Corps of Volunteers formed from Nova Scotia and Maroon settlers, and rebuilt Fort Thomson, replacing wood with stone walls and installing new cannon. Concerned the arrival of troops and building of forts would lead to loss of land, the local Temne under King Tom along with some of the onetime settler rebels attacked the colony in 1801 but were defeated. In a series of skirmishes that lasted until 1807, Sierra Leone forces and local Susu allies defeated the Temne and gradually expanded their dominance over the peninsula.

In 1808, following the British prohibition of slave trading the previous year, Sierra Leone became a crown colony and from 1819, Freetown served as the main base of operations for the Royal Navy's Anti-Slavery Squadron. Africans rescued from slaving vessels, called recaptives, were settled in the colony and were placed under missionary supervision. Eventually it became a Christian settler community. Although the Maroons had formed the backbone of the militia, they were edged out in 1811 by a requirement to take an oath of allegiance, which they feared would reduce them from free citizens to soldiers who could be sent elsewhere. Many Maroons refused to take the oath and moved to other parts of the colony. In turn, the RAC was transformed from a unit of European convicts to one consisting primarily of African recaptives who now constituted the colony's main security

force. With the end of the Napoleonic wars, the RAC was disbanded in 1819. The 2nd West India Regiment, its headquarters, and five companies garrisoned Freetown. However, since some former RAC convicts were considered too dangerous to be sent to Britain, they formed two companies of the 2nd West India Regiment, which became a special unit for deserters from other stations. At the same time, around 1,000 black veterans of the 5th West India Regiment, who were not entitled to pensions, were settled as farmers in Sierra Leone. In 1825, Major General Charles Turner, who had been denied regular troops, arrived in Freetown as the new governor accompanied by 700 convict soldiers of the new Royal African Colonial Corps (RACC). The Sierra Leone colony expanded further as suppression of the slave trade became an excuse for subduing neighboring African groups. Throughout 1825 and 1826, Turner used the RACC and local militia to attack and destroy a number of Temne towns and annex their territory. In 1830, within the context of developing black participation in administration, sickly Europeans from the RACC were sent home and replaced by African recaptives who became senior noncommissioned officers. William Smellie, a man of African West Indian origin, became Sierra Leone's first black regular officer in 1831. Furthermore, the militia was reformed with a rural branch called the Sierra Leone Loyal Volunteers. Between 1825 and 1840, various Temne groups, encouraged by the British to keep open the coastal trade routes through their territories, fought against the Loko, who often raided merchant caravans. During an 1861 colonial expedition against a Temne group that added more land to the colony, the militia was discredited by the desertion of some of its leaders. When the Militia Ordinance expired in 1864, colonial officials did not renew it, which meant that Sierra Leone's black citizens lost their right to participate in the defense of the colony. West India Regiment reinforcements were brought in, and the local police—hitherto unarmed—were transformed into a paramilitary force equipped with firearms.¹²

With the mixed motives of returning slaves to their motherland and removing the imagined threat of free blacks from the United States, the American Colonization Society (ACS) established a freed slave settlement called Liberia in 1821. In December of that year, U.S. Navy captain Robert Stockton and ACS agent Eli Ayers, having failed to gain land by consent, resorted to coercion. Stockton put his pistol to the head of King Peter to force him and five other local Dei rulers to sign a treaty that gave the ACS land on Cape Mesurado, which

became the site of Monrovia (named after U.S. president James Monroe). This led to almost immediate conflict with indigenous people. In March 1822, the Dei under King George clashed with visiting British sailors and freed black settlers over access to water, which prompted the settlers to construct fortifications and stockpile firearms and ammunition. Seeing the settlers as an obstacle to their continued slaving, Cuban sailors supplied locals with muskets and swords. In November and December 1822, a coalition of Dei village states under King Peter, which fielded an army of around 1,500 men armed mostly with spears, launched three determined attacks against the settler defenses. Although they managed to penetrate the fortifications on the first and third assaults, the Dei were repelled by cannon fire. Frustrated by Liberian attempts to suppress the slave trade, Dei kings Kai Pa, successor of Peter, and Willey imposed a trade embargo on the settlement in 1832 and harassed frontier settlers. In late March, a 270-strong Liberian militia force advanced on Kai Pa's town, which was found abandoned because he had taken refuge with Willey, whose town was protected by a large log wall. The Liberian expedition used artillery to blast Willey's defenses and within 20 minutes, the Dei warriors fled and Kai Pa was dead. The Liberians burned both settlements, and Willey accepted a peace treaty that reopened trade.

In June 1835, the Bassa under King Joe Harris destroyed the newly created Liberian settlement of Port Cresson, which lacked defenses because it was administered by a pacifist Quaker. Harris feared that Port Cresson would block his trade contacts, including slaving, with visiting Europeans such as the Spanish, but he underestimated Liberian military power. The ACS in Monrovia sent 120 armed settlers under General Elijah Johnson to the area and with the help of militia from nearby Edina and several other Bassa rulers, attacked Harris's town and forced him to accept Liberian authority. In early 1838, Liberian settlers purchased land from the Sno Kru, a farming community that lived near the coast, to create Greenville, also known as Mississippi in Africa. However, the new settlement inhibited the fishing and trading activities of the coastal Kabor Kru, who killed the Mississippi governor and were then raided by a settler militia. Raids and counterattacks between Liberians and local African slavers prompted the different Liberian settlements, in 1839, to form a commonwealth to coordinate security and trade, and expand their authority in the face of British and French competition. The expansion of Liberian settlements led to conflict with the Vai ruler Getumbe in late 1839 and

early 1840. After Getumbe's forces attacked Liberian settlers and their Dei allies, and seized a Liberian delegation, ACS authorities dispatched a 200-man expedition, which easily captured the Vai leader's capital and drove him away. In the wake of this Vai-settler war, many Dei rulers accepted Liberian authority and unrestricted Liberian trade. Responding to the possibility that the British in Sierra Leone would annex Liberia, Joseph Jenkins Roberts, a settler hero of previous wars who was now head of the ACS administration, greatly expanded the settler militia to conquer indigenous groups.

In 1847, with ACS support, the settlers of Liberia declared themselves an independent republic. Although Liberia did not have a standing army, it maintained a volunteer uniformed militia of two companies that trained once a month. After independence, Liberia intensified antislaving activities with raids against groups such as the Bassa of King Grando. In November 1851, Grando led 300 men, including contingents from other Bassa rulers, in two attacks on Liberian settlements, the second of which was repelled with significant loss. Within a few weeks, Grando's force grew to 2,000 men. In mid-January 1852, an army of over 1,000 militiamen led by Roberts, now Liberia's first president, defeated Grando's force and destroyed his base of operations. Roberts gave partial credit for his victory to the presence of the warship USS *John Adams* along the Grand Bassa coastline because it intimidated the Bassa and provided the Liberians with communication.

During the early 1850s, various Kru groups attempted to impose a trade embargo on the coastal settlers and their African allies. In late 1855, these tensions turned violent as the Blue Barre Kru raided a visiting British ship and kidnapped several African deckhands who had flouted Kru laws about employment on vessels. The same Kru group then attacked settler and associated African communities around Greenville. Transported from Monrovia on a German merchant vessel, a Liberian militia contingent under President Stephen Benson fought the Kru in several engagements from December 1855 to March 1856. With trade and agriculture disrupted, the Kru surrendered and agreed to a treaty that brought them under Liberian jurisdiction. The establishment in 1831 of Maryland in Africa, another settlement of free blacks from the United States to the east of Monrovia, and its independence in 1854 escalated conflicts between local Grebo groups over land and trade. In December 1856, there were 200 Maryland militia and 200 local African allies supported by artillery who attacked the

Cape Palmas Grebo, who they accused of plotting to destroy the colony. In turn, the Cape Palmas Grebo counterattacked Maryland settlements. Another settler-African force sent out to get revenge lost 26 men and 3 cannon during an accidental fire and were pursued by the Grebo. With their settlements cut off from each other, the Maryland administration, in February 1857, requested help from Liberia, which dispatched J. J. Roberts with 115 men, who negotiated an end to the conflict. In the resulting treaty, Maryland gained land from the Cape Palmas Grebo in exchange for \$1,000, and all Grebo came under its authority. Maryland joined Liberia later that year. With the formalization of relations with the United States in the early 1860s, Liberia enjoyed the support of the U.S. Navy, which reduced British and French encroachment as well as indigenous resistance.¹³

In the 1300s, traders from Mali, then at the height of its power, began to make contact with Akan farmers on the border between the savannah and forest in what is now Ghana. This prompted the Akan, during the 1400s, to permanently move into the forest, where they used slave labor to clear land for agriculture and mine gold. Many small Akan states developed, each based on a capital town. Northward export of gold from Akan served to shift the trans-Saharan trade eastward through towns such as Timbuktu and Gao. In the late 1400s, the Portuguese at the southern coast began to exchange slaves from Benin for gold from Akan. Within a few years, several Akan states emerged, such as Denkyira and Akwamu, that fought over control of gold mining and trade routes to the coast. Since the forest in this area was extremely thick (made up often of secondary growth in formerly cleared areas) raiding parties and larger armies had to travel by a network of narrow paths on which it was easy to set up ambushes or hold off attackers; larger battles usually took place in clearings near settlements. Until the late 1700s, Akan warfare often revolved around control of these paths, which meant a small force could block a larger one for a long time, and the strategic movement of multiple columns could cut off an enemy from food supplies. Warfare was dominated by archers and javelin throwers launching their missiles over the heads of a formation of sword- and shield-armed warriors who closed with the enemy for hand-to-hand fighting.

In the 1500s and early 1600s, small groups of European gunmen, usually Portuguese and Dutch, sometimes supported an African army to ensure their local trade partner remained strong or to counter the intervention of other small European units by rivals. However,

between the 1650s and 1680s, a “gun revolution” took place as large amounts of firearms, particularly new flintlocks (which were easier to use) and ammunition, were obtained from Europeans on the coast in exchange for gold and slaves. These new weapons led to a change in Akan fighting methods, which shifted to mobile groups of gunmen called the right and left wings. It became common for Akan armies to employ units of hundreds of musketeers. The spread of firearms and the growth of a few larger states also had an impact on military organization. The small Akan states usually raised small armies made up of professional warriors trained in sword and shield combat, while the larger kingdoms raised larger armies made up primarily of peasant conscripts with guns. Akwamu was the first Akan state to adopt firearms, and its ruler cultivated an army made up of a core of semi-professional gunmen and a large number of conscripts. Adopting firearms and new tactics, Denkyira was the dominant Akan state from the 1660s to 1690s and controlled trade with the Dutch, who had captured El Mina, and the British at Cape Coast castle.

Fighting a series of demanding wars during the 1690s to its south against Asen and Twifo to keep trade routes to the coast open, Denkyira requisitioned more resources from its own subjects and tributary states. This led to a rebellion against Denkyira by a coalition of northern Akan groups led by Osei Tutu and based at the trading center of Kumasi. Osei Tutu had observed gun-bearing armies in the region and upon becoming ruler of Kumasi around 1680, he recruited a detachment of gunmen from Akwamu. Fighting between Denkyira and Osei Tutu’s alliance began around 1699 or 1700, and the southern communities began to block shipments of firearms and ammunition from the coast to Denkyira. In 1701 Denkyira’s army pushed Osei Tutu’s rebels northeast in a series of fierce battles. However, this seems to have been a trap because the Denkyira force clashed with Osei Tutu’s main army at Feyiase and was defeated. The Denkyira ruler, Ntim Gyakari, was killed and his army fled south, allowing Osei Tutu’s men to advance and sack Denkyira’s trading towns. From this point, Osei Tutu brought most other Akan states under his new Asante Empire, which was centered on Kumasi. After a Denkyira rebellion was suppressed in 1707 and 1708, it was incorporated into the Asante state. Around the same time, coastal Fante was becoming an important intermediary in the European trade and extended its territory by conquering other coastal states such as Fetu, Aguafu, and Asebu. From 1700 to 1710, Akwamu expanded east across the Volta River.

Although Asante began as a loose coalition, Osei Tutu's power was enhanced when local religious leaders presented him with a "golden stool" as the symbol of Asante kingship. Between 1713 and 1715, Osei Tutu led his army south to subdue the Twifu, Wassa, Aowin, and Nzema. In 1717, he invaded Akyem to the east but was killed.

Taking over as Asante ruler, Opoku Ware led numerous campaigns that expanded the empire. In the 1720s, he attacked Akyem to the east, fought off an invasion from the west by Aowin, defeated Bono to the north, and in the south pushed the capital of Wassa closer to the coast. Opoku Ware subsequently conquered many areas, including western Gonja and Gyaaman in 1732, Banda in 1740, Akyem in 1742, and eastern Gonja and Dagomba in 1744. When Opoku Ware died in 1750, Asante was a vast empire that controlled all the Akan states except Fante and stretched across an area larger than present-day Ghana. During this period, the Asante army was organized into a number of distinct elements: scouts, advance guard, main body, commander's body guard, rear guard, and right and left wings. Each part of the empire was responsible for providing one of these elements. During the late 1700s, the Asante Empire constructed a network of "great roads" that connected major towns. While this enhanced trade, it also removed the advantages that small forces had along the narrow forest paths and allowed for quick movement of large armies through the forest. This enabled Asante to put down a long series of rebellions by vassal states such as Wassa in 1760, 1776, and 1785, and Akyem in 1765 and 1767. However, Akyem defeated Asante in 1772.¹⁴

In 1807, Asante invaded and conquered Fante on the coast to control the trade with Europeans, which was confirmed by victories in further conflicts in 1811 and 1814 to 1816. At this time, Asante could raise a total force of 80,000 men, of which about 50,000 had firearms. During the late 1810s, the Asante imposed a trade blockade on the British because they refused to pay rent for their coastal castles, encouraged the Fante to suspend sending tribute north to Kumasi, and failed to ratify a treaty that recognized Asante sovereignty over the Fante. In late 1823, Brigadier General Charles MacCarthy, British governor of Sierra Leone, led an invasion of the southern part of the Asante Empire. His plan was that four separate British colonial columns would link up and defeat the Asante. However, on January 21, 1824, before the rendezvous took place, MacCarthy's column (consisting of 80 British soldiers, 170 Cape Coast militia, and 240 Fante allies)

was confronted by an Asante army of 10,000 men on the banks of a tributary of the Pra River. The two forces shot at each other across a 60-foot stream until the British ran out of ammunition (their supply carriers had run off), and the Asante then attacked and overwhelmed them. Only 20 members of the British force escaped the Battle of Nsamankow, and the decapitated heads of MacCarthy and another British officer were brought to Kumasi as trophies. The Asante advanced south and attacked Cape Coast castle but were repelled. On August 7, 1826, at the Battle of Katamanso (also called Dodowa), a few kilometers north of Accra, the Asante attacked a larger force of 12,000 men from various coastal states supplemented by 120 British soldiers and marines along with a few cannon and rockets. Leading the Asante army, Osei Yaw ignored the advice of his officers to stage a night attack and launched a daylight assault across the open coastal plain, which did not favor the usual Asante forest tactics of ambush. During their approach, the Asante took heavy casualties from British cannon fire until they were close enough to respond with their own musket volleys. When the Asante began to push back the coastal fighters, the British opened fire with rockets, the sound and flash of which panicked the Asante and in the confusion, the sacred golden stool was almost lost. In Asante's worst military disaster, hundreds were killed or captured, and 60 leaders were killed. In turn, Kumasi lost control of the coast, the Fante gained independence, and the Pra River was recognized as the southern border of Asante. Defeat by the British weakened the king's authority and caused the rise of a prowar faction among Asante leaders. Tensions again escalated in the early 1860s when the British gave sanctuary to several Asante fugitives. As a result, in 1863, Asante armies raided the coastal communities allied with the British and pulled back before the start of the wet season. Although the British responded by sending West Indian troops to the Pra River in preparation for a strike into Asante territory, half of them succumbed to tropical disease and in July 1864, they were withdrawn. This bolstered Asante confidence and set the stage for future conflict.¹⁵

Inhabiting what is now western Nigeria stretching from the savanna below the lower Niger River south to the coastal forest, Yoruba farmers produced a food surplus and began state formation around 1000 or 1100. Located in the fertile and well-watered border between savanna and forest that was suitable for cultivation and livestock, Ife became the original Yoruba city-state and produced enough food that some of its subjects became specialist artists producing wood and

ivory carvings and metal castings. Ife inspired the formation of a series of similar states, each based on a major town. Because Ife's influence was based on its spiritual and cultural importance to the Yoruba, it did not maintain a standing army. Located on the savanna near where the Niger River enters the forest, the town of Oyo Ile was inhabited as early as the 700s and was an important trading center around 1535, when it was attacked by neighboring Nupe. As a result, the Oyo rulers fled west to Borgu, where they copied their Nupe enemies and other neighbors such as the Hausa by adopting cavalry warfare. By the early 1500s, they had established a new capital at Igboho, 65 kilometers west of the old one. During the late 1500s, they recaptured Oyo Ile and conquered the Yoruba city of Ilorin to the east. Expanding into the savanna gap to the west and southwest, Oyo became a major intermediary in the trade between coastal groups in the south and the Hausa in north. Because Oyo's military power was based on cavalry, which dominated its open savanna homeland, yet tropical disease made it difficult to breed large horses in that area, their success came to depend on constantly acquiring horses from the north by exporting slaves. In addition, slaves played important roles in the Oyo state administration and military. Oyo established a semipermanent heavy cavalry force of 70 war leaders (Eso) who were appointed on merit by the ruling council and king. Each war leader provided a number of specialist soldiers such as heavy cavalry, sometimes slaves of northern origin, and archers. Initially, the kings of Oyo personally led their armies into battle; but during the wars with Nupe, one was accidentally drowned in a river and another narrowly avoided death in combat. Therefore, from around 1600, all military expeditions were led by an appointed supreme commander who was required to live outside the capital and was usually a provincial governor. To provide motivation, the Oyo state required that the leader of an unsuccessful military expedition commit suicide, and several failed commanders were executed in the late 1600s and 1700s. Oyo Ile was protected by a perhaps 10,000-strong metropolitan army, which included a palace guard made up of slaves who were commanded by a member of the ruling council and who provided most of the state's cavalry forces. Provincial governors were responsible for raising armies that consisted mostly of infantry to collect tribute or embark on imperial campaigns. Attempts by Oyo to expand southeast into the forest during the late 1500s and early 1600s were hindered by the area's lack of suitability for cavalry and resistance by Benin.

Although Oyo's southern expansion was limited by the fact that its horses could not live permanently near the coast because of tropical disease, it began raiding south toward Dahomey in 1682 and invaded that coastal state several times in the early and mid-1700s. These conflicts pitted the Oyo cavalry, armed with lances, swords, and bows, against Dahomey's firearm-equipped infantry. In 1726, the smoke and noise of Dahomey's firearms frightened the horses of Oyo's all-cavalry invasion force and prevented them from launching what would have been a devastating charge. Dahomey forces also attempted to counter Oyo cavalry by fortifying their settlements with wooden and bush walls as well as ditches protected by European-made cannon. Oyo fighters responded by dismounting and launching determined infantry assaults on the forts that overwhelmed Dahomey forces after days of hard fighting. During the two protracted conflicts fought by these two states from 1726 to-1730 and 1742 to 1748, Oyo was unable to conquer Dahomey, and Dahomey was unable to prevent damage from Oyo raids. As a result, in 1748, Dahomey agreed to a humiliating settlement in which it became a tributary state of Oyo.¹⁶

Conflict between the king and his council during the late 1700s weakened Oyo's power. In the 1790s Afonja, the commander of Oyo's provincial armies and ruler of Ilorin, rebelled against the central government. Afonja's army took Oyo Ile in 1796 but when he was not named the new Oyo ruler, he declared Ilorin's independence. After two decades of inconclusive warfare between Oyo and Ilorin, Afonja, in 1817, gained assistance from the Sokoto Caliphate, which extended its Fulani-led jihad into Oyo, where there was a Muslim minority. Although Afonja initially benefitted from this alliance, he was not a Muslim and in 1823, the Fulani jihadists under Abd al-Salam killed him and incorporated Ilorin into Sokoto. As early as the 1780s, Oyo was defeated by neighboring Borgu and Nupe, with the latter becoming part of Sokoto in the early 1800s. In the 1790s, the Egba, located south of Oyo and north of Lagos Lagoon, rebelled and broke from Oyo. In 1822, Owu (Oyo's main ally) was destroyed by forces from Ijebu and Ife. Dahomey reasserted its independence by cutting off Oyo's access to the coastal slave market at Porto Novo in 1807, ceasing payment of tribute in 1823, and seizing Oyo's most southern province of Egbado around 1830. Denied slave exports and unable to acquire horses from its hostile jihadist neighbors, Oyo collapsed and in 1833, its capital and major towns were sacked by Ilorin.

During the 1820s and 1830s, refugees from Oyo moved south into the forest zone, where some re-created their state at New Oyo and others founded new states such as Ibadan and Ijaye; exiles from Egba formed Abeokuta. These Yoruba states fought a series of wars to fill the vacuum created by the fall of Oyo.¹⁷ As the Yoruba shifted south into the forest, they abandoned cavalry warfare and developed infantry armies led by commanders on horseback. Compared to other West African coastal groups, the Yoruba were late in taking up firearms. In the early 1800s, most Yoruba soldiers were armed with bows and arrows (sometimes poisoned), and swords. They seem to have discarded the shields that were employed in earlier times. The first Yoruba state to use firearms was coastal Ijebu during the 1822 siege of Owu. The use of firearms proliferated across Yoruba country in the mid-nineteenth century. In the early 1840s, a few Yoruba soldiers had firearms; by the 1850s, their possession had become widespread; and by the 1870s, every fighter had one. While individual soldiers were responsible for bringing their own guns to war, rulers were supposed to supply ammunition. Most of these firearms were long-barreled flintlocks of Danish origin called Dane guns or long Danes; they were fed with low-quality powder from the United States and shot made from iron bars by local blacksmiths. With the spread of firearms, battles between Yoruba armies became characterized by two lines of men firing at each other from less than 100 meters apart, with those finished firing moving to the rear.¹⁸

Unlike most of the new Yoruba states, which were monarchies, Ibadan by the 1840s had become a "military meritocracy"¹⁹ in which chieftaincy was determined by military skill and not inheritance or place of origin. Lacking such opportunities at home, men from other parts of Yoruba country flocked to Ibadan, where they joined one of the existing leaders. Fighters who proved themselves in combat would attract their own military followings, eventually gaining public attention and appointment to leadership positions. Ibadan's army consisted of many smaller personal armies, each with its own leader and made up of his relatives, local volunteers, new immigrants, and war captives. These small armies were the chiefs' primary means for advancement in the state. An advantage of this system was that in war, each chief strove to distinguish himself, and each soldier was intensely loyal to his chief (upon whom his future prospects depended). However, it also meant that Ibadan had to constantly engage in warfare because the leaders always needed to prove

themselves and acquire shares of slaves, which they exported to the coast in exchange for the firearms necessary to arm their followers.²⁰

Around 1840, Fulani jihadist cavalry from Ilorin besieged Osogbo, which was a walled Yoruba town on the edge of the forest and represented an important crossroads from the other Yoruba settlements. Upon a call for help from Osogbo's ruler, an army from Ibadan marched north and entered the town. Since the open ground around Osogbo would favor the highly mobile Ilorin horsemen in conventional battle, the Ibadan infantry, mostly armed with swords and a few flintlocks, conducted a surprise night attack on their enemy's camp, which threw them into complete confusion and flight. In their panic to escape, many Ilorin cavalymen forgot to untie their horses and were cut down. A large number of prisoners and horses were taken, though the latter were not used to re-create the Yoruba cavalry. Another factor in the Ilorin defeat was likely disease; it appears that their soldiers were suffering from dysentery and their horses from the impact of the tsetse fly. Historians consider this Battle of Osogbo to be the most significant engagement of the nineteenth century Yoruba wars because it halted the southward advance of the Fulani jihad and marked the beginning of Ibadan's rise as an expansionist power.²¹

During the 1840s, Ibadan pushed the Ilorin cavalry north to within just a few kilometers of their capital. In 1854, Ibadan intervened to suppress a refugee rebellion in Ile-Ife, which made the Yoruba spiritual capital a tributary state. Throughout the 1850s, armies from Ibadan advanced east into Ijesa, Ekiti, Igbomina, and Akoko territories, where they defeated Ilorin interventionist forces, besieged and destroyed many towns, and accepted the surrender of others. Along the northern border of its new territory, Ibadan constructed a series of defensive posts to guard against Ilorin attack. As more communities were subjugated, free men and slaves from these areas swelled the ranks of Ibadan's armies, which began to enjoy numerical superiority over their enemies. In 1860, Ijayi built a coalition against growing Ibadan imperialism. Along the coast, the Egba and Ijebu blocked Ibadan's access to European firearms and ammunition, raided Ibadan farms to their north, and captured the Ibadan town of Apomu. However, the Ijebu Remo faction refused to join the alliance and continued to provide Ibadan with ammunition. Further inland, Ilorin horsemen attacked south into Ibadan territory, joined forces with an Ijayi army besieging Ogbomoso in the far north of Ibadan's empire, and smashed

the Ibadan tributary town of Ilobu. Early in the war, an Ibadan army drove an Ijayi force, along with its ineffectual Egba allies, back to their capital town, which endured a long siege until its destruction in March 1862. After the destruction of Ijayi, the Egba and Ijebu attacked the Ijebu Remo in an attempt to completely cut Ibadan off from coastal trade. In turn, Ibadan sent an army south against the Egba and Ijebu, but the campaign stalemated because Ibadan forces could not get ammunition and feared attack from the rear. This protracted conflict undermined commerce at coastal Lagos, which the British had seized in 1861 to secure palm oil and suppress the slave trade. As a result, in 1865 the British intervened by sending a small force that used rockets to lift an Egba siege of the Remo town Ikorodu. The Egba and Ijebu then partly lifted their restrictions on Ibadan's access to the coast. With Ibadan distracted by these conflicts, the Ijesa attempted to regain their independence in the 1860s. However, in December 1867, an Ibadan army defeated an Ijesa force and pushed them back to the well-fortified town of Ilesa, which was besieged for several years. Starved into submission, the rebels negotiated a settlement whereby they were given safe passage out of the town, which the Ibadan army entered and took many inhabitants as slaves. Although news of the sacking of Ilesa caused the Egba to tighten their trade restrictions on Ibadan, most other groups in the area abandoned resistance for the next few years.²² The Yoruba wars of the early to mid-1800s caused a surge in the number of slaves exported from what is now western Nigeria. Since this was the same time that Britain was suppressing the oceanic slave trade, the Yoruba were some of the last West African slaves taken to the Americas and sometimes retained their identity, such as in Brazil.

In the early 1600s, in West Africa's forest gap where the savanna extends down to the ocean, Aja people from the coastal slave-trading state of Allada moved north and organized the Dahomey state among disunited local Fon villages. From around 1650, Dahomey ruler Wegbaja led a series of raids and expansionist wars, exported slaves to the Atlantic, and transformed Dahomey into a highly centralized and militarized state. Human sacrifice of war captives became increasingly important to Dahomey religion, particularly in veneration of the king's ancestors, and many human heads and skulls were displayed at the capital. Dahomey maintained a semiprofessional army that was loyal to the king rather than local chiefs because it consisted of mercenaries and conscripted boys from each village who were raised

as soldiers, and it was commanded by a hierarchy of military officers who reported to the monarch. While the primarily infantry force of Dahomey was initially armed with bows and arrows, and throwing clubs, from the late 1600s it acquired firearms on a large scale and developed disciplined drill to produce concentrated firepower. From that point on, Dahomey infantry were armed with both musket and sword, the latter used mostly to decapitate dead and wounded opponents. Authority was centralized, the king obtained and distributed all firearms and ammunition, and soldiers were obliged to surrender whatever captives and heads they had collected to him for a payment of cowry shells. Monopolizing the slave trade in Dahomey, the king exported some slaves in return for firearms and kept others to work royal plantations. It should be noted that since the ruler's main duty was to provide security, he prohibited enslavement of his subjects unless they had committed serious crimes. A distinctive feature of the Dahomey military was the employment of an entirely female unit—called Amazons by European visitors—which originated in the early 1700s as the king's bodyguard and developed into a large elite fighting force in the early 1800s.

During the early 1700s, Dahomey expanded south toward the coast. In 1716, it subjugated the Weme state and in March 1724, under Agaja, it occupied Allada. Refugees from these conquered states formed new coastal slaving centers, with those from Weme establishing Badagri and those from Allada creating Porto Novo. Dahomey's drive to the coast prompted a military intervention in the interior by an Oyo cavalry army in 1726 that defeated Agaja's infantry. Oyo permitted Dahomey to retain Allada in return for tribute. In March 1727, Agaja personally led a small army of 3,000 into the coastal state of Whydah, where they defeated a much larger force of 40,000 that did not put up much resistance because of quarrels between its leaders and collusion with Dahomey. In turn, the Dahomey army destroyed Whydah's capital of Savi, killed around 5,000 inhabitants and taking another 10,000–11,000 captive. Pursuing the Whydah to the coast, they also sacked a Portuguese fort and attacked a French one but were repelled. The ruler of Whydah and his supporters fled west of Lake Ahene, where they established themselves at Geze and Great Popo, and resumed slave trading. The next month, April 1727, the Dahomey army attacked Tofo, a state just north of Allada that had raided one of Agaja's trade caravans, and took 1,800 captives, 400 of whom were sacrificed. In March 1728, another cavalry army from Oyo invaded

Dahomey intending to reinstate the rulers of Allada and Whydah who landed on the coast of their former territory. Agaja fought a series of delaying actions against the Oyo force because he believed that they could not remain long in his country given the need to feed their horses and return home before the coming rains flooded rivers that they would have to cross. With guidance from a renegade Frenchman, the Dahomey army built fortifications supported by cannon looted from Whydah. When the Oyo riders withdrew after 12 days of pillage, Agaja once again seized Whydah, partly destroyed the French fort, and used canoes to pursue the fleeing Whydahs across Lake Ahene. In 1729, Oyo once again invaded Dahomey and despite Agaja's continued delaying actions, they remained for two months destroying fortified towns and taking captives. This disruption caused famine among the displaced people of Dahomey. Taking advantage of this situation, the exiled Whydahs, supplemented by allies from Great Popo, returned home with an army of 15,000. Short of manpower because of the Oyo invasion, Agaja reinforced his army with a female unit and marched to Whydah, where they routed the exiles and their allies. Agaja replenished his forces by hiring mercenaries and in 1730 paid tribute, including 600 slaves, to avoid further Oyo attacks. Attempts by the exiled ruler of Jakin, the coastal port of Allada that had been taken by Dahomey in 1724, to return with the support of several exiled groups such as the defeated Weme prompted Agaja to destroy the town in 1734. During these coastal campaigns, several times Agaja permitted exiles to return to their homes but then ambushed and enslaved thousands of them. Around the same time, resistance by Whydah exiles declined as they fought with their Popo hosts, Agaja ruthlessly pursued them, and many returned home to accept rule by Dahomey. During the early 1730s, Dahomey also fought an inconclusive campaign to subdue the neighboring Mahi to his northeast, and Agaja had several of his officers executed for objecting to continued operations during the rainy season. Although some historians have seen Agaja's drive to the coast as intended to suppress the export of slaves, he wanted to eliminate the middlemen in the trade, Allada and Whydah, and create a Dahomey royal monopoly to deal with the Europeans. While exiles at Badagri and Porto Novo did not represent a military threat to Dahomey, they pulled European trade away from the Dahomey port of Glenhoe. As the Dahomey army was not skilled with canoes, these commercial rivals were safe from attack as they were on the other side of the Weme River and Lake

Nokue. In 1737, a 13,000-strong Dahomey army raided west toward Great Popo by requisitioning canoes from local people. They looted the Dutch fort at Keta and killed its governor, who was accused of helping the Popo. Ashangmo, the ruler of Little Popo who had deserted the Dahomey army, led a force that destroyed the Dahomey canoes. Trapped in enemy territory, the entire Dahomey force died from starvation, disease, or combat.

Following Agaja's death in 1740, there was a short civil war in which the late ruler's youngest son, Tegbesu, emerged victorious with the support of the Dahomey army commander. Since Agaja had stopped paying tribute to Oyo in the late 1730s, Oyo invaded Dahomey in 1742 and 1743, destroyed many of the kingdom's towns, and drove its people into the bush. Taking advantage of the turmoil in the interior, Whydah exiles and Ashangmo's Popo raided Dahomey's coastal trading center of Glenhoe in 1743 and 1747, respectively. Threatened with another invasion in 1748, Tegbesu agreed to pay tribute to Oyo, which Dahomey would continue to do until the 1820s. Throughout the 1750s, Whydah exiles and Popo continued disruptive raids against Glenhoe. These became less significant after 1763, when a large combined force of Whydah exiles and Popo attacked Glenhoe and was decisively defeated by a Dahomey army assisted by artillery from the British fort. Tegbesu also continued the war against the Mahi to the northeast and successfully besieged the town of Gbowele in 1753. While Tegbesu and subsequent rulers partly relaxed Dahomey's royal monopoly on the slave trade and began incorporating rather than exterminating conquered peoples, the state retained its distinctive military ethos, which prompted a nineteenth-century British explorer to describe it as a "small black Sparta."²³ During the 1770s and 1780s, Dahomey came to resent the competition that Porto Novo, protected by Oyo, represented to its own trade center of Whydah. In the 1790s, Dahomey refused to send its regular tribute to Oyo. In turn, Oyo invaded Dahomey and the tribute was continued. In 1803, Dahomey began to raid Porto Novo, which caused Oyo to shift its slave caravans, protected by cavalry and archers, further east to Lagos.

Coming to power in 1818, Dahomey ruler Gezo saw the Fulani jihad against Oyo as an opportunity to reassert his state's independence. In 1823, he refused to pay tribute and killed several Oyo ambassadors. An Oyo army sent to suppress the rebellion was defeated in Mahi country by a Dahomey force. While a second Oyo army of 4,000 cavalry and infantry were on the way, Gezo besieged the Mahi town of

Kpaloko, which was an ally of Oyo. After the Oyo force arrived to try to lift the siege, Gezo led a successful night attack on its camp, and the Oyo general was subsequently executed in front of Kpaloko, which was then captured. Since the significantly weakened Oyo could not fight a protracted war, Dahomey regained its autonomy. By the 1840s, Dahomey had conquered Mahi and made the western Yoruba state of Ketu a tributary. In the 1830s, Dahomey and the Egba came into conflict over Egbado, which was sandwiched between them, and control over the coastal trade at Porto Novo and Badagri. Gezo directed the Dahomey army to destroy the Egbado trading town of Refurefu and took its entire population as slaves to work a plantation. In 1842, the Egba captured the Egbado town of Otta and besieged another settlement at Ado. Around 1844, Gezo led a relief force toward Ado but one morning, while breaking camp, it was caught in a surprise Egba attack and fled, abandoning the Dahomey royal umbrella, stool, and war charms. In early 1851, a Dahomey army consisting of 10,000 male and 6,000 female warriors crossed Ketu country and approached the Egba capital of Abeokuta. Warned by their intelligence network, the Egba were well prepared for the attack and mustered an army of 15,000 men equipped with firearms. British missionaries provided ammunition and several small cannon. On March 3, the Dahomey army, after driving an Egba contingent into Abeokuta, concentrated its attack on one of the gates that informers had previously told them was the weakest part of the defense. However, these informers had been double agents, and the Egba had actually reinforced their defenses at that spot. During the battle, the Egba men gained additional motivation when they discovered that many of the Dahomey warriors were women. Inside Abeokuta, Egba women led by Madame Tinubu formed a supply chain that delivered water, food, and ammunition to the battlements. After 10 failed assaults on the city's walls, the Dahomey army conducted an orderly withdrawal, keeping Egba pursuers at bay. The next day, the Dahomey force attacked the town of Ishaga, where they had been given the false information about Abeokuta's weak point, but was forced to continue its withdrawal by the arrival of the Egba army. During this campaign, 3,000 Dahomey fighters were killed and hundreds were taken prisoner. On March 15, 1864, a 10,000-strong Dahomey army once again attacked Abeokuta but were repelled, having lost almost half their number. This ended Dahomey ambitions to expand further east into Yoruba territory.²⁴

Inhabiting the forest west of the Niger River and east of the Yoruba states, in what is now southern Nigeria, the Edo-speaking people developed a strong agricultural economy and by around 900 had formed a state centered on Benin City. Town-based traders and artisans emerged, and Benin engaged in trans-Saharan trade to acquire copper and salt. Around 1200, local people overthrew their ineffective ruler and established a new dynasty originating from the royal family of the neighboring Yoruba state of Ife. Around 1250, Oba (King) Ewedo began centralizing royal power by significantly reducing the power of the nobles, who were forbidden to sit or carry ceremonial swords in the king's presence. Ewedo also separated the town from the palace and created a hierarchy of appointed royal officials. Laying the foundation for future expansion, he introduced horses that were used on a limited basis, new types of swords and bows, and a more efficient military organization. After winning a civil war in which Benin City was burned, Oba Ewuare came to power in the 1440s and reformed the political system by incorporating town chiefs into the central government and appointed them on the basis of merit. He placed the army under his direct command and was assisted by a number of appointed and hereditary military leaders. The nucleus of the army consisted of permanent forces based at the capital city and royal palace—the latter included a unit dedicated to the queen mother—and when required, these were supplemented by units raised from neighboring villages. Fighting with spears and bows, these infantry forces were supplied by porters and canoes which were important in the Niger Delta and on the Lagos Lagoon. Ewuare also expanded Benin City's earthwork fortifications and network of roads. Remembered for conquering 201 towns and villages, he expanded the borders of the Benin Kingdom and, in particular, pressed east to subdue Igbo groups on the west bank of the Niger River and sent one of his sons south to create the vassal state of Itsekiri near the coast. Following Ewuare's death, there was a brief period of instability until Ozolua, one of his sons, came to power around 1480, put down rebellions, and expanded the empire even more aggressively. He reputedly won 200 battles, sometimes fought two campaigns in a single year, and installed his sons as rulers of neighboring subject states. One of Ozolua's most impressive victories was over the Yoruba state of Ijebu, which extended Benin's authority far west to the Lagos Lagoon. Around 1500, after Ozolua had starved the rebellious northeast town of Uromi into submission during a three-month siege, his own

war-weary soldiers poisoned him. Given their role in establishing Benin as an empire, these warrior kings would be remembered as Ewuare the Great and Ozolua the Conquerer.²⁵

In 1487, the Portuguese established a fort at Ughoton on the Niger River and began trading with Benin, which exported ivory, palm oil, pepper, and slaves for cloth and salt. Products of Benin's many wars, the slaves were sent to Akan to trade for gold and to Sao Tome and Principe to work the Portuguese sugar plantations. In 1514, Benin sent a delegation to Portugal to request firearms, which were used by small Portuguese detachments allied to the Benin army, to give them military superiority in the region. However, the Benin rulers' rejection of Christianity and their ban on the export of male slaves resulted in the Portuguese preventing the import of firearms into the kingdom for the remainder of the 1500s, though some were likely smuggled from Sao Tome in the 1530s, and the Dutch seem to have continued this restriction during the 1600s.²⁶ Beginning in the early 1600s, the kings of Benin, plagued by succession disputes, began to lose power to increasingly influential officials. From around 1600, a law forbade the Oba from commanding military expeditions, which were now placed under the leadership of the Iyase, the head of the association of town chiefs, and other specialized positions such as head of intelligence were created for chiefs. Changing trade patterns were also important as during the 1600s exports shifted from slaves and ivory controlled by the monarchy to cloth produced at the village level. These factors led to a long civil war from 1689 to 1721 between royalists and supporters of the town chiefs. Although the royalists eventually won, Benin became less centrally governed, and the military command structure was altered to reduce the Iyase's authority. The civil war also resulted in Benin losing territory and influence, and it spent much of the 1700s suppressing revolts and reasserting its claims west toward Lagos Lagoon. It was during the civil war that firearms, primarily flintlocks, were acquired from Europeans on a large scale and were important in securing a royalist victory. While there is an oral tradition that Benin attempted to manufacture its own firearms during the late 1700s to reduce dependence on Europeans, there is no corroborating evidence.²⁷

Inhabited by the Igbo people in the interior and the Ijo closer to the coast, the forested Niger Delta in what is now southeastern Nigeria was controlled by many different communities ranging from small centralized states to independent villages governed by councils of

elders. Wars in the delta were usually fought over access to land, though other issues such as the mysterious death of a relative in another community could also spark hostilities. Preceded by negotiations meant to avoid fighting, warfare between Igbo communities was regulated by formal rules and usually produced few fatalities, did not involve women and children, and placed markets and religious shrines off limits. Small skirmishes usually occurred during periods of reduced agricultural activity and represented a way for young men to prove themselves. Wars were usually ended when women initiated negotiations, and leaders from both sides would discuss a "balance sheet" with the side with the lowest casualties providing victims to the other. An obviously victorious side could have a boundary adjusted in its favor, but the concept of completely conquering another community was unknown. Although the principle of ending war with equal casualties tended to minimize death on the battlefield, men who beheaded an opponent and kept the skull entered the prestigious warrior elite.

There were several notable exceptions to the usual Igbo practice of warfare in precolonial times. Igbo communities in the Cross River area, the Adam, Edda, and Ohafia, developed a reputation for pursuing military glory by collecting human heads, cultivated a terrifying reputation by ignoring the rules of war, and were regularly employed by the Aro as mercenaries on slave raids. Ohafia men were divided between "heroes" who engaged in warfare and enjoyed full citizenship privileges and "cowards" who were regularly humiliated. The Ezza, an Igbo group located in the agriculturally rich northeast, expanded their land by fighting a long series of vicious wars against neighbors whose villages were destroyed and people subjugated or driven off. Among the Ezza, men of certain age-grades were obliged to perform military service. During the 1700s, the northern Igbo around Nsukka, living on the frontier of the forest and savanna, fought a series of wars with the expansionist Igala state under its famous warrior leader Onoja Ogboni. Given the area's mixed terrain, the Igala cavalry and archers enjoyed an advantage over the machete-armed Igbo infantry.

Further south, in the delta, canoes were extremely important for trade and warfare, and the Ijo of the coast became notorious pirates. During the 1700s, this area experienced an intensification of slaving and became the source for most slaves taken from West Africa. This led to a militarization of delta communities, and warfare became more

widespread and destructive. When mobilizing an expedition, the king of Abo would call on subordinate chiefs and village heads to supply varying numbers of crewed canoes depending on the size of their communities. In the early 1840s, the king of Abo could muster a fleet of 300 war canoes. It appears that the Aro, an Igbo group who became middlemen in the slave trade, were the first to adopt firearms in the 1700s, which mostly had a psychological impact on adversaries. The use of firearms, mostly flintlocks, became widespread among the Igbo in the 1800s, though gunpowder and shot were often of low quality. It appears that guns remained in the hands of prosperous and elite warriors—among the special military elite of the Obibi, each man owned five guns—and that many people used bows and arrows. By the start of the nineteenth century, Niger Delta war canoes had small cannon tied to the bow and stern, which were aimed by moving the entire boat; some had swivel guns mounted to the sides; and the crew was outfitted with spears and firearms. On the eastern delta, the basic unit of social organization shifted from traditional houses based on kinship to the “canoe house,” which was a small trading and fighting group that operated and maintained a canoe manned by 50 fighters. Canoe houses became the primary instrument of capturing slaves who could be exported for firearms or other goods, or they could be assimilated as new soldiers who, through bravery in combat, could rise through the ranks to become head of the house. Successful canoe houses could spawn networks of satellites. By the 1800s, eastern delta trading towns such as Bonny and Calabar consisted of a dozen or more canoe houses, with the head of the senior house also serving as head of the town who chaired meetings of the other house heads, commanded the combined canoe fleet, and served as titular leader of the secret society of warriors who had taken human life in combat. Delta towns became fortified with high earth and wood walls, moats, removable bridges, pits filled with sharpened stakes, and watchtowers. Decentralized groups began to band together in military federations for mutual defense. As in other parts of West Africa, decentralized communities surrounded themselves with walls as slave raiders usually lacked artillery and did not favor long sieges, moved to defensible hilltop locations, planted close to home and went out to work the fields in armed groups, and sought protection by paying tribute to more powerful neighbors.²⁸ When the oceanic slave trade was suppressed in the early to mid-1800s, the same canoe houses that had been responsible for slaving easily switched to the export of palm oil.

During the nineteenth century, abolitionist naval operations were staged in West African waters. In 1808, the year after Britain outlawed the slave trade, it sent two warships to seize slaving vessels along the West African coast, but these had little impact on the vast area. With the end of the Napoleonic wars, Britain formally created the West Africa Squadron of the Royal Navy in 1819 with six ships based at Freetown, Sierra Leone, and signed treaties that gave it authority to search and seize slave vessels from other maritime powers. When American-made slaving vessels proved faster than the squadron's ships, they pressed into service captured craft such as the Baltimore clipper HMS *Black Joke* that ran down 21 slavers and freed 7,000 slaves between 1828 and 1832. During an 80-minute engagement, this small ship, with one gun on a pivot, defeated and captured the 14-gun Spanish *El Admirante* after it left Lagos. During the 1840s, the squadron became more effective as other countries agreed to an "equipment clause" whereby ships could be seized for containing articles related to slaving such as chains and shackles, agreements were made with African rulers to stop slave exports (though they were often repudiated), and the squadron was increased to 36 ships, some of which were steam-driven vessels that could catch the fastest sailing ships. Between 1811 and 1867, the squadron intercepted about 1,500 slavers, estimated as one in five, and liberated about 160,000 out of 2.7 million slaves exported from Africa during that period. At roughly the same time, over 2,000 British officers and sailors died, mostly from disease, and the squadron cost £7.5 million. During the early 1840s, the squadron acted more aggressively. In May 1840, HMS *Wanderer* under Captain Joseph Denman blockaded the Spanish slaver enclave of Gallinas in present-day Sierra Leone, capturing 15 vessels, and in December mounted an amphibious raid that destroyed 8 slave depots and freed 800 captives on their way to Cuba. During 1842, West Africa Squadron ships staged similar raids on Portuguese slaving stations at Cabinda and Ambriz in what is now northern Angola, destroying infrastructure and freeing over 1,300 Brazil-bound slaves. While this more aggressive approach contributed to the temporary decline of the Brazilian slave trade, it was relaxed as London ordered the squadron to refrain from blockades and raids against foreign powers it was not at war with, and Denman was dragged through a six-year and ultimately unsuccessful court case by the Gallinas slavers. In December 1851, the squadron bombarded the coastal slaving center of Lagos, replacing a local ruler with one who signed an antislavery treaty. The

United States outlawed the slave trade in 1808, and in the Treaty of Ghent that ended the War of 1812 with Britain committed to send ships to patrol the West African coast where, between 1818 and 1821, the U.S. Navy seized 11 slaving vessels and freed 573 Africans. Given slaver legal action against U.S. naval officers and American resentment of British search and seizure of American ships (which Washington had forbidden), these irregular patrols were discontinued for two decades. However, the United States came under pressure from abolitionists at home and the British government, which resulted in an 1842 treaty with London in which Washington committed to maintaining a permanent naval presence off the West African coast to intercept slavers. The U.S. Navy's Africa Squadron was established the next year with four ships under Commodore Matthew C. Perry, who went on to force the opening of Japan in the 1850s. Because it was based at Cape Verde, the small force could patrol only north of the equator, which kept it away from the most heavily slaved parts of West Africa. Over the next decade, it seized just over a dozen vessels. With the end of the Mexican-American War in 1848 and the dismissal of slaver suits, the squadron shifted operations south and cooperated with the British. In 1859, the squadron's base was moved south of the equator to Luanda, and it received 4 steamers to add to its 4 sloops-of-war, enabling it to seize 21 vessels over the next two years. This was a considerable portion of its historical total of 36. The squadron was withdrawn in 1861 with the outbreak of the American Civil War. Although its effectiveness was limited, the Africa Squadron was the first major military undertaking by the United States in pursuit of liberal ideals. During the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the coastal Kru (called Kroomen or Krumen) of Liberia, formerly intermediaries in the slave trade, became specialist paid sailors on British and American naval vessels who were employed as members of shore parties to minimize European exposure to tropical disease and in the intense below-deck heat of steamships. This resulted in a Kru diaspora along the West African coast, with communities emerging in Freetown and Lagos.²⁹

CONCLUSION

The changing nature of warfare in precolonial West Africa was closely tied to trade networks and geography. With the expansion of the trans-Saharan trade and the coming of Islam, Mali, Songhay, and Borno

used highly mobile and hard-hitting cavalry forces to dominate the open Sahel and savanna, building vast territorial empires from the 1200s to 1600s. Horse warfare continued to be important to Saharan nomads such as the Tuareg, who took control of trading centers in the early 1700s, and jihadists, who established new states such as Sokoto in the late 1700s and early 1800s. The development of the trans-Atlantic slave trade along the West African coast led to the rise of large centralized and militarized states along the forest belt such as Benin, Dahomey, and Asante. While short range bows with poisoned arrows remained the main weapon of forest warfare for many years, during the late 1600s, most of the major states adopted imported European flintlocks on a large scale and changed tactics accordingly. It is important to note that large warhorses could not reproduce in much of the Sahel and savanna, and while forest societies had Iron Age technology, they never manufactured firearms. As such, military power in West Africa came to depend on key imports—horses from North Africa and firearms from European ships on the coast—that were acquired by exporting slaves who were captured through increasingly endemic warfare. While limited coastal and riverine naval warfare was fairly rare except in the Niger Delta, small boats were used primarily for transporting armies across rivers or lakes and carrying supplies. Armies without boats such as Dahomey and the Moroccans who invaded Songhay were at a disadvantage. The intensity of tropical disease in the forest restricted foreign invaders such as the Moroccans from the north and Europeans from the coast.

Chapter 3

East Africa to ca. 1870

East Africa includes the Indian Ocean coast, the Horn of Africa, and the great lakes region of the interior. The coast of present-day Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia are mostly desert or semidesert. Much of today's Kenya and Tanzania are dominated by the vast Serengeti grassland. The interior of what is now Ethiopia is mountainous, while the great lakes area of present-day Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi is often mountainous and forested. For purposes of this chapter, East Africa will be defined as beginning in the north with present-day South Sudan and extending southward following the Great Rift Valley to present-day Malawi. A central theme in East African history is the development of oceanic trade with the Middle East and Asia first conducted by Arab sailors and eventually, after 1500, dominated by the Portuguese. Detailed knowledge of the history of the interior of precolonial East Africa is extremely uneven. Documentary evidence allows the history of Christian Ethiopia to be traced back over 1,000 years, and the rich oral traditions of centralized states such as Rwanda and Buganda can be used to reconstruct events that happened several centuries ago. However, very limited oral and archeological evidence means that little is known about many parts of the East African interior, particularly the history of the decentralized societies of Kenya and Tanzania, before around 1800.

Swahili became Muslims. Militarily weak, Swahili towns were independent, and there was intense economic competition between them. Given that they had occasionally been attacked by inland groups, Swahili fortifications usually faced toward the land. By the end of the 1400s, some Swahili had acquired simple firearms but were not skilled in their use. Continuing their movement down the west and southwestern African coast, Portuguese mariners bound for rich trading in India first rounded the Cape of Good Hope and entered the Indian Ocean in 1498. Portuguese ships were larger, more maneuverable, and more heavily armed with cannon than Indian Ocean vessels. The initial expedition, led by Vasco da Gama, bombed the Swahili towns of Mogadishu and Mozambique. Countering competition from Mombasa to the south and Pate to the north, Malindi made a lasting alliance with the Portuguese. Da Gama's subsequent 1502 expedition established the pattern of Portuguese naval activity on Africa's east coast. Swahili towns were forced to pay tribute to Portuguese fleets or face bombardment. In 1503, Portuguese captain Ruy Lourenco Ravasco bombed Zanzibar until the ruler agreed to an annual payment. Ravasco then sailed up and down the coast seizing trade ships for ransom. In 1505, a Portuguese flotilla of 11 ships under Francisco de Almeida and two other expeditions the next year attacked Swahili towns and seized Mozambique, Sofala, and Kilwa, where they built forts. The Portuguese were the first to use state-sponsored violence to control the Indian Ocean trade. Although the Egyptians, Indians, and Persians assembled a large combined fleet to regain the Indian Ocean, it was defeated by 18 Portuguese vessels at the Battle of Diu in India in 1509. Subsequently, the Portuguese established a chain of fortified coastal enclaves along the Indian Ocean rim. Since the east coast of Africa was a low priority, the Portuguese withdrew from Kilwa in 1512, leaving a local vassal in charge. Towns along the northern section of the coast, such as Mogadishu, remained independent. In the 1530s, the Portuguese began to penetrate the interior along the Zambezi River, hoping to secure sources of gold and ivory to pay for spices and other goods in India.

Starting in the 1540s, the new Ottoman rulers of Egypt, with a better navy than their Mamluk predecessors, expanded down the Red Sea and into the Indian Ocean, where they presented themselves as liberators to the Swahili and challenged the Portuguese. As discussed in Chapter 1, Ottoman ambitions in the Indian Ocean were delayed in 1571 when they were defeated by a Christian coalition naval force at

the Battle of Lepanto off the coast of Greece. However, in 1585, the appearance of a single Ottoman ship off the East African coast prompted a general Swahili rebellion, which was quickly suppressed by the Portuguese. Several years later, a small Ottoman naval force under Amir Ali Bey encouraged another Swahili revolt. The entire Portuguese garrison on Pemba Island was annihilated, and the Portuguese ally of Malindi attacked. A Portuguese fleet from India restored control. The entire population of Faza on Pate Island was killed, all its plantations and ships were destroyed, and the head of its ruler was sent to Goa, the Portuguese colony in India. Two years later, Ali Bey returned with a slightly larger naval force and occupied Mombasa, where his men were besieged by a mainland group called the Zimba, which had recently sacked Kilwa. A Portuguese relief fleet attacked Mombasa in 1589 and then withdrew to let the Zimba finish off the city. The Ottoman incursions showed the Portuguese that they needed a strong naval base along the northern East African coast and between 1593 and 1596, they built the imposing Fort Jesus at Mombasa. A member of the Malindi royal family was installed as ruler, taxed the local population and traders, and sent tribute to the Portuguese. Portuguese relations with the Mombasa rulers were not always cordial. In 1631, Dom Jeronimo, the Christian ruler of Mombasa, annihilated the Portuguese garrison and repelled a Portuguese relief force. After Jeronimo abandoned Mombasa and became a pirate, the Portuguese recaptured the town in 1632 without resistance, imposing direct rule and taxation. During the late 1600s, the Arab Sultanate of Oman, which had expelled the Portuguese from its capital of Muscat in 1650, began to push them out of the northern section of the East African coast. Omani naval expeditions raided the Portuguese at Zanzibar in 1652, Mombasa in 1661, and Mozambique in 1669. In 1696, seven Omani ships carrying 3,000 men arrived at Mombasa and after a 30-month siege, they took control in 1698 with a Portuguese relief force from India arriving too late. The Omanis seized Zanzibar in the same year. The East African coast was now controlled by the Omanis in the north and the Portuguese in the south.¹

Before around 1600, the many small states on the large Indian Ocean island of Madagascar fought many minor wars over cattle and control of people. Without specialist warriors, fighting was conducted by farmers and therefore usually happened between December and March before the harvest. The objectives of warfare were frequently seizing cattle or grain stores, which would cause hunger in the

enemy's community, and taking captives for ransom. Battles were usually preceded by exchange of insults, war songs, and deployment of magical charms—any of which may have frightened off one of the belligerent armies. In the south, violence was more intense because men of the Zafiraminia aristocracy, originally from Sumatra, were shown no mercy and their subjects were made prisoners.

The ports of western Madagascar had a strong connection to the East African coast and were peripherally involved in the Indian Ocean trade. The first European sailors to arrive in Madagascar were the Portuguese, who sacked the northwest port of Sada in 1506. During the 1600s, Dutch, French, English, Anglo-American, and Danish vessels established regular commerce for slaves (some of whom were shipped to North America and the Caribbean), and cattle. Similar to what happened on the coast of West Africa, this led to the rise of a centralized Sakalava Kingdom under Lahifotsy that, in the mid-1600s, expanded from the interior to control the southwestern coast. Succession disputes led to the creation of a number of other Sakalava states such as when Tsimenata, a fugitive son of the recently deceased Lahifotsy, acquired firearms from English merchants in the late 1600s and used them to conquer the northern part of the island, including the important port of Mazalagem Nova, to establish the powerful kingdom of Boina. Sakalava armies relied heavily on firearms acquired by waging wars specifically to capture slaves who were exported to Europeans on the coast. In 1719, a Dutch visitor to the midwest coast recorded that local men could handle muskets as expertly as any European, though less than a century before a single man with a firearm could frighten off many warriors. The Sakalava kings often employed European military advisors or mercenaries such as Tsimenata, who used 20 sailors from New York in his conquest of Mazalagem Nova. By the 1690s, between 400 and 830 European pirates who had been expelled from the Caribbean were based in northern Madagascar from where they raided ships carrying Muslim pilgrims from South Asia to Mecca and sold their military services to the Sakalava until they were expelled by the Royal Navy in the 1720s. Tom Similaho, son of an English pirate and a local woman who visited England and India, used his military skills and access to firearms to become chief minister to Boina's second ruler Toakafa. Eventually, he formed his own kingdom in eastern Madagascar where his subjects called themselves Betsimisaraka (the many undivided), which became one of the island's major ethnic groups. While wars in Madagascar were often decided by just

one battle, Similaho (usually called Ratsimilaho to indicate royal status) introduced European-style protracted campaigns. The Betsimisaraka Kingdom, during the mid-1700s, benefited from the shift of the European slave trade from the island's west to east coast, which was closer to the new French plantation islands of Mauritius and Reunion.

In the early 1700s, several of Madagascar's central highland states merged into a kingdom. However, by 1740, it had collapsed, the area suffered from slave raiding of fortified hilltop villages, and displaced people formed armed bands. Beginning in 1778, Andrianampoinimerina (the king at the heart of Imerina) used warfare and diplomacy, as well as alliance with powerful Boina, to subjugate all the war-weary small states of the central highlands and re-establish the kingdom of Imerina with its capital at Antananarivo ("the town of a thousand"). Magical amulets captured from these small states were given to Imerina's military leaders, who became central to a new religion. Promising his subjects that they would not be enslaved, Andrianampoinimerina raided for slaves in neighboring areas, imposed a monopoly on slave exports from the east coast, and increased prices to enable him to amass wealth in imported silver coins and a substantial armory of firearms. Expelled from the trade, the Betsimisaraka rulers resorted to sending fleets of hundreds of war canoes to take slaves from the Comoro Islands and the East African coast. When Andrianampoinimerina died in 1809, he was the most powerful ruler in Madagascar and controlled the entire central highlands. Antananarivo was the island's largest town with 25,000 people.

The late ruler's son, Radama I, took over Imerina and led a series of military campaigns to suppress rebellion, which caused hunger by taking men away from their farms for long periods and produced many slaves who were traded for silver and firearms. Since loyal subjects of Imerina were not to be enslaved, the expanding kingdom had to send raiding expeditions further away, which required greater logistical organization and time than the peasant army possessed. In 1817, Radama entered into a formal alliance with the abolitionist British (who had seized the island of Mauritius during the Napoleonic wars) in which Imerina banned slave exports and also accepted British missionaries and military advisors, firearms and ammunition, and uniforms. With an army of 40,000 farmer conscripts and occasional support from British warships, Radama embarked on the conquest of most of Madagascar. Given the logistical difficulty in campaigns against the Sakalava kingdom of Menabe in the west, the Imerina ruler

created a standing army centered on an elite permanent force of men from the noble caste that quickly grew from 400 to 1,000 and was trained and commanded by Jamaican British Sergeant John (or James) Brady, who became a general. With the addition of farmers conscripted on the basis of a state census, Imerina could field an army of 25,000 for a single operation. Men not in the military were obliged to provide labor or other services for the king. Slaves captured on campaign were no longer exported, and women assumed additional agricultural work. However, lack of a formal supply system continued to plague Radama's army, which sometimes lost half its men from hunger and disease during the wars of the 1820s, particularly when it left the highlands. By 1825, Radama had subjugated most of the economically useful parts of the island and established fortified garrisons along the coast in a series of campaigns in which his army often killed the entire male population of some areas and enslaved the women and children. He was now ruler of the kingdom of Madagascar.

With Radama's death in 1828, a clique of army officers made wealthy by war booty orchestrated a coup to put Queen Ranavalona I, one of the late ruler's wives, in power and from that point, they became the power behind the throne. Over the next few decades, the military declined given poor organization, morale problems among unpaid conscripts, and mission school graduate officers distracted by trade and politics. By the 1850s, Imerina struggled to mount a 2,000-strong expedition beyond the highlands, bandits became more aggressive, and the Sakalava kings of the west regained autonomy and exported slaves to the clove plantations of Omani Zanzibar. Wanting to avoid foreign domination, Ranavalona I repudiated the alliance with the British and during the 1830s and 1840s employed shipwrecked Frenchman Jean Laborde to oversee the construction of a firearms factory. In 1845, when the queen threatened Europeans and local Christian converts, French and British warships bombarded Tamatave (on the east coast), which was raided by a joint landing party. In 1869, mission-educated Queen Ranavalona II made Anglican Christianity the kingdom's official religion and ordered the burning of traditional talismans. More British missionaries and soldiers arrived. While many of the queen's subjects converted out of loyalty, traditional religion remained active underground, and the rise of Christianity weakened the bond between the monarchy and the people. Beginning in 1872, renowned military leader prime minister Rainilaiarivony reformed the kingdom's military by employing British

advisors, purchasing weapons from Britain and the United States while continuing local manufacture, introducing a five-year period of conscription, and ending a corrupt system whereby senior officers appointed aide-de-camps. In 1877, all the slaves in the kingdom were emancipated.²

THE HORN OF AFRICA: ETHIOPIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS

By 200 or 300 CE, Aksum, a state located in what is now Eritrea and northern Ethiopia, had developed strong trade ties along the Red Sea to Egypt and the eastern Roman Empire. Aksum exported ivory and slaves, and imported silver, gold, olive oil, and wine. Possibly to cement his economic relationship with the Greek-speaking eastern Mediterranean, the Aksum ruler Ezana adopted Christianity during the first half of the fourth century. Aksum expanded and around 350 invaded the neighboring kingdom of Meroe, as stated in Chapter 1, and during the 500s, its forces crossed the Red Sea to conquer parts of the southern Arabian Peninsula in what is now Yemen. While little is known of Aksum's military, it likely possessed a strong navy to protect its merchant ships on the Red Sea and ferry troops across to Arabia. The rise of Islam and its rapid expansion across the Middle East and North Africa in the 600s and 700s led directly to the decline of Aksum as it became cut off from other Christian powers and trade between the Indian and Mediterranean Oceans shifted from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf.

Aksum moved southward into the highlands and evolved into an isolated Christian Ethiopian state controlled by local nobility and focused on agriculture. Around 1000, the emergence of an independent Egypt revived Red Sea trade in which Ethiopia began to export female slaves, probably captured from highland communities around Lake Tana, to southern Arabia. Around 1150, the Zagwe dynasty, originally a Christian military and political elite class, took power in Ethiopia and initiated a period of expansion. With a large army, Ethiopia advanced south into Gojjam and Shewa. Associates or members of the ruling family, Christian military leaders were appointed governors of newly conquered areas that were also settled with Christian Ethiopians who carved religious buildings out of rock formations. Prospering from revived external trade, the Christian community in Shewa under Yekumo Amlak rebelled against the Zagwe rulers in the 1260s. After several battles, the last Zagwe king was killed in 1270, and

Yekuno Amlak declared himself head of a new dynasty that gained legitimacy by claiming ancestry from biblical king Solomon. Abandoning the Zagwe concept of a fixed capital, the Solomonid rulers lived in vast tented military camps that moved to the scene of the latest conflict and lived off local food supplies. In medieval Ethiopia, the system of land tenure was closely related to military service. Masters allowed their vassals to hold land on the understanding that they fight during war, which meant that massive numbers of part-time soldiers could be mobilized. During the early 1500s, an Italian visitor recorded that the Ethiopian emperor went on campaign with an army of at least 200,000 or 300,000 men, and Portuguese sources put the figure at 100,000. However, lack of a logistical system meant that these soldiers survived by looting local peasants, which meant that an Ethiopian army operating in its own territory could inflict serious damage on the kingdom.

Although Ethiopia was distracted by succession disputes in the late 1200s, it managed to expand west of Shewa. Ruling from 1312 to 1342, Amda Tsiyon, grandson of Yekuno Amlak, consolidated the kingdom and led a series of expansionist campaigns that were also aimed at controlling trade routes to the coast against Muslim states to the south and east. In 1332, he undertook a massive invasion of the Muslim states of Ifat, Hadya, Dawaro, and Bali, which extended what was becoming the Ethiopian Empire south to the top of the Great Rift Valley. In response, Muslims rallied around the newly formed kingdom of Adal, east of Ethiopia, which gained military strength through alliances with Somali nomads and raided Ethiopia's Christian frontier tributaries. In 1403, the Ethiopian ruler Dawit led a campaign into Adal that killed its king and drove most of its ruling family to Yemen. Eventually, the royal family returned and re-established authority over Adal, which benefitted from Indian Ocean trade and firearms from the Ottoman Empire. While Zara Yaqob tried to centralize the Ethiopian state from 1434 to 1468, a series of young and ineffective rulers weakened the empire during the late 1400s and early 1500s. Tensions between Ethiopia and Adal increased. Beginning in the 1490s, Imam Mahfuz, a Muslim religious and military leader, led Adal forces in 25 annual raids into Ethiopia during Lent. Weakened by religious fasting, the Ethiopians found it difficult to resist, and Adal raiders seized slaves for export to Arabia as well as cattle. These attacks ceased in 1517 when Ethiopian ruler Lebna Dengal led an army to Mahfuz's camp, where the Imam was decapitated and his followers fled.

In 1526, Ahmad ibn Ibrahim, who the Ethiopians called Gagn or "the left handed," became ruler of Adal and declared jihad against Christian Ethiopia. Ahmad encouraged Adal border towns to stop sending tribute to Ethiopia and invaded the Ethiopian highlands, taking slaves who were then exported to Arabia in return for firearms. In March 1529, at the Battle of Shimbra-Kure fought 80 kilometers south of present-day Addis Ababa, Ahmad's army defeated a larger Ethiopian force (though both sides sustained heavy casualties). Ahmad's victory has been attributed to his deployment of a unit armed with matchlocks, which was the first time Ethiopians faced firearms in battle. To placate his anxious men, Ahmad withdrew from the Ethiopian highlands. Around 1530 and 1531, he launched a new invasion of southern Ethiopia. In October 1531, with Turkish cannon that panicked the Ethiopian army, Ahmad won the Battle of Amba Cella (also called Antukyah). This allowed the Adal army to march north, where they looted churches, including one where the Ethiopian rulers were traditionally crowned. Subsequently, the Ethiopian leader Lebna Dengal directed his army to retreat and desperately tried to rally support against the invading Muslims who occupied the area from the Shewa Plateau in the south to present-day Eritrea in the north. Only a quarter of Ethiopia remained unoccupied. When Ahmad's forces captured Amhara and Lasta in 1533 and Tigray in 1535, the Ethiopian ruler became a fugitive, fleeing from one mountain stronghold to another. A desperate Lebna Dengal then appealed to the Portuguese, who had made contact with Ethiopia in 1508 and were vying with the Ottomans over control of the Red Sea, for assistance against a common Muslim enemy. Adal forces were becoming overstretched and failed to consolidate their conquests. Allied Somali nomads returned home with their loot.

In February 1541, Christovao da Gama, son of the famous Vasco, led 400 well-armed Portuguese musketeers who landed on the Red Sea coast at Massawa and marched inland to link up with Christian Ethiopian forces. News of the Portuguese arrival prompted some Ethiopians who had supported Ahmad to desert him in favor of Empress Seble Wangel, widow of the recently deceased ruler. The Portuguese contingent clashed with Ahmad's army in April 1542 at Jarta. Forming a square, the Portuguese advanced and used concentrated firepower to repel repeated Muslim attacks. When Ahmad was wounded in the leg, his forces retreated, and many were killed by pursuing Portuguese and Ethiopians. Two weeks later, the Portuguese again

advanced in square formation against the now reinforced Muslims. At the moment the Adal cavalry was about to break through the Portuguese lines, an accidental explosion of gunpowder spooked the horses and caused a general Muslim retreat. During the winter rains, Ahmad called for additional firepower from other Muslim powers. He received 10 cannon and 700 musketeers from the Ottomans. By this time, casualties had reduced the Portuguese force to 300 men. In August 1542, Ahmad used vastly superior numbers to attack the Portuguese camp, killing half the defenders and capturing a badly wounded da Gama, who was executed after refusing conversion to Islam. This victory gave Ahmad false confidence, and he allowed the Ottoman gunmen to return home. The Portuguese survivors then joined the army of the new Ethiopian emperor Galawdewos. On February 21, 1543, a force of 9,000 Ethiopian troops defeated 15,000 Muslims at the Battle of Wayna Daga. During this engagement, Ahmad was killed by a Portuguese musketeer, and the Adal forces subsequently withdrew east. While Galawdewos reoccupied the Shewa Plateau during the rest of the 1540s and early 1550s, the recent power vacuum had allowed Oromo pastoralists from around Lake Turkana to occupy the southern highlands. Adopting settled agriculture and horses, which gave them mobility, the Oromo separated the historical enemies of Christian Ethiopia and Muslim Adal. Given the increasing Portuguese involvement in the area, the Ottomans, in 1557, landed 2,000 troops at the Red Sea port of Massawa, which they held for the next three centuries. Galawdewos was shot dead in 1559 while leading a badly planned campaign to capture Harar, capital of Adal.³

Under the brief reign of Emperor Minas, Galawdewos's brother and successor, Ethiopia abandoned efforts to control eastern trade routes to the Gulf of Aden, which ended the long conflict with Adal. During the early 1560s, Minas led two campaigns—one against the Falasha (or Jewish Ethiopians) to the northwest and another against the Ottomans who were supporting Bahr Nagash rebels in the north. The next Ethiopian emperor, Sarsa Dengal, ruled for 30 years and directed numerous campaigns such as against Gambo in the west, Enarya and Hadeya in the southwest, the Oromo in the south, the Falasha in the northwest, and the Ottoman supported Bahr Nagash in the north. Despite Ethiopian resistance, the Oromo continued to expand. In the late 1570s and 1580s, they adopted a large body-length shield that allowed them to defeat the Maya people of eastern Shewa, whose poisoned arrows had repelled previous invasions. The threat of Oromo expansion

prompted a series of Ethiopian rulers, during the early 1600s, to attempt to replace Orthodox Ethiopian Christianity with Roman Catholicism to attract Portuguese military support. This prompted numerous rebellions by Ethiopian traditionalists, and the Portuguese firearms promised by Jesuit missionaries never arrived. Emperor Susenyos, after defeating a rebellion in Gojjam during which 8,000 Ethiopian peasants were killed in a single day, realized the self-destructiveness of this policy and returned to the Orthodox Church. His successor, Fasiladas, expelled the Jesuits, cut relations with the Portuguese, and signed treaties with the Ottomans to prevent Europeans from entering the area by sea.

In the late 1600s and early 1700s, the Ethiopian state established a fixed capital at Gondar. Although the Oromo stretched further north into Gojjam and Bagemder, increased importation of firearms beginning in the 1680s allowed Emperor Iyasu I to drive them back toward the Awash River. Many Oromo were incorporated into the Ethiopian state, converted to Christianity, and served in the imperial army. Some even became key members of the Ethiopian royal court. In 1705, Iyasu I led a large expedition south of the Blue Nile to reassert Ethiopian rule and Orthodox Christianity in the Gibe area, which was an important collection point for slave trading and had been overrun by the Oromo. The failure of the campaign led to the overthrow and murder of Iyasu the following year. In 1741, Iyasu II led a successful expedition against Nubian Sennar in the west, capturing 300 camels and 20,000 cattle. However, another attack on Sennar in 1744 was a complete disaster. Iyasu's army suffered heavy casualties and allowed its sacred icon of Christ to be captured and ransomed for gold. During the 1750s, the regional ruler of Tigray near the northern coast, Mikael Sehul, gained control of firearms imports and developed an army that included 6,000 men armed with matchlocks. Sehul used his military power to dominate the capital and kill two emperors, which led to the decline of the Ethiopian state.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ethiopian monarchy had become dominated by three powerful and autonomous regions. In the north, Tigray controlled trade with the Ottoman Red Sea port of Massawa and retained most imported firearms. In the west, Amhara contained fertile areas; was an important transit point for ivory, gold, and slaves from the south; and hosted the imperial capital. In the south, Shewa was militarily the weakest province but maintained trade with ports in the Gulf of Aden through which some

firearms were acquired. The Oromo migrations had isolated it from the civil wars fought in the north. The modernization and southward expansion of Egypt under Muhammad Ali in the early 1800s and the continued Ottoman presence in Massawa prompted the Ethiopian lords to appeal, unsuccessfully, to Britain and France for better firearms and other types of more direct military support.

In 1848, Kasa Haylu, distant member of the Ethiopian royal family who ruled the western frontier area of Qwara, led an expedition that attempted to capture an Egyptian fort in Sudan, but it was repulsed with heavy casualties. In turn, Kasa realized that his country's military system would have to be extensively reformed if it was to restore its former glory. During the Ethiopian civil war of the early 1850s, Kasa quickly defeated his enemies and gained control over the northwest, including Amhara and the capital of Gondar. Only Tigray and Shewa fell outside his control. In February 1855, at the Battle of Darasge, Kasa defeated and captured the ruler of Tigray, Webe Hayla Maryam, who was on his way to Gondar to be crowned emperor. Three days later, Kasa had himself enthroned as Emperor Tewodros, a name associated with a prophecy of a king who would eliminate Islam and recapture Jerusalem. The next year, Tewodros led an expedition into Shewa, the first in 150 years, and captured the local heir Menilik. Despite these successes, Tewodros was in a difficult military position because his rivals in Tigray, Shewa, and the Egyptians in Sudan had access to the international firearms trade. Tewodros moved the capital from Gondar to the strategically more favorable Dabra Tabor 100 kilometers to the southeast and turned the natural fortress of Maqdala, another 112 kilometers east in rebellious Wollo, into his headquarters. He launched several well-planned expeditions that subjugated Tigray, Wollo, and Shewa, and he married into the Tigray ruling family. Although Tewodros wanted to establish a standing army in which the soldiers would be paid by the state, he did not have enough resources and continued to rely on troops who looted from Ethiopian peasants, thus alienating them from the central government. The inability of Tewodros to import modern artillery meant that he forced European missionaries to cast mortars, including a giant one that could fire a 450-kilogram shell and was pulled by hundreds of laborers. The transportation of artillery prompted him to oversee the construction of a network of roads from Dabra Tabor to the sometimes rebellious provinces. Tewodros also replaced local feudal chiefs with his own military leaders, who formed a new nobility loyal to the emperor.

In the early 1860s, Tewodros appealed to imperial Britain, as a fellow Christian power, for assistance against Muslim Egyptians threatening Ethiopia from Sudan and Ottomans blocking Ethiopian trade through the Red Sea. The emperor's request was rejected as the British, because of the American Civil War, were dependent upon Egypt for cotton and on the Ottoman Empire as a foil to Russian ambitions in India. Tewodros, angry that the Christian British would betray their Ethiopian co-religionists, ordered the detention of British diplomats in Ethiopia. At this point, Tewodros's authority was declining as Menilik, who had escaped captivity in 1865, declared himself the independent ruler of Shewa, Tigray had broken away, and there was a rebellion in Gojjam. Confined to a smaller area, Tewodros could raise an army of around 10,000 men, though he had once commanded over 100,000. In October 1867, an Anglo-Indian expeditionary force commanded by Sir Robert Napier landed at Zulla, about 50 kilometers south of Massawa on the Red Sea coast, where it built a port and marched inland toward the Maqdala stronghold to liberate the British hostages. Napier's contingent consisted of 16,000 soldiers, one third British and two thirds Indian; 26,000 workers and camp followers; and 40,000 pack animals that included some Indian elephants to carry artillery consisting of 16 cannon, 16 rocket tubes, and 2 mortars. It took three months for the British to travel the 640 kilometers of mountainous terrain. The Ethiopians clashed with the Anglo-Indian force on April 10, 1868 (Good Friday), at Aroge near Maqdala. Despite defending a natural mountain fortress, the Ethiopians were outnumbered and outgunned. Ethiopian troops were armed with obsolete muzzle-loading, smooth bore matchlocks, and British and Indian soldiers were equipped with current breech-loading rifles. Tewodros's locally manufactured artillery was either defective or not fired correctly. The British repelled a massive Ethiopian attack and then dislodged a defending force in just two hours with 700 Ethiopians killed and 1,400 wounded. Only 2 British were killed and 18 wounded. On April 12, the emperor attempted to make peace by sending the British 1,000 cattle and 500 sheep, and releasing the captives. Napier refused the livestock because he did not want to make peace without defeating the Ethiopians. Tewodros, seeing that he was surrounded, fled to Maqdala. The next day, the British successfully assaulted the mountain stronghold and instead of surrendering, Tewodros placed his pistol in his mouth and killed himself. The British destroyed Maqdala and the Ethiopian artillery, and withdrew with the dead emperor's

son along with a large number of religious items and manuscripts. Returning to the coast, the British rewarded Kasa Mercha, the Tigrayan ruler who had allowed them to pass through his territory and supplied animals and workers, with 6 mortars, 6 howitzers, 900 muskets and rifles, and a great stock of ammunition, all of which greatly increased his military power. John Kirkham, a member of the British expedition, remained to train the Tigray army in European warfare. This enabled Kasa to challenge Wagshum Gobaze (the ruler of Amhara, Wag, and Lasta), who had himself crowned emperor at Gondar. Gobaze sent an army of 60,000 men to capture Adwa, then the capital of Tigray, but Kasa's well-armed force defeated it at the Battle of Assam on July 11, 1871. Subsequently, Kasa was crowned Emperor Yohannes IV, and Menilik remained the autonomous ruler of Shewa.⁴

WEST OF LAKE VICTORIA: KINGDOMS OF THE GREAT LAKES

By the 1600s, the area of present-day Rwanda was controlled by a number of small states in which herding families dominated more numerous cultivators. The authority of a local chief over people living on a few hills depended on a small guard of professional warriors, less than 100 men, drawn from his kin and other herding families. A local chief would also send one or more of his sons to serve in the guard of a superior ruler to whom he paid tribute and annual labor. A large royal court would be divided into three corporations: those who cared for the royal cattle, those who were in charge of organizing conscripted labor, and a permanent royal guard of perhaps 100 to 150 men composed of the sons of subordinate chiefs. Since the military was the only corporation not based on a kinship group, it became an instrument of centralization as the warriors came from all parts of the state. During war, a ruler would supplement his own guard with contingents sent by subordinate chiefs. Herder chiefs with permanent military forces emerged as authorities who managed the activities of herders and farmers on the same densely populated land.

During the 1600s, pastoralist ruler Ndori conquered much of central Rwanda and established the Nyiginya Kingdom. Through lending out cattle and offering military protection, Ndori extended his influence over many small states. Ndori spent most of his life fighting wars, probably 15 separate campaigns that included cattle raids and territorial conquests, and after he died from an eye wound received

in battle, it was said that his soul came to inhabit the royal kalinga drum that became a symbol of the new and larger state. Ndori's most important innovation, which distinguished the Nyiginya state from its neighbors, was the creation of an army composed of different companies, each with a distinct name and formed at different times during his reign. Ndori created four such companies during his lifetime. To distance the king from the soldiers, the army was placed under a military commander. This system had many advantages. The Nyiginya Kingdom could field four or five times more warriors than nearby states, the young warriors of a newly formed company would be trained by the experienced ones of another, esprit-de-corps improved, and no single company held too much power. When boys from prominent herder families reached about 10 years of age, they were sent to the king's court and eventually formed into a new military company that became something like an age-grade system. Over time, the military became extremely influential as it was linked to other royal corporations that coordinated herds and pastures. According to historian Jan Vansina, "The deepest effect of this new military organization was the institutionalization of militarism and martial violence that finally permeated the whole of Nyiginya culture as the armies became the foundation of the administrative structure of the realm."⁵

During the early 1700s, the Nyiginya rulers centralized their control over cattle and land, and transformed the military into a permanent professional force with multiple armies. Previously, each king's army had been demobilized upon his death with the exception of the youngest company from which the new ruler, often a member of that unit, would build his own force. During the reign of Mazimpaka, beginning around 1735, conscription became hereditary as sons had to join their father's army, which meant that the military was now permanent. It appears that one of the motivations for this reform was increased hostility with neighboring Burundi from the 1730s onward. Although earlier rulers each had a single army, Mazimpaka formed seven in 30 years, and subsequent kings Rujugira and Ndabarasa established 13 and 10, respectively, during much shorter reigns. Military specialization began to develop. Each army consisted of 4 companies of 100 herder warriors each and was led by a small headquarters. The king's own army or royal guard usually included at least one company of Twa hunter-gatherers who were considered loyal because of their broadly marginalized status. It was supplemented by unknown numbers of specialists such as herder rustlers who stole

enemy cattle, farmer servants who carried additional weapons for the warriors in battle and foraged for food on the march, and a group that cared for the cattle that were sent with the army on campaign. During a campaign, about four fifths of an army's members remained at home to tend the fields and herds from which it derived some food. Many armies had affiliated and named "cattle armies" that functioned as a commissariat and consisted of livestock from warriors' families and war booty. It appears that the polarization of Tutsi and Hutu identities may have begun with the precolonial military. During the 1700s combatants, recruited from the elite herders, became called Tutsi while noncombatants, drawn mostly from the farming population, were called Hutu (which meant they were servants). Eventually, these terms spread to broader society, with herders called Tutsi and farmers called Hutu. Army commanders tended to live at the royal court along with one of their companies. After a civil war around 1770, Rujugira realized the danger in keeping armed factions in the capital and began stationing entire armies at permanent camps along the state's borders with enemies such as Burundi and Ndorwa. Although this gave an army control of a particular region, army commanders were kept in check by the requirement that they spend most of their time at court.

A typical Nyiginya military campaign progressed through a number of stages. At first, spies obtained information on the enemy and determined if a military action was possible. Once the royal court decided to launch a campaign, a commander was appointed and given ritual powers. The required armies and support personnel were assembled, and the commander ensured rituals were performed to prepare them for war and that they were armed with the necessary bows and arrows, spears, clubs, and swords. As the army and accompanying cattle went off to war, they often trampled fields on both sides of narrow paths, and young members of the force looted crops. For both friendly and enemy populations, the passage of a Nyiginya army through its territory could be so destructive that it often resulted in famine. On the battlefield, the army deployed according to the commander's preferred tactics, and fighting commenced by shooting arrows. If this did not break the opponents, the warriors, followed by their weapon bearers, charged and engaged in short-range spear throwing and hand-to-hand combat. Several of these charges, followed by withdrawal and regrouping, usually took place during a battle, which might last several days with truces being called during the night. In combat, warriors killed every enemy male they found and

cut off testicles as trophies to prove courage. During and after the fighting, teams were dispatched from the main force to seize cattle and women, as well as destroy homes and fields. Most of the loot from such operations was retained by the army commander, with shares going to the king and warriors. Successful warriors were revered and wore symbols of their prowess. A warrior who had killed 7 men in battle wore an iron necklace with bells, 14 total kills earned him an iron and brass bracelet, and 21 resulted in a mountaintop ceremony during which he was made a national hero.⁶

In the late 1700s, the Nyiginya Kingdom was embroiled in almost constant warfare. By the 1790s, it had 30 armies and could field about 12,000 combatants, which made it a leading regional military power and inspired the saying "Rwanda attacks, it is not attacked." Perhaps the most serious conflict of the time was with Burundi to the south, which invaded in the 1770s but was eventually repulsed. In the east, the Nyiginya state faced many adversaries and conquered Buganza, caused the collapse of Ndorwa, pushed Gisaka back, and reduced Bugesera to insignificance. To the northwest, Bugoyi (on the upper shore of Lake Kivu) was forced to acknowledge Nyiginya suzerainty, and settlers from Rwanda moved west to the eastern shore of the same lake. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Nyiginya Kingdom controlled a territory that included much of present-day Rwanda plus the northwest volcano area and Kigezi in what is now southern Uganda. The increasing importance of the military contributed to a growing gulf between warrior herder elites who gained spoils and prestige from warfare and the majority of their farmer subjects for whom war usually meant disruption of food production.

The death of Ndabarasa in 1796 led to a disastrous civil war between 10 elite lineages, each of which controlled a portion of Rwanda's 30 armies. The conflict ended with a climactic battle near present-day Butare around 1802, after which a coalition made the infant Gahindiro king with his mother Nyiratunga ruling on his behalf until around 1820. While the monarchy survived the civil war, it was seriously weakened and power shifted to elite families present at court. Around 1799, armies from Rwanda conquered the northern portion of Bugesera, which had been spared a regional drought. During the 1860s, Gisaka, with its important trade links to the Indian Ocean coast, was also subdued. Throughout the first half of the 1800s, there was almost constant warfare between Rwanda and Burundi, with each state launching several major but ultimately disastrous invasions of

the other. While it appears neither kingdom had the power to defeat the other, Rwanda convinced the border chiefs of Buyenzi to reject Burundi's authority. During the 1850s, Rwanda began to trade with Arab-Swahili caravans from the coast but perhaps because of fear of their firearms, forbade them from entering its territory. Prompted by population increase and struggles at court, settlers and raiders continued to expand Rwanda's influence toward Lake Kivu in the west and the volcanoes in the northwest. Between around 1800 and 1870, Rwanda had doubled in size. In the late 1860s, a new ruler called Rwabugiri came to power who would lead the kingdom in an intense series of wars during the late nineteenth century.⁷

During the nineteenth century Burundi, located on the highlands overlooking the north end of Lake Tanganyika, emerged from the shadow of neighboring Rwanda to become a prominent military power. Ruling from around 1800 to 1850, Ntare Rugamba (Battle Lion) established a professional cadre of warriors called the Abatezi (attackers) recruited from the sons of aristocrats, court advisors, and provincial governors. When required, this group formed the core of a much larger army of several thousand that consisted mostly of levies from various communities led by the king's son Rwasha. In battle, a Burundi army would engage the enemy with archers while detachments circled around the flanks. The aim of the army was to capture cattle and, if possible, kill the ruler of the enemy state. Reforming the administrative system, Ntare Rugamba placed newly conquered areas under royal sons (Baganwa), wives, or court officials with a mandate to continue expansion. A civil war between royal factions during the 1850s led to the appointment of Mwezi Gisabo, the late Ntare's youngest son, as king under the regency of his older brother Ndivyariye. When Mwezi Gisabo reached adulthood during the late 1860s, he fought another civil war to take power from the regent and then used his skilled guard to fend off numerous Arab-Swahili incursions.⁸

In the late 1400s, the Bito clan ruled the Bunyoro Kingdom located on the west side of Lake Albert and over the next century extended control over much of what is now western, central, and southern Uganda. Its economy was based on farming, hunting, herding, and the production of salt and iron for trade. A loosely organized state, Bunyoro raised military forces by calling upon levies from subordinate territorial rulers. These forces were used to raid neighboring communities for cattle and occasionally ventured as far south as Rwanda. The need to defend against raids from Bunyoro encouraged state

formation and military reforms in the region. For example, the small Nkore state suffered two major invasions from Bunyoro. The first happened during the 1520s when a solar eclipse convinced the Banyoro (people of Bunyoro) to retire, and the second occurred during the early 1700s when many cattle were seized and Nkore ruler Ntare IV fled to an island in the Kagera River. Later in the 1700s, another Banyoro army that had been defeated while attacking Rwanda where Bunyoro King Chwa I was killed withdrew to its staging area in Nkore, where Ntare IV routed it with a surprise attack. This event stimulated internal conflict which signalled the beginning of Bunyoro's decline. After his victory, Ntare abandoned Nkore's old military system of quickly assembling ad hoc forces for raids or defense and created new permanent regiments with specialized military training focused on archery and the use of a long spear. As in Rwanda, Hima pastoralists specialised as warriors, and Iru farmers were excluded from the army. However, when the new Nkore army was defeated in an attack on neighboring Buhweju, the regiments were disbanded. Under Mutambuka, who ruled from 1839 to 1867, the standing age regiments, each totalling 600–1,000 warriors, were re-established to defend against the expansion of Rwanda in the southwest and Buganda (see later in this chapter) in the northeast, and subjugate smaller states. Each regiment was assigned a herd of royal cattle that it would tend and protect. Hima leaders combined military and administrative duties, and imposed greater control over the disorganized Iru farmers. The Hima monopoly on the military was not absolute; a few Iru became regimental commanders and court military officials, adopted Hima customs and cattle, and eventually dropped their Iru identity.⁹

By the early 1500s Buganda, on the northwest side of Lake Victoria, had expanded enough to represent a threat to the established power of Bunyoro to the northwest. As a result, Bunyoro fomented civil war in Buganda by sending an army to support Juma, who challenged his brother Nakibinge for leadership. Nakibinge then sought his own external allies by requesting assistance from Wanema, ruler of the Sesse Islands in Lake Victoria. Wanema sent an army under his son Kibuka, a renowned warrior, to help Buganda drive out the Banyoro invaders. However, in the subsequent fighting, which might have happened around the mid-1500s, the Baganda (people of Buganda) and Sesse were defeated, and the Baganda were driven from their core territory. After Nakibinge fell in battle, Kibuka reputedly climbed a

tree from where he shot arrows at the Banyoro for two days until he was also shot, and later legends would portray him as a deity who could fly. Since the defeated Baganda had lost most of their iron weapons, Nanono, the late Nakibinge's principle wife, organized a last-ditch defense by having her subjects sharpen reeds. Probably because of this stubborn resistance or their enemy's exhaustion, Buganda managed to survive the conflict. This defeat illustrated to the Baganda that they needed more effective military organization and reliable sources of raw materials such as iron to make weapons.¹⁰

During the early to mid-1600s, Kateregga led the Baganda in a series of military campaigns to the immediate west that recaptured the areas of Butambala and Gomba from Bunyoro and took completely new territory in the northwest around Lake Wamala, where he built a capital. Internal conflicts plagued both Buganda and Bunyoro during the late 1600s and early 1700s. Gaining a reputation during Buganda civil wars as a fearless fighter, Mawanda overthrew his brother Kikulwe in the early 1700s and emerged as a popular ruler. He embarked upon expansion in all directions. His first campaigns were directed into northwestern Singo, much of which he took from Bunyoro. Mawanda then turned east and invaded Kyaggwe with the help of Nkutu, a courageous warrior from Lwaje Island who was a renowned canoe builder and led a large fleet of war canoes on Lake Victoria. Subsequently, Mawanda appointed Nkutu as commander of the eastern fleet and governor of the new eastern districts, and many of Nkutu's subordinates became chiefs there. Kyaggwe provided iron and skilled smiths to make iron weapons, and wood to build war canoes. Using canoes to cross east of the Nile, Mawanda's army raided Busoga and terrorized the area's loosely organized and conflict-ridden groups. Mawanda's last conquest was of Bulemezi in the northeast, where some local rulers paid tribute to Bunyoro for protection. The first Baganda invasion of Bulemezi met tenacious resistance and was decisively defeated. Mawanda then appointed Lutale Sikyaya Matumpaggwa, a famously brave warrior, as leader of the second invasion, which defeated the Banyoro during a large battle at Bowa and stormed their positions in the Sempa, Bukesa, and Buligwe hills. Mawanda then moved his capital to the site of his army's victory at Bowa and assigned Matumpaggwa as governor of the newly conquered territory, with other successful warriors and some royal brothers becoming chiefs. Sometime after this last victory, another civil war broke out, and Mawanda was killed in battle against a force led by

three ambitious cousins, Mwanga, Namugala, and Kyabaggu, who each succeeded him.¹¹

Given his poor health and enjoyment of luxury, Namugala was not interested in military campaigns. Kyabaggu also loved song and dance at court but was a strong and agile man who led a new invasion of Busoga during the early to mid-1700s. He enlarged the navy of war canoes, over which he appointed three commanders, and used it to transport a large army east of the Nile to subjugate Busoga. Attempting to annex Busoga, Kyabaggu moved his capital to Jinja in that territory. However, the historically divided Basoga (people of Busoga) united and fought a series of successful battles against the Baganda, who were put on the defensive. With the Basoga continuing to inflict pressure, Kyabaggu ordered a withdrawal from the territory and narrowly avoided heavy losses. After Kyabaggu was assassinated by royal princes who then fought each other, Junju became ruler in the mid- to late 1700s and was remembered as a skilled but cruel military leader who fought many wars to expand Buganda. In planning the invasion of Buddu, an iron- and livestock-rich area southwest on the shore of Lake Victoria dominated by Bunyoro, Junju made alliances with border chiefs to secure an important crossing on the Katonga River and ensure they would not attack his army's rear. The first target of the invading Baganda army was the ruler Lwemukoko, who had a reputation as a brave fighter. Initially, Lwemukoko's large force held the Baganda back, but once they were reinforced, he was compelled to surrender. Junju's army then advanced to the capital of the ruler Bwakamba, who fled without offering much resistance. The Baganda continued to the southeast into Bujerero district, where they faced stiff opposition from an enemy that was continuously reinforced from communities further south. Outnumbered, the Baganda withdrew north, regrouped, and once again marched south where after a prolonged struggle, they annexed Buddu. The victorious Baganda pressed even further south, where they turned Kooki, another iron-rich territory, it into a tributary state. Evidence seems divided over whether Kooki allied with Buganda during its Buddu campaign and voluntarily became a tributary or was itself subjugated. After being exiled to eastern Kyaggwe, Semakokiro, a rival younger brother of Junju, and his followers rebelled against royal authority by refusing to send tribute and gained the support of the queen mother. Junju directed the subordinate ruler of Kyaggwe to lead an army against Semakokiro, and in the ensuing battle, the rebel prince's force was

saved by reinforcements led by his sons, who then defeated the royal contingent. Using spies to spread disinformation, Semakokiro and his followers avoided ambush by royal forces that they defeated in a fierce battle in Mawokota in central Buganda. When confusion caused part of the royal army to march off in pursuit of a nonexistent enemy, Semakokiro's followers advanced on the capital, where they defeated a small force led by Junju, who fled and was later killed in an ambush.

Semakokiro seized power and during the late eighteenth century suppressed several rebellions, killed or exiled potential rivals, and consolidated Buganda's recent conquests. His external military operations were mostly concerned with securing commercial interests. He sent a punitive expedition south of the Kagera River, the southern frontier of Buddu, in response to the killing of a Muganda (person of Buganda) trader in Kiziba and another army east, where it sacked the Nile trading post of Bulondoganyi. The most serious challenge to Semakokiro came from his exiled son Kakungulu, who led a Banyoro army into Singo, defeated a Baganda force, and came unsettlingly close to the royal capital before it was driven off. Around the 1790s, Semakokiro became one of the only Buganda rulers to die a natural death, and this led to a long civil war between his sons Kamanya and Mutebi. With the support of experienced military leaders, Kamanya eventually triumphed and had his rival killed. Incorporating a significant military element in his administration, Kamanya would become Buganda's last great warrior king, and his reign (ca. 1790–1820s) marked the zenith of the kingdom as a regional power.¹² Around the turn of the century, the exiled Kakungulu, once again leading a Banyoro army, took advantage of the absence of the Baganda army (which was raiding far to the west in Busongora) and attacked Bulondoganyi, slaughtered almost all the inhabitants, and established a permanent military post. In retaliation, Kamanya dispatched a large army under Settuba to the northwest that decisively defeated the Banyoro and seized the Buwekula area. This represented Buganda's last significant conquest before British colonial intervention in the 1890s. During the early to mid-1820s, a large Baganda army under Sewankambo, who had risen to military prominence by accusing a superior of cowardice, which resulted in his execution, advanced east into Busoga to punish local rulers for assisting Kakungulu. After a long and terrible campaign, the Baganda force was driven west and suffered the humiliation of having its war regalia captured. Imposing widespread conscription, Buganda organized a new and massive

army led by Sewankambo, which crossed east of the Nile and defeated the Basoga rulers, who then agreed to resume paying tribute. It did not take long for the Basoga to suspend tribute payment and side with the wandering Kakungulu, which prompted a series of Buganda raids to the east. Historian Richard Reid maintains that Buganda's military was becoming too large and hierarchical, which made it vulnerable to small guerrilla forces. The last campaign of Kamanya's reign was directed north against communities in Buruli, Bukedi, and Lango around Lake Kyoga. The successful operation was facilitated by the Baganda use of canoes transported by water to Jinja, disassembled and carried north to the Nagombwa River, reassembled and used to attack the Bakedi (people of Bukedi) from the rear. At the same time the king led an army north along the west bank of the Nile to attack the Bakedi from that direction. Breaking a religious taboo, Sewankambo ordered canoes to be dragged overland resulting in rebuke by the king who stripped the veteran leader of his war spoils. Although Kamanya did not establish a permanent military, Buganda armies were almost always active during his period and conscription was common.¹³

By 1800, Buganda had replaced Bunyoro as the dominant power in the northern Great Lakes region. While Buganda's eighteenth-century campaigns were aimed at territorial expansion, those of the nineteenth century were primarily long-distance raids. Earlier success encouraged military arrogance among the Baganda. During the reign of Suna, Kamanya's son and successor in the mid-nineteenth century, two new weapons were adopted by Buganda. The first was a short spear for close combat, which one historian has speculated was brought into East Africa by the Zulu-speaking Ngoni who, as discussed later in this chapter, had moved north from present-day South Africa in the late 1830s and 1840s. Little is known about the impact of this weapon on Baganda warfare. The second was the muzzle-loading firearm introduced in 1844 by the first Arab traders from the coast to enter the kingdom. The participation of just three or four Arab gunmen in a campaign against Bunyoro resulted in a great success for the Baganda, who took considerable loot. In the late 1840s and early 1850s, a Baganda army led by Kayira, essentially the kingdom's prime minister, crossed into Busoga and forced the surrender of most local rulers. Becoming tributaries of Buganda, each Basoga ruler had to report to a chief in eastern Buganda and eventually had to send musicians, dancers, and tax to the royal court. Creating a series of new

military-oriented chieftaincies that answered directly to the king, Suna expanded the number of soldiers he could mobilize. The arrival of coastal merchants who were particularly active south of Lake Victoria prompted Suna to use Buganda's canoe navy to control the north part of the lake and attack several islands such as Sesse. When the Basoga occupied Kitente Island in the Buvuma Channel, Suna assembled a fleet of 500 canoes, with the Buvuma and Sesse islanders providing 100 and 200 crewed boats, respectively. The Baganda tried to land on Kitente Island but were blocked by the Basoga, who had acquired the same number of canoes from other islander allies. After a month of failed naval engagements in which the Baganda warriors seemed hesitant to fight on water, Suna blockaded the island, which compelled the starving Basoga to surrender two months later. Sometime in the early 1850s, Suna himself led an army south to the Kagera River to punish the Bakoki for interfering in Buganda's trade and seize a great amount of livestock. Another southward attack against Kiziba on the south side of the Kagera, incited by a rumor of copper in the area, failed because of hunger among the Baganda force.¹⁴

Mutesa, coming to power around 1856, embarked upon a series of campaigns in the late 1850s and 1860s against Bunyoro, Busoga, Buruli and others. Some of these proved unsuccessful. A Baganda army sent southwest to Karagwe to support the local ruler against rebellion was defeated and expelled. During the mid-1860s, Mutesa's forces experienced a series of defeats by the Basoga, though a last expedition was successful and maintained Buganda's eastern frontier. In 1870, Buganda intervened in a Bunyoro civil war to install Kabarega who, as discussed in the next volume, would go on to fight the British invasion. During the 1870s, an overland expedition against Bunzinza on the south coast of Lake Victoria, meant to extend Buganda control over trade, had to return home because it was too large to find enough food. The failures of the Buganda army on land prompted Mutesa to expand the navy and embark on naval campaigns to dominate the growing trade on Lake Victoria. Under Mutesa, a Baganda war canoe could carry 60 to 100 warriors, not including the crew of 50 to 100. Such vessels were organized into a squadron under a leader. When engaged in battle, the paddlers squatted on the sides of the canoes while the warriors stood upright holding spears and shields. While canoe builders and crews were often provided by tributary and allied island fishing communities, the Baganda Mamba clan specialized in water transport and provided the kingdom's overall "chief of canoes."

A weakness of Buganda's navy was that the warriors transported by canoe distained the islander crews, who were treated as little more than slaves and gained a reputation for cowardice.¹⁵ In 1875, the Buvuma Islanders refused to pay tribute to Buganda and were accused of illegally capturing slaves on the mainland. As a result, a large Baganda canoe fleet attempted to land an invasion force on the island. The explorer H. M. Stanley witnessed how the outnumbered Buvuma fishermen used their boating skill and hit-and-run tactics to frustrate the Baganda:

A hundred canoes against 325 was rather an unequal contest, and so the Wavuma thought, for as the fleet of Mtesa approached in a compact tolerably well-arranged mass, the Wavuma opened their line to right and left, and permitted their foe to pass them. The Waganda, encouraged by this sign, began to cheer, but scarcely had the first sounds of self-gratulation escaped them when the Wavuma paddles were seen to strike the water with foam, and, lo! into the midst of the mass from either flank the gallant islanders dashed, sending dismay and consternation into the whole Uganda army . . . But the Wavuma, having made fourteen good prizes, did not wish, so unequally matched, to meet the Waganda in a pitched fight, and accordingly hastened away—contented for a time—into deeper water, whither, strangely enough, the Waganda fleet did not dare to follow them.¹⁶

Mutesa explained to Stanley that the Baganda did not venture into deep water because most of the warriors came from inland and could not swim. In a series of similar lake skirmishes, the Baganda deployed musketeers in some of their canoes and positioned on a nearby causeway a group of gunmen and several cannon that inflicted series casualties on the Buvuma boatmen. Stanley ended the conflict by directing the Baganda to construct a large fortified wooden barge manned by 150 musketeers and 60 paddlers, which intimidated the Bavuma (people of Buvuma) into presenting tribute.¹⁷ In 1878, Mutesa sent a canoe fleet to Ukerewe Island, where it helped the local ruler, Lukonge, overcome a rebellion. The next year, the Baganda mounted successful slave raids against Busoga and Buvuma Island. This gave Mutesa confidence, and later the same year, he sent a large army far south to seize cattle from Rwanda. But it was decisively defeated.¹⁸

The Baganda army consisted of district levies. Each was headed by a royal-appointed chief or governor and remained the basic unit of

military organization. Like the collection of tax or labor, each district was expected to provide soldiers when called by the king. By around 1800, an elite royal bodyguard had been established. During Mutesa's reign, it was merged with the increasing number of armed royal pages at the capital to create a 2,000-strong royal regiment equipped with firearms. During the late nineteenth century, the gun-toting royal pages were rewarded for their loyalty to the king rather than their military prowess, which caused conflicts with experienced war chiefs and contributed to Buganda's decline. The size of the armies of Buganda varied a great deal. Although the accounts of explorers like Richard Burton in the 1850s (who was told that Buganda could field 300,000 men) and Stanley in 1875 (who claimed to have seen 150,000 men fighting against the Bavuma) were likely exaggerations, they confirm that the kingdom could muster extremely large armies. There was no formal military hierarchy, and district chiefs with military experience and skill—at least until the late 1800s—were appointed to positions of command. Success in leading military operations could lead to political promotion and increased wealth. By the early 1800s, it was fairly rare for the king to lead an army himself. Within each district were some men who were military specialists equipped with well-made spears and shields that did most of the fighting, and servants who went to war armed with clubs and focused on looting. Up to the 1850s, the average warrior carried one long spear, several light spears, a dagger, and a heavy wooden shield. The Baganda never used the bow and arrow, possibly because throwing spears offered more freedom of movement, carrying a shield was seen as important, and/or the spear and shield were powerful cultural symbols. The district-based warriors represented the core of the Buganda army for several centuries until the 1880s, when they were sidelined by capital-based musketeers. Since the Baganda were never properly trained in the use of firearms, acquired mostly old flintlocks, and lacked good ammunition, the impact of guns on their enemy was usually more psychological than physical. From that time, combat centered on the musketeers with the spearmen, still in the majority, following up by looting a defeated foe. Within the kingdom, Baganda armies were fed by local people, and the larger armies of the 1800s would often break into smaller groups and move by different roads to a rendezvous point to spread out the impact on food resources. In enemy territory, the army lived by plunder and was usually accompanied by some wives and children carrying food that would last a few

days. It usually took several days for a Buganda force to assemble in enemy territory, and during this time, scouts conducted reconnaissance. Once ready for the attack, the commander positioned himself on high ground to see what was happening and dispatched a succession of waves of warriors who would fight and then return to the main body. Success was usually measured by the amount of loot captured, and the king was kept informed of an army's operations by specialist runners trained from childhood.¹⁹

EAST AND NORTHEAST OF LAKE VICTORIA: DECENTRALIZED PASTORALISTS

Sometime before the 1700s, Nilotic-speaking pastoralists began moving south from what is now South Sudan into the grasslands of present-day Kenya and northern Tanzania. In a military process, existing communities were pushed off the rich grazing land. Believing that they were the legitimate owners of the entire world's cattle, their military activities revolved around livestock. Pure pastoral communities with cattle focused on protecting them, while those without attempted to build their herds by raiding. Lacking centralized state structure, East African pastoralist groups were governed by councils of elders and organized on the basis of military-oriented age sets. During their early teens, young men endured a harsh initiation that included military training. As young adults, they were full-time warriors and herders. Young warriors formed something like a standing army and lived in their own camps, where they ate only beef, blood, and milk because other foods were thought to make them weak. A sense of warrior masculinity was important in these societies that, given the tough life of guarding and raiding cattle, produced skilled fighters. The elders maintained stability by holding back antagonistic young warriors from excessive raiding. During the early phase of their expansion, the pastoralist Maasai enjoyed several military advantages over the pre-existing Sirikwa communities of the Great Rift Valley. The Maasai employed large socketed spear blades that were deadlier than the lighter tanged ones used by locals. The fenced and partly dug-in enclosures of the Sirikwa protected their cattle from individual thieves but became traps when attacked by a large Maasai raiding party, which would surround them and burn the defenders out. The Maasai protected their own cattle by keeping them highly mobile and posting sentries. Known as the "eagle's wing," Maasai battle formation was

simple, with the best warriors forming a core and others deployed on each flank and behind as a rearguard. Tactics were simple—a Maasai force usually charged directly at its enemy. Neighboring people like the Kikuyu copied aspects of the Maasai military system, including age sets and initiation.

Although the Maasai lacked a formal military hierarchy, by the beginning of the 1800s, popular religious leaders could assemble large contingents of warriors from many sections. Centralizing prophets did not emerge among the Samburu, a similar group in what is now northern Kenya, because they had to move their herds around much more in the very dry environment, which meant they did not have large gatherings of warriors like the Maasai. During the late 1700s and early 1800s, Maasai prophets began to exert a centralizing influence over warriors, directed large-scale military operations, and built up big personal herds from shares of captured cattle that attracted more followers. Consequently, the moderating influence of the elders declined, and Maasai warriors became more aggressive. In the early 1800s, a prophet (or laibon) called Supet directed warriors from several Maasai sections in a southward expansion into present-day northern Tanzania. Around the 1810s, Supet's alliance of pure pastoral Maasai fought a long war, characterized by many skirmishes, against the Iloogolala, a section of the Maa-speaking (Maa is the Maasai language) Iloikop who lived by both herding and farming and had a reputation as particularly bellicose raiders. The Iloogolala were defeated, their communities either scattered or absorbed by Supet's alliance, in what is remembered as the first significant war in Maasai history. After a drought in the mid-nineteenth century that prompted many cattle raids, the pastoral Maasai of a now elderly Supet fought another major war against the Ilosekelai, another Iloikop group on the west side of Lake Nakuru, in the early 1860s and defeated them within a year. By the 1870s, a new laibon called Mbatiany, Supet's son, had brought together a dozen Maasai groups into the Purko-Kisongo confederation. The last of the Maasai-Iloikop wars took place in the early 1870s east of Lake Nakuru. Around 1869, a cholera outbreak made the Maasai vulnerable to increased raiding from the Ilaikipiak, an Iloikop group that had recently acquired their own prophet-war leader. After the Purko Maasai were initially defeated by the Ilaikipiak, Mbatiany called together warriors from all the Maasai sections into a large army—which vowed to win or die naked—aimed at annihilating all the Iloikop communities in the highlands surrounding the Maasai

plains. The *Ilaikipiak* were defeated in a quick series of large decisive battles near Lake Nakuru that involved heavy loss of life. For about a year, the Maasai conducted mop-up operations against pockets of *Ilaikipiak* on both the west and east sides of the Rift Valley grassland. A century later, the *Laimer*, the senior age set at the time of this conflict, was still celebrated for its courage.

Maasai control of the grasslands often rested on their martial reputation, and the appearance of a war party was sometimes enough to discourage resistance. Maasai raiding was successful in open country, but they had trouble overcoming enemies ensconced in rough terrain. Consequently, their attempts to expand further south into what is now central Tanzania were thwarted by the *Gogo* around 1830 and the *Hehe* around 1880. It has been suggested that warfare among East African pastorals in the first half of the nineteenth century was meant to secure resources for a growing population but that in the second half, it was about feeding starving people suffering from drought and a series of human and cattle diseases introduced by new links with the coast. With the expansion of coastal trade from the 1840s, the Maasai reputation for bellicosity and the arid nature of the country discouraged Arab and Swahili caravans from taking a direct route from Zanzibar to Lake Victoria. It is also likely that some Arab slave and ivory traders exaggerated the Maasai threat to keep their competitors, as well as meddlesome European explorers, out of the area. The Maasai quickly developed a response to muzzle-loading firearms employed by coastal forces. They would take cover to avoid the first volley and then storm the enemy before they could reload. The Maasai sometimes employed feigned retreats which encouraged the enemy to recklessly advance to seize cattle exposing them to a pre-arranged counter-attack. According to explorer Richard Burton, in an 1857 encounter, 800 Maasai used this tactic to annihilate 148 Arab and Baluchi gunmen.²⁰

During the early 1800s, the *Turkana*, also pure pastoralists of Nilotic origin, moved east from the *Karamoja Escarpment* in what is now Uganda to Lake Turkana in present-day northwest Kenya. They then moved both north and south along the west shore of the lake. Earlier inhabitants such as the *Siger* and *Kor* were expelled or absorbed, and the area became known as *Eturkan*, homeland of the *Turkana*. The *Turkana* had several advantages—they possessed a special breed of cattle better suited to the arid environment and maintained trade connections with *Karamoja*, where they acquired grain and iron. Like

those of other East African pastoralists, the Turkana military system was based on age sets that mobilized warriors and councils of elders that directed military policy. Commanding specific operations, war leaders emerged informally because of their combat skill and courage, and they lay outside the age-set system. War leaders had to use great diplomacy to convince elders to sanction raids, and diviners were also consulted. However, as the Turkana expanded, it became impossible for all the elders to meet, and they broke into a number of territorial divisions that diluted their influence. Additionally, during the early 1800s, resistance from established communities prompted the Turkana to reform their age-set system so that it could better mobilize men for war. Up to this point, the age sets were based on generational, not biological, age—which meant that all of a father's generation had to be initiated before his sons could go through the same process. Some men were initiated into adulthood and became warriors when they were around 40 years old. Although uninitiated men could participate in raids, they were not included in the age-set system, which provided the organizational structure and esprit de corps essential for Turkana warfare. The Turkana altered their age-set system in favor of biological age, which meant young adult men became full members of the warrior class and could be quickly mobilized. It is likely that this change was influenced by the biological age-set system of Maa-speaking people like the Maasai who were absorbed by the Turkana. Turkana age sets increasingly functioned as military units, and initiation increased raiding as young men strove to prove themselves.

Turkana society was strongly preoccupied with military matters, and status was gained by martial prowess and leadership. Great social importance was attached to the granting of praise names earned in battle, the scarring of warriors' shoulders, the wearing of white ostrich feathers to mark confirmed human kills, and claiming captured cattle by notching their ears. Governed by elaborate rules emphasizing courage and honor, Turkana warfare was limited. Rather than inflicting total defeat on an enemy, it sought to impose a new reality on existing relations that favored the victor. War was characterized by small armies from specific communities conducting cattle raids and skirmishes with few fatalities. After consulting elders and diviners, a war leader prepared for a campaign by calling together the warrior age sets that would perform dances and feast on meat and beer. He then announced the specific operational plan. Upon going to war, a man would smear his body with clay and gather his hair in a

blue-mudded knot at the back of his head. A war leader, in order for his men to recognize him in the fray, wore several giraffe tails below his left elbow. A warrior was usually armed with two 10-foot-long spears for throwing and thrusting, a hide shield, and sometimes knives, clubs and a bow and arrows. A raiding party often took along dogs for tracking. Attacks were usually made at dawn and involved warriors assaulting in crescent formation or a pincer movement of two columns. Taking advantage of surprise, they attempted to capture livestock along with young boys and girls as quickly as possible and stab adult men and women. To hinder pursuit, the raiding party would then break into several small groups with their loot and withdraw quickly in different directions. After moving about 80 kilometers, the party would then come together at a prearranged point. Child prisoners were kept by the men who had seized them and incorporated into their families, and some of the cattle were allocated to the war leader and diviner. The warriors would fight—knives and clubs were used but spears forbidden—over the rest of the cattle, with the first man to mark a beast's ear getting it. The party then dispersed to their respective homes with their spoils where, if a warrior had killed a person, he would undergo ritual cleansing and scarification.

Although Turkana expansion slowed during the 1820s and 1830s because of intense resistance from Maa-speaking people, around 1850 it was renewed under the leadership of Lokerio, a prominent diviner. With the new age-set system and further decentralization, the authority of Turkana elders declined and Lokerio, a new type of great diviner, stepped in to take control of military matters. Beginning with the diviners' usual ritual of preparing armies for war, Lokerio gradually began to make tactical decisions. This emerging centralizing figure used a system of messengers to mobilize larger raiding parties that seized cattle and camels from Samburu communities around the southern tip of Lake Turkana and east of the Kerio River, which up to that point had represented the limit of Turkana expansion. Whereas the elders had often restrained raiding, Lokerio encouraged it because a share of the captured livestock increased his personal herds. Northwest of the lake, Turkana and Dassanetch, after years of raiding, agreed on a border between them. Violence declined. During the 1870s, Maasai raids and cattle disease called lung sickness, which did not affect the Turkana herds, weakened societies south of the lake and facilitated more Turkana expansion. Ten years later, around the time of Lokerio's death in the 1880s, rinderpest (a more serious cattle

disease) and smallpox devastated many East African pastoral societies except the Turkana, who kept their cattle in remote places.²¹

EAST OF LAKE TANGANYIKA: SLAVES, IVORY AND FIREARMS

In the Usambara highlands of what is now northern Tanzania, the Shamba people lived in a series of decentralized villages and cultivated bananas. During the 1700s, the arrival of the pastoral Maasai from further north stimulated Shamba centralization. Shamba settlements on the lower mountain slopes were vulnerable to attack and abandoned, larger defensive towns were created further up in the highlands, and refugees such as the Mbughu and Nango moved in from other areas. The first king of Usambara was a legendary hunter named Mbegha who established his Kilindi clan as a royal family with ritual powers. Originally created to defend against Maasai raids, Vugha became the kingdom's capital, where various refugees, outcasts and escaped slaves sought protection and formed a sort of standing army at the king's disposal. By 1857, Vugha had a population of around 3,000. From this center, the king headed a loose network of subsidiary rulers who were supposed to send him a share of captured slaves and cattle. Every Shamba man was liable for military service when called and possessed a spear, shield, and bow and arrows. War drums called men for fighting, and in the early twentieth century, a German colonial observer noted that 6,000 men could be assembled in this fashion. During a civil war in the late 1700s, the Shamba were split into two states, with one capital at Mshihwi and the other at Vugha. Around the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Kinyashi ruled at Vugha and is remembered as a warrior king who tried to expand his territory south across the Pangani River. Around 1800, he died in a battle with the Zigua of that area. Between around 1800 and 1860, Vugha was governed by Kimweri, a benevolent priest-king who maintained order and peace. According to oral tradition, Kimweri used his control over rain to punish his enemies with drought and famine. His death led to a 20-year civil war in the late nineteenth century. During the 1840s, the Zigua acquired flintlocks through coastal trade and began to challenge Shamba dominance. Kimweri had been slow to appreciate the importance of firearms and only after defeat by the Zigua did he begin to acquire them, though he never caught up in the local arms race. In 1852, Kimweri had a total of 400 guns, while just one of several Zigua chiefs had 600. The

growing coastal trade meant the division of Kimweri's state into two rival nodes of power. Vugha, its highland location that was well suited to defend against the Maasai, was not on the main trade route and became an isolated ritual capital. Conversely, because it was located on the route from the coast, Mazinde became a commercial center where guns were available and outsiders such as the Zigua and coastal Swahili flocked to do business. The civil war of the 1860s pitted Shekulwavo, the late Kimweri's grandson and heir based at Vugha, against Semboja, a minor but innovative son of the late king, who was at Mazinde. Shekulwavo had the advantage of ritual legitimacy and traditional military recruitment among the Shamba, while Semboja's force had more firearms and relied on outside allies and mercenaries. Semboja's most important military contingent was a group of Zigua gunmen and slavers. He also maintained a group of gun-toting Pare elephant hunters in his domain who gave half their ivory to Semboja in exchange for gunpowder. Around 1869, Semboja divided his army in two and approached Vugha. When the Vugha army ventured out to fight one of Semboja's contingents, the other destroyed the capital and killed Shekulwavo. Despite this battle, intermittent warfare continued until the 1880s, with the followers of the late Shekulwavo in control of the east and those of Semboja in control of the west. Both sides sought external allies. Mbaruk, the Arab ruler of Mombasa who had rebelled against Zanzibar, helped the Shekulwavo faction invade Semboja's territory and, in turn, the sultan of Zanzibar assisted Semboja. Both sides exported slaves to the coast. In 1870, the Bondei, who had moved into the highlands during the eighteenth century, rebelled against Kilindi rule and permanently divided the highlands. With this, power shifted toward to the lowland areas with their coastal trade route.²²

In the highlands between the Usambara Mountains and Mount Kilimanjaro, near the present-day border of Tanzania and Kenya, the Pare people of the eighteenth century lived in a series of small states. By around 1750, the northern Pare had a single state called Ugweno with a common language, Kigweno, and initiation system. This had been accomplished by using tribute given to the rainmaking ruler to build a military force that subdued smaller groups. At the same time, the southern Pare had at least six different states with a separate language, Chasa, and initiation. It appears that rainmakers were in charge of both rituals and military operations. In the south, the Ndambi shrine—a place where warriors long gathered to sharpen their weapons on

a large stone—was established by rainmakers as a rallying point for young men in times of war. In addition, stone cairns that were infused with magical properties were constructed along the frontiers to ward off invaders. Specialized clans in the Pare highlands exported iron north to the Chagga of Mount Kilimanjaro, the Maasai of the plains, and south to the Shamba (who brought skins and livestock). By the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, increased trade from the coastal towns of Mombasa and Pangani to the Pangani River basin led to more warfare in the region. Pare iron production grew as the neighboring Chagga fought more among themselves and the smiths of Kilimanjaro began to specialize in the large-scale production of weapons. By the 1860s, individual Arab and Swahili coastal merchants were beginning to ally themselves to specific Pare rulers who they supplied with firearms, which were then used to take captives from their neighbors. Shamba and Zigua gunmen from the south entered the Pare highlands and acted as middlemen in the slave and ivory trade. Competition among the Pare led to further fragmentation. During the mid-nineteenth century, Ugweno ruler Ghendewa attempted to impose stability by having young men reside at his fortified capital, where they were fed by cattle requisitioned from subordinates and could be called for military duty. Making an important alliance with the Chagga ruler Rundi, a cattle and slave raider who had come to power around 1860, Ghendewa subdued his rebellious southern districts. Encouraged by the same coastal traders dealing with Ghendewa, Rundi then led a cattle raid on the Ugweno capital. Since the people of Ugweno were dissatisfied with the constant demands for young men and cattle from their ruler, they did not answer his call for help, and the defeated Ghendewa was shot while leading his bodyguard against the raiders. After Ghendewa's death, Chagga cattle raids continued and were so damaging that iron to make weapons replaced livestock as the traditional bride wealth. Ugweno split into a number of warring factions. The southern Pare were further fragmented as lesser rulers rebelled against established authorities and carved out their own place as slave raiders for the coastal trade. Traditional rulers with ritual power declined in favor of upstart commoners with firearms. During the 1880s, insecurity meant that women went to market with armed escorts and agriculture collapsed, which caused famine.²³

The expansion of the slave and ivory trade in the nineteenth century led to the rise of powerful warlords in parts of East Africa not already dominated by centralized states. Around 1860, Mbula Mtelya

united two relatively small Nyamwezi groups in what is now western Tanzania and took the name Mirambo (meaning "corpses") as a sign of his military prowess. His new state was called Urambo (the country of Mirambo). While the Nyamwezi had emerged in the early 1800s as important carriers and merchants, Mirambo's state quickly dominated trade on the south side of Lake Victoria and east of Lake Tanganyika. Previously, the military system of the small Nyamwezi states depended on rulers calling levies of warriors from subordinate communities. Mirambo developed what was close to a standing army based on two types of recruits. First, he employed firearm-equipped mercenaries from other areas, called *ruga ruga*, who were mostly young men displaced by the slave trade. Second, communities defeated by Mirambo were required to supply young men to be absorbed into his army. Perhaps inspired by the Ngoni, who had moved into the region a few years before, Mirambo required all warriors to live close to his capital so that they could be mobilized quickly. He obliged them to remain unmarried until he no longer needed their military service. Since their firearms were mostly muzzle-loading flintlocks with poor or limited ammunition, Mirambo's men usually fired one volley and then charged the enemy to fight hand-to-hand. The noise and smoke of the guns as well as the sight of the red-cloaked and dreadlocked warriors worked into frenzy by war songs, drums, and Indian hemp had a negative psychological impact on many adversaries. Mirambo maintained a strong agricultural base in his homeland and launched campaigns after the rainy season was over because travel was easier and crops had been harvested. Mirambo personally led his army, which could number up to 7,000 men. His favorite tactic was a surprise dawn attack on a fortified village with the aim of getting inside quickly and catching the defenders off guard. Like most regional forces, Mirambo's army had no artillery to blast holes in timber stockades and did not carry enough food to support an extended siege. Once inside the stockade, Mirambo's raiders would kill men who resisted and sometimes many who did not. Subsequently, the local ruler, who was often killed, was replaced with a compliant relative who became subordinate to Mirambo and supplied him with young warriors. Mirambo's growing reputation for violence sometimes encouraged rulers to voluntarily submit.

During the 1850s and 1860s, coastal Arab traders based at Tabora in what is now central Tanzania gained control over the Nyamwezi state of Unyanyembe. Mnywa Sele, who had been deposed as ruler of

Unyanyembe in 1861, fought a bush war against the Arabs and their Nyamwezi allies until he was killed in 1865. Mirambo and the Tabora Arabs clashed over control of the trade routes between the port of Ujiji on the east bank of Lake Tanganyika and the Indian Ocean coast around Zanzibar. In 1871, war broke out between Urambo and Arab-controlled Unyanyembe. There are several versions of how the conflict began, including Mirambo being tricked into providing ivory to an Arab merchant who did not pay him. This eventually provoked the Urambo ruler to seize an Arab caravan. In August 1871, an Arab-Unyanyembe force (supplemented by the caravan of explorer Henry Stanley, who was on his way to the storied meeting with David Livingstone at Ujiji) that numbered 2,255 men, 1,500 of whom were equipped with firearms, invaded Urambo. The main problem with this army was that it did not have a single leader. According to Stanley, Mirambo had about 1,000 gunmen and 1,500 Ngoni allies at his disposal. The Arab-Unyanyembe army sacked several villages in Mirambo's territory and then split up to continue looting. A 500-strong contingent that had penetrated the center of Urambo (where it captured slaves and ivory without opposition) was returning to the main Arab camp when it was ambushed by Mirambo's force. Caught off guard, half of the group was killed, including all 20 Arabs. Despite a concerted effort by Omani Arab leader Khamis bin Abdulla to rally his men, the ambush caused a general panic throughout the entire Arab-Unyanyembe army, including Stanley's contingent, which fled east to Tabora. Although Mirambo's ruga-ruga pursued them and looted the Unyanyembe area, they did not attack the fortified residences (tembes) of the main Arab leaders or Stanley, who had hoisted an American flag over his. Khamis bin Abdulla attempted to lead a counterattack, but he and his followers were surrounded and killed. Stanley, who was disappointed with Arab martial abilities and proceeded to Ujiji by another route, dubbed Mirambo the African Bonaparte. Mirambo's army returned home to regroup and in September 1871 attacked Unyanyembe. However, they suffered a crushing defeat at the village of Mfuto. By early 1872, the war was not going well for Mirambo, who offered to return all the loot his men had taken from the Arabs. The Arabs rejected the offer. During May and June, a 2,000-strong Arab-Unyanyembe army, equipped with a 200-year-old cannon, advanced on Mirambo's stockade but withdrew because of hunger. Mirambo then directed his forces to conduct small hit-and-run attacks against the Arab-Unyanyembe army. Local

sympathies may have swung toward Mirambo as his men acquired gunpowder from Nyamwezi communities supposedly allied with the Arabs and in an 1873 engagement, several African leaders turned against the Arabs and attacked them from the rear.

The Tabora Arabs called on assistance from Barghash bin Said, the sultan of Oman in Zanzibar who intervened to stabilize trade. Buganda ruler Mutesa, wanting to develop trade and technological connections with Zanzibar, sent a military expedition south to Tabora in 1872, but it is not clear if it saw action.²⁴ In August 1873, a Zanzibar army of 1,000 Baluchi mercenaries recruited from what is now Pakistan and 2,000 troops from Zanzibar and the East African coast arrived in Unyanyembe. Given that Zanzibar had no professional military officers, command of this force was given to Amir bin Sultan al Harthi, a prominent Arab who had lived in the interior for a decade. Squabbles between local Arab leaders meant that the expedition did not attack Mirambo and Barghash bin Said, who had to raise duty on coastal exports to pay for it, recalled it to Zanzibar in 1875 and renounced claims to the interior. While this withdrawal and the continuing arguments between the Tabora Arabs allowed Mirambo's force to recover, the Arab refusal to send gunpowder into the interior put Urambo at a disadvantage. Consequently, Mirambo decided to make peace by allowing Arab and African trade caravans to pass through the area, and he sent a significant gift of ivory directly to the Zanzibar ruler, who reciprocated with a gift of equal value. Realizing that they would get no further assistance from Zanzibar, the Tabora Arabs made peace with Mirambo in 1875. Mirambo would allow Arab caravans to pass through his territory as long as they paid the usual tariff. Mirambo had failed to eliminate the Arab-Unyanyembe presence, and the Tabora Arabs had suffered a major business setback. In 1877, Barghash bin Said turned his gunpowder blockade of the interior into a trade monopoly that forced inland rulers such as Mirambo to maintain good relations with Zanzibar. Although Stanley had fought on the side of the Arabs, Mirambo did not let this poison his relationship with Europeans who were beginning to visit the area, and he sought to develop alliances with them. Indeed, in 1876, Stanley returned and had a peaceful encounter with the Urambo ruler who continued raiding.²⁵ In 1877, missionary C. T. Wilson observed:

The neighbouring country is in rather a disturbed and unsettled state, the people living in constant dread of being attacked by

Mirambo and his Ruga-Ruga. On my return I and my party were taken for these dreaded robbers, the whole district turning out to resist us . . . Everything here shows that the people are in constant dread of invasion; the villages are surrounded by strong thorn fences, with narrow openings, which can easily be defended by a few men, the cattle are sent out to graze under strong armed escorts, and even the farmer when at work in his mtama fields, has his spear stuck in the ground beside him, ready for a fight.²⁶

In the vast wooded area in what is now west-central Tanzania, east of Lake Rukwa and south of Tabora, the Kimbu people were organized into 38 separate states. In the early 1800s, they began exporting cattle and ivory to neighbors for beads and slaves. During the early 1830s, Arabs from the coast entered the Kimbu area in search of ivory. However, in the late 1830s, the sudden emergence of the Sangu as a military power blocked the development of this new coastal trade route, and the Arabs moved further north to establish the commercial center of Tabora. Throughout the 1840s and 1850s, the Ngoni, moving up from the far south, devastated the Kimbu. By the late 1850s, the Kimbu had recovered and Bungu, a Kimbu state, had gained wealth and military power through alliance with Arabs further south. During the early 1870s, a coalition of Bungu, Arabs, and Ngoni attacked the Sangu but were defeated. The Arab and Bungu leaders Amran Masudi and Kilanga (respectively) were both killed. Nineteenth-century Kimbu chiefs, who were both ritual and military leaders, gained more authority as they monopolized ivory trading and distribution of firearms. Attempts by lesser royals to seize power led to the further splintering of Kimbu states, which responded to increased violence by building large fortified villages.

After the death of ousted Unyanyembe ruler Mnywa Sele in 1865, his guerrilla struggle was taken up by his relative Nyungu ya Mawe (a martial name meaning "pot of stone"), who developed an army of ruga-ruga warriors. During the 1870s, Nyungu, a small man with one eye about whom little is known because he was never visited by Europeans, forged an empire among the Kimbu in the same way as his sometime ally Mirambo had done among the Nyamwezi. In 1875, he took over Kirurumo (through which an important coastal trade route passed) and then pushed south to conquer other Kimbu states, particularly the strategically located Kiwele. Nyungu's army was

divided into a number of companies, each led by a warrior with an intimidating name such as Mzwala Mino go Vanhu (Wearer of Human Teeth), Kafupa Mugazi (Spitter of Blood), and Kania Vanhu (Defecator of People). Nyungu could field several forces at once that ranged in size from 20 to 500 men and send them to different areas. Strict discipline was maintained, and Nyungu simply had to drop a cloth for a man to be executed or shake a foot for a man to be banished. Nyungu referred to his warriors as "logs" and when sending reinforcements to a fight, he would say, "Pile on more logs." Nyungu distributed loot himself on the basis of those who had fought most bravely. As Nyungu conquered Kimbu territory, he appointed his military leaders as district governors to collect ivory and slaves from numerous subordinate rulers. Unlike Mirambo, Nyungu's relationship with the increasing number of European visitors deteriorated, particularly after one of his 1878 raiding parties killed a British missionary and plundered his caravan.²⁷

By the early 1800s, the people of what is now southwestern Tanzania, such as the Sangu and Hehe, lived in numerous small-scale farming communities. The arrival of two outside forces in the mid-1800s, Arabs from the coast and Ngoni from the south, led to military changes and political centralization. Just before 1830, coastal Arabs arrived in the Sangu area and exchanged gunpowder and other goods for slaves and ivory. This seems to have prompted the Sangu chief Munyigumba to conquer the other inhabitants of the Ruaha plains and establish the Sangu as a military power that raided neighbors and trade caravans. In the 1840s and early 1850s, the Ngoni arrived and drove the Sangu east into Hehe territory. When the Ngoni withdrew, the Sangu returned to their homes and Munyigumba founded a capital at Ilamba where the Ruaha River enters a swamp. The Sangu then became the first people in what is now Tanzania to copy Ngoni military organization, fighting techniques, and weapons such as the short stabbing spear and large hide shield.

The name Hehe seems to have originated from a war cry "Hee, Hee, Hee, we are fighting the enemy, ahee!" From the late 1850s to the 1870s, Munyigumba, originally the leader of a small Hehe group and possibly named after the earlier Sangu ruler, began a series of wars that led to the amalgamation of a single Hehe state. He did this by copying the Sangu use of Ngoni methods and weapons, and by adopting Sangu language war cries, which better motivated warriors. Both the Sangu and Hehe adopted Ngoni-style age regiments and shared

three of the same regimental titles: Vanamwani, Valambo, and Vaten-gelamutwa. Winning important victories over the Sangu and Ngoni, the new Hehe Kingdom emerged as the main power on the highlands of southern Tanzania. The Hehe drove the Sangu from the Ruaha Plain and into the Usatwa Hills, where they built a stone fort known as Utengula Usongwe. The fort, which sometimes housed Baluchi or Arabs from the coast, was attacked at least twice by the Hehe, who failed to penetrate it. At the Battle of Mdodamtitu (Black Forest), in 1874 or 1875, the Hehe drove the Bena people off the forested Iringa plateau and south into the open Kilombero Valley. Subduing the valley's inhabitants, the Bena abandoned pastoralism and took up rice cultivation and fishing. To the north, Munyigumba sent Hehe forces into Gogo territory and established themselves at Wota, where they repelled raids by the pastoral Maasai. The Hehe also expanded east into the territory of the decentralized Sagara, where they raided caravans from the coast and traded ivory and slaves with Arabs near the present-day town of Kilosa. Hehe military success was not achieved through employment of firearms, which were still rare among them in the late 1870s, but through the leadership of Munyigumba, who made important alliances. He established a capital at the strategic location of Lungemba, where he was surrounded by councillors, war captives, young men training for battle, and numerous servants and retainers. Authority was delegated to subordinate rulers, some of whom lived at the capital and others who lived in their respective areas, who were responsible for assembling men for war. In the mid-to late 1870s, the Sangu and Ngoni allied against the Hehe, which led to a series of raids and counter-raids. Around 1878, Munyigumba avoided an Ngoni raiding party by hiding in a cave in which he became sick and died shortly after driving out the invaders. A civil war fought from around 1879 to 1880 ensued between the followers of Mkwawa (Munyigumba's son) and Mwambambe, a subordinate ruler of Nyamwezi origin who had married one of the late ruler's daughters, in which the later was defeated and fled north to seek help from Nyungu ya Mawe. Consolidating his position, Mkwawa constructed his first fort at Kalenga and inflicted a major defeat over the Ngoni around 1881. The Hehe and Ngoni then made peace and entered into a cordial relationship as traditional "joking partners." Mwambambe returned with many ruga-ruga gunmen but was defeated with heavy casualties at the fiercely fought Battle of Ilundamatwe (the place where many heads are

pilled up). Once securely in power, Mkwawa continued Hehe expansion.²⁸

BETWEEN LAKE MALAWI AND THE COAST: MORE SLAVES, IVORY, AND FIREARMS

Between Lake Malawi and the northern bank of the Zambezi River, three centralized states emerged among Chewa-speaking people during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Possibly originating from the Luba Kingdom of Central Africa, the ruling families of the Kalonga, Undi, and Lundu—collectively known as Maravi, meaning “flames”—became involved in the growing ivory trade to the coast. From the 1530s, the Portuguese began to move inland from the Indian Ocean coast via the Zambezi Valley, where they set up trading enclaves at Sena and Tete, and developed local alliances. In the late 1500s, the Zimba, possibly from south of the Zambezi, moved into the area and established themselves as a strong military power. They were portrayed by the Portuguese as marauding cannibals. The Maravi state of Lundu used an alliance with the Zimba to extend its control over the entire Shire Valley, south of Lake Malawi. In 1592, a local chief allied to the Portuguese asked for help when the Zimba occupied his territory. The captain of Sena, Andre de Santiago, led 130 Portuguese and more local allies to the Zimba capital but found it fortified by a double wooden and earth palisade and a deep, wide trench. Santiago then called on the captain of Tete, Pedro Fernandez de Chaves, who set out with an army of 100 Portuguese and mixed Portuguese-African gunmen along with many African allies. However, when the Tete contingent was within a few kilometers of the Zimba capital, it was ambushed and wiped out. The next morning, the Sena contingent, not knowing what had happened to their Tete colleagues, was surprised when Zimba warriors emerged from their stronghold carrying the limbs of the Portuguese dead. The Zimba chief wore the vestments of a dead Portuguese priest, and the head of de Chaves was mounted on the end of a spear. After warning the Sena army that the same fate would befall them, the Zimba withdrew into their fortress. Falling victim to this psychological warfare, the Sena contingent withdrew that night but were ambushed by the Zimba and annihilated. Since this was a major blow to Portuguese status in the area, the Portuguese captain of coastal Mozambique, Pedro de Sousa, put together an army consisting of 200 Portuguese and

1,500 Africans supported by several artillery pieces. In 1593, he attacked the Zimba capital, but the artillery could not penetrate its thick walls. Assaults were repelled. Following a two-month siege, de Sousa decided to return to Sena. But as his army was withdrawing, the Zimba attacked its badly defended camp, killing many and seizing equipment and artillery. During the late 1590s, there was sporadic fighting between the Portuguese and Zimba who were spreading along the coast.

In 1608, Masula (or Muzura), a hunter who had built up a powerful state and assumed the Kalonga title of the Maravi, made an alliance with the Portuguese and provided them with 4,000 warriors to subdue a rebellious chief who was to usurp the Mutapa ruler Gatsi Rusere, their ally, south of the Zambezi River (see Chapter 5). In 1622, the Portuguese helped Kalonga Masula to defeat the Lundu and establish himself as the principle Maravi ruler. After Gatsi Rusere's death in 1624, Masula's army, assisted by a contingent of gunmen, invaded Mutapa, where it sacked some Portuguese settlements and seized gold and cattle before being forced back over the Zambezi. In 1629, Kapararidze, the exiled heir of Gatsi Rusere, convinced Masula to join him in an anti-Portuguese alliance. While Kapararidze led a rebellion against the Portuguese within Mutapa, Masula's Maravi forces attacked Quelimane on the coast but were repulsed with heavy casualties. With an army of 10,000 to 12,000 men, Masula conquered a vast area—often called the Maravi Empire—that stretched from the Luangwa River in the west along the north side of the Zambezi to the Indian Ocean coast between Mozambique Island and Quelimane. This included much of present-day Malawi and Mozambique. The Makua of the Mozambique Island hinterland (see later in this chapter) were also subjugated by the Maravi Empire. Masula's empire facilitated trade—the Portuguese imported cloth, guns, and gunpowder, while the Maravi exported ivory. By 1635, Masula was back on good terms with the Portuguese and assisted them in a campaign against some coastal Swahili. The Maravi Empire began a quick decline after the death of Masula, its founder and military strongman. During the late 1600s, the Maravi Empire, overextended and lacking a strong administrative foundation, fragmented and withdrew from the coast. Yao groups from the east side of Lake Malawi began to dominate trade from the interior to the Indian Ocean.²⁹

Between the south part of Lake Malawi and the Mozambican coast, the Makua people lived in a number of different states situated on

trade routes between the interior Yao and the coastal Portuguese. Before battle, all the warriors of a Makua chiefdom were called together in the bush where a war-medicine man prepared them with magical charms and ritual cleansing. Although surprise attacks were sometimes launched, it was not unusual for the Makua to send an emissary to their enemy to declare war. Each ruler had a set of military lieutenants, and an army was divided into separate companies. Known for their particular skill with the spear, Makua fighters usually decapitated enemy men, took women captive, and practiced scarification so that they could identify their dead after battle. In the late 1500s, the Makua, some of whom had recently been pushed into the area by the Zimba invasion further south, represented a serious threat to the Portuguese, who described them as savage cannibals. In 1585, the Makua of Mauruca, a name adopted by a series of rulers, began to terrorize Portuguese coastal settlements. In turn, Nuno Velho Pereira, captain of Mozambique, organized an expedition of 400 men, including 40 Portuguese, which advanced on Mauruca's capital located about 15 to 25 kilometers inland. Under Antonio Pinto, the expedition successfully attacked the village at dawn and burned it. However, on its way back to the coast, this force was ambushed by a Makua army hidden in the bush. Most of the Portuguese, overconfidently being carried in litters by their slaves, were killed. Mauruca eventually made peace with the Portuguese and traded with them, though periodic violence continued. While Mauruca emerged as the head of a loose confederation of Makua rulers, the area was dominated by Maravi military power throughout most of the 1600s. During the 1630s, Mauruca refused a Portuguese offer to build him a strong fort if he attacked the Maravi.

The decline of the Maravi Empire in the late 1600s presented the Makua with an opportunity for military revival and to become middlemen in the coastal trade. Although evidence is sparse, it appears that Portuguese-Makua relations in the early 1700s were peaceful, though this did not last—there were skirmishes in the late 1720s. By the 1750s, the Makua of Mauruca had gained many firearms by trading slaves to the French as labor for their island plantation colonies of Mauritius and Reunion. During the second half of the eighteenth century, Brazilian slavers also became involved in this gun trade. Despite an official ban, some Portuguese merchants supplied the Makua with gunpowder because that was the only commodity they would accept for slaves. While the Makua of the 1720s fought

entirely with locally made spears and arrows, they were well equipped with firearms from the 1750s, which increased their aggressiveness toward the Portuguese and Yao.

From the late 1740s, warfare between the Makua and Portuguese became endemic. The main issue was that the Makua were blocking Yao traders from bringing ivory to the coast. Murimuno, a Makua ruler about 45 to 60 kilometers inland, worried the Portuguese the most because he gave asylum to slaves who had escaped their coastal enclaves. In 1753, a Portuguese military expedition that had been assembled in Lisbon arrived in Mozambique to suppress the troublesome Makua. In September this force, consisting of over 100 Portuguese regulars and around 1,000 local auxiliaries, moved inland and burned several of Murimuno's abandoned villages. Conflict between the Portuguese and their allies prompted a disorderly withdrawal to the coast during which the army was ambushed by the Makua, who killed half the Portuguese. The Portuguese then convinced the sheikh of Quitangonha, one of their coastal Swahili allies who had been involved in the disastrous campaign, to attack the Makua, who were routed with many taken captive. Murimuno then led his forces toward the coast for a revenge attack, but they were ambushed by a Quitangonha force that pursued them for three days, inflicting heavy casualties and seizing many prisoners. In late 1754, Murimuno moved his subjects further inland, sent peace envoys to the Portuguese, and allowed trade to resume. However, between September 1756 and February 1758, from the end of one dry season through two of the next, Murimuno fought the Yao, which again disrupted coastal trade. The Portuguese were hesitant to act against the Makua for fear of a repeat of the 1753 expedition. However, Makua raids against both Portuguese and Yao became such a problem that in 1766 the Portuguese, assisted by Quitangonha and friendly Makua, conducted operations against their old adversaries, the details of which are unknown.

From the 1770s, French demand for slaves increased and led to open warfare between the Makua and Portuguese. After some Portuguese from the coastal settlement of Mosseril seized captives from communities under Murimuno, this Makua ruler led 8,000 warriors against the offending enclave, killing over 100 Portuguese and their servants. The settlement's fort and church were also looted. Portuguese food supplies began to run low as Murimuno forbade trade with them, and many Portuguese settlements were abandoned. The Portuguese then convinced Mocutoamuno, a Makua ruler from

Cambira and rival of Murimuno, to lead a combined force of friendly Makua that swept through Murimuno's territory and pushed his people further inland. In 1782, the new Portuguese governor-general, Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque, made peace with the Makua, but within two months their raids resumed. Albuquerque then planned a major campaign against the Makua, but his death delayed preparations. In January and February 1784, Portuguese and local allies repeatedly attacked hostile Makua communities. While heavy losses prompted Murimuno, whose territory was closest to the Portuguese settlements, to make peace, the Portuguese demand that the Makua agree to permanently allow other African traders to pass through their areas was unacceptable to the other chiefs who continued fighting. This included Mocutoamuno, who now fought against his erstwhile Portuguese allies. In June, the hostile Makua launched another attack on Portuguese settlements such as Mosseril. Nine days later, a 3,000-strong force of Portuguese and local allies counterattacked and were supported by the Makua ruler Comalla, who saw an opportunity to attack his rival Mocutoamuno. This forced all the anti-Portuguese Makua rulers except the powerful Mauruca to surrender. At the end of July, Murimuno ceded his territory to the Portuguese, who took some land but let him continue as chief under their protection. Further inland, other Makua rulers were more difficult to control, though peace was maintained for the next decade.³⁰

During the early 1800s, the Sakalava and Betsimisaraka kingdoms of northern Madagascar launched seaborne raids on the Kerimba Islands and the East African coast between Ibo and Mafia Islands. The raiders used single sail, single outrigger canoes and took both African and Portuguese captives back to Madagascar, where they worked plantations or were traded to other European slavers. The first raid happened in 1800 and involved just 3 canoes and 60 men raiding Vamizi. The first significant attack took place over three months in late 1808 when around 8,000 Sakalava ransacked the coast between Vamizi and Ushanga on the south side of Pemba Bay. The only place they were repelled was the Portuguese fortress on Ibo. About 800 prisoners were bundled off to Madagascar. In 1816 and 1817, large Sakalava fleets attacked Kilwa and Mafia Island. During the 1817 raids, a combined naval force from Zanzibar and other Swahili towns defeated the Sakalava at Msimbati Bay just north of the Ruvuma River mouth. On the mainland, at the same time, the Makua of chiefs Mugabo and Mutuga, and the Makonde constantly raided Portuguese settlements.

While Mutuga was encouraging Swahili slave merchants from the Kilwa coast to operate in his area, the Portuguese could not eliminate this competition because they lacked the military strength for a protracted war. In 1787, the Portuguese had legalized the gun trade on the Mozambique coast because it was the only way to acquire slaves, an increasingly important commodity in the Indian Ocean, from groups such as the Makua.

With the collapse of French slaving in the revolutionary 1790s, growing competition led to hostilities between the Portuguese and Quitangonha, who had been longtime allies. An official state of war existed from 1795 to 1796 and 1799 to 1801. In 1799, the Portuguese organized a huge 14,000-man expedition against Quitangonha, including Makua contingents. Most of the fighting in this conflict consisted of Makua rulers launching separate raids on Quitangonha communities for their own reasons. The situation soon changed. In 1804, the new sheikh of Quitangonha supported the Portuguese in operations against the Makua of Murimuno, who had been harboring escaped slaves and demanding payment for their return. In 1807, the Portuguese orchestrated attacks on Murimuno's Makua, who then retaliated by raiding Mosseril. In November 1810, a force of 1,300 Makua—mostly armed with guns and from several rulers—raided the coastal enclaves of Sanculo and Lumbo. The Portuguese retaliated, and this was followed up by 3,500 men from Quitangonha looting Makua communities. The Portuguese then organized a large expedition, supported by field artillery, which defeated the Makua rulers and left the area in chaos. Since the Portuguese were militarily weaker than they had been in the eighteenth century, they made much greater use of African allies equipped with firearms.³¹

The East African coastal slave trade expanded in the 1800s as Brazilian, French, Spanish, and American slavers were driven from West Africa by the British antislavery squadron mentioned in Chapter 2. British antislavery patrols in the Indian Ocean were too small and limited in authority to have an impact until the second half of the nineteenth century. Following a disastrous Portuguese expedition against the Makua in 1811, there was a decade of peace between these two groups. Demand for slaves became great enough that Portuguese traders organized their own raids on the interior, which intensified competition with Makua rulers. In 1820, the Portuguese mounted an expedition against the Makua of Mauruca. Lacking the military clout to control the interior, the Portuguese engaged in a series of intrigues

with a shifting network on local allies. In 1857, the Portuguese sent soldiers into Makua territory to acquire slaves. They were repelled. A promise from the governor-general not to seek slaves in that area prevented a Makua attack on the coast. By the 1870s, communities that were victims of slave raiding had moved further inland, which caused Makua groups to turn on each other to gain captives for the oceanic trade. Makua states began to fragment, and their ability to resist Portuguese intrusion was undermined.³²

Captured by gun-toting Yao, most slaves in the nineteenth century Indian Ocean trade originated from the Lake Malawi area. Chewa-speaking communities around the lake were further destabilized in the late 1830s by the arrival of the Ngoni, who brought new fighting methods and military organization, and whose origins are discussed in Chapter 5. In 1835, Zwangendaba's Ngoni crossed north of the Zambezi River and around the 1840s established themselves on the Fipa plateau near the south end of Lake Tanganyika, where they absorbed local people. Another Ngoni group under Mputa Maseko crossed the Zambezi just after Zwangendaba, moving across the Shire Valley on the south side of Lake Malawi and up the east side of that lake around 1846. Settling near Songea in southern Tanzania, the Maseko Ngoni fought the Yao, who were driven into the hills or joined the invaders. After Zwangendaba's death in 1848, his Ngoni state on the Fipa plateau split into different groups that settled throughout present-day eastern Zambia, Malawi, and southern Tanzania. One of these groups, the Tuta Ngoni, moved north along the eastern shore of Lake Tanganyika and arrived near the south side of Lake Victoria in the early 1850s where, since they were not strong enough to constitute an independent power, they often worked as mercenaries for warlords such as Mirambo. The Ngoni of Mpezeni moved southwest and clashed with the Bemba. The Ngoni of Mombera invaded the highlands of what is now northern Malawi where, around 1855, they subjugated local Tumbuka, Henga, and Tonga. The Chewa leader Mwase Kasungu, with guns from Arab traders, repelled an attack on his stockage by these Ngoni and then became their ally. Around 1875, the Tonga subjects rebelled and fled east to the shore of Lake Malawi, where they built fortified villages that were often protected by pitfall traps to discourage continued Ngoni attacks. Another Ngoni group from Fipa, under Zulu-Gama and Mbonani, moved east across the north end of Lake Malawi and, around the late 1850s, clashed with the Ngoni of Maseko, who was killed in the fighting. The Maseko

Ngoni, under the leadership of Chikuse, then moved back down the east side of Lake Malawi and eventually settled to the southwest of the lake in what is now the Dedza district of Malawi. The Ngoni of Zulu-Gama and Mbonani remained in the Songea area and continued attacks on the Yao, who called them Gwangwara. In 1866, David Livingstone travelled inland from Kilwa to find Yao territory depopulated, probably from Ngoni raids. Given attacks by Ngoni and Yao slavers in the 1800s, fortified villages became the norm around Lake Malawi.

Like the Zulu of their southern homeland, Ngoni young men were expected to be ready for military service, and only the ruler granted permission for mature men to marry, establish families, and wear the distinctive head ring. Unlike the Zulu, the Ngoni did not maintain permanent age regiments of young warriors with their own settlements near the royal enclosure. When an Ngoni ruler called together an army, it consisted of contingents from various communities. Once assembled, warriors from across the state joined up with their age mates to form age regiments that would fight as tactical units. Each Ngoni ruler maintained a hierarchy of appointed military officials who had other duties during peacetime. The king was considered the commander in chief but rarely went on campaign. Reporting to him, a senior war leader was responsible for overall planning and conduct of military operations, and a senior diviner administered medicine to protect the warriors. When an army was assembled, each age regiment was led by a junior official who answered to the senior war leader. On the march, an Ngoni army made extensive use of scouts to gather information. Women and children carried supplies. In a typical attack on a village stockade, an Ngoni force rested nearby while its leaders reconnoitred the target and the warriors prepared for battle by smoking hemp to make them fearless. When the attack commenced, each man vied to be the first over the wall because he would then be given the pick of loot such as prisoners and livestock. Although the size of Ngoni armies is not well established, some European sources from the late nineteenth century put them at between 10,000 and 50,000 men. After a campaign, warriors returned to their homes, where those who had killed or helped kill a person underwent ritual purification. The army was later reassembled for a celebration during which the king recognized those who had performed well by presenting them with bull's horns or a special cow hide shield.³³


CONCLUSION

While most warfare in precolonial East Africa was conducted by infantry, naval forces were also important. Superior naval technology allowed the Portuguese to take control of parts of the East African coast from the entrepreneurial Swahili. The development of a canoe fleet allowed Buganda to dominate trade on the northern portion of Lake Victoria and occasionally project its power south. The growth of coastal trade stimulated increasing political centralization. In this context, successful leaders, whether monarchs of well-established kingdoms or emerging warlords among historically decentralized people, needed almost constant access to armed men. Many states came close to establishing permanent armies. Rwanda, Mirambo's Nyamwezi, and Radama I's Madagascar Kingdom represent good examples of this. The adoption of firearms was often key to military dominance and certainly important to states such as Ethiopia and the Makua, who had to deal with incursions from gun-equipped outsiders such as Ottomans, Arabs, and Europeans. However, not all of East Africa's great military powers took to firearms, such as Rwanda (which was too far inland to obtain them) and the Maasai (who developed tactics to counter muzzle loaders). Indeed, the way firearms were adopted in Buganda seems to have undermined its military effectiveness. Increased slave raiding and the importation of firearms in the 1800s increased the importance of defensive fortifications such as timber walls, trenches, and traps.

Chapter 4

Central Africa to ca. 1870

Geographically, Central Africa is difficult to define because it overlaps with the continent's other regions. For example, the modern countries of Rwanda and Zambia are often considered to be located in Central Africa but also in Eastern and Southern Africa, respectively. For the purposes of this historical overview, Central Africa will be regarded as a block of territory from the Atlantic coast in the west to the Great Lakes in the east and roughly from the Congo River Basin in the north to the Zambezi River in the south. Characterized by the vast Central African rainforest in the north and the mixed grasslands and trees of the savanna in the south, it includes the present-day countries of Angola, Zambia, Malawi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Gabon, and Central African Republic. Historically, between about 1000 and 1600 CE, during the "Later Iron Age," the inhabitants of Central Africa improved their metallurgical skills, communities began to specialize in producing certain goods, and trade increased. The previously independent and self-sufficient villages began to group together to form a series of larger centralized states. From around 1500, the coastal areas of western Central Africa became incorporated into the Atlantic economy, including the oceanic slave trade, which brought increased warfare. Societies deeper in the interior remained somewhat isolated, though their adoption of imported American crops, maize and cassava, around the 1700s caused



population growth, expansion, and conflict. It was not until the mid-1800s that the peoples of the interior experienced intrusion by firearm-equipped African ivory and slave traders from the north, east, and west.

WEST CENTRAL AFRICA

By around 200 BCE, the western part of Central Africa, just below the rainforest and near the Atlantic coast, was inhabited by farming communities with embryonic Iron Age technology. During the 1300s, small states of Bakongo farmers, enjoying the fertile soils and good rainfall of the frontier between forest and savanna, had formed a federation south of the Congo River and west of the Kwango River. The Congo River provided a means of transport for trade and tribute

collection, as well as a source of fish. By the start of the 1400s, this formation had developed into the kingdom of Kongo with its capital at Mbanza Kongo, a town of some 10,000–15,000 people. When Portuguese sailors working their way down the Atlantic coast reached the mouth of the Congo River in 1483, they found a large and powerful African state that dominated part of present-day northern Angola, western Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Republic of Congo. Military cooperation soon followed as in 1491, following the Christian conversion of the Kongo ruler, a Portuguese expedition assisted the Kongo army in suppressing rebellion in a province near the Congo River. In 1506 Afonso I, a Christian convert with support from the provincial rulers of Soyo and Mbata, came to power after defeating the forces of his traditionalist brother in a battle during which it was later claimed Saint James and a host of heavenly warriors intervened on his behalf. Christianity became the royal cult, and Kongo's rulers attempted to enhance their regional clout by monopolizing trade with the Portuguese. Portugal's alliance with Kongo developed at precisely the moment the former began to acquire slaves for the plantations of Sao Tome and a few years later, from the 1530s, the colonies of the Americas. During a 1512 campaign against the Mbundu people in the south, Afonso I rewarded his Portuguese military allies with a share of the captives, some of which he kept for himself. Given Portuguese written sources, more is known about the precolonial history of west-central Africa than any other part of the region.

Like other Central African states, Kongo's army consisted of a small core of heavy infantry with shields who fought in close order and many skirmishers with spears and bows who used incredible agility to dodge enemy missiles. The king of Kongo selected provincial governors, each of whom could call up a military force of professionals, lesser nobility such as village heads who formed the heavy infantry, and conscripts who would serve as light infantry or supply carriers. The authority of the king to appoint and dismiss provincial officials gave him, in theory, ultimate control of the army. However, in Kongo's many wars over royal succession, the success of claimants to the throne often depended on support from the provinces. In addition, Kongo controlled the lower Congo River by maintaining a fleet of 800 large dugout war canoes that could carry 150 people each. In 1525, one of these cooperated with a Portuguese vessel to seize a French ship off the coast of the Congo River mouth. During the 1550s

Kongo expanded south along the coast, and during the next decade pushed east toward the Kwango River, where it faced determined local resistance that resulted in the death in battle of two successive kings: Bernardo I in 1567 and Henrique I in 1568. A major reverse happened in 1569 when a group called the Jaga invaded Kongo, defeated its army, and sacked the capital. Historians have debated the origins of the Jaga, with most explaining that they were people from east of the Kwango River displaced by warfare and one claiming that the invasion story was invented by either the Kongo ruler Alvaro I or the Portuguese to cover up local rebellion. Kongo failed to defend itself because it took time to assemble an army from the provinces during harvest season, once assembled the force lived off the land and therefore consumed the state's own resources when operating internally, and leadership had been weakened by a series of succession disputes. The royal court took refuge on a Congo River island from where Alvaro I requested Portuguese assistance. In 1571, Francisco de Gouveia Sottomaior led a 600-strong Portuguese force from Sao Tome, which rallied Kongo resistance, defeated the Jaga (who were afraid of the blast and smoke of firearms), and returned Alvaro to power. As a reward, Portugal was given permission to colonize Luanda Island to the south, and Portuguese living in Kongo were not subject to local authority. Alvaro further centralized his power by retaining many of the Portuguese expedition as the core of his army, acquiring firearms while denying them to subordinate rulers except those of Mbata in the embattled east, and establishing a royal guard of armed slaves.¹

By the late 1400s, the Kingdom of Ndongo, south of Kongo, controlled an area from the Kwanza River in the east to the location of modern Luanda on the coast to the west. Most of the inhabitants of this area were Mbundu-speaking people. Called the Ngola (from which the modern country of Angola takes its name), the ruler of Ndongo lived in a large royal capital called Kabasa and dispatched administrative and military officials to govern a small number of provinces, each of which contained many subordinate rulers each called soba. Ndongo's basic military structure was similar to Kongo, with armies consisting of a small nucleus of heavy infantry supported by masses of skirmishers. When the king mobilized an army, each of the roughly 100 soba provided and commanded a small contingent. Since the king's authority to appoint or remove a soba was limited, he had less central authority over the military than in Kongo. During

the 1500s, perhaps because of conflict with the Portuguese, the Ndongo ruler developed a unit of professional soldiers based at the capital who operated directly under his command. In battle, an Ndongo army usually deployed with a center of heavy infantry, who guarded the baggage and discouraged their colleagues from running away, and left and right wings of skirmishers. During the 1520s and 1560s, the Portuguese sent deputations to Kabasa to establish official relations, but both were rejected. However, around the same time, Portuguese renegades began trading with Ndongo, which was considered illegal by the rulers of Kongo and Portugal. In 1575, Portuguese under Paulo Dias de Novais established a colony on Luanda Island, which had been given to them by the ruler of Kongo as a reward for expelling the Jaga. Concerned about the stability of their Kongo ally, the Portuguese wanted to establish a military presence in the area and pursue rumors of silver mines at Cambambe, which was located inside Ndongo territory. The Portuguese colony expanded inland and established forts along the Kwanza and Bengo Rivers. For several years, the Portuguese at Luanda hired out their contingent of 700 soldiers, many of whom had firearms, to Kongo and Ndongo to assist in suppressing internal rebellions.

In 1579, Portuguese renegades along with local factions convinced the Ndongo king to massacre the Portuguese representatives living in his capital and destroy their colony. Subsequently, a 12,000-strong Ndongo army attacked the Portuguese fort at Nzele, 50 kilometers inland from Luanda, which was successfully defended by a garrison of 60 Europeans and 200 Africans. In September 1580, Paulo Dias, grandson of famous explorer Bartolomeu Dias, led a Portuguese invasion of Ndongo advancing inland along the Kwanza River with 300 Europeans and 200 armed slaves. The invaders raided villages for food and trade goods, and terrorized the Mbundu by burning people in their huts and displaying severed heads. When the rains began in November, the Portuguese built a fort at Makunde and were joined by local rulers with armed contingents. Some of the Portuguese began to succumb to tropical disease, and their foraging parties were ambushed by Ndongo forces. A 60,000-strong army from Kongo, led by 50 Portuguese soldiers, moved south and attempted to relieve Makunde but were driven off by Ndongo fighters. Some of the Ndongo local chiefs who had defected to the Portuguese changed sides once again. Dias renewed his offensive in late 1582, with several hundred Portuguese gunmen and several thousand African archers

and spearmen. At the start of February 1583, Dias's expedition clashed with a massive Ndongo army at Tala, which was considered the gateway to the Ndongo Kingdom. Although the Portuguese claimed victory, they were too exhausted to exploit it and withdrew to the intersection of the Lukala and Kwanza Rivers, where they built a fortified settlement at Massangano. This would serve as their forward base for many years to come. Under Joao Castanho Velez, 200 Portuguese reinforcements arrived in 1584 at Luanda and were sent into central Ndongo, where they were defeated the following year. The Portuguese survivors of this disastrous expedition buried their guns, burned their trade cloth, and fled to the coast. Given problems related to retaining the local allies that the small Portuguese forces depended on, they remained confined to Massangano for the next few years.

In late 1590, a Portuguese army of 125 European gunmen and 15,000 African archers, led by Luis Serrao (who had replaced the recently deceased Dias) left Massangano and advanced east along the Lukala River toward the Ndongo capital of Kabasa. However, at the end of December 1590, at the Battle of Lukala, they were intercepted by a much larger Ndongo force supplemented by allies from the neighboring state of Matamba further inland. The Ndongo army initially attacked the Portuguese center but then sent out a large detachment on each flank to surround them. Overwhelmed, Serrao ordered a retreat during which his army lost all the trade goods—the contents of 25 ships—they had brought to acquire slaves. After 15 days, they returned to Massangano. Continuing to believe that Ndongo contained silver mines, the Portuguese renewed their offensive, and in 1592, Francisco de Almeida was appointed governor of the colony and arrived at Luanda with 600 soldiers. The next year, Jeronimo de Almeida, the governor's brother, led 160 Portuguese troops, 18 of whom rode horses—which represented a new feature of warfare in the region—to Massangano, where they joined the local garrison and invaded Kisama, an Ndongo tributary near the coast and south of the Kwanza River. This army seized the Kisama salt mines, which would deprive Ndongo of its most important export, where they built a fort garrisoned with 100 men. Although the Portuguese subjugated 26 minor rulers in this area, Kafushe Kambare, the senior Kisama chief, fought a guerrilla war against the invaders and killed most of them in a battle in late April 1594. Given that the Portuguese had burned and abandoned their fort sometime earlier, Kambare remained in control of Kisama.

In 1594, the new governor—Joao Furtado de Mendonca—arrived in Luanda with an army and marched inland along the Bengo River into Ilamba, another Ndongo tributary, during the wet season but had to withdraw because of tropical disease. Around 1596, he repeated the expedition, and his 400 Portuguese and 15,000 Africans, who had been recruited along the way, defeated a force of 20,000 Ilamba archers who were panicked by European firearms. The Ilamba ruler submitted to the Portuguese and gave them tribute. At the same time, an Ndongo army besieged Massangano but was repelled by a Portuguese relief force from Luanda. On their return journey, these Portuguese established a fort at Mushima just south of the Kwanza River, which was meant to intimidate the rulers of salt-producing Kisama. During this time, Luanda itself was also fortified. Around 1602, Joao Rodrigues Coutinho, yet another new governor with an army, arrived in Luanda and immediately led his men inland along the Kwanza River to defeat a large force from Kisama. However, Coutinho died of fever after the battle. Taking command of the Portuguese, Manuel Cerveira Pereira subjugated Kisama either by defeating it in a decisive battle or menacing it into sending him slaves as tribute. When Pereira's men took Cambambe around 1603 and found that the rumored silver mines did not exist, they refused to advance any further into Ndongo. Pereira then negotiated with a delegation from the Ndongo ruler, who sent tribute to Luanda and reopened trade with the Portuguese.²

Around 1600, a new type of militarized African society called Imbangala emerged in what is now Angola. Historians have debated whether they originated from the interior or were local people, perhaps from southern Angola, transformed by the wars of the slave trade. Although they were frequently called Jaga, these groups were not the ones who had invaded Kongo in the late 1560s. Rejecting kinship as the basis of social organization, the Imbangala killed their newborn babies and replenished their community by incorporating captured young boys of seven or eight years old who were raised as warriors and girls who became wives. To gain acceptance, a prisoner would have to engage in cannibalism, and endure a rigorous initiation ritual that included military training and circumcision. Each freshly initiated young man would have to wear a humiliating collar until he proved himself by killing a man in combat. These ordeals were designed to divorce an initiate from his home community and bind him to the Imbangala. Such practices also represented a powerful psychological weapon because settled communities feared the

Imbangala, and armies would sometimes flee at news of their approach. The Imbangala grew no crops, survived by constant raiding and slave trading (which meant they had to regularly move to new unspoiled areas), lived in large fortified settlements, and elected their most successful fighters as leaders. Through constant practice, they mastered battlefield maneuvers and became expert in the highly acrobatic fighting techniques common in the area. As such, the Imbangala enjoyed a military advantage over agricultural societies in which a few warriors trained part-time and most armies consisted of untrained peasant conscripts. In the early 1600s, some Imbangala moved toward the coast and allied with the Portuguese. By the middle of the 1600s, some Imbangala groups began to develop formal state structures such as Kasanje (located east of Ndongo).³

The short period of peace between the Portuguese colony and Ndongo was ended when Bento Banha Cardoso became governor in 1611 and quickly led an army, the core of which consisted of 200 Portuguese but which recruited local allies, up the Lukala River and established a fort at Hango, which was dangerously close to Kabasa. Reasserting authority in the Luanda hinterland, Cardoso had several local chiefs beheaded or hanged, and others were bullied into providing slaves. Cardoso also employed notorious Imbangala raiders, who he invited into the colony. In turn, the Ndongo army attacked the Portuguese fort at Cambambe but was repelled. Just after this conflict, the Portuguese fought off an invasion of the Luanda colony by the Ndembu, who came from the southern part of Kongo and were looking for food. In 1617, Governor Luis Mendes Vasconcelos, on the pretext of punishing a minor ruler who had rebelled against the Portuguese, led a strong force of all available European soldiers and settlers, African allies and mercenaries, Imbangala bands, and armed slaves up the Kwanza River; attacked Kisama villages; and arrived at Massangano, where they prepared for an invasion of Ndongo. While attempting to relocate the Hango fort further up the Lukala River, which would put it just north of Kabasa, the Portuguese-led army was attacked by an Imbangala group working for Ndongo. In retaliation, Vasconcelos marched on the now abandoned Kabasa and burned the palace of Ngola Mbandi, Ndongo's ruler. Occupying the Ndongo capital through the rainy season of 1618, the Portuguese troops suffered from malaria. Since Mbandi refused to negotiate with enemy troops in his capital, the Portuguese-led force moved north to the upper Lukala River, where they built a fort at Mbaka. When the

governor returned to Luanda because of illness, Joao Mendes de Vasconcelos, his son, took command of the army, left half of it at Mbaka, and took the other half deep into Matamba, further east than any Portuguese had traveled up to that point. The younger Vasconcelos defeated numerous local rulers, destroyed the Matamba capital, and compelled its army to flee. The Portuguese also intended to punish several Imbangala groups that had worked for them but had changed sides. The Imbangala of Kasanje refused to engage the Portuguese in a pitched battle and shot at them from the bush. As the Portuguese began to withdraw, the Imbangala seized their baggage train, which forced Vasconcelos back to Luanda to regroup. Within a short time, Vasconcelos and his army were back at the Mbaka fort, from which a new and successful offensive was launched against Ndongo, which was suffering a four-year drought. Ngola Mbandi fled to islands on the Kwanza River.

Appointed as governor in 1621, Joao Correia de Sousa realized that the area's slave trade depended on cordial relations with Ndongo. He sent emissaries to negotiate with Mbandi, and the Portuguese agreed to withdraw the fort at Mbaka, help Ndongo drive off the Imbangala raiders of Kasanje, and return all the Ndongo leaders who had been captured in the recent conflict. Njinga (also spelled Nzinga), the ngola's sister, was sent to Luanda, where she ratified the treaty and was baptized as Ana de Sousa. At this meeting, Njinga famously refused to squat on the floor and instead sat on the back of her kneeling servant to be at eye level and hence on equal terms with the Portuguese governor, who sat in a chair. During the early 1620s, an Imbangala leader called Kasanje, not to be confused with the more famous Kasanje located east of Ndongo, was raiding north of Luanda around the Bengo River, which disrupted the colony's trade. Governor Sousa directed his army to surround the area and close in on the raiders by cutting the bush where they hid. Kasanje was captured and executed, and his subordinate chiefs were sent to Brazil. Around the same time, the governor dispatched an expedition north to extort slaves from a chief called Nambu a Ngongo. Because he was a subordinate ruler of the powerful Kongo state, Nambu engaged the Portuguese-led force in battle. Although Nambu's men attacked first and overwhelmed the many local skirmishers in Portuguese service, they were repulsed by gunfire. Nambu and others were captured and shipped off to Brazil. Within Kongo, many Portuguese traders were killed in retaliation.⁴

In 1624, Ngola Mbandi either committed suicide or was poisoned by his sister Njinga, who then seized control of Ndongo. She was initially a regent for the late Mbandi's young son (who eventually died under mysterious circumstances). Throughout her life, Njinga was plagued by European and African claims that as a woman she was not a legitimate ruler. There is some evidence that she attempted to address this problem by a succession of dependent husbands who served as puppet kings. Njinga also adopted aspects of male identity and kept a number of men as concubines, who were forced to dress as women and sleep among her maids (with whom sexual relations were strictly forbidden). Dressing as a man, she maintained an armed guard of female warriors and personally led armies into battle, where she earned a reputation as a skilled warrior and commander. Since Njinga would fight the Portuguese over a long period in the mid-1600s, there has been a tendency in recent times to portray her as an anti-slave trade resistance leader. In fact, Njinga was a pragmatic leader who exported slaves when it suited her, and it appears more likely that her main goal was to have the Portuguese and other African states interact with her as a sovereign ruler.⁵ Under pressure to supply slaves to Luanda, some Mbundu chiefs left the vicinity of the Portuguese forts and rallied to Njinga, who was based on Kwanza River islands in eastern Ndongo. Slaves and slave soldiers escaped the Portuguese colony and sought refuge with Njinga, who refused Portuguese requests for her to provide them with captives. The next year, a subordinate Ndongo ruler defected to the Portuguese and claimed that Njinga was planning a war against them. Njinga's threats against this chief provided the Portuguese with a pretext for an invasion of Ndongo that was aimed at replacing the queen with a more compliant ruler. In February 1626, a Portuguese-led army, commanded by Bento Banha Cardoso, drove Njinga and her followers off the Kwanza River islands and installed a local chief called Ari Kiluanji, baptised as Dom Felipe, as ngola of Ndongo. The puppet ruler agreed to supply the Portuguese with 100 slaves annually, build a church at his capital, and reopen the slave markets. Njinga was now exiled from her Ndongo home. Around 1627, Njinga and her forces returned to the Kwanza islands, which they used as a base to attack the Portuguese, who once again drove them away. An outbreak of smallpox prevented the Portuguese army, now under Payo de Araujo de Azevedo, from pursuing Njinga, who fled to somewhere south of the Kwanza River. Allying with the Imbangala of Kasanje, who had moved east to escape

the Portuguese and settled between the Lui and Kwango Rivers, Njinga once again returned to the Kwanza islands. From this location, she blocked slave trade routes and convinced local chiefs to close slave markets. Kasanje was a useful partner because the Portuguese believed it could field 80,000 archers.

Luanda was threatened by Dutch naval forces that attacked the port in 1623 and 1624, and that occasionally intercepted Portuguese trading vessels. Since the Portuguese had to keep troops close to Luanda and because Njinga's resistance reduced slave supplies from Ndongo, they sent an expedition northeast against Mbwila, an Ndembu chief and vassal of Kongo, around 1635 with the excuse that he was harboring escaped slaves. The Portuguese nucleus of the force was commanded by Antonio Bruto, and local African allies were led by African mercenary leader Antonio Dias Musungu, who carried a large iron bell without a clapper on which he rang out signals to his Imbangala troops. Mbwila's men had acquired firearms that they used to inflict surprisingly heavy casualties on Bruto's force that besieged their rocky stronghold. The expedition was withdrawn because it had captured a large number of slaves and because Dutch ships were nearing Luanda. Shortly after this, the Portuguese sent another raiding party south into Kisama. During the late 1620s, Njinga adopted Imbangala methods such as extremely agile fighting techniques, ritual cannibalism, infanticide, and incorporation of captured and homeless young men into a warrior society. It was rumored that Njinga herself had been initiated as an Imbangala fighter. Around 1629 or 1630, she returned to the Kwanza islands to recruit displaced Mbundu people. Between 1630 and 1635, Njinga and her army conquered the interior Matamba state to use as a base from which to mount attacks on Ngola Ari's Ndongo and the Portuguese. Although Njinga led an attack on the Portuguese fort at Mbaka, she had to withdraw to counter a slave and cattle raid on Matamba by her erstwhile ally Kasanje. In 1639, Pedro Cezar de Menezes arrived in Luanda as the new governor, bringing with him the first Portuguese reinforcements in 14 years. Attempts to negotiate with Kasanje and Njinga failed because they both refused to accept Christianity, and the latter would not renounce her claims as Ndongo ruler.

To acquire a regular supply of slaves for the Brazilian colonies they had recently captured, the Dutch seized Luanda in August 1641, and the Portuguese under Menezes withdrew inland to the Bengo River. The Portuguese now faced the problem of their African tributaries

trading with the Dutch. When the Ndembu chief Nambu a Kalombe, a subordinate of Kongo, began to negotiate with the Dutch, a Portuguese force under Bruto invaded his area, defeated his army, and built a cairn out of skulls of executed prisoners. Distancing itself from the Portuguese, the Kongo Kingdom invited the Dutch to establish forts in its territory. Surrounded by enemies, the Portuguese on the Bengo River moved further inland to the forts at Mbaka, Cambambe, and Massangano, where they secured alliances with Ngola Ari of Ndongo (who they had placed in power) and an Imbangala group under Kabuku Kandonga. This gave the Portuguese control over the western Mbundu people of the lower Lukala and middle Kwanza Rivers. In 1642, Menezes sent a force under Bruto north to subdue the Ndembu of chief Nambu a Ngongo and take captives for sale. However, with the assistance of 200 Dutch soldiers, the Ndembu defeated the Portuguese. Based in Matamba, Njinga dispatched an army under her trusted military commander Mona through Ndembu country, where they established a camp on the Dande River from where trade was conducted with the Dutch at Luanda to the west and raids sent against Ndongo and the Portuguese to the south. The Dutch welcomed Njinga's move into Ndembu and sent 100 European soldiers to help subdue a resistant local chief. At the end of 1641, the Portuguese reoccupied the Bengo River area and negotiated a truce with the Dutch, from whom they acquired food and cloth for slaves. In May 1643, the Dutch, perhaps attempting to finish off their European rivals in Angola, broke the truce and drove the Portuguese back to Massangano. The Portuguese were then forced to export ever-greater numbers of slaves to obtain food from the Dutch. In one incident, the Portuguese responded to appeals from chiefs in Libolo south of the Kwanza River by dispatching an expedition that expelled Imbangala raiders but then took captives from the communities that had sought their assistance. Around the same time, Njinga sent an army of 80,000 archers into southeastern Kongo to take slaves for the Dutch. In 1644, a Mbundu chief who supported Njinga led attacks on the Portuguese tributary communities around Mbaka. When the Portuguese sent most of their European and African troops to retaliate, Njinga's main army under Mona defeated them and captured several pro-Portuguese chiefs, including Kabuku.

Just as the Portuguese position at Massangano became tenuous, relief forces from Brazil landed on the Angolan coast. It was in April 1645 that 260 Portuguese troops arrived at Benguela, south of

Luanda, and 100 of them attempted to march overland to Massangano but ran into an Imbangala camp and were almost all killed. In October, the newly arrived governor, Francisco de Sottomaior, transported a second contingent of 300 troops up the coast by boat to Cabo Ledo from where they marched inland to the Kwanza River, which they followed to Massangano. In 1646, an army consisting of Portuguese and Ndongo allies from Ngola Ari crossed the Dande River, where they were attacked by Njinga's force, which was now equipped with Dutch firearms and assisted by a few Dutch soldiers. However, the Portuguese and Ndongo army drove off Njinga's followers and entered the queen's compound, where they captured an Ndembu chief and the queen's sister Kifunji. They also found a supportive letter from the king of Kongo. Around this time, the Portuguese entered into an alliance with Kasanje's Imbangala against Njinga. The arrival of Portuguese reinforcements made the Dutch determined to eliminate their European rivals. In mid-1646, the Dutch advanced along the Lukala River, where they defeated a disorganized Portuguese army but were then halted at Mushima. Supported by 500 Dutch troops and a growing number of Ndongo chiefs, Njinga's army defeated the Portuguese on the Lukala River, and the survivors retreated to Massangano. The Portuguese had all the canoes along the Lukala destroyed to make it difficult for their enemies to cross the river. Kifunji, Njinga's sister, was drowned. It took until mid-1648 for the Dutch and Njinga to organize their forces for a final push on Massangano. In August of that year, as the Portuguese and their Ndongo allies suffered another defeat and it appeared Massangano would fall, Portuguese ships from Brazil, commanded by Salvador de Sa, recaptured Luanda from the Dutch, who had deployed most of their soldiers inland.

The Portuguese at Luanda immediately began re-establishing dominance over neighboring African groups. Northeast of the port, Panji Ndona led a rebellion. The Portuguese sent an army that pushed the rebels into the marshes of the Dande River, killed their leader, and starved them into submission. Lacking Dutch support, Njinga withdrew from Ndembu territory and returned to her Matamba base. Kongo made peace with the Portuguese by sending them a large gift of cloth and agreeing to a mutual defense pact that excluded the Ndembu country, which essentially gave them permission to raid there. In 1650, the Portuguese sent an expedition south into Lobito territory, where they defeated local chiefs, and seized prisoners and cattle. The commander of the force wanted to proceed south of the

Kuvu River into the lands of the Ovimbundu, but his weary soldiers refused and returned to Luanda. A force of Portuguese, Imbangala, and Ndongo troops marched north from Mbaka to attack the Ndembu leader Mbwila, who had supported Njinga. The thick bush of Ndembu territory made the assault difficult, and when Mbwila appealed to Luanda, the Portuguese and their allies were recalled. Realizing that constant war disrupted trade, Portuguese governor Luis Mendes de Souza Chicorro entered negotiations with Njinga in 1655. The following year, they signed a treaty in which the Matamba queen would accept a Christian mission, assist the Portuguese in conflicts, and allow trade in the area. Njinga also gave the Portuguese 130 slaves to secure the release of her other sister, Mukambu, who had been held prisoner. During the mid-1650s, as his representatives were bargaining with Njinga in the east, Chicorro conducted a year and half long campaign to subdue Kisama in the south, where local people had been threatening boats on the Kwanza River. The largest army Luanda had mobilized in many years, 400 Portuguese and 16,000 African troops, failed to defeat the many chiefs of the Kisama region who were assisted by Imbangala armed with particularly powerful long bows from further south. The Portuguese then turned their military ambitions north toward Kongo. Chicorro claimed that Kongo had violated its treaty with Portugal by interfering with traders and giving sanctuary to escaped slaves. Economic competition was an important factor because Kongo preferred to trade with the Dutch, who offered better prices and quality goods, rather than the Portuguese, who tried to impose a monopoly through military might. During the dry season of 1657, an army advanced north from Luanda and invaded the territory of the southern Kongo chief Mbumbi that was located between the Dande and Loje Rivers. Although the Portuguese leader wanted to pursue Mbumbi and his followers, who had fled north across the Loje, his soldiers disagreed—they claimed no white man had ever returned from that area—and the expedition withdrew south.

Joao Fernandes Viera and Andre Vidal Negreiros were Portuguese Brazilians appointed as successive governors of Angola in 1658 and 1661, respectively, as reward for their efforts in fighting the Dutch in South America. Eager for personal wealth, they used direct military action to capture slaves for export. In 1658, Viera assembled a force of 400 Portuguese troops along with allies from Ngola Ari's Ndongo and Kabuku's Imbangala. The men smashed a subordinate chiefdom

close to Luanda along the Bengo and Dande Rivers, sending its people to Brazil as slaves. The next year, Viera sent an expedition north to punish two Ndembu chiefs accused of harboring runaway slaves, and although the fighting was inconclusive, the Portuguese gained more captives. In 1660, another Portuguese-led army was dispatched south to Libolo and Hako to secure slave and ivory trade routes from marauding Imbangala bands and local groups. Viera's army suffered a serious defeat in Haka and withdrew from the troublesome south. Under Governor Negreiros, the Portuguese, in 1663, intervened militarily in a succession dispute in one of the Ndembu chiefdoms. A Portuguese-led army defeated the Kongo-backed candidate, shipped him to Brazil, and placed their own man in power. The expedition captured 2,000 slaves, of which 500 were taken by the governor and his military commander. The rest were distributed among the Portuguese soldiers.⁶

Looking for an excuse to attack Kongo, Negreiros revived Portuguese claims to rumored gold mines in Wandu on the southern frontier of that kingdom. When Kongo ruler Antonio I sent forces into Wandu, Negreiros responded by organizing his own expedition in 1665. Commanded by Luis Lopes de Sequeira, this army consisted of 450 Portuguese and African gunmen, two small cannon, and 3,000 African archers. It marched into the mountainous Ndembu territory, where a civil war was raging between rival claimants to the Mbwila chieftaincy—one backed by Kongo and the other by the Portuguese. During the early morning darkness of October 29, 1665, the Portuguese army was joined by local Mbwila allies. Led by Antonio, the Kongo army attacked at dawn. It was made up of 100,000 men, probably an exaggeration, who were mostly archers but also included 800 shield-bearing heavy infantry, and 380 Portuguese and African musketeers commanded by the Portuguese African leader Pedro Dias de Cabra. Although the Kongo army enjoyed vast numerical superiority, most of their troops were inexperienced conscripts, while the majority of the Portuguese-led fighters were veterans of many recent conflicts. Sequeira deployed his army with all the gunmen and artillery in a tight diamond formation in the center and skirmishers on the flanks. The Kongo assault came in two direct waves. The first consisted of all their gunmen, half their heavy infantry, and 4,000 light infantry, which was repelled after heavy fighting in which the Portuguese artillery played a key role. Antonio then personally led most of his troops in a second wave that surrounded the Portuguese and drove off their

African auxiliaries on the flanks but could not overcome their strong center. Pursued by Sequeira's Imbangala contingent, the remnants of the Kongo army retreated, and the rear guard abandoned its baggage train. Thousands of Kongo fighters were killed, including 98 senior nobles, 400 lesser nobles, and Kongo's first ordained African priest. Twice wounded by gunshots, Antonio was captured and decapitated. His severed head, crown, and sceptre were later taken to Luanda as trophies. Since most of their African allies had fled, the Portuguese were unable to exploit the victory by taking many captives. Defeat at the Battle of Mbwila, perhaps the largest and most decisive single engagement in the precolonial history of Central Africa, significantly reduced Kongo's military power because it lost most of its musketeers and plunged the state into a disastrous civil war exasperated by the deaths of many potential successors to Antonio.⁷

The deaths of Njinga in 1663 and her rival Ngola Ari the following year led to civil wars in Matamba and Ndongo, respectively. The Portuguese intervened in both. In Matamba, conflict developed between Mona, the late Njinga's military leader who took over immediately after her death, and Kanini, her main advisor who had a strong personal claim to the Matamba monarchy. Since Mona threatened Portuguese influence in Matamba, Luanda sided with Kanini and in 1666 sent a military expedition that helped him take power and expel his rival. When Kanini died after about a year in office, Mona and his supporters retook Matamba and killed several Portuguese living there. Acting on instructions from Luanda, the Imbangala of Kabuku, a long-time Portuguese ally, invaded Matamba around 1672, overthrew and killed Mona, and placed Kanini's son in power. Under Kanini II, Matamba initially became a reliable Portuguese ally and trading partner, but eventually relations soured. In Ndongo around 1664, Ngola Ari was succeeded by his son Ngola Ari II, who tried to reassert the state's independence by attacking several local Portuguese allies, including one near the fort at Mbaka; raiding trade caravans on the way to Kasanje; and protecting escaped Mbundu slaves. Given his success against Kongo at the Battle of Mbwila, Luis Lopes de Sequeira was placed in command of an army, which included contingents dispatched from Brazil, sent to reconquer Ndongo. In 1671, the Portuguese besieged Ari II's rocky stronghold of Pungu a Ndongo, where the king had previously built up food stores. At one point, the Ndongo leader led a foray out of the fortress and burned Portuguese supplies and shelter. At the end of November 1671, the Portuguese penetrated

and destroyed Pungu a Ndongo, where they took several hundred slaves. Ari II fled southwest to Libolo, where he was captured and beheaded by the Portuguese. His fugitive brother and son reached Matamba, but Kanini II surrendered them to the Portuguese, who sent them to a monastery in Portugal. The Portuguese built a fort at Pungu a Ndongo and placed Ndongo territory under direct rule.

Beginning in the 1640s, the Imbangala state of Kasanje balanced trading with the Portuguese with maintaining independence. Around 1680, Kanini II of Matamba, whose relationship with the Portuguese had deteriorated, sent an army to intervene in Kasanje's succession crisis, and it attacked traders and plundered goods. Once Kinguri kia Kasanje emerged as the new ruler of Kasanje, he called on the Portuguese to punish Matamba. Joao de Silva a Souza, the governor at Luanda, accepted this invitation because he felt Matamba had to be stopped from disrupting regional trade, and he feared that Kanini II would rally wider resistance against the Portuguese. Led by the now famous Luis Lopes de Sequeira, an army of 500 Portuguese troops, 50 Portuguese cavalry, and 40,000 African bowmen marched to Mbaka in August 1681 and then advanced further east into Matamba. On September 4, at dawn, the Portuguese-led force was camped at Katole, a short distance from Kanini's capital, when they were unexpectedly attacked by the Matamba army. The Portuguese ammunition dump was destroyed almost immediately and Sequeira killed while trying to organize a defense. Having already lost 100 Portuguese soldiers, Sequeira's deputy decided to retreat to Luanda. Although the Portuguese tried to save face by claiming to have killed Kanini, it appears that this was actually done by a Kasanje army that defeated Matamba after Sequeira's expedition withdrew. Veronica Gutterres, the late Kanini's sister, became queen of Matamba and in 1683 concluded a treaty with the Portuguese in which she promised to let them travel through her territory to trade in eastern and northern Kongo, to allow a Christian mission to be established in Matamba, to send 200 slaves to Luanda as compensation for the war with Kanini (only 90 were actually provided), and to expel Vili traders who were bringing in firearms and ammunition acquired from other European merchants north on the Loango coast. The Portuguese position in west-central Africa now appeared secure. Kongo had been defeated and was embroiled in a civil war, Ndongo had been completely conquered, and Kasanje and Matamba were cooperative trading partners. The Portuguese could

refrain from direct military action in the interior and remain in their colony, where African allies would bring slaves for export.

During the late 1600s and early 1700s, the Portuguese at Luanda faced new challenges. In 1691, the Ndembu ruler of Mbwila rebelled against the Portuguese by expelling Europeans, burning a church, seizing trade good, and blocking trade routes. A Portuguese-led army of 800 gunmen and 40,000 archers invaded Mbwila and sacked local villages. Although initially driven off, the rebels survived as the Portuguese led force was compelled to withdraw by rains that slowed movement and accelerated tropical disease. During the late 1600s, English trading vessels began to call at Loango on the coast north of Luanda and, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, provided firearms to the local Vili for slaves and ivory. Unlike the Portuguese, the English did not have territorial ambitions and thus would never face these firearms in battle. They hoped that the spread of warfare in the hinterland would produce more slaves. The Portuguese had established an enclave at Benguela, on the coast south of Luanda, in the early 1600s. During the late 1600s, they pushed inland, established a fort at Kakonda in 1682, and fought a series of wars with the Ovimbundu states. These conflicts produced captives, who were taken to Benguela and then shipped up the coast to Luanda. From there, they were exported as slaves. During the 1720s, slave ships from Brazil began to travel directly to Benguela.

Economic competition from the north at Loango and the south at Benguela, prompted the Portuguese at Luanda in the 1730s to try to bypass Matamba and acquire slaves directly from the Holo further east on the Kwango River. In 1742, a Holo slave caravan that was on its way to Portuguese territory and guarded by 120 armed men was attacked and seized by an army from Matamba. In February 1744, a Matamba force raided the Cambambe trade fair in Portuguese-ruled Ndongo and withdrew with 500 slaves along with many trade goods. Since this was an obvious violation of the 1683 treaty, Luanda organized an army of 600 Portuguese soldiers, 500 Portuguese settlers, 2,000 armed slaves, and 20,000 archers. During the dry season of 1744, this force—led by Bartolomeu Duarte de Sequeira—invaded Matamba, destroyed villages, drove off its army, and seized its capital. This was the furthest inland any Portuguese-led army had penetrated. With the rainy season approaching, Sequeira negotiated a treaty with the Matamba queen in which Portuguese traders were permitted to do business to the east and pulled his army back toward the coast.

Sequeira was later criticized by Portuguese authorities for not penetrating far enough into Matamba, failing to capture its ruler, and neglecting to provide the required one fifth of captives to the state. During the 1740s, the Portuguese at Luanda also sent a number of ultimately failed expeditions into Kisama territory to the south, from where raiders still threatened the Kwanza River trade routes.

In 1759, a Portuguese army built a fort at Nkoje in Ndembu territory where the Mbwila ruler, over the previous 20 years, had been facilitating the northward trade with other Europeans elsewhere on the coast and interfering with the east-west Portuguese commerce. Fleeing from Lunda expansion in the interior, which will be discussed later in this chapter, the Hungu under Mushinda entered Portuguese territory in 1761 and attacked missionaries east of Mbaka. This was not a raiding party but an entire population of men, women, and children looking for a new home. During the dry season, a small Portuguese army from Pungu a Ndongo defeated the Hungu, killing around 11,000 (including Mushinda) and taking 4,000 as slaves. Hungu fatalities were so high because the Portuguese killed prisoners they did not have the manpower to guard. By early the next year, the Hungu had outflanked the Portuguese by going north, where they blockaded trade from the fort at Nkoje. The Portuguese sent cavalry units, which a Luanda governor had requested from Lisbon in 1753 as a way to patrol long trade routes, to regain control in the north, but the horses were wiped out by tropical disease. The Hungu and Sosso, who had a similar history, built stockades surrounded by three walls of branches and earth, and entered into an alliance with the local Ndembu of Mbwila. In 1765, a Portuguese army was sent north and was blocked from crossing the Dande River by Mbwila's Ndembu, who were well equipped with firearms. Taking heavy casualties, the Portuguese pushed over the river and relieved the Nkoje fort, which they used as a staging area to raid Hungu stockades. When several Hungu chiefs were driven north by forces from Wandu (which was a Portuguese ally) and the Sosso made their own alliance with Luanda, the Portuguese gained control over trade in the southern part of Kongo. Given that Africans were already acquiring firearms from the English and illegal Portuguese merchants, in 1767, Luanda permitted a limited trade of 1,500 guns and 200 barrels of powder per year.⁸

Around 1770, the Portuguese built a fort at Novo Redondo on the coast between Benguela and Luanda and location of the modern Angolan town of Sumbe to stop the Ovimbundu from trading with

passing ships of other European powers. As a result, the army of Sela, an Ovimbundu state that had been engaged in the trade, captured the fort and its Portuguese garrison. The Portuguese responded by attempting to conquer the Ovimbundu. Portuguese columns were sent out from Luanda and Benguela, and linked up in the Ovimbundu homeland of the Biha Plateau. Over three years of fighting, from 1774 to 1776, the Ovimbundu initially responded to the Portuguese invasion by mounting guerrilla attacks but then concentrated on defending stone forts. While the Portuguese brought in artillery to demolish the fortifications, some were so extensive that they took months to overcome. Although the Portuguese defeated Bailundu, the largest Ovimbundu state, they did not have the resources to occupy the entire territory, and Kakonda remained their most advanced outpost. During the late 1770s and 1780s, the Portuguese paid less attention to the interior and attempted to strengthen their position on the coast, which was threatened by the Dutch, French, and British. To control the Loango trade to the north of Luanda, the Portuguese took advantage of the absence of the French and British from the south Atlantic during the American Revolutionary War and established a fort at Cabinda in 1780. However, four years later, two French frigates sailed into Cabinda and easily seized it from the sick and demoralized Portuguese garrison.⁹

THE INTERIOR SAVANNA

By around 300 CE, iron-using farming and fishing communities lived around Lake Kisale in what is now the southeastern part of the DRC. With the fertile soil and regular rainfall of the savanna on the southern border of the forest, they produced a surplus of cereal crops. Exporting dried fish and copper jewelry, these communities acquired iron and salt from the north, and copper from the south. By around 1300, several small states had been formed around Lake Kisale, and between 1400 and 1500 these had united into a single Luba Kingdom. The legendary founder of Luba was Nkongola, who came from the north, subdued local villages, and built a capital. After a short time, Ilunga Mbili—an accomplished hunter—arrived from the east, had a child with Nkongola's sister, but then violently clashed with the ruler and returned home. Kalala Ilunga, the hunter's son, became a legendary warrior and helped Nkongola expand his kingdom to the south. However, Nkongola eventually tried to assassinate Kalala Ilunga, who

fled to his father's homeland and returned with an army that took over the Luba state, captured and killed Nkongola, and built a new capital at Munza just a few kilometers from the old one. Under Kalala, Luba expanded by subjugating small chiefdoms to the north and northwest. During the 1700s, Luba conquered decentralized and populous groups along the upper Congo, Luvua and Luapula River valleys, and the western shore of Lake Tanganyika. This expansion was delayed by a civil war in the late 1700s but was then renewed in the early 1800s. The Luba Kingdom developed a structure in which several small chiefdoms made up a province under the central royal court. Among the most important officials appointed by the king to administer the state was a military leader (called *twite*) who commanded a royal bodyguard of young men who were given war titles by the ruler. This constituted the only standing force in the empire. With this group providing leadership, each new military operation required forming an army from available recruits, some of whom came from recently subjugated peoples. Motivations for going to war included the possibility of upward mobility by gaining war titles from the king and capturing prisoners or other loot. Major campaigns were personally led by the king, while raids and small operations were commanded by the *twite*. On the battlefield, titleholders and groups of fighters were deployed around the king in the same way they were positioned at the royal court. Since a Luba army lived off the land and whatever the fighters' accompanying wives could carry, campaigns tended to be short, possibly several months at most, and it usually took a few years to subjugate a neighbor. Operational planning always involved consultation with royal spirit mediums. Fighters who fled combat were punished by having a foot chopped off, and amputation became a method to inflict terror upon conquered groups. Psychological warfare was important—before a battle, Luba fighters would shout insults at their enemy, show off magical charms, and display prisoners who had had their noses, ears, and/or arms cut off.¹⁰

Around 1500, conflict among the Luba royals resulted in a disaffected section moving west, where they established a large centralized state over the many small groups east of the upper Kasai River. According to oral tradition, the Luba noble Chibunda Ilunga married a local queen called Rweej and founded a dynasty that would rule the new Lunda state. The king took the title *Mwata Yamvo* ("Lord of Vipers"), and several of them were killed personally leading expansionist campaigns. Although a war leader was included among the

retinue of royal officials, Lunda did not maintain a standing army except for a small police force at the capital. While officials sent to collect tribute or execute other orders on the kingdom's frontiers would be accompanied by a small military force, these would not operate in the Lunda homeland. Each new Mwata Yamvo created a new capital that was fortified by a double fence of wooden stakes and live trees. Disputes among Lunda royals prompted disgruntled members to move away to found neighboring states such as Lozi in what is now western Zambia. Lunda expansion during the 1600s and 1700s was facilitated by the adoption of American crops, particularly drought resistant cassava, which had been brought to the coast by the Portuguese and increased food production and population growth in the interior. Since Lunda had plenty of land but not enough people, its expansion was characterized by raiding armies sent out to seize captives, who were taken back to the capital area, placed in agriculture work, and eventually incorporated into Lunda society. As the Lunda frontier became too far away to bring prisoners to the center, the Mwata Yamvo established satellite states that expanded in the same manner and sent him tribute. Lunda engaged in the Atlantic slave trade by exporting its own criminals and prisoners taken on raids against Luba to the northeast. During the 1700s, Mwata Yamvo's Lunda began a westward expansion and by the 1760s, it was fighting Matamba and Kasanje along the Kwango River to secure access to Atlantic coastal trade. Armed with swords, spears, and shields, Lunda fighters thought of firearms as a coward's weapon, and they were not in demand in Lunda markets.

In the early 1700s, a Lunda army led by Nganda Bilonda was sent 800 kilometers east of the Mwata Yamvo's capital to capture sources of salt and copper on the upper Luabala River and collect tribute. The conquest was successful, and Bilonda was rewarded with the title Kazembe. The large Lunda army usually outnumbered the forces of the small chiefdoms it subdued and in turn, the rulers of these states joined the Lunda hierarchy and supplied Kazembe with even more fighters. By the 1740s, Kazembe II had invaded the lower Luapula Valley, where his army defeated the local Bwilile and Shila, and founded a Lunda satellite state with its capital on the south side of Lake Mweru. The Lunda brought a few guns into this area, but they had no bullets and were used to frighten local people with sound and smoke. In the late 1700s, Kazembe III pushed further east to the Chambeshi River and subjugated more groups such as the Bisa.

By the 1780s, the Bisa had become traders, taking Kazembe's ivory and copper across the Luangwa Valley to the Yao of Lake Malawi and to a lesser extent the Portuguese on the Zambezi River, who then transported it to the Indian Ocean coast. The main imports were beads and cloth. Although Kazembe's Lunda was so far from its parent kingdom that it evolved into an autonomous state, it continued to send tribute of salt, copper, and slaves to the Mwata Yamvo. With a rich agricultural heartland producing maize and cassava that promoted population growth, Kazembe's Lunda became the center of a complex trading network connected to both the west and east coasts. This eastern Lunda state copied the administrative system of its parent, with appointed governors collecting tax for the king and subordinate local chiefs being given Lunda titles and respected as "owners of the land." Like Mwata Yamvo, Kazembe did not maintain a standing army but gathered large conscript forces when needed. In theory, Kazembe could call upon every man in his territory for military service. The army was divided into units supplied and led by subordinate rulers and these could be combined into larger formations under provincial governors. Kazembe's fighters used an oblong shield made of light wood and reeds that was soaked in water before battle to make it expand and become impervious to arrows, and they were armed with spears, swords, and bows and arrows. Indeed, the mpok sword served as a symbol of Lunda identity. Both branches of the Lunda Empire exported slaves, though not to the extent of states like Kongo, Ndongo, or Kasanje closer to the Atlantic coast.¹¹

Living in what is now southern DRC, the Kanyok people hunted, fished, and farmed the savanna just south of the forest along the parallel and north-flowing Mbuji Mayi, Luilu, and Lubilash Rivers. Growth in trade and agricultural production after around 1500 drove regional competition, which meant that the small Kanyok villages, located between the rising powers of Luba and Lunda, experienced more insecurity from raids and warfare. The dominant Kanyok matrilineal clans employed a secret male warrior society called mungongo to enforce their authority, defend territory, and ensure order at public events. After their initiation during puberty, young men joined the mungongo, which consisted of units of 30–40 warriors who were constantly reorganized depending on the situation. Between 1600 and 1700, military pressure from Lunda made mungongo leaders more important and enabled them to challenge the matrilineal clans for control of broader Kanyok society. Gathering groups of young men who

they provided with the spoils of war, including captured women, these warrior leaders founded military-oriented villages and eventually states with patrilineal dynasties. By the end of the 1700s, through a process of expansion and centralization connected to growing trade, the Mulundu state had come to dominate most of Kanyok territory. During the 1700s, the Kanyok were regularly raided by the Luba, who built a large dry moat fortification with a circumference of 4 kilometers close to the main crossing of the Lubilash River, which they occupied during the dry season and used as a staging area. Kanyok leaders, around 1800, responded by repudiating their legendary ties to Luba royalty, breaking off diplomatic and tributary relations, and constructing two large earthwork and timber fortifications with circumferences of 6 and 11 kilometers, respectively, along the Luilu River. Because it would have taken about 1,000 men working continuously for four dry seasons to construct just one of these moats, Kanyok leaders must have achieved a good deal of centralized power and control of labor. Similar fortifications, sometimes with double moats and walls, were built in the south of Kanyok territory to discourage Lunda attacks. The Kanyok also set booby traps, usually consisting of sharp poison-coated stakes planted in the ground, along paths around the fortifications. Made from poisonous insects and snakes as well as crocodile gallbladders, the venom was also used on weapons such as spears, axes, and barbed arrows. By around 1810, the Luba found it more difficult to raid the Kanyok, who were now led by the great warrior Ilung a Cibang, ruler of Mulundu. According to legend, a climactic battle took place between the Kanyok and Luba on the Lubilash River in which a giant snake (Kanyok means "little snake") emerged from the water to defeat the Luba, who vowed never to return. With the Luba unable to control their western frontier, Mulundu expanded its influence to the north and south. At this time, Ilung sent an army south to counter Lunda slave raids that had been taking place for some time and enforce equitable trade. Ilung's successor, Ciam a Ciband, consolidated the Mulundu state but after his death around 1850, the Kanyok became embroiled in destructive civil conflicts that were worsened by the proliferation of slave raiding and firearms in the area. In 1875, a Luba ivory and slave trader named Kasonge Cinyama led a small army equipped with firearms that briefly occupied the Mulundu state before it was expelled by local leaders.

Ilung had strengthened the Mulundu army and organized it into three divisions. The Biin Luhit was a small force of perhaps 200

commoner professional soldiers recruited from across the territory. They lived at the royal court, where they protected the ruler, enforced laws and tribute payment, and discouraged potential rebellion. The king gave them regular payments of food, access to agricultural land, and a share of loot taken in warfare. The commander and deputy commander of this unit were appointed by the ruler based on merit and advised him on military matters. When war broke out, these two officers, covered with red clay and adorned with red parrot feathers, would perform a dance for the ruler to signal their support. Called the Biin Mazemb, the second division consisted of 500 or 600 slaves who lived at the capital, where they performed nonmilitary work and during warfare would be armed and sent out ahead of the main force to serve as decoys to lure enemies into ambush. The third division was called the Biin Mund and was made up of several hundred ambitious royal sons who were housed at the capital to keep them from engaging in plots or causing trouble. During operations, these men commanded units of conscripts from surrounding villages who filled out the wartime army. Housed a few hundred meters from the king's compound and excluded from the state's administrative affairs, the senior member of this group was called the Mwen a But and commanded the entire army during war. He was responsible for battle plans, deployment, and distribution of royal weapons. Supernatural forces played a major role in Kanyok warfare. Before fighters took the field, their confidence would be bolstered by being rubbed with wet leaves believed to make them invisible and other charms said to protect them from enemy weapons or give them the ability to fly. In battle, Kanyok tactics were more practical and usually involved surrounding an unsuspecting enemy by sneaking up through tall grass or trees in a crescent formation and springing forward at the last minute.¹²

During the nineteenth century, Lunda and Luba declined in the face of new aggressive raiders equipped with firearms. The era began with a destructive war between Luba and Kazembe's Lunda. Sometime in the mid-1830s, expansionist Luba ruler Kumwimbe Ngombe led an invasion of the heartland of Kazembe's Lunda to try to control the growing trade with the Indian Ocean coast and capture booty and prisoners. Using canoes to cross water obstacles was central to the Luba campaign as they first captured an important crossing point on the Congo River and after crossing the Luapula River they penetrated Kazembe's territory by digging a canal through a large swamp to

Kayo Lagoon. However, upon landing they were confronted and defeated in battle by a large Lunda force under Kazembe Kanyembo. The Luba sustained heavy casualties and returned home. Living in a remote and thinly populated part of what is now eastern Angola, the Chokwe had not been greatly involved in the slave trade. During the 1700s, they began to specialize in producing bees' wax and hunting elephants for ivory. They imported a large number of flintlock muskets and became skilled gunsmiths. When the Atlantic slave trade declined in the mid-1800s, Chokwe wax and ivory was suddenly in great demand by European traders along the coast. Organized in bands of about 1,000 male hunters along with their families, the Chokwe followed elephant herds and expanded northeast into the territory of Mwata Yamvo's Lunda, who struggled to defend themselves against this new gun-toting enemy. The Chokwe proliferated because when a band became too large, a section hived off to form a new hunting group. The increase of ivory and slave exports from the Indian Ocean coast led to the development of two new military powers in Central Africa during the mid-1800s. On its eastern frontier, Kazembe's Lunda was challenged by Arab-Swahili from the east coast who initially came to the interior as traders but slowly used firearms to exercise military dominance. During the 1850s, Arab-Swahili gunmen were involved in fighting a series of civil wars within Kazembe's Lunda that greatly weakened that state. At this point, the Nyamwezi were beginning to control the trade routes from the east coast through what is now Tanzania. In the 1850s, the Yeke, a Nyamwezi group under Msiri, pushed into the Central African interior and carved out a copper-rich territory from the western part of Kazembe's Lunda, the southern part of Luba, and the eastern part of Mwata Yamvo's Lunda. The Yeke military depended on a core of around 2,000 professional fighters armed with guns and supplemented by many local levies equipped with bows and arrows, and spears. Building a fortified capital called Bunkeya and several satellite strongholds, Msiri adopted Lunda-style administration with provincial governors collecting tax paid in ivory. Slaves were gained by warfare, collection of tribute, and judicial fines from subordinate rulers. While most of Msiri's trade flowed to and from the Indian Ocean, around 1870, he cultivated contacts with the Ovimbundu of southern Angola and sent caravans to Benguela on the Atlantic. Beginning his career with Msiri, Hamed bin Muhammed, popularly known as Tippu Tip, moved north in the 1860s and established a raiding state on the Lualaba River west

of Lake Tanganyika. He exported ivory and slaves to Zanzibar in the east, from where he imported firearms. With several thousand gunmen under his command, Tippu Tip led a loose federation of Arab-Swahili and Muslim Nyamwezi bands that raided villages for slaves that were either exported or put to work on local plantations. His gunmen also ventured into the thick forest to hunt elephants. Tippu Tip's trading empire stretched from Luba in the south, which he significantly weakened, to the westward bend of the Congo River in the north. Firearms, mostly flintlocks, came into Luba and Lunda very suddenly in the 1860s and 1870s, which meant that local armies did not have a chance to adapt to their use. Since the armies in this area usually fought in tight formations and closed with their enemy to shoot arrows and throw spears, they took heavy casualties from firearm-equipped Arab-Swahili, Nyamwezi or others.¹³

In the late 1700s, the Bemba, located in a resource-poor area between Lakes Malawi and Tanganyika in what is now eastern Zambia, began to raid neighboring communities such as the Bisa for cattle and trade goods, and expanded by founding subordinate communities on their frontier. Bemba people were governed by several semiautonomous chiefs, one of whom was considered the senior ruler. During the early 1800s, the Bemba sought to fill the power vacuum created by the decline of Kazembe's Lunda to the west and exercised more control over the growing ivory and slave trade with the east coast. Bemba rulers established fortified villages along main trade routes and river crossings, and appointed officials to command them. The growing ivory and slave trade with the Arab-Swahili in the mid-1800s motivated Bemba rulers to conduct more raids and with increased wealth to distribute, they could mobilize larger armies. In the 1850s, the Ngoni—pastoralists and raiders who had moved north from Southern Africa about 15 years before (as explained in Chapter 5)—rampaged through Bemba territory and established themselves on its northeastern frontier, from where they continued to mount attacks. Around 1870, a rare coalition of Bemba rulers, led by Chitapankwa and supported by a few Arab-Swahili gunmen, advanced on the Ngoni capital of Chipekeni. Following initial skirmishes, the Bemba lured some Ngoni warriors into a successful ambush and then assaulted the town. The Ngoni fled east into what is now Malawi and within a year, their raids against the Bemba had stopped. Since Ngoni predations had weakened other groups in the

area, their expulsion facilitated further Bemba conquest and the centralization of Chitapankwa's authority.

Decisions regarding warfare were taken by a Bemba ruler in the presence of a special war charm fashioned from an antelope horn with an iron bell hanging from its tip (called *ilamfya*) and in consultation with a war council of perhaps 40 members assembled from across the state. A Bemba ruler appointed military leaders who each administered a section of his capital bearing a name associated with warfare or violence such as "evil omen," "murder," "soldier ants," and "young married warriors." The capital was fortified with three layers of walls and a trench with sharpened stakes at the bottom, and those approaching it had to carry their weapons pointed downward or be mistaken for enemies. Bemba rulers also maintained a group of young unmarried warriors called the fearless ones at their capital, which included royal sons and grandsons as well as other recruits from across the territory. When a member of the fearless ones had proven himself in battle by bringing back the head of an enemy combatant, the ruler could reward him with a wife and perhaps appoint him as a military official. However, the Bemba did not have a standing army, and military expeditions of more than 200 men required calling on subordinate communities who were obliged to provide conscripts. Given the agricultural nature of Bemba society, large armies of several thousand were kept in the field for only one or two months during the dry season. A Bemba army was divided into subunits ranging in size from 20 to 60 men. Each was led by one of the ruler's military officials. Preceded by scouts, a Bemba force usually marched in column led by the bearer of the *ilamfya* war charm followed by the fearless ones, then detachments from the various sections of the capital and finally conscripts and carriers. Men who had already killed an enemy in combat carried only their weapons because their food and belongings were transported by porters. Others struggled with all their belongings. If the ruler accompanied the force, he traveled at the rear of the column with his bodyguard and senior officials. Avoiding pitched battles, Bemba tactics usually involved approaching an enemy by night and conducting a surprise attack at dawn. The war charm would always be pointed in the direction of the attack. At times, they set ambushes and used small decoy groups to lure unsuspecting adversaries into a trap. The Bemba besieged enemy stockades and starved the inhabitants into submission, burned the settlement with oil-soaked flaming arrows, or pulled down the weakest section of the fence to create a

breach through which fighters could assault. During the late nineteenth century, a European missionary witnessed a Bemba force move at night toward a fortified village, where they built a tall platform and dug a trench under the wall. At dawn, Bemba archers on the platform shot arrows down into the village to cover others who penetrated it through the trench. Although some historians attributed Bemba military success to possession of firearms, it appears that it was not until the 1890s that these weapons became common among Bemba fighters, who were usually armed with spears, axes, and bows.¹⁴

During the 1600s the Lozi of the upper Zambezi River, in present-day western Zambia, developed a centralized state that was probably influenced by a splinter group from the Lunda Empire. The state was administered by commoner officials appointed by the king on the basis of ability. These included officials based at the royal court, provincial governors whose function was mostly judicial, and chiefs of specific groups who were responsible for collecting tribute, recruiting labor, and raising armies. The foundation of Lozi state organization became a territorially based labour and military unit under an official appointed by the king as a reward for service or success in war or hunting. Although the Lozi Kingdom did not export slaves, it raided for captives from the nearby Tonga and Ila, and received prisoners as tribute from subordinate rulers. These slaves were employed internally to build mounds to raise villages above floodwaters, construct dams, and cut canals along the Zambezi floodplain that became the center of agriculture. In the mid-1700s, the Lozi ruler Ngombala led the conquest of less organized neighbors such as the Mbukushu in the west and the Subiya and Toka in the southeast, where local chiefs were left in charge though under supervision of a Lozi official who ensured the assembly of tribute and labor. As such, the Lozi state developed a highly centralized core and a frontier of loosely controlled non-Lozi chiefdoms.

Sometime in the 1830s, the Kololo, a Sesotho-speaking group led by Sebetwane that had fled violence in what is now South Africa, moved north through today's Botswana and crossed the Zambezi River at Kazungula. Probing east, they seized cattle from the plateau Tonga and the Ila of the Kafue River. Around 1840, the Kololo defeated an Ndebele army that had also come from south of the Zambezi and continued to raid the Ila until news of the approach of another Ndebele force prompted Sebetwane to lead his followers west toward the Lozi capital. Weakened by a civil war, the Lozi were easily defeated by the

Kololo, who took over the southern part of their floodplain. The Ngoni of Nxaba, also raiders from the far south, advanced up the Zambezi River into southern Lozi territory, where they were massacred by Sebetwane's Kololo. Around 1848, the Lozi court moved to Lukulu in the northern section of the now partially occupied kingdom, but it was then expelled by a Kololo attack. Former Lozi elites went into exile among neighboring groups and organized resistance to Kololo occupation. Since Sebetwane was a military leader who remained accessible to his fighters, he became more popular than the aloof and now deposed Lozi kings. Sebetwane cemented his position among the Lozi by passing out gifts of captured cattle and appointing local people to important positions. Around 1850, the Ndebele sent two more expeditions in pursuit of the Kololo, but Sebetwane had them trapped. Most starved to death. At the same time, Sebetwane made contact with Mambari traders from Angola, who he supplied with slaves in return for guns, and a Kololo force supported the Mambari in a slave raid on the Ila that garnered 200 captives. After Sebetwane died in 1851, his son and heir Sekeletu established his capital to the south at Linyanti, where the swamps of the Chobe River provided some protection from Ndebele attacks and it was easier to make trade contacts with Europeans further south from whom he wanted to obtain guns. Attempts to trade directly with the Portuguese along the Angola coast were mostly unsuccessful. A Kololo chief was put in charge of the Lozi heartland and continued to trade with the Mambari middlemen. Militarily, the Kololo occupation of Lozi territory was caught between Ndebele attacks from the south and the threat of Lozi exiles from the north. Under the Kololo, the Lozi Kingdom expanded west and east, and developed a more potent military that regularly raided the pastoral Ila and hunted elephants. The older Lozi territorial labour and military units declined in favor of Kololo age regiments. Discontent grew among the Lozi, who Sekeletu treated as agricultural slaves and taxed heavily, and some were exported to Ovimbundu slavers in exchange for firearms. After Sekeletu died in 1863, a succession struggle among the Kololo elites presented the Lozi with an opportunity to rebel. In 1864, an exiled Lozi army led by Lozi noble Njekwa invaded and annihilated most of the Kololo, who failed to mount effective resistance. The Lozi dynasty was re-established under Sepopa. One of the main problems of the Kololo was that since they originated from the less tropical south, they suffered badly from malaria in this hot and wet area. During the two decades that

followed the overthrow of the Kololo, the Lozi military system became decentralized and disorganized with powerful unit leaders and weak kings.¹⁵

THE FOREST AND ITS NORTHERN FRINGE

The decentralized nature of the precolonial societies of the Central African rainforest makes it difficult to reconstruct their military history. The dense terrain meant that change happened slowly, and the population remained sparse. Over a long period well before 1600, Bantu-speaking fishing and farming communities with Iron Age technology entered parts of the forest and either absorbed the existing bands of Twa hunter-gatherers or developed a symbiotic relationship with them. By the mid-1500s, northern Teke groups living around the junction of the Congo and Kasai Rivers began to move eastward to escape Kongo slave raiding or search for their own victims. Along the Atlantic coast north of the Congo River, in the Loango region, the Vili states exchanged salt produced in their area for ivory acquired by Twa hunters deeper in the forest. Little is known about Vili armies except that the Loango Kingdom's military was powerful enough to force its neighbors, Ngoyo and Kakongo, to pay tribute. When the Dutch began trading along the Loango coast in the early 1600s, they were mostly interested in acquiring ivory, copper, and dyewood. Although local rulers initially hesitated, by the 1660s, they had no choice but to export slaves because their main trading partner, the Dutch, now had plantation colonies that needed labor. From the late 1600s to the late 1700s, the Dutch and eventually the Portuguese, French, and British exported 10,000 slaves a year from Loango. In addition to the usual imports of cloth, beads, ironware, tobacco, and alcohol, Europeans also brought in large amounts of firearms and ammunition. This enabled interior raiding states such as Kasanje to develop a military core of musketeers and created a constant demand for more guns and powder. Slaves brought to Loango came from the Bobangi peoples (who used canoes to trade along the middle Congo River) and the southern Teke (who had been trading with the Portuguese in Angola for some time). Although Atlantic trade connections initially strengthened the Loango state, the expansion of the slave trade eventually empowered the two other Vili kingdoms of Ngoyo and Kakongo with their ports at Cabinda and Malemba, respectively. The slave trade in Loango was not as destructive to local African states

as it was to those in Angola because there was more competition among several European buyers who remained on the coast and tended not to get involved in local warfare. As happened in West Africa, involvement in the oceanic slave trade led to Vili nobles employing large numbers of slaves on their agricultural plantations and after 1860, slavers stopped exporting prisoners but continued to supply them locally.

By 1600, the relatively limited trade with Portuguese sailors, who exchanged iron and copper for slaves and fish, had stimulated the formation of small Duala states on the coast of present-day Cameroon. In the early 1800s, more European and American ships were attracted to the Cameroon estuary by the availability of ivory, which was becoming scarce elsewhere as elephants were hunted out. This resulted in an expansion of the slave trade in this area and a balkanization of local states, each of which wanted to deal independently with visiting ships. To suppress this growing slave trade, the British established a naval base on the island of Fernando Po in 1827 and created a settlement of freed slaves at Port Clarence in 1843 under the guidance of Baptist missionaries who soon spread their operations to the mainland. Although slave ships visited the Cameroon coast as late as 1861, the people of this area gradually shifted to the export of palm oil. Since the coast of modern Gabon was more thickly forested, was less populated than Cameroon, and lacked good harbors, it did not attract much oceanic commerce until the ivory and slave traders were looking for new sources in the early 1800s. In this area the French, who established a freed slave settlement at Libreville in 1848, tried to suppress the slave trade and promote raw material export. Under pressure from raiders from the northern savanna such as the Fulani of Adamawa, many small and independent groups of Fang people, during the mid-1800s, moved from what is now eastern Cameroon south into the coastal forests of Cameroon and Gabon. By the 1840s, advance parties of Fang hunters arrived at the Gabon estuary, where they took over the ivory trade and acquired firearms. During the 1860s and 1870s, the area's exports shifted from ivory (which was running out) and slaves to rubber, and French merchants began to penetrate the interior. Caught between Fang and European expansion, the small independent Mpongwe groups lost their position as economic intermediaries.

After around 1600, savanna raiders with horses and swords pressed south along the Ubangi River at the northern forest border to capture

slaves who were then sent north along the trans-Saharan trade routes. Along the Uele River on the northeast forest frontier, in what is now the DRC's northeast corner, the Mangbetu developed a strong agricultural foundation by growing plantain, maize and cassava, and their skilled ironworkers produced weapons such as spears and a range of swords that were prized among their neighbors. In the early 1820s, Nabiembali, leader of a small Mangbetu group, led the conquest of numerous chiefdoms and created a large and centralized Mangbetu Kingdom. However, Nabiembali failed to create a stable administration that brought together the various components of his state, which was held together by his personal leadership. In 1859, Nabiembali was usurped by his sons, who split the Mangbetu into several smaller but still powerful states that expanded to the east and south. Tuba, the deposed ruler's eldest son, took over the Mangbetu heartland and in the 1860s fought a series of wars against his rival brothers that failed to bring them under his authority. In the southwest in the early 1860s, the neighboring Azande invaded and conquered a portion of western Mangbetu territory. In 1866, Tuba fought the first Arabized Khartoum ivory and slave traders under Abn al-Rahman to reach the Uele River from the north. In the northwest Dakpala, a former slave and Tuba's top military leader founded his own state among the Bangba people. Allying with one of the Mangbetu dissident chiefs, Dakpala killed Tuba in 1867, and the late ruler's son Munza took over the heartland. Defeated by a coalition of Azande and Mangbetu groups, Munza moved his kingdom to the northeast, where he established a new large capital called Nangazizi and distracted the Azande by playing them against one another. In 1871, Munza provoked a Bangba attack on his capital in which Dakpala was killed. Munza initially welcomed the firearm-equipped Khartoum traders of Abn al-Samad as long as they remained in his capital and did not acquire slaves. However, around 1870, al-Samad's direct trade route to Nangazizi was cut off by the Azande, who killed him in battle. Munza briefly cooperated with the Khartoum traders of Abd al-Mai who wanted both ivory and slaves, and demanded to travel through Mangbetu territory to reach the Azande and others. Around 1871 or 1872, Munza expelled these Khartoum traders because they demanded his daughters as wives. In 1873, al-Mai's traders formed a grand coalition against Munza, which included the Bangba under the late Dakpala's son Yangala and Mangbetu dissidents under Munza's disaffected nephew Nesogo.

Later that year, or perhaps in 1874, the coalition attacked Nangazizi. Munza, despite valiantly leading the defense, was killed. After several other local powers were defeated, the Khartoum merchants installed their allies as rulers of parts of Mangbetu territory. Once Mangbetu leaders were exposed to firearms, they seemed eager to acquire them—Dakpala bought some guns around 1869, and Munza had 20 flintlocks by 1872. However, the Khartoum traders maintained a policy of not providing guns to people south of the Uele River, their primary targets for slaving, which meant that they had almost no impact on Mangbetu warfare. During the 1880s, European visitors observed that the Mangbetu possessed very few firearms.¹⁶

In the late 1700s, Azande states led by chiefs of the ruling Avungara clan expanded east toward the north part of the Congo River and Nile watershed in what is today the border area of South Sudan and DRC. They were motivated by the desire to incorporate subject peoples into their society and gain new land, rivers, and hunting areas. Although the Azande expanded rapidly, they did not centralize but constantly established new and usually rival groups. By the 1870s, a number of powerful Azande states were almost constantly at war with ivory and slave traders who were probing south from Khartoum. Each Azande ruler and his provincial governors maintained separate companies of unmarried and married men between 20 and 100 strong. During a large war, these companies were expanded by the addition of conscripted men from outside the state or provincial capitals who were not members of a company. Each company was led by its longest- and second-longest-serving members. While the unmarried men lived in company barracks at the central or provincial capital, married ones resided with their families in their own homesteads. These companies also performed nonmilitary duties, with unmarried men providing the ruler with labor for clearing fields and married men sending him food or trade goods as tribute. Large Azande states could field about 20,000 fighters, with individual provinces contributing between 200 and 3,000 each. Those who did not report for military service were each fined 10 spears. It was common for an unmarried warrior to take a young boy as a homosexual lover and apprentice fighter. The warrior gave the boy's parents spears as bride wealth—usually less than when he would later marry a woman—and the boy collected water and firewood, and carried the warrior's shield and belongings while on campaign. When the boy grew up, he joined the company and acquired his own boy-wife. While each fighter was

expected to supply his own spear and large wickerwork shield, the ruler and governors distributed iron throwing knives and additional spears to their men. Sometimes superiors rewarded brave warriors with gifts of spears that could not be used to pay bride wealth. The Azande also used a curved sword that could hook the edge of an opponent's shield and expose his body. Although the Azande refrained from using the bow and arrow in combat, during the mid-1800s, they began to acquire muskets from African Arab traders and in 1876, Azande ruler Mofio employed 600 gunmen.

Azande groups constantly raided and ambushed each other as well as their non-Azande neighbors. Oracles played an important role in Azande warfare because they approved targets and times of raids as well as places of assembly. They also determined which companies should fight and which remain behind. Before a raid, the Azande ruler sent to the target community a spy who tried to let his masters know when its inhabitants were engaged in a feast during which men would be unarmed and perhaps drunk, and many women would be present to be taken captive. Azande chiefs led their armies and administered war medicines kept in a special horn. An Azande raiding party would approach its target at night while maintaining strict noise and fire discipline. After meeting and consulting with the spy, the raid or ambush took place with the gunmen and unmarried warriors forming the assault force, and the married warriors covering the withdrawal at different ambush points. The assault group tried to conduct a simultaneous action, with each company assigned a specific objective. Acting swiftly before a counterattack could be organized, Azande raiders killed all males over eight years old; seized women and young boys; made off with any weapons, tools, livestock or food; and destroyed anything that could not be taken. As the raiders withdrew with their spoils, the victims and their neighbors used gongs and drums to signal mobilization, and several companies would be sent in pursuit, though they would usually stop after engaging several of the enemy's ambush parties. When a raiding party returned home, it assembled before the ruler, and each company commander reported on what his unit had done during the action. Each man who had taken loot laid it before the ruler, and anyone who had run away from the fight was fined spears or mutilated—hands, genitals, and ears were cut off in extreme cases. If a particular company had distinguished itself in the operation, the ruler walked past it singing a war song to which its members responded in kind. After the debriefing, the men returned to their

homes singing war songs and boasting to their families about their accomplishments in battle. Captives became domestic slaves. Some were kept by the ruler, some were distributed to his warriors, and others were sent to a senior ruler as tribute. The chief kept captured weapons to distribute to the army during a future operation.

Preparations for larger campaigns were not kept secret, and Azande rulers and governors staged rallies at their capitals to whip up enthusiasm for the fight and pass out weapons to their men. Guided by an oracle, an Azande ruler commanded his army in the field, giving orders directly to the governors who led their respective sections. During longer operations, Azande fighters brought some food with them. Some were accompanied by their wives, who cooked and maintained the camp. For the most part, Azande armies did not have any logistical system, and it was the responsibility of each fighter to live off the land, which meant that a military campaign usually caused famine where it was fought. On the defensive, an Azande force denied resources to invaders by burning all granaries and dwellings, and removing noncombatants, livestock, and food to swamps and forests. An Azande army marched in column with gunmen and married companies in the lead. Encountering the enemy, companies deployed in a line with a strong center and a wing on each flank. During battle, the Azande tried to encircle an enemy, though concern over casualties meant that a small gap would usually be left open to tempt a losing force to retreat instead of making a desperate stand. Another convention of Azande warfare meant to reduce casualties was that large battles were supposed to be fought in the late afternoon so that the loser could withdraw under cover of night. During a battle, Azande warriors remained in their lines but moved close to the enemy to throw knives and engage in hand-to-hand fighting. They were skilled in using large shields, agile body movements, and jumps to avoid injury. Faced with Arabized raiders with firearms, the Azande altered their usual tactics and began setting ambushes in tall grass or forest to surprise the enemy at very close range, thus rendering their guns almost useless. The hunger common to long campaigns led to some Azande eating the flesh of fallen enemies. Such stories were greatly exaggerated by Arabs and Europeans who portrayed the Azande as savage cannibals called *Niam Niam* (meat, meat), which is what they allegedly yelled during a fight. This reputation gave the Azande a psychological advantage—they were greatly feared by outsiders.¹⁷

CONCLUSION


Warfare in precolonial Central Africa was dominated by infantry. Recognizing that the savanna was open enough for horses to enhance their mobility, the Portuguese brought in a few, but they quickly died of disease. Along the northern forest border, mounted slave raiders plagued communities but could not penetrate far south. The spread of firearms across the region happened over about 300 years. During the 1500s and 1600s, African states near the Atlantic coast, such as Kongo and Kasanje, became embroiled in the oceanic slave trade and acquired firearms. Possession of firearms did not radically change local tactics in western Central Africa, but it did strengthen the core of armies that continued to deploy and fight in much the same manner, though perhaps with more loss of life. It was not until the 1800s that firearms began to appear in the deep interior in significant numbers, and they were used by intruders such as the Chokwe and Arab-Swahili to defeat long-established powers like Luba and Lunda, which did not readily adopt these new weapons. Although firearms could inflict terrible casualties, part of their advantage was psychological, especially among people who were first exposed to them. Central African states did not maintain large standing armies but used small groups of professional fighters to lead conscript forces put together as required. Responding to increased slave raiding at different times and in different places, some groups such as the Imbangala of the 1600s and the Bemba of the 1800s attempted to create militarized societies.

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Chapter 5

Southern Africa to ca. 1870

Below the Zambezi River, Southern Africa has a coastline along both the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and with the exception of a few large rivers such as the Orange and Vaal, water sources are few, making the environment generally arid. The central part of the region consists of the high and open plains of present-day Zimbabwe, central South Africa, northern and eastern Botswana, and northern Namibia. To the east, a series of mountain ranges, the Drakensberg Mountains and Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands, run parallel with the Indian Ocean and separate the coastal belt from the interior. The extremely arid west is dominated by the Kalahari Desert of present-day Botswana and Namibia, and the Namib Desert of Namibia's Atlantic coast. While most of these areas have dry winters and wet summers, this is reversed in South Africa's Western Cape. Many different Bantu-speaking and iron-using societies, practicing cattle herding and cultivation of cereal crops, were present in most of the region from at least 400 CE. Settlement patterns were determined by availability of water. Shona cattle herders and farmers on the Zimbabwe plateau exported gold to the coast of present-day Mozambique, from where Swahili merchants exchanged it for goods such as glass beads, porcelain, and textiles brought from the Middle East and Asia by Arab sailors. Given the limited water sources of central South Africa and eastern Botswana, Sotho and Tswana people developed a relatively small number of large towns. With many small



streams running down from the mountains, communities of Nguni speakers were smaller but spread out fairly evenly along the Indian Ocean coast of South Africa and southern Mozambique. Somewhat isolated by the southwestern Karoo Desert and the different rainfall pattern in the western Cape, many small groups of Khoisan, members of a different linguistic and cultural family than the Bantu, did not develop metallurgy or agriculture, and survived by raising livestock as well as hunting and gathering. Given the region's normally cooler temperatures that reduced the prevalence of tropical diseases such as malaria compared to further north, a distinctive feature of Southern African history was the comparative early establishment of European settlers in the Cape and their eventual conquest of vast tracts of the interior.

EXPANSION OF THE CAPE COLONY

The Dutch East India Company established a permanent post at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 to secure this strategic point on the sea route between Europe and Asia, and to create a reliable source of fresh

water and food for their passing ships. This small enclave would eventually become the city of Cape Town, capital of the Cape Colony. Since the pastoral Khoisan around Table Bay were hesitant to trade a large number of cattle, the Dutch brought in settlers in 1657 to produce vegetables and meat. Competition over grazing land between Europeans and Khoisan led to the First Dutch-Khoi War of 1659–1660 in which the Khoisan groups united briefly and trapped the settlers within their fort. However, the Khoisan alliance deteriorated, and they eventually negotiated with the Dutch. After the conflict, the Dutch erected a series of fences and hedges between themselves and the Khoisan, who were pushed off their land. The Second Dutch-Khoi War of 1673–1677 consisted of a series of cattle raids by Dutch settlers, assisted by impoverished Khoisan allies, which broke the power of the large Cochoqua group in the Saldanha Bay and Boland areas. European settlers expanded, and many Khoisan—their cattle taken and game hunted out—began to work for the Dutch alongside slaves imported from other parts of Africa and Asia.¹

Frontier Dutch settlers, Trekboers, began to organize voluntary local militias called commandos to mobilize for raids and defense. Once they disbanded, the Khoisan would renew their attacks. Organized between 1700 and 1715, the first commandos consisted of Company employees and some settler volunteers. While the first entirely civilian commando was formed in 1715, these groups remained dependent upon the Company for ammunition. In 1739, commando service became compulsory for all frontier settlers, who often brought along armed Khoisan servants or sent them as substitutes and who collected a share of captured livestock. Commando leaders were not required to get permission before raising a force but had to submit a report upon disbandment. According to historian Susan Newton-King, “the commando was an institution well suited to the guerrilla warfare favoured by the Khoisan. Its loose command structure rendered it highly flexible and capable of almost immediate response to surprise attack or robbery.”²

As Dutch settlement expanded north beyond the Piketberg Mountains during the 1730s, Khoisan mounted intense guerrilla attacks, and violence there continued for the rest of the century. Eastward Dutch expansion across the arid Karoo and into the rich grazing land between the Gamtoos and Fish Rivers led to warfare from the 1770s to 1790s. A major factor in these conflicts was that since the Trekboers lacked capital to employ wage labor, they captured Khoisan women

and children for indentured service. In the northeast, particularly in the Sneeuwberg area, violence between “Bushmen” hunters and Trekboer herders in the early 1770s caused many of the latter to abandon their farms. In 1774, a “grand commando” of 100 Europeans and 150 Khoisan swept the area, killing 503 Bushmen and capturing 241. Between 1786 and 1795, there was near constant warfare in the northeast, and commandos killed 2,480 Bushmen and captured 654. The Bushmen killed 276 of the Boers’ Khoisan herders.

Khoisan resistance failed because they did not produce iron weapons or tools—the Dutch quickly banned trading iron with them—and the small scale of their political organization facilitated Dutch divide and rule tactics. Furthermore, imported smallpox, such as the epidemic of 1713, and Dutch control of water sources reduced the Khoisan population. Dutch horses provided greater mobility, and their firearms were lethal and terrifying. The Khoisan learned to counter Dutch firepower by adopting hit-and-run and ambush tactics, and attacking when it rained because firearms of the period did not work when wet. Although Khoisan reliance on livestock left them vulnerable to fast-moving Trekboer raiders, groups that had lost their cattle and resorted to hunting and gathering proved more adept at guerrilla tactics. By the 1670s, the Khoisan had acquired a few guns through trade and capture, and this led to a series of frequently ignored Dutch prohibitions on trading firearms with the Khoisan.³

In the late 1700s, both the eastward moving Trekboers and the westward moving Xhosa entered the rich grazing land between the Sundays and Fish Rivers known as the Zuurveld and in so doing subjugated the Khoisan autochthones. Although the Trekboers still enjoyed the advantage of horses and guns, the Xhosa offered more effective resistance because their mixed herding and cultivating economy supported a larger population than the Khoisan, and the Xhosa possessed iron weapons. In Xhosa society, boys developed martial skills by stick fighting, and upon ritual circumcision at around 18 years old, they were considered warriors. Wars were usually short and involved capturing cattle and occasionally burning huts. Prior to a campaign, messengers gathered men at the chief’s capital. There they were told about the conflict, and spiritualists administered charms such as parts of fierce animals or protective herbs. Men who ignored a call to arms had cattle confiscated by chiefs. On the march, armies were accompanied by cattle for milk and meat, and women who handled logistics. In battle, chiefs directed their armies from the

rear, where they were protected by a reserve of experienced warriors. Sons of chiefs led the younger men from the front and usually attempted to encircle an enemy. Military organization was loosely based on age, but there were no formal age regiments. Each Xhosa man, like others in the region, went to war with a long cow hide shield, a bundle of long throwing spears, and perhaps one shorter spear for close combat. Sometimes, in close quarters, Xhosa warriors threw broken off spearheads at the enemy.⁴

Warfare between Boers and Xhosa began shortly after Cape governor Baron Van Plettenberg visited the eastern frontier in 1778 and made arrangements with several small Xhosa chiefdoms that they should remain east of the upper Fish and Bushmans Rivers. That same year, frontier Boers accused the Xhosa of stock theft and attacked in an effort to force them east of the Zuurveld. In 1780, Plettenberg claimed the entire Zuurveld by declaring that the eastern border of the Cape Colony would be the entire length of the Fish River. However, by this time, many Xhosa groups—including the Gwali, Dange, Ntinde, Mbalu, and Gqunukhwebe—had moved west of the Fish. The governor ordered Adriaan van Jaarsveld, commandant of the eastern country, to form a large Boer commando and expel the Xhosa east of the new border. In late May and early June 1781, van Jaarsveld and his men rode around the area informing Xhosa rulers that they should lead their people back east. When they did not comply, he launched a series of attacks on the Xhosa, forcefully driving them across the Fish. At the beginning of this campaign, van Jaarsveld, while seeming to negotiate with the Gwali Xhosa, scattered tobacco on the ground and when the Xhosa rushed to pick it up, he ordered his men to open fire, killing around 200. When van Jaarsveld dissolved the commando in mid-July his men had seized 5,330 cattle and killed a large but unknown number of Xhosa. This represented the end of what has become known as the First Cape-Xhosa War.

With the demobilization of van Jaarsveld's commando, many Xhosa returned west of the Fish, as there was little to stop them. In May 1793, a party of Boers under Barend Lindeque, who wanted to push the Xhosa off the Zuurveld, allied with the Rharhabe Xhosa of Ndlambe who lived east of the Fish and wanted to bring the western Xhosa under his authority. The combined force raided Mbalu and Gqunukhwebe Xhosa communities, seizing about 2,000 cattle. However, for unknown reasons, the alliance broke down, and Ndlambe's warriors returned to their eastern home. The Mbalu and Gqunukhwebe

retaliated by attacking Boer farms and capturing 50,000 cattle, 11,000 sheep, and 200 horses. The Boers fled west of the Zuurveld. Christiaan David Maynier, the landdrost of the new district of Graaff Reinet, organized a commando and in late August, it drove the Gqunukhwebe and other Xhosa groups east of the Fish River and seized 8,000 cattle. Reinforced by settler volunteers from Swellendam, Maynier's commando tried to keep the Xhosa from returning to the Zuurveld, but by November, it was clear this was impossible. The group disbanded, which ended the Second Cape-Xhosa War.⁵

The British seized the Cape in 1795 to prevent the French from blocking the sea route to India. In mid-July, British troops were landed at Simonstown. When a detachment of 1,600 British soldiers and sailors assaulted Muizenberg in early August, 440 Dutch East India Company regular troops fled, while just 350 settler, Khoisan, and mixed race volunteers repelled them. Dutch colonial forces conducted hit-and-run attacks and ambushes on the British until early September, when the Royal Navy landed 2,500 reinforcements and the advance on Cape Town continued. Facing overwhelming odds, the Dutch surrendered within two weeks.⁶

By the late 1790s, most of the Zuurveld was controlled by the Gqunukhwebe and other Xhosa groups, with the Boers occupying the western portion near the Sundays River. More Xhosa had moved west onto the Zuurveld in the mid-1790s because of the power struggle between rival Rharhabe Xhosa leaders Ndlambe and Ngqika. In March 1799, a British military force under Brigadier General Thomas Vandeleur was shipped from Cape Town to Algoa Bay and marched inland to suppress a Boer rebellion in Graaff Reinet. In April, Vandeleur received instructions from the British acting governor Major General Francis Dundas to expel the Xhosa east of the Fish River. In the subsequent fighting, the Gqunukhwebe, under Chungwa, conducted several tenacious attacks against the British and were eventually driven back by concentrated musket and artillery fire. Flustered by determined Xhosa bush warfare, Vandeleur led his force back to Algoa Bay, from where he embarked most of his men to Cape Town. Around the same time, Khoisan and mixed race people staged a rebellion against the frontier Boers who held many of them as indentured labor. They eventually rallied around three leaders: Klaas Stuurman, Hans Trompetter, and Boesak. This uprising differed considerably from previous instances of Khoisan resistance because the rebels did not seek to prevent colonial expansion but were colonized people who aimed

to overturn settler dominance from within. Although they initially sought British protection, the rebels saw Vandeleur was sending his soldiers away and therefore allied with the Gqunukhwebe Xhosa. This alliance between rebel Khoisan servants and Zuurveld Xhosa was also a new development. During June and July, 700 Khoisan rebels, about half mounted and 150 armed with guns, along with Chungwa's warriors attacked Boers along the Zuurveld and further west toward Swellendam. Vandeleur raised a commando of 300 Boers that was defeated by 150 Khoi and Xhosa near the Sundays River. In August, Governor Dundas arrived on the frontier with 500 soldiers and immediately negotiated a cease-fire with the Khoisan, many of whom agreed to return to working for the Boers and the Gqunukhwebe, who were permitted to live between the Sundays and Bushmans Rivers.

In July 1801, Boers in the Graaff Reinet District briefly rebelled against British colonial authority because they objected to Khoisan servants attending Christian church and being taught to read and write by missionaries. Boer attacks on Khoisan reignited the Khoisan rebellion, and armed groups began to raid Boer farms. In January 1802, Tjaart van der Walt, landdrost of Swellendam, led a commando of 88 Boers against a Khoisan rebel stronghold, but on the return journey they were ambushed and forced to surrender captured livestock. In May, Van der Walt returned with a force of 700 men and spent several months trying to push the Khoisan and Xhosa east of the Zuurveld. In early August, Van der Walt was killed in a predawn attack on a band of Khoisan and lacking leadership, the Boer commando dispersed. During September and October 1802, the Khoisan and Zuurveld Xhosa launched a concerted westward offensive, destroying Boer farms as far into the Cape Colony as Knysna and Plettenberg Bay. Defended by a few Boers, the only colonial outpost remaining on the eastern frontier was besieged Fort Frederick at Algoa Bay. In March 1803, the British abandoned the Cape Colony to the Dutch Batavian Republic, which lacked military strength and so ended the eastern frontier conflict through negotiation. Khoisan rebels were placated with land and promises of better treatment by the Boers who slowly returned to the Zuurveld. The Batavians did not enforce the Fish River border and held a conference with western Xhosa leaders who were allowed to remain on the Zuurveld. This concluded the four-year Third Cape-Xhosa War.⁷

Although settlers were required to participate in regular military drills and could be mobilized to defend the colony,

eighteenth-century Dutch East India Company officers considered them poorly trained, undisciplined, and rebellious. This led to investment in fortifications and military recruitment of blacks and mixed race people. In 1722, a militia was created consisting of free blacks, manumitted slaves, convicts, and exiles. By the 1730s, Khoisan and mixed race men had been incorporated into settler commandos, and frontier policing was transferred to local burgher war councils. In the 1770s, the formation at Stellenbosch of a nonwhite militia called the Free Corps seemed to indicate the beginning of racially segregated military service. Concern about the Cape coming under attack because of Dutch involvement in European conflict led to the enlistment of 400 Khoisan and mixed race men as the Corps Bastaard Hottentotten in 1781, which was disbanded after 14 months when reinforcements arrived from Europe. In 1793, because France had declared war on the Netherlands, the Pandour Corps was formed from Khoisan and mixed race servants armed by their white masters, along with recruits from a Moravian mission. During their first occupation of the Cape, the British recruited several hundred Khoisan and mixed race soldiers to cultivate loyalty among that community and discourage Boer rebellion. In 1801, the Hottentot Corps, also known as the Cape Regiment, was expanded to over 700 men and became a regular unit of the British Army based at the Cape. Under Batavian rule, the unit became a light infantry battalion and was renamed the Corps Vrijen Hottentotten. When the British returned in 1806, this unit became the Cape Regiment. In 1817, it was reformed as the Cape Corps with separate infantry and cavalry sections that were combined during the 1820s as the Cape Mounted Rifles (CMR). This would represent the only permanent military unit formed by the Dutch and British in the Cape Colony.⁸

THE CAPE-XHOSA WARS, 1811–1819

The second British occupation of the Cape in 1806 was prompted by the same strategic considerations as the first. In early January, a British naval force arrived at the Cape and landed two infantry brigades totaling 5,400 men north of Cape Town. A 2,000-strong Dutch colonial army, led by Governor Jan Willem Janssens and including French marines, German and Hungarian mercenaries, Javanese artillerymen, and Khoisan soldiers, confronted the British on the slopes of

Blaauwberg Mountain on January 8. After both sides exchanged cannon fire, desertion and a determined Highlander bayonet charge compelled the Dutch to withdraw inland. While both sides had sustained casualties—347 Dutch and 204 British were killed—it became obvious to Janssens that he was hopelessly outnumbered and anticipated French allies would not arrive. The British reached the outskirts of Cape Town the next day, and the Dutch eventually surrendered without further resistance.⁹

The British administration of Governor Lord Caledon, lacking military resources and concerned mostly with securing the strategically important Western Cape, ignored the situation on the eastern frontier where Boers and Xhosa had been fighting over the Zuurveld. By mid-1810, most Boers had withdrawn west of the Zuurveld, and the Xhosa had largely regained complete control. In September 1811, Sir John Cradock, newly arrived Cape governor, instructed Colonel John Graham of the Cape Regiment to expel the Xhosa east of the Fish River, which was to constitute the eastern border of the colony. By December, Graham had assembled a force of around 900 regular troops—167 British dragoons, 221 British infantry, 431 Khoisan infantry, and a detachment of Royal Artillery—as well as 500 mounted Boer volunteers. This was the largest colonial army ever assembled in the Eastern Cape. Graham deployed his force in three divisions along the Sundays River and instructed them to advance east, pushing the Xhosa over the Fish. The southern column under Landdrost Jacob Cuyler advanced east from the Sundays River mouth to the great place of Chungwa, elderly leader of the Gqunukhwebe. There he discovered that Rharhabe chief Ndlambe had assembled many warriors from various Xhosa groups to make a stand in the nearby Addo Bush. Cuyler's column was not strong enough to confront Ndlambe's men in overgrown terrain. Graham, with the center column, decided that the center and northern columns would converge on Cuyler's position to drive Ndlambe from this stronghold. Anders Stockenstrom, the Graaff-Reinet landdrost commanding the northern column, felt that moving south would leave his Boer community open to Xhosa attack. Stockenstrom and 25 Boers rode toward Graham to discuss his concerns, but he and most of his men were killed when they stopped to negotiate with a group of Xhosa. Andries Stockenstrom, the landdrost's young son, then led a small patrol that drove off the Xhosa. The next day, the northern column moved south to join Graham.

On New Year's Day 1812, Graham sent 500 men into the Addo Bush to root out Ndlambe's warriors. Colonial forces could not concentrate their firepower or use horses in the dense vegetation, and when a small colonial unit was isolated, the Xhosa would break off their spear shafts to engage in close combat. During five days of intense bush fighting, colonial forces killed Xhosa men, women, and children, and Chungwa, too old and sick to move, was shot where he lay. The Xhosa quickly lost confidence and fled east of the Fish River. Because the focus of Xhosa warfare was on the capture of productive resources such as women and livestock, they were traumatized by this indiscriminate slaughter. Graham's men then seized cattle, destroyed crops and villages, and killed any remaining Xhosa. By the end of February, 20,000 Xhosa had been expelled from the Zuurveld, and the Boers began to return. Governor Cradock arranged for the construction of 22 military posts, manned by the Cape Regiment, along the Fish River to prevent the Xhosa from coming back. The center of this defense system was a military camp located around the middle of the Zuurveld and in August 1812, it was named Grahamstown.

The eviction of Ndlambe and his subjects east of the Fish River reignited conflict with Ngqika over control of the Rharhabe Xhosa. In 1817, Ngqika gained the support of the Cape Colony by agreeing to the "Spoor Law," which sanctioned independent settler raids east of the Fish in pursuit of allegedly stolen livestock. Not surprisingly, the main target of these attacks became Ndlambe's people. The rival Rharhabe leaders each adopted a spiritual advisor that reflected their broader positions. Ngqika patronized Ntsikana, the first Xhosa Christian convert (who preached peaceful co-existence with Europeans), and Ndlambe embraced Nxele (who, though influenced by Christianity, prophesized that the Xhosa would drive out the white man).

In October 1818, Ngqika sent an army of 2,000 men, led by his eldest son Maqoma, south from the Tyume River to attack the great place of Ndlambe on the Buffalo River. During the march, Maqoma's force camped near the base of the mountain called Ntaba ka Ndoda. The next morning, they continued their journey but observed a group of several hundred of Ndlambe's warriors camped on the open plain scarred by swallow depressions known as Amalinde. Maqoma's army charged into their enemies but just as it seemed they would push them back, several thousand warriors emerged from a nearby forest and rushed to the fray. Many of these men were from the Gqunukhwebe and Gcaleka groups that had allied with Ndlambe. The clever ambush

had been orchestrated by Mdushane, Ndlambe's eldest son. The fighting lasted all day until Maqoma's warriors eventually broke out of the encirclement and fled home. Maqoma was seriously wounded and narrowly escaped capture. Mdushane's men, some of whom had horses and guns, pursued Ngqika's defeated army and raided their communities, seizing around 6,000 cattle. At the Battle of Amalinde, 300 of Ngqika's men were killed and as a result of this devastating defeat, he withdrew his capital and cattle north to the Winterberg Mountains.¹⁰

Ngqika appealed for British assistance and in early December 1818, a colonial expedition led by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Brereton, military commander of the Cape's eastern frontier, advanced into Ndlambe's territory. Ndlambe withdrew his people into nearby forests, where they were bombarded by two British artillery pieces. Facing little resistance, Brereton captured 23,000 cattle, gave 11,000 to Ngqika, and moved back into the colony. In January 1819, Ndlambe retaliated with numerous raids against settler farms west of the Fish River. Colonel Thomas Willshire was sent from Cape Town with a British regiment, and Andries Stockenstrom, now a landdrost, was instructed to organize a large commando. However, before the British could mount any operations, Ndlambe's warriors appeared to withdraw from the colony. In reality, they were massing in the Fish River bush to prepare for the most ambitious military endeavour in Xhosa history.

At mid-day on April 21, 1819, around 10,000 Xhosa warriors from Ndlambe's Rharhabe and the Gqunukhwebe attacked Grahamstown, which was now a small colonial town. A few days earlier, a Xhosa interpreter, in reality a spy working for Ndlambe, had warned Willshire that the Xhosa were crossing the Fish River close to the coast, and a British company was sent there. This left Grahamstown with around 350 defenders (mostly British and Khoisan infantry), five cannon, and a few armed settlers. Sixty British soldiers were sent to defend the military barracks on the east side of the village while the rest of the colonial force lined up on a slope in front of a stream, infantry in front and artillery on higher ground in back, to confront the main body of Xhosa attackers. The Xhosa divided their large force into four divisions. Two of these under Mdushane attacked the main colonial defensive line. A third group under Nxele, who promised that colonial bullets would turn to water, assaulted the military barracks and a fourth, the smallest division, moved around to the south to

intercept anyone fleeing the settlement. Mdushane's men, who broke off the long shafts of their spears, made repeated attacks but took heavy casualties from colonial muskets and artillery firing grapeshot. Many of them were terrified by the smoke and flash of the firearms, and warriors were seen holding their hands or hide cloaks to their eyes so that they would not see it. The most intense fighting took place when Nxele's men penetrated the barracks' external walls, with some getting inside the hospital building. A wife of one of the British soldiers passed through the Xhosa, who did not molest women during war, carrying what looked like a baby but was in fact a sack of gunpowder to the beleaguered defenders. Willshire sent some men from the Cape Corps to reinforce the barracks. At this critical moment, a party of 130 Khoisan hunters from a Christian mission arrived, and their accurate shooting helped to repel Nxele's division. After two and a half hours of fighting, the Xhosa retreated toward the Fish River, but the British did not pursue for fear of leaving Grahamstown defenseless. On the colonial side, two men were killed and five wounded. Estimates of Xhosa losses vary from 150 corpses reported by Willshire three days later to 2,000 estimated by Charles Stretch, a veteran of the battle, in 1876. Regardless of the exact death toll, the largest Xhosa army ever assembled had suffered a grave defeat at what became known as the Battle of Grahamstown. The Xhosa might have overwhelmed the town had they attacked under cover of darkness and from several different directions.¹¹

In late July, Willshire led three converging columns, totaling 500 men, across the Fish and into Ndlambe's territory, where Xhosa hit-and-run night attacks and unexpected winter rains hampered colonial operations. Ndlambe attempted to concentrate his people in the dense bush around the Fish River, but Boer volunteers under Stockenström drove them into the open, where British cavalry pursued them further east. Once again, the Xhosa were shocked that colonial forces killed women and children, and colonial destruction of crops and seizure of cattle meant that famine threatened Ndlambe's people. In mid-August, he capitulated to the British by giving up Nxele, who later died trying to escape from imprisonment on the infamous Robben Island off the coast of Cape Town. Willshire then took another 13,000 cattle from Ndlambe's subjects and brought them into the colony. British support had made Ngqika the dominant Rharhabe ruler, but this came at a steep price. Governor Charles Somerset forced

Ngqika to accept the advance of the colonial boundary to the Keiskamma and Tyume Rivers, with all Xhosa having to move further east. Known as the Ceded Territory, the strip of land between the Fish and Keiskamma/Tyume was meant to remain mostly uninhabited, with the exception of some colonial military posts, and form a buffer between settlers and Xhosa. Furthermore, throughout the 1820s, colonial patrols would continue to cross into Xhosa territory in pursuit of supposedly stolen livestock.

By 1828, Matiwane's Ngwane (see later in this chapter) had moved south from present-day Lesotho and settled at Mbolompo near the Mtata River. In late July 1828, Major Dundas, a British officer conducting reconnaissance east of the colonial boundary, led 50 armed and mounted settlers and many more Thembu allies against the Ngwane, and seized 25,000 cattle plus some female prisoners. Impressed by the effectiveness of the settlers' firearms, local African rulers such as Hintsa of the Gcaleka and Faku of the Mpondo saw an opportunity to eliminate the newly arrived Matiwane and absorb his herds and subjects. In late August, with roughly 30,000 Thembu, Gcaleka, and Mpondo allies, a colonial army led by Colonel Henry Somerset that consisted of about 1,000 British infantry, Cape Mounted Riflemen, armed settlers, and several artillery pieces advanced on the Ngwane. On the morning of August 27, Somerset launched a surprise cavalry charge against Matiwane's people supported by artillery bombardment. An African oral account from the late nineteenth century describes the rather one-sided engagement:

The AmaNgwana [sic] made no stand, but fled and went into the bushes. The reports of the guns were very dreadful, none of the native allies fought, they just looked on in astonishment. The report of the cannon was fearful, it was directed at the bush; women and children screamed, and cattle bellowed, and all came out of the forest where the army was, and were captured.¹²

Over 700 Ngwane were killed, 100 women and children were taken back to the colony, and colonial African allies seized many cattle and prisoners. Matiwane's power was broken, and many of his former subjects scattered among the Thembu and Mpondo. With Somerset claiming he had heroically defended the colony and its African neighbors from an advancing Zulu army, a massive cattle and labor raid was remembered as The Battle of Mbolompo.¹³

WARFARE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN COAST, 1815–1830

East of the Drakensberg Mountains, population increase caused by the adoption of American maize and competition over the ivory trade with the Portuguese at Delagoa Bay had, by the late 1700s, led Nguni speakers to amalgamate their previously small states. By the early 1800s, the Ndwandwe, a highly centralized and militarized state under Zwide, and the Mthethwa, a looser confederation under Dingiswayo, vied for power north of the Thukela River. Around 1818, the Ndwandwe moved south to defeat the Mthethwa and kill Dingiswayo. Shaka, new leader of the small Zulu portion of the Mthethwa, took over from Dingiswayo by killing his legitimate heir, organized resistance against the Ndwandwe, and brought new groups under his authority. In 1819, Zwide renewed his southward offensive, and Shaka responded by destroying food resources and retreating south. When the exhausted and starved Ndwandwe reached the Thukela River, Shaka launched a counterattack that sent them fleeing north. Shaka also organized a stealthy night raid on Zwide's capital. As a result, Zwide moved north of the Pongola River, and many of his allies deserted.¹⁴

Shaka, ruler of the Zulu Kingdom from around 1815 to his assassination in 1828, is one of the most famous figures in African military history. It is often claimed that before Shaka, battles between Southern African groups were ritualized performances in which a few spears were thrown, little life was lost, and one side eventually backed down. In books and films, Shaka is popularly portrayed as a great military genius who is compared to Julius Caesar and Napoleon Bonaparte, and who revolutionized warfare in the region and turned the Zulu state into an expansionist empire. Other African people submitted or fled to the mountains or across the subcontinent. This period of upheaval became called the Mfecane (or crushing). Shaka is credited with numerous military innovations, including a short stabbing spear for more lethal close combat, discarding of sandals and dancing on thorns so that his men could run faster, a "chest and horns" battlefield formation to outflank and annihilate enemies, an age-based regimental system that united the Zulu state across regional lines and fostered a martial spirit, the banning of marriage by younger regiments so that they were constantly available and warriors' sexual energy could be channelled into fighting, and a much more aggressive and deadly approach to warfare. However, there is little evidence to support this

story. Short spears and age regiments existed before Shaka's time, there is no proof that he required his men to dance on thorns, and it seems he used the chest and horns tactic only once and similar crescent battle formations were common in precolonial Africa. Shaka's most important military victory, where he first defeated the Ndwandwe at Gqokli Hill in 1819, appears to have been invented by a twentieth-century novelist. Shaka's real military innovation was intensified ruthlessness and effective use of terror—he employed surprise night attacks, set fire to huts to blind enemies, and executed those suspected of cowardice. The age regiments, probably pioneered by Sotho-speaking people, were not entirely military formations but were meant to give the ruler control of young men's labor. These men were motivated by the fact that later in life, the king would release them from full-time service and grant cattle so that they could provide bride wealth for marriage. This meant that Shaka had to repeatedly add to his royal herd by launching cattle raids against neighbors. Seen in this light, Shaka's military campaigns did not represent territorial expansion but a continuing process of restoring herds needed to maintain the Zulu military-social organization. The Zulu state was much smaller than many previous historians have suggested—probably no more than 160 kilometers in diameter. It can be seen as one of a number of larger defensive organizations occasionally launching long-distance cattle raids that emerged in this area during the early nineteenth century. The rise of Shaka is also associated with the decline of circumcision as ritual male initiation in this area because it tended to keep young men of about 18 years old away from military service while they healed.¹⁵

Historians have debated whether Portuguese-sponsored slave raiding from Delagoa Bay, today's Maputo, influenced African state formation in southeastern Africa, particularly the rise of Shaka's Zulu. While some claim that before 1820, the slave trade was too limited to have much impact, the evidence is far from conclusive. What is not in doubt is that there was a significant slave trade in the area after 1820, which must have had repercussions. In the early 1820s, powerful African leaders such as Zwangendaba, Soshangane and Nxaba, all former Ndwandwe allies driven north by Shaka, took their people closer to Delagoa Bay, where they defeated the local Tsonga and Tembe and took over as intermediaries in the oceanic slave trade. Around 1815, a dispute over agricultural land between Zwide's Ndwandwe and Sobhuza's Dhlamini resulted in the latter moving north into a

mountainous area, from where they engaged in cattle and slave raiding. Eventually known as the Swazi Kingdom, this polity specialized in exporting beef to Delagoa Bay. In the early 1820s, Shaka moved the Zulu state south probably to gain distance from increasing slaving further up the coast, which brought him into closer alliance with independent British ivory and slave traders establishing themselves at Port Natal (the later site of the city of Durban), and he eventually employed them to lead gunmen in his operations against the Ndwandwe in 1826 and the Mpondo in 1828.

Historians once portrayed the Mpondo state, ruled by Faku and located southwest of the Zulu, as victims of Shaka's aggression. The Zulu supposedly pushed the Mpondo west of the Mzimvubu River and took all their cattle, and only in the 1830s and 1840s did they recover and emerge as a regional power. However, this is contradicted by available evidence, including Zulu oral testimony recorded in the early 1900s. Shaka's Zulu attacked the Mpondo twice. In 1824, a cattle-raiding Zulu army was decisively beaten by the Mpondo and fled home. The Zulu raided the Mpondo again in 1828 and were more successful because of assistance from Henry Francis Fynn with a contingent of Port Natal musketeers. It is clear that this raid did not seize all the Mpondo cattle and that although Faku moved his great place west of the Mzimvubu, other Mpondo settlements remained east of the river. During the 1820s, Faku's Mpondo became a feared military power in the region. Between 1815 and 1819, the Mpondo raided the Bomvana and drove them west, where they settled between the Mtata and Mbashe Rivers. Around 1820 or 1821, Ngoza's Thembu moved southwest from the Thukela Valley to escape incorporation into the Zulu state and sought to make a new home by expelling the Mpondo from the eastern portion of their territory. After two days of fighting on the west side of the Mzimkhulu River, Mpondo numerical superiority defeated the Thembu, with survivors absorbed by Faku and Shaka. In 1826, Faku—together with new Bhaca allies—led another cattle raid west against the Bomvana, but the captured livestock was recovered by a successful counterattack. In 1828, shortly after the Zulu incursion of that year, the Mpondo launched a punitive expedition that brought the rebellious Xesibe back into line as a tributary state. The Mpondo, in August 1828, joined Gcaleka, Thembu, and British from the Cape to destroy the recently arrived Ngwane at the Battle of Mbolompo. In 1829, Nqeto's Qwabe, displaced from the Zulu state after the assassination of Shaka, moved into Mpondo territory, where

they captured a wagonload of guns and ammunition from Cape traders bound for Port Natal, and seized cattle. Faku's army eventually trapped and annihilated the Qwabe on the banks of the Mzimvubu River. Mpondo military organization was based on communities, not age regiments, and during the 1820s, Faku personally banned circumcision because it endangered the health and readiness of his young warriors.¹⁶

WARFARE ON THE HIGHVELD, CA. 1800–1830

During the eighteenth century, Khoisan refugees from Boer expansion and escaped slaves and outlaws from the Cape moved north to the Orange River area, where they used horses and guns to raid established Sotho and Tswana communities. These new groups, each led by an independent "captain" directing Boer-like commandos, were called by many names such as Griqua, Kora, Koranna, Oorlams, and Bastards. They captured cattle and children; traded them with the Boers to the south for more horses, guns, and gunpowder; and maintained large numbers of captives to work in their homesteads. By 1800, mobility and firepower had made them a major force on the southwestern Highveld of what is now South Africa. Traditional means of defense such as surrounding villages and cattle enclosures with thorn bushes could not stop bullets. Repeating what the Boers had done in the Cape, they expelled groups like the Rolong and Tlhaping from their lands and contributed to their division by working as mercenaries for rival leaders. Sotho and Tswana people often lived around Griqua settlements in a type of feudal arrangement. In the 1810s, British missionaries began to establish themselves among the Griqua, who had picked up Christianity and Afrikaans (South African Dutch) language from the Boers. Believing the Griqua central to the spread of Christianity in the region, the missionaries turned a blind eye to their raids. An 1823 drought prompted Sotho and Tswana living on the grasslands around the Vaal River to move southwest to find food. When they were driven off by the Ngwaketse, Rolong, and Hurutshe, this refugee group, which was sometimes called Mantatees because they had been attacked by the Tlokwa under Mantatisi, headed south toward the Kuruman River, where there was food and water. A combined force of Tlhaping and Griqua, accompanied by missionary Robert Moffat and British agent John Melville, confronted this group on June 24, 1823, near the Tlhaping settlement of

Dithakong. Having never fought against horses and guns, the so-called Mantatees were easily scattered and left behind around 500 dead. The Griqua returned home with 1,100 cattle and some captives.¹⁷

In the western Highveld and southern Kalahari, the late 1700s and early 1800s was a period of increased cattle raiding warfare among the Tswana. A period of good rainfall had enhanced food production and led to population increase, but this resulted in competition over useful land, which was limited by the arid Kalahari to the west and the tsetse fly-infested Limpopo River to the northeast. More conflict over cattle also seems to have been related to the growing Tswana engagement in regional trade that was focused on Delagoa Bay to the east and the Cape Colony in the south. Livestock and sometimes ivory were exchanged for metals, beads, and tobacco. In the early 1800s, the Ngwaketse Tswana, located to the northwest and thus isolated from the new trade routes, fought a series of wars against neighboring Tswana and Griqua/Kora groups to extend authority south and control the trade. In the late 1700s, the Ngwaketse broke the monopoly of the Tlhaping and Kora over trade in the southern Kalahari. Under the famous warrior king Makaba II (1790–1824), the Ngwaketse established a fortified capital at Kanye Hill, repelled an attack by Griqua and Kora under Jan Bloem, attracted many new subjects, reduced other Tswana groups such as the Kgatla and Rolong to tributaries, and raided the Hurutshe (who were their main rivals over trade). In the 1810s, the Ngwaketse defeated a Hurutshe-led coalition of Tswana and Kora groups in the War of Moabi, which was named after an uncle of Makaba who had deserted to the other side. In 1818, a combined Ngwaketse and Rolong army attacked the Hurutshe, who avoided serious losses by hiding their cattle. Although a few Europeans—like frontiersman Conrad de Buys who assisted both the Ngwaketse and Hurutshe at different times in the 1810s—aggravated these conflicts, they arrived long after the Tswana Wars had begun.¹⁸

In the early 1820s, the Caledon Valley, with its water and defensible flat-topped mountains, became the scene of conflict as groups such as Mantatisi's Tlokwa, Mpangazita's Hlubi, and Matiwane's Ngwane arrived from drought-stricken areas and tried to control valuable grazing land and increase their herds. By this time, Moshoeshoe—a relatively minor leader of one of many Sotho groups in the area but with a reputation as a ruthless fighter—had amassed a large herd through raiding and was using it to develop alliances with neighbors. In 1820

or 1821, he founded his own village on the slopes of a defensible mountain called Botha Bothe and rallied dispossessed people. Around 1822 or 1823, the Tlokwa inflicted such a serious defeat on the Ngwane that some of the latter committed suicide rather than return to Matiwane in disgrace. In early 1823, in a prolonged battle, Matiwane's Ngwane inflicted significant damage on the Hlubi. That same year, the Tlokwa, encouraged by their success against the Ngwane, attacked communities under Moshoeshoe but were initially driven off by a counterattack that broke into their camp and destroyed their cookware in what would be remembered as the Battle of the Pots. The Tlokwa attacked once again, pushing Moshoeshoe and his followers into the Maluti Mountains. When Moshoeshoe recruited some Hlubi refugees as military allies, the Tlokwa retired without a fight. Around this time, the Tlokwa took the mountain of Marabeng, just west of Botha Bothe, from a local group and made it their stronghold. In 1824, Sekonyela, Mantatisi's son, besieged Botha Bothe, on top of which Moshoeshoe's people nearly starved, but after three months withdrew because of their own hunger and a raid by an Nguni group allied to Moshoeshoe. Realizing that his stronghold was too close to his Tlokwa enemies and exposed to any group moving south from the plains, Moshoeshoe shifted his people 100 kilometers down the Caledon River to a mountain fortress called Thaba Bosiu which he seized from a minor chief. Thaba Bosiu had a spring on top that would enable Moshoeshoe's people to hold out against a long siege, it was protected from direct access by the Berea Plateau, and it was backed by the Maluti Mountains, where cattle could be concealed during war. In the mid-1820s, Matiwane was the strongest ruler in the Caledon and received cattle tribute from local chiefs such as Moshoeshoe. In March 1825, Matiwane's Ngwane finally crushed the Hlubi in a decisive battle in which Mpangazita was killed. However, in 1826, a destructive Zulu cattle raid—which had been invited by Moshoeshoe—reduced the power of the Ngwane. In July 1827, the Ngwane tried to reassert dominance over Moshoeshoe by attacking Thaba Bosiu, but the Sotho defenders rolled large stones down on the Ngwane, and they eventually withdrew. With this defeat and further attacks from the north by Mzilikazi's Ndebele, who had recently moved onto the Highveld (see later in this chapter), Matiwane decided to move south into what is now the Eastern Cape. After the departure of the Ngwane, Moshoeshoe and Sekonyela expanded their territories around their respective strongholds, and at the same time, Griqua horsemen

from the southwest began to raid more aggressively up the Caledon Valley.¹⁹

During the early 1820s, it appears that Mzilikazi, leader of the Kumalo lineage, became caught up in the Ndwandwe-Zulu conflict and led his people north onto the Highveld, where they were called Matabele or Ndebele, meaning outsiders. Sometime after 1825, Mzilikazi's people settled near present-day Pretoria and began to absorb local Sotho and Tswana communities, as well as refugees from the defeated Hlubi. This area had been dominated by the Pedi Kingdom, which controlled trade between the Limpopo River and Delagoa Bay. While historians disagree over whether the Ndebele inflicted a serious defeat upon the Pedi in the late 1820s, it is clear that the arrival of new groups such as the Ndwandwe and their allies reduced Pedi influence. Like the Zulu state, Mzilikazi's kingdom was fairly compact but sent raiding parties across the Highveld, including into present-day Botswana, in search of livestock. In 1828, a combined force of Jan Bloem's Griqua and Moletsane's Taung, who had been raided by the Ndebele, attacked some of Mzilikazi's settlements and absconded with around 3,000 cattle. There had been little resistance because the main Ndebele force was off to the west raiding the Ngwaketse. Ndebele warriors rallied, chased after the Griqua-Taung force, and recovered most of the livestock. Mzilikazi then decided to eliminate the Taung. In June 1829, a large Ndebele army of 5,000 men destroyed Moletsane's town on the Vaal River, which had been abandoned, and caught up with the fleeing Taung on the Modder River near present-day Bloemfontein. Mzilikazi's men seized cattle and killed many people. Moletsane escaped and sought refuge with the Griqua and then Moshoeshoe. In 1830 or 1831, an Ndebele raiding party ventured south into the Caledon Valley, where they mounted unsuccessful assaults on the mountain strongholds of both Sekonyela and Moshoeshoe.

Mzilikazi began to dominate the Tswana groups on the western Highveld. By 1830, the Ndebele had forced the Hurutshe to pay regular tribute of crops, and Ndebele raids in 1828 and 1830 pushed the Ngwaketse west into the Kalahari Desert. This restricted Griqua trading and elephant hunting in that area. In June 1831, the Griqua leader Barend Barends forged a coalition of 300 Griqua horsemen and several hundred Tswana spearmen from the Ngwaketse and Rolong, and marched off to confront Mzilikazi. At this time, the Ndebele army was raiding the Ngwato Tswana far to the northwest, leaving their

undefended communities easy targets for Barends's commando that seized cattle and women. On their homeward journey, the Griqua-Tswana force camped near present-day Sun City, where at night they were surrounded and attacked by Mzilikazi's recently mobilized reserve warriors. Several hundred Griqua and Tswana were killed, and the livestock was recovered. The Ndebele captured large numbers of firearms and horses but did not make much use of them. It appears that Mzilikazi, with his easy victory over the Griqua, underestimated the effectiveness of firearms, and most of the captured horses died of disease. Soon after the massacre of Barends's commando, Mzilikazi moved his state 200 kilometers west to the Marico River, where he hoped to subdue the Tswana groups allied with the Griqua, dominate trade between the Cape and the Zimbabwe plateau, and distance his people from Zulu cattle raids. The Hurutshe Tswana were now conquered with little resistance, and the Ndebele raided other groups such as the Rolong who moved south to seek Griqua protection and the Ngwaketse who moved further west. Griqua horsemen would continue to harass Ndebele settlements for the next five years.²⁰

COLONIAL CONQUEST IN THE EASTERN CAPE, 1834–1848

By the early 1830s, Cape colonial expansion against the Xhosa had intensified. Under the Spoor Law also known as the "patrol system," settlers and soldiers from the Cape Colony could pursue allegedly stolen livestock into neighboring independent Xhosa chiefdoms. This often became an excuse for colonial raids, which constantly harassed Xhosa communities and seized their livestock. The last straw came in December 1834 when Xhoxho, brother to high-ranking Rharhabe Xhosa leaders such as Maqoma, was shot in the arm by a colonial patrol. In turn, late that month, some Xhosa launched retaliatory raids into the colony, and many surprised settlers took refuge at frontier towns such as Fort Beaufort, Grahamstown, Bathurst, and Salem, where they built barricades and fortified stone churches. Further west, Boers formed wagon laagers, one of which was attacked by Xhosa on eight successive nights.

These Xhosa raids were quickly portrayed by British colonial officials and the settler press as a massive and unprovoked invasion of the colony. Based at Cape Town, Governor Benjamin D'Urban sent Colonel Harry Smith, veteran of the Napoleonic Peninsula Campaign, to take command of military operations in the eastern districts. By the

time Smith arrived in Grahamstown in early January 1835, the Xhosa were already retiring east of the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers. Smith declared martial law, ordered barricades disassembled, and immediately organized an offensive. Around the same time, a column of 400 armed volunteers moved east from Grahamstown and burned the homes of Xhosa leaders Nqeno and Tyhali. Smith directed Colonel Somerset, commander of the CMR, to lead a force in clearing the road to Algoa Bay, the main colonial supply route, and patrols were sent to secure other strategic points along the frontier. D'Urban arrived in the area in late January and spent the next eight weeks mustering a large invasion force. In early February, Smith led 900 armed Khoisan and settlers against the Xhosa occupying the Fish River bush. After three days of many small desperate engagements in the overgrown terrain, Smith returned to Grahamstown with 2,000 captured cattle. Twelve colonial troops and around 75 Xhosa had been killed.

Preparing his forces, D'Urban planned to invade Rharhabe territory and cross the Kei River to attack Hintsa's Gcaleka Xhosa. With 358 regular cavalry; 1,639 mounted Boers; and 1,570 regular infantry now at his disposal, the governor organized four divisions of roughly 800 men each. In late March, Smith led a strong patrol into the Amatola Mountains, the Rharhabe Xhosa stronghold, and returned with 1,200 cattle. Five days later, on March 31, the governor's invasion commenced. Leaving Fort Willshire, the first division, under D'Urban and Smith, marched northeast toward the Amatolas. Camped between Fort Willshire and the coast, Somerset's second division also swept toward the mountains. Led by Major William Cox, the third division left Fort Beaufort and traveled east over the Tyume River. Finally, assembled in the northern extremity of the Ceded Territory, the fourth division, consisting entirely of mounted Boers and led by Field Commandant Stephanus Van Wyk, entered the Amatolas from the north. Facing the most serious colonial intrusion to date, Maqoma delayed the converging columns and withdrew his followers into the most inaccessible mountain kloofs. Harassed by small groups of Rharhabe, some of whom had muskets, D'Urban's forces destroyed settlements, and seized women and children for service in the colony. In mid-April, the governor left the third and fourth divisions to continue ravaging the Amatolas, and led the first and second east of the Kei to confront Hintsa.

Although Hintsa's people had not participated in the Xhosa raids on the colony, as senior Xhosa ruler, he was guilty by association,

and the British were looking for an excuse to seize cattle. Smith led 300 horsemen in a series of raids against Gcaleka communities and at around the same time, 5,000 Thembu led by Major Henry Warden attacked the Gcaleka and captured 4,000 cattle. These actions prompted Hintsa to visit the colonial camp and agree to D'Urban's demand for 50,000 cattle and 1,000 horses as compensation for the December raids. Hintsa then accompanied a 500-man colonial patrol commanded by Smith as it collected cattle from various Gcalaka settlements. On May 12, Hintsa—according to colonial witnesses—attempted to escape by riding away but was pursued and knocked off his horse by Smith. Running into some bush, the chief was shot to death by colonial soldiers, who cut off his ears as trophies. At that time, D'Urban's camp began attracting African people, including Gcaleka Christian converts from the nearby Butterworth mission, Gcaleka seeking food and protection, and opportunistic mercenaries who wanted to side with the British. D'Urban reported to his superiors in London that these people, known as Fingo, had been refugees from the wars of Shaka further up the coast that had subsequently been enslaved by Hintsa and were now seeking emancipation by the British. Thousands of Fingos were settled between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers, particularly around Fort Peddie, and they provided the Cape with labor and military allies. D'Urban's force also returned to the colony with 10,000 Gcaleka cattle. In addition, the governor declared that the territory between the Keiskamma and Kei Rivers was annexed by Britain as Queen Adelaide Province.

While D'Urban's force was operating east of the Kei, the divisions under Cox and Van Wyk continued pursuing the Rharhabe into the Amatola Mountains but were hampered by rough terrain and heavy rain. In mid-May 1835, Maqoma rejected a colonial offer to suspend hostilities if his people moved east of the Kei. Throughout June, D'Urban and Smith, by now west of the Kei, launched a large-scale offensive aimed at engaging the Rharhabe in a decisive battle. Hoping to maintain British goodwill, the Gqunukhwebe Xhosa leader Phato sent 1,200 warriors to assist colonial forces. The mountainous terrain made it possible for Maqoma and his people to elude the cumbersome colonial columns. Therefore, toward the end of June, the British changed their approach and began sending numerous small patrols of 30 to 100 men (mostly Gqunukhwebe, Fingos, and Khoihei) into the Amatolas to destroy crops and capture cattle in the hope of starving the Rharhabe into submission. The Rharhabe responded by further

developing their ambush tactics and making use of more captured firearms. By the beginning of September, the Rharhabe had to plant crops, and D'Urban was under pressure from London to end the expensive war. Several weeks of negotiations, in which Maqoma rejected initial British demands for him to abandon the Amatolas and surrender firearms, produced a treaty in which the Rharhabe accepted nominal British authority but retained their land and chiefs.

British rule in Queen Adelaide Province did not last long, as in 1836 Lord Glenelg, the colonial secretary in London who disapproved of the abuse of indigenous people in the empire, ordered the retrocession of the territory and withdrawal of colonial forces. At this point, British imperial policy did not favor expanding the Cape Colony because the primary purpose of holding it was to control shipping between Europe and Asia. Relations between the Cape settlers and neighboring Xhosa groups became governed by a "treaty system" in which stock theft accusations or other grievances were arbitrated by border agents who negotiated with the Xhosa chiefs. Disappointed that the years of sanctioned raiding and ambitions for more land had come to an end, frontier settler leaders discredited this system by exaggerating and inventing Xhosa depredations. By 1844, these complaints led to a change of policy in London, and Sir Peregrine Maitland, who had commanded a division at Waterloo, was sent to the Cape to cancel the treaties, which quickly led to renewed violence. When a Xhosa man accused of having stolen an axe from a Fort Beaufort store escaped colonial custody in March 1846, Maitland used the incident as a pretext for war.

In early April 1846, three colonial columns commanded by Colonel Somerset and supported by a supply train of 125 wagons crossed the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers and encountered no resistance as they converged on the capital of Sandile, the new Rharhabe leader, near Burnshill Mission in the Amatola foothills. Leaving his wagons under guard at Burnshill, Somerset led 500 men into the Amatola Valley, where they came under musket fire from Rharhabe lurking in the forest. That afternoon, Somerset called for the supply train, which had been harassed by Xhosa fire from the bush, to move forward to his position and as it passed through a mountain defile, it was ambushed by a large force of Rharhabe. Abandoning 65 wagons, some of which carried muskets and ammunition, the train pulled back to Burnshill, and Somerset withdrew his entire force to Block Drift on the Tyume River. Encouraged by Sandile's victory, most of the Xhosa leaders

between the Keiskamma and Kei sent their men to raid settler farms on the colonial frontier. Even Phato's Gqunukhwebe, who had allied with the British in 1835, joined Sandile because they had lost land to Fingo settlement near Fort Peddie. In early May, they ambushed a colonial supply train passing through the Fish River bush on its way to Fort Peddie and captured 43 wagons. At the end of May, a combined Xhosa army of 8,000 attacked Fort Peddie but was repelled by colonial artillery and muskets that killed 92 warriors. As they withdrew, the Xhosa made off with 4,000 cattle captured from the Fingo. At the end of May, Somerset led a supply train of 82 wagons escorted by 1,200 troops through the Fish River bush and pushed straight through a Xhosa ambush—oxen pulling the wagons were shot but then replaced—to relieve beleaguered Fort Peddie. In early June, Somerset led a cavalry patrol out of Peddie to destroy nearby Xhosa homesteads. The patrol inadvertently encountered 500 Xhosa warriors led by Siyolo in the open ground near the Gwangqa River. British dragoons and Cape Mounted Riflemen charged the Xhosa, who responded with ineffective musket fire and then broke. Pursued for eight kilometers, 300 Xhosa were cut down. News of this disaster prompted Xhosa raiding parties to leave the colony.

By the end of June 1846, Maitland had arrived from Cape Town with reinforcements and took command of a colonial army of 3,200 regular troops; 5,500 armed settlers; 800 Khoisan levies; and 4,000 Fingo and Khoisan laborers. The army was organized into two divisions. In mid-July, the division under Somerset in the south advanced on the Gqunukhwebe, who withdrew east of the Kei River with their cattle. Somerset pursued them and seized a few thousand cattle, but he lost most of them to Xhosa ambushes and harassment on the way back to Fort Peddie. In the north, in late July, the division under Colonel John Hare launched a 10-day sweep of the Amatolas that the Rharhabe successfully avoided. By the end of August, Maitland had moved most of his force, badly demoralized and half-starved, to the mouth of the Fish River, where they were supplied by ship. Some minor Xhosa chiefs who also had problems feeding their people because of drought surrendered. Sudden heavy rains in September meant that it was difficult for colonial forces to resume the offensive, and the Xhosa concentrated on planting crops. In mid-September, most major Xhosa chiefs, including Maqoma and Sandile, attempted to negotiate but could not accept Maitland's demand to abandon all land west of the Kei River. At the end of December, Maitland led an

expedition across the Kei that seized cattle from the Gcaleka with little resistance. Unable to end this "War of the Axe," Maitland was recalled to London.

The new governor, Sir Henry Pottinger, renewed the colonial campaign to drive the Xhosa east of the Kei. The only Xhosa group actively opposing the British were Phato's Gqunukhwebe along the coast. In September 1847, Pottinger mounted an invasion of the Amatolas, and the Rharhabe responded by avoiding colonial forces that seized livestock and destroyed settlements. While attempting to parley with the British, Sandile was detained and imprisoned in late October. During the last three months of the year, Somerset directed operations against the Gqunukhwebe who were ensconced in difficult ground on the Kei's west bank. In mid-December, Phato was the last Xhosa chief to surrender to avoid starvation imposed by colonial raiding. In December, Sir Harry Smith, who had commanded Cape colonial forces during the 1835 war and subsequently distinguished himself fighting Sikhs in India, was appointed the new governor of the Cape Colony. Late that month, he gathered the captive Xhosa chiefs at King William's Town and declared that the land between the Keiskamma and Kei Rivers would become a colonial possession named British Kaffraria. The Xhosa were assigned "reserves" that roughly corresponded to their existing territories. Technically separate from the Cape Colony, the administration of British Kaffraria was conducted by chiefs supervised by European magistrates reporting to a chief commissioner. For internal security, 2,000 colonial soldiers occupied seven forts in the area, and the commissioners controlled 400 "Kaffir Police."²¹

WARFARE AND THE BOER TREK, 1836–1840

During the late 1830s, about 15,000 Boers left the Cape Colony and moved into the interior, where they defeated African states and established independent republics. While this movement represented a continuation of previous Trekboer and Griqua expansion, there are a number of theories seeking to explain it. Seeing this "Great Trek" as the formative moment in their national history, Afrikaner nationalist historians stressed British oppression of the Boers and a desire for self-determination. On the other hand, some English-speaking historians maintained that the Boers, who had missed the European Enlightenment, fled British ideas about equality that had resulted in the

abolition of slavery. The result of the Cape-Xhosa War of 1834–1835, which frustrated settler desires for expansion, also seems to have contributed to the Boer departure. More recently, it has been suggested that there were factors that attracted the Boers to the interior such as the desire for new land and trade links with the outside world either through Port Natal or Delagoa Bay. The Boers split into two broad groups. Those under Andries Potgieter traveled north into the high grasslands over the Vaal River, and those under Piet Retief crossed south of the Drakensberg Mountains to enter the Indian Ocean coastal area of Natal. Warfare would be essential to their success.²²

By the mid-1830s, the Ndebele Kingdom of Mzilikazi, based around the settlements of Mosega and Gabeni on the Marico River, constituted the main power on the western Highveld. It dominated neighboring Tswana and Sotho groups. Mzilikazi knew about the danger of mounted gunmen as he had moved to Mosega partly because of Griqua raids. In August 1836, he sent out a 500-strong raiding party that destroyed several Boer camps and returned with captured livestock. In early October, he dispatched an army of 3,000 warriors under MkhaliPhi, his senior commander, to drive off the Boers. On October 16, 1836, a group of around 35 Boers led by Potgieter rode out to meet the Ndebele about 16 kilometers from the Boer laager at the base of the hill later called Vegkop (Hill of the Fight). Although it appears the Boers wanted to negotiate, one of them fired into the Ndebele, who then charged. Utilizing fire and movement, the Boers rode back to their laager pursued by the Ndebele. The laager was tightly formed with wagons tied together and thorn bushes placed in gaps. When the Boers reached the laager, they secured their horses inside and manned the defenses. The Ndebele stopped just out of musket range to prepare for the attack, which gave the Boers additional time to organize. After a few hours, MkhaliPhi launched a typical envelopment attack on the laager by surrounding it and charging on all sides. After 15 minutes of Boer shooting during which scattershot from muskets proved particularly effective, Ndebele corpses were piling up. The Ndebele then withdrew with 6,000 cattle and 40,000 sheep that the Boers had kept outside the laager. One hundred fifty Ndebele died in the assault, and 450 may have been killed in the entire engagement. Only 2 Boers were killed and a dozen wounded. Boer horsemen pursued the Ndebele but failed to recover their livestock.

Over the next two months, Potgieter and recently arrived leader Gert Martiz rallied Boer newcomers, and recruited Griqua and Rolong

Tswana allies displaced by Mzilikazi some years before for an offensive against the Ndebele. In January 1837, Potgieter and Maritz led a raiding party of 107 Boer and 40 Griqua horsemen, and 60 Rolong infantry across the Vaal River. On the morning of January 17, this party attacked Mosega from an unexpected direction, catching the Ndebele by surprise. No coherent defense was organized, probably because the open ground greatly favored the mounted attackers, and Mzilikazi and MkhaliPhi were away at Gabeni. Between 400 and 500 Ndebele were killed, while the other side lost just 2 Rolong. Potgieter and Martiz captured around 7,000 cattle. Most Ndebele abandoned Mosega and fled north toward Gabeni.

News of Ndebele defeats spread and encouraged opportunistic attacks against them. In June 1837, Zulu ruler Dingane sent an army against the Ndebele. The Zulu force split in two, with one section seizing several thousand cattle and the other engaging the Ndebele in an inconclusive battle near the Pilanesberg Mountains. In August, a combined force of Jan Bloem's Griqua and Hurutshe Tswana raided Ndebele cattle posts. They met little resistance. About 300 Ndebele were killed in both engagements. In November 1837, Potgieter and Pieter Uys, another newly arrived Boer leader, led a commando of 360 Boers and a few Rolong allies 80 kilometers northwest of Mosega, where they attacked the Ndebele. The result was a nine-day running battle in which the Boers and Rolong pursued the fleeing Ndebele north, disrupted attempts to rally groups of warriors, and seized livestock. While the Boer claim of killing 3,000 Ndebele was probably exaggerated, Mzilikazi's people sustained heavy casualties. Consequently, the Ndebele moved far north over the Limpopo River, where they encountered the Rozvi Shona. The Boers, claiming the entire Transvaal by right of conquest, replaced the Ndebele as the main power on the western Highveld and developed tributary relations with many Tswana and Sotho groups.²³

The Boers who crossed south of the Drakensberg entered an area dominated by Dingane's Zulu Kingdom. In early February 1838, Piet Retief and a Boer party visited Dingane at the Zulu capital of Umgungundlovu, where they put on a display of mock combat with their horses and guns, and allegedly obtained an agreement ceding them the vast land between the Thukela and Mzimvubu Rivers. However, on February 6, Dingane tricked the Boers—who had begun to demand the return of the cattle that the Zulu had taken from the Ndebele—into leaving their guns outside his royal enclosure before he ordered their

execution. At once, Zulu regiments left Umgungundlovu to attack the dispersed and unsuspecting Boer camps at the Drakensberg foothills. The shocked Boers quickly organized a number of defensive laagers and then pursued the Zulu, who withdrew with 25,000 cattle. Two hundred eighty-one Boers, mostly children, and 250 mixed race servants were killed, and although the Zulus had attacked an unprepared enemy, they lost around 500 men. The surviving Boers, numbering around 640 men, and 3,200 women and children supported by 1,260 African servants, organized a consolidated defense, and reinforcements arrived from the Transvaal.

In early April 1838, two commandos, one of 200 Boers led by Potgieter and the other of 147 Boers led by Uys, crossed the Thukela River and rode toward Umgungundlovu intending to repeat their success against the Ndebele. However, the well-prepared Zulu set an ambush. On April 10, Uys's commando tried to capture a herd of cattle but realized too late that they had been caught in a trap as several Zulu regiments emerged from concealed positions and attempted to surround them. Potgieter and his men, who had not taken the bait, fled. Uys's Boer horsemen employed their usual fire and movement drills together with sudden direction changes to try to break out, but the Zulu were too close and too many. Ten Boers, including Uys and his son, were killed before the rest of the commando escaped. Although it is likely that several hundred Zulu were killed, the Boers considered themselves defeated, and the resultant arguments between their leaders prompted Potgieter's return to the Transvaal. On April 13 and 14, a force of 10,000 Zulu under Ndlela attacked a Boer laager near the Bushman's River. Only 75 Boer men defended the laager, but with women reloading muskets, they kept up a steady fire against the Zulu assaults. On April 15, the Zulu, unable to penetrate the laager, retired with the Boers' livestock. The British settlers at Port Natal, who had previously allied themselves with the Boers, led attacks against undefended Zulu communities. In mid-April, one of these raiding groups, consisting mostly of African mercenaries, was caught near the Thukela River by several Zulu regiments under Mpande, the king's half-brother, and annihilated. Mpande's army then attacked Port Natal, burning buildings and killing anyone they found. The white settlers took refuge on a ship, leaving their black followers to fend for themselves.

In late November, Andries Pretorius, leading 60 Boers with a small ship's cannon, arrived in Natal and took charge of combined Boer

forces. He led a column of 64 wagons that were carrying supplies and ammunition into the heart of Zulu territory. On December 9, the Boers made a religious vow that if God granted them victory, they would build a church and forever commemorate the day. The column arrived at the west bank of the Ncome River on December 15, 1838. Dingane mobilized a large army of between 12,000 and 16,000 men under Ndlela and Nzobo, his most trusted commanders, to deal with this threat. Boer scouts spotted the Zulu to the east of the river. Pretorius then directed his men to form a laager on the west bank of the Ncome. The Zulu could attack this laager only from the north and west because the east was blocked by a deep section of river and the south by a deep ravine. Defending the laager were 464 Boers, 3 Port Natal settlers, 120 Port Natal Africans, and 200 African servants who held 750 horses in the center until they were needed for pursuit. There were also 3 cannon. The next morning, December 16, the Zulu attack began with a disorderly and impulsive charge by the younger Zulu regiments. Fighting between younger and older Zulu warriors caused confusion. Funnelled into a narrow approach, the tightly formed Zulu were cut down by grapeshot from cannon and musket. The Boers disrupted the Zulu leaders by bombarding the hilltop position from where they were coordinating the attack. By 11 a.m., the demoralized Zulu began to withdraw pursued by 160 Boer horsemen who prevented them from regrouping. With perhaps 3,000 Zulu corpses filling the Ncome River, the Boers renamed it Blood River. No Boers were killed, and only 3 were wounded. The Battle of Blood River represented a divinely inspired victory for the Boers and was a terrible loss for the Zulu though it did not break them as a military power.

Before Dingane withdrew, he ordered Umgungundlovu burned. When the Boers arrived, they buried the remains of Retief and his party, and allegedly found the treaty (the original no longer exists) that had given them vast lands. Shortly thereafter, Dingane launched an invasion of the Swazi Kingdom with the intention of pushing north, as Mzilikazi had done, to escape the Boers. However, Swazi resistance thwarted these plans and led to civil war within the Zulu Kingdom between Mpande, who acquired support from the Boers, and Dingane. In January 1840, the followers of Mpande defeated Dingane's loyalists in the Maqongqo Hills. Dingane fled and was eventually killed by a Swazi patrol. Mpande became the new Zulu king, allying himself with the neighboring Boers who established the Republic of Natalia.²⁴

ANNEXATIONS, REBELLIONS, AND CONVENTIONS, 1848–1853

During the 1840s, the British extended political and military control over some of the Boers who had left the Cape. In 1843, the British occupied the Republic of Natalia, which became the Colony of Natal, as an independent Boer state on the coast directly threatened British naval interests. Missionaries had warned that Boer raids westward against the Bhaca and Mpondo could destabilize the Cape's eastern frontier. In early 1848, newly arrived Cape governor Smith summarily annexed the territory between the Orange and Vaal Rivers, called the Orange River Sovereignty, which was home to many Boer trekkers.

Boer resistance to the British proved ineffective. Andries Pretorius attempted to rally the Orange River Boers and by August 1848, he had taken control of the territory with 1,200 armed men. Rivalries between Boer leaders meant that Pretorius did not get much help from his colleagues north of the Vaal. Smith personally led a force of 800 regulars, 4 companies of Cape Mounted Rifles and 4 companies of British infantry, along with 250 mounted Griquas and 3 field guns. As Smith's column crossed the Orange River on August 16, many of the Boers lost confidence and went home to their farms. Pretorius decided to oppose the advancing Cape force on the road to Bloemfontein at a farm called Boomplaats. The 750 remaining Boers deployed along the reverse slope of a ridge that straddled both sides of the road, and sentries were positioned on higher ground on both flanks. The terrain favored a fighting withdrawal because there was a succession of ridges to which the Boers could withdraw and defend. However, the Boers prematurely opened fire as the British advanced up the road. Boer shooting was intense, but the long range lessened its effectiveness, and Boer positions were revealed. Initially shaken by the Boer fire, Smith's troops rallied and fought off an assault on the left flank. Smith then launched an attack on the Boer center and left positions, driving them back to another ridge. At this point, British artillery disrupted Boer efforts to regroup, and a cavalry charge by the CMR and Griqua put them to flight. The British suffered 25 men killed and another 25 wounded. While the British reported that they recovered 49 Boer corpses, Pretorius claimed that only 9 of his men had been killed and 5 wounded. Smith's force quickly occupied Bloemfontein and Winburg, and pursued Pretorius's retreating commando until it crossed north of the Vaal.

Remembered as The War of Mlanjeni, the African rebellion that broke out in British Kaffraria in December 1850 had many causes.

In early 1850, as drought began to reduce food production, a Xhosa prophet called Mlanjeni gained popularity by ordering the slaughter of yellowish or dun-colored cattle, often associated with white people, and abandon the contaminating influence of witchcraft. The rise of Mlanjeni occurred in the context of increasingly intrusive colonial rule in British Kaffraria. In the late 1840s, the Rharhabe were expelled from the west bank of the Tyume River, and settlers took their place. White military veterans established the villages of Woburn, Auckland, and Juanasberg in the Amatola foothills. Fingo locations expanded around nearby Fort Hare and Alice. Fingos began to acquire land in the Kat River Settlement at the expense of the procolonial Khoisan who had been placed there in the late 1820s. In the north, Fingos gained land from a section of the Thembu who had quietly come under colonial rule in 1848. European magistrates assumed greater powers from the Xhosa chiefs, who were forbidden to fine their subjects cattle and sanction witchcraft accusations. More missionaries were encouraged to work in British Kaffraria to westernize and Christianize the Xhosa. During the last half of 1850, the Rharhabe Xhosa, still ensconced in the Amatola Mountains, began to prepare for war by gathering firearms and storing food. In October 1850, Governor Smith officially deposed Sandile as Rharhabe leader when he and Maqoma failed to report for a meeting in King William's Town.

On Christmas Eve morning 1850, Colonel George MacKinnon led 600 colonial soldiers from Fort Cox into the Amatolas under instructions from Smith to capture Sandile. As the British troops moved east through the narrow Booma Pass, hundreds of Rharhabe musketeers fired down on them from rocky precipices. MacKinnon led his men through the ambush and headed south out of the mountains toward Burnshill Mission and Fort White. The Rharhabe counterattacked on Christmas morning by storming out of the Amatolas to destroy nearby Woburn, Auckland, and Juanasberg. Smith was trapped at Fort Cox with only a handful of cavalrymen and along the frontier, colonial forts and settlements were similarly besieged. Several other developments shocked the British. Within a few days, the Khoisan and mixed race people of the Kat River Settlement, created to serve as a buffer between settlers and Xhosa, also rebelled by attacking recently settled Fingo. Within a few weeks, many Khoisan Cape Mounted Riflemen deserted and joined rebel groups. On January 6, 1851, a combined force of Kat River and Rharhabe rebels approached Fort Beaufort under cover of darkness with the intension of capturing the town

and its supply of arms and ammunition. When the Khoisan attacked prematurely and were cut down by colonial firepower, the Rharhabe withdrew. In January 1851, the Thembu of northern British Kaffraria, who had also lost land, attacked the nearby colonial town of Whittlesea. A broad multiethnic rebellion that involved three groups that had previously been rivals broke out in response to colonial oppression. However, several Xhosa groups such as the Gqunukhwebe of Phato, who did not enjoy the protection of a mountainous homeland and had lost heavily in 1846–1847, sided with the British.²⁵

On the morning of January 21, 1851, Sandile led around 2,000 to 3,000 Xhosa warriors, including a large mounted detachment, in an attack on Fort Hare, which was the closest British post to the Amatolas. As the Xhosa infantry moved on the fort, their cavalry swept around the flank to cut off and seize 5,000 Fingo cattle grazing around the area. Fort Hare was short of defenders because a number of soldiers from its regular garrison had been sent to escort supplies coming up from Grahamstown. This left 100 loyal Cape Mounted Riflemen to man the walls and cannon, a few settler volunteers to defend the village of Alice, and 800 armed Fingo to go out of the fort to confront the attackers. The Xhosa plan to seize cattle was spoiled by musket fire from the nearby town of Alice and Fingos concealed within the herd. According to Somerset, the British commander at Fort Hare, 100 Xhosa had been killed and many wounded, but on the colonial side, only 6 Fingo were dead and 10 severely injured. The Xhosa withdrew with 200 cattle, which was one for every two of their dead. On January 24, 1851, a detachment of 120 loyal Cape Mounted Riflemen and 150 Fingo was sent out from King William's Town to drive off around 600 Xhosa of chiefs Anta and Siyolo who were threatening the town. Although outnumbered and ultimately surrounded, the colonial force managed to send the Xhosa fleeing into the bush before British reinforcements arrived.²⁶

With Xhosa attacks on Fort Hare and King William's Town defeated, colonial forces regrouped and seized the initiative. At the end of January 1851, Colonel MacKinnon took a wagon train from King William's Town that was escorted by 300 British regulars; 150 Cape Mounted Riflemen; 1,500 Khoisan; 300 Fingo irregulars; and 1 cannon to deliver supplies to the beleaguered forts Cox and White. A large body of Xhosa tried to block their march across the Keiskamma River at Debe Nek by attacking the rear and left flank of the column, but shrapnel shells from the cannon compelled them to withdraw.

In early February, MacKinnon sent two columns—one led by himself and the other by Lieutenant Colonel George Napier—from King William's Town to attack the Xhosa of Siyolo. Napier's force, consisting of 2 companies of British regulars, 100 CMR, and numerous settler volunteers (in total 1,100 men) marched in a direction that would block Siyolo if he moved northwest toward the Amatola Mountains to link up with Sandile. MacKinnon's column, made up of three companies of British regulars, 100 CMR, some settler levies, and the Fort Peddie Fingo (in total 1,150 men) supported by 2 cannon advanced on Siyolo's settlement, destroyed it, and withdrew with some cattle. Both columns spotted Siyolo's fleeing men and pursued them to Mlanjeni's homestead on the Keiskamma River, where they made a brief stand before being dispersed by artillery. The colonial forces then destroyed the settlement and sent out a patrol of CMR and Fingos that, after some fighting, returned with 500 cattle. After just three days, both columns returned to King William's Town with 700 captured beasts, having lost just 1 Fingo.²⁷

In mid-February 1851, under instructions from the governor, Colonel MacKinnon led a column of 2,750 men that consisted of five British regular companies, 100 CMR, and settler and Fingo levies to reinforce Somerset at Fort Hare. At the same time, Governor Smith ordered another force of 300–400 Fingo from Fort Peddie to rendezvous with MacKinnon. Once the Fort Peddie Fingo levy determined that all Siyolo's men had been sent to fight against MacKinnon's column, they crossed over the Keiskamma River, raided undefended homesteads, and returned with 440 cattle. On February 13, a group of Siyolo's Xhosa attempted to block the passage of MacKinnon's column through Debe Nek, but artillery and a "spirited charge" by the CMR and Fingos drove them off. MacKinnon's force then joined up with Somerset at Fort Hare, and each commander led a column into the Amatola Mountains to destroy fields and houses. In late April, MacKinnon once again left King William's Town with an expedition of 200 cavalry; 1,800 British infantry; and 200 Fingo that went into the Amatolas, fought off a number of ambushes, and returned a few days later with 400 cattle. MacKinnon reported that his patrol had killed 250 Xhosa with a loss of only 3 British soldiers and 1 Fingo. Another colonial sweep of the Amatolas took place in June with similar results.²⁸

At Whittlesea, in the north of British Kaffraria, Royal Engineer Captain Richard Tylden took command of a mixed group of armed

volunteers consisting of 70 settlers, 200 Xhosa Christian converts, and 800 Fingo, and directed the fortification of 4 strong buildings. On January 25, 1851, Maphasa's Thembu raided Whittlesea and took many cattle. Some Fingo pursued, were ambushed, and then were rescued by mounted settlers who drove off the Thembu. The next day, the Thembu, joined by some Kat River rebels, occupied the nearby Shiloh Mission. Between 3,000 and 4,000 Thembu attacked Whittlesea on each of the next two days and were repulsed by colonial firepower. On February 1, Tylden led 350 Xhosa Christians and Fingo in an attack on Shiloh. But after six hours of hard fighting, most of the village was burned, and around 1,000 Thembu and some Khoisan remained in possession of the barricaded church, which was too wet to burn. Tylden withdrew to Whittlesea with 600 cattle. Forty rebels and 8 Fingo had been killed. On February 3, the Thembu retaliated with another ultimately unsuccessful attack on the four Whittlesea strong points. With his contingent running out of ammunition, Tylden sent a message requesting reinforcements. On February 6, another Thembu assault, which seemed likely to capture the town, was foiled by the timely arrival of mounted settler volunteers from Craddock 200 kilometers to the south. The next day a wagon train of supplies arrived from Craddock escorted by 180 Boers. Tylden then led another attack on Shiloh, which again failed to dislodge the rebels because the Boers withdrew to Whittlesea at the last moment. Daily skirmishes ended on February 11 when a confusing order was received from Somerset instructing Tylden to cease operations. By the time the misunderstanding was resolved and Tylden was ready to resume attacks against the Thembu, they had withdrawn north to defend their communities against a Boer commando. Raiding continued and on July 15, 1851, a patrol of 300 Fingo left Whittlesea, attacked Thembu homesteads along the Black Kei River, and returned the next day with 400 cattle.²⁹

In February 1851, Somerset took command of operations against the rebellious Kat River Settlement. Arrangements were made for armed settlers assembled at Post Retief and Somerset's force at Fort Hare to converge on the Kat River Settlement and take Fort Armstrong, which had been captured by the rebels. The settlers arrived first and unwisely attacked the insurgent camp on their own. Taking up positions on higher ground, the rebels poured musket fire down upon the settlers who were caught in the open. Just as it looked like the settlers would have to retreat, Somerset arrived with 1,800 men, and the

rebels withdrew to Fort Armstrong. Somerset's force bombarded the fort with several artillery pieces and stormed the walls with overwhelming numbers of CMR and armed settlers. A few rebels tenaciously defended the central tower, but a field gun blew the door off, and colonial volunteers entered to finish them off. Overall, 500 prisoners were taken, 400 of whom were women and children, and many more women and children perished in the fort. The Kat River rebellion had been crushed, and some survivors managed to join the Rharhabe in the Amatolas.

Rharhabe leader Maqoma took a few hundred Xhosa and rebel Khoisan into the thickly forested valleys of the Waterkloof Highlands, located within the Cape Colony overlooking Fort Beaufort, to use as a base for raiding settler farms. In trying to dislodge Maqoma's rebels from the Waterkloof, colonial forces were distracted from destroying the main Xhosa reservoir of crops and cattle in the Amatolas. In early September 1851, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Fordyce, commanding officer of the 74th Highlanders, responded to Xhosa cattle raids by taking a punitive expedition of 250 British regulars, 250 Fingo, and about 150 other settler and Khoisan volunteers up to the Waterkloof. On the fairly open summit, this force was engaged in a brief skirmish by rebels who then withdrew down into the bush of the ravines. Since his men did not have rations and he believed the Xhosa had fled, Fordyce decided to return to Fort Beaufort by taking his expedition down a particularly narrow path through a densely forested valley. Maqoma's rebels then ambushed the column, and the Fingo rear guard panicked and ran down the path, causing confusion among the highlanders. Maqoma's rebels immediately charged, killing 8 soldiers and wounding another 9 before running back into the forest.

Fordyce led another force into the Waterkloof in mid-October 1851 that included two Fingo levies of several hundred men each, one from Fort Beaufort and one from Port Elizabeth. They searched the dense bush, some of which appeared impenetrable. In early November, during a large but unsuccessful sweep of the Waterkloof, Fordyce was killed by a rebel Khoisan sniper.

The war's continuation prompted the colonial office, in January 1852, to replace Smith with Sir George Cathcart. In June, Cathcart—who was haunted by “the bugbear of the Waterkloof”—planned to extricate the rebels with a large force of 1,200 British regulars and 450 Fingo. His new strategy was to build a series of small fortified posts on the Waterkloof highlands to serve as patrol bases for searching

the forested ravines. Occupied by detachments of British regulars and Fingo, these posts denied the rebels high ground for observation and kept them off balance. Colonial sweeps of the Waterkloof continued, with one in September involving 3,000 British soldiers, CMR, and Fingos. Since his position was no longer tenable, Maqoma began pulling his people back to the Amatolas and by the middle of October, Cathcart reported that the Waterkloof was cleared of enemy. The Waterkloof campaign degenerated into a dehumanizing bush war in which British officers collected human skulls as trophies, colonial troops shot Xhosa women and children, dead insurgents were hung from trees, and the Xhosa tortured a captured British soldier and fed him strips of his own flesh. Although British Lieutenant Colonel William Eyre initially objected to ambushing an enemy as unsoldierly and un-British, he emerged as one of the most ruthless bush-fighters of the campaign who had no qualms about massacring Xhosa women and children. The number of Xhosa killed in the Waterkloof will never be known, but accounts from British soldiers refer to large numbers of human bones littering the area.³⁰

With the end of the Waterkloof campaign, the British concentrated on destroying the productive capacity of Rharhabe society in the Amatolas. Throughout October and November 1852, colonial patrols burned crops and seized cattle, and many Rharhabe fled east across the Kei River. Sandile crossed the Kei in January 1853 and Maqoma, who had remained in the Amatolas with only 40 followers, joined him in mid-February. Both chiefs sent a message to colonial officials that they wished to surrender.

During the conflict, colonial forces mounted several raids east of the Kei River to seize cattle from the Gcaleka Xhosa of Sarhili, who had declared neutrality but was blamed for harboring fugitives and robbing white traders and Fingo. For six weeks in December 1851 and January 1852, Somerset led a 5,000-strong force into Sarhili's territory and returned with 30,000 cattle and 7,000 "Fingo," probably Gcaleka, who had decided to desert. At times, these patrols encountered stiff resistance from Xhosa ensconced among rocks. In August 1852, Cathcart prepared for further operations in the Waterkloof and Amatolas by organizing another major raid against the Gcaleka that returned with 10,000 cattle. During this operation, Captain Tylden commanded 200 Fingo horsemen who burned villages and captured livestock. This was a new development as previous Fingo units had been infantry.³¹ These raids against the Gcaleka provided colonial

forces with food supplies, loot to reward volunteers, and additional African labor. At the same time, the colonial scorched earth campaign destroyed Rharhabe food sources and starved them into submission.

With Smith's expansion into the Orange River Sovereignty, the British took responsibility for continuous frontier conflict between Boers and Sotho, and between various Sotho rulers. In 1849, Major Henry Warden, British resident in Bloemfontein, attempted to define a boundary, later called the Warden Line, between the Boers of the eastern Orange River Sovereignty and the Sotho, which stripped land from the latter. In June 1851, Warden decided to move decisively against the Sotho of Moshoeshoe and Moletsane, who had been blamed for destabilizing the area. Although he intended to gather a force of 3,000 men, he pulled together only 1,400 consisting of 160 British troops, 120 settlers, 250 Griqua and Kora, and 800 Rolong. Based at Platberg, Warden sent messengers to Moshoeshoe demanding 6,000 cattle as compensation for theft from surrounding communities. At the end of June, before the deadline for payment had expired, Warden led his composite force against Moletsane's Taung who had occupied Viervoet Mountain. With support from a six-pounder gun, Warden's men drove off the Taung and captured around 3,000 cattle. However, a large force of Sotho under Molapo, Moshoeshoe's son, crested the mountain and poured down on Warden's surprised men. Around 200 Rolong, drunk on captured beer, were killed. The rest of the colonial force fled back to Thaba' Nchu in the Orange River Sovereignty. Further British plans to confront Moshoeshoe and his allies were delayed by the continuation of the War of Mlanjeni in British Kaffraria. Learning from their experience of Griqua raiders, the Sotho had adopted widespread use of the horse and acquired obsolete fire-arms through trade.

In December 1852, Cathcart led a force of 2,000 men, including cavalry and artillery, into the Sotho Kingdom, where he demanded Moshoeshoe surrender 10,000 cattle and 1,000 horses as reparation for stock theft from the settlers of the Orange River Sovereignty. Although Moshoeshoe delivered 3,500 cattle with a promise of more once they were collected, on December 20, Cathcart launched a sweep of the Berea Plateau to seize cattle and punish the Sotho, who he thought would not resist. Based at a crossing point on the Caledon River, Cathcart divided his force into three columns that were meant to converge on Moshoeshoe's capital of Thaba Bosiu. Lieutenant Colonel Napier was instructed to lead 230 cavalrymen, British lancers, and CMR

around the northern side of the plateau, which was impossible because, unknown to the British, it extended many kilometers to the east. This mounted detachment climbed the plateau and captured 4,000 cattle but was ambushed and driven back to the colonial camp by 700 Sotho under Molapo and the sons of Moletsane. Just over 10 percent of the column were killed, 25 lancers and two mounted riflemen. The main column, consisting of 500 British infantry supported by several rocket tubes, was led by Colonel Eyre to the Berea Mission and then straight across the plateau. Eyre's force encountered little initial resistance but without cavalry, they could only collect 1,500 cattle. During the afternoon, Molapo's 700 Sotho rode south and made several charges against Eyre's column, but the sustained fire of the British infantry drove them off. Rounding the southern side of the plateau, Cathcart commanded a column of 300 infantry supported by a small detachment of cavalry and two howitzers. This group advanced to a small knoll just five kilometers from Thaba Bosiu, where it waited for the other columns and watched as a large number of Sotho horsemen gathered around Moshoeshoe's stronghold. At around 5 p.m., Eyre's column arrived and reinforced the position just before 5,000 to 6,000 Sotho cavalry attacked. Led by several sons of Moshoeshoe, the Sotho made repeated attempts to outflank the British, including one incident in which they recovered 400 cattle, but they were repulsed by colonial firepower. With the sun going down, both Cathcart and Moshoeshoe pulled back their forces. Moshoeshoe sent Cathcart a message, scribed by a missionary, which requested that hostilities cease and the British keep the 5,000 cattle they had captured as recompense for the Boers. Sotho mobility and overwhelming numbers had failed to overcome the firepower of disciplined British infantry. Cathcart, surprised by the tenacity and scale of Sotho opposition, accepted the offer and withdrew his forces from the area.

If victory is measured by obtaining objectives, then Moshoeshoe won the Battle of Berea. Cathcart's two objectives, capturing cattle and punishing the Sotho, were incompatible because rounding up livestock required splitting the colonial force and gave the Sotho ample warning of their approach. Cathcart's goals were only partly fulfilled; he had taken less than half of the livestock demanded and from the perspective of the Orange River settlers, the Sotho remained unpunished. Although the Sotho had inflicted serious casualties on the British, 38 dead and 15 wounded, this was mostly from the

ambush on Napier's cavalry, and Sotho losses were probably higher. Moshoeshoe's people were so impressed by the British infantry that they called this The Battle of the Soldiers. Moshoeshoe, whose objective was to protect his people and the integrity of his state, had repelled British invaders through a combination of military action and diplomacy.³²

In May 1852, Moshoeshoe raided the Tlokwa, led by his longtime rival Sekonyela, and took most of their cattle. Sekonyela prevented the Sotho from attacking his Marabeng stronghold by submitting to Moshoeshoe's authority, though within a short time, he resumed raids and made an alliance with the Kora leader Gert Taaibosch. After his partial success against the British at Berea, Moshoeshoe gained confidence and set out with an army of 10,000–12,000 men to storm Sekonyela's mountain strongholds of Joalaboholo and Marabeng, which were defended by 800 Tlokwa and 100 Kora. Sotho warriors under Posholi and Mohale were sent around the northern side, Moletsane and Mopeli led men to the western end, and Letsie took his fighters in from the south. Joalaboholo fell first. The final assault on the previously impregnable Marabeng was led by Masopha and a few men who scrambled up a difficult approach and others under Molapo who took the main pass. Taaibosch was killed, and Sekonyela escaped to exile in the Orange River Sovereignty. With the collapse of an independent Tlokwa state, Moshoeshoe extended his leadership over the northern part of Lesotho.

British withdrawal from the interior given lack of strategic interest and continued conflict led to the amalgamation of two larger Boer republics. In the 1852 Sand River Convention, the British recognized the independence of the Boers north of the Vaal River in what became the Transvaal (or South African Republic). The 1854 Bloemfontein Convention recognized the autonomy of the Boers of the Orange River Sovereignty, which became the Orange Free State.

SETTLER MILITARY CULTURE

When the British seized the Cape in 1806, they retained the Boer commando system and during the late 1830s and 1840s, the trekkers brought it inland to become the military system of their republics. Commandos were mustered when required, there was no training, members provided their own firearms and horses, and since a commando came from a specific district, most of its members were

relations and/or neighbors, and skills were passed down over generations. The election of officers created an egalitarian myth, but since votes were not secret, elite landowners were usually appointed by their dependents. Councils of war were held before operations, officers voted on plans, and anyone who disagreed could ride away with their men. Although the commando was an inexpensive way for frontier republics to quickly organize a defense, it was notoriously unreliable, with no method of punishing deserters and logistics consisting of Boer women bringing food in wagons that were also used to create defensive laagers. With a small population, Boer commandos did not favor last stands, avoided close combat, and rode off when things went wrong. The Boers of the 1830s and 1840s perfected a tactic of dismounting to fire volleys, riding a short distance, dismounting, firing again, and repeating the process, which was successful in goading spear-wielding African infantry into attacking prepared laagers where they would be cut down by concentrated firepower. From the 1850s to 1870s, Boer commandos represented mounted infantry who rode to battle and dismounted to fight using "fire and movement" in assaults sometimes supported by a few field guns. Although the Boers besieged many African mountain strongholds, this practice did not favor them because hungry Boers eventually returned to their farms, which they were anxious to protect. In the republics, each district had a few military-administrative officials called field cornets who reported to an elected commandant who led a commando and who ultimately reported to a commandant-general. In the 1850s, the Orange Free State passed a commando law that compelled all white males between 16 and 60 to register for armed service and further institutionalization of the system continued later in the century. Since the Free State and Transvaal prohibited blacks from carrying guns, the nineteenth-century republican commandos were significantly whiter than their eighteenth-century Cape predecessors. However, black servants called *agterryers* (after riders) came along to drive wagons, tend horses, load weapons, handle livestock, gather firewood, dig trenches, help the wounded, and stand sentry.

In the Cape, many *ad hoc* military units had been formed during the Cape-Xhosa wars of the early to mid-nineteenth century, including settler commandos, Khoisan hunting parties, Fingo levies, and in the early 1850s a unit of Cape Town convicts called Lakeman's Volunteers. Since they were disbanded after each conflict, these formations lacked institutional identity and were not part of a formal military system.

During the 1850s, Britain began to expect the settler colonies of the Cape and Natal to take greater responsibility for their own defense, imperial troops were withdrawn from the region during the Crimean War of 1853–1856, and the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and newly landed British settlers wanted to copy the increasingly popular volunteer units of their home country. After the 1852 granting of representative government to the Cape, a local defense establishment emerged consisting of a full-time all-white Frontier Armed and Mounted Police (FAMP), burgher commandos, and permanent though part-time all-white volunteer regiments. Mixed race and Khoisan full-time military service in the Cape declined after the CMR mutiny of the early 1850s; the CMR, an imperial unit, was abolished in 1870; and although African ad hoc formations continued to be raised for wars, they were never made permanent. When the Cape's 1855 Burgher Levies Act extended commando service to both white and mixed race men, whites protested and Governor George Grey suggested that they form racially exclusive volunteer units. Men interested in forming a regiment petitioned the local magistrate to call a public meeting and if there was enough interest, the governor was requested to form the unit with the magistrate usually appointed commanding officer. The first volunteer regiment in the Cape, the Cape Royal Rifles, was established in Cape Town in November 1855, and dozens of others followed across the colony in the late 1850s and early 1860s. Although Natal did not yet have self-government, settlers feared the African population that they had not conquered, and the Zulu Kingdom loomed over the border. South Africa's first white volunteer regiment, the Royal D'Urban Rangers, was formed in Natal in March 1854, and many others appeared over the next decade. Mirroring British military structure, volunteer regiments designated themselves infantry, mounted infantry, cavalry, artillery, or engineers. While volunteer regiments held regular drill sessions, they resembled social clubs because they elected committees, officers did not have much authority, members could freely express views at meetings, they organized dinners and other social events, and they maintained club rooms in hotels or taverns. The volunteers were armed by the state but since they had to buy their own uniforms—and saddles and horses for cavalry—and pay membership fees, poorer whites were sometimes excluded, and elitism was promoted by giving prominent personalities honorary membership. When Prince Albert visited the Cape and Natal in 1860, he was constantly escorted by local volunteers and saluted by

volunteer gunners. Volunteer regiments performed full-time duty during crises such as in 1857 when the Cape Royal Rifles and Cape Volunteer Artillery assumed garrison duties in Cape Town, which freed imperial units for India, and in 1858 when the elite Natal Carbineers joined an expedition to depose an African chief. An economic depression in the 1860s led to the decline of volunteering, but the discovery of diamonds in the Northern Cape late that decade revitalized it as the economy improved and new wars of colonial conquest raised settler martial spirit.³³

THE FREE STATE–LESOTHO WARS, 1858–1868

Conflict continued between Free State Boers and Sotho in the Caledon Valley. In mid-March 1858, Jacobus Boshof, president of the Free State, sent Moshoeshoe an ultimatum demanding that he force chiefs Posholi and Lebenya to leave the frontier area, pay livestock compensation for thefts against the Boers, and accept the Warden Line as the border between the Free State and Lesotho. The Free State mobilized 1,000 men, and war was declared a week later because no reply had been received from Moshoeshoe. Two Boer commandos were organized, one at Smithsfield in the south under Weber and the other at Winburg in the north under Frederick Senekal and W. J. Pretorius. The commandos moved into Lesotho intending to converge on Thaba Bosiu. The Boers were supported by supply wagons and seven small field guns. In response, Moshoeshoe directed his people to drive their cattle up into the Maluti Mountains, Sotho communities in the disputed frontier zone were withdrawn toward Thaba Bosiu, chiefs prepared to fight a delaying action against the advancing Boers, and raiding parties were readied to counterattack farms in the Free State. Although Moshoeshoe enjoyed a huge numerical advantage as he mobilized 10,000 men to fight 1,000 Boers, the Free State had the upper hand in firepower. At this point, Sotho cavalry were armed with old flintlocks with inferior gunpowder, and their infantry had spears, clubs, and axes. The Boers had newer smooth bore percussion cap muskets, a few more accurate and longer range rifles, and good ammunition. In mid-April, the northern Boer column, which crossed the Caledon River at the same point Cathcart had in 1852 and formed a laager, was repeatedly attacked by 6,000–8,000 Sotho under Molapo, Mopeli, and Moletsane, who took heavy casualties and withdrew. This Winburg commando then moved down the Caledon River to

Jammerberg Drift to await their colleagues from Smithsfield. In late March, the southern Boer column, assisted by Sotho allies, destroyed the mostly abandoned villages of Posholi and Lebenya, crossed the Caledon, and linked up with the Winburg Boers on April 25. The combined Boer force, now under Senekal, advanced on Morija, where it burned Letsie's village and looted the property of European missionaries and traders.

On May 6, 1858, the Boers formed a laager below Thaba Bosiu. When an attack by 10,000 Sotho horsemen was repulsed, Moshoeshoe concentrated his forces on defending the mountain. Learning that their farms in the Free State were being attacked by Sotho raiders from the east, and Griqua and Tswana from the west, the Boers of Senekal's commando, on May 8, bombarded Thaba Bosiu and then quickly withdrew across the Caledon. Although the Boers had retreated, they had destroyed food reserves and crops, which caused hunger among the Sotho, which worsened an outbreak of typhoid. This put pressure on Moshoeshoe, who also feared that the British would ally with the Boers, to make peace. The October 1858 Treaty of Aliwal North, an agreement between the Free State and Lesotho brokered by the British, set a formal boundary between the two states that was similar to the disputed Warden Line and authorized the Boers to pursue alleged stock thieves across the border. To the Boers, this was the First Basotho War, while the Sotho named it Senekal's War.

During the early 1860s, internal politics distracted the Orange Free State from its eastern frontier with Lesotho. An aging Moshoeshoe struggled to restrain his subordinate rulers, and Sotho expansion toward the poorly defined northern border caused a dispute with the Free State. In May 1865, J. H. Brand, the new and forceful Free State president, directed a Boer commando to expel the Sotho from this area and warned Moshoeshoe not to interfere. In this conflict, the Free State mobilized around 5,000 Boers supported by several hundred white volunteers from the British colonies; several thousand African allies, mainly Roland and Fingo; and eventually a Boer commando from the Transvaal. The Boers were mainly armed with double-barrelled muzzle-loading rifles that they were beginning to replace with newer and faster firing Whitworth breech loaders. About 20,000 Sotho warriors were armed with a variety of outdated firearms, mostly smooth bore muzzle loaders, as well as spears, clubs, and battle-axes. As both sides had a few artillery pieces, the Sotho would call the conflict the War of Cannon's Boom. The Boers had purchased some from the

British, while the Sotho had smuggled them in and cast some with the assistance of British deserters. Traders from the Cape supplied the Boers with arms and ammunition but refused to deal with the Sotho. Moshoeshoe's authority had deteriorated to the point where his rival sons, Molapo and Letsie, fought the war as separate rulers.

The Sotho simultaneously brought their cattle to the mountains and launched raids on Boer farms. In mid-June 1865, Commandant-General Jan Fick led 850 Boers supported by two field guns into northern Lesotho, where they were attacked by a large Sotho army that, despite some determined charges, was repulsed after losing 50 men. Only 1 Boer had been killed but instead of pursuing the fleeing Sotho, Fick's commando withdrew to restock ammunition. A few days later, 3,000 Sotho warriors under Posholi, Moorosi, and Lebenya raided Boer farms in the Caledon Valley, killing around 14 settlers and capturing 100,000 sheep along with several thousand cattle and horses. Molapo led a raiding party against Boers around Kroonstad and returned with a great deal of seized livestock. Masopha and Lerotholi, Letsie's son, led 2,000 Sotho into the Bloemfontein District, where they killed settler men and boys, and took livestock. However, on their way home, they were spotted by one of Fick's detachments, which gave chase and killed at least 100. Another Sotho raid crossed into Natal in pursuit of Free State cattle and killed some white travelers from the Transvaal. Throughout July, the Sotho, seeing that they were no match for Boer firepower, withdrew to their homes. Boer commandos entered Lesotho, destroyed food stores and crops, and easily captured the small mountain strongholds of Posholi and Masopha.

By the end of July 1865, the Sotho were focused on the defense of Thaba Bosiu, with around 2,000 men on the mountain and several thousand in reserve in nearby villages. A Boer commando under Fick arrived on the Berea Plateau and established a laager two and a half kilometers from Thaba Bosiu. With the arrival of another Boer commando under Louis Wepener in early August, the combined Boer force now consisted of 2,100 Europeans; 500 Rolong; 400 Fingo; and 5 field guns. On August 8, Wepener directed an attack against Raebe Pass on the south side of the mountain, which fell into chaos because of lack of preliminary reconnaissance. On August 15, Wepener led another assault against the mountain that concentrated on northwestern Khubelu Pass, the weakest point in the position protected by three stone walls manned by Moshoeshoe's best men. Wepener's plan was to approach the pass from the side and move from

one boulder to another using small arms fire to pin down the defenders. Boer artillery bombed the positions higher up the mountain but had to cease as the attackers advanced. However, of the 600 Boers who volunteered for the dangerous operation, only 300 actually went forward at 11 a.m. By 5 p.m., the Boers had taken two of the three walls, but many of them had fled, leaving only 100 men to complete the assault. As Wepener was calling for reinforcements, he was shot dead and his second in command was wounded. While the Boers were mustering reinforcements around sunset, the Sotho launched a massive counterattack that swept them down the mountain.

Fick's force then besieged Thaba Bosiu, where cattle were starving to death. President Brand rejected a request from Moshoeshoe for British mediation and demanded the Sotho surrender 40,000 cattle; 60,000 sheep; and 5,000 horses. They were also to cede all land below the Maluti River to the Free State. However, the Boers continued to desert, and by the middle of September, Fick had to withdraw his camps on the southern and eastern sides of Thaba Bosiu, which was now defended by between 1,500 and 1,800 Sotho warriors. On September 25, the Boers left Moshoeshoe's mountain but instead of going home, they divided into two commandos with one under Fick raiding north and one under P. J. Wessels raiding south around the Orange River. At the end of the month, 300 Boers from the Transvaal, led by Paul Kruger, entered Lesotho to avenge the killing of their countrymen, attacked Molapo's regiment, and eventually joined Fick's commando. This combined force of 1,200 men raided Sotho communities near the Berea Plateau, taking 8,000 cattle; 4,000 sheep; and 800 horses. A dispute among Boer leaders about how to divvy up the spoils prompted Kruger and his men to return home. In the south, Wessels' force inflicted such a decisive defeat on Moorosi's people that they disavowed Moshoeshoe and confined themselves to the upper Orange River. The Sotho attempted to raid Free State farms, but this proved impossible because the Boers had organized a series of frontier laagers. Fick intended to starve the Sotho into submission by destroying crops, but he did not have enough men.

In January 1866, the Free State commandos withdrew from Lesotho to regroup. Later the same month, 4 commandos, consisting of 400 to 600 Boers each, returned to Lesotho to capture livestock and disrupt cultivation. At this point, there was no overall Sotho strategy because local chiefs failed to cooperate and resisted only when their own communities were threatened. Sotho cavalry rarely attempted to close

with the Boers, as they feared taking horrible casualties from gunfire. There were several Sotho raids into the Free State, but most of these parties were intercepted and their looted livestock taken away. In March 1866, Molapo, who had lost a large amount of livestock to the Boers, made a separate peace called the Treaty of Mpharane in which he and his followers became subjects of the Free State. This was a major blow to Moshoeshe. With his people anxious to harvest their remaining crops, Moshoeshe, in early April, agreed to modified Free State terms to surrender 3,000 cattle and give up a considerable amount of land taken by Boers during the conflict. While the Europeans called this the Treaty of Thaba Bosiu, the Sotho referred to it as the Peace of the Millet.

After harvesting and planting, Sotho communities refused to vacate the conquered land claimed by the Boers and maintained that peace had been obtained entirely through provision of cattle. Some prominent Sotho chiefs asked to join the Free State to preserve their communities but were rejected because the Boers wanted more land, not more African subjects. In January 1867, Boers moved into the new Free State territory to occupy farms, but the Sotho refused to leave. When President Brand threatened to dispatch a commando, the Sotho, who decided not to attack the Boers if they invaded, once again moved their cattle and food stores into the mountains and prepared to defend Thaba Bosiu and other strongholds, three of which were within the conquered area. In March, Boer commandos began destroying Sotho crops, but the only way to accomplish this thoroughly was to take casualties by capturing the strongholds. In turn, the Boers made separate agreements with some Sotho chiefs—including Letsie, Mopeli, and Moletsane—who became Free State subjects and were allowed to retain a portion of their land. Incensed by these defections, Moshoeshe ordered his remaining men to fatten their horses in preparation for war. Violence broke out when some Boers once again tried to claim farms in the conquered area, and several Europeans were killed. In mid-September 1867, two Free State commandos, each with around 500 Boers, attempted to clear Sotho from the conquered territory and bombarded Sotho strongholds. Hoping that the British would intervene, Moshoeshe told his people to plant as much as possible and defend their mountain positions. Moshoeshe had been seeking British protection for some time and in late January 1868, he received a letter from Cape governor Sir Phillip Wodehouse offering to accept the Sotho as British subjects. However, the Boers continued their attacks,

captured several strongholds, killed Posholi, and seized 10,000 cattle; 8,000 sheep; and 1,500 horses. It appeared Thaba Bosiu might fall. In mid-March, Moshoeshoe's Sotho were proclaimed British subjects, the British prohibited arms and ammunition sales to the Free State, and a FAMP detachment from the Cape was sent to Thaba Bosiu. Unwilling to risk conflict with the British, President Brand withdrew Boer forces from Lesotho. In February 1869, the British and Free State Boers negotiated a new border for Lesotho without any Sotho representation. Lesotho gained arable land in the west that it had lost in the Treaty of Thaba Bosiu, but all its territory north of the Caledon and a section between the Caledon and Orange was confiscated. Although the Sotho chiefs were resentful, they were tired of almost constant warfare and acquiesced to what became the modern borders of Lesotho. Moshoeshoe, who died in 1870, had invited indirect British rule to prevent the conquest of his state by the Boers.³⁴

THE TRANSVAAL

The Sand River Convention of 1852 recognized the self-rule of the Transvaal Boers and prohibited Africans in that area from obtaining firearms and ammunition from British territories. This weakened African resistance to Boer attacks. When Boer trekkers initially moved north of the Vaal River in the late 1830s and 1840s, they were primarily interested in elephant hunting. However, during the 1850s and early 1860s, the growth of cash cropping by Boers in the western and central Transvaal led to an increase of Boer slave raids in the region.³⁵ With smaller commandos than the Free State, problems acquiring ammunition from the far south, and a vast territory, the mid-nineteenth century Transvaal Boers found it difficult to decisively defeat African states and engaged mostly in frontier raiding.

During the 1840s, Boers moved into the northwestern Transvaal and began demanding livestock, land, and labor from the Kekana and Langa, led by Mokopane and Mankopane respectively, around present-day Mokopane (Potgietersrus). This area was important to the Boers as a route through the mountains to the ivory-rich northern Transvaal. In 1847 and 1848, the Boers, without provocation, attacked these groups and seized livestock and children, who were sold as slaves. As a result, these African communities began acquiring firearms. The Boers believed that their defeat of Mzilikazi had given them jurisdiction over all the Africans in the area, but Mokopane and

Mankopane had never been subjects of Mzilikazi. Furthermore, because of demands for labor and prohibition on Africans owning guns and horses, they did not want to submit to Boer authority. In September 1852, a Boer war council at Olifantsrivier declared Mokopane and his people enemies of the republic. In September 1854, the Kekana and Langa, in several incidents, killed and mutilated 28 Boers (including Field Cornet Hermanus Potgieter) who had stolen their cattle and children, and killed Mokopane's brother. Boers in the Rustenburg and Zoutpansberg areas left their farms and formed laagers. Two Boer commandos, 100 men under P. W. Potgieter from Zoutpansberg and 200 under M. W. Pretorius from Pretoria, rendezvoused in Mokopane's territory and were joined by some Kgatla allies.

As they had done before, the Kekana took shelter in a deep cave, where they fortified the two entrances and interior with stone walls and stockpiled firearms, ammunition, and food. A stream flowing through the cave would supply water. In late October, the Boers assaulted the entrances, blasted the walls with cannon, and pushed the Kekana back into the cave. P. W. Potgieter was shot dead while standing near a cave mouth. After unsuccessful attempts to blow up the cave and smoke out the defenders, the Boers diverted the stream and besieged the Kekana by building stone fortifications around the two entrances. Two weeks later, the Boers, suspecting that the Kekana were sneaking out of the cave, used 300 African laborers to block the entrances with trees and stones. When some Kekana tried to slip out of the cave at night, they were discovered by a Boer patrol, which killed between 700 and 900. By mid-November, around 800 Kekana women and children had surrendered and were taken to work on Boer farms. The Boers ceased the campaign at the end of the month because of horses that had become sick, a shortage of gunpowder, Boer desires to get back to their farms, slim prospects for more loot, and the beginning of the rainy season. Though Mokopane escaped, the Kekana were broken up, with some survivors taken by the Boers and others seeking refuge with the neighboring Langa. After the siege was lifted, a Boer patrol under Paul Kruger, deputy of the Pretoria commando, went north and seized 1,000 cattle from Maraba's people, who did not resist. The main Boer army then advanced against the Langa but found little loot because Mankopane and his people had withdrawn. Most of the cattle taken by the Boers were sold to cover the costs of gunpowder, which meant it became difficult to rally Boers for subsequent offensives against Mankopane's Langa. In April 1858, a commando under

Kruger once again attacked the Langa, who fortified themselves on a steep mountain around 100 kilometers northwest of Potgietersrus. Kruger and 100 volunteers attempted to surprise the defenders by scaling the mountain at night, but they were discovered by a sentry and in the ensuing fight, Mankopane escaped. In June 1868, Kruger led 900 Boers in another assault of the Langa stronghold that killed 300 defenders, with a loss of 2 Boers. However, he but failed to secure the entire mountaintop or capture Mankopane.³⁶

When Boer trekkers arrived in the eastern Transvaal in the mid-1840s, they were initially welcomed by Africans such as the Pedi, who cooperated with them in hunting and raiding. By the late 1840s, Boer demands for ivory, cattle, and captive children had alienated the Kopa of Boleu and the Ndzundza Ndebele of Mabhogo. In 1847, Boer leader A. H. Potgieter and Pedi ruler Sekwati fell out while trying to divide loot from a joint raid on the Kgatla of the Zoutpansberg, as well as Boer demands for children. The departure of many Boers for the richer elephant hunting of the northern Transvaal weakened them in the east. As relations with their neighbors deteriorated, the Boers blamed labor desertion and stock theft on local African rulers, and Africans began acquiring firearms by going to work in the British territories to the south. In 1848, a Boer raid on the Kopa captured 24 guns and some cattle. In 1852, Boers from Zoutpansberg and Lydenburg besieged the Pedi mountain stronghold of Phiring but were unwilling to assault it because the defenders had firearms, and African allies had tried and failed. After 25 days, the Boers left with 5,000 cattle; 6,000 small livestock; and some captured children. Since the siege revealed to Sekwati that his stronghold did not have a reliable water source, the following year, he moved his people to the Tsate Valley, which had better rainfall and soils, and a central hill called Mosego was fortified with stone and pole walls. Divisions among the Boers during the late 1850s and early 1860s delayed an expected campaign against the Ndzundza and Kopa who rejected Boer claims to their land. When a commando was finally organized in 1863, the Ndzundza mountain stronghold held out against a blockade by Boers and Pedi allies while Kopa communities were devastated by a Swazi attack called upon by the Boers. The continuation of raiding and retaliation meant that by the mid-1860s, many Boers, their farming disrupted by living in laagers, sent cattle to Mabhogo (who permitted them to remain). Between 1859 and the mid-1860s, the Swazi captured slaves and exchanged them with the Boers for livestock.³⁷

In the western Transvaal, Boer commandos regularly raided Tswana communities for cattle and slaves. In 1844, the Kwena leader Sechele fortified his principle town with a stone wall that included loopholes from which his men could fire muskets acquired in the ivory trade. Over the next few years, Sechele rejected Boer demands for submission. Tensions increased as the Boers seized guns from traders doing business with the Kwena and Sechele prevented Boer hunting parties from passing through his territory. With a view to disarming the Kwena, Boer military commander Andries Pretorius, in July 1851, convened a war council and authorized spying operations. In October 1851, a Boer commando rode west, where it accepted the submission of Tswana groups such as the Hurutshe while others withdrew into what is now Botswana. In August 1852, a large commando of 430 Boers and over 400 African allies under Ernst Scholtz and Paul Kruger attacked Mosielele's Kgatla and Sechele's Kwena. The Boers employed cannon to bombard the Kwena mountain stronghold of Dimawe and during the assault used African allies as human shields. After six hours of fighting, while Sechele and his entourage held the top of Dimawe Hill, the village had been burned and other Kwena positions captured. Between 4 and 30 Boers and between 60 and 100 Kwena had been killed. That night, Sechele and his people fled to another stronghold called Dithubaruba. Over the next three days, the Boers pursued the Kwena and sacked the residence of missionary, David Livingstone, who was away, where they found firearms that were used as evidence that missionaries were arming Africans. Although the Boers withdrew with around 3,000 cattle and 600 captive women and children, they had failed to conquer Sechele's people. Harassed by the Kwena on its return, Scholtz's commando disbanded because its horses and oxen were worn out, and the Boers were unwilling to continue. In December 1852 along the Harts River, a commando attacked Montshiwa's Rolong who, after ambushing the Boers to buy time, withdrew north to live among the Ngwaketse. In January 1853, retaliatory Tswana attacks caused Boer farmers to abandon the Transvaal's Marico District and later that month, the Boers and Tswana concluded an uncertain armistice. By 1857, both sides recognized the Limpopo, Madikwe, and Ngotwane Rivers as a border between the Transvaal and independent Tswana groups. With the spread of cattle disease among the Tlhaping of the Harts River in 1856–1857, some of them tried to replenish their herds by stealing from the Boers. In 1858, the Boers retaliated by attacking the Tlhaping

of chiefs Gasebonwe and Mahura, seizing 4,000 sheep and goats; 2,800 cattle; 165 horses; 23 wagons; and up to 100 children. Gasebonwe fled but was captured and beheaded by a Boer patrol. Some Tswana groups—such as Kgamanyame's Kgatla, Mgale's Po, Mokgatle's Fokeng, and Ramokoka's Phalane—developed alliances with the Boers, participated in their raids, and were permitted to keep guns and avoid labor conscription.³⁸

When the Boers of A. H. Potgieter arrived in the Zoutpansberg area of the northern Transvaal in 1848, eventually founding the town of Schoemansdal, they employed local Africans in elephant hunting, which is how the Venda first gained firearms. When the elephant population declined in the 1850s, the Boers began enslaving local children and exporting them south. The Boers also claimed land for farming and forced African women and children to work their fields. These issues poisoned relations between the Boers and the Venda. Coming to power in 1864, Makhado reformed the Venda military system by introducing age regiments based on existing circumcision lodges and creating military detachments for specific places. In 1865, Makhado launched raids on settler farms. In May 1867, Kruger led a 500-man commando into the area, but ammunition shortage and mountainous terrain forced them to withdraw. In July, Kruger and his war council ordered the complete evacuation of Schoemansdal, which the Venda destroyed and the Boers could not muster enough men to take back.³⁹

THE ZIMBABWE PLATEAU

Between the Limpopo and Zambezi Rivers, by around 1000, the Zimbabwe Plateau was home to various pastoral and agricultural Shona-speaking communities, some of which exported gold east to the Indian Ocean. From around 1200 to 1450, a large stone build settlement, now called Great Zimbabwe (House of Stone) and currently the largest archaeological site south of the Sahara, housed around 20,000 people and served as a trading center for gold going to the east coast via the Sabi River in exchange for imported Asian glass beads and porcelain. Given the exclusively archaeological evidence, almost nothing is known about the military history of Great Zimbabwe. According to oral tradition, an army led by Nyatsimbe Mutota was sent north from Great Zimbabwe, probably around the 1420s, to search for a new source of salt. Conquering the Mazoe Valley in the northeast, Mutota established the Mutapa state, which took over the gold trade

that was shifting north toward the Zambezi River on which the coastal Swahili established inland trading posts at Sena and Tete. In the 1530s, these were seized by the Portuguese who had taken over the Indian Ocean trade and were moving up the Zambezi River looking for gold and ivory.

The Portuguese became determined to conquer Mutapa's gold mines. After a failed attempt to convert the Mutapa ruler to Christianity in which a priest was killed, the Portuguese sent an invasion force under Francisco Barreto from Lisbon to the port of Sofala in present-day Mozambique, from where it marched up river to Sena. In July 1572, after numerous delays, Barreto proceeded overland from Sena with an expedition of 650 Portuguese gunmen supported by 30 ox-drawn wagons, 8 donkeys, 5 camels, and around 2,200 local African slaves to carry supplies. He also relied on 20 supply-laden canoes that headed up the Zambezi. Barreto's first target was the Tonga, who were led by Samungazi and who had rebelled against Mutapa in the 1550s. More recently, they had been fighting the Portuguese at Tete. Trying to frighten the Portuguese and their African carriers, the Tonga tied knots in tall grass to warn that they would capture and bind enemies. After a month-long trek that covered just 250 kilometers, the Portuguese were caught in the open by an army of 10,000–13,000 Tonga, who attacked in traditional crescent formation. Portuguese firepower forced them to withdraw. Barreto inflicted a psychological blow on the Tonga by having his men shoot a female Tonga diviner who was spraying water in the air and proclaiming it would blind the Portuguese. The next morning, a Tonga attack on the Portuguese camp was repelled. Three days later, in a battle during which gunpowder smoke engulfed an entire valley in darkness, an army of 16,000 Tonga were once again repulsed by Barreto's expedition. While the Tonga lost between 4,000 and 6,000 men, only 40 Portuguese had been killed. With the Tonga offering tribute to end hostilities, Barreto led his force back to Sena to regroup. Tropical disease and lack of water turned a second Portuguese attempt to march on the Tonga capital, where a peace treaty was to be concluded, into a disaster. Barreto once again returned to Sena. The timing of Barreto's invasion, from July to September, was problematic because the withdrawing Tonga could take recently harvested crops with them, thus depriving the Portuguese of food. In addition, water was scarce during the dry season. Barreto's army had not left the Zambezi Valley.

Mutapa attempted to placate the Portuguese by giving them control of a few marginal gold mines on the plateau. A Mutapa army then subjugated the Tonga, who had been weakened by Portuguese intrusion. By mid-1573, Barreto had died, and only 180 members of the original Portuguese expedition survived. Vasco Fernandes Homem, Barreto's successor, returned to the coast to rally a new force of 412 Portuguese. In 1575, Homem led an invasion of the Teve state, which blocked the trade route between the Portuguese and the gold-exporting Manyika Kingdom in what is now Zimbabwe's eastern highlands. The Portuguese were harassed by the Teve, who spoiled waterholes, abandoned villages, and concealed food. Homem's force defeated a Teve army at Sotabotonga Hill, which blocked passage to Manyika, and then burned their capital. Although Homem entered Manyika and established cordial relations, the Portuguese found they did not have the labor or technology to exploit local gold sources, and they departed for Sena. With reinforcements from Portugal, Homem built a fort at Tete and invaded the Chikova area where there were rumored to be silver mines, which they ultimately could not locate. Homem left 200 men in Chikova to continue the search, but local people lured them into an ambush with the promise of silver. All were killed.

In 1597, Gatsi Rusere, the relatively new ruler of Mutapa, gained Portuguese military assistance against two Maravi groups that had invaded his territory from north of the Zambezi. Escaping a Mutapa army supported by some Portuguese, the Maravi of Kapampo fought a scorched earth campaign back across the Zambezi. Conversely, the Maravi of Chikanda built a stockade surrounded by a deep trench, as well as a high and thick wooden wall with loopholes for shooting arrows. It was defended by 600 men. In 1599, a 30,000-strong Mutapa army, along with 75 Portuguese and 2,000 Africans from Tete, spent an entire day assaulting Chikanda's fort but could not penetrate it. After Gatsi Rusere refused Chikanda's peace offer, the Maravi attempted to escape under cover of darkness but were discovered, and many were killed. Pleased with Portuguese support, Gatsi Rusere lifted the ban on them carrying firearms within Mutapa territory and gave them land on the plateau. Rusere triggered a protracted Mutapa civil war by having his uncle, who had led the army against the first Maravi group, executed for letting Kapampo escape. The rebel faction led by Matuzianhe seized power and drove Rusere and his followers into exile. Initially hesitant, the Portuguese intervened on behalf of

Rusere as he had threatened them and the rebels began interfering in Portuguese trade. Since a Portuguese contingent under Diogo Simoes Madeira helped gain some victories against Matuzianhe, the exiled Rusere, in 1607, declared they would own all the mines in Mutapa. The next year Rusere, who had sent his Portuguese allies back to Tete, led unsuccessful operations against Barwe and Tonga supporters of Matuzianhe. Rusere, suffering from two arrow wounds and with his eldest son killed in the fighting, was saved by a relief expedition of 20 Portuguese gunmen and 1,000 African allies. Supported by Madeira's 100 Portuguese and 2,000 African allies, Rusere, in 1609, led an advance up the Zambezi and defeated a number of rebel sympathizers. In one instance, the Portuguese used swivel guns to drive rebels off an island and into canoes, which were then overturned in the bombardment. That same year, the forces of Rusere and Matuzianhe met in a climactic battle. Two thirds of Matuzianhe's 20,000 men used a crescent formation to attack Rusere's contingent, and the other third assaulted the Portuguese. Rusere's position was bleak until the Portuguese, having repelled the enemy sent against them, turned to help their ally and routed Matuzianhe's remaining forces. Subsequently, Rusere reclaimed his capital after three years in exile. Withdrawing to Mount Matarira, the wounded Matuzianhe reorganized his force and launched a night attack on the capital. Once again, he divided his forces in two, with one division devoted to attacking Rusere's enclosure and the other the Portuguese. In a now familiar pattern, the Portuguese repelled their attackers and moved to save Rusere and his followers from being overwhelmed. Leaving most of the Portuguese at his capital, Rusere led an assault on Mount Matarira that drove off Matuzianhe and his associates, and captured 8,000 cattle. Rusere later had the fugitive Matuzianhe assassinated. Securely in power, Rusere sent Madeira's Portuguese back to Tete less 10 gunmen who became his personal bodyguard. Relations between Mutapa and the Portuguese deteriorated as the latter delayed sending tribute to Rusere, who then vacillated on giving them access to the mines. While the Portuguese took land from Mutapa and its neighbors and built forts, conflict between Portuguese leaders enabled Rusere to recover territory around Tete.⁴⁰

The 1624 death of Gatsi Rusere plunged Mutapa into another civil war at a time when, as mentioned in Chapter 3, it had just been weakened by a large Maravi raid. Kapararidze, son of the late ruler, seized power even though his uncle Mavhura, a Christian convert close to

Portuguese missionaries, was the legitimate heir. When the traditionalist Kapararidze ordered the death of a Portuguese emissary in 1628, the Portuguese from Sena and Tete intervened on behalf of Mavhura. In December 1628, Mavhura's army, consisting of 15,000–30,000 Africans and 250 Portuguese, clashed with Kapararidze's supposedly 100,000-strong force. The latter was compelled to withdraw. In May 1629, Kapararidze's army attacked Mavhura's force and was repulsed with heavy casualties. Shortly thereafter, Mavhura's warriors and the Portuguese captured the Mutapa capital after using firepower to drive off its defenders. Mavhura then became the new Mutapa ruler and signed a treaty that made him a Portuguese vassal. Muslim traders were expelled, and Portuguese missionaries were given full access to Mutapa. Gaining additional land and control of the gold mines, the Portuguese in Mutapa were exempt from the authority of its ruler. In effect, Mutapa became a Portuguese puppet. Portuguese settlers (holders of land grants called *prazos*) expanded across the country and built forts as bases for their private African armies and trade. Expanding beyond Mutapa, Portuguese settlers and their African mercenaries defeated Shona communities, seized mines, and enslaved locals.

In 1631, Kapararidze, supported by some Muslim traders, led an army against Mavhura, who was backed by the Portuguese. Given rivalry among the Portuguese leadership, Mavhura's force suffered a major defeat, losing around 6,400 men (including 300–400 Portuguese) in one engagement. This was the most serious Portuguese military disaster in the region. As a result, Africans south of the Zambezi rebelled against their Portuguese overlords, who took refuge at fortified Sena and Tete. Diogo de Sousa de Menezes, the Portuguese captain of Mozambique, mounted an offensive that moved inland from the coastal enclave of Quelimane and defeated Kapararidze's forces, killing around 2,000 and seizing many men and cattle. This expedition reoccupied the territory up to Sena and then invaded Manyika, killed its ruler, and replaced him with a relative who agreed to become a Portuguese vassal and acknowledge the suzerainty of Mutapa. The Portuguese then moved against Kapararidze. Around the same time, Mavhura, assisted by Portuguese priests, assembled a 20,000-strong army that included many Maravi warriors from north of the Zambezi and some Portuguese. News that Mavhura had a vision of a light and a cross in heaven motivated his army to inflict a terrible defeat on Kapararidze's followers, who retreated. According to the Portuguese,

35,000 Africans, mostly from Kapararidze's army, were killed in the terrible battle. Kapararidze then organized another army with support from most Mutapa nobles. However, Mavhura's army was now joined by de Menezes's expedition to create a total force of between 12,000 and 40,000 men (including 200–300 Portuguese gunmen). In June 1632, Kapararidze's force was once again overpowered, suffering between 2,000 and 12,000 dead and with many women, livestock, weapons, and supplies captured. The battle took place on the feast of St. John, and the Portuguese claimed that a mysterious and splendid man, perhaps the saint himself, had appeared before Mavhura's army to encourage them. Although Kapararidze fled north of the Zambezi and continued to represent a threat to Mavhura for the next 20 years, his strength was broken. Mavhura regained control of Mutapa and was more dependent on Portuguese military support than before. The Portuguese prazos and forts expanded, including into Manyika, and by 1634, the captains of Tete and Sena could field 8,000 and 30,000 African mercenaries respectively.

Despite several rebellions (including by the Tonga), a smallpox epidemic, and the partial revival of Mutapa under new rulers in the 1670s and 1680s, the Portuguese continued to dominate the area south of the Zambezi River. With the decline of Mutapa as a regional power and the increase of violence, local Shona rulers with cattle developed their own armies. Young men offered several years' military service in exchange for cattle to pay bride wealth. Beginning as one of these emerging local warlords, Dombo gained the title Changamire (lord) and developed an effective army known as Rozvi (destroyers) that, by the 1670s, became a major force in the northeast Zimbabwe plateau. During the early 1680s, Dombo led his army to the southwest, where he defeated the Torwa state of Butua, occupied its capital of Danagombe, and began absorbing local Kalanga people. He then challenged the Portuguese of the Zambezi Valley. Dombo's first military encounter with the Portuguese and their African mercenaries took place just before June 1684 at the Battle of Maungwe. Pitting Rozvi bows and arrows against Portuguese firearms, the engagement lasted an entire day. Although Dombo nearly managed to rout the Portuguese four or five times, his army took heavy casualties from gunfire. Both armies camped on the battlefield and intended to resume fighting the next day. At 1 a.m., the Portuguese awoke to see that they were surrounded by fires made by the Rozvi women on Dombo's order. Believing they were surrounded, the Portuguese and their African

allies ran off into the night, and when the sun came up, Dombo's army looted their abandoned camp. Dombo did not pursue the Portuguese because of the heavy casualties his army had suffered and because he had to contend with a Mutapa force, including some Portuguese, invading Butua that he eventually defeated, killing 5,000. From around 1685 to 1692, Dombo consolidated his hold on Butua. In 1693, a new Mutapa ruler called Nyakunembire, who wished to establish his independence, invited Dombo's Rozvi to assist him against the Portuguese. In November of that year, a Rozvi army attacked unprepared Portuguese settlements, destroyed churches, defiled holy vessels and sacred images, displayed the skins of two priests as war trophies to demoralize enemies, and dug up Portuguese graves and used the remains to make war medicine to render them invincible. Many Portuguese fled to Tete. A combined force of Portuguese and African supporters of Pedro Mhande, a rival of Nyakunembire, seized the Mutapa capital and put their candidate in power. Dombo's Rozvi did not intervene because at that point, they were invading Manyika, where they replaced the ruler and destroyed the Portuguese presence. Further Rozvi campaigns to the northeast were delayed by Dombo's death in 1696 and the outbreak of a civil war among possible successors. The Rozvi threat and civil war in Mutapa in the 1690s and early 1700s prompted many Portuguese settlers to leave the plateau and move down into the Zambezi Valley.⁴¹

Portuguese sources, eager to explain defeat or glorify victory, greatly exaggerated Mutapa military capacity by claiming that it could field an army of 100,000, including a large force of "Amazon" warrior women. The number of warriors available to Mutapa varied greatly over time as it rose and declined. Lacking a standing army, a Mutapa force consisted largely of volunteer farmers called up for an emergency. Those at or around the capital would be mobilized first, with contingents from further away arriving later. It appears that a Mutapa ruler could muster around 3,000–5,000 men within 24 hours. Recruiting in the rainy season was difficult because farmers were preoccupied with their fields. For the average farmer, the incentive to join an army was that most loot was divided between all members. The Mutapa ruler would convene a council of war made up of various leaders and officials, who would formally declare war, appoint a commander if the ruler was not to accompany the army, and establish a chain of command. District chiefs would then return to their respective local courts, where a specific war drum was beaten to call men

for military service. A Mutapa army was divided into units of 300–500 men and sometimes as many as 1,000, which were further broken down into companies of around 100 each. These units and subunits originated from specific communities, and men were led by their local chiefs. Preferring pitched battles fought in the open, Mutapa armies attacked in crescent formation with a strong center and two wings, and for retreat formed a three-sided square with interlocking shields. They fought with bows and arrows, spears, axes, and clubs. Constructed from light wood, a Mutapa shield had an iron spike at the bottom that enabled the user to stick it in the ground while he fought more freely or shot a bow. In the absence of initiation schools or age regiments, Mutapa farmers had no formal military training beside skills gained in hunting. An army commander used a large drum to communicate orders. Each unit was identified by a banner or badge that represented an animal such as a bull or elephant. While men were required to bring food from home and sometimes cattle accompanied an army, Mutapa forces usually lived off the land. The introduction of Portuguese firearms did not revolutionize warfare on the south side of the Zambezi River. Rather, it was the practice of building wood and earth forts, introduced by the Maravi from the north, and the availability of large numbers of African allies that gave the Portuguese military advantage. While Portuguese gunmen won battles, their small numbers could not hold territory, for which they relied on forts and local allies.⁴²

During the early 1700s, rival Mutapa rulers, at different times, gained support from either the Rozvi or the Portuguese. As Mutapa waned and became one of many Shona states, Rozvi emerged to dominate much of the Zimbabwe Plateau. Trade was maintained with the Portuguese, but they were confined to the Zambezi Valley. Given limited Portuguese contact, less is known about eighteenth-century Rozvi than seventeenth-century Mutapa. Several European written accounts from the mid- to late 1700s describe Rozvi armies of around 2,000–3,000 men. Well-armed and disciplined, Rozvi armies were divided into units under a hierarchy of commanders. It appears that the Changamire maintained a small and permanent bodyguard of young men who would be discharged when married. Other Rozvi forces consisted of contingents from communities around the capital who were called up for specific campaigns. It appears that non-Rozvi tributary communities did not supply men for the Changamire's army. According to historian David Beach, the Rozvi were "the most respected fighters in southern Zambezia up to the mfecane."⁴³

By the 1820s, Rozvi was being pressured by the Ngwato Tswana from the southwest and Tsonga from the southeast. In the 1830s, for reasons discussed earlier in this chapter, a series of Nguni and Sotho groups with the military advantage of age regiments, short-stabbing spears, and shock tactics invaded from the south. The first was a Sotho group led by Mpanga that, in the early 1830s, entered Rozvi territory from the west and after defeat in battle fled south. Maseko's Ngoni, Nguni speakers, arrived from the southeast and were chased away to the north. Shortly thereafter, Zwangendaba's Ngoni arrived from the south and established a camp on the Mazoe River from where they conducted livestock raids for about a year until crossing north of the Zambezi River in 1835. Another Nguni group led by the extraordinary female warrior Nyamazana, who was related to Zwangendaba, passed through Rozvi territory, sacked the capital of Danagombe, and killed the fleeing ruler Chirisamhuru. Yet another Ngoni group under Nxaba passed through the area rapidly on its way north.

The arrival of the Ndebele under Mzilikazi had a more lasting impact on the Rozvi. After defeat by the Boers in 1836 and 1837, the Ndebele moved north of the Highveld and crossed the Limpopo River. They split into a smaller group under Mzilikazi and a larger one under Gundwane. In 1838–1839, Gundwane's group arrived in the Umzingwani Valley in what is now southwest Zimbabwe and faced tough Rozvi resistance. Mzilikazi took his division further north to scout the Zambezi, but when his people began to suffer malaria, he withdrew south and linked up with Gundwane's faction. Because Gundwane had attempted to install one of Mzilikazi's sons as king, a civil war broke out in which Gundwane was killed and Mzilikazi restored his authority over all the Ndebele. Unlike their Ngoni predecessors, the Ndebele did not terrorize the local Kalanga and came to rely on them for grain. Rozvi resistance was undermined by the failure to quickly find a successor to the late Chirisamhuru. As a result, during the 1840s, the Ndebele replaced the Rozvi as the main power on the southwest plateau, though the Rozvi continued to dominate further east. Since the Rozvi had lost many cattle to previous Ngoni raids, they sent young men to Mzilikazi's age regiments in exchange for livestock. This relationship greatly favored the Ndebele, who incorporated these recruits. Eventually, the Rozvi, under the new ruler Tohwechipi, became frustrated with their loss of power and raided Ndebele communities in the late 1840s and early 1850s. The Ndebele counterattacked and devastated the Rozvi during the great raids of

1854–1855 that ultimately led to the flight of Tohwechipi further east in 1857. Since Mzilikazi found it difficult to assault Rozvi mountain strongholds, some of which were defended by gunmen, he could not extend Ndebele power east. Throughout the 1860s, the Ndebele continued to raid Shona groups and in 1866, they once again defeated the Rozvi. Signifying the end of Rozvi as a significant force, Tohwechipi surrendered to Mzilikazi, who allowed him to return home. This gave the Ndebele a strong position in regional trade and during the 1870s, they were at the height of their power with many Shona tributaries. As stated in Chapter 4, the Ndebele of the middle nineteenth century also sent raided the Lozi Kingdom north of the Zambezi as well as Tswana groups to the southwest. To the east, an Nguni group under Soshangane established a similar state in the highlands of the present-day Zimbabwe-Mozambique border in 1836, but smallpox forced him to move south where, in 1838, he founded the Gaza state between the Sabi and Limpopo Rivers. Unlike the Ndebele, who absorbed many Kalanga in the southwest, Gaza never stabilized as it moved around a number of times in the mid- to late 1800s.⁴⁴

CONCLUSION

Southern Africa experienced European colonial conquest before most other parts of the continent. The combination of horses and firearms in open terrain was used by seventeenth-century Dutch settlers to overcome Khoisan guerrilla warfare in the Cape; by early nineteenth-century Griqua frontiersmen who seized livestock and captives from Sotho, Tswana, and other groups on the Highveld; and by mid-nineteenth century Boer trekkers who defeated the Ndebele and Zulu and established independent republics. Although they had firearms, Portuguese expansion onto the Zimbabwe Plateau from the mid-1500s to the late 1600s was limited by overgrown terrain in which horses were useless, tropical disease, and powerful African enemies. African allies became central to European invaders such as the Portuguese fighting the Rozvi in the seventeenth century and the British fighting the Xhosa in the nineteenth. Some Africans attempted to counter colonial military advantages in different ways. The Sotho established defensive mountain strongholds, and eventually acquired their own horses and guns. After a series of terrible defeats in open battle, the Xhosa also started to use firearms and moved into the bush and hills of the Eastern Cape to conduct hit-and-run attacks on British supply lines.

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Notes

Introduction

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Index

- Abbas, Egyptian commander, 59
Abbas Hilmi I, Egyptian ruler, 62
Abd al-Mai, Khartoum
raider, 193
Abd Al-Malik, Moroccan Sultan,
30, 31
Abd al-Qadir bin Muhyi al-Din,
Algerian resistance leader,
33, 35, 40
Abd al-Salam, Fulani leader, 96
Abdallah ibn Yasin, Almoravid
leader, 24
Abdallahi Arabs, Sudan, 28
Abdul Mejid, Ottoman Sultan, 61
Abdul-Muhajir Dinar, 20
Abdul Mu'min, Almohad
leader, 25, 26
Abdulla Muhammad ibn Tumart,
Almohad leader, 25
Abdullah ibn Sa'ad, 19, 20
Abdullah ibn Saud, Arabian
leader, 53
Abeokuta, Yoruba city, Egba capital,
97, 103
Abid regiments, Morocco, 32, 33
Abn al-Rahman, Khartoum
raider, 193
Abn al-Samad, Khartoum
raider, 193
Abolitionist movement, 85, 108, 109
Abu Abdallah Mohammed II,
Moroccan leader, 30, 31
Abu al-Dhahab, Mamluk leader, 48
Abu-Bakr, Almoravid leader, 24
Abukir, Battle of (1799 CE), 50
Acre, 50, 59, 61
Actium, Battle of (31 BCE) 11
Ad Decimum, Battle of (533 CE) 16
Adal Kingdom, 119–21
Adamawa, Fulani state, 192
Adana, region of Anatolia, 59, 61
Aden, 47, 60
Ado, Battle of (ca.1844 CE), 103
Adwa, Ethiopia, 125
Afonja, Ilorin ruler, 96
Afonso I, Kongo ruler, 163
Africa Squadron, U.S. Navy, 109
Africanus, Leo, 75
Africanus, Scipio, Roman
general, 15

- Agadir, Morocco, 30
 Agaja, 100, 101
 Agouz, Morocco, 30
 Ahmad, Egyptian commander, 56
 Ahmad al-Mansur, Moroccan ruler, 31, 75, 76
 Ahmad Bey, governor of Constantine, 39
 Ahmad bin al-Qadi, Algerian leader, 35
 Ahmad ibn Ibrahim (Gragh), ruler of Adal, 120, 121
 Ahmad Pasha, Ottoman governor of Egypt, 27
 Ahmad Qaramanli, Libyan ruler, 45
 Ahmad II Qaramanli, Libyan ruler, 45, 46
 Ahmed Bey, Tunisian ruler, 43
 Ahmed Fawzi, Ottoman admiral, 61
 Ahmenotep, pharaoh, 5
 Ahmose, pharaoh, 5
 Aïr, 75, 78
 Akan, 78, 84, 91, 92, 105
 Aksum, 13, 118
 Akwamu, Akan state, 91, 92
 Akyem, Aksen state, 92, 93
 al-Atish, Battle of (1837 CE), 56
 Al-Kahina, 21
 al-Ksar Kebir, Battle of (1578), 30, 31
 al-Ma'mura, Morocco, 32
 al-Qasr al-Saghir, Morocco, 30
 Alawid dynasty, Morocco, 31
 Alcaudete, Spanish count, 36
 Aleppo, Syria, 59
 Alexander the Great, 10, 11, 49
 Alexandria, 18, 19, 20, 48, 49, 51, 52, 58, 61, 63
 Algeria, 32, 33, 34–41
 Algeria, French occupation, 39–41
 Algiers, 25, 26, 29, 33–41
 Ali Bey, Ottoman naval commander, 114
 Ali Bey I, Tunisian ruler, 42
 Ali Bey al-Kabir, Mamluk leader, 48
 Ali Burghul, Ottoman captain, 45
 Ali Pasha, Libyan ruler, 45
 Alkalawa, Battle of (1808), 81
 Allada, 99, 100, 101
 Almohads, 25, 26
 Almoravids, 24, 25, 26, 71
 Aloma, Idris, Borno ruler, 44, 78
 Alvaro I, Kongo ruler, 164
 Alwa, Nubian Kingdom, 28
 Amalinde, Battle of (1818), 208, 209
 Amatola Mountains, 219–24, 230–36
 Amazons, Dahomey female warriors, 100, 101, 103
 Amba Cela (Antukyah), Battle of (1531 CE), 120
 American Colonization Society (ACS), 88, 89, 90
 American crops, 161, 182
 Amhara, Ethiopia, 120, 122–25
 Amir bin Sultan al Harthi, Arab-Zanzibari leader, 148
 Amlak, Yekumo, Ethiopian leader, 118, 119
 'Amr ibn al-'As 18, 19, 20
 Anatolia, 28, 36, 59
 Andrianampoinimerina, Malagasy ruler, 116
 Anta, Xhosa leader, 231
 Antananarivo, Madagascar, 116
 Anti-Slavery Squadron (West Africa Squadron), Royal Navy, 87, 108, 157
 Antonio I, Kongo ruler, 175, 176
 Arab Conquest of North Africa 18–22, 71
 Arab navy 20, 21
 Arabia, 51–53, 56, 60, 62
 Arab-Swahili, 129, 134, 140, 145, 146–51, 186, 187
 Ari Kiluanji (Dom Felipe) Ndongo ruler, 170–174, 176
 Ari II, Ndongo ruler, 176, 177
 Army of Africa, French, 41
 Aro, Igbo group, 106, 107
 Aroge, Battle of (1868), 124
 Arquebus, 75, 76

- Arsuf, Battle of (1191 CE), 23
 Arzila (Asila), Morocco, 30, 32
 Asante Empire, 92–94
 Askia Ishaq, Songhay ruler, 76, 77
 Askia Nuh, Songhay ruler, 77
 Askia the Great (Muhammad Turi),
 Songhay ruler, 74, 75
 Assam, Battle of (1871 CE), 125
 Assyrians, 10, 12
 Aswan, 11, 23, 55
 Atlas Mountains, 1, 25, 32
 Augustine, Saint, 15
 Augustus, Roman emperor
 (Octavian), 11, 13, 15
 Auzun'Ali, Egyptian officer, 53
 Awdaghust, 24, 71
 Ayers, Eli, Liberia, 88
 Ayyubid dynasty, Egypt, 22, 23
 Azande, 194–96
 Azemmour, Morocco, 30

 Babylon, Egyptian fortress, 18, 19
 Babylonians, 10
 Badagri, 100, 101, 103
 Badi III, Sultan of Funj, 29
 Badi IV, Sultan of Funj, 29
 Bagemder, Ethiopia, 122
 Baghdad, 22
 Baghirimi, Kingdom, 46, 47, 82
 Bahrain, 60
 Baluchi mercenaries, 140, 148, 151
 Bamako, Mali, 72
 Bambuk, 70, 71, 83
 Bangba people, 193
 Baqt (Egyptian-Nubian treaty),
 19, 20
 Bara, Battle of (1821), 55
 Barbary War, First (1803), 45–46
 Barbary War, Second (1816), 38, 39
 Barends, Barend, Griqua leader,
 218, 219
 Barghash bin Said, sultan of
 Zanzibar, 148
 Barreto, Francisco, Portuguese
 leader, 251

 Bashi Bazouks, 53
 Bassa, 89, 90
 Batavian Republic, 205
 Beach, David, historian, 257
 Bedouin, 18, 27, 48, 53, 55, 63
 Beja, 56
 Belgium, 35
 Belisarius, Byzantine general,
 16, 17, 69
 Bemba people, 158, 187–89
 Benguela, Angola, 172, 173, 178–180,
 186
 Benin (precolonial), 84, 91, 95, 104, 105
 Benson, Stephen, Liberian
 president, 90
 Berbers, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20–22, 24,
 26, 30, 33, 39, 56, 71
 Berea, Battle of (1852), 236–38
 Betsimisaraka, Madagascar,
 115, 116, 156
 Bhaca, 214, 229
 Bilbeis, Egypt, 18
 Bilma, 79
 Bilmez, Turce, Mamluk leader, 60
 Bisa people, 182, 183, 187
 Bizerte, 21
 Blaauwberg Mountain, Battle of
 (1806), 206, 207
Black Joke, HMS, 108
 Black loyalists, 87
 Bloem, Jan, Griqua leader,
 216, 218, 226
 Bloemfontein Convention
 (1854), 238
 Blood River, Battle of (1838), 228
 Boer Trek (Great Trek), 224–28
 Boina Kingdom, Madagascar,
 115, 116
 Bomvana, 214
 Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon, 63, 64
 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 49, 50, 212
 Bondei, 144
 Bonny, 107
 Bonosus, Byzantine general, 18
 Booma Pass, Battle of (1850), 230

- Boomplaats, Battle of (1848), 229
 Borgu, 77, 95, 96
 Borno, Kingdom of, 30, 44, 46, 47, 78, 79, 81, 82
 Boshof, Jacobus, Orange Free State president, 241
 Bosphorus Strait, 59
 Botha Bothe, Moshoeshoe's stronghold, 217
 Boure, Sierra Leone, 86
 Brady, John, Jamaican-British Sergeant, 117
 Brand, J.H. Orange Free State president, 242, 244, 245, 246
 Brazil, 85, 99, 108, 154, 157, 169, 171–176, 178
 Breech-loading rifles, 124, 242
 Brereton, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas, British officer, 209
 Bridge of al-Lahun, Battle of (1810 CE), 51
 Britain, 34, 35, 37, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 58–63, 85, 89–94, 99, 102, 103, 108, 109, 115, 123, 178, 180, 191, 192, 224, 240, 246
 British and Madagascar, 116–118
 British Invasion of Ethiopia (1867–68), 124, 125
 British Kaffraria, 224, 229, 230–36
 British Occupation of the Cape Colony, 204–207
 Bruto, Antonio, Portuguese leader, 171, 172
 Buddu, 132
 Buganda, 130–38
 Buganda army organization, 136–38
 Buganda canoe fleet, 135, 136
 Bugeaud, Marshall Thomas Robert, 34, 40
 Bugesera, Rwanda, 128
 Bullum, Sierra Leone, 86
 Bulondoganyi, Nile trading post, 133
 Bundu state, 79
 Bungu, Kimbu state, 149
 Bunyoro, 129–35
 Bure, 71, 73
 Burton, Richard, explorer, 137, 140
 Burundi, 126–129
 Busoga, 131–36
 Butua, Shona state, 255, 256
 Buvuma Island, 135, 136
 Byzacena (Tunisia), 17, 20
 Byzantine Empire, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 26
 Cabinda, 108, 180, 191
 Cairo, 11, 19, 23, 27, 49, 50, 51, 53–55, 60, 64
 Calabar, 107
 Caledon, Lord, British governor of Cape Colony, 207
 Cambambe, 165, 167, 168, 172, 178
 Cambyes II, Egyptian ruler, 10
 Canaan, 6–10
 Cannae, Battle of (216 BCE), 14, 15
 Cannon's Boom, War of (1865–66), 242–45
 Canoe House, 107
 Cape Coast Cattle, 92, 94
 Cape Colony, 201–212, 219–24, 229–36, 240
 Cape Corps, 206, 210
 Cape Mesurado, 88, 89
 Cape Mounted Rifles (CMR), 206, 211, 220, 223, 229–232, 234–237, 240
 Cape Palmas, 91
 Cape Royal Rifles, 240
 Cape Verde, 86, 109
 Cape-Xhosa War, Eighth (War of Mlanjeni) (1850–53), 229–36
 Cape-Xhosa War, Fifth (1819), 209–211
 Cape-Xhosa War, First (1781), 203
 Cape-Xhosa War, Fourth (1812), 208
 Cape-Xhosa War, Second (1793), 203, 204

- Cape-Xhosa War, Seventh (War of the Axe) (1846–47), 222–24
 Cape-Xhosa War, Sixth (1834–35), 219–22
 Cape-Xhosa War, Third (1799–1803), 204–205
 Caputvada, 16
 Cardoso, Bento Banha, Portuguese governor of Luanda, 168, 170
 Carthage, 13–18, 20, 21
 Castanho Velez, Joao, Portuguese leader, 166
 Cathcart, Sir George, British governor of Cape Colony, 234–37
 Ceded Territory, Cape Colony, 211, 220
 Cerisy, Louis Charles de, French naval engineer, 59
 Cerveira Pereira, Manuel, Portuguese leader, 167
 Ceuta, 30, 34
 Chagga, 145
 Charles V, Spanish emperor, 36
 Charles X, French king, 39
 Chasseurs a' Afrique (Huntsmen of Africa), 41
 Chewa (Chinyanja) people, 152, 158
 Chikanda, Maravi leader, 252
 Chikuse, Ngoni leader, 159
 Chirisamhuru, Rozvi ruler, 258
 Chitapankwa, Bemba ruler, 187, 188
 Chokwe, 186
 Chungwa, Xhosa leader, 204, 205, 207, 208
 Ciam a Ciband, Kanyok leader, 184
 Cillium, Battle of (544 CE), 17
 Clausel, Marshall Bertrand, 39
 Cleopatra VII, Egyptian ruler, 11
 Codrington, Sir Edward, British naval officer, 58
 Comalla, Makua ruler, 156
 Commando system, South Africa, 201, 206, 238, 239
 Comoro Islands, 116
 Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818 CE), 46
 Constantine, Algeria, 39, 43
 Convention of Alexandria (1827 CE), 58
 Coptic Christians, 19, 63
 Corps Bastaard Hottentotten, 206
 Corps of Volunteers, Sierra Leone, 87
 Corps Vrijen Hottentotten, 206
 Correia de Sousa, Joao, Portuguese governor of Luanda, 169
 Cortes, Hernan, 36
 Coutinho, Joao Rodrigues, Portuguese governor of Luanda, 167
 Cox, Major William, British officer, 220
 Cradock, Sir John, British governor of Cape Colony, 207, 208
 Crete, 11, 57, 61, 64
 Crimean War (1853–1856 CE), 41, 43, 62, 63, 240
 Cross River, 106
 Crusaders, 22, 23
 Cuba, 89, 108
 Cuyler, Jacob, Cape official, 207
 Cyprus, 10, 11
 Cyrenaica, 20, 21, 46
 Da Costa, Salvador, Portuguese mercenary, 86
 Da Gama, Christovao, 120, 121
 Da Gama, Vasco, 113
 Dabra Tabor, Ethiopia, 123
 Dagomba, 93
 Dahomey, 96, 99–103
 Dakpala, Mangbetu leader, 193, 194
 Damascus, 20, 21, 59
 Damietta, Battle of (1169 CE), 22
 Dan Fodio, Usman, 79, 80
 Danagombe, Rozvi capital, 255, 258
 Dane gun, 97
 Darasge, Battle of (1855 CE), 123
 Darfur, 29, 55

- Dariya, Arabia, 53
 Darna, Libya 46
 Dassanetch, 142
 Dawit, Ethiopian ruler, 119
 Day, William, British governor of
 Sierra Leone, 87
 De Almeida, Francisco,
 Portuguese governor of Luanda,
 late 1500s, 166
 De Almeida, Jeronimo, Portuguese
 leader, 166
 De Almeida, Francisco, Portuguese
 leader early 1500s, 113
 De Almeida, Lourenco, 24
 De Araujo de Azevedo, Payo,
 Portuguese leader, 170
 De Buys, Conrad, Boer
 frontiersman, 216
 De Chaves, Pedro Fernandez,
 Portuguese captain, 152
 De Gouveia Sottomaior, Francisco,
 Portuguese leader, 164
 De Menezes, Pedro Cezar,
 Portuguese governor
 of Luanda, 171, 172
 De Sa, Salvador, Portuguese
 leader, 173
 De Saldanha de Albuquerque,
 Pedro, Portuguese governor, 156
 De Santiago, Andre, Portuguese
 captain, 152
 De Silva a Souza, Joao, Portuguese
 governor of Angola, 177
 De Sottomaior, Francisco,
 Portuguese governor
 of Luanda, 173
 De Sousa, Pedro, Portuguese
 captain, 152, 153
 De Sousa de Menezes, Diogo,
 Portuguese leader, 254, 255
 Decatur, Stephen, U.S. naval officer,
 38, 46
 Dei, 88, 89, 90
 Dengal, Lebna, Ethiopian
 ruler, 119
 Dengal, Sarsa, Ethiopian emperor, 121
 Denham, Dixon, British explorer, 82
 Denkyira, Akan state, 91, 92
 Denman, Joseph, British naval
 captain, 108
 Dias, Bartolomeu, Portuguese
 explorer, 165
 Dias de Cabra, Pedro, Afro-
 Portuguese leader, 175
 Dias de Novais, Paulo, Portuguese
 founder of Luanda, 165, 166
 Dibalami, Dunama, Kanem ruler, 78
 Dimawe Hill, Tswana
 stronghold, 249
 Dindera River, Battle
 of (1744 CE), 29
 Dingane, Zulu ruler, 226–28
 Dingiswayo, Mthwethwa
 leader, 212
 Dinka, 28, 55, 56, 64
 Dithakong, Battle of (1823), 215, 216
 Diu, Battle of (1509 CE), 24, 113
 Diu, Indian port, 47
 Djalonkes people, 86
 Dombo, Rozvi leader, 255, 256
 Dongola, 19, 20, 23, 53
 Dragut, pirate, 44
 Duala people, 192
 Duarte de Sequeira, Bartolomeu,
 Portuguese leader, 178, 179
 Dunama, Borno ruler, 82
 Dundas, Major General Francis,
 British acting governor of Cape
 Colony, 204, 205
 D'Urban, Benjamin, British
 governor of Cape Colony, 219,
 220, 221
 Dutch, 85, 91, 92, 102, 105,
 115, 171–174, 180, 191,
 200–207
 Dutch East India Company, 200–206
 Dutch-Khoi War,
 First (1659–1660), 201
 Dutch-Khoi War,
 Second (1673–77), 201

- Egba, Yoruba state, 96–99, 103
 Egbado, Yoruba area, 96, 103
 Egypt: Anatolia, invasion of (1832), 59; Ancient period, 1–12; Arab conquest, 18, 19; Assyrian invasion, 10, 12; Babylonians, 10; British intervention (1807), 51; Byzantine period, 18; Chariots, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10; Crete, expedition to (1866–67), 64; Crimean War, 62, 63; Defenses, 4, 7, 9; Ethiopia, conflict with, 56; Expeditions to Arabia, 51, 52, 53, 56, 60; Faqaris, army faction, 48; French occupation, 49–50; Greece, expeditionary force to (1820s), 56, 57, 58, 59; Greek Influences, 10; Hyksos invasion, 4, 5, 7, 8; Intelligence, 4, 7; Kush invasion, 12; Logisitcs, 7, 8; Mamluks, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 48, 49, 51, 54, 55; Memphis, capital, 7, 10; Mexico, Sudanese contingent to (1863–67), 73–64; Middle Kingdom, 3, 4, 5; Navy, 6, 10, 11, 52, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 63, 113; New Kingdom, 3, 5, 6, 7, 12; Nubian mercenaries, 3, 4, 12; Old Kingdom, 3, 4, 12; Organization of ancient army, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11; Organization of Ottoman Army, 28; Ottoman period, 26, 27, 28, 48, 49–51, 113; Persian invasions, 10, 18; Ptolemaic Dynasty, 10, 11, 13; Qasimi, army faction, 48; Roman army in Egypt, 11–12; Roman conquest, 11; Roman fortresses, 11, 13; Saite kings, 10; Sudan, invasion of (1820–21), 53, 54; Syria, invasion of (1832–39), 59, 60, 61; United States advisors, 64, 65; Upper Egypt, 1, 7, 20; Weapons and armor, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11; Yemen, campaign (1834–39), 60
 Ekiti, Yoruba state, 98
El Admirante, Spanish vessel, 108
 El Alamein, 9
 El Mina, 84, 92
 Elephants, 11, 13, 14, 15
 English, George Bethune, American mercenary, 53, 54
 Erckman, Jules, French officer, 35
 Ethiopia, 23, 28, 29, 56, 118–25
 Eupatoria, Crimea, 63
 Ewedo, Benin ruler, 104
 Ewuare, Benin ruler, 104, 105
 Exmouth, Viscount, 38, 46
 Eyre, Lieutenant Colonel William, British officer, 235, 237
 Ezana, 13, 118
 Ezza, Igbo group, 106
 Faku, Mpondo ruler, 211, 214, 215
 Falasha, Ethiopian Jews, 121
 Fang people, 192
 Fante, 92–94
 Fasiladas, Ethiopian emperor, 122
 Fatimid dynasty, Egypt, 22
 Fernandes Viera, Joao, Portuguese governor of Angola, 174, 175
 Fernando Po, 192
 Feyiase, Battle of (ca. 1701 CE), 92
 Fez, 25, 26, 30–33, 36
 Fezzan, Libya, 44–46, 78
 Fick, Jan, Boer leader, 243
 Fields of Cato, Battle of (548), 17
 Fingo (Mfengu), 221, 223, 230–36, 242
 Fire ships, 57
 Flintlocks, 82, 92, 97, 98, 105, 107, 110, 137, 143, 146, 186, 187, 194, 241
 Fordyce, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas, British officer, 234
 Fort Armstrong, Cape Colony, 233, 234
 Fort Beaufort, Cape Colony, 119, 220, 230, 231, 234
 Fort Cox, Cape Colony, 230, 231
 Fort Hare, Cape Colony, 230–233

- Fort Jesus, Mombasa, 114
 Fort Peddie, Cape Colony, 221, 223, 232
 Fort Thomson, Sierra Leone, 87
 Fort Willshire, Cape Colony, 220
 France, 32–36, 39–41, 43, 46, 47, 49, 50, 55, 57, 58, 59, 62–64, 79, 83, 85, 87, 89, 91, 100, 101, 123, 154, 157, 163, 180, 191, 192
 France and Madagascar, 115–117
 Franco-Moroccan War (1844), 33, 34
 Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), 40, 41, 61
 Free State–Lesotho War, First (1858), 241–42. *See also* Senekal's War
 Free State–Lesotho War, Second (1865–66), 242–45. *See also* War of Cannon's Boom
 Free State–Lesotho Wars (1858–68), 241–46
 Freetown, 87, 88, 108, 109
 Frontier Armed and Mounted Police (FAMP), 240, 246
 Fulani, 46, 79–82, 86, 96, 98, 102, 192
 Funj, 28, 29, 54
 Furtado de Mendonca, Joao, Portuguese governor of Luanda, 167
 Futa Jalon, 79, 83
 Futa Toro, 79, 82, 83
 Fynn, Henry Francis, Port Natal raider, 214

 Gabeni, Ndebele settlement, 225–26
 Gabes, 21, 26
 Gabriel, Richard, historian, 7
 Gahindiro, Rwandan king, 128
 Galawdewos, Ethiopian emperor, 121
 Gallinas, slaving enclave, 108
 Gao, 69, 73, 74, 76, 77, 91
 Garmul, king of Masuna, 18
 Gasebonwe, Tlhaping leader, 250
 Gatsi Rusere, Mutapa ruler, 153, 252, 253
 Gaza, 10, 11
 Gaza Kingdom, 259
 Gcaleka Xhosa, 208–211, 214, 220, 221, 224, 235
 Gelimer, 16, 17
 Gennadius, Byzantine general, 18
 Genseric, 15, 16
 Germanus, Byzantine general, 17
 Germany, 35
 Getumbe, Liberian Vai leader, 89, 90
 Gezo, Dahomey ruler, 102, 103
 Ghaisnes de Bourmont, Marshall Louis-Auguste-Victor Count de, 39
 Ghaliyah, Arab leader, 52
 Ghana, precolonial, 24, 69–71
 Ghazi Hassan, Ottoman admiral, 48, 49
 Ghendewa, Pare leader, 145
 Gibraltar, 33, 34
 Gisaka, Rwanda, 128
 Glenelg, Lord (Charles Grant), British colonial secretary, 222
 Glenhoe, Dahomey port, 101, 102
 Goa, India, 114
 Gobaze, Wagshum, Ethiopian leader, 125
 Gobir, 75, 80
 Gogo, 140, 151
 Gojjam, Ethiopia, 118, 122, 124
 Gondar, Ethiopian capital, 122–26
 Goumier, 41
 Gqokli Hill, mythical battle, 213
 Gqunukhwebe Xhosa, 203–209, 221, 223, 224, 231
 Graham, Colonel John, British officer, 207, 208
 Grahamstown, 219, 220, 231
 Grahamstown, Battle of (1819), 209, 210
 Grando, Liberian Bassa ruler, 90
 Great Popo, 100–102
 Great Zimbabwe, 250

- Grebo, 90, 91
 Greece, 47, 54, 56–59, 62
 Greenville (Mississippi in Africa),
 Liberia, 89, 90
 Gregory, Exarch, 20
 Grey, Sir George, British governor of
 the Cape, 240
 Griqua, 215–19, 224–226, 229, 236,
 242
 Gundwane, Ndebele leader, 258
 Gunpowder weapons, 26, 31, 69, 82,
 83, 85, 92, 96, 97, 100, 105, 107, 110,
 113, 115, 116, 118, 120, 129, 134,
 140, 146, 154, 164, 171, 178, 179,
 182, 185, 186, 187, 189, 191, 194,
 195, 196, 202, 215, 219, 230, 236,
 241, 248, 249, 250, 251, 255, 257
 Gutierrez, Veronica, queen of
 Matamba, 177
 Gwali Xhosa, 203
 Gwandu, Battle of (1806 CE), 81
 Gwangqa River, Battle
 of the (1846), 223

 Hadendowa, 56
 Hafiz Pasha, Ottoman
 commander, 61
 Hafsids dynasty, 26, 35, 41
 Halq al-Wadi, Tunisia, 41, 43
 Hamdallahi, Masina capital, 84
 Hamidu, pirate, 37, 38
 Hammuda Bey, Tunisian ruler, 43
 Hango, Portuguese fort, 168
 Hannibal 14, 15
 Harar, capital of Adal, 121
 Hare, Colonel John,
 British officer, 223
 Harris, Joe, Liberian king, 89
 Hasan Agha, Ottoman governor of
 Algiers, 36
 Hassan ibn Numan, Arab leader in
 Egypt, 21
 Hausa, 75, 78–81, 95
 Hehe, 140, 150–52
 Heliopolis, Battle of (640 CE), 19
 Heliopolis, Battle of (1800 CE), 50
 Heraclius, Byzantine emperor, 18, 19
 Heraclius the Elder, 18
 Hima pastoralists, 130
 Hintsá, Xhosa king, 211, 220, 221
 Hippo Regius, 15, 16
 Hittites, 9
 Hlubi, 216–19
 Hombori Mountains, 77
 Homem, Vasco Fernandes,
 Portuguese leader, 252
 Horses, 10, 69, 70, 74, 77, 80, 95, 96,
 109, 202, 215, 219, 236
 Hottentot Corps (Cape Regiment),
 206–208
 Hugu, 179
 Hurutshe Tswana, 215–19, 226, 249
 Husayn Bey, Tunisian ruler, 43
 Husayn bin Ali, Tunisian bey, 42
 Husaynid Dynasty, Tunisia, 42, 43
 Hutu, 127

 Ibadan, Yoruba state, 97–99
 Ibo Island, 156
 Ibrahim, Egyptian commander and
 ruler, 53, 54, 57–62
 Ibrahim, Mamluk leader, 49
 Ibrahim Pasha, grand vizier, 27
 Ife, Yoruba state, 94–96, 98, 104
 Igala, 106
 Igbo, 104–106
 Igboho, Nigeria, 95
 Ijayi, Yoruba state, 97–99
 Ijebu, Yoruba state, 96–99, 104
 Ijebu Remo, Yoruba faction, 98, 99
 Ijesa, Yoruba state, 98, 99
 Ijo, 105, 106
 Ila, 189, 190
 Ilaikipiak, 139, 140
 Ilamba, Ndongo tributary, 167
 Ilesá, Siege of (late 1860s CE), 99
 Iloikop, 139
 Ilorin, Yoruba state, 95, 96, 98
 Ilundamatwe, Battle
 of (ca. 1881 CE), 152

- Ilung a Cibang, Kanyok leader, 184
 Imbangala, 167–80
 Imerina, Madagascar, 116, 117
 Indian Ocean slave trade
 (expansion), 157, 158
 Indian Ocean Trade, 112–18, 183,
 185, 250
 Iru farmers, 130
 Islam, 18, 69
 Ismail, Egyptian commander, 53, 54
 Isly, Battle of (1844 CE), 34
 Ismail Gibraltar, Egyptian
 admiral, 57
 Ismail Pasha, Egyptian ruler, 64
 Itsekiri, 104
 Iyasu I, Ethiopian emperor, 122
 Iyasu II, Ethiopian emperor, 29, 122

 Jabal Daiqa, Battle of (1820 CE), 54
 Jabal Mara Mountains, 29
 Jaga, 164
 James, General Montegue, Maroon
 commander, 87
 Janissaries, 27, 28, 36, 37, 39,
 41, 42, 44, 45
 Janssens, Jan Willem, Dutch
 governor of Cape Colony, 206, 207
 Jarta, Battle of (1542 CE), 120
 Jenne, 69, 74, 77, 84
 Jeronimo, Dom, ruler
 of Mombasa, 114
 Jerusalem, 22, 23, 59
 Jesuits, 122
 Jezreel Valley, 7, 8
 Jezzar Pasha, Ottoman
 commander, 50
 Jiddah, Arabia, 60
 Jihad (holy war), 24, 30, 46,
 71, 75, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 96,
 98, 102, 120
 Jijel, Algeria, 35
 Jirba Island, 26, 44, 45
 John Adams, USS, 90
 Johnson, General Elijah, Liberian
 commander, 89

 Jolof, 73, 74, 79
 Judar Pasha, Moroccan commander,
 76, 77
 Junju, Buganda ruler, 132
 Justinian I, Emperor, 16

 Kaabu, 73
 Kaarta, 83
 Kabarega, 135
 Kabasa, Ndongo capital, 164, 165,
 166, 168
 Kabuku Kandonga, Imbangala
 leader, 172, 174, 176
 Kafushe Kambare,
 Kisama leader, 166
 Kagera River, 130, 133, 135
 Kai Pa, Liberian king, 89
 Kairouan (Qayrawan), 20, 21
 Kajoor state, 79
 Kakonda, Portuguese fort, 178, 180
 Kakungulu, Buganda rebel, 133, 134
 Kalala Ilunga, Luba ruler, 180, 181
 Kalanga, 255, 258, 259
 Kalonga, Maravi state, 152, 153
 Kamanya, Buganda ruler, 133, 134
 Kamose, pharaoh, 5
 Kanem, 77, 78
 Kanini, Matamba leader, 176
 Kanini II, Matamba leader, 176, 177
 Kano, 75, 78
 Kanye Hill, Ngwaketse
 settlement, 216
 Kanyok, 183, 184
 Kapampo, Maravi leader, 252
 Kapararidze, Mutapa leader, 153,
 253–55
 Karamoja, 140, 141
 Kasanje, Imbangala leader, 169
 Kasanje, Imbangala state, 168, 169,
 170, 171, 173, 176, 177, 182, 191
 Kasonge Cinyama, Luba slaver, 184
 Kat River Settlement, Cape Colony,
 230, 233, 234
 Katamanso, Battle of (1826 CE), 94
 Kateregga, Buganda ruler, 131

- Katole, Battle of (1681), 177
 Katsina, 75
 Kazembe Kanyembo, 186
 Kazembe's Lunda, 182, 183, 185, 186
 Keith, Thomas (Ibrahim Agha), 51
 Kekana, 246–48
 Kerimba Islands, 156
 Kgatla Tswana, 216, 247, 249
 Khalid ibn Saud, Arabian leader, 60
 Khamis bin Abdulla,
 Omani leader, 147
 Kharijites, 22
 Khartoum, 28, 54, 56, 193, 194
 Khayr al-Din, pirate, 35, 36
 Khoisan, 200–206, 220, 223, 230, 231,
 233, 234, 240
 Khurshid Pasha, Egyptian
 commander, 56, 60
 Khusraw, Egyptian commander, 55
 Kibuka, hero of Buganda, 130, 131
 Kifunji, Njinga's sister, 173
 Kikiya, Songhay capital, 74
 Kikuyu, 139
 Kilwa, 113, 114, 156, 157, 159
 Kimbu, 149, 150
 Kimweri, Usambara ruler, 143, 144
 King William's Town, 224,
 230, 231, 232
 Kinguri kia Kasanje,
 Kasanje ruler, 177
 Kinyashi, Usambara ruler, 143
 Kirina, Battle of (1235 CE), 72, 73
 Kirkham, John, British advisor in
 Ethiopia, 125
 Kisama, Ndongo tributary, 166, 167,
 168, 171, 174, 179
 Kleber, French general
 Jean Baptiste, 50
 Knights of Saint John, 44
 Kololo, 189, 190
 Kongo Kingdom, 162–65, 172, 173,
 174, 175, 176, 177
 Konya, Battle of (1832), 59
 Kopa, 248
 Kordofan, 29, 55, 63
 Koroma, Fakoli, Mali
 commander, 73
 Kru, 89, 90, 109
 Kruger, Paul, Boer leader, 244,
 247–50
 Kucuk Ibrahim, Egyptian
 commander, 60
 Kukawa, Borno capital, 82
 Kulughlis, 36, 42, 45
 Kumasi, 92–94
 Kumbi-Saleh, 71
 Kumwimbe Ngombe, Luba ruler,
 185, 186
 Kurti, Battle of (1820), 54
 Kusayla, Berber leader, 20, 21
 Kush Kingdom, 8, 9, 10, 12
 Kwena Tswana, 249
 Kyabaggu, Buganda ruler, 132
 Kyaggwe, 131
 Laborde, Jean, shipwrecked
 Frenchman, 117
 Lahifotsy, 115
 Lagos, 96, 99, 104, 105, 108, 109
 Lake Ahene, 100, 101
 Lake Albert, 129
 Lake Chad, 77, 78
 Lake Kisale, 180
 Lake Kivu, 128, 129
 Lake Kwotto, Battle of (1804 CE), 80
 Lake Kyoga, 134
 Lake Malawi, 152, 153,
 158, 159, 183, 187
 Lake Mweru, 182
 Lake Nakuru, 139
 Lake Rukwa, 149
 Lake Tana, 118
 Lake Tanganyika, 129, 146,
 147, 158, 181, 187
 Lake Turkana, 121, 140, 142
 Lake Victoria, 130, 131, 135,
 140, 146, 158
 Lake Wamala, 131
 Lakeman's Volunteers, 239
 Langa, 246–48

- Larache (Al-Ara'ish),
 Morocco, 32, 33
 Laribus fortress, 17
 Later Iron Age, 161
 Law, Robin, historian, 74
 Lebenya, Sotho leader, 241, 242
 Legitimate commerce, 85
 Lepanto, Battle of (1571 CE),
 29, 41, 114
 Lerna, Battle of (1825 CE), 58
 Lerotholi, Sotho leader, 243
 Leslie, Peter (Murad Ra'is),
 pirate, 45
 Lesotho, 238, 241–46
 Letsie, Sotho leader, 238, 243, 245
 Liberia, 85, 85, 88–91
 Libreville, 192
 Libya, 3, 20, 26, 43–47
 Limba people, 86
 Lindeque, Barend, Boer leader, 203
 Little Popo, 102
 Livingstone, David, 147, 159, 249
 Loango Coast, 177, 178, 180, 191
 Lokerio, Turkana leader, 142
 Loko, Sierra Leone, 86, 88
 Lopes de Sequeira, Luis, Portuguese
 leader, 175, 176, 177
 Lozi Kingdom, 182, 189–91, 259
 Luanda, Angola, 109, 164–80
 Luba Kingdom, 152, 180, 181, 182,
 184, 185, 187
 Lukala, Battle of (1590), 166
 Lunda (Mwata Yamvo), 179, 181–83,
 184, 186, 187, 189
 Lundu, Maravi state, 152, 153
 Lungemba, Hehe capital, 151
 Lutale Sikyaya Matumpaggwa,
 Buganda commander, 131
 Maasai, 138–40, 143, 145, 151
 MacCarthy, Brigadier General
 Charles, British officer, 93, 94
 MacKinnon, Colonel George, British
 officer, 230–32
 MacLean, Harry, British officer, 35
 Madagascar, 114–18, 156
 Madeira, Diogo Simoes, Portuguese
 leader, 253
 Mafia Island, 156
 Maghreb, 1, 20–22, 26, 29, 30
 Mahdiyya, 26
 Mahfuz, Imam, 119
 Mahi, 101, 102, 103
 Mahmud Pasha, Moroccan
 commander, 76, 77
 Mahmud II, Ottoman sultan, 59, 60
 Mahura, Tlhaping leader, 250
 Maitland, Sir Peregrine, British
 governor of Cape Colony, 222–24
 Makaba II, Ngwaketse ruler, 216
 Makhado, Venda leader, 250
 Makua, 153–58
 Makunde, Portuguese fort, 165
 Makuria, Nubian Kingdom, 19
 Mali, precolonial, 69, 71–74, 85, 91
 Malindi, 113, 114
 Malinke (Mandinka), 71–73, 85
 Malta, 44, 46
 Malta, Siege of (1565), 29
 Mambari, 190
 Mamluks, 22–24, 26, 28, 49,
 51, 54, 55
 Mandinka. *See* Malinke
 Mane invasions, 85–86
 Mangbetu, 193, 194
 Mankopane, Langa leader, 246–48
 Mansa Musa, 74
 Mansa Ouali, Mali ruler, 73
 Mansa Sakura, 73, 74
 Mantatees, 215, 216
 Mantatisi, Tlokwa leader, 215–17
 Manyika Kingdom, 252, 254, 256
 Maqdala, Ethiopian
 fortress, 123, 124
 Maqoma, Xhosa leader, 208, 209,
 219–24, 230–36
 Marathon, Battle of (490 BCE), 10
 Maravi Empire, 153, 154,
 252, 254, 257
 Maravi societies, 152, 153

- Marabeng, Tlokwa stronghold, 217, 238
 Marcian, Byzantine general, 17
 Maritz, Gerit, Boer leader, 225–28
 Marj Dabiq, Battle of (1516 CE), 26
 Maroons, 87
 Marrakesh, 25, 26, 31–33
 Marta, Battle of (547 CE), 17
 Maryland in Africa, 90, 91
 Masalit, 29
 Maseko Ngoni, 158, 159
 Masina, 83, 84
 Masopha, Sotho leader, 238, 243
 Massangano, Portuguese settlement, 166, 167, 172, 173
 Massawa, Red Sea port, 48, 120–124
 Masts, Battle of (655 CE), 20
 Masula, Maravi ruler, 153
 Masuna (Berber Kingdom), 17, 18
 Matamba, 166–80, 182
 Matchlocks, 120, 122, 124
 Matiwane, Nkwane leader, 211, 217
 Matuzianhe, Mutapa leader, 252, 253
 Maungwe, Battle of (1684), 255, 256
 Mauretania (Roman), 17
 Mauritius, 116, 154
 Mauruca, 154, 156, 157
 Mavhura, Mutapa leader, 253–55
 Mawanda, Buganda ruler, 131
 Mawlay Abderrahman, Moroccan ruler, 33, 34
 Mawlay Abdullah, Moroccan ruler, 32
 Mawlay al-Rashid, Moroccan ruler, 31, 32
 Mawlay Hassan, Moroccan ruler, 34, 35
 Mawlay Ismail, Moroccan ruler, 32
 Mawlay Sidi Muhammad III, Moroccan ruler, 33
 Mawlay Sidi Muhammad IV, Moroccan ruler, 34
 Mawlay Sulayman, Moroccan ruler, 33
 Maynier, Christiaan David, Boer leader, 204
 Mazagan (El Jadida), Morocco, 30
 Mazalagem Nova, Madagascar, 115
 Mazimpaka, Rwandan king, 126
 Mazinde, Usambara center, 144
 Mbaka, Portuguese fort, 168, 169, 171, 172, 174, 176, 177, 179
 Mbandi, Ndongo ruler, 168–170
 Mbanza Kongo, 163
 Mbatiany, Maasai leader, 139, 140
 Mbegha, Usambara ruler, 143
 Mbolombo, Battle of (1828), 211, 214
 Mbonani, Ngoni leader, 158, 159
 Mbumbi, Kongo chief, 174
 Mbundu people, 163–80
 Mbwila, Battle of (1665), 175, 176
 Mbwila, Ndembu chiefdom, 171, 174, 175, 178, 179
 Mdodamtitu, Battle of (1874 or 1875 CE), 151
 Mdushane, Xhosa leader, 209
 Mecca, 23, 52, 53, 60, 74, 83, 115
 Medeus, Siege of (534), 16
 Medina, 20, 23, 52
 Medine, French fort, 83
 Megiddo (Armageddon), Battle of (1457 or 1479 BCE), 7, 8
 Melilla, 34
 Melville, John, British agent, 215, 216
 Mems Kusayla, Battle of (686 CE), 21
 Menabe, Malagasy kingdom, 116, 117
 Mendes de Souza Chicorro, Luis, Portuguese governor of Luanda, 174
 Mendes Vasconcelos, Joao, Portuguese leader, 169
 Mendes Vasconcelos, Luis, Portuguese governor of Luanda, 168, 169
 Menilik, Ethiopian emperor, 123, 124

- Meroe, 12, 13, 118
 Mesopotamia, 8, 10
 Mexico, 36, 41, 63, 64
 Mfecane, 212, 257
 Mhande, Pedro, Mutapa leader, 256
 Middle Passage, 85
 Miknasa, Morocco, 32
 Minas, Ethiopian emperor, 121
 Minya, Siege of (1805), 51
 Mirambo, 146–49, 158
 Missalonghi, Siege of (1826 CE), 58
 Misurata, Libya, 44
 Mkhaliphi, Ndebele leader, 225–26
 Mkwawa, Hehe ruler, 151, 152
 Mlanjeni, War of (1850–53), 229–36
 Mnywa Sele, 146, 147, 149
 Moabi, War of (1810s), 216
 Mocutoamuno, Makua ruler, 155, 156
 Moffat, Robert, British missionary, 215, 216
 Mofio, Azande leader, 195
 Mogadishu, 113
 Mogador (Essaouira), Morocco, 30, 34
 Mohale, Sotho leader, 238
 Mokopane, Kekana leader, 246–48
 Molapo, Sotho leader, 236–238, 241, 243–245
 Moletsane, Taung leader, 218, 236, 238, 241, 245
 Mombasa, 113, 114, 144, 145
 Mombera, Ngoni leader, 158
 Mona, Matamba commander, 172, 176
 Mongols, 23
 Monrovia, 89, 90
 Montshiwa, Rolong leader, 249
 Moorosi, Sotho leader, 243, 244
 Mopeli, Sotho leader, 241, 245
 Morocco, 21, 22, 24, 25, 30–36, 40, 75–77
 Mosega, Ndebele settlement, 225–26
 Mosego, Pedi stronghold, 248
 Moshoeshoe, Sotho leader, 216–19, 236–38, 241–46
 Mosseril, Portuguese settlement, 155–157
 Mossi, 74, 75
 Mostaghanem, Algeria, 35, 36
 Mount Bourgaon, Battle of (535 CE), 17
 Mount Kilimanjaro, 144, 145
 Mozambique Island, 113, 114, 153
 Mpande, Zulu ruler, 227, 228
 Mpanga, Sotho raider, 258
 Mpangazita, Hlubi leader, 216
 Mpezeni, Ngoni leader, 158
 Mpondo, 211, 214, 215, 229
 Mputa Maseko, Ngoni leader, 158, 258
 Mshihwi, Usambara capital, 143
 Msimbati Bay, 156
 Msiri, Yeke leader, 186
 Mthethwa, 212
 Muawiya, 20
 Muhammad, Prophet, 18
 Muhammad Abu Likaylik, Funj leader, 29
 Muhammad Ali, Egyptian ruler, 51–62, 123
 Muhammad al-Asfar, Tunisian dey, 42
 Muhammad al-Kanemi, Borno ruler, 46, 47, 82
 Muhammad al-Mukri, Libyan leader, 46
 Muhammad al-Shaikh, Moroccan leader, 30
 Muhammad Bello, Sokoto ruler, 81
 Muhammad Bey Almas, Sudanese officer, 63
 Muhammad Pasha, Ottoman governor of Egypt, 48
 Muhammad Said, Egyptian ruler, 63
 Muizenberg, Battle of (1795), 204
 Mulundu, Kanyok state, 184
 Muniyigumba, Hehe ruler, 150, 151
 Muniyigumba, Sangu ruler, 150

- Munza, Mangbetu leader, 193, 194
 Murad, Mamluk leader, 49
 Murad, pirate, 37
 Murad family, Tunisia, 42
 Murat, Joachim, French
 commander, 50
 Murimuno, Malua ruler, 155–57
 Murzug, Libya, 46, 47
 Musa bin Nusayr, 21
 Mushima, Portuguese fort, 167
 Mustafa Pasha, Ottoman
 commander, 50
 Musungu, Antonio Dias,
 mercenary, 171
 Mutambuka, Nkore ruler, 130
 Mutapa Kingdom, 153, 250–57
 Mutesa, 135–37, 148
 Mutuga, Makua leader, 156, 157
 Muwatallis II, 9
 Mwambambe, Hehe leader, 151, 152
 Mwase Kasungu, Chewa leader, 158
 Mwezi Gisabo, Burundi ruler, 129
 Mzilikazi, Ndebele leader, 217–19,
 225–26, 246, 247, 258, 259

 Nabiembali, Mangbetu leader, 193
 Nakibinge, Buganda ruler, 130
 Nambu a Kalombe,
 Ndembu chief, 172
 Nambu a Ngongo,
 Ndembu chief, 169, 172
 Namugala, Buganda ruler, 132
 Nangazizi, Mangbetu
 capital, 193, 194
 Nanono, Buganda Queen, 131
 Napata, 12, 13
 Napier, British commodore
 Charles, 61
 Napier, Lieutenant Colonel George,
 British officer, 232, 236, 237
 Napier, Sir Robert, British
 commander, 124, 125
 Narmer, pharaoh, 3
 Nasr el Din, Futa Toro jihad leader, 79
 Natal, British colony, 229, 240, 243
 Natal Carbineers, 241
 Natalia, Republic of, 228, 229
 Navarino, Battle of (1827 CE), 58
 Navarro, Pedro, Spanish military
 leader, 44
 Ndabarasa, Rwandan king, 128
 Ndambi shrine, 144–45
 Ndebele, 189, 190, 217–19, 225–26,
 258, 259
 Ndembu, 168, 171–175, 178, 179
 Ndlambe, Xhosa leader, 203–211
 Ndlela, Zulu leader, 227, 228
 Ndongo Kingdom, 164–80
 Ndori, first king of Rwanda,
 125, 126
 Ndorwa, 127, 128
 Ndwandwe, 212–14, 218
 Ndzundza Ndebele, 248
 Nectanebo II, Egyptian ruler, 10
 Negueboria, Battle of
 (ca. 1235 CE), 72
 Nelson, Admiral Horatio, 49
 Newton-King, Susan,
 historian, 201
 Nezib, Battle of (1839), 61
 Nganda Bilonda, Lunda leader, 182
 Ngazargamu, Borno capital, 81
 Ngombala, Lozi ruler, 189
 Ngoni, 134, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151,
 158, 159, 187, 188, 190, 258
 Ngqika, Xhosa leader, 204–211
 Nguni, 200, 212, 258
 Ngwaketse, 215–19, 249
 Ngwane, 211, 214, 217
 Ngwato Tswana, 218, 258
 Niani, Mali capital, 73
 Nicetas, 18
 Niger Delta, 105–107
 Nile, Battle of (1798), 49, 50
 Nioro, Tukolor headquarters, 83
 Njinga (Nzinga, Ana de Sousa),
 169–76
 Nkoje, Portuguese fort, 179
 Nkongola, Luba founder, 180, 181
 Nkore, 130

- Nkutu, Buganda fleet
 commander, 131
 Normans, 26
 Novo Redondo, Portuguese fort, 179
 Nqeno, Xhosa leader, 220
 Nqeto, Qwabe leader, 214, 215
 Ntare IV, Nkore ruler, 130
 Ntare Rugamba, Burundi ruler, 129
 Ntsikana, Xhosa
 Christian leader, 208
 Nsamankow, Battle of (1824 CE), 93
 Nuba Mountains, 55
 Nubia, 3–5, 7–10, 12, 13, 19,
 20, 23, 28, 48, 49, 53, 54, 122;
 Netekamani, 13; Nubian
 armies, 12, 13
 Numidia (Algeria), 17
 Numidians, 14, 15
 Nupe, 95, 96
 Nyakunembire, Mutapa ruler, 256
 Nyamazana, Ngoni leader, 258
 Nyamwezi, 146–49, 186, 187
 Nyatsimbe Mutota, Great
 Zimbabwe military leader, 250
 Nyiginya Kingdom, 125–29. *See also*
 Rwanda
 Nyungu ya Mawe, 149–151
 Nxaba, Ngoni leader, 190, 213, 258
 Nzele, Portuguese fort, 165
 Nxele, Xhosa prophet, 208–210
 Nzobo, Zulu leader, 228

 O'Donnell, Leopoldo, Spanish
 prime minister, 34
 Ogboni, Onoja, Igala leader, 106
 Ohafia, Igbo group, 106
 Oman, 60, 114, 117, 147
 Oran, 26, 36, 38
 Orange Free State, 238, 239, 241–46
 Orange River Sovereignty, 229,
 236–38
 O'Reilly, Alexander, Irish
 mercenary, 38
 Oromo people, 121–23
 Osogbo, Battle of (ca. 1840 CE), 98
 Ottoman Empire, 24, 26, 28–31,
 35–37, 39, 41–44, 47–51,
 56–64, 78, 113, 114,
 119, 121, 122, 124
 Oujda, Morocco, 33, 34
 Ovimbundu, 174, 178, 179,
 180, 186, 190
 Owu, Yoruba state, 96, 97
 Oyo, Yoruba state, 95–97, 100–103
 Ozolua, Benin ruler, 104, 105

 Pandour Corps, 206
 Pangani, 145
 Panji Ndona, Angolan
 rebel leader, 173
 Pare, 144, 145
 Pate, 113, 114
 Pedi Kingdom, 218, 248
 Pelusium, Egypt, 10, 18
 Pemba Island, 114, 156
 Pereira, Nuno Velho, Portuguese
 captain, 154
 Perry, Commodore Matthew C., U.S.
 Navy, 109
 Persia, 10, 11, 18, 24
 Perunefer, Egypt, 6
 Peter, Liberian king, 88, 89
 Petronius, Gaius, Roman
 general, 13
 Phato, Gqunukhwebe leader, 221,
 223, 224, 231
Philadelphia, USS, 46
 Phocas, Byzantine emperor, 18
 Phoenicians, 13
 Pinto, Antonio, Portuguese
 leader, 154
 Piracy, 32, 33, 35, 37–39,
 42, 43, 45–47, 57, 106,
 114, 115
 Port Clarence, 192
 Port Cresson, 89
 Port Loko, Sierra Leone, 86
 Port Natal (Durban), 214,
 225, 227
 Porto Novo, 96, 100–103

- Portuguese, 24, 29, 30, 31, 38, 47, 48, 69, 74, 79, 84, 86, 91, 100, 105, 108, 191, 192
- Portuguese at Delagoa Bay, 212, 213
- Portuguese in Angola, 163–80, 190
- Portuguese in Ethiopia, 120–22
- Portuguese in Indian Ocean, 113–15
- Portuguese in Mozambique/
Zambezi Valley, 152–58, 183, 251–57
- Posholi, Sotho leader, 238, 241–46
- Potgieter, A. H., Boer leader, 248, 250
- Potgieter, Andries, Boer leader, 225–27
- Potgieter, Hermanus, Boer leader, 247
- Potgieter, P. W., Boer leader, 247
- Pots, Battle of the (1823), 217
- Pottinger, Sir Henry, British governor of Cape Colony, 224
- Pra River, 93, 94
- Pretorius, Andries, Boer leader, 227, 228, 229, 249
- Pretorius, M. W., Boer leader, 247
- Pretorius, W. J. Boer leader, 241
- Principe, 84, 105
- Psamtik III, Egyptian ruler, 10
- Pungu a Ndonga, Angola, 176, 177, 179
- Punic Wars, 14, 15
- Purko-Kisongo confederation, 139
- Pyramids, Battle of (1798 CE), 49
- Qadesh, Battle of (1274 BCE), 9
- Qaramanli Dynasty, Libya, 45
- Qasr Ibrim (Premnis), 13, 23, 48
- Queen Adelaide Province, 221, 222
- Quelimane, 153, 254
- Quitangonha, Swahili state, 155, 157
- Qunfidah, Arabia, 52
- Qwabe, 214, 215
- Radama I, Malagasy ruler, 116, 117
- Radiniyya, Battle of (1517 CE), 27
- Rainilaiarivony, Madagascar prime minister, 117, 118
- Rameses II, Egyptian ruler, 8–10
- Ranavalona I, Malagasy queen, 117
- Ranavalona II, Malagasy queen, 117
- Raphia, Battle of (217 BCE), 11
- Rass, Seige of (1817 CE), 53
- Ravasco, Ruy Lourenco, Portuguese captain, 113
- Reid, Richard, historian, 134
- Retief, Piet, 225–28
- Reunion, 116, 154
- Rharhabe Xhosa, 203–211, 219–24, 230–36
- Richard the Lionheart, King, 23
- Rif Mountains, 25
- Rinderpest, 142, 143
- Robben Island, 210
- Roberts, Joseph Jenkins, Liberian president, 90, 91
- Rolong Tswana, 215–19, 225, 226, 236, 242, 249
- Roman Republic/Empire, 14, 15, 16, 69, 118
- Rosamel, Admiral Claude Charles Marie du Campe de, French naval officer, 47
- Rosetta, Egypt, 51
- Royal African Colonial Corps (RACC), 88
- Royal African Corps (RAC), 87, 88
- Royal D'Urban Rangers, 240
- Rozvi Shona, 226, 255–59
- Ruga Ruga, 146–49, 151
- Rujugira, Rwandan king, 126, 127
- Rundi, Chagga leader, 145
- Russia, 57–59, 61–63, 124
- Russian-Ottoman War (1768–1773), 48
- Rwabugiri, Rwandan king, 129
- Rwanda, 125–29
- Saadian dynasty, Morocco, 30
- Sada, Madagascar, 115
- Safi, Morocco, 30

- Saint Louis, Senegal, 83
 Sakalava Kingdoms, Madagascar, 115, 116, 156
 Salah al-Din ibn Ayyub (Saladin), 22, 23
 Salman Ra'is, Ottoman admiral, 24
 Samburu, 139, 142
 Samungazi, Tonga leader, 251
 Sand River Convention (1852), 238, 246
 Sandile, Xhosa ruler, 222–23, 230–36
 Sangu, 149–151
 Sanhaja Berbers, 70, 77
 Sao Tome, 84, 85, 105, 163, 164
 Sapes people, 86
 Sarhili, Xhosa ruler, 235
 Saud Family, 52
 Sbeitla, Battle of (546 CE), 17
 Sbeitla, Battle of (647 CE), 20
 Scalae Veteres, Battle of (537 CE), 17
 Schoemansdal, Boer settlement, 250
 Scholtz, Ernst, Boer leader, 249
 Sebastian, Portuguese king, 30, 31
 Sebetwane, Kololo leader, 189, 190
 Sechele, Kwenia leader, 249
 Segu, 83
 Sehul, Mikael, Tigray ruler, 122
 Sekeletu, Kololo leader, 190, 191
 Sekonyela, Tlokwa leader, 217–18, 238
 Sekwati, Pedi leader, 248
 Seleucid Kingdom, 11
 Semakokiro, Buganda ruler, 132, 133
 Semboja, Usambara ruler, 144
 Sena, Mozambique, 152, 153, 251, 252, 254, 255
 Senekal, Frederick, Boer leader, 241, 242
 Senekal's War (1858), 241–42. *See also* First Free State–Lesotho War
 Sennar, 28, 54, 122
 Serrao, Luis, Portuguese governor of Luanda, 166
 Sesse Islands, 130, 135
 Sewankambo, Buganda military leader, 133, 134
 Sfax, 26
 Shahrbaraz, Persian general, 18
 Shaiqiya Arabs, 54–56
 Shaka, Zulu ruler, 212–15, 221
 Shamba, 143–145
 Shekulwavo, Usambara ruler, 144
 Sherbro, Sierra Leone, 86
 Sherman, General William Tecumseh, 64
 Shewa, 118–24
 Shi'ites, 22, 48
 Shilluk, 28, 29, 55, 56
 Shimbira-Kure, Battle of (1529 CE), 120
 Shona, 199, 226, 250–59
 Sibley, General Henry Hopkins, 64
 Sierra Leone, 85, 86–88, 93, 108
 Sierra Leone Loyal Volunteers, 88
 Sijilmasa, 24
 Similaho, Tom, Malagasy leader, 115, 116
 Sinai Desert 8, 10, 11, 18
 Sinan Pasha, grand vizier, 41
 Sipahi (Spahi) cavalry, 28, 31, 41, 48
 Sirikwa, 138
 Sirte, Libya, 46
 Sitif, Battle of (1153 CE), 26
 Siyolo, Xhosa leader, 223, 231, 232
 Smallpox, 202
 Smellie, William, Sierra Leone officer, 88
 Smith, Sir Harry, British officer and governor, 219–21, 224, 229, 230, 232, 234, 236
 Sobhuza, Swazi ruler, 213, 214
 Sofala, 113, 251
 Sokoto Caliphate, 81, 82, 96
 Solomon, Byzantine general, 17
 Solomonid Dynasty, Ethiopia, 119
 Somali people, 119, 120
 Somalia, 7
 Somerset, Charles, British governor of Cape Colony, 210, 211

- Somerset, Colonel Henry, British officer, 211, 220, 222–24, 231–235
- Songhay, 31, 32, 69, 74–77
- Soninke, 24, 70, 71
- Sonni Ali, Songhay ruler, 74, 75
- Sonni dynasty, Songhay, 74
- Soshangane, 213, 259
- Sosso Kingdom, 71–73
- Sotabotonga Hill, Battle of (1575), 252
- Sotho, 199, 213, 215–19, 225, 236–38
- Southern Sudan, 55, 56, 63, 138
- Spain: alliance with Morocco, 36; Almohad invasion, 26; Almoravid Invasion, 25; Arab conquest, 21, 22; Christian reconquest, 29; conflict with Ottoman Algeria, 35; relations with Morocco, 34, 35
- Spanish Armada (1588), 31
- Spanish expedition to Algeria (1775), 38
- Spanish military culture, 34
- Spanish occupation of Tripoli (1510 CE), 44
- Spanish occupation of Tunis (1535 CE), 41
- Spoor Law (patrol system), 208, 219
- Spragge, Sir Edward, English naval officer, 37
- Stanley, Henry Morton, explorer, 136, 147, 148
- Stockenström, Anders, Cape official, 207
- Stockenström, Andries, Cape official, 207, 209, 210
- Stockton, Robert, U.S. naval captain, 88
- Stone, General Charles Pomery, 64, 65
- Strabo, Greek geographer, 13
- Strait of Sicily, 21, 35
- Suakin, Red Sea port, 60
- Suez, 24, 52
- Sufi brotherhood, 39
- Sulayman Solong, 29
- Sumaguru, 71–73
- Sumba people, 86
- Suna, Buganda ruler, 134, 135
- Sundjata, 71–73
- Supet, Maasai leader, 139
- Susenyos, Ethiopian emperor, 122
- Susu, 86, 87
- Swahili, 112–14, 144, 153, 155–157, 199, 251
- Swazi Kingdom, 213, 214, 228, 248
- Syria, 6–9, 11, 18, 20, 22, 23, 48–50, 59, 60–62
- Taaibosch, Gert, Kora leader, 238
- Tabon, Battle of (ca. 1235 CE), 72
- Tabora, 146–49
- Tadla, Battle of (1554 CE), 30
- Tafilalet, Morocco, 21
- Taghaza, 32, 70, 76
- Tahir Pasha, Ottoman commander, 47
- Tajura, Libya, 44
- Takedda, 74
- Takrur Kingdom, 73, 75, 79
- Tala, Battle of (1583), 166
- Tamatave, Madagascar, 117
- Tangier, Morocco, 21, 29, 30, 32, 34
- Taraba, Arabia, 52
- Tariq ibn Ziyad, 21, 22
- Taung, 218, 236
- Tegbesu, Dahomey ruler, 102
- Temne, 87, 88
- Tete, Mozambique, 152, 251–256
- Tetuan, Morocco, 34
- Teve Kingdom, 252
- Tewodros, Ethiopian emperor, 123, 124
- Thaba Bosiu, Moshoeshe's stronghold, 217, 236, 237, 241–46
- Thembu, 211, 214, 221, 230, 231, 233
- Theodore, Byzantine governor of Egypt, 19

- Thembu, Ngoza's, 214
 Three Kings, Battle of the (1578 CE),
 30, 31. *See also* al-Ksar Kebir
 Thutmose III, Egyptian ruler,
 6–9
 Tigray, Ethiopia, 120, 122–25
 Tijani, Tukolor ruler, 84
 Timbuktu, 69, 74, 76, 77, 84, 91
 Tinubu, Madame, Egba leader, 103
 Tio, Battle of (1861), 83
 Tippu Tip (Hamed bin
 Muhammed), 186, 187
 Tirailleurs, North African, 41
 Tlemcen, Algeria, 21, 26, 36
 Tlhaping Tswana, 215–19, 249, 250
 Tlokwa Sotho, 215–19, 238
 Tohwechipi, Rozvi ruler, 258, 259
 Tondibi, Battle of (1591 CE), 76
 Tonga, 158, 189, 251, 252, 253, 255
 Toulouse, Battle of (721 CE), 22
 Trans-Atlantic slave trade, 85–110,
 115, 161–80, 182, 186, 191, 192, 213
 Trans-Sahara trade, 14, 21, 24, 30–32,
 44, 46, 68–85, 91, 104, 193
 Transvaal (South African Republic),
 238, 239, 242–244, 246–50
 Traore, Tiramaghan, Mali
 commander, 73
 Trarza, Kingdom, 32
 Treaty of Aliwal North (1858), 242
 Treaty of Ghent (1814 CE), 109
 Treaty of Mpharane (1866), 245
 Treaty of Tangiers (1844 CE), 34
 Treaty of Thaba Bosiu
 (1866), 245, 246
 Treaty system, Cape Colony, 222
 Trekboers, 201–206, 224
 Tricamarum, Battle of (533 CE), 16
 Tripoli, 20, 26, 29, 30, 43–47, 52, 78
 Tripolitania, 17, 20, 21
 Troglita, John, 17
 Tsimenata, 115
 Tsiyon, Amda, Ethiopian ruler, 119
 Tsonga, 213, 257
 Tsuntua, Battle of (1804 CE), 80
 Tswana, 199, 215–19, 225,
 242, 249, 259
 Tswana Trade Wars, 216
 Tuba, Mangbetu leader, 193
 Tubna, Algeria, 21
 Tukolor, 79, 82–84
 Tumbuka, 158
 Tunis, 21, 29, 35, 41–44
 Tunisia, 41–44
 Turkana, 140–43
 Turner, Major General
 Charles, British governor
 of Sierra Leone, 88
 Tussun, Egyptian commander, 51,
 52, 53
 Tuta Ngoni, 158
 Tutsi, 127
 Tutu, Osei, Akan leader, 92
 Twa people, 126, 191
 Tyhali, Xhosa leader, 220
 Tylden, Captain Richard,
 British engineer officer,
 232, 233, 235
 Ugweno, Pare state, 144, 145
 Ujiji, 147
 Umar, Borno ruler, 82
 Umar Tall, Tukolor ruler,
 82–84
 Umayyad dynasty 20
 Umgungundlovu, Zulu capital,
 226–28
 United States, 38, 45, 46, 64, 88, 89,
 91, 97, 109, 118, 157
 Uqba ibn Nafi, 19, 20, 21
 Unyanyembe, Nyamwezi state,
 146–49
 Urambo, 146–49
 Uruj, pirate, 35
 U.S. Marines, 46
 U.S. Navy, 45–46, 88, 91, 109
 Usambara Highlands, 143, 144
 Utengula Usongwe,
 Sangu fort, 151
 Uys, Pieter, Boer leader, 226, 227

- Vai, 89, 90
- Van der Walt, Tjaart, landdrost of Swellendam, 205
- Van Jaarsveld, Adrian, commandant of the Eastern Cape, 203
- Van Plettenberg, Baron Joachim, Dutch governor of Cape Colony, 203
- Van Wyk, Stephanus, Boer leader, 220
- Vandals, 15, 16, 17
- Vandeleur, Brigadier General Thomas, British officer, 204, 205
- Vansina, Jan, historian, 126
- Vegkop, Battle of (1836), 225
- Venda, 250
- Vidal Negreiros, Andre, Portuguese governor of Angola, 174, 175
- Viervoet Mountain, Battle of (1851), 236
- Vili people, 177, 179, 191, 192
- Visigoths, 21
- Volunteer Regiments, Cape Colony and Natal, 239–41
- Von Moltke, Prussian captain Helmuth, 61
- Vugha, Usambara capital, 143, 144
- Wadai, 29, 82
- Wadaya Army, Morocco, 32, 33
- Wahabbism, 52, 53, 56, 60
- Walata, 74
- Wanderer*, HMS, 108
- Wangel, Sebla, Ethiopian empress, 120
- War of Africa (1859–1860), 34
- Warden, Major Henry, British officer, 221, 236
- Ware, Opoku, Asante ruler, 93
- Wassa, Akan state, 93
- Waterkloof Highlands, 234, 235
- Wauchope, British major general Patrick, 51
- Wayna Daga, Battle of (1543 CE), 121
- Wegbaja, Dahomey ruler, 99
- Weme, 100, 101
- Wepener, Louis, Boer leader, 243, 244
- Wessels, P. J., Boer leader, 244
- West India Regiment, 88, 94
- Whittlesea, 12 Battles of (1851), 231–233
- Whydah, 100–102
- Willey, Liberian king, 89
- Willshire, Colonel Thomas, British officer, 209, 210
- Wilson, C. T., missionary, 148, 149
- Wodehouse, Sir Phillip, British governor of Cape Colony, 245
- Woitala, Siege of (1860), 63
- Wollo, Ethiopia, 123
- Xhosa, 202–211, 219–24, 229–36
- Xhoxho, Xhosa chief, 219
- Yahya al-Suwaydi, Libyan rebel leader, 44
- Yahya ibn Umar, Almoravid leader, 24
- Yao, 153–59, 183
- Yaqob, Zara, Ethiopian ruler, 119
- Yaw, Osei, Asante leader, 94
- Yazid ibn Abi, 22
- Yeke, 186
- Yemen, 24, 47, 48, 60, 118, 119
- Yohannes IV, Ethiopian emperor, 125
- Yoruba, 94–99, 103
- Yoruba Wars (nineteenth century), 97–99
- Ysif ibn Tashfin, Almoravid leader, 25
- Yunfa, sultan of Gobir, 80, 81
- Yusuf Qaramanli, 45–47
- Zafiraminia aristocracy, Madagascar, 115
- Zaghawa, 29
- Zagwe dynasty, Ethiopia, 118
- Zallaqa, Battle of (1086 CE), 25

Zama, Battle of (202 BCE), 15
Zanzibar, 113, 114, 117, 140, 144, 147,
148, 156, 187
Zawila oasis, 20
Zigua, 143–145
Zimba, 114, 152–154
Zouaves, 41, 42
Zuhayr ibn Qay, 21
Zulla, Red Sea port, 124

Zulu, 159, 211–15, 217–219,
226–28, 240
Zulu-Gama, Ngoni leader, 158, 159
Zuurveld, 202–208
Zuwawa Berbers, 41–43
Zwangendaba, Ngoni leader, 158,
213, 258
Zwide, Ndwandwe leader, 212

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A Military History of Africa

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A Military History of Africa

Volume 2

**The Colonial Period: From the
Scramble for Africa to the Algerian
Independence War (ca. 1870–1963)**

Timothy J. Stapleton



PRAEGER

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*To Anna M. Stapleton, Berthe Kayitesi,
and Oceane Kayitesi-Stapleton*

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Contents

Introduction	ix
Chapter 1 The Scramble for Africa: Part 1, ca. 1870–1914	1
Chapter 2 The Scramble for Africa: Part 2, Southern Africa, ca. 1870–1914	69
Chapter 3 Africa and World War I, 1914–1918	137
Chapter 4 The Interwar Period and World War II, 1919–1945	187
Chapter 5 Warfare, the Military, and Decolonization, 1945–1963	241
Notes	283
Selected Bibliography	297
Index	309

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Introduction

This volume looks at the history of warfare and military structures in Africa between roughly the 1870s and early 1960s, when most of the continent was conquered and ruled by European powers. Unlike the other two volumes of this set, which are organized geographically, this one adopts a chronological framework with distinct chapters on European conquest and African resistance, the African experience of both world wars, and the post-World War II decolonization era.

Called the scramble for Africa, the European invasion and conquest of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is the most studied aspect of African military history, and every region experienced numerous campaigns. With superior technology in weapons, communications, and transport, the European-led invaders relatively quickly defeated the divided African states, with only Ethiopia successfully defending itself. European colonial rule rendered most African states irrelevant and prohibited warfare between African groups because it undermined the capitalist exploitation of African labor and extraction of resources. Like many aspects of African society and economy, the relatively sudden colonial conquest of most of Africa radically reinvented African military culture, which became more homogeneous and specialized. European colonial states developed their own Western-style military organizations, small standing armies separate from civilian communities, which were primarily

aimed at maintaining internal security and represented foreign occupation. Mirroring colonial society, colonial militaries in Africa were racially hierarchical, with a small number of European officers directing a much larger African rank in file often drawn from imagined warrior peoples.

During the world wars, Africa became a source of military manpower for the colonial powers, which expanded their colonial armies and sent them across the continent and to other parts of the world. There was fighting in every region of Africa during World War I as the British, French, and Belgians invaded isolated German colonies and the Ottoman Empire attempted to disrupt British control of the Suez Canal. The French employed several hundred thousand African troops on the western front, and wartime demands for recruits and resources prompted rebellion. Between the world wars, new or improved technology such as airplanes and motor vehicles became important in mopping up the last pockets of African resistance to colonial rule. The African campaigns of World War II focused on the regions of Italian colonization (East and North Africa), and some of the French colonies became the scene of fighting between Free French and Vichy forces. Tens of thousands of African soldiers served in the Middle East, Italy, western Europe, and Burma. While the overall impact of World War I on Africa was to strengthen colonial rule, World War II generally created conditions for the rise of radical African nationalism and European decolonization.

A number of military events during the 1950s; anticolonial insurgencies in Madagascar, Kenya, Cameroon, and Algeria; the Suez Crisis; and the emerging international Cold War triggered the rapid withdrawal of most European powers from Africa within a few years. At the same time colonial rule was being increasingly challenged across the continent, the British and French employed African soldiers against anticolonial insurgencies in Malaya and Indochina. With independence, colonial military structures were transformed into the national defense forces of new African states. While European officers often stayed on to lead African forces through this transition, there was rapid Africanization of the officer corps, and sometimes unprepared soldiers rose meteorically to senior positions. While the first generation of African officers had been trained in British, French, and Belgian military academies in the 1950s and early 1960s, many African countries eventually founded their own training institutions. Although the new national armies were initially seen as symbols of

progress and technical efficiency, problems of regionalism and politicization led to a long series of coups and military governments with often tragic outcomes, and authoritarian regimes resorted to the colonial practice of using the military to suppress popular protest. The white minority regimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), claiming to champion the Western powers in the new Cold War, strengthened and whitened their military structures to face the beginning of protracted black insurgency.

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Chapter 1

The Scramble for Africa: Part 1, ca. 1870–1914

By around 1870, the European presence in Africa was confined to coastal enclaves in the west and east, and settler colonies in what is now South Africa and Algeria. The vast majority of African people, especially in the interior, lived in independent communities and states. However, during the 1880s and 1890s, almost all of Africa fell under European colonial rule so rapidly the process became known as the scramble for Africa. Ethiopia, the only African state to successfully defend itself from European invasion, and Liberia, a republic of former slaves from the United States, were the only areas to remain independent. At the 1884 Berlin Conference, at which no Africans were present, representatives of European powers claimed parts of Africa and planned the invasion of the continent without much regard for geography or population. Although some African people came under European rule through treaties, the scramble represented an armed conquest in which warfare and military structures were central. Given the recent Second Industrial Revolution in mid-nineteenth century Western Europe and North America, the European-led and -equipped armies of the scramble enjoyed a dramatic technological advantage over African forces, which had not had time to catch up. Superior firepower allowed relatively small colonial forces to defeat much larger African armies. During the 1870s and 1880s, European-led invaders

were armed with breech-loading single-shot rifles, manually operated early machine guns like the Gatling and muzzle-loading but rifled field artillery. By the 1890s, they employed magazine-fed repeating rifles, gas-operated machine guns such as the Maxim, and breech-loading artillery. Firepower was not everything—telegraphs facilitated speedy communication and coordination, and steamships and trains allowed troops and resources to move quickly. In most cases, the soldiers of these “European” armies were Africans from the older coastal colonies and/or local allies. The European powers had planned the conquest and did not fight among themselves over parts of Africa. Conversely, African leaders tended to have a narrow geographical vision and perceived the invaders as new local powers to be engaged in terms of local politics. Although there was tenacious resistance to European invasion, the overall African response to the scramble was piecemeal and divided.


Almost since it happened, writers have tried to explain the sudden late nineteenth-century European conquest of Africa, which took place in the context of renewed Western overseas empire building known as the New Imperialism. At the time, British social reformer Thomas Hobson saw lust for colonial conquest as coming from the decline of small-scale capitalism in favor of a few emerging ambitious and greedy magnates. Vladimir Lenin, leader of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, saw the scramble as evidence that capitalism was beginning to tear itself apart as large-scale capitalists rushed to claim new areas to invest surplus capital. Although Lenin recognized the acquisition of raw materials as a reason for conquest, he gave primacy to investment opportunities, which contradicted the fact that European powers tended to invest little in their African colonies. Rejecting economic explanations associated with Marxism, Cold War-era British historians Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher saw the scramble as having been motivated by the perceived strategic interest of the European powers that through several key conquests such as the 1882 British occupation of Egypt set off a domino affect of territorial seizures. Subsequently, A. G. Hopkins pointed out that while the European powers had no strategic interests in West Africa, they raced to occupy this region during the late nineteenth century. The conquest of West Africa was stirred by an economic depression in the 1870s that pushed Europeans to reduce the cost of West African raw materials, long acquired through coastal trade, by eliminating the African middlemen and gaining direct control over producers in the

interior. A number of other factors were important in stimulating the scramble. The intensification of European racism encouraged the conquest of darker skinned peoples as either a moral obligation or scientifically proven inevitability. Extreme nationalism prompted newly unified Germany to seek equality with Britain by acquiring an overseas empire and influenced France to compensate for its loss of power in Europe to Germany by conquering vast stretches of the Sahara Desert. European lobby groups such as merchants and missionaries with interests in parts of Africa pressured their home governments to secure hitherto vaguely understood spheres of influence.¹

NORTH AFRICA AND SUDAN

Some of the first and last wars of the scramble happened in North Africa. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire by Russia in 1877–1878 encouraged European powers to intervene directly in parts of North Africa under the nominal authority of Istanbul. In 1877, an 8,000-strong Egyptian expeditionary force was sent to Bulgaria to join Ottoman forces but suffered incompetent Egyptian and Ottoman leadership as well as lack of cold weather clothing, and many of its soldiers injured themselves to avoid the pointless fighting. This was the last time Egyptians fought under the Ottoman sultan. In the Egyptian army, which had been modernized by American Civil War veterans during the 1870s, men of local peasant origin had gained access to junior officer ranks, where they became nationalistic and resented the continued dominance of their Turko-Circassian superiors. The 1869 opening of the Suez Canal, which links the Red and Mediterranean Seas, dramatically increased the strategic importance of Egypt for naval powers Britain and France, to which Cairo was indebted financially. In May 1882, prompted by a coup attempt by 4,000 nationalist Egyptian soldiers, France and Britain dispatched a combined naval squadron of ironclad warships to Alexandria. American, Greek, Italian, German, and Russian gunships were also sent but did not participate in subsequent fighting. The weakened Ottoman Empire rejected a request from the Egyptian ruler (or khedive) Tawfiq Pasha to send an expeditionary force to assist him. On July 11, responding to the outbreak of riots in Alexandria, British warships bombarded the port's ineffective gun emplacements, killing 100 crewmen and injuring 400. At the last minute, the French chose not to intervene. Two days later,

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at the request of the embattled khedive, Royal Marines landed and quickly occupied the city. By late August, the British were in control of both ends of the Suez Canal, vital for shipping to and from India, and Sir Garnet Wolseley commanded an army of 25,000 British and Indian troops at Ismailiya at the middle of the canal. Opposing them was a larger Egyptian army under nationalist leader Urabi Pasha. On September 13, after a silent night march, the British surprised the Egyptian camp at Tel al-Kabir. The Highland Brigade stormed the Egyptian trenches with a bayonet charge, allowing the rest of Wolseley's force into Urabi's unprotected camp. British horse artillery galloped forward and cut down the retreating Egyptians with grape-shot. Several other wild British charges were supported by fire from artillery and Gatling guns. Urabi fled, and the next day he surrendered Cairo to the British. The khedive disbanded the Egyptian army, its American chief of staff General Charles Pomeroy Stone returned home to supervise the installation of the Statue of Liberty in New York, and many of the nationalist leaders, including Urabi, were exiled to Ceylon.²

By around 1870, Tunisia—officially an Ottoman territory but with a largely independent local ruler called bey—had modernized its administration and infrastructure but in the process had become indebted to European powers, particularly France. In April 1881, with the excuse that a Tunisian group had raided French colonial Algeria, a French army of 28,000 invaded overland while another 8,000 troops were landed on the coast. The capital at Tunis was occupied quickly, and Sadik Bey was forced to sign the Treaty of Bardo, which imposed a French protectorate. Britain agreed to this in exchange for the former Ottoman Mediterranean island of Cyprus, Germany thought it would forestall French claims in Europe, and Italy objected because it had commercial interests in Tunisia but did not have the military capacity to challenge France. In June, the Tunisian cities of Sfax and Kairouan rebelled against the French. Within a few weeks, French ironclad naval vessels bombarded the port of Sfax and landed expeditionary forces that overcame intense resistance. The French then marched inland to Kairouan, which was taken in October without a fight. Under French administration, the bey became a figurehead, and a French official functioned as the country's prime minister and military commander.

Italian claims to what is now Libya started with the 1878 division of Ottoman territories and major Italian economic investment in Tripoli. In 1911, Italian public pressure for colonial expansion, in part

stimulated by their failure to subdue Ethiopia in the 1890s, pushed Rome into war with Istanbul and in early October, Italian ships bombarded Tripoli, which was captured by a naval landing party as the Turkish garrison withdrew inland. Throughout the rest of the month, a 30,000-strong Italian expeditionary force, supported by 100 artillery pieces, 800 trucks, and 4 airplanes, easily captured the coastal cities of Tobruk, Derna, Khoms, and Benghazi. With Italian naval superiority in the Mediterranean, Turkish soldiers, weapons, ammunition, and equipment were smuggled overland from Tunisia and Egypt, which remained neutral. The Italian invasion of Libya incensed many young Turkish officers who made their way to the campaign by various means. The Ottoman military attaché in Berlin, Enver Bey who a few years later would lead his country during World War I, developed a plan to draw the Italians into the desert, where they would be defeated by ambushes. Disguised as a journalist, he went to Libya to take command of Turkish forces. Muslim solidarity between Arabs and Turks was encouraged when the leader of the Arab Sanussi group, Ahmed Serif, declared holy war against the Christian Italians. In November and December, units under Mustafa Kemal, who later founded the modern Republic of Turkey, effectively fought the Italians at Tobruk and Derna, and those under Neset Bey and Enver Bey did the same at Tripoli and Benghazi, respectively. The Italians increased their force in Libya to 100,000 men to oppose perhaps 20,000–30,000 Arabs and several thousand Turks. A stalemate developed as the poorly prepared and trained Italians could not move more than five or six kilometers inland from offshore naval artillery support, and the lightly equipped Arab-Turkish forces could not drive them into the sea. During this conflict, the Italians conducted the first aerial reconnaissance and bombing in the history of warfare. In the naval campaign, the Italian fleet sank Ottoman ships near Beirut, bombarded coastal Yemen and the Dardanelles, and seized Aegean islands. Just as Turkish-led resistance to the Italians was gaining momentum, the outbreak of war in the Balkans meant that Istanbul had to make peace with Rome to redirect military resources. In the Treaty of Ouchy, signed in October 1912, the Ottoman Empire accepted Italian rule in Libya for the return of Aegean islands. Continued Arab guerrilla operations prevented Italy from controlling the Libyan interior until a major campaign in the 1920s (discussed in Chapter 4).³

Although Morocco had remained independent from the Ottoman Empire, during the early twentieth century, it was plagued by civil

war and gradually fell under French domination. In 1903, France abandoned claims to Egypt in exchange for Britain not interfering in Morocco. Anti-European violence, prompted by ruler Mawlay Abd al-Aziz's acceptance of a substantial French loan, led to French forces landing in Casablanca on the Atlantic coast and French soldiers from Algeria occupying Oujda in 1907. In 1911, the French seized the capital of Fez. The arrival of a German gunboat at Agadir on the Atlantic in 1911 signalled an intervention in favor of Moroccan independence but was called off when Paris granted Berlin territory along the Congo River. The next year, the French forced Mawlay Abd al-Hafiz, the new ruler who had recently deposed his brother in a civil war, to sign the Treaty of Fez, which imposed a protectorate on the core of Morocco. Nominally independent, Morocco would be governed by a French resident with authority over administrative and military affairs. France and Spain then agreed that the latter should control Morocco's far north and south. Rebellions and army mutinies broke out almost immediately in Fez and Marrakech but were suppressed by superior French firepower. In the interior, particularly the mountainous Rif, resistance against Spanish and French occupation continued well into the 1920s.⁴

Under the modernizing rule of Muhammad Ali, Egypt conquered Sudan in the 1820s and 1830s in a futile attempt to acquire military slaves and gold. The Egyptians imposed a Westernized state that taxed the Sudanese and sent their agricultural and other products north. Sudanese frustrations increased in the 1860s and 1870s with the start of an Egyptian antislavery campaign that threatened local economic interests and brought Christian Europeans into the Muslim country. In late June 1881, the increasingly popular religious leader Muhammad Ahmad proclaimed himself the Mahdi, a saviour chosen by God to restore Islam to its pure form, and organized an army for holy war against Egyptian occupation. Political turmoil in Egypt itself meant that the Egyptians failed to suppress the rebellion. The first major victory for the Mahdi happened in 1882 when his supporters captured the Egyptian military base at El-Obeid west of the Nile. Although Mahdist forces initially tried to storm the fort and were cut down by breech-loading rifles, they eventually undertook a successful siege. Given this lesson, the Mahdi formed part of his army into a near professional infantry corps equipped with firearms. The British occupation of Egypt drew them into Sudan because control of the upper Nile was important to control of Egypt. In November 1883, an

Egyptian force of 8,500 soldiers under British colonel William Hicks—complete with artillery and early manual machine guns such as the Nordenfellt—invaded Sudan to suppress the insurrection. Letting Hicks's expedition advance so that harsh desert conditions would take their toll, the Mahdi's troops eventually surrounded and annihilated them with firepower at the Battle of Shaykan. The British then decided to abandon Sudan and in early 1884 sent Charles Gordon, who had governed part of south Sudan for the Egyptians, to organize the withdrawal. However, Gordon was not committed to London's plan, and he delayed long enough to be trapped in Khartoum by the Mahdi's forces. Around the same time, Sudanese Beja leader Osman Digna led a rebellion against Egyptian rule in the eastern region of Suakin. A British column under General Gerald Graham pushed back the rebels at the hard-fought battles of El Teb and Tamai but then was ordered to pull out. A British relief expedition led by Wolseley failed to break through to Khartoum in time, and Gordon was killed when the Mahdists stormed the city in January 1885. Although the Mahdi died that June, a Mahdist state had been created with its capital a few kilometers from Khartoum at Omdurman.

Abdallahi al-Taaisha, the Mahdi's successor known as the khalifa, imposed strict Islamic law, and his aggressive policy of conversion brought conflict with neighboring states as well as people in south and west Sudan. In 1889, Sudanese Mahdists invaded Ethiopia and killed Emperor Yohannes IV at the Battle of Gallabat. In 1895, they ventured into western Eritrea and were confronted by Italian colonial forces. During the scramble in the 1890s, Belgian and French expeditions began to move into parts of southern Sudan. The British feared that if another European power controlled Sudan, it could threaten their strategic interests in Egypt. The Ethiopian victory over Italian invaders in 1896 at the Battle of Adwa (also known as Adowa) increased these concerns as a joint French-Ethiopian occupation of southern Sudan seemed possible. In 1896, an Anglo-Egyptian army under Horatio Kitchener invaded Sudan, defeated a Mahdist army, and captured Dongola province near the border. Kitchener's plan involved a slow southern advance supported by Nile gunboats that were disassembled and rebuilt after every cataract and the construction of a railway to deliver supplies and reinforcements. In April 1898, Kitchener's army defeated a Mahdist force sent to Atbara on the Nile to block the approach to Khartoum. While Kitchener began his two-year campaign with mostly Egyptian troops and just 4 British battalions, between April and August 1898, he was

reinforced by 2 British infantry brigades and a cavalry regiment. On September 2, 1898, Kitchener's 25,000 British, Egyptian, and Sudanese troops were confronted by Abdallahi's 50,000 followers just north of Omdurman. The Mahdists failed to make use of firepower because their 15,000 riflemen were mixed among spearmen and shot inaccurately, and artillery and machine guns captured in the 1880s were not employed because they were seen as siege weapons and there were no trained crews. A Mahdist attempt to draw the British army out of its earthen fortification that was covered by Nile gunboats failed, and one of the Mahdist divisions was slaughtered by British firepower. When Kitchener advanced, one of his Sudanese brigades repelled assaults from three sides and prevented a potentially disastrous flank attack on the main force in open ground. The Mahdists retreated, and Kitchener's army occupied Omdurman, where it was rumored they desecrated the Mahdi's corpse. Present at the battle was young junior officer Winston Churchill, who participated in what has been called the last significant British cavalry charge and who published a two volume account of the war the next year. At the Battle of Omdurman, Anglo-Egyptian casualties numbered 48 killed and 382 wounded, while the Mahdists lost around 10,000 killed; 15,000 wounded; and 5,000 captured, which together represented half of their entire army. Abdallahi escaped but was killed by an Anglo-Egyptian column in 1899. With their decisive victory at Omdurman, the British almost eliminated Mahdism and dominated Sudan.⁵

The closest European powers came to going to war over Africa during the scramble took place in September 1898 at the village of Fashoda on the White Nile in southern Sudan. What would be called the Fashoda Incident represented the clash of two incompatible European imperial ambitions in Africa—the British dreamed of ruling a continuous strip from the Cape in the south to Cairo in the north, and the French desired a territory from the Atlantic in the west to the Red Sea in the east. During 1896, three colonial powers converged on southern Sudan to secure the headwaters of the Nile. Kitchener's large Anglo-Egyptian army was slowly pushing south along the Nile, and (as is discussed later in this chapter) Belgian king Leopold II had sent a force northeast from the Congo Free State that collapsed because of mutiny by African troops. In June 1896, a French expedition under marine major Jean-Baptiste Marchand that consisted of 12 European and 140 Senegalese colonial soldiers with numerous supply carriers left the Atlantic port of Loango in Gabon. Proceeding up the Ubangi River in

a borrowed Belgian steamer and then trekking across jungles, scrubland and desert, the French reached Fashoda in July 1898. After traveling 4,000 kilometers in 14 months, Marchand's expedition was meant to link up with a French-Ethiopian force from the east that had been turned back by starvation and disease. The French expected to be welcomed as allies by the Sudanese Mahdists. However, in August, a hostile force of 1,200 to 1,500 Mahdists in canoes towed by steamers captured at Khartoum in 1885 attempted to make an amphibious landing at Fashoda and was repelled by French firepower. On September 18, a 1,500-strong Anglo-Egyptian force under Kitchener, fresh from victory at Omdurman, arrived at Fashoda, and the comparatively small French expedition was instructed to leave. Distracted by scandal at home and intimidated by British naval power, Paris backed down, and Marchand's expedition withdrew in November. The Fashoda incident led to a March 1899 agreement between Britain and France on their African borders and ultimately to the 1904 Anglo-French alliance against Germany.⁶

ETHIOPIA

After Ethiopia's defeat by a British expeditionary force and the death of Emperor Tewodros in 1868, a power struggle developed between Wagshum Gobaze (who ruled Amhara, Wag, and Lasta) and Kasa Mercha (who ruled Tigray). With an army of 60,000 men, Gobaze captured Adwa, the capital of Tigray. However, weapons left behind by the British and the assistance of British officer John Kirkham facilitated Kasa's victory at the Battle of Assam on July 11, 1871, and in January the following year, he was proclaimed Emperor Yohannes IV. Although Yohannes's core area of Tigray was militarily strong because it was close to the Red Sea coast from which firearms were imported, this made it vulnerable to foreign invasion. Conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia began in 1868 when the former gained control of the Red Sea port of Massawa from the Ottoman Empire and then took the nearby port of Zulla. Subsequently, the Egyptians imposed an arms embargo on Ethiopia. In 1874, an Egyptian force under Swiss adventurer Werner Munzinger seized the Bogos area on the Sudan-Ethiopian border inland from Massawa. Munzinger then advanced into the Afar area along the coast south of Massawa, where he was killed by local people. In 1875, Egypt seized the Red Sea ports of Zayla and Berbera in what is now Somalia. Under Danish colonel



Soren Arendrup and American Civil War veterans, a well-armed Egyptian army crossed the Marab River and invaded Tigray. However, they were defeated by Yohannes's army at the Battle of Gundat on November 16, 1875. A few months later, Tigray was again invaded by a larger Egyptian force of 15,000–20,000 men armed with breech-loading rifles, Gatling guns, and modern artillery. After crushing the Egyptians at the Battle of Gura, fought from March 7 to 9, 1876, the Ethiopians captured many modern weapons, made the Remington rolling-block rifle their standard infantry firearm, and employed Egyptian artillery instructors to train local gunners. Although Yohannes did not lead his army against the Egyptian fortified coastal

enclaves, the failure of negotiations led to the end of Egypt's ambitions along Africa's Red Sea coast. During the late 1870s and early 1880s, Yohannes's well-equipped army imposed more control over other Ethiopia's other regions such as Wollo and Shewa. In 1884, Ethiopian forces under Ras Alula Engida rescued the Egyptian garrisons of five towns in neighboring Sudan from Mahdist forces during the Anglo-Egyptian withdrawal. In return, the British agreed that Ethiopia could take back the Bogos area and import arms through Massawa, which the Egyptians also abandoned.⁷

The 1869 opening of the Suez Canal attracted the interest of recently unified Italy to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, and Egypt's 1884 withdrawal from Sudan created a power vacuum. In 1883, Italian forces landed on the Red Sea coast of what would eventually become Eritrea and two years later, they took Massawa from the departing Egyptians and reimposed the arms blockade on Ethiopia, which was seen as a regional rival. The Italians then moved around 30 kilometers inland, where they made alliances with local rulers hostile to Ethiopian dominance. Contradicting their recent agreement with Ethiopia, the British encouraged Italian ambitions in the Horn as a counter to the French in what is now Djibouti. Ethiopia was once again cut off from the coast. On January 25, 1887, a 25,000-strong army under Ras Alula attacked the fort at Sahati, which was held by 167 Italian and 1,000 African colonial troops. The Ethiopians withdrew after hundreds of them were killed by Italian firepower. The next day, at the Battle of Dogali, Ras Alula led around 10,000 men who ambushed 500 Italian soldiers with 2 machine guns under Colonel Tommaso De Cristofori marching to relieve Sahati. All were killed except 80 wounded men who escaped. Although the Italians claimed that Ras Alula had lost 1,000 men, the Italians abandoned Sahati and several contested villages in the area. In a failed bid to mediate the conflict, the British asked Yohannes to cede the Italians the Bogos area, which they had given back to him three years before. The Italians massively reinforced their colony and by the end of 1887 had 18,000 soldiers, of whom only 2,000 were African troops, in Eritrea. In turn, they retook Sahati and other inland villages, constructed a series of frontier forts, fortified Massawa, built a railway from Massawa to Sahati, and imposed a complete trade embargo on Ethiopia. In 1888, the Italians established regular military units of *ascari* (meaning soldiers) recruited from local Eritreans, who replaced Turkish and local mercenaries. That year, Yohannes led an 80,000-strong army to Sahati, but the Ethiopians ran low on supplies and withdrew into Tigray.


The Muslim Mahdist threat from Sudan distracted Christian Ethiopia from dealing with the Italians. In 1885, Mahdist forces under Osman Digna had moved from Kassala in Sudan into Ethiopia, where they were confronted at Kufit by an Ethiopian army under Ras Alula. Although the Ethiopians had suffered heavy casualties, they drove off the Mahdists. After several years of border skirmishes, a Mahdist army under Hamdan Abu Anga raided the Ethiopian highlands in early 1888 and sacked the old capital of Gondar. Yohannes and Ras Alula negotiated with the increasingly strong Italians who, in 1888, occupied parts of Ethiopia's Tigray province and incorporated them into Eritrea. When Yohannes moved forces from the western border with Sudan to strengthen the eastern frontier with the Italians, the Mahdists once again invaded. On March 9, 1889, while leading his army to victory against the Mahdists at Gallabat (also called the Battle of Metemma), Yohannes was mortally wounded by a sniper. Subsequently, Menelik (the ruler of Shewa province) ascended to the imperial throne with the assistance of Italian firearms. This resulted in the 1889 Treaty of Wuchale in which Italy recognized Menelik as ruler of Ethiopia, and Menelik formally ceded the Italians the territory they had already taken. As ruler of Shewa, Menelik had begun expanding south in the early 1880s and in 1887, when his army defeated a Muslim state that had emerged at Harar after the Egyptian departure two years earlier, he gained access to firearms from nearby Gulf of Aden ports. After becoming emperor, he continued these southern campaigns, conquering areas such as Ogaden and Sidamo in 1891 and Walamo in 1894, which gave him new sources of slaves, ivory, and gold.⁸

A discrepancy in the Italian and Amharic versions of the Treaty of Wuchale would lead to the First Italo-Ethiopian War of 1895–1896. In the Italian version, Ethiopia was obliged to conduct all foreign relations through Italy; in the Amharic version, this was optional. During the early 1890s, Menelik purchased up-to-date weapons and ammunition from the French, British, and even Italians because the European powers wanted to counter each other's ambitions and saw Ethiopia as a foil to Mahdism in Sudan. In 1892, Emperor Menelik imposed a new tax to support the military, which partly ended the old system in which Ethiopian soldiers fed themselves by looting peasants. The following year, he repudiated the Treaty of Wuchale, which prompted the Italians to annex small territories over the Eritrean border. In December 1894, an Italian military expedition crossed the Mareb River into Tigray, where

it suppressed a rebellion by 1,600 Eritrean fighters under Bahta Hagos, who was killed in the fighting. In January 1895, at the Battle of Coatit, the Italian army under General Oreste Baratieri defeated a Tigrayan force under Ras Mengesha Yohannes (son and heir of the previous Ethiopian emperor), who had once sought Italian assistance against Menelik but now sided with him. While the French rejected a request for assistance from Menelik to gain Italian backing for their occupation of Tunisia, an Ethiopian diplomatic mission to Russia in June 1895 succeeded in gaining a promise of military support. In September, Menelik mobilized the army of Shewa at the north-central town of Were Illu. In early December, Ethiopian troops overran Italian defensive positions at the mountain of Amba Alagi, which drove them back to Eritrea. Leaving a garrison of 1,200 African and 200 Italian soldiers at an unfinished fort at Mekele in northern Tigray, Baratieri then concentrated Italian forces at the Tigrayan town of Adigrat just over the Eritrean border. The first Ethiopian forces under Ras Mekonnen arrived at Mekele on December 19, but the Italians offered to negotiate a surrender to buy time. In early January, Menelik and his wife Empress Taytu Betul arrived with a large army that made several unsuccessful assaults and after 15 days of siege, the Italians capitulated. Hoping for a negotiated settlement, Menelik allowed the prisoners to leave with their weapons and supplies.

Although Baratieri wanted to wait until the Ethiopian army began to dissolve because of lack of logistical support, Rome could not tolerate African resistance and ordered an immediate engagement. With 20,000 troops and 56 artillery pieces, most of which were slow-firing mountain guns, Baratieri planned to surprise the much larger Ethiopian army north of Adwa. About half of the Italian army consisted of African soldiers—Eritrean colonial troops or Tigrayan irregular allies—armed with single-shot breech-loading rifles, and the other half consisted of regular Italian infantry equipped with up-to-date magazine-fed Vetterli rifles. The Ethiopian army numbered 100,000, of which 70,000 were armed with repeating rifles, many of French origin and supported by 46 cannon, most of which were quick-firing French Hotchkiss guns as well as some machine guns. Among the Ethiopian force were a few Russian advisors and artillerymen. For a few days in late February, both armies tried to out-maneuver each other. On the night of February 29, 1896, Baratieri sent his four brigades to occupy the high ground between the Italian and Ethiopian camps, hoping that at daybreak his men would be able to fire

down onto an unprepared enemy. However, poor maps and communications meant the Italian brigades never reached the high ground and became separated. At sunrise, the Ethiopian field commander Mekonnen ordered his cavalry to attack the widely dispersed Italian columns. The Ethiopians sent wave after wave against the Italians. By around 9 a.m., the Italian African colonial troops began to rout and by noon Baratieri, who had lost his glasses and had to be led around on a mule, ordered a withdrawal. Left behind, one of the brigades tried to conduct a fighting withdrawal during the afternoon, but most of its men were killed. At this Battle of Adwa, 5,000–6,000 Ethiopians were killed and 8,000 wounded. On the Italian side, 261 Italian officers; 2,918 Italian soldiers; and about 2,000 Ascari were dead. Nine hundred and fifty four Italians were permanently missing. Four hundred and seventy one Italians and 959 Ascari were wounded. Those taken prisoner included 1,900 Italians and about 1,000 Ascari. Baratieri was the only Italian general to escape the slaughter—3 out of 5 field commanders had been killed, 1 was wounded, and 1 was captured. Seen as traitors, many of the Ascari had their right hands and left feet cut off by the Ethiopians, who forced them to march 800 kilometers to Addis Ababa. Many died on the march. The Italians at Adwa had sustained the highest proportion of casualties of any nineteenth-century European army, about 50 percent, including the French at the bloody Napoleonic engagements of Eylau and Waterloo. In addition, the Italians abandoned all their artillery and 11,000 rifles, which were taken by the Ethiopians. Although Ras Alula wanted to advance to the coast, Menelik refused because his army was starving and the Italians at Massawa were ensconced in a fortified island. News of the crushing defeat caused riots in some Italian cities and the collapse of the government. Tired of foreign military adventures, a new administration in Rome signed the Treaty of Addis Ababa, which set the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and renounced Italian claims over Ethiopia. Free from Italian invasion, Menelik was able to renew his southern campaigns into what is now Somalia. The stunning victory at Adwa meant that Ethiopia would remain the only African state to successfully defend itself from European invasion during the scramble period. While many theories have sought to explain Ethiopian success, such as emphasizing its long national history, Ethiopia was Africa's strongest independent state and Italy one of the weakest European invaders.⁹



THE FRENCH IN WEST AFRICA AND MADAGASCAR

Based at the West African ports of Dakar and Saint Louis, the French expanded eastward up the Senegal River to secure trade and hinder the westward expansion of the Tukolor Empire during the 1850s and 1860s. This was accomplished by establishing a French colonial army initially based on purchasing local slaves who, trained and equipped with modern firearms, came to be known as the *Tirailleurs Senegalais*. Defeat by Prussia in 1870–1871 encouraged the French to expand their colonies in West Africa to promote national prestige but with locally recruited forces that would not detract from the defense of France. From 1879 to 1883, the French pushed down the Niger River, constructed a series of forts, and began building a railway between Senegal and Bamako, now the capital of Mali, in the southern part of Tukolor weakened by civil war and French encouragement for the subject Bambara population. The French focused on employing artillery to destroy the forts the Tukolor Empire used to control its vast territory. However, French moves against Tukolor were undermined by lack of continuity in French colonial policy and underfunding, and the rise of Mahmadu Lamine's Muslim state of Futa Bondu between the upper Gambia and Senegal Rivers, which threatened both. From 1885 to 1887, Tukolor ruler Ahmadu Seku supported the French, with whom he signed a treaty, in the suppression of Futa Bondu. Nevertheless, once Mahmadu Lamine was defeated, the French returned to sponsoring Ahmadu's enemies such as the Bambara and rival Tukolor aristocrats, and the Tukolor ruler requested support from neighboring leaders such as Samori Toure (see later in this chapter) and Ali Bouri of the Jolof, who had been resisting French encroachment in the southern part of Senegambia. In April 1888, the French captured the fort of Koundian, which was the Tukolor base in the gold-producing Bambuk area and central to the Tukolor frontier defense system. Tukolor forces eventually retook the fort. The French built up their forces in the Senegambia area, turned Tukolor chiefs against one another, and placed an embargo on the shipment of firearms to the Tukolor Empire. In mid-February 1889, French military commander colonel Louis Archinard led a 500-strong expedition, including about 400 local auxiliaries, to attack Koundian, where they overcame stiff Tukolor opposition and used artillery to destroy the fort. Typical of French military leaders in the area, Archinard informed the civilian governor about this action after it had taken place. The destruction

of Koundian buoyed Bambara support for the French, which had declined during the conquest of Futa Bondu, and cut off Ahmadu's communication with outlying areas. Ahmadu planned a counteroffensive, but it did not happen because of famine that made it difficult to feed an army and fear of internal Bambara rebellion. In early May 1889, the French built a fort at Nyamina on the Niger River near the Tukolor capital of Segou. Ahmadu prepared for war by importing firearms from the coastal British territories in the south and to his relief, harvests at the end of 1889 were good.

In December 1889, Archinard concocted a border dispute with the Tukolor Empire and gave Ahmadu an impossible ultimatum that served as a pretext for all-out war. Just before he was overthrown by the French in early 1890, Ali Bouri sent large Jolof contingents to assist Tukolor. On the morning of April 6, 1890, a 3,600-strong French force attacked Segou, which surrendered that afternoon after bombardment by 2,776 artillery shells. The conquest of Segou pushed Ahmadu's forces east, which made it hard for them to cooperate with Samori to the south. In late April, Archinard—largely to encourage Bambara cooperation with the French—led his forces northwest to destroy the fortress of Ouelessebougou, which was a symbol of Tukolor authority in the Beledougou area. In early June, Ahmadu directed a counterattack west into the vast Kaarta area, which represented the western half of his empire. Although his army's advance on the main French base at Kayes was stopped a few kilometers short at the village of Bougoura, Tukolor troops occupied various places in Kaarta such as the town of Koniakary, which became a rallying point. Responding quickly, the French captured the fort at Koniakary in mid-June and used it as a base to raid Tukolor forces across Kaarta. Ahmadu's troops attempted to retake Koniakary but were hampered by the rainy season, which caused communication and transport problems; desertion of non-Tukolor soldiers; superior French firepower; and the defection of the ruler of the Khasso district, who sent troops to assist Archinard. By the end of September, the Tukolor army had withdrawn from Koniakary eastward to the town of Nioro. After losing a series of pitched battles with the French from September 1890 to January 1891, Tukolor forces abandoned Kaarta, where more subordinate rulers began siding with the French and Ahmadu fled to Masina, which was the most easterly section of his disintegrating empire. Disappointed that the French would not restore their pre-Tukolor independence, the Bambara staged several rebellions in 1892 and supported

Ahmadu in his campaign. Ahmadu used diplomacy to settle the conflict between Samori and Tieba, the ruler of the Kenedugu area centered on the town of Sikasso who had been supported by the French but now saw them as a threat to his own independence. This created a broad anti-French alliance and reopened Ahmadu's access to firearms from the southern coast, which had been blocked by Kenedugu when he withdrew east. However, because the French intensified their operations against Samori in 1892 so that he could not help Ahmadu, Tukolor efforts to recapture Segu failed, and Ahmadu lost many men and horses. With a French expedition sent to distract Samori, in early April 1893, Archinard led another force into the Masina area, where many of the demoralized local rulers and soldiers began to desert Ahmadu. In mid-April, the French defeated the weakened Tukolor army and captured the important Niger River center of Jenne. A few days later, the French took the other Niger trading town of Mopti, which the Tukolors had abandoned. At the end of the month, a disheartened Tukolor army of just 1,500 men was easily defeated by the French and their allies at Bandiagara, the capital of Masina. The French proclaimed Aguibu, a rival half-brother of Ahmadu and their ally, as the new Tukolor ruler. He was then accepted by many local chiefs. Ahmadu fled east to the Sokoto Caliphate in what is now northern Nigeria, and many of his followers moved south to join Samori's fight against the French.¹⁰

Samori Toure originated from a non-Muslim Mandinka-speaking merchant family in the upper Niger basin east of Futa Jalon in what had been the center of the Mali Empire. During the 1860s, to protect his family's trade in gold and cattle, he developed a force of soldiers equipped with firearms imported through the British enclave of Sierra Leone. From 1865 to 1875, Samori subjugated surrounding states and established a large and powerful Mandinka Empire that promoted trade, conquered gold-producing Bure, and encouraged the spread of Islam (to which he had converted). A major factor in the development of what quickly became West Africa's third largest territorial empire (Sokoto and Tukolor were larger) was Samori's army, which consisted of male slaves armed with repeating rifles from Sierra Leone and muzzle loaders manufactured and maintained by local blacksmiths. By the early 1880s, Samori, appealing to the memory of the Mali Empire, had mustered a force of 30,000 men, mostly firearm-equipped infantry supported by elite cavalry. The Mandinka Empire was divided into 10 provinces, 8 of which were

ruled by a governor assisted by a war chief who commanded a 4,000- to 5,000-strong military force consisting primarily of conscripts led by 200 to 300 professional soldiers. During war, the rate of conscription increased from 10 to 50 percent of the able-bodied male population. Under Samori's direct control, the 2 central provinces provided an elite unit of around 500 professional troops who supplied most of the senior officers of the provincial armies. At the capital of Bissandugu, the ruler's small bodyguard was armed with repeating rifles. On the offensive, Samori's army usually operated with 4 army corps—3 forming an advancing arc and 1 held in reserve. In peacetime, the armies spent six months of the year training and another six months performing agricultural labor. Organized down to squad level, the Mandinka army was disciplined and competent, made effective use of cavalry, and was skilled at ambushes. The military was paid for by taxation of peasants, gold miners, and traders. Since Samori's state sold slaves in Futa Jalon and used the profits to acquire firearms from Europeans on the coast, the empire had to constantly wage offensive wars to maintain military power.

French attempts to push south from the Tukolor Empire to link up with their enclaves on the Ivory Coast led to conflict with the Mandinka Empire. Ignoring orders from the governor of Senegal, French military commander lieutenant colonel Gustav Borgnis-Desbordes, in January 1882, led a small column to the Niger River and tested Samori's military potential by attacking Mandinka forces besieging the town of Keniera. In February 1883, the French occupied Bamako, an important trading center on the Niger, where they built a fort that easily repelled an attack by the Mandinka in April. Bamako then became the forward base for a French punitive expedition that drove Samori's forces to the south and east of the Niger. In France, Borgnis-Desbordes was lionized, and support for colonial expansion grew. However, in 1885, a new French commander, Colonel A. V. A. Combes, unwisely established forts along the Niger at Niagassola and Nafadie, which had unfriendly populations and were difficult to supply. In turn, Samori's forces drove the small French garrison out of Nafadie, besieged Niagassola, and regained control over the north side of the Niger. A French relief expedition was forced to turn back because of rains. Because the French and Samori were distracted by other conflicts, they signed the Treaty of Bissandugu in 1887, which established the Niger as Samori's northeastern border. The French attempted to undermine Samori by encouraging dissidents in his

empire to cross the Niger and by supporting the independence of Kenedugu on his eastern frontier. In 1888, Samori was greatly weakened when his army lost 1,000 men and several skilled generals during the failed siege of Sikasso, capital of Kenedugu. In 1891, the French under Archinard, who characteristically did not wait for permission from civilian authorities, discarded the treaty and sent an invasion force south of the Niger, where it burned Bissandugu. The engagements of the 1880s had taught Samori to avoid direct confrontation with superior European firepower, so he led a guerrilla war in which the French were lured out of their forts to be harassed and ambushed, and local food resources were denied them. By this time, Samori's men were equipped with around 8,000 repeating rifles that took a heavy toll on the French. Although a 1,300-strong French expedition under Lieutenant Colonel Gustave Humbert, Archinard's temporary replacement, had driven Samori as far as Kerouane, it had to withdraw to Bissandugu because it was too large to supply in the wasted countryside, and yellow fever broke out in the ranks. Since the ruler of Kenedugu had rejected French requests to supply troops for the invasion, the French had to take soldiers from garrisons in the north, which meant they were unable to quickly deal with Bambara rebellions in Tukolor.

From 1892 to 1894, Samori sought to escape the French by a general eastward movement of his state to what is now northern Ivory Coast and Ghana. Part of his forces fought delaying actions against the French in the west while others conquered new areas in the east. In early 1893, with the expansionist Archinard in overall political and military command of the French in the region, another French expedition under Combes chased Samori's forces further east beyond Gueliba to the Baoule River and prevented him from assisting the remnants of the Tukolor Empire to the north. Around the same time, another French column, attempting to cut off the Mandinka supply of firearms, moved south to occupy Farana and Erimakono on the new and still debated frontier with British Sierra Leone. In December, by which time Archinard had been replaced by a civilian governor, a French expedition under Lieutenant Colonel Etienne Bonnier pushed yet further east to block Samori's coastal trade with Liberia and briefly occupied Bougouni before returning to the Niger by the end of the month. Ignoring his civilian superiors, Bonnier sent two gunboats down the Niger and followed them with an overland column that occupied Timbuktu, long a goal of French colonial expansion, on January 10, 1894. A few days later Bonnier, a dozen French officers and

noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and 68 tirailleurs were killed when a patrol, camped near Goundam, was attacked at night by Tauregs who stampeded a cattle herd that threw the badly defended post into confusion. This was the worst French loss during the conquest of West Africa. In mid-February, a column under Commandant J. J. C. Joffre, future marshal of France during World War I, defeated the Tauregs and took Goundam and Timbuktu. Given the Goundam disaster, a planned French offensive against Samori was suspended, which gave the Mandinka leader time to regroup. In January and February 1895, a 300-man French column led by Commandant Parfait-Louis Monteil, originally en route to Congo to assert French claims, was landed on the Ivory Coast and marched inland with orders to protect Kong, a state that had accepted French protection in 1889, from Samori and potentially negotiate with him. Just before reaching Kong, the expedition, which experienced logistical problems because of its diversion, clashed with Samori's forces, suffered heavy casualties (including the severely wounded Monteil), and was compelled to retreat. This disaster, which might have been avoided by the dispatch of 3,000 troops from the north, contributed to the unification of the French colonies of Senegal, Guinea, Sudan, and Ivory Coast as French West Africa under a governor-general responsible for civilian and military issues.

Samori's eastward movement was eventually blocked by the large Asante Kingdom that, in 1896, was occupied by the British, who rejected the Mandinka leader's request for protection. Indeed, during the 1890s, Samori's military power was weakened when the British, in accordance with the Brussels Declaration, stopped arms shipments to him from Sierra Leone. In March 1896, a French mission under Captain Braulot was sent to Samori to offer him authority over the provinces of Djimini and Diamanko if he paid an indemnity and accepted a French resident with military escort. After Samori rejected the offer, Mandinka fighters massacred the French mission. Bent on revenge, French forces under Commandant P. C. Caudrelier occupied Bobo-Dioulasso in October 1897 and fought the Mandinka at Kong in January 1898. In February, the French sacked Sikasso because its new ruler had refused to supply men for the campaign. The Anglo-French Agreement of 1898 settled disputes over West African colonial borders and gave the French a free hand to deal with Samori. By this time, conflict with the French and local resistance had reduced the once large Mandinka armies to small groups living off the land. After the French rejected Samori's offer to demobilize his forces and retire to the Niger

River, the Mandinka leader was captured by a French column that surprised his camp in August 1898. He was exiled to Gabon, where he died in 1900.¹¹

In 1851, the Kingdom of Dahomey, located near the West African coast in what is now the Republic of Benin, allowed French traders to enter its territory. However, during the 1860s and 1870s, Dahomey and France competed for control of the coastal trading enclaves of Porto Novo and Cotonou. Dahomey had long tried to dominate the coastal trade and in the early 1860s, its campaign to expand east into Yoruba territory had failed. Dahomey's army was based on firearm-equipped infantry, including an elite corps of female warriors that Europeans romanticized as "Amazons." After Porto Novo was attacked by British antislavery warships in 1861, the local ruler requested French protection, but this was opposed by Dahomey, which saw the ports as tributaries. During the 1880s, Dahomey raided Porto Novo and surrounding villages. In March 1889, Dahomian warriors decapitated a coastal chief and wrapped his severed head in a French flag that he had claimed would protect him. The French fortified Cotonou and built up a 360-man garrison there, of which 300 were tirailleurs from Senegal and Gabon. On the morning of March 4, 1890, a Dahomey army attacked the French fort at Cotonou. Some Dahomian warriors pried open the stockade's wooden stakes, through which they shot their muskets, and others climbed over the wall and engaged in hand-to-hand fighting. French firepower, including from a gunboat, eventually drove off the Dahomey force, which suffered several hundred killed. French losses were minimal. Dahomey's ruler, Behanzin, sent another army to attack Porto Novo, but it was intercepted by a contingent of 400 colonial troops with 3 field guns and 500 local allies who served as a screening force. While the Porto Novo contingent was routed, the French-led tirailleurs formed a square and slowly withdrew to the coast while fending off repeated Dahomian attacks. The First Franco-Dahomey War ended in early October 1890 when Behanzin signed a treaty recognizing Porto Novo and Cotonou as a French protectorate.

When Dahomey reasserted its claims to the coast in 1892, a French gunboat was sent up the Oueme River, where it was attacked and forced to turn back. Under Colonel Alfred-Amedee Dodds, a 2,164-man expeditionary force was sent from Senegal consisting of Foreign Legionnaires, marines, artillery, Senegalese auxiliary cavalry, and tirailleurs. Porto Novo provided the expedition with 2,600 supply carriers.

After the previous war, Behanzin had acquired 4,000–6,000 rifles, including many repeating models, as well as some machine guns and Krupp artillery pieces from Togo-based German merchants through the port of Whydah. Because they lacked appropriate training, it is unlikely that the machine guns and artillery were ever used by Dahomey forces. The French then blockaded the coast to prevent further firearm imports to Dahomey. Justifying their planned campaign, French officials vilified Dahomey by highlighting its ritual human sacrifice and slavery. After French gunboats bombarded villages up the Oueve River in early July, Dodd's expeditionary force began marching up the river toward the Dahomian capital of Abomey in mid-August. On September 19, at Dogba, some 80 kilometers from the coast on the border of Porto Novo and Dahomey territory, the French colonial force was attacked by a Dahomian army that tried repeatedly to get into close combat but was repelled after three or four hours. Hundreds of Dahomey warriors were killed. On October 4, after the French column turned west to approach Abomey, it was attacked at Poguessa by a Dahomey force led by Behanzin. After several unsuccessful charges against lines of 50 centimeter long French bayonets, the Dahomians were repelled, having lost 200 troops. The French suffered only 42 casualties. It then took the French a month to advance 40 kilometers to Abomey, as they had to overcome entrenched Dahomey positions. At the village of Adegon, on October 6, a major engagement took place in which a French charge inflicted 419 fatalities on Dahomey's famous Amazon corps. The French lost just 6 dead and 32 wounded. After this stunning defeat, the royal court at Abomey realized that they could not win. The French reached the village of Akpa, 16 kilometers from Abomey, in mid-October. There they were repeatedly attacked by Dahomey forces, including remnants of the Amazon unit, until the end of the month, at which point they resumed the advance. In late October, the French used bayonet charges to overcome Dahomey trenches near the capital. Though the Dahomey warriors favored hand-to-hand fighting, they were disadvantaged because their swords and machetes did not reach as far as the French bayonets. In early November, the French defeated a 1,500-strong Dahomey force, led by Behanzin but consisting of many slaves and convicts called up to replace losses, at Cana just outside Abomey. While the Amazons specifically targeted French officers to disrupt command and control, colonial bayonet charges once again overpowered the Dahomey army. The French

occupied Abomey in mid-November while the king (his offer to negotiate ignored) and his remaining supporters fled north. The French appointed another member of the royal family as king of Dahomey. Behanzin tried but failed to rebuild the Dahomey army, eventually surrendered in January 1894, and was exiled to Martinique and then Algeria, where he died in 1906. After this Second Franco-Dahomey War (1892–94), the French extended colonial rule further inland over the Ewe-speaking people, and in 1904, Dahomey—where French merchants took over palm oil exports—became part of French West Africa.¹²

Rabih ibn Fadl Allah had served in Egypt's Sudanese cavalry during the war against Ethiopia in the 1860s and became the military commander of a Sudanese slaver in the Bahr el Ghazal region of southern Sudan during the 1870s. In 1879, following the suppression of slave traders by the Egyptian-appointed governor-general Charles Gordon, Rabih led 700–800 slave soldiers south to raid the country between the Nile and Ubangi basins. In 1887, after the Mahdi had overturned Egyptian rule in Sudan, Rabih's forces invaded Darfur, where they recruited more soldiers but were defeated by the sultan of Wadai and then subjugated a small sultanate just north of what is now the Central African Republic. Rabih claimed to be a follower of the Mahdi, and his expansion clashed with growing French ambitions in the region. His army relied on a core of fast cavalry armed with imported rifles. In 1892, Rabih led an invasion of the Baghirimi Sultanate southeast of Lake Chad and destroyed its capital in March 1893, which prompted the exiled ruler to eventually accept French protection in 1897. Later that year, Rabih led 2,000 horsemen into Borno, southwest of Lake Chad, and defeated its 15,000-strong army in May and September. After new Borno ruler Kyari inflicted a defeat on the invaders and occupied their camp, Rabih launched a vicious counteroffensive that sacked the capital Kukuwa in what is now northeastern Nigeria. Kyari was killed, and Rabih established a new fortified capital at nearby Dikwa. As military dictator, Rabih reformed Borno taxation and used its revenue to rebuild the army commanded by his fellow Sudanese, which seized food from villages and captured slaves. In 1895, Rabih tried unsuccessfully to obtain guns and ammunition from the British Royal Niger Company and a French expedition under Emile Gentil, meant to block British and German expansion, traveled by steamboat up the Congo and Ubangi Rivers to establish Fort Archambault (today's Sahr) in what is now southern Chad. The French greatly underestimated Rabih's military

strength and in late 1898 and early 1899, a small French expedition led by naval lieutenant Henri Bretonnet with five French officers, 50 Senegalese tirailleurs, and 3 cannon was dispatched up the Congo River to support Baghirimi, which lent it 400 fighters, and establish a defensive position on the Togbao Hills overlooking the town of Kouno. On July 17, 1899, Rabih's army, consisting of 2,700 gunmen and 10,000 auxiliaries with spears and bows, overwhelmed the position after three attacks and massacred the defenders. Subsequently, the French set out to unify their African territories by having three columns converge on Lake Chad. One, led by Gentil, traveled by steamboat up the Congo River. Another, under Major Amedee-Francois Lamy, marched south from Algiers across the Sahara. Another, which was commanded by the psychopathic captain Paul Voulet, originated from Dakar in Senegal and marched across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Since it wantonly destroyed villages and massacred people along its path, the Senegal expedition was pursued for over 2,000 kilometers by 70 Senegalese tirailleurs under Lieutenant Colonel Jean-Francois Klob, the French commander at Timbuktu ordered by Paris to stop the slaughter, who was killed in a confrontation with Voulet. The expedition then degenerated into mutiny and infighting during which Voulet and other officers were killed. After capturing the town of Zinder in what is now Niger, the force's 600 tirailleurs were divided, with 170 under Lieutenant Paul Joalland continuing east where they linked up with Lamy's column and proceeded to Lake Chad. On October 28, Gentil led an attack on Rabih's fort at Kouno, with his gunboat providing artillery fire from the Chari River and 340 tirailleurs with several cannon approaching overland. With the 3 cannon captured at Togbao, Rabih and his men repelled repeated French assaults and after half his force was killed or wounded, Gentil ordered a withdrawal to Fort Archambault to await the other columns. On April 21, 1900, Gentil's and Lamy's expeditions joined on the east bank of the Chari across from the town of Kousseri in today's northern Cameroon. The next day, 700 tirailleurs along with 600 Baghirimi infantry and 200 cavalry attacked Rabih's camp, where his 10,000 men were routed. Lamy and Rabih were both killed, and the French displayed the latter's decapitated head as proof of their conquest. French control of what is now Chad, administered from Fort Lamy (now Ndjamena) linked their Central, West and North African territories.¹³

The French decided to strengthen their position in the Indian Ocean by subjugating the Christian-ruled Kingdom of Madagascar using

failure to honor an old 1855 agreement on mining and forestry as an excuse for military action. When a French warship threatened the island's east coast port of Tamatave in May 1882, the kingdom's British allies advocated negotiation, and requests for German and American assistance were refused. In February 1883, a French naval squadron bombarded ports on the island's west coast and in May occupied northwestern Majunga (Mahajanga). A subsequent French ultimatum for the acceptance of French property rights in the island's northeast, a protectorate over the autonomous Sakalava states in the west, and the payment of a large indemnity was rejected by Antananarivo, the kingdom's capital. The French moved their ships to the east side of the island, where they occupied Tamatave (Toamasina). This led recently crowned Queen Ranavalona III to sign a treaty in which she accepted a French resident in Antananarivo and agreed to pay an even larger indemnity. While the term "protectorate" was not used in the treaty, the French believed they had imposed one on the entire island. In 1890, in typical scramble style, the British and French agreed to divide the western Indian Ocean, with the former gaining Zanzibar and the latter Madagascar. Since Ranavalona III rejected French protectorate claims, the French navy bombarded and occupied Tamatave in December 1894 and Majunga in January 1895. The main expeditionary force under General Jacques Duchesne, consisting of 15,000 troops and 6,000 porters, landed at Majunga in May 1895 and tried to advance by constructing a road toward Antananarivo during the rainy season. Despite heavy losses from malaria, French firepower pushed back the 30,000-strong Malagasy army under General Rainianjalahy at Tsarasoatra at the end of June and Andriba in late August. French conquest was facilitated by local uprisings related to Christianization and obligatory gold mining to pay the previous war indemnity. The advent of the dry season allowed the French to move more quickly and in mid-September, Duchesne formed a "flying column" of 4,000 light infantry supported by supply-carrying mules that dashed toward the capital. After thwarting a Malagasy attempt led by Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony to attack their rear in which the kingdom's elite artillerymen were slaughtered, the French column arrived at Antananarivo, where they bombarded the queen's palace. This forced immediate capitulation. The next day, Ranavalona III accepted a French protectorate whereby the French would govern indirectly through the existing monarchy. Rainilaiarivony was exiled to Algiers. About 4,600 French troops, one third of the expedition, had

died—almost entirely from disease—and four fifths of these were Europeans.

Popular resentment of French conquest, continued aristocratic rule, Christianity, and forced labor, provoked rebellions across the island. Violence began in November 1895 when 2,000 men overran Avironimamo near the capital, where they killed the Malagasy governor, two British missionaries, and three French visitors. In the subsequent weeks, 750 missions and churches were destroyed, and insurgents enslaved captives, ambushed traveling merchants, and disrupted mining. In March 1896, a 400-strong rebel force of aristocratic Malagasy troops who had not been disarmed, led by former governor Rabezavana and insurgent Rabozaka, took Anjozorobe some 90 kilometers north of Antananarivo. At this stage, the French occupation force consisted of 2,600 French and Algerian soldiers, along with 1,800 Malagasy auxiliaries. In May and June, after several small French expeditions had failed to hunt them down, rebel activity increased and they besieged Antananarivo. The highly mobile rebels, later called red togas after the traditional warrior symbol they wore, were organized into seven main groups and possessed 10,000 firearms in addition to many axes and machetes. In early August, France annexed Madagascar as a colony and abolished slavery on the island. Fresh from suppressing piracy in Indochina, General Joseph-Simon Gallieni and his assistant Lieutenant Colonel Hubert Lyautey arrived in October to take administrative and military control. Ranavalona III was exiled to Algeria and the monarchy abolished. Under Gallieni, Madagascar was divided into a number of districts, roughly corresponding with the old kingdom's divisions, each under a French colonel with a small security force responsible for military and civil affairs. The districts were further divided into sectors, each commanded by a captain or lieutenant with similar military and civil responsibilities who led a company- or platoon-sized garrison and was encouraged to exercise initiative. Gradually, insurgents were pushed out of the central province and trade routes reopened. While most rebels in the central territory of the former kingdom had surrendered by the end of 1897, it took until 1905 for Senegalese and Algerian troops under French leadership to pacify the small groups of the periphery, and some resistance continued into the World War I era. The French were the first to impose a single administration on the island and partly financed their operations by selling 900,000 hectares of land to 6 chartered companies and 2,000 French settlers from

Reunion. Considered a pioneer of modern counterinsurgency, Gallieni went on to play a key role in the defense of Paris during World War I and served as France's minister of war just prior to his death in 1916. Lyautey would become a central figure in the pacification of Morocco.¹⁴

THE BRITISH IN WEST AFRICA

During the mid-1800s, Kosoko, ruler of coastal Lagos, appeared unfriendly to British missionaries and traders, and did little to suppress the slave trade. As a result, the British navy bombarded Lagos in December 1851, which forced Kosoko to flee. He was replaced by the rival Egba leader Akitoye, who signed an antislavery treaty. Because Akitoye and his successors failed to stabilize the area, the British took direct control of Lagos in 1861, and it eventually became a center for further colonial expansion into what is now western Nigeria. The process was hastened by French and German competition in the 1880s. In 1886, the British intervened in the interior Yoruba states to end a 15-year war between Ibadan and a coalition of Ekiti, Ijesa, Ijebu, and Ife. War weary, the Yoruba rulers agreed to call upon the British governor in Lagos to resolve future disputes and to encourage free trade, which gave British merchants greater access. In 1891, the ruler of Ijebu, a state that had kept Europeans out for most of the century, refused to discuss trade conditions with the Lagos governor, which was seen as a violation of the treaty. In May the following year, it took a 1,000-strong British-led force less than a week to conquer Ijebu, where it used machine guns to route an army of 7,000–10,000 men equipped with obsolete firearms. Intimidated by British military power, most Yoruba leaders signed away their sovereignty and became part of an enlarged Lagos colony in 1893. In November 1894, New Oyo, the only Yoruba state to have rejected British supremacy, was bombarded and came under colonial rule.

Beginning in the 1850s, local rulers and British traders in the Bight of Biafra, with its intense economic competition looked to the British consul to solve disputes. With increasing power as the area's puppet master, the consul imposed treaties that promoted British free trade, suppressed the slave trade, and assisted missionaries. In Calabar around the 1850s, the consul intervened to place pro-British rulers in power in Creek Town and Duke Town. In 1855, the consul ordered

the bombardment of Old Town to end the practice of human sacrifice and killing of twins. In 1869, a civil war in the city-state of Bonny prompted Jaja, a former slave who had become head of an important trading house, to break away to establish the new city state of Opobo. In 1873, the British formally recognized Jaja, who was by this time the most powerful ruler in the Bight of Biafra. Reacting to the arrival of French and German agents in the mid-1880s, the British consul toured the area and secured treaties of protection with all rulers, including Jaja. In 1885 Britain, having gained rights to control the foreign affairs of local states and to intervene to promote peace and free trade, declared the Oil Rivers Protectorate (renamed the Niger Coast Protectorate in 1893). In 1887 Jaja, who had violated his treaty by refusing British traders free access to Opobo, was lured to negotiations by the British, where he was arrested and exiled to the Caribbean. In early 1897, the Kingdom of Benin, which had rejected several British treaty offers and massacred a British diplomatic mission, was invaded by the 1,200-strong Benin Punitive Expedition under Rear Admiral Harry Rawson, which consisted of marines, sailors, and Niger Coast Protectorate forces. The expedition looted and burned Benin City, the capital's rich artwork was sold to defray the cost of the invasion, and King Ovonranwen was eventually captured and exiled to Calabar.

In 1886, George Goldie's National African Company (an amalgamation of the three largest British trading firms on the Niger River) was granted a charter by the British government to gain control of the Niger and Benue rivers by making treaties with local rulers and suppressing the slave trade. While the British Protectorate had secured the coast and Niger Delta, Goldie's renamed Royal Niger Company (RNC) was meant to forestall French and German penetration of the navigable rivers of the Nigerian hinterland. The RNC established its coercive arm in the form of the Royal Niger Constabulary with headquarters at Lokoja. The RNC signed a series of treaties, though it is unclear if the signatories understood they were signing away their sovereignty, and created a monopoly by imposing high import duties that drove out other European and African merchants. Since the Brass people of the Niger Delta were therefore restricted from their historic trade further up the river, they could not afford to import food and began to starve. As a result, in late December 1894, a Brass army under King Koko attacked the RNC headquarters at Akassa, destroyed warehouses and machinery, looted trade goods, and captured several company employees who were later eaten as part of a ritual to counter a

smallpox epidemic. Although RNC policies had caused Brass resistance, Goldie was unwilling to expend company resources in response and called on British Protectorate forces, which bombarded the Brass town of Nembe. French competition continued as in December 1894 when a French gunboat proceeded 160 kilometers up the Niger from the delta before running aground and in 1897 when a French post was established in the west at Bussa on the Niger, which could have been used to develop military strength in the area. During January and February 1897, RNC forces, prompted by concerns about the French, conquered the kingdoms of Nupe and Ilorin, which were tributary states of the large Sokoto Caliphate to the north. With superior firepower, including seven artillery pieces and six Maxim guns, an RNC force of 1,000 African soldiers and 32 European officers easily defeated the 30,000-strong Nupe army. A smaller RNC contingent of 320 African infantry and 22 Europeans, supported by two field guns and four Maxims, invaded Ilorin. As it was marching, this force was almost ambushed by Ilorin cavalry, though the horsemen sprang the trap prematurely, which gave the RNC troops time to form a defensive square. In 1898, the British government bought the RNC from Goldie and sent Frederick Lugard, a veteran of colonial wars in Nyasaland and Uganda, to the area where he transformed the company's constabulary into the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). During the next year, Lugard led troops into Borgu, and French forces withdrew west into what became Dahomey (today's Republic of Benin). At the beginning of 1900, the RNC territory south of the Niger and Benue, in the palm oil zone, was joined to the Niger Coast Protectorate to form the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Former RNC territory in the north plus Ilorin on the south side of the Niger became the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, with Lugard as its first commissioner.

The Sokoto Caliphate presented the British with two problems: its tributary relations with smaller neighboring states such as Ilorin could encourage resistance to colonial rule, and it could serve as an avenue for French encroachment from the north. In 1899, the Sokoto ruler had rejected an RNC request to establish a military post and British resident in the caliphate as a foil to French ambitions. The British now saw military conquest as the only way to secure northern Nigeria. Sokoto's decentralized government and lack of a standing army meant that each of the caliphate's subordinate rulers, or emirs, faced British invasion on their own. In addition, the Sokoto Caliphate's army still consisted primarily of traditional cavalry, as it had

not modernized (partly because of European prohibition on selling firearms to Africans). Lugard justified his invasion of Sokoto on the basis that it practiced slavery and was a threat to regional peace. Initially, Lugard invaded the emirates of Bida and Kontagora on the Niger, and Yola (capital of Adamawa) on the Benue, where he installed new rulers friendly to the British. The WAFF, with soldiers from the commoner Hausa population, then moved against Bauchi and Gombe, and had taken Zaria by 1902. Although most of these battles were easy victories for the British, one incident illustrates what Sokoto forces could have accomplished with more artillery. In 1901, a WAFF expedition led by Colonel T. L. N. Morland advanced in square formation toward the army of Emir Zubeira, who was protecting his city of Yola. Suddenly, two cannon with Tukolor crews fired grapeshot at close range at the WAFF attackers, killing 50 and almost breaking their square. The British officers rallied their men and rushed the guns before they could reload. In February 1903, a WAFF expedition of 722 African infantry under 24 European officers, with four Maxims and four artillery pieces, advanced on the walled market city of Kano, which Emir Aliyu had abandoned, taking with him a large portion of the army. After the British artillery breached the 12 meter thick city walls, WAFF soldiers stormed Kano. Lugard's next target was the city of Sokoto, where Caliph Attahiru II, perhaps wanting to avoid the bombardment of his capital, led the army outside the gates to await the British. On March 15, a WAFF expedition of 656 African infantry and 25 European officers, supported by four Maxims and four artillery pieces, fought a 90-minute battle against the far larger Sokoto army. After repeated but failed charges by his sword- and spear-wielding cavalry and infantry against the WAFF square, the caliph and his army withdrew east, and Lugard's men occupied the city. Although Lugard declared victory, installed a new caliph, and left for Britain, Attahiru rallied his followers for a last stand on the sacred ground of Bima Hill near the town of Burmi, which was 320 kilometers southeast of Kano and near Gombe on the Gongola River. In May, a 130-man WAFF patrol under Captain D. W. Sword was surrounded near Burmi and withdrew in square formation, suffering heavy casualties (mostly from arrow wounds). On July 27, the WAFF attacked Burmi in what proved to be the war's most intense battle, which was fought from late morning to early evening. Attahiru and his two sons were killed early and by the end of the day, British artillery and machine guns had silenced resistance in the town and killed over 600 people, mostly

from the Fulani aristocracy. This marked the end of resistance, and the Sokoto Caliphate was absorbed into the Northern Nigeria protectorate. The following year, British forces occupied Borno, which had been weakened by the 1893 conquest of Sudanese slaver Rabih ibn Fadl Allah (who had been killed by the French in 1900) and which was also annexed to northern Nigeria.¹⁵

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Asante Empire and the British struggled over control of the Fante communities and oceanic trade along the Gold Coast (now Ghana). The British also disliked that after abolition of the coastal slave trade, Asante redirected much of its commerce to the Muslim states of the north. The 1871 British purchase of Dutch forts along the Gold Coast threatened Asante's supply of fire-arms from that direction. After Asante ruler Kofi Kakari's objections were ignored, Asante invaded the coast in 1873 and besieged the small British garrison at Cape Coast Castle while the African inhabitants of the former Dutch enclaves rebelled in support. Although the war party within Asante had gained the upper hand, those who favored a negotiated peace included the Queen Mother and the state's top military leader, Asamoa Nkwanta, who had recently seen a demonstration of the firepower of the new British Snider breech-loading rifle. At this time, the Asante army was still using muzzle loaders fired from the hip with an effective range of around 50 meters. In August 1873, newly promoted Major General Garnet Wolseley, at 40 years of age the youngest general in the British army, was placed in command of a punitive expedition against Asante and was appointed administrator of the Gold Coast Protectorate. For Wolseley, it was important that to compensate for the defeats inflicted by Asante in the 1820s and 1860s, and to assert European dominance over Africans, the military power of Asante be crushed by a force made up primarily of British troops and not African allies. Aware that British soldiers would be vulnerable to tropical diseases, Wolseley planned a quick invasion and had his men issued quinine to counter malaria, a light uniform to replace the traditional scarlet tunic, and a pamphlet instructing them on how to live in a hot jungle environment, including sleeping off the ground and keeping one's head covered. To lead the expedition, Wolseley selected a group of officers, some of whom he had come to know while subduing the Metis in western Canada in 1870 and others who had reputations for bravery or intellect, including Redvers Buller as intelligence officer, Henry Brackenbury as military secretary, John Frederick Maurice as private

secretary, George Pomeroy Colley as head of transport, and Henry Evelyn Wood. Called the Wolseley Ring or Asante Ring, many of these officers would have highly successful military careers, and several played key roles in later British campaigns in Africa. To get the British troops in and out during the short dry season of January and February 1874, Wolseley arranged the improvement of the road that ran from the coast 112 kilometers inland to the forward staging area at Prahsu, on the Pra River, which included the construction of 237 bridges and a supply/rest base every 16 kilometers. Once the army reached the Pra, it would make a lightning strike on the Asante capital of Kumasi another 100 kilometers inland. Because pack animals would die from sleeping sickness, supplies were transported by thousands of carriers press-ganged from coastal communities. The expedition itself consisted of 1,500 British regulars and 700 black troops, including the West India Regiment of Barbados and a unit of Hausa from northern Nigeria, supported by several artillery pieces and rockets. Given that the thick forest meant that small units could easily become separated from the main body, Wolseley's expedition had a disproportionately high number of officers, one for every 20 men. Suffering from smallpox and dysentery, the Asante army had withdrawn inland across the Pra River and sought to fight a delaying action to lure the British to a strongly defended position at Amofo, 30 kilometers from Kumasi, where they would be outflanked and trapped by the destruction of a bridge. The British expedition, formed into a loose square with the artillery in the center, advanced on Amofo, where it clashed with the Asante army on January 31. While the Black Watch highlanders at the front of the square pushed ahead slowly, troops on the left flank struggled through the forest, which created a gap that was almost penetrated by Asante attack. Taking heavy casualties, the Asante slowly withdrew, though they launched a determined counterattack that came within 100 meters of the British headquarters. Other attacks at the rear of the square cut off British supplies. Although defeat at the Battle of Amofo propelled the peace party to power in Kumasi, harsh British surrender terms were rejected, and another Asante army mobilized under Asamoia Nkwanta. Despite mounting fierce resistance, the Asante were defeated by the advancing British at the Battle of Odahsu, and Wolseley's expedition entered nearby Kumasi on the evening of February 4. Two days later, after waiting in vain for Asante leaders to arrive to surrender, the British burned the capital and began marching back to the

coast before the arrival of the rains. Asante emissaries eventually caught up with Wolseley and agreed to surrender. This resulted in the Treaty of Fomena in which the Asante renounced claims to the coast, agreed to pay an indemnity to Britain, and promised to open the area to free trade. Both sides wanted to end the war, as the British expedition was unable to stage further operations, and weakened Asante wanted to prevent its provinces from declaring independence. Perhaps around 3,000 or 4,000 Asante had been killed and twice that many wounded. Within the British expedition, 68 had died, 367 had been wounded, and 1,018 suffered sickness.

Under new ruler Prempeh, Asante recovered militarily, rejected a British offer to become a protectorate in 1890, and launched a campaign to subdue the Nkoranza people in 1893. In 1894, Prempeh rejected a British proposal to pay him a stipend in exchange for accepting a British resident at Kumasi and not attacking coastal groups. An Asante delegation to London in 1895 failed to prevent British invasion. In January 1896—fearing that the French in the Ivory Coast to the west or the Germans in Togo to the east would intervene—British forces, including West Indian troops and African auxiliaries led by Robert Baden-Powell, occupied Asante without a fight. The British declared a protectorate, built a fort at Kumasi to serve as a base for a British resident, and exiled Prempeh, his family, and his main advisors to the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean. In late March 1900, after Gold Coast governor Sir Frederick Hodgson refused to return the exiles and insisted on the surrender of the sacred golden stool, the Asante rebelled under the leadership of Queen Mother Yaa Asantewa and besieged the British fort at Kumasi, which was defended by several Maxim guns. The Asante cut British telegraph wires, built stockades on each of the roads leading out of Kumasi, and encircled the town with a path cut through the forest so that men could be dispatched quickly to wherever they were needed. Each Asante military unit was assigned a position in the cordon and a reserve held at headquarters. While most Asante fighters were still armed with their old muskets, a unit of snipers was created from professional hunters with up-to-date rifles who were placed in trees and trenches around the fort to pick off British officers. Given the major British campaign in South Africa, the organization of a substantial relief force from the coast was delayed. In late April, a small relief force of 250 soldiers along with one field gun and two Maxims that had been rushed to the Gold Coast from Lagos fought its way through a series of Asante ambushes

and entered the fort at Kumasi, though 5 had been killed and 139 wounded, including all 6 officers. Another small relief force of around 200 African soldiers pushed through to the fort from the north in May, but all it accomplished was to provide more mouths to feed with rapidly diminishing supplies. Within the fort, deaths from hunger and smallpox amounted to two or three dozen a day. In late June, the governor and most inhabitants of the fort broke out of the siege, leaving behind about 100 men too sick to march. Every morning, they carefully opened the gate and rolled fresh corpses into a nearby trench. On July 15, the main relief force from the coast, consisting of 1,000 African soldiers and 1,600 porters who were led by Colonel James Willcocks, arrived at Kumasi, assaulted the Asante stockades, and relieved the fort's desperate defenders. By September, British colonial troops at Kumasi had increased to 2,000, and nearby Asante towns were attacked. In October, some Asante leaders surrendered when they were offered amnesty. The last battle between the British and Asante took place on September 30, 1900, at Aboasu just northwest of Kumasi. Supported by field guns and Maxim guns, Willcocks led a force of 1,200 men mostly from the Central Africa Rifles (CAR) from Nyasaland (now Malawi), the West African Regiment from Sierra Leone, the West African Frontier Force from Nigeria, and Sikhs from India. With intense hand-to-hand fighting, the Asante were slowly driven up a hill, where they were outflanked and fled into the forest to avoid being completely surrounded. Kobina Chere, a defiant rebel leader accused of killing prisoners, was later captured and brought to Kumasi, where he was tried by a military commission and publically hung. Yaa Asantewa and 15 other rebel leaders were also captured and sent to join Prempeh in the Seychelles. The British administration quietly dropped the sensitive issue of the golden stool. In this last Anglo-Asante war, the British lost 692 soldiers and carriers, and 732 troops had been wounded. The Asante estimated their dead at over 1,000, and the number of wounded remains unknown. In 1902, Asante was incorporated into the Gold Coast Protectorate; in 1925, Prempeh was allowed to return home as a private citizen; and in 1935, the monarchy was restored under his successor Prempeh II, who ruled under British supervision.¹⁶

During the 1880s, the borders of the British freed slave colony of Sierra Leone, where the British Anti-Slavery Squadron was based at Freetown, had been established with neighboring Liberia and the French in what is now Guinea. Around the same time, attempts by

Creole merchants to control strategic trade routes between the coast and interior led to a series of Trade Wars. Local British and Creole traders began to demand that the British extend their authority into the hinterland. Samori Toure, who was leading resistance to the French, promised the British that his forces would not advance into the Temne part of Sierra Leone as long as he could obtain firearms through Freetown. In 1887, trade competition prompted the Yoni Temne to attack Senehun, a Kpaa Mende town ruled by Madam Yoko, who had allied with the British. As a result, a British military expedition defeated the Yoni Temne and established a garrison in the area. In 1890, with the French driving Samori's forces south and east, the British sent agents into the Sierra Leone interior to sign treaties with chiefs who promised to reject other European powers and accept the presence of a newly created Frontier Police that would prevent local conflict. That same year, the British rejected an alliance with Samori because it would have led to conflict with the French. The 1st West India Regiment, in 1893, drove some of Samori's followers out of Sierra Leone territory toward the French, which led to an accidental skirmish between French and British forces at Waima in which a French officer and the inspector general of the Frontier Police were killed. Although the Frontier Police was forbidden to interfere in the internal affairs of the Sierra Leonean chiefs, they gradually gained political power, which meant there was little resistance when the British declared a protectorate over the area in 1896. However, the imposition of tax in 1898, abuse by the Frontier Police, abolition of the internal slave trade, and loss of authority by chiefs caused a widespread rebellion known as the Hut Tax War. In the south, the Mende attacked symbols of British power. They also killed missionaries and Africans wearing European clothes, particularly Creoles. In the north, the Temne were led by Kasseh chief Bai Bureh, who had won fame as a warrior during three decades of brutal conflict over trade and learned British military methods by leading a "native levy" of 1,500 "war boys" as part of a 1892 British punitive expedition against a Susu war party. After an attack on Port Loko in early March was thwarted by the arrival of a British gunboat with reinforcements, the Temne avoided direct confrontation with superior colonial firepower, staged sudden raids, ambushed columns on narrow bush paths, sniped at British officers, employed a network of spies, and fought delaying actions from behind clusters of small wooden or stone stockades well positioned on high ground, along roads, and in dense bush. British

forces concentrated on trying to keep the roads open, burning Temne towns and establishing garrisons and regular patrols to prevent the building of more fortifications. In one day, a British-led column of 100 West Indian infantry supported by several hundred local porters could destroy 20 stockades and fight 4 or 5 intense battles. By October, the British, to supplement West Indian troops and localize the war, had formed a 1,000-strong battalion of the West African Regiment (WAR) recruited from interior communities such as the Mende and Temne, and based in Freetown. During the raining season from May to October, the British suspended operations, and the war came to an end in mid-November when a colonial patrol captured Bai Bureh, who was exiled to the Gold Coast until 1905, when he was allowed to return to Sierra Leone. He died three years later and eventually became a nationalist icon.

While the British controlled the port of Bathurst at the Gambia River mouth and a narrow strip along either side of that river, the French occupied the hinterland. British attempts to exchange the Gambia with France for the Ivory Coast ultimately failed because of local African opposition. One reason the British had wanted to give away the territory was that the adjacent Soninke Kingdom of Kombo since the 1850s had been embroiled in a series of civil wars between traditionalists and Muslim reformers. In 1887, the French occupied towns along the river, where they assisted local traditionalist rulers against Muslim forces. As a result, British agents made treaties with the chiefs along the Gambia and negotiated a border with the French, which led to their withdrawal in 1889. Because four decades of warfare had damaged or destroyed many Soninke states and divided the Muslim leaders, the British occupied the 22-kilometer wide and 320-kilometer long strip of territory in 1891 without much resistance. Muslim leader Fode Silla fought stubbornly but was defeated in 1894. Fode Kabba, who had taken up jihad in the 1850s, continued resisting until 1901 by slipping in and out of French territory. In the last operation against Kabba the British employed troops from the West Indian and Central Africa Regiments.¹⁷

LIBERIA

During the mid-nineteenth century, African American settlers established the Republic of Liberia and subjugated indigenous people. In January 1874, the various Grebo groups around Cape Palmas in the

south, under the leadership of Western-educated Christian Grebo who had been discriminated against in Americo-Liberian society, united as a single kingdom and adopted laws meant to reduce the exploitation of Grebo working on foreign-owned ships. While the Liberian government, controlled by the Americo-Liberian settlers, saw the Grebo as subjects and named their area Maryland County, the Grebo believed they were independent. After the British government rejected a Grebo request for a protectorate, some British officials and merchants hinted that Britain would recognize Grebo independence if they defeated Liberia in war. Under the mistaken belief that they had an alliance with Britain, the Grebo began to resist Liberian efforts to evict them from land to make way for new black settlers from the United States. In early September 1875, the Grebo launched a series of attacks on Liberian towns in the Cape Palmas area. On September 11, for example, 2,000 Grebo fighters surprised the settlers of Harper and Jacksonville, which were burned to the ground. With fire-arms and ammunition obtained from British merchants and Grebo mission employees, the Grebo army grew to 7,000 by October, and reinforcements continued to arrive from inland towns such as Grand Cess and Bereby. Liberian president Joseph Jenkins Roberts dispatched 1,000 militiamen to Maryland. On the morning of October 10, the militiamen, who had been drinking heavily for several days and under the command of an incompetent General Clayton, attacked Grebo fortifications around Hoffman Station and after several hours of intense fighting retreated in disorder, leaving behind artillery pieces and ammunition. The next day the Grebo, using captured weapons, attacked militia positions but themselves were repelled by superior firepower, and a number of prominent warriors were killed. Roberts ordered an arms embargo on the Liberian coast, but it was difficult to enforce. Since the Liberian state did not have the military resources to continue the war, Roberts requested support from the United States, which sent the warship *USS Alaska*, commanded by Alexander A. Semmes, to put an end to the dispute. In early March 1876 the Grebo, who Semmes threatened with direct American intervention, accepted a treaty in which they disbanded their kingdom, demobilized their army, and submitted to Liberian rule. With both the government in Monrovia and indigenous groups weary following years of warfare, during the late 1870s and 1880s, many village-states signed treaties accepting Liberian sovereignty and taxation. The Liberian state adopted a more conciliatory policy toward indigenous groups, partly

because it was worried about fending off territorial claims by the French and British in the adjacent colonies of Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone, respectively.

With a better financial situation and increased foreign interference, the Liberian government became more aggressive toward indigenous peoples during the 1890s. In Maryland, the British and French made alliances with anti-Liberian Grebo groups. In February 1893, warring Grebo leaders refused to attend a peace conference organized by Liberian president Joseph James Cheeseman. As a result, he sent a gunboat with 200 Liberian militiamen to Maryland, where they met up with 300 Nyemowe Grebo allies and defeated the Kudemowe and Cavallan Grebo in a series of battles around Rocktown. While the Grebo belligerents made peace with each other and accepted Liberian authority, inter-Grebo warfare resumed fairly quickly. Between 1893 and 1900, there were dozens of small skirmishes in the south between Liberian militia and various Grebo and Kru groups who rebelled against the government and fought among themselves. In November 1894, a Liberian gunboat bombarded Kru boats unloading illegal cargo, which led to a short-lived antissettler Kru alliance in 1895, which broke down because of internal disputes.

In 1906, the Liberian militia was criticized inside and outside Liberia for stealing cattle, food, and other items while trying to enforce peace between rival Kru communities. Eyeing Liberia's natural resources, Britain and France declared that they would annex the Liberian interior if Monrovia did not control warring factions that were threatening their colonial borders. Consequently in 1908, Liberia established the Frontier Force, which functioned as both a permanent military and police in the hinterland. Under British captain Mackay Caldwell, a veteran of the South African War assisted by a dozen other British officers and sergeants, 250 soldiers were recruited and housed in new barracks in Monrovia. The French complained about British dominance of the Frontier Force. When it was discovered that many of the new troops were Mende from British Sierra Leone, the Liberian government sacked Caldwell, who encouraged a brief mutiny that was put down by the settler militia. The Frontier Force was reorganized with Americo-Liberian officers and a rank and file recruited from the small and less Westernized indigenous groups of the interior such as the Kissi, Gbandi, Mende, and Mano. Liberian authorities believed that this ethnic diversity would discourage mutiny and that soldiers from one small group could be used to suppress another. Since they

were hostile to Americo-Liberians, coastal groups such as the Grebo and Kru were seen as unreliable. During the early twentieth century, the Frontier Force gained a reputation for abuse during tax collection and suppression of conflict among indigenous communities. To discourage British and French intrusion, the Liberian government turned to the United States. From 1912 to 1922, the Frontier Force was trained and commanded by a series of African American U.S. Army officers posted to Monrovia as military attaches and former buffalo soldiers (African American cavalrymen) on contract with the Liberian government, many of whom were veterans of the 1898 Spanish-American War. When Major Charles Young became the first African American field grade officer in a regular line unit in 1912, he was sent to Liberia because of concerns in the U.S. Army and government that white officers found it intolerable to serve under blacks. Young had been encouraged to accept the post by prominent African American educator Booker T. Washington. Under African American leadership, the Frontier Force grew to around 1,000 men armed with German-made Mauser rifles that put down a series of rebellions, the most serious of which was staged by the Kru of the southern coast in 1915–1916 in which hundreds were killed and 42 rebel leaders hung.¹⁸

THE BELGIAN CONGO

With the Belgian government uninterested in acquiring colonies in the late nineteenth century, the country's king, Leopold II, engaged in private empire building. In 1876, he founded the International Africa Association, which—during the early 1880s—conquered the vast Congo River basin euphemistically named the Congo Free State. Although the goals of Leopold's association were supposedly scientific and abolitionist, his regime in the Congo became one of colonial Africa's most brutal, ruthlessly extracting rubber and ivory. Leopold never visited Africa and hired famous explorer Henry Morton Stanley to organize the initial occupation, which focused on gaining control of the Congo River itself. Because navigating the first 400 kilometers of the Congo River was hampered by rapids and falls, Stanley, in 1881, organized local people to carry a steamboat in pieces from the river's mouth on the Atlantic coast to Malebo (later Stanley) Pool, the eventual site of Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), where it was assembled and proceeded up river. Between 1886 and 1896, the Congo Free State used

half its revenue to develop a fleet of steamers that patrolled from Leopoldville some 1,400 kilometers northeast up the Congo River to Stanley Falls, the eventual site of Stanleyville (now Kisangani), and then another 800 kilometers south up the Lualaba River to what would become Katanga Province. Leopold hired Canadian-born British mercenary Captain William Stairs to lead an expedition of 100 African gunmen and 300 carriers that traveled from Zanzibar to the south end of Lake Tanganyika where, in December 1891, they killed the Yeke ruler Msiri and incorporated Katanga into Belgian territory. In 1895, the Congo Free State built a railway from the Atlantic coast to Stanley Pool to better transport steamboat parts around the rapids of the first stretch of the Congo River. In 1886, Leopold, to enforce his rule, created a 2,000-strong private army called the Force Publique, which was initially a mercenary force consisting of West African Hausa and Zanzibari soldiers and officers from various European countries. To economize, recruitment was shifted to local people in 1891, when chiefs were ordered to produce a quota of young men every year and a militia was created for emergencies. In 1900, the term of service in the Force Publique was extended from five to seven years. During operations, the Force Publique employed local auxiliaries such as the Azande in the north and the Tetela in the south-central area who were paid with booty. Through enforcing Leopold's regime, the Force Publique gained a reputation for cruelty, looting, and cannibalism. When communities failed to produce a set quota of rubber, Force Publique soldiers flogged people and cut off hands or heads to prove to their officers that bullets had not been wasted. Functioning as an occupation army and labor police, small Force Publique posts of several dozen black soldiers under one or two white officers were maintained in every district, with their number growing from 183 in 1900 to 313 in 1908. Larger bases and training camps were established near the colonial capital of Boma on the coast, at Irebu near the confluence of the Ubangi and Congo Rivers, and Lisala in the north. Although men from many ethnic backgrounds joined the Force Publique, Lingala became the soldiers' lingua franca, as many early recruits had come from the northwest where this language is spoken, and soldiers from there did not participate in a series of mutinies in the 1890s. Soldiers and their families were prohibited from speaking other languages on or off duty. At the same time, the white officers adopted French as the language of command.¹⁹

The main obstacle to Leopold's control of the eastern Congo basin was the Arab-Swahili ivory and slave trading empire of Tippu Tip, who considered himself nominally under the sultan of Zanzibar. With the British and Germans challenging Zanzibar's influence in East Africa, Tippu Tip switched allegiance to Leopold, who (in 1887) appointed him governor of the eastern Congo Free State with his capital at Stanley Falls (now Kisangani). Tippu Tip promised to stop slaving as mandated by the Berlin Conference. However, the Arab-Swahili merchants resented that their ivory, previously exported to the east coast, was being sent west where it was subject to Congo Free State tax; that their slave raiding was restricted; and that the Force Publique was recruiting from their subordinate communities. When Tippu Tip retired to Zanzibar in 1891, war seemed inevitable. Anticipating hostilities with the Arab-Swahili, the Force Publique built fortified and well-supplied bases at Basoko down the Congo River from Stanley Falls and Lusambo to the south on the Sankuru River. Additionally, in 1890, the Congo Free State administration imposed a ban on the sale of breech-loading rifles and ammunition to the Arab-Swahili. While subsequent Congo Free State military operations against the Arab-Swahili were explained with accusations that they continued to trade slaves and were plotting with fellow Muslim Mahdists in Sudan, competition over the ivory trade represented an important motivation. During the Arab War, the Force Publique was expanded from 6,000 in 1892 to 10,000 in 1894, and irregulars were recruited from the previously conquered Tetela and Luba. In March and April 1892, Sefu (Tippu Tip's son) led attacks on Congo Free State officials who were seizing ivory from Arab-Swahili merchants. Within six months, Sefu mobilized an army of 10,000 mostly local men led by 500 Arab-Swahili. Open warfare began in November when Sefu established a fort on the Lomani River that was taken by the Force Publique. Under Commandant Francis Dhanis, the Force Publique advanced on the main Arab-Swahili towns of Nyangwe and Kasongo on the Lualaba River, which were besieged, bombarded by artillery, and captured during the first half of 1893. To the north, another Force Publique detachment under Commandant Louis Napoleon Chaltin, using the fort at Stanley Falls as a base, proceeded up the Congo and Lomani Rivers by steamboat and captured lightly defended Arab-Swahili outposts. At the same time, an Arab-Swahili army attacked and besieged the garrison at Stanley Falls, which, in May 1893, was


saved from disaster by the timely arrival of a steamer carrying a relief force under Chaltin. The war ended on October 20 when the Force Publique under Commandants Dhanis and Pierre Joseph Ponthier defeated the Arab-Swahili at the Luama River immediately west of Lake Tanganyika. Although both sides suffered heavy casualties and Ponthier later died of wounds, Sefu was killed, which meant Arab-Swahili resistance collapsed. After a campaign that took the lives of tens of thousands of mostly local people, the Congo Free State took over the region in January 1894. The mobility and ease of supply made possible by control of the river system facilitated the Force Publique victory. In Belgium, the Arab War would be portrayed as European-led forces of civilization and progress liberating an oppressed African people from a violent and exploitative Arab regime.²⁰

During the 1890s, the Force Publique experienced several serious mutinies. In 1895 at Luluabourg (today's Kananga) in the south-central area, Sergeant Kandolo led a rebellion by soldiers who were tired of oppression by their commander Mathieu Pelzer, who routinely punished men with 125 lashes and ordered his African concubine killed for sleeping with another man. Pelzer fled into the bush but was followed and killed. Donning a white officer's uniform and riding a bull, Kandolo led the mutineers to other military posts, where they killed loyalist soldiers and white officers, rallied recruits, and allied with local chiefs. For about a year, the rebels controlled most of the Kasai region and split into small groups to fight hit-and-run campaigns against several heavily armed Force Publique expeditions, which suffered several hundred casualties. In early 1897 while leading about 400–500 rebels, Kandolo was mortally wounded and replaced by his two corporals, Yamba-Yamba and Kimpuki, who continued the guerrilla war until they were killed in 1908. After the Arab War, Leopold embarked on an ambitious plan to extend his rule to the headwaters of the Nile. In 1896, Dhanis led 30,000 men—the largest Force Publique army to date, which included many irregulars—northeast toward southern Sudan. However, food shortages, mistreatment by officers, and forced marches through swamps provoked a mutiny that ended the expedition before it reached its objective. The mutineers killed most of their officers, rallied under their own red and white flag, and fought a three-year war against several Force Publique expeditions sent against them. In 1900, shortly after a large attack on a heavily defended Congo Free State position, some 2,000 rebels crossed into German-ruled Rwanda and Burundi, where they

were allowed to settle after yielding their arms. When an expedition led by Chaltin occupied a small sliver of southern Sudan called the Lado Enclave in 1897, Britain and France discouraged Leopold from further expansion. In 1908, after an international outcry about the severe viciousness of the Congo Free State regime, Leopold was compelled to relinquish the territory to the Belgian government. The Force Publique continued as both the military and police for what became the Belgian Congo.²¹

EAST AFRICA AND THE GERMANS

Up to the 1870s, British policy in East Africa had been to support the sultan of Zanzibar's claim to the coast of what is now Kenya and Tanzania, which gave British traders, missionaries, and explorers access to the interior. However, in February 1885, Germany declared



a protectorate over the mainland of present-day Tanzania, which became German East Africa. The arrival of the Germans prompted the British to drop their support for Zanzibar and impose direct control from the Kenyan coast inland to what is now Uganda.

In 1888, the German East Africa Company of explorer Karl Peters leased the coastal strip opposite Zanzibar from the sultan for 50 years. Attempting to extend German authority inland, Peters led an expedition that used repeating rifles to inflict heavy casualties on the Maasai around Elbejet during late December 1889.²² German attempts to control coastal towns sparked resistance from local Arab-Swahili ivory and slave traders. A rebellion broke out in August 1888 when German administrator Emil von Zelewski attempted to raise a German flag over Pangani. Led by Arab African planter Abushiri ibn Salim al-Harthi, the revolt spread along the coast from Tanga in the north to Lindi and Mikindani in the south. With the exception of the larger centers of Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam, the Germans were either killed or expelled. In February 1889, Berlin sent Captain Hermann von Wissman, a German army officer and explorer who had been employed by Leopold II in the Congo, to the East African coast with a detachment of Sudanese mercenaries recruited from demobilized units of the Anglo-Egyptian army as well as Zulu from South Africa. With the assistance of the British navy, Wissman fortified Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam, and recaptured Tanga and Pangani. The Germans fortified the interior center of Mpwapwa, opened trade routes to the interior, and used superior firepower to crush the rebellion. Abushiri attempted to flee but was betrayed and captured in December 1889. He was publically hanged in Pangani. The imperial German government then took over control of German East Africa from the German East Africa Company. Wissman was criticised by some German diplomats and military observers for executing people, burning villages, and destroying fields for no reason. Wissman's African mercenaries, from March 1891, formed the nucleus of the East African Schutztruppe (Protection Force), a German colonial army with white leaders and black soldiers called askari (meaning soldier in Kiswahili). From 1896, this force fell under the command of the German colonial office.

In the mountainous area of what is now central Tanzania, Mkwawa emerged from an 1881 civil war as leader of the powerful Hehe state. During the mid- to late 1880s, he embarked on a series of military campaigns that expanded Hehe territory and raided Arab-Swahili trade caravans. Around this time, the Hehe staged several unsuccessful

attacks on a stone fort at Utengule Usongwe that had been built by the Sangu, perhaps inspired by Arabs, who had moved west of the Ruaha River because of Hehe raids. This influenced Mkwawa to rebuild the wooden stockade at his capital of Kalenga with stone, which he believed was impregnable. Since the Hehe were expanding toward the coast and the Germans were moving inland, each represented a major obstacle for the other. Around 1890, the Hehe attacked African communities that had submitted to the Germans, who had built forts at Mpwapwa and Kilosa on the trade route inland from Bagamoyo. The Germans began to fear that the Hehe might attack the coast. Lacking the military resources to defeat the Hehe, the Germans initially negotiated. After a German expedition of 150 men visited the Hehe in the Usagara area, a Hehe delegation visited the coast and departed with an understanding that they could acquire guns and ammunition from the Germans. In June 1891, reports of Ngoni and Hehe raids in the interior prompted the Germans to send a patrol under Zelewski, nicknamed “the hammer” during the Abushiri rebellion, to Usagara, where it destroyed abandoned Hehe villages; entered the core of Hehe territory, where more villages were sacked; and marched toward the main Hehe fort at Kalenga. The German column consisted of 13 Europeans, 320 askari and 170 porters who were supported by 2 machine guns and 3 light cannon. On the morning of August 16, when the German column paused to regroup at a place called Lugalo, some 3,000 Hehe warriors unexpectedly attacked from a clump of dense bush and rocks just 30 meters away. Although the Hehe had few guns and were armed mainly with spears and shields, the askari managed to fire only one or two shots before they were overwhelmed and the donkeys carrying the support weapons bolted. The Germans lost 10 European officers and NCOs, including Zelewski, who had been riding a donkey at the head of the column; 256 African soldiers and their firearms; 96 porters; 3 cannon; and most of their baggage. Lieutenant Maximilian von Tettenborn rallied the German rear guard on a hill and held there for two days waiting for survivors before withdrawing toward the coast. The Hehe set fire to the dry grass to burn any wounded trying to crawl away and then pulled back. Although Tettenborn estimated that around 700 Hehe had been killed, the ambush represented a major German defeat. While French missionaries visited the Hehe to assure them that the Germans wanted peace, German garrisons were established at Kilosa and Kisi. In early October 1892, a Hehe force attacked and almost annihilated a large

caravan at Mukondoa, which led to the evacuation of the missionaries. The Germans were unable to quickly mobilize a large expedition against the Hehe because a number of other African rulers took the opportunity to rebel, for example, Mkwawa's father-in-law Isike in Unyamwezi, the Arab Mwinyi Mtwana, and several Sangu rulers living around Lake Rukwa. One by one, the Germans stormed the forts of these rulers, and Isike was killed while trying to blow himself up. In 1893, Mkwawa sent a force to Kiwele, where it attacked the people of his late enemy Nyungu-ya-nawe.

During the dry season of 1894, the new German governor Freiherr von Schele led a large expedition with 600 askari, three machine guns, and some field guns from the coast into Hehe territory. Taking a different route from Zelewski, the Germans approached Mkwawa's stone fort at Kalenga on the Little Ruaha River and built their own thorn stockade just 400 meters away. About three kilometers in circumference, the two and a half meter tall and up to one and a half meter thick stone wall that encircled Kalenga could not be properly defended by the existing 3,000-man garrison and was vulnerable to artillery fire. On October 30, after two days of German bombardment, Captain Tom von Prince led a dawn assault that broke into the Hehe fort and after four hours of intense hand-to-hand fighting, the Germans were in control and Mkwawa had escaped. One German officer, 8 askari, and 150 Hehe had been killed. The Germans were surprised to discover that Mkwawa had issued just 100 of the 300 guns in his possession and that the Hehe had not attacked them en route to the fort. Years later, some Hehe sources suggested that Mkwawa had gone mad and instructed his men to load their guns with blank charges because magical charms would stop the Germans. The Germans blew up 1400 kilograms of gunpowder at Kalenga, and seized some ivory and guns. On its march back to the coast, the German column was ambushed by 1,500 Hehe warriors who disrupted the porters but were repelled by superior firepower. Although the Germans attempted to negotiate with Mkwawa, the Hehe continued to attack other African groups that had accepted German rule. In 1896, a substantial German expedition under Prince, accompanied by his wife Magdalene, returned to Hehe territory and built a garrison town at Iringa about 11 kilometers from Kalenga. Within a few weeks, four of Mkwawa's subordinate rulers surrendered to the Germans, who made Mpangile, Mkwawa's brother, the puppet sultan of Uhehe. However, Prince blamed these men for continued Hehe attacks on German patrols

and in February 1897, he had them executed. Hunger, disease and protracted fighting took a toll on the Hehe, and their resistance began to wane. The German-Hehe War ended on July 19, 1898, when Mkwawa shot himself to avoid capture by a German patrol that had been tracking him. His head was sent to Berlin as a trophy. As a result of this conflict, the German and subsequent British colonial administrations developed some respect for the Hehe as a warrior people, and in postindependence Tanzania, Mkwawa is remembered as an anticolonial hero.²³

The German imposition of cotton growing, which undermined food production, along with other grievances such as taxation, restrictions on hunting, and abuse by askari led to rebellion by peasant communities in the Matumbi Hills, northwest of Kilwa, in July 1905 that quickly spread to the rest of southern German East Africa. Because local spirit medium and prophet Kijikitle Ngwale told people that a magical water (called Maji in Kiswahili) would render German bullets useless, this event was dubbed the Maji-Maji Rebellion. Though Ngwale was captured and hung by the Germans early in the war, other prophets seem to have been involved in organizing the rebels. German officials, soldiers, traders, and missionaries were attacked and killed, including the Catholic bishop of Dar es Salaam, who was traveling in the interior. In the entire south, the Germans had just 588 askari and 558 African police. In mid-August, the Mbunga people overwhelmed a German post at Ifakara, killed all 13 askari, and placed the imperial German eagle on a flagpole next to the decapitated head of a German NCO. The Germans at Mahenge, the main colonial post in the southern highlands, were warned of an impending attack and built fortifications that included a wooden machine gun tower and hung suspected rebels. On August 30, 1905, several thousand Pogoro, Ngindo, and Mbunga rebels assaulted Mahenge but were cut down by shooting from Captain Theodore von Hassel's garrison of 60 askari and several hundred Bena loyalists. Some of the rebels fell within 30 meters of the fort's two machine guns. Mahenge was then besieged until a German relief force under Captain Ernst Nigmann from nearby Iringa drove off the rebels in late September. The rebellion spread further south to the Ngoni who, frustrated by colonial taxation and restrictions on raiding, planned to attack the Germans at Songea. In late October, Nigmann led a German detachment, including two machine guns, from Mahenge and dispersed a camp of 5,000 Ngoni rebels. Although Governor Graaf Gustav Adolf von Goetzen

requested reinforcements, the Herero and Nama rebellion in German South West Africa (today's Namibia) meant that Berlin could dispatch to East Africa only two cruisers with 200 marines that arrived in October. Three German columns then moved into the south, where they destroyed food resources to starve the rebels into submission, pardoned rank-and-file rebels, and hung only their leaders. The Hehe, who had fought the Germans during the 1890s, sided with the colonizers against the rebels. After months of protracted guerrilla fighting, the rebellion ended in June 1906. Although the Germans claimed to have killed 26,000 rebels, it appears that somewhere between 250,000 and 300,000 people perished in the ensuing famine. Half of the Vidunda, over half of the Matumbi, and three quarters of the Pangwa people died during the rebellion. In addition, most of the southern highlands, once well settled and cultivated, had been turned into wilderness. Indeed, the hills of the Ngindo subsequently became the world's largest game park. Although Tanzanian nationalist historians of the 1960s claimed that Maji Maji represented the emergence of proto-nationalism among the country's diverse peoples, more recent scholars suggest it was a series of rebellions that erupted for different reasons and was part of a long series of wars that had begun before the arrival of the Germans.²⁴

During the late 1860s, the appointment of a young Sebizoni, later renamed Rwabugiri ("the boss" or "the lord"), as ruler of Rwanda caused a civil war between royal factions during drought and famine. The new queen mother, Muronrunkwere, organized a successful attack upon the rival Abagereka family at Nyanza, where several hundred of them were killed and their property seized. To redirect internal tensions, Muronrunkwere ordered an attack on Ijwi Island in Lake Kivu and made the unusual choice of accompanying the army that failed to capture local ruler Kabego. There had been a successful cattle raid against neighboring Ndorwa at the time of Rwabugiri's succession, and the queen mother attempted to organize another. However, it was aborted because of fighting among the troops. While Rwanda had shown hostility to coastal traders up to at least 1871, when an Arab trade caravan entering the country was slaughtered, Rwabugiri began to participate in regional trade at a distance by exporting and importing through neighboring rulers. When Rwabugiri came of age around 1875, violence at court between supporters of the new king and those of his mother led to her death. Embarking on an almost continuous series of military campaigns,

Rwabugiri ordered the construction of a large royal residence in each new territory supervised by a royal wife and senior army commander. In 1879–1880, Rwabugiri dispatched a large force northward toward Lake Albert, which returned with a huge number of cattle, most of which he used to establish 10 new chiefs under his patronage. He ruthlessly eliminated possible rivals, purged the leadership of several armies, and organized a great raid on Burundi called the War of Rito, during which two army commanders—his biological father Nkoronko and Rwampembwe—were to be murdered. Although the killings were botched, Rwabugiri had Rwampembwe executed because of the campaign's failure. Given the instability this created at court, Rwabugiri personally led a single army on an expedition to Buhunde on the north end of Lake Kivu, which was unusual because the kings of Rwanda had not gone on campaign for a century. He then led this force to the forests of Butembo on the west side of the lake, perhaps to collect ivory for the growing regional trade in which Rwanda was becoming peripherally involved. In 1882, Rwabugiri had Nkoronko brought to the frontier with Burundi, where he was killed, supposedly in combat with the enemy. The king then ordered an invasion of Ijwi Island, which he tried to annex by establishing two royal residences that were quickly expelled by the island's new ruler, Nkundiye, who had previously conspired with Rwanda to kill his father Kabego. In the early 1880s, Rwabugiri personally directed a raid on Bushi on the south end of Lake Kivu, particularly the Kabare state, in which his forces were destroyed. After a year of recovery, Rwabugiri sent a large force of eight armies back to the area, but it experienced more defeats than victories in which many important chiefs were killed, and it was withdrawn. This encouraged Nkundiye, ruler of Ijwi Island, to openly declare independence in the mid-1880s. In turn, Rwabugiri ordered yet another invasion of the island during which Nkundiye was killed, and a strong garrison was left behind to maintain control. In 1888, Rwabugiri settled part of his personal guard at Minove west of Lake Kivu, probably to secure ivory and slaves for trade. In 1888 and 1891, Rwabugiri's forces defeated raiders sent by Muhammad bin Khalfan popularly known as Rumaliza (the Exterminator) who was an Arab-Swahili ivory and slave trader who ruled Ujiji on the east bank of Lake Tanganyika and was defeated by Congo Free State forces in 1893.

During the first half of the 1890s, Rwanda was weakened by drought and locusts that ruined crops, rinderpest and foot and mouth disease that killed cattle, and smallpox and jiggers that affected

people. Loss of cattle meant that the king seized animals from his subjects to replenish royal herds, which were then lent out to subordinate rulers. A few elites began to control most of the country's cattle, and the many small-scale Tutsi herders became Hutu cultivators. In 1890, Rwabugiri sent several forces southeast to intervene in a civil war in Bushubi in what is now Tanzania. Around the same time, he reinvaded Bushi with a large force composed of elite companies sent by the most successful military commanders, which fought a brutal campaign and occupied the area but failed to capture its ruler and queen mother. This led to another invasion, but in 1894, the occupation force mutinied and returned home. In May and June 1894, the first German expedition under Goetzen arrived in Rwanda and visited Rwabugiri. As he was organizing a fourth invasion of Bushi, Rwabugiri learned that his tributary state of Ndorwa had endured a major cattle raid by Nkore, which was located to the northeast. During September and October 1894, Rwabugiri led a force into Nkore, pushed beyond its capital, and defeated its army several times despite its use of some firearms. The outbreak of smallpox in his army in February or early March 1895, plus threats of armed intervention by nearby British and German agents, prompted Rwabugiri to withdraw from Nkore. He then returned to Rwanda, where he organized yet another campaign to quell resistance in Bushi. However, he died on his way there via Lake Kivu in September 1895. Almost immediately, all the territories that Rwabugiri had conquered, such as Ijwi Island and Bushi, rebelled and regained autonomy. Rwabugiri had orchestrated 13 major military campaigns in 20 years, not including smaller operations. He had also raised eight new armies, though some existing ones were eliminated because they were more loyal to their commanders than the king. He changed the nature of Rwanda's military organization—entire armies were no longer mobilized for major operations; rather, expeditions were assembled from detachments of various armies. This reduced the armies' independence and the amount of loot they received, and armies were tied to specific territories, which led to conflict over land. The frequent movement of armies during Rwabugiri's reign put a massive strain on the peasantry who had to feed them, which led to three provincial rebellions and a series of smaller insurrections—all of which were crushed. It is likely that Rwabugiri's centralization led to increased polarization of Tutsi pastoralists and Hutu cultivators. While some historians of Rwanda have portrayed

Rwabugiri as a political visionary and military genius, Jan Vansina maintains he was thoughtless and undisciplined.²⁵

After Rwabugiri's death, his son and co-ruler Rutarindwa, who enjoyed strong military support, was installed as king of Rwanda and his rival Kanjogera, one of the late ruler's wives but not the new ruler's mother, became queen mother. In July 1896, the Belgian Force Publique established two posts at Shangi at the south end of Lake Kivu and looted the area. After a debate about the supposed invincibility of Europeans, Kanjogera's brothers convinced Rwanda's royal court to send an army against the Belgians. Four elite companies totaling around 600 men assaulted the Belgians, were cut down in minutes by gunfire, and withdrew. Kanjogera then arranged for the deaths of several of the king's supporters. This led to a battle at the royal residence of Rucunshu in December 1896 between forces loyal to Rutarindwa and Kanjogera in which hundreds were killed and the king committed suicide. In February 1897, Kanjogera arranged for her teenage son Musinga to become king, followed by a purge of military commanders suspected of disloyalty. In late March, a German expedition consisting of 300 soldiers commanded by Captain Hans von Ramsay, who had just established a German military district in Ujiji on the east shore of Lake Tanganyika, arrived in Rwanda and allied with Kanjogera and Musinga, who gained European support in return for the kingdom becoming a German protectorate. After the Belgians had been driven out of Shangi by mutineers from their own Force Publique, the Germans occupied the area in November 1898 and founded the military district of Bujumbura to oversee Rwanda and Burundi. A Belgian attempt to retake Shangi led to a skirmish with the Germans that encouraged both countries to sign a treaty in 1899 recognizing German authority in Rwanda. As Musinga came of age, he began to rely increasingly on German colonial troops with guns to suppress rebellions and extend his rule northward. In recently conquered Ndorwa, resentment of Rwanda's Nyiginya rulers led to the emergence of a prophetic movement that believed Nyabingi, the daughter of the last independent ruler, would return one day. In 1897, Muhumuza (one of the late Rwabugiri's wives who had been on the losing side of the power struggle after his death) fled to Ndorwa with her young son, where she was celebrated as the returned Nyabingi. During the early 1900s, Muhumuza led guerrilla resistance against Musinga's Rwanda as well as the Germans,

Belgians, and British in this border area. In 1908, she was jailed for two years by the Germans and in 1911, a British expedition attacked her stronghold on Ihanga Hill. Muhumuza was captured and exiled to Kampala, where she died in 1944. In April 1912 a small detachment of German soldiers and 3000 of Musinga's best warriors, including his personal guard, suppressed a northern Hutu rebellion led by Ndungutse, a former lieutenant of Muhumuza, and subsequently destroyed the homes and crops, and seized the livestock of his sympathizers. Musinga was now entirely dependent upon German military support.²⁶

Coming to power during late 1860s, Burundi's ruler Mwezi Gisabo used his powerful royal guard to repel numerous Arab-Swahili incursions from the south and west, and Nyamwezi raiders from the east in 1884. Burundi remained less centralized than its neighbor Rwanda and during the late 1800s, there was internal conflict between rival royal sons (Baganwa), and between Baganwa and the king. The Germans, in 1896, established a military post at the trading town of Bujumbura on the north end of Lake Tanganyika and assumed nearby Burundi would become part of their East African colony. In 1899, a German military expedition under Captain Heinrich von Bethe marched into Burundi and attacked communities under a local chief who had burned a new Catholic mission. At that time, Mwezi Gisabo, perhaps intimidated by colonial firepower (with which Burundi had no experience), accepted German authority. In 1902, continued violence in Burundi between territorial rulers and the king—who now seemed to reject German supremacy—prompted Captain Friedrich Robert von Beringe, the German commander at Bujumbura, to organize a punitive expedition of 8 European officers and NCOs, 115 askari, 234 local auxiliaries, and 60 warriors from Rwanda supported by a machine gun and a light cannon. The German force was divided into 4 sections that converged on Mwezi Gisabo's capital, killing 200 men and suffering only 3 dead and 2 wounded. Mwezi Gisabo surrendered, recognized German sovereignty, promised to refrain from attacking trade caravans and missionaries, granted independence to rebellious subordinates Kilima and Maconco (who had assisted von Beringe), and provided 424 cattle as reparations. Since Beringe had disobeyed explicit instructions from Governor von Goetzen to avoid conflict, he was replaced by Captain Werner von Grawert. Goetzen then reversed Beringe's policy of divide and rule, with strong support for Mwezi Gisabo as a central ruler. Assisted by a 1905–1906 German

expedition under Grawert, Mwezi Gisabo reasserted his authority over rebellious chiefs, including those who had supported Beringe and extended his influence over new territory. Maconco tried to spear Grawert, who shot him dead. Kilima, his home destroyed and cattle seized by German forces, was captured by warriors from Rwanda and exiled to Lake Nyasa (Malawi). Symbolizing the importance of superior firepower in the German conquest, Burundians gave Grawert the nickname “Digidigi” in imitation of a machine gun’s retort.²⁷

EAST AFRICA AND THE BRITISH

In Buganda, a compact but powerful state on the north shore of Lake Victoria, three new religious-political factions aligned to external forces emerged during the second half of the nineteenth century. Muslim converts associated with Arab traders, Catholic converts with French missionaries, and Protestant converts with British missionaries. Around the same time, Bunyoro, located to the northwest and under Kabarega, reformed its military, which usually consisted of a mass levy of spear-armed peasants from various districts. Kabarega created a professional corps of musketeers made up of deserters from the Egyptian army in Sudan and other displaced men. Within a few years, Bunyoro could field 1,000 gunmen armed with breech- and muzzle-loading rifles who, given the decentralized nature of Bunyoro’s government, were dispersed in small units across the country. Since no other state in the area had a similar force at the time, Kabarega launched a series of campaigns in the late 1880s and early 1890s to recover land taken from Bunyoro years earlier. The young Mwanga, who took over as Buganda’s ruler after his father Mutesa’s death in 1884, feared that his kingdom’s Christian converts supported European encroachment from the east coast. In 1886, Mwanga ordered the killing of the new British Anglican bishop James Hannington while on his way to Buganda as well as 50 Baganda Christians. A Buganda army raiding Bunyoro was defeated by superior firepower. These developments prompted Buganda’s Muslims, Catholics, and Protestants to acquire firearms and organize military units. Because Mwanga lacked military support, he promoted Muslim and Christian converts of his generation to head four new special chieftaincies of young unmarried men located close to the capital. Among the new military elite were Protestant Apolo Kagwa, who controlled

the royal armory; Catholic Henry Nyonyintono, who headed a large armed group; and Muslim Kapalaga, who was the army's chief of staff. However, in 1888, the three armed convert factions converged on the capital of Mengo and overthrew Mwanga, who fled south by boat across Lake Victoria. Since the Muslims were militarily the most powerful faction—they made up the entire palace guard and had more than 2,000 gunmen compared to 1,000 for the Christians—they controlled the new ruler Kiwewa Mutebi II. As a result, the religious alliance dissolved, fighting broke out at the capital, and the combined Christian forces fled south to Nkore. The Muslims then overthrew Kiwewa Mutebi II, who was a traditionalist; installed Kalema, who became the first Muslim ruler of Buganda; persecuted Christians; burned Christian missions; and expelled European missionaries. Responding to a cattle raid by Christian exiles, Kalema sent an expedition south that was routed, and the confident Christians then attacked Kalema's force. At the subsequent Battle of Mawuki, one of the Christian divisions defeated a major wing of the Muslim army, but the other Christian division was ambushed and overwhelmed. A number of important Christian leaders, including Henry Nyonyintono (who was one of the few who appealed to both Catholics and Protestants), were killed. Since Kalema had killed many of the Baganda royals, the Christians had no alternative but to support the exiled Mwanga and his traditionalist followers. After Mwanga's combined army of Christians and traditionalists was defeated by the Muslims, former Protestant missionary Charles Stokes began using his Lake Victoria steamer to supply the Christians with arms and ammunition. Also on the lake, Mwanga sent a canoe force under Gabriel Kintu to intercept a Muslim Zanzibari arms shipment on its way to Kalema. After an intense naval engagement, the Arab boat was blown up. Attempting to regain control of the vital lake supply route, Kalema ordered the construction of war canoes, but Mwanga's forces attacked and destroyed them. After a series of land battles, the Muslims were eventually encircled and began withdrawing toward the capital. At the Battle of Bunkabira in early October 1889, a Christian army under the emerging military leader Semei Kakungulu inflicted heavy losses on the Muslims. The next day at the Battle of Kitebi, which was fought near modern Kampala, the Muslims were again defeated. Kalema fled the capital, which was reoccupied by Mwanga. With the help of neighboring Bunyoro, the Muslim army was reorganized and quickly went on the offensive, defeating a Christian force with 2,600 gunmen under

Apolo Kagwa. Mwanga once again abandoned the capital. At the ensuing Battle of Bulwanyi, Christian forces under Gabriel Kintu and Kakungulu—the most successful Christian military leaders of the Buganda civil war—decisively defeated the Muslims, Kalema fled and later died of disease, and Mwanga was restored.²⁸

In December 1890, an Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) expedition with 100 Swahili and Sudanese soldiers and 1 machine gun under British officer Frederick Lugard arrived in Buganda with instructions to stop Mwanga from making agreements with other powers. Mwanga had recently signed a treaty with German agent Karl Peters, which had been voided by an 1890 Anglo-German agreement on colonial borders in East Africa. After Lugard threatened to use his machine gun, a hesitant Mwanga marked a “treaty of friendship” that surrendered Buganda’s sovereignty to Britain. Reinforced with 175 African soldiers and another machine gun in January 1891, Lugard began to fortify his post on Kampala Hill overlooking Mengo. In May, Lugard led a British detachment that accompanied a Buganda army to attack exiled Baganda Muslims in Bunyoro, where his machine gun inflicted 300 fatalities. This was likely the first time the machine gun was employed in combat. Lugard then led his expedition to southern Sudan, where he found 600 Sudanese soldiers and thousands of dependants left behind after the Egyptian evacuation. He brought them back to Buganda. Lugard positioned most of these Sudanese along the Bunyoro-Buganda border and brought 100 of them back to Mengo. With British support, Baganda Protestants became aggressive toward their more numerous Catholic countrymen, who were backed by Mwanga, who sought to assert Buganda’s independence. On January 24, 1892, just after Lugard issued a few Snider repeating rifles and 500 muzzle loaders and ammunition he had obtained from Stokes to the Baganda Protestants, civil war broke out. With the support of Lugard’s machine gun, the Protestants drove the Catholics and Mwanga out of Mengo to islands in Lake Victoria. The houses of the Catholics were burned. Violence continued over the next few days, with the British contingent using a machine gun to sink 30 boats of refugees and Sudanese troops under Captain W. H. Williams, Lugard’s second in command, driving the Catholics off nearby islands. The Protestant minority became Buganda’s ruling elite, and Mwanga returned and converted to Protestantism. Lugard returned to Britain to respond to criticism of his intervention and in 1893, the British government took over administration of Buganda from the financially failing IBEAC.

In mid-1893, the colonial administration discovered that the Muslim Baganda were plotting with some of the Muslim Sudanese troops to rebel, and the mutineers were disarmed and arrested. Near the capital, a Baganda Christian army of 2,200 gunmen and 4,000 spearmen led by Kakungulu defeated a smaller Muslim force with just 1,300 gunmen. Protestant Baganda forces under Kakungulu embarked on an offensive against the Muslim Baganda, who were slaughtered by superior firepower. The Muslims were then disarmed, excluded from Buganda's government, and restricted to a small western section of the country. In December 1893 and January 1894, the British and Baganda launched a grand offensive against Bunyoro that consisted of 400 Sudanese troops with several machine guns under Henry Colville and thousands of Baganda that included 2,500 musketeers under Kakungulu. Faced with an overwhelming adversary, Kabarega withdrew from his capital and fought a series of delaying actions. Suffering from smallpox, the British-Baganda army returned with captives, vast amounts of livestock and ammunition, and control over much of southern Bunyoro, which was given to chiefs from both Christian factions. In April and May 1895, two British-Baganda forces, an overland one under Major George Cunningham and Kagwa with machine guns and an amphibious force of 123 canoes under William Grant and Kakungulu, converged on Kabarega's new capital on the Nile. After pursuing the fleeing Banyoro for several days, the expedition returned with captured cattle, which were argued over by rivals Kagwa and Kakungulu. The resurgence of Bunyoro had been checked, and further raids were mounted. Later the same year, Kakungulu led 1,000 Baganda warriors as part of a British punitive expedition against the pastoral Nandi in what is now western Kenya. The Baganda, who stormed a stockade and were later ambushed in a forest, took heavy casualties, and there were problems supplying them with food.

Resentful of attempts by the British and Protestant Baganda leaders to limit his authority, Mwanga and his 150 bodyguards left the capital in early July 1897 and went to Buddu province to rally Catholic and Muslim forces. A British and Protestant Baganda force immediately pursued Mwanga and after the Battle of Kabuwoko, another occasion during which Protestant forces succeeded because of machine guns, the exiled king and his men fled south to German East Africa. While 300 Nkore warriors had joined Mwanga's struggle, the new and insecure Nkore ruler Kahaya rejected the rebels and accepted British protection in 1898 which contributed to his battlefield victory over local

rivals the following year. In August 1897, the British regime in Buganda officially deposed Mwanga and appointed his one-year-old son, Daudi Chwa, as king. He was supported by one Catholic and two Protestant regents. Around this time, Baganda forces under Kagwa (one of the Protestant regents) and Kakungulu suppressed a rebellion by Sudanese colonial troops. After a three-month siege, the Baganda overcame the Sudanese mutineers holding out at Bukaleba in Busoga. Since the Sudanese were trained soldiers equipped with repeating rifles and machine guns, the Baganda suffered terrible casualties and succeeded because of overwhelming numbers. Escaping from German custody, Mwanga returned to Buddu, where he and Gabriel Kintu, who had been convicted of murder by the Protestant rulers, led a guerrilla campaign against the superior firepower of colonial forces for the next two years. Mwanga's messages made it clear that he was not fighting for religion but against British domination. He was joined by Kabarega and other exiles from Bunyoro, and they moved north to Langi country. In April 1899, the British sent the Wakeddi Field Force, which included 100 Baganda gunmen led by Kakungulu, to find the fugitive kings whose location was revealed by Langi eager to avoid colonial retribution. Mwanga and Kabarega, who lost part of his arm in the subsequent skirmish, were captured and exiled to the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean. Given his rivalry with Kagwa, who was now Buganda's prime minister, Kakungulu was assigned the northeastern frontier territory of Bugerere, which had been taken from Bunyoro. Extending his influence eastward beyond Lake Kyoga into Iteso territory, he established a network of forts with Baganda garrisons, built roads to link them, and appointed loyal Baganda as local rulers. The British soon replicated this pattern. In 1900, the British and Buganda regents signed the Uganda Agreement, which made Buganda a province within a larger protectorate, granted Buganda land taken from Bunyoro, reduced the power of the Buganda king, and turned the Baganda Protestant leaders into wealthy landowners. From that point, Buganda became the center of British expansion and rule in the larger colony of Uganda.²⁹

The British government was mostly interested in using the East African Protectorate, which it took over from the failed IBEAC in 1895 and which was referred to as Kenya after 1920, as a corridor for a railway that would extract resources from agriculturally rich southern Uganda to the Indian Ocean coast. The former company

troops were reorganized into the East African Rifles with 300 Indians, 250 Sudanese, 300 Swahili and 200 others. During the first year of British rule, colonial officials intervened in a succession dispute among the Swahili Mazrui clan that sparked a rebellion led by Mbarak bin Rashid, which quickly spread along the coast. After the Royal Navy stormed his stronghold at Mweli, some 24 kilometers from the coast, the Mazrui leader then embarked on a guerrilla campaign and attracted numerous supporters, including the Giriama, who were ivory and slave traders in the Mombasa hinterland. The rebels attacked Malindi and set fire to the coastal town before being driven off. With the arrival of reinforcements from India in March 1896, the British launched a concerted offensive that drove the rebels into German East Africa, where they were disarmed and detained. Some rebel leaders eventually returned under an amnesty. Although the Mazrui Rebellion delayed the establishment of colonial administration, it resulted in the subjugation of coastal Swahili leaders and marked a transition from Zanzibari Arab to British dominance of coastal Kenya. In 1896 the East African Rifles, with 800 Maasai allies, burned the villages of Kamba people who had destroyed several colonial police posts. The unit helped subdue the mutiny by Sudanese colonial troops in Buganda in 1897–98, and staged other punitive actions in Jubaland in 1899 and against the Kikuyu in 1901. By 1900, when the Indian soldiers left after the expiry of their contracts, the East African Rifles consisted of five Sudanese and four Swahili companies.

The most serious obstacle to British colonial rule in Kenya came from the decentralized and pastoral Nandi who lived in the forested hills around Mount Elgon on the main route to Uganda. During the mid-1800s, the Nandi had earned a fierce reputation by ambushing Arab-Swahili caravans and like the Maasai, they countered muzzle loaders by rushing forward to draw fire, diving for cover, and then charging again before the enemy guns could be reloaded. For much of the 1870s and 1880s, European explorers tended to skirt Nandi territory. In 1895, Nandi raiders began attacking British merchant and missionary caravans along the developing Uganda road. With just 1,200 Sudanese troops in the entire protectorate, the IBEAC could not deal with the Nandi threat. When the British government took over, it created the Uganda Rifles with 800 local askari and brought in the 27th Bombay Light Infantry from India. In late 1895, a British column under Major George Cunningham that consisted of 400 Uganda Rifles, a machine gun, 23 Baganda irregulars, and 600 porters left Kampala and invaded Nandi territory. Destroying Nandi communities and

seizing livestock, the British initially faced limited opposition from Nandi skirmishers. However, on November 13, five hundred Nandi warriors attacked Cunningham's force on the Kimonde River. While it seemed like the British might be overrun, the Nandi made it to within 30 meters of the firing line and then broke. Over 100 Nandi had been cut down. The British lost 14 African troops. While the British learned about Nandi discipline and élan, the Nandi learned that their usual tactics could not overcome colonial firepower. Subsequently, the Nandi began to use archers to harass the British force as it passed through forests and ravines in which the ability to deploy firepower was limited. Exhausted and demoralized, Cunningham's men withdrew in late December, still pursued by Nandi warriors. In 1896, the British built a road through Nandi territory and a fort to protect it. In May and June 1897, Colonel Trevor Ternan, acting commissioner of the Uganda Protectorate, dispatched two columns to converge on the suspected location of the Nandi spiritual and war leader (called the orkoiyot) Koitalel Arap Samoei. Each column consisted of 220 askari, 200 Maasai irregulars, 150 carriers, and a machine gun. Avoiding a pitched battle, the Nandi ambushed colonial patrols sent to seize livestock and the British, unable to capture the orkoiyot, eventually withdrew with only 137 cattle along with 1,500 sheep and goats. In 1900, the Nandi resumed attacks on colonial caravans and messengers. A British punitive expedition of Indian and African troops, assisted by Luo allies from western Kenya, was once again sent against the Nandi, who refused to be lured into a large battle. The expedition withdrew, and the British negotiated with the Nandi, who gave permission for the Uganda railway to be built through their area. Nandi raiding along the railway and theft of copper telegraph wire led to further hostilities. In late 1905, a large military expedition of African troops from the recently formed King's African Rifles (KAR—an amalgamation of the CAR, Uganda Rifles and East African Rifles), along with Maasai and Somali irregulars, finally subdued the Nandi. In October, Koitalel was invited to negotiations, where he was shot dead by British captain Richard Meinertzhagen. In this last and costly campaign, 1,117 Nandi had been killed; almost 5,000 huts and grain stores had been burned; and 16,000 cattle, and 36,000 goats and sheep had been seized. During the next year, colonial troops drove the Nandi into a reserve in the arid northern part of their territory, and their fertile land in the south was given to white settlers.³⁰

BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA

The British South Africa Company, which as discussed in the next chapter conquered what became Southern Rhodesia (today's Zimbabwe) during the 1890s, subjugated two of Central Africa's potentially most powerful states by treaty to form Northern Rhodesia. Both the Lozi and Bemba states were plagued by internal conflict. While the Lozi ruler Lewanika recreated an earlier system of territorial military units and restored central royal control, he accepted a British protectorate in 1890 to counter continued Ndebele raids from the south. The Bemba, with over 1,000 firearms, allowed a French missionary to declare himself king and invite British rule in 1898.³¹

By the 1880s, British traders and Scottish missionaries had been operating around Lake Nyasa (now Lake Malawi) for a number of years. During the late 1880s, Arab-Swahili slave and ivory traders clashed with the British African Lakes Company, based at Blantyre south of the lake and near the Shire River, over control of the north part of the lake. The British allied with African groups such as the Nkonde and Tonga who had been the victims of Arab-Swahili and Ngoni raids. In 1887, an Arab-Swahili force led by Mlozi besieged the company's half-built stockade at Karonga (where the defenders had just 13 rifles with little ammunition), which was saved by the intervention of a large number of Mambwe from the north. With supplies and reinforcements brought by lake steamer, company agent Monteith Fotheringham organized a large force of Nkonde and Mambwe into companies of 200 or 300 men under their own leaders and a contingent of African company employees under Europeans. While this company army attacked and defeated Mlozi's force, Fotheringham's African allies returned home once they had captured ivory, cloth, and gunpowder. This North End War continued in April 1888 when a company force of 8 Europeans and 500 African allies from Karonga armed with 270 rifles and muskets attacked and burned the stockade of Arab-Swahili leader Salema but was driven off by another Arab-Swahili force under Kopakopa. Company operations once again stopped as African allies, disappointed by lack of loot, went home. In May, Captain Frederick Lugard, a British army officer visiting Blantyre to hunt elephants, led another relief expedition of 20 European volunteers up the lake by steamer to Karonga. Lugard assembled 220 Africans, mostly Tonga, of which a third were armed with breech loaders, a third with muzzle loaders, and a third

with spears or other hand-to-hand weapons. The group was divided into 7 units, each of which consisted of about 40 Africans under a European. Distinguished by a narrow band of red cloth worn around their heads, Lugard's men were taught to shoot, cast bullets, and made grenades from jam tins. After an unsuccessful June attack on Kopakopa's stockade, which was made of a thick and loop-holed mud wall topped by a four meter tall wooden fence, Lugard's force sent out patrols to harass Arab-Swahili caravans. Lugard also reorganized his growing army into three companies, one each of Tonga, Nkonde, and Mambwe. In January 1889, a 7-pounder cannon, purchased by the Nyasa Anti-Slavery and Defence Committee in Britain, arrived at Karonga. While part of the company army besieged Mlozi's stockade, the rest bombarded the forts of Salema and Kopakopa, though the poor-quality ammunition failed to blast a hole large enough for the men to assault through. Around this time, Lugard left to join the IBEAC.

Reacting to Portuguese expansion from Mozambique, the British in 1889 claimed the territory south and west of Lake Nyasa, which was eventually dubbed the Central African Protectorate and later renamed Nyasaland. Harry Johnston, an associate of mining magnate Cecil Rhodes, was sent there to establish British authority and in October made a treaty with the Arab-Swahili in which they were permitted to keep their stockades for a promise of peace with the company and its African allies. The situation at the northern end of the lake became relatively stable. In 1891, Captain C. M. Maguire, seconded from the Second Hyderabad Lancers in India, brought a contingent of 70 Indian soldiers (40 Sikh infantry and 30 Muslim cavalry) to the protectorate's new administrative center of Zomba near Blantyre in the south. Hostilities developed between the embryonic British colonial state and Yao slave traders at the south end of the lake. In July 1891, Maguire's Indian unit, after two days of hard fighting, repelled Chikunde's Yao, who had attacked two British coffee planters around Mount Mulanje. In September, Johnson and Maguire led the Indian troops, along with 10 Zanzibari and 10 Makua mercenaries and a field gun, north along the Shire River, where they built an earthwork position they named Fort Johnston as a base for attacks on the area's Yao leaders. The expedition destroyed the stockades of Makandanji, Mponda, and Makanjira (the last of which was initially bombarded from a steamer), and an intimidated Yao leader Zarafi signed a treaty of submission. Shortly after the expedition returned to Zomba, it unsuccessfully attacked the stronghold of Yao leader Kawinga, who

subsequently accepted British supremacy. In mid-December, Maguire was shot dead while leading an amphibious raid by 30 men against one of Makanjira lakeshore outposts. In turn, Zarafi led an attack on Fort Johnston, now permanently garrisoned, which prompted a series of colonial raids on villages under his jurisdiction. Around this time, the Muslim cavalrymen were sent back to India because their horses had died from tropical disease. Yao morale was bolstered when an expedition from Fort Johnston under J. G. King that consisted of 35 Indians, 30 Zanzibaris, and 100 Ngoni allies attacked Zarafi's hill stockade but were repulsed with a loss of 6 Indians and a field gun. In June 1892, Captain C. E. J. Johnson arrived from India with 60 Sikhs, and by this time, the British had 3 gunboats on the lake. In February 1893, Johnson led operations against the Yao leader Liwonde along the upper Shire River, attacking his town and establishing two new colonial forts. During that year, the British military in the protectorate grew to 3 British officers, 200 Sikhs, 150 African regulars, and a fluctuating number of African auxiliaries. During this time, two Yao chiefs around Mount Mulanje, Nyaserera, and Mkanda were subdued by separate expeditions that involved intense fighting in mountainous terrain. In November 1893, Johnson led an assault that destroyed the capital of Chiwaura, an ally of Makanjira who lived close to the lake, and released hundreds of slaves. A British gunboat chased 1 of Makanjira's slaving dhows to shore at Leopard Bay, where the 70-man crew was besieged on a hill. Johnson's force landed nearby and with support fire from the gunboats, attacked Makanjira's capital, which contained several thousand huts. After 5 hours of fierce fighting, the Yao warriors surrendered. However, because Makanjira refused to submit, the British destroyed his town. The British built a fort on the site that on January 1, 1894, was attacked by Makanjira's men, who were repelled. In early 1895, Yao leaders Kawinga, Zarafi, and Matapwiri attempted to drive the British out of the Shire Highlands. For a few days, a post defended by Engineer Corporal William Fletcher (who commanded 6 Sikhs and a few Tonga troops) was besieged by 2,000 of Kawinga's men until the arrival of Tonga reinforcements. On February 17, Captain William Manning led 55 Sikhs and 200 African soldiers in an attack that destroyed Kawinga's stronghold, from which the Yao leader escaped. In September, a British force approached Matapwiri's village by night and easily overwhelmed it with a surprise attack. During the next month, a force of 5 British officers, 65 Sikhs, and 230 African soldiers assaulted Zarafi's villages around Mount Mangoche, and the Yao chief fled to Portuguese territory.

Another expedition against Makanjira and his followers completed the conquest of the southern Yao, and the British secured the area through constructing a series of small forts.

At the lake's north end, Mlozi and the other Arab-Swahili slave traders rejected a treaty with the British and threatened them at Karonga. In late November 1895, several lake steamers brought 6 European officers and volunteers, 100 Sikhs, and 300 African troops commanded by Lieutenant H. Coape-Smith to Karonga. On the morning of December 2, with 3 colonial detachments guarding Mlozi's stronghold, the gunboats bombarded Salema's stockade, and a group of Sikhs and sailors captured it. The process was repeated at Kopakopa's fort. That afternoon, the British began to bombard Mlozi's stockade, which would not catch fire because of heavy rain. The Arab-Swahili responded with small-arms fire and an old muzzle-loading cannon. After Mlozi refused surrender terms, the Arab-Swahili leader was wounded when a British shell hit his house. The enraged defenders made a sortie, which was countered by the Sikhs, who fought their way over the stronghold's walls. About 200 of Mlozi's followers were killed, compared to only 1 Sikh and 3 African troops. Sergeant Bandawe, a Tonga soldier, entered a chamber dug under Mlozi's ruined house, killed Mlozi's bodyguard, and captured the Arab-Swahili leader, who the British tried and hung the next day. The remaining Arab-Swahili forts were then destroyed. Immediately after the defeat of Mlozi, a force of 40 Sikhs and 149 African soldiers under Lieutenant E. Alston was shipped to the lakeside town of Nkotakota, from where it marched 100 kilometers west to attack the stronghold of Chewa leader Mwasi, who had been an ally of the Arab-Swahili. While a reserve of 2,400 local auxiliaries looked on, the Sikhs and African regulars stormed the stronghold, and Mwasi fled. A colonial fort was erected on the site.

In 1896, Nyasaland's colonial military establishment was formalized by the creation of the Central Africa Rifles (CAR; renamed the Central Africa Regiment in 1900) consisting of 6 companies of 120 men each. Spread out at forts across the territory, the companies were ethnically oriented with 3 of Tonga, 2 of Yao, and 1 of Marimba. Recruitment of Makua from Portuguese territory was discontinued because they were expensive, and British authorities began to see Yao as martial people. Sikh troops were gradually phased out and for the next few years, they provided senior NCOs and instructors, and formed a 100-man quick reaction force based at Zomba. In January 1896, a small British expedition of 24 Sikhs and 80 African soldiers from Nkotakota stormed the

mountain villages of Ngoni leader Tambala in the center of the protectorate. Unlike the Arab-Swahili, the Ngoni did not employ many firearms or fortify villages. Shortly after this, a Zomba-based British force of 58 Sikhs and 200 Africans took the village of Chikuse, an Ngoni leader south of the lake. In January 1897, the protectorate's entire military under Captain H. E. J. Brake, 7 European officers, 118 Sikhs, and all 6 CAR companies supported by artillery and Maxim guns, assembled at Fort Jameson in the west and marched into northeastern Northern Rhodesia at the request of the North Charterland Exploration Company, which was experiencing resistance from the Ngoni of Mpeseni. On January 20, just east of the colonial fort at Luangweni, Brake's force used volley fire to disperse at least 600–700 Ngoni, who were shot at by artillery as they fled. Later the same day, the expedition used artillery and Maxim fire, as well as a threatening charge from one of the CAR companies, to drive off another group of 500 Ngoni approaching from the west. During the remainder of January and early February, the British dispatched patrols to destroy Ngoni villages and capture cattle. Mpeseni surrendered and spent a year in prison before being allowed to return as chief. His son Singu, who the British blamed for the hostilities, was captured and shot. A new colonial post, Fort Manning, was erected in the area, and 3 new CAR companies—1 of Tonga and 2 of Yao—were created to garrison it. In August 1899, a British force of 9 officers, 119 Sikhs, and 269 Africans, cooperating with Portuguese forces, destroyed the villages of Yao leaders Nkwamba and Mataka, who had harassed European traders along the protectorate's eastern border. In September, a party of 12 Sikhs, 60 Africans, and a field gun commanded by Captain E. C. Margesson marched northwest from Karonga to Abercorn on the southern end of Lake Tanganyika and then southwest to Kazembe's Lunda, where it drove the last active Arab-Swahili slavers into Belgian territory. The last British operations against the central Ngoni took place in November and December 1900 with the destruction of over 300 villages and Tambala's capture. With the small-scale nature of African states around Lake Nyasa and the mobility provided by lake steamers, tiny British-led colonial expeditions were able to conquer a vast area. In January 1899, a second battalion of CAR consisting of 7 British officers, 32 Sikhs, and 878 African soldiers was formed and in June, to relieve pressure on imperial forces needed in South Africa, it was sent to garrison the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius, an important coaling station, where the African troops clashed with racist Creoles who objected to their presence. The second

battalion, including several hundred soldiers' wives and some children from Nyasaland, left Mauritius in February 1900 and over the next two years fought in British campaigns in Somaliland, the Gold Coast, and Gambia. In 1902, the CAR, along with the Uganda Rifles and East African Rifles in Kenya, became part of the new KAR.³²

The next chapter will look at the scramble in Southern Africa.

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Chapter 2

The Scramble for Africa: Part 2, Southern Africa, ca. 1870–1914

South of the Zambezi River, the “scramble” was intensified by the discovery of diamonds and gold, the colonial desire to harness African labor for the mine industry, and the presence of established European settlers.

DIAMOND WARS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1870–1879

The discovery of diamonds in the Northern Cape in the late 1860s began Southern Africa’s mineral revolution. It led to a series of military campaigns that dramatically expanded colonial rule yet eventually frustrated British imperial ambitions. At the time, what is now South Africa consisted of the British colonies of the Cape and Natal, the Boer republics of the Orange Free State and Transvaal, and independent African groups such as the Zulu, Pedi, and Tswana. The British controlled the coast as part of the strategic Cape shipping route and had just recognized the suzerainty of the interior Boer states. However, the diamond discovery prompted the British to try to control the interior through a confederation of British colonial territories that would include the Boer republics. Although the Boers resented how the



British had annexed the diamond fields to the Cape Colony in the early 1870s, ignoring the Orange Free State's claim, their impoverished republics did not have the military capacity to defy the British Empire, which annexed them in 1877. Since the confederation scheme ultimately depended upon Boer cooperation, the British had to win them over by eliminating the remaining powerful African states such as the Pedi and Zulu. The Boers were willing to have the British destroy their African enemies but then reasserted their autonomy in the First Anglo-Boer War of 1881. Together with African rebellion in Lesotho and Transkei against increasingly intrusive Cape colonial rule, Boer resistance brought a temporary end to British plans for confederation.

By the 1860s, the Pedi had established a heavily fortified capital backed by the eastern side of the Lulu Mountains with an entrance guarded by the mountains of Mosego and Modimolle. Defensive features included the use of stone walls at strategic points. Coming to power in 1861, Sekhukhune built up a stock of muskets acquired from Boers who imported them from the Portuguese enclave at Delagoa

Bay. In September 1869, a Swazi army that had been encouraged by Sekhukhune's rival exiled brother Mampuru, attacked the Mosego stronghold and were slaughtered by Pedi ambushes and counterattacks. Around 500 Swazi were killed in a single day. Later that year, the Pedi ambushed and routed a Swazi army returning home from raiding in the Zoutpansberg Mountains. In 1870, the Pedi abandoned their usual defensive tactics to raid an outlying Swazi village, capturing many cattle and prisoners. It was clear that military power in the eastern Transvaal was shifting away from the Swazi and therefore also from the Boers (who depended on Swazi allies) toward the firearm-equipped Pedi. Although the 1869 Swazi attack failed, it revealed some defensive weaknesses of Mosego, and Sekhukhune consequently moved his stronghold to nearby Tsate, a flat-bottomed and steep-sided valley in the middle of which was a prominent hill called the Fighting Kopje.¹

In the late 1850s, after numerous frontier conflicts, the Transvaal Boers and the Pedi had agreed that the Steelpoort River represented the border between them. In the 1870s Sekhukhune, considering himself independent of the Transvaal, refused to allow Boers to prospect for gold or establish farms on the eastern side—his side—of the river. Transvaal president T. F. Burgers declared war against the Pedi and in July 1876, two thousand Boers supported by a few Krupp guns, 400–500 wagons, and Swazi allies eager for captured livestock advanced on Sekhukhune's stronghold. The force was divided into two sections. The eastern one, under Commandant General M. W. Pretorius, consisted of around 600 armed Boers from Lydenburg and the Swazi, and was to proceed to Sekhukhune's capital. The western division, under Commandant N. Smit, was to clear the Olifants River. Initial success by these columns led to the collapse of Pedi resistance in the southwest and southeast. However, just a few days into the campaign the Swazi, not wanting to repeat their 1869 disaster, returned home with their captured livestock, claiming that the Boers had failed to assist them in attacking the stronghold of a subordinate Pedi chief. On July 31, 1876, the eastern and western Boer divisions linked up to assault Sekhukhune's capital. The Boers planned a classic pincer movement with 800 Boers and 500 African allies under Commandant P. Joubert, who had replaced the now ill Pretorius, to attack from the south and another 900 Boers and some African levies under Smit to advance simultaneously from the north. The assault was supported by fire from four Krupp guns. During the night,

Joubert's force was delayed and was eventually forced to return to camp by many Pedi defending rough terrain. With no communication between the two divisions, Smit did not know what had happened and launched an attack on Sekhukhune's stronghold without support from the other column. Smit's men managed to burn some huts before the Pedi drove them off. Lacking Swazi to lead the attack as human shields, the Boers refused orders from their war council to attack Tsate and insisted they starve the Pedi by destroying crops. Demoralized, the Boers retreated across the Steelpoort River and returned to their homes. The Boers surrounded the Pedi with a series of forts, garrisoned by small groups of volunteers, which served as bases for raids to seize cattle and disrupt cultivation. In late September 1876, Sekhukhune sent his men to attack Fort Burgers, where they recovered some cattle but failed to dislodge the Boers. For the next four months, the Boers sent small raiding parties into Pedi territory, and the Pedi attempted to ambush them. In February 1877, Sekhukhune accepted a treaty in which he became a Transvaal subject and promised to surrender 2,000 cattle as tribute. This concluded the First Sekhukhune War, or the First Pedi War.

When the British annexed the Transvaal in April 1877, it was clear that Sekhukhune did not consider himself subordinate to that state and refused to supply the promised cattle. This position was reinforced by the British when they convinced the Boers to withdraw their volunteers from the forts surrounding Pedi territory and garrisoned them with a small force of Zulu colonial police. Theophilus Shepstone, British administrator of the Transvaal, pressured Sekhukhune to concede that he was under Transvaal jurisdiction, but the Pedi ruler surrendered only 245 cattle, claiming that famine made providing the rest impossible. In early 1878, Sekhukhune began to reassert his authority over smaller African groups, and the British and Boers feared he was mobilizing an alliance against them that was encouraged by Zulu King Cetshwayo (see later in this chapter). The Pedi pillaged Fort Burgers and Fort Weeber after the colonial police abandoned them, and the Pedi also attacked Boer farmers who had encroached upon their land. Boers gathered in frontier towns such as Lydenburg and formed defensive laagers. Shepstone concentrated on trying to confine Pedi raids to the local area until British reinforcements could be brought up from Natal to assault Sekhukhune's stronghold. Over the next few months, small colonial patrols skirmished with the Pedi around the forts. By September 1878, a colonial

army had been assembled under Colonel Hugh Rowlands that consisted of 1,216 infantry; 611 cavalry; and 500 Swazi warriors. Keeping the forts garrisoned meant that only a small group, 130 infantry and 338 cavalry supported by two cannon, could mount the anticipated assault on Sekhukhune's capital. During October, Rowlands led this column toward the Pedi stronghold, but pockets of Pedi resistance, horse sickness, and lack of water sources forced it to turn back. Rowlands then assembled 730 men supported by three guns that destroyed the settlement of a nearby Pedi headman. In late October, the British campaign against the Pedi was suspended because men and equipment were moved south for the invasion of the Zulu Kingdom.

After the defeat of the Zulu in early July 1879, General Sir Garnet Wolseley, the new British commander in the region, demanded that Sekhukhune surrender 2,500 cattle and accept a British fort within his stronghold. The Pedi leader refused. For the next few months, Wolseley built up supplies and forces in the Transvaal for a large attack on Sekhukhune's capital that he hoped would decisively crush Pedi resistance. By October this Transvaal Field Force consisted of 1,400 British infantry; 400 colonial cavalry; and 10,000 African allies that included 8,000 Swazi. Armed mostly with spears and a few firearms, Swazi confidence had been bolstered by the British defeat of the Zulu and the promise of captured cattle. With an army more than twice the size of the one organized by the Transvaal in 1876, Wolseley repeated what he had done in Asante by devoting considerable time to planning and avoiding past mistakes. At a total cost of almost £400,000, this campaign could never have been undertaken by the penniless Transvaal. Seeing that the western approach was too mountainous for horses and lacked water, Wolseley intended to take the majority of the European troops up the Olifants River, round the top of the Lulu Mountains, and head southward down a 31-kilometer long valley (at the end of which was Sekhukhune's stronghold). A smaller column, based at Fort Burgers and under Major H. A. Bushman, would travel along the eastern Lulu Mountains, link up with the Swazi, and assault the Pedi capital from behind.

Guarding the entrance of Sekhukhune's capital, the Fighting Kopje was 91 meters long, 60 meters wide, and 45 meters high, and it was honeycombed with caves. The Pedi had supplemented these natural defenses with stone walls and grain stores to hold out against a siege. Behind the Fighting Kopje, the capital town was spread over 3 kilometers and consisted of around 3,000 huts fronted by rifle pits

along the mountain's foot and lower slopes. Around 4,000 Pedi warriors defended the stronghold while Sekhukhune would watch the battle from caves further up the mountain.

The British attack on Tsate began at dawn on November 28, 1879. Wolseley divided his main force into three groups. The Fighting Kopje was isolated by two small columns made up of dismounted colonial cavalry along with some African allies that moved around each side of the stone hill and attacked the Pedi town. Initially, the Pedi in the rifle pits managed to hold off the attackers, but they were eventually forced to withdraw up the slope of the mountain to rocky outcroppings and ravines. A central column consisting of all the British regular infantry—just over 12 companies—and four cannon kept the Fighting Kopje's defenders suppressed by concentrated fire. That night, 8,000 Swazi warriors who had joined Bushman's force from Fort Burgers moved toward the stronghold from the east, climbed the far side of Sekhukhune's mountain, and just after first light poured down on the Pedi town below as the colonial forces were fighting up the slopes. The Pedi in the town were unexpectedly caught between two attacking forces, one below and another above, and their resistance was over by 9:30 a.m.

Later that morning, Wolseley sent most of his men to assault all sides of the Fighting Kopje. Masses of lightly equipped Swazi warriors surged up the rocky feature and overwhelmed the defenders. They were followed by British and Boer troops who used their firepower to pin down the more ensconced Pedi positions. Although the Royal Engineers attempted to seal some of the caves with explosives, many Pedi just moved deeper into these caverns and refused to surrender. Wolseley then brought his men down from the Kopje and had them surround it with entrenched positions. That night, under cover of rain and thunder, numerous Pedi descended the hill and charged through the colonial perimeter. In taking the Kopje the death of 500 Swazi meant that European fatalities were fairly light at 3 officers and 10 men. Pedi losses are not known. The extent of Pedi firearm use is illustrated by the British capture of 2,014 rifles and muskets. Sekhukhune had escaped earlier that day and eventually surrendered to British forces on December 2, 1879. Pedi resistance had been crushed, and they were incorporated into the Transvaal. Sekhukhune was released in 1881 but two years later was murdered by Mampuru who had risen to power in his absence.²

The catastrophic Xhosa Cattle-Killing movement of 1856–1857 led to mass starvation in British Kaffraria and neighboring areas, and the

removal of thousands of Xhosa into the Cape Colony as labor. At this time, the new Frontier Armed and Mounted Police (FAMP) crossed east of the Kei River, the colonial boundary, and occupied an inland strip of land around the Butterworth mission, removing it from the authority of Gcaleka Xhosa ruler Sarhili. In 1865, when British Kaffraria was absorbed into the Cape Colony, armed parties of Fingo colonial allies assisted by missionaries and FAMP units invaded this section of land. Gcaleka people living there were either evicted to Sarhili's remaining territory along the coast or submitted to the new Fingo leaders and therefore became known as Fingo. Cape authorities designated this area Fingoland and although not officially a colonial entity, it enjoyed colonial military protection.³

East of the Kei River, stock theft and violence between Fingo leaders and Sarhili's Gcaleka increased in the 1870s. A clash between Fingo and Gcaleka in August 1877, at the homestead of Fingo leader Ngcayecibi, provided colonial officials with an excuse to demand allegedly stolen cattle from Sarhili's people, which pushed them into war. Within a few months, Rharhabe Xhosa living within the Cape Colony, such as those under Sandile and Tini Maqoma, were bullied into rebellion by settlers and colonial officials who wanted their land.⁴ In late September 1877, colonial police and armed Fingo skirmished with Gcaleka who were assembling at Sarhili's capital. At the same time, colonial forces created a laager at Ibeka, manned by 180 FAMP and 2,000 armed Fingo, which was just eight kilometers from Sarhili's great place and thus a major threat to the Gcaleka state. On September 29, an army of 7,000–8,000 Gcaleka warriors attacked Ibeka on three of its four sides. After the Gcaleka spent the morning probing the defenses and skirmishing with the Fingo, the main assault lasted from mid-afternoon until dusk, when Sarhili's warriors finally withdrew under the relentless fire of cannon, rockets, and repeating rifles. Key to the defense was a nearby stone kraal held by 400 Fingo under Captain Veldtman Bikitsha, a veteran of two previous Cape-Xhosa conflicts and the largest landholder in Fingoland, the fire from which accounted for many Gcaleka casualties. The next morning, the Gcaleka men used thick fog as cover to attack the post on one flank but were again repulsed by cannon and rocket fire. The Gcaleka fled toward Sarhili's great place, pursued for several kilometers by the Fingo and mounted FAMP troopers, who burned homesteads and killed stragglers. Ibeka became a staging area for colonial attacks on the Gcaleka. On October 9, several columns of FAMP troopers, settler

volunteers, two artillery pieces, and hundreds of Fingos converged on Sarhili's capital. Cannon fire drove people away, and the Fingo pursued them to the Qora River. Some Gcaleka tried to make a stand on a piece of high ground but were outflanked by armed settlers and Fingo. The great place and many other homesteads were destroyed, and the Fingo looted livestock and other items. In late October and early November, a colonial force of 5,100 mostly Fingo men organized into two divisions, advanced on the Gcaleka along the Mbashe River, and swept through the Dwesa Forest. Various patrols were dispatched from the main force to harass the Gcaleka. They stole thousands of cattle and sheep. During the entire sweep, 40 Gcaleka and 8 Fingo were killed.⁵

By the start of December 1877, colonial authorities believed the Gcaleka had been evicted east of the Mbashe River, making their former land available for European settlement. It was therefore surprising when on the morning of December 2, a FAMP patrol was ambushed by a large army of Gcaleka near a destroyed store called Holland's Shop just south of Ibeka and Sarhili's abandoned capital. By mid-December, forces from the Cape Colony, mostly settler volunteers, were quickly assembled at Ibeka and resumed operations against the Gcaleka. Armed settlers and Fingo conducted raids and sweeps in December 1877 and January 1878. On the morning of December 29, near the junction of the Xabacasi and Qora Rivers, Fingo under Bikitsha were acting as an advanced guard for the main colonial force when they encountered the Gcaleka. The Fingo attacked with such spirit that the Gcaleka were driven off, leaving behind 900 cattle and more than 100 women and children—all of whom were captured. A colonial force sent east of the Kei River to attack the Gcaleka in mid-January 1878 consisted of 50 FAMP, 52 settler volunteers, and 800 armed Fingo. The Fingo were well equipped with firearms, great coats, blankets, and haversacks. While seizing 2,300 cattle, the Fingo encountered stiff resistance from the Gcaleka, who retired after 100 of them were killed. Among the Fingo, only 4 were killed and 7 wounded. Several days later, the column was joined by another Fingo contingent of 600 under a Captain McGregor, which had already captured 2,500 cattle and 5,400 sheep. All the seized livestock were then sent west into the colony.⁶

Since the early 1850s, the Rharhabe Xhosa of Sandile had been living in a small colonial reserve between their former home of the Amatola Mountains and the Kei River. News of fighting east of the

Kei encouraged colonial officials to disarm the Rharhabe, which caused them to split. Sandile led a faction into rebellion, while others remained loyal to the Cape government. Sandile's men and the Gcaleka force that had ambushed the police at Holland's Shop joined in the Tyityaba Valley just west of the Kei. While British commander General Arthur Cunynghame was rushing his forces west to deal with this new threat, the combined Xhosa army crossed east of the Kei and on January 13, 1878, attacked a colonial outpost near the Nyumaga Stream. Commanded by Colonel Richard Glyn, who had just ridden west from Ibeka that day to take charge, the colonial position was defended by two small detachments of British infantry, a few FAMP troopers, some Fingo auxiliaries, Royal Marine rocket launchers, and two cannon. The Xhosa attacked, but their old muzzle-loading muskets could not match the fire of repeating rifles, and they eventually fled. The Fingo and mounted police pursued the Xhosa until dusk, killing any that turned to make a stand. Although colonial patrols swept the Tyityaba Valley, the Rharhabe and Gcaleka warriors remained hidden there, though they were short on food and ammunition. While Sandile wanted to raid Fingo communities to the north around Butterworth for supplies, Sarhili overruled him and sent the combined army to attack a nearby colonial supply base recently established on Centane Hill near his abandoned capital. This was a surprising decision, considering the problems previous Xhosa armies had with attacking defended colonial positions. On February 7, the earthen defenses of Centane Hill were defended by 400 settler infantry, British regulars, and FAMP; 2 cannon; and 560 Fingo auxiliaries. That morning, 1,500 Gcaleka and Rharhabe attacked the camp. As usual, the Fingo units were deployed on the flanks outside the European manned fortifications. After 20 minutes of heavy firing from the defenders, the Xhosa withdrew, pursued by Bikitsha's Fingo company and FAMP cavalry. Almost 400 Xhosa men had been killed with minimal colonial losses. This decisive defeat ended Gcaleka resistance, and Sarhili went into hiding east of the Mbashe River. In late April and early May, colonial forces that consisted of British infantry, FAMP cavalry, and well over 3,000 Fingo pursued Sarhili and the Gcaleka but found only a few cattle.⁷

With the end of the campaign east of the Kei River, colonial forces turned their attention to Xhosa rebels within the Cape Colony. In January 1878, several colonial columns had swept through the Rharhabe reserve, shooting Xhosa they saw, loyalists included; seizing

cattle; and destroying homesteads. Motivated by paranoia and greed for land, colonial police surrounded the farm of Tini Maqoma (son of the famous Xhosa leader Maqoma who had died imprisoned on Robben Island in 1873) near Fort Beaufort and tried to arrest him. Tini Maqoma fled and was instantly cast as a rebel. With the withdrawal of the Gcaleka east of the Mbashe, Sandile and his Rharhabe rebels returned to colonial territory and took refuge in the overgrown ravines of the eastern part of the Amatola Mountains known as the Pirie Bush. Throughout March, Lieutenant General F. A. Thesiger (soon to be Lord Chelmsford), the recently arrived British commander, led several columns in a coordinated sweep of the Pirie Bush meant to push the Rharhabe south into a line of fortified colonial positions. Thesiger's force quickly fell into disarray as the Xhosa cleverly drew colonial units into thick undergrowth, where they were ambushed. He responded by uselessly bombarding unoccupied forest. To make matters worse, hundreds of starving Xhosa women and children flocked to the colonial camps, where they were fed from military supplies. During fighting in the Pirie Bush in March, the British first sent in Fingo levies to determine the location of the Xhosa rebels and then dispatched British soldiers to attack them. The roughly 1,000 Fingo recruited from places such as Fort Peddie and Fort Beaufort were not enough to dislodge Sandile's people. At the end of the month, Thesiger imported another 1,000 hastily assembled Fingo reinforcements from east of the Kei. Reluctant to volunteer because they had already captured livestock from the Gcaleka, these Transkei Fingoes were conscripted and forced to march 85 kilometers within 24 hours to reach the battlefield.⁸

On April 3, 1878, a desperate rebel force was located in the bush and attacked by the Transkei Fingo, who were supported by two cannon and a company of British infantry. Although they killed 41 Xhosa at a loss of 1 European captain and 2 Fingo killed, European commanders were dissatisfied. Around the same time, Siyolo, another Rharhabe chief who had fought the British decades before and had been released from Robben Island, led 2,000 Xhosa north toward the Amatolas to reinforce Sandile. Attempting to prevent the amalgamation of rebel forces, Thesiger ordered an attack on Siyolo's group at Ntaba ka Ndoda, a prominent hill, but the Transkei Fingo once again proved a disappointment, and the Xhosa escaped. Thesiger sent these Fingo back east of the Kei River, and many of the settler volunteers—disillusioned with the progress of the campaign—went home when

their term of service expired. Thesiger spent several weeks in April 1878 reassembling his forces at King William's Town. In late April, he took 4,000 men into the western Amatolas to root out Siyolo's Xhosa. Cannons were positioned on high ground, from where they fired down into forested ravines that were swept by large numbers of infantry. Suffering many casualties, Siyolo and a few other rebel leaders fled east to join Sandile. In early May, Thesiger moved his force east to the Pirie Bush, which he surrounded with 3,000 men. Sandile was trapped. Thesiger abandoned the idea of coordinated operations and assigned separate colonial columns specific areas where they would hunt the Xhosa and also seize food and cattle. In these operations, Lieutenant Colonel Redvers Buller proved a particularly aggressive leader. By the end of the month, the hungry and harassed Xhosa were trying to flee. Siyolo, Sandile, and Dukwana (son of the Xhosa Christian prophet Ntsikana) were killed, and Tini Maqoma was captured.⁹

During the 1850s, civil war broke out in the Zulu Kingdom between the followers of King Mpande's rival sons Mbuyazi and Cetshwayo. On December 2, 1856, Cetshwayo's 15,000-strong army trapped Mbuyazi's 7,000 men on the eastern bank of the Thukela River near Ndondakasuka Hill. Although Mbuyazi was supported by about 140 African gunmen led by white trader John Dunn, the numerical superiority of Cetshwayo's faction allowed them to roll up the enemy flank, which caused a general panic and flight across the river. Mbuyazi and many of his people were killed. When Mpande died in 1873, colonial agents from neighboring Natal arranged an elaborate "coronation" ceremony for Cetshwayo. Since the 1840s, the British had supported the Zulu against the Boers of the Transvaal. However, with the advent of confederation in the late 1870s, the British became hostile to the Zulu Kingdom and portrayed it as a threat to regional peace. In 1878, the British demanded restitution from the Zulu for alleged border violations and issued an ultimatum to Cetshwayo to disband his army, which was impossible because it was inseparable from broader Zulu society. Cetshwayo continued to seek a negotiated settlement even as British troops massed on his border.

For the invasion of the Zulu Kingdom, British commander Lord Chelmsford (F. A. Thesiger) had just over 17,000 men, of which 5,476 were British regulars; 1,193 were irregular colonial cavalry; and 9,350 were African allies from Natal. For logistics, the British assembled 10,000 oxen; 400 mules; 977 wagons; and 56 carts. Chelmsford

organized three columns that would each cross the border in separate places and converge on Cetshwayo's capital of Ulundi. He hoped that the relatively small size of each column would lure the Zulu army into an attack during which they would be annihilated by firepower. However, Chelmsford's staff had inaccurate maps, did not know the location of Zulu forces, and seriously underestimated Zulu military abilities. Since the Swazi postponed British requests to attack the Zulu from the northeast, Cetshwayo concentrated his forces on the British in the west, and he sent most of his regiments against the colonial central column, the largest of the three, accompanied by Chelmsford.

The 4,700 men of the British center column crossed into Zulu territory in mid-January 1879 and camped near Isandlwana Hill. Concerned about finding a location for the next camp en route to Ulundi, Chelmsford made the fatal mistake of splitting his force. On January 21, he dispatched a patrol of 150 colonial mounted police and 1,600 Natal Native Contingent (NNC) under Major J. G. Dartnell to check a report that Zulu were assembling nearby to raid Natal. Zulu commander Matshana with some 2,000 men led this patrol 20 kilometers from Isandlwana and at night, they built numerous fires to convince the British they had located a large Zulu army, which caused Dartnell to request assistance from Chelmsford. At 4:30 a.m. on January 22, Chelmsford led six companies of British infantry under Colonel R. Glyn out of the Isandlwana camp toward Dartnell's patrol, which—once the sun came up—saw that there were only a few Zulu present. Once a detachment of colonial troops under Colonel A. W. Durnford, which had been called forward by Chelmsford, arrived at Isandlwana at 10 a.m., the camp had a total of 1,768 defenders, about half of which were poorly trained and inadequately armed African allies. Almost immediately, Durnford took out a patrol of 103 cavalry and a company of NNC to search for Zulu and ordered Captain Theophilus Shepstone Junior to do the same with another patrol of Natal Native Horse. Durnford assumed command of Isandlwana camp and instructed the British officer Colonel H. B. Pulleine to use his infantry to support these patrols. Shepstone's patrol pursued Zulu foragers and ran unexpectedly into the main Zulu army concealed in low ground. The patrol quickly withdrew, but many Zulu pursued, which triggered the Zulu attack on the Isandlwana camp. Because of Durnford's instructions to Pulliene, the defenders of the camp, along with their two guns, were spread out in an extended line along a low ridge to cover the patrols if they were chased back to camp. As a result, there

were no fortified positions, and it was impossible for the British troops to focus firepower. Just after midday, the Zulu, numbering around 25,000, deployed in traditional “chest and horns” formation and advanced toward the vastly outnumbered colonial line. By mid-afternoon, the Zulu had completely routed the colonial units, rampaged through the camp, and were pursuing fleeing survivors toward the border. Some of the regular British infantry rallied but eventually ran out of ammunition and were overrun. On the colonial side, 52 officers, 727 European troops, and 471 African allies were killed, making this the worst military defeat inflicted upon the British by indigenous people. It is more difficult to determine the exact number of Zulu who died in the Battle of Isandlwana, as they considered it their worst loss of the war with perhaps 1,000 killed outright and the same number dying later from wounds.

On January 22–23, 1879, the king’s half-brother Dabulamanzi was leading 5,000 Zulu on their way to raid Natal, when they attacked the colonial post at Rorke’s Drift, the river crossing that was used by the central column to move into Zululand and that was protected by 139 British soldiers. Defending improvised fortifications, the small British garrison repulsed repeated Zulu assaults. Setting fire to one of the buildings, the Zulu undermined their own attack, as the British soldiers had enough light to see their targets. When the exhausted Zulu withdrew, only 15 British soldiers were dead, and 370 Zulu corpses lay around the post. Given the British humiliation of Isandlwana, the Rorke’s Drift victory was emphasized for propaganda, and 11 of the defenders were awarded Victoria Crosses, the highest number issued for a single engagement. Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift taught the British valuable lessons. It became obvious that the Zulu would attack in large numbers during the daytime and that the British could inflict massive casualties by concentrating their forces and firepower. Although Cetshwayo had hoped for a negotiation, after Isandlwana the British became more determined to crush the Zulu Kingdom.

Close to the coast, the colonial right column under Colonel C. K. Pearson consisted of 4,750 men with 400 supply wagons and was intercepted by 4,000–6,000 Zulu warriors. Cetshwayo suggested to Godide, the 70-year-old Zulu commander, that his men ambush the British at a place north of the Nyezane Stream where flat ground gave way to several high hills covered with tall grass. On the morning of January 22, as events at Isandlwana unfolded, Pearson halted his column just before the hills where the Zulu lay in wait. Observing a few

Zulu scouts, Pearson sent forward an NNC company that discovered the Zulu ambush. He then directed two companies of British infantry, two cannon, a Gatling gun, and a rocket battery to the front of the column, from where they poured fire on the hills and repelled the Zulu. This was the first time the British army employed the Gatling gun in action. At least 300 Zulu were killed to a loss of only 11 on the colonial side. Following instructions, Pearson advanced to the abandoned mission at Eshowe, where his men established a supply depot with earthen fortifications. At the end of the month, Pearson learned about the Isandlwana disaster and although he sent most of his cavalry back to Natal, he decided to maintain a garrison at Eshowe to block potential Zulu attacks on the colony. Subsequently, around 5,000 Zulu warriors besieged the post.

In the northwest, the colonial left column, consisting of 2,278 men under Colonel Evelyn Wood, advanced from Utrecht into Zulu territory in mid-January. Under the aggressive Redvers Buller, the column's mounted settler volunteers spent the rest of the month skirmishing with various Zulu groups. In late January, when Wood received the news of Isandlwana, he withdrew the column to the fortified camp on Khambula Hill and launched raids against Zulu communities.

After the battles of late January, most Zulu warriors returned to their homes for ritual purification. By late March 1879, Cetshwayo had again assembled a large army of at least 17,000 at his capital. The most pressing Zulu problem at this point was colonial raiding from Khambula. At the same time, Wood led a 1,200-strong raiding party to the Zulu stronghold at Hlobane Mountain, where they captured 2,000 cattle. The British did not know this was a trap. On the morning of March 28, the Zulu around Hlobane delayed the withdrawal of Wood's force until the main Zulu army, commanded by Mnyamana (the kingdom's second most important leader) arrived from Ulundi. The British retreated to Khambula in disarray, leaving behind almost 100 European dead and abandoning around the same number of African allies who were slaughtered by the advancing Zulu. Khambula was defended by just over 2,000 men, including 1,238 British infantry; about 600 colonial cavalry; and 6 cannon. The position was organized into two strong points, a redoubt, and a wagon laager with mutually supporting fire. Despite Cetshwayo's instructions to avoid attacking the fortified position and instead outflank it and draw out the defenders, the huge Zulu army approached Khambula in a

crescent formation spread over 25 kilometers. The crucial event in the battle was when Buller led around 100 colonial horsemen out of the defenses toward the Zulu right wing that was moving around the flank of the camp. Copying Boer tactics from the late 1830s, Buller's cavalry then dismounted, fired, and withdrew, which lured the incensed Zulu to within rifle range of the fortifications. This disrupted Zulu strategy and prevented the British position from being surrounded. The Zulu then attacked with their center and left wing, which were devastated by British fire. During mid-afternoon, the Zulu captured the post's cattle kraal, but two British companies charged out from the fortifications and expelled them with bayonets. While the Zulu attempted to make an orderly withdrawal at sunset, they were pursued by Buller's cavalry followed by British and African infantry. The Zulu retreat deteriorated into a rout. The Battle of Khambula, in which around 3,000 Zulu were killed, destroyed the capacity of the kingdom to mount significant resistance against the British. Lack of discipline had led the Zulu into the worst possible situation for them: a frontal attack on a well-prepared and defended colonial position.

By late March 1879, around 10,000 Zulu warriors, members of royal regiments and local irregulars, had gathered around the British garrison at Eshowe. On March 28, the British relief column, led by Chelmsford, crossed into Zulu territory and marched northeast close to the coast, where the fairly open terrain made it easy to avoid ambush. Leading African scouts ahead of the column was John Dunn, the British trader who, despite his opposition to Cetshwayo in 1856, had been made chief of this area and deserted the Zulu king when the British invaded. On April 1, the column camped near the destroyed Zulu settlement of Gingindlovu in rolling, boggy, grass-covered country 2 kilometers from the Nyezane Stream. Dunn selected a site on a small hill, where they organized a square wagon laager surrounded by an earthwork trench. The column's 2,280 African soldiers would defend the laager, which housed 2,000 oxen and 300 horses; 3,390 European troops would man the trenches; and at the corners were cannon, Gatling guns, and rockets. Colonial troops cleared fields of fire by cutting down tall grass within 100 meters, and Pearson's Eshowe garrison sent a message to the relief column warning of a Zulu attack. At dawn on April 2, a Zulu force of around 11,000 men surrounded the laager and sent small groups of gunmen forward to harass the defenders with mostly inaccurate fire. The Zulu then attacked from all sides. The Gatling guns began to fire when the

Zulu came within 1,000 meters and then colonial rifles, organized in a double tier with one line of men in the trench and the other above in the wagons, opened up from 300 meters. The closest the Zulu came to the laager was 20 meters. At around 7:15 a.m., the Zulu retreated with colonial cavalry and the NNC in pursuit. A Zulu attempt to regroup was disrupted by artillery fire from the laager. Nearly 1,200 Zulu and 41 colonial troops were killed at the Battle of Gingindlovu. Later that morning, Chelmsford relieved Eshowe and on April 5, both Pearson's garrison and the relief column moved back toward Natal.

Chelmsford's desire to avenge Isandlwana was hastened by news that Wolseley was on his way to take command. With reinforcements from Britain, Chelmsford launched his second invasion of the Zulu Kingdom in early June 1879. The colonial force was organized into a 1st Division of 7,500 men under Major General H. H. Crealock that advanced from Fort Pearson in the south, and a 2nd Division of 5,000 men under Major General E. Newdigate that advanced from Dundee to the north and linked up with a Flying Column of 3,200 men under Colonel Wood moving down from Khambula. It was essentially a two-pronged offensive converging on Ulundi from south and north. The colonial columns moved slowly and established a number of fortified positions along their routes. To make it difficult for Zulu forces to operate near them and prepare ambushes, colonial forces destroyed Zulu homesteads and seized cattle, which had a terrible impact on the noncombatant population. Cetshwayo sent emissaries to the British with offers to negotiate, but these were answered with impossible conditions. It appears that Zulu royal authority was weakening by colonial defeat, as many regiments delayed obeying the king's call to assemble at the capital and more chiefs defected to the British.

At the end of June 1879, the 2nd Division and Flying Column reached the vicinity of the Zulu capital and on July 1, established a double wagon laager near the west bank of the White Mfolozi River. Although thousands of Zulu warriors had witnessed the British arrival and had an excellent opportunity to attack the disorganized 2nd Division, they were prevented from doing so by Cetshwayo, who was still sending messengers to Chelmsford to negotiate. On July 3, Buller led a patrol of 500 colonial cavalry out of the laager and across the river to drive off Zulu snipers. A small party of 20 Zulu, acting as bait, lured the aggressive Buller into an ambush where around 4,000 warriors sprung up from tall grass. Buller managed to flee because he had wisely halted short of the ambush site and had

previously positioned another cavalry unit to cover his retreat. This small action illustrated that the Zulu still had the potential to challenge the British. On the morning of July 4, Chelmsford directed a colonial force of 4,166 European and 958 African soldiers supported by 12 cannon and 2 Gatling guns across the White Mfolozi. About 600 men were left behind to defend the laager. The Zulu did not attack the British during the river crossing because they wanted to draw them out of the laager and assault them on open ground in hopes of repeating the victory at Isandlwana. Chelmsford formed his men into a huge square, with cannon and Gatling at the corners, and marched awkwardly into the clear ground before Cetshwayo's capital. About 20,000 Zulu warriors emerged from various regimental settlements to quickly surround the British square. Tempting the Zulu to attack, Buller's colonial horsemen rode out on three sides of the square and then withdrew by fire and movement. British artillery opened fire first but had little effect on the Zulu, who attacked in open order. As the Zulu closed, British rifle and Gatling fire made it impossible for them to get within 90 meters of the square, despite attempts to advance through low ground and concentrate on weak sections of the line. A few Zulu came to within 30 meters before being shot down. None actually made contact. As usual, Zulu shooting at the British proved ineffective. By 9:30 a.m., the Zulu, having failed to find any gap in the British defense, had lost heart and began retreating. Zulu attempts to regroup were countered by British artillery, and British lancers and colonial cavalry charged out of the square to slaughter the fleeing enemy. Ulundi and the surrounding regimental centers were burned. While the British lost only 13 men in the Battle of Ulundi, around 1,500 Zulu were killed. Having fled before the final battle, Cetshwayo was captured by a colonial patrol in August.

When Wolseley arrived, he abolished the Zulu monarchy and its control over the Zulu military system. Cetshwayo was taken as a prisoner to Cape Town and then Britain. Zululand remained independent but divided among 13 chiefs many of whom, including John Dunn, had deserted to the British during the war. Those most loyal to the British were given control of areas bordering Natal and Transvaal.¹⁰

REBELLIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1880–1881

In late 1880, Africans in Basutoland (now Lesotho) and Transkei rebelled against the administration of the Cape Colony. Common causes for these uprisings included Cape legislation to disarm

Africans, undermining of African chiefly authority, and dispossession by European settlers and/or African colonial allies. It also appears likely that some Boers, chafing under British rule, encouraged Africans to rebel and supplied them with firearms. Eager to prove their self-reliance, Cape authorities suppressed these insurrections with their own forces and did not call upon imperial assistance.

The rulers of Lesotho had volunteered to come under British protection in 1868 to prevent conquest by the Orange Free State Boers. The Sotho monarchy and chiefs continued to govern their people under nominal British supervision. In 1872, administration of Basutoland had passed to the self-governing and settler-dominated Cape Colony, and eventually colonial magistrates were brought in and challenged the chiefs' authority. Cape disarmament policy represented a direct threat to Sotho independence, which relied on men acquiring horses and guns through migrant labor on the diamond fields, and Sotho land rights were jeopardized when the Quthing District was opened for white settlement.

In September 1880, the colonial garrison of Mafeteng, 171 Cape Mounted Riflemen (the CMR had once been a primarily Khoisan and mixed race unit but was disbanded in 1870 and in 1878 the entirely European FAMP adopted the same name), and 120 Native Police along with a few volunteers, were besieged by a large Sotho force under Lerothodi. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Carrington of the CMR, the defenders fortified the town, including the construction of three strong points, and cleared fields of fire. On September 21 in the morning, 7,000 Sotho, mostly mounted, attacked the town. Despite intense colonial shooting, the Sotho made off with all the town's cattle and captured a small African village some 410 meters away that had some strong buildings and walls that provided cover from which they returned fire on Mafeteng. During the next six hours, Sotho from nearby hills fired continuously on the colonial defenses while large groups of Sotho cavalry made a series of determined charges but were repulsed by small-arms fire. In one instance, over 1,500 Sotho cavalry charged down the main road of town but were driven back within 180 meters of colonial fortifications. Some of these Sotho dismounted and set fire to a house, the smoke from which allowed around 400 others to crawl up to within 45 meters of one of the strong points where they piled up rocks for cover and loop-holed garden walls. These Sotho were eventually repelled by a sortie of 25 CMR who withdrew under tremendous fire from the

surrounding hills. Later, Carrington, who had no artillery at his disposal, remarked that just one cannon would have dispersed the Sotho reserves and firing positions further from Mafeteng. By the end of the day, the Sotho had withdrawn but kept up harassing fire against Mafeteng all night. Because the Sotho carried away most of their casualties, it is impossible to determine how many were killed or wounded. None of the defenders were killed, and only five were wounded. Cartridge cases found after the battle suggested that most of the Sotho were armed with up-to-date Martini-Henry and Snider breech-loading rifles. On October 4, dismounted Sotho used low ground to attack an outlying section of Mafeteng's defenses known as Frazer's Store and although they managed to breach its walls, they were eventually driven off by repeated colonial counterattacks. On the night of October 14, Carrington dispatched a patrol that destroyed one of the Sotho positions overlooking Mafeteng. The next day, he sent out dismounted skirmishers who lured 1,500 Sotho into an attack on the town in which several were killed and the rest repulsed.¹¹

In early October 1880, rebel Sotho began to gather around Maseru, the colonial capital (which was defended by a fort) and seized cattle from Sotho communities that had not joined the uprising. On October 12, the rebels began shooting down on Maseru from nearby hills, but return fire from colonial cannon prevented a daylight attack. The Sotho attacked at dusk. Before retiring into the fort, colonial troops set the town's hospital on fire, which provided enough light for them to shoot accurately. Following an unsuccessful assault on the fort, the Sotho burned and looted some buildings, captured firearms, and withdrew around midnight. Sotho losses are not known, though colonial sources considered them heavy. Just one of Maseru's defenders was killed and four wounded. After the attack, the rebels abandoned their settlements near Maseru and took refuge in mountain caves. On the morning of October 25, Sotho cavalry charged into Maseru from the south and southwest followed by around 400–500 Sotho infantry who took up firing positions on nearby rocky ground, from where they supported the attack. The Sotho cavalry withdrew after capturing some cattle and horses. Twenty Sotho lay dead, and some Sotho had been seen carrying away casualties.¹²

From early October, Brigadier General C. M. Clarke, commander of Cape military forces, had been gathering reinforcements near Wepener in the Orange Free State for the intended relief of Mafeteng. On October 19, 1880, he led a column of 1,600 European and 75 African

troops, together with a supply train, across the Basutoland border. As the relief force advanced through the mountain pass near Kalabani Hill, the 1st Cape Mounted Yeomanry, volunteers from the Eastern Cape, were ambushed by many Sotho cavalry who charged down a slope brandishing lances. Thirty-two colonial troops were killed and 10 wounded. The loss was blamed on the yeomens' lack of swords that disadvantaged them in hand-to-hand combat. Between 7,000 and 8,000 Sotho then appeared on the heights above the column and were repelled by colonial artillery. Clarke's force made it to Mafeteng, though the ambush proved he did not have enough men to undertake further operations, and he requested an additional 1,000 settler volunteers. Several days later, on October 22, Clarke led a strong patrol from Mafeteng into the mountains to attack Lerothodi's village, which was occupied briefly before stiff resistance and news of an impending attack on Mafeteng forced them to retire. Clarke then warned his superiors that a second corps of 1,000 volunteers might be needed. At the end of October, Clarke once again took a force, this time numbering 1,450 men, to seize Lerothodi's village but was again compelled to withdraw by an unexpectedly reinforced enemy tenaciously clinging to mountainous positions. In early November Clarke, faced with a new rebellion in Transkei, suspended colonial offensive operations in Basutoland until sufficient reinforcements had arrived.¹³ The conflict stalemated, with colonial patrols occasionally raiding the Sotho who defended their mountain strongholds. Negotiations began in February 1881, and a cease-fire was declared. Heavy rains flooded rivers, making military activity almost impossible, and the Sotho used the respite to reap crops and strengthen fortifications. Making it clear that their problems were with the Cape and not the imperial government, Sotho rebel leaders refused demands for unconditional surrender. An agreement was reached in April 1881 in which the Sotho accepted colonial rule and turned over 5,000 cattle as compensation for war damages. However, they were allowed to retain firearms under license, and rebel leaders received amnesty.¹⁴ In 1884, Basutoland was removed from Cape administration and again became a British crown colony with a large degree of internal autonomy. It would eventually become the independent country of Lesotho.

In late October 1880, Hamilton Hope, colonial magistrate at Qumbu in the Cape's Transkei Territory, met with Mhlonhlo, leader of the Mpondomise, and around 800 of his men who had indicated their willingness to fight against the Sotho rebels if given firearms. Hope

had arranged for the delivery of 265 Snider rifles and 15,000 rounds of ammunition. However, on Mhlonhlo's order, the magistrate was killed and the Mpondomise, seizing the weapons, cut telegraph wires and looted European stores. They had rebelled. Within days, Mhlonhlo was joined by some Thembu people and Mditshwa, the other major Mpondomise leader who later claimed that he had been pressured by his hot-headed sons. The Mpondomise and Thembu had agreed to come under Cape colonial rule in the 1870s, but erosion of chiefly authority, loss of land, and the opportunity presented by the Sotho rebellion convinced them to take up arms. Because the Fingo in Transkei, longtime colonial allies, had just been disarmed by Cape authorities, they could hardly defend themselves let alone combat the rebellion. Wagons full of firearms and ammunition, and parties of Cape settler volunteers were rushed into Transkei. Fingo and other African loyalists were quickly rearmed and organized into military units. On November 15, the rebels suffered their first major defeat when 65 European volunteers and 500 Fingo intercepted 800 Mpondomise rebels under Mditshwa looting Fingo communities near the town of Umtata. After less than an hour, 50 rebels were dead and the rest were fleeing east across the Umtata River. On the colonial side, only 2 Fingo had been wounded. The armies of Mhlonhlo and Mditshwa gathered near Umtata, and on November 23, a force of 30 CMR, 50 settlers, and 1,500 African allies ventured out and drove them away. Some 30 or 40 Mpondomise were killed, compared to just 1 Fingo on the other side. The support of the independent Mpondo for the Cape represented another major blow to the rebellion.

Colonial forces launched an offensive against rebel communities. Raids against Thembu settlements in December killed several hundred rebels and captured many cattle and sheep. In early December, a mounted patrol from Mount Frere attacked Mhlonhlo's people, killing 120 and wounding many others. Facing a colonial scorched earth campaign, many Mpondomise prepared to move to the Drakensberg Mountains, and others surrendered to European outposts. The defeated Mhlonhlo and Mditshwa withdrew their remaining forces into the rugged Tsitsa Gorge. On December 18, Mhlonhlo's people were trapped in the ravine by two converging colonial columns consisting mostly of African allies, including a contingent of 750 Bhaca. One column engaged the Mpondomise in an intense firefight from across the river while the other moved around and descended upon them from the opposite direction. Two hundred Mpondomise

horsemen attempted to flee, but most were overtaken by colonial cavalry. While Mhlonhlo was one of the few who managed to escape by horse and took refuge in Basutoland, over 300 rebels were killed, with the colonial side sustaining minimal casualties. The next day, colonial forces observed 400–500 of Mditshwa's people abandoning the gorge. In Transkei, rebel chiefs were replaced by loyalist ones, and rebel land was given to colonial allies such as the Fingo.¹⁵

British annexation encouraged a sense of unity among the previously divided Transvaal Boers. Ironically, the British defeat of the Pedi and Zulu meant that the Boers could dedicate more time and resources to anti-British activities. The Boers were alienated by Wolseley's open contempt for them, the arrest of some of their leaders for anti-British statements, and the arrival of British soldiers, immigrants, businesses, and churches in the Transvaal. The Boer rebellion was sparked by the British imposition of taxation on the Transvaal Boers, who had never before paid tax. In late 1880, British attempts to hunt down tax evaders in the Potchestroom District led to an armed standoff in which a Boer was wounded. Across the Transvaal, the infuriated Boers mobilized upwards of 7,000 mounted men for military action. On December 16, the anniversary of the 1838 Battle of Blood River in which God was believed to have intervened to assure Boer victory against the Zulu, Boer leaders at Heidelberg proclaimed a restoration of the South African Republic.

The seven garrisons of British soldiers in the Transvaal, totaling 1,759 men, fortified their positions. Since the Boers lacked artillery and had limited rifle ammunition, their initial strategy was to besiege the British posts, cut telegraph wires between them, and starve the defenders into submission while blocking the mountain pass to Natal from where British reinforcements landing on the coast were likely to approach. The first major engagement occurred on December 20 when a British column moving west from Lydenburg to reinforce Pretoria was ambushed by the Boers at Bronkhorstspuit. The British commander, Lieutenant Colonel Philip Anstruther, refused a warning from Boer leader Piet Joubert to turn back, and shooting began. The Boers were spread out, well concealed, had previously set out stones as range markers, and were skilled shots. Caught unprepared, the British soldiers made excellent targets because they bunched together and were wearing red tunics that contrasted with the brown countryside. This resulted in 56 British fatalities and 92 wounded while only 1 Boer was killed and 4 wounded. The British quickly surrendered

and were treated mercifully by the Boers, who cared for the wounded and returned many of the captives to the Cape via the neutral Orange Free State. In contrast, wounded African wagon drivers were shot dead.

Holding Pretoria, the largest British detachment dispatched patrols to attack surrounding Boer laagers, though they were always pursued back to their lines by Boer horsemen. In an effort to capture British artillery that could be used against Pretoria, the Boers besieging Potchestroom dug a sap trench toward British lines but were repelled by a determined counterattack. By the end of January 1881, it was obvious that the military situation in the Transvaal had stalemated as the Boers were unable to capture any of the British garrisons, and the British could not lift the sieges. Some 2,000 Boers were tied down at the British posts, which left fewer men to counter the coming British invasion of the Transvaal via Natal.

By late January, Major General George Pomeroy-Colley, a protégé of Wolseley and now the British governor of Natal and high commissioner of Southeastern Africa, had assembled the Natal Field Force, which he led north toward the Transvaal. Around 600 Boers waited for them on the high ground overlooking the only wagon road through the mountain pass. The Natal Field Force was short cavalry and to some extent artillery. Colley had not called up settler volunteer horsemen because he feared the rebellion would expand into a regional Boer-British conflict. On January 28, 1881, Colley directed his 1,200 men to conduct a frontal attack on the Boer mountain defenses after preliminary bombardment proved ineffective. During the attack, the British cavalry were meant to protect the right flank of the infantry but completely failed because the ground was so steep that many horses were injured. Caught in a killing zone, the advancing British infantry was exposed to Boer fire from the front and right flank, none made it closer than 30–40 meters from the Boer positions, and they made an orderly withdrawal under intense fire. The British had failed to penetrate the Boer defenses. In this Battle of Laing's Nek, 16 Boers were killed and 27 wounded, and 80 British were killed and 115 wounded.

Camped on Mount Prospect, the Natal Field Force depended upon a long and exposed supply route from southern Natal. In early February, the Boer commander at Laing's Nek, Joubert, sent a patrol of 200 mounted men under Commandant General Nicolaas Smit to ambush anticipated British reinforcements moving up this route. When these Boers began to block British messengers and wagon

trains, Colley realized he had to clear his line of communication. On the morning of February 8, 1881, Colley led five British infantry companies supported by four artillery pieces and 40 cavalry along the southward road, and did not bring additional rations or water because they expected to return that afternoon. Soon after leaving camp, the detachment was ambushed near the Ingogo River by the Boer patrol. Expecting the Boers to flee from British cannon fire, Colley was surprised when they mounted their horses, charged closer, and adopted new firing positions. The British were almost surrounded when 100 Boer reinforcements arrived from Laing's Nek. Shooting continued throughout the day, with men on both sides taking cover behind rocks. While it appeared the British were trapped and would have to surrender, that night the Boers pulled back and did not post any sentries because they believed the British could not cross a flooded river, which was their only avenue of escape. However, when the sun came up, the Boers were shocked to discover that Colley's force had indeed forded the river under cover of darkness and retired to Mount Prospect. Smit's Boers had failed to take advantage of an opportunity, and the British had suffered another humiliating loss with 63 soldiers killed and 78 wounded. The detachment also lost 37 of its 65 horses. The British had expended a large amount of ammunition, but only 8 Boers were killed and 9 wounded.

In February 1881, both the British government and the Transvaal Boers began to search for a resolution to the conflict. British losses meant that the war was unpopular at home, and William Gladstone's government was distracted by other imperial issues such as troubles in Ireland. In Southern Africa, settler newspapers were divided over the war, Afrikaners (Boers) in the Cape were becoming more nationalistic, and in the neutral Orange Free State there was mounting pressure on President J. H. Brand to enter the war in support of the Transvaal. Whites feared a wider conflict between Boers and Britons, and that conquered blacks would use the occasion to rebel. The Transvaal Boers also wanted a quick end to hostilities because they feared the imminent arrival of British reinforcements. After their victory at Ingogo, the Boers sent peace overtures to the British government, and negotiations began.

Colley was determined to salvage his reputation by a decisive military victory, and his confidence was buoyed by the arrival of 727 British soldiers, mostly from India. It was also obvious that the Boers were improving and expanding their defenses around both

sides of Laing's Nek and the lower slopes of nearby Majuba Hill. In late February, Colley planned to threaten the flank of the Boer positions at the Nek by seizing the top of Majuba and then launching a new assault from his main camp. As diversions, he organized a small attack on the opposite Boer flank and sent empty wagons south. During the early morning darkness of February 27, Colley led just under 600 British regulars and some African guides and porters up the slope of Majuba Hill. Artillery was left behind because the ground was considered too steep and there was no preliminary reconnaissance of the summit. Colley detached some of his troops to guard the line of communication, so when his force reached the top of Majuba, it consisted of only 400 men. At dawn, Colley realized that the summit was much larger than he had anticipated and was compelled to extend and therefore weaken his defenses. The soldiers were not instructed to dig in, although some units did on their own. When the Boers initially realized that the British had seized the imposing hill, they panicked, believing that artillery would soon bombard them from above. This did not happen, and Joubert quickly organized volunteers for an attack on Majuba. Some 450 dismounted Boers used fire and movement to assault up the north and northeast slope that, because of the nature of the ground, could not be observed by the British on the summit, which meant Colley did not fully appreciate the extent of the attack. At the same time, another 150 Boer horsemen under Smit rode around the western side of Majuba to cut off the British and scatter smaller positions. Just after midday, the Boers on Majuba captured a poorly defended knoll, later called Gordon's Knoll after the Gordon Highlanders who had occupied it, that dominated the summit and allowed them to pour fire down on the British defenders. Continuing with fire and maneuver, the Boers executed a pincer movement around the disorganized British, who eventually broke and ran in terror down the hill. Colley, who had been asleep during the critical moment when the Boers seized Gordon's Knoll, was shot through the head and died. Representing a loss of 46 percent of the British force that had seized the hill, 92 British soldiers were killed, 131 wounded, and 57 captured. Only 1 Boer had been killed and 6 wounded. Joubert did not exploit this success, as he feared the other British positions were too strong. At the Battle of Majuba Hill, the British Army experienced its worst defeat since Isandlwana at the hands of untrained farmers.

Instructed by the British government, Evelyn Wood, Colley's replacement, signed a preliminary treaty with the Transvaal Boers in early March 1881. A final settlement was signed later that month in which the Boers regained self-government under nominal British supervision. The last British troops withdrew from the Transvaal in October, with the ratification of this agreement through the Pretoria Convention. The British did not have the political will to wage protracted war against the Transvaal Boers over what at the time was an impoverished agricultural territory with few known mineral resources. While Colley's incompetence was obvious, other factors contributed to the British defeat. British soldiers of this period were not well trained in marksmanship and relied on concentrated volley fire, while the frontier Boers were accomplished shots and had acquired modern rifles. Lack of effective British cavalry or mounted infantry in the crucial early months of the campaign meant that the Boers, almost all of whom were mounted and excellent horsemen, were more mobile. British artillery was not in sufficient quantity, and the Boers countered it by digging trenches and moving fast.¹⁶

CONFLICT IN GRIQUALAND WEST, BECHUANALAND, AND ZULULAND, 1873–1885)

In 1873, the British took over the diamond mining area north of the Cape, which became the colony of Griqualand West. Two years later, white diamond diggers who were attempting to exclude blacks from mining formed an army to rebel against British authority but backed down with the arrival of 300 British and colonial troops.¹⁷ Loss of land to white settlers, impoverishment, and deterioration of chiefly authority caused the 1878 rebellion of Africans, mostly Griqua and Tlhaping Tswana, in Griqualand West. In early May, Lieutenant Colonel William Owen Lanyon, the territory's administrator, led a patrol of 100 armed settlers and police to the rebel mountain stronghold of Koegas west of Griquatown. After repelling a rebel attack, Lanyon realized that the position could not be assaulted until artillery arrived from the Cape. On May 22, Lanyon and 34 horsemen attacked Jackal's Vlei, five kilometers south of Griquatown, and killed 25 rebels, including some leaders. With colonial reinforcements approaching, 600 to 1,000 rebels attacked the colonial camp at Koegas at the end of May but were driven off. In early June, 113 colonial cavalry supported by

a cannon seized the rebel stronghold at Koegas, killing between 40 to 50 rebels and capturing 1,700 sheep with just 1 loss. When the main body of the Diamond Fields Horse, a colonial unit under Major Charles Warren that had been fighting in the Eastern Cape, arrived on June 7, the total colonial force amounted to 700 men. During mid-June, Lanyon and Warren led a series of attacks on rebel mountain positions, killing 66 enemy and capturing 2,200 cattle; 3,000 small stock; and 200 horses. Colonial casualties were minimal. Many rebels began to flee north and on June 25, they were caught by a colonial force at Boetsap, where 80 surrendered along with 500 women and children. Three rebel leaders were shot. On June 28, Griqua and Tlhaping unsuccessfully attacked Campbell, a colonial post east of Griquatown.

The flight of rebels north of the border extended the conflict to independent southern Tswana country. In early July, 90 colonial volunteers en route to occupy Kuruman mission were ambushed by 240 Tlhaping but were driven off. In mid-July, 300 colonial soldiers under Lanyon and Owen, supported by artillery, drove the rebel Tlhaping from stone fortifications at Gamopedi. Some 50 Tlhaping and 9 colonial troops were killed. The colonial force captured 600 cattle; 2,000 sheep; and 20 wagons. On July 24, the colonial army bombarded the stone-walled Tlhaping stronghold of Dithakong for three hours and then launched a two-pronged cavalry and infantry attack. As professional hunters, the Tlhaping had firearms and knew how to use them. Despite a determined stand, they were compelled to flee by the attackers' firepower. In what Lanyon called "the most decisive victory of the war," his men captured 3,600 cattle; 6,000 sheep; 63 wagons; some rifles; and a considerable amount of trade goods such as ivory, ostrich feathers, and hides. Five colonial troops and 39 Tlhaping were killed. During the last months of 1878, Warren led patrols through the independent area between Griqualand West and the Molopo River, where he apprehended rebels and obtained the submission of all rulers to British authority. Africans in Griqualand West were disarmed and taxed, and in 1881, the territory was absorbed by the Cape Colony.¹⁸

During the mid-1870s, the Tswana-speaking Rapulana and Ratlou Rolong moved northwest from the Orange Free State and Transvaal, where they had lost land to Boers and settled in the Molopo River basin. They gathered around Lotlhakane, which had been the capital of Montshiwa's Tshidi Rolong before they had been evicted by Boer raids in the early 1850s. In 1877, Montshiwa and his 7,000 subjects

moved south from Ngwaketse country to their old home near the Molopo River. Seeing the British and Boers distracted by the Transvaal Rebellion, Montshiwa, in early 1881, led an attack on Lotlhakane that drove the Rapulana and Ratlou Rolong east into the Transvaal. The Tshidi Rolong gained land and control of the trade route to the diamond fields around Kimberley. In November 1881, the Rapulana and Ratlou, with some Boer mercenaries, attacked the Tshidi at Lotlhakane, who retired north to their Mafikeng settlement. Continuing the war for their own gain, between 200 and 300 Boers with three cannon and some African allies besieged Mafikeng for most of 1882, seizing livestock and prisoners from surrounding communities. With ammunition running low, Montshiwa's pleas for British assistance were rejected. Despite near starvation inside Mafikeng, Montshiwa refused to submit, and the Boers forged his mark on a treaty giving them the land south of the Molopo River, where they established the small Republic of Goshen centered on a farm called Rooigrond on the Transvaal border.

Further south, around the confluence of the Harts and Dry Harts Rivers, competition over grazing developed as Mossweu's Kora were hemmed in by Mankurwane's Tlhaping and Transvaal Boers. Open warfare began in November 1881 when the Tlhaping attacked the Kora settlement of Mamusa in an attempt to expand east to the Transvaal border that had been formalized by the Pretoria Convention. Although Mankurwane's army was assisted by 50 Boers, it failed to retain captured cattle as other Transvaal Boers intervened and drove them back. Mossweu enlisted the support of Boer mercenaries and quickly attacked the Tlhaping capital of Taung. Mankurwane tried to recruit his own white volunteers from Kimberley by promising a farm for three months of military service, but this was prohibited by the Cape government, which did not want indirect war with the Transvaal. By June 1882, Taung was besieged by 400–600 white mercenaries who were looting cattle and timber. With the British refusing to help and his few white allies deserting, Mankurwane, in September 1882, agreed to a treaty brokered by the Transvaal government. White gunmen from both sides, who curiously had never been able to hit each other, were given farms in Tlhaping territory and created the Republic of Stellaland with its capital at Vryburg.

During these conflicts, the Transvaal government supported the new small republics as a way of extending its western border to tax the trade route to the diamond fields. Concerned about the

implications of Boer control of the trade road, Cape officials and British missionaries urged the imperial government to secure the area. The British declaration of vague protection over the southern Tswana in early 1884 prompted Montshiwa, in May, to attack Rooigrond and drive its Boer inhabitants into the Transvaal. The Boers retaliated by seizing Tshidi Rolong cattle and by August, full-scale war had resumed around Mafikeng. German colonization on the coast of South West Africa (now Namibia) raised the possibility of an alliance with the Transvaal and prompted decisive British imperial action. In early 1885, Major General Charles Warren led 5,000 British and colonial troops north of the Cape Colony. The size of the expedition and the slowness of its advance discouraged Boer resistance. Warren established a fixed border with the Transvaal; the Boers of Stellaland accepted British authority, and those of Goshen moved back into the Transvaal. In April and June, the Warren expedition traveled north of the Molopo River and entered into agreements with Tswana rulers such as the particularly anti-Boer Khama of the Ngwato who had also been the target of Ndebele raids from the northeast. By September 1885, the area south of the Molopo River, inhabited by the Rolong and Tlhaping, became British Bechuanaland and was eventually incorporated into South Africa. The territory north of that river became the Bechuanaland Protectorate, which later became Botswana.¹⁹

In January 1883, the British returned Cetshwayo to Zululand on the condition that he maintain peace with the chiefs who had replaced him, accept the advice of a British resident, and not revive the Zulu military. Cetshwayo's authority was diminished because many young men had abandoned their age regiments, and chiefs such as Zibhebhu and Hamu had seized royal herds the king had previously used to secure loyalty. Zulu territory had been reduced by the creation of a thin buffer running along the Natal border called the Reserve Territory. Tensions developed between royalists (Usuthu) and supporters of Zibhebhu and Hamu. In March, Cetshwayo demanded all Zulu acknowledge him or leave Zululand. Royalists mobilized 5,000 men under area chiefs rather than age regiments, and this undisciplined army advanced east, plundering and burning Zibhebhu's communities. On March 30, the marauders were ambushed at Msebe Valley by a more disciplined force of 1,500 Zulu, many of whom had firearms, led by Zibhebhu and assisted by a few white mercenaries. The Usuthu fled in panic and were pursued. While Zibhebhu lost just 10 men, it is likely that several thousand royalists perished. Hamu

joined Zibhebhu, and their combined forces ravaged Usuthu communities across northern Zululand, driving many into the Transvaal. In May and June, Cetshwayo assembled 3,000 Usuthu under Dabulamanzi that set out from oNdini, his capital, but turned back at the Black Mfolozi River when they saw Zibhebhu's supporters. Since the royalists had to regain their land for the upcoming planting season, Cetshwayo planned an all-out offensive against Zibhebhu. However, Zibhebhu rallied 3,000 men and marching 50 kilometers in one night, attacked oNdini on the morning of July 21. When the hastily assembled Usuthu battle line was outflanked, they broke and ran, and oNdini was burned. In this Battle of oNdini, Zibhebhu lost seven men while hundreds of Usuthu were slain, including many leaders, and Cetshwayo was wounded while fleeing to the Nkandla Forest.

Failing to rally support, Cetshwayo took refuge at the British Residence at Eshowe in mid-October 1883, where he died of apparent poisoning in February 1884. Dinuzulu, Cetshwayo's son and heir, was proclaimed king by surviving Usuthu leaders. With Zibhebhu in control of northern Zululand, many Usuthu could not cultivate. Desperate Usuthu leaders turned to Transvaal Boers who had been pressing into Zulu territory for some years, and Dinuzulu was taken to a farm in the Transvaal. Dabulamanzi gathered 2,000 royalist men in the Nkandla Forest, where on May 10 they repulsed a patrol of black colonial police led by the British resident. Calling themselves Dinuzulu's Volunteers, around 350 mounted Boers escorted the teenage king back into Zululand in May, where they declared him king in exchange for a large chunk of land. At the beginning of June, an army of 7,000 Zulu, supported by 120 Boers under Lucas Meyer and including a young Louis Botha (who would become South Africa's first prime minister) advanced cautiously against Zibhebhu's people. With only 3,000 Zulu men and a few white mercenaries, Zibhebhu directed a retreat east to the Lubombo Mountains. With the Usuthu-Boer force approaching from the west, Zibhebhu used his cattle and noncombatants as bait by positioning them on the Mkhuze River's north bank and concealing his warriors on the south bank near the expected Usuthu crossing point. On June 5, Dinuzulu personally led the advance in a classic crescent formation that prematurely sprang Zibhebhu's ambush. Although some Usuthu tried to flee, fire from their Boer allies drove them toward the enemy. Blocked from retreat across the Mkhuze River and driven back by Boer firepower, Zibhebhu's men were slaughtered. While the number of casualties in the Battle of

Tshaneni is unknown, the Usuthu and Boers seized 60,000 cattle. Zibhebhu escaped on horseback and in September, he moved one third of his followers, about 6,000 people, into a location the British assigned him in the Reserve Territory. In August, Dinuzulu gave 800 Boers over 1 million hectares in northern Zululand with authority over Zulu living there, and Meyers became president of the New Republic. Many Zulu moved south, while some resisted the Boers who burned their homes. It was this civil war, rather than the 1879 British invasion, that destroyed independent Zulu power.²⁰

GOLD WARS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1886–1902

In Southern Africa, the discovery of gold in the Transvaal in 1886 caused a rapid shift in regional economic power from the British-dominated coast to the interior Boer republics. This opened the possibility of a Boer alliance with one of Britain's imperial rivals such as Germany that had suddenly colonized South West Africa in 1884. Although the Transvaal government of President Paul Kruger gained wealth by taxing its fast-growing mining economy, the conservative Boer landowning elite was generally hostile to the development of industrial capitalism. Particularly galling to the mine owners was the Transvaal state's monopoly on the sale of dynamite, which was increasingly important as mines went deeper. Mining capitalists began to believe that their long-term success would be better facilitated by a different administration. In the early 1890s, Cecil Rhodes—the Cape Colony premier, mining magnate, and dreamy British imperialist—sought to outflank the Boers by orchestrating the conquest of the territory between the Limpopo and Zambezi Rivers, ultimately named Southern Rhodesia (today's Zimbabwe) because he mistakenly believed it contained another huge reservoir of gold. In 1895, tensions between British and Boers were enflamed by the Jameson Raid, Rhodes's failed attempt to overthrow the Kruger regime by invading the Transvaal with a small armed group. The imperial British government used the issue of the uitlanders, white foreigners who had come into the republic because of the gold rush, to undermine the Transvaal state and create a pretext for war. The British knew that if the uitlanders, mostly British in origin, were given the vote, they would elect a proimperial government in the Transvaal, and the Boers did not want to meekly surrender their independence.

In the 1890s, the Transvaal, strengthened by new wealth, embarked on a series of campaigns against the remaining independent African groups on its northern frontier. Given that the British had eliminated the Pedi threat in the late 1870s, the Transvaal Boers could expand elsewhere. During the 1880s, the Gananwa of the northwest experienced increased Boer demands for labor, livestock, land, and taxes and were able to resist because many had acquired firearms through wage labor in the diamond or gold mines. In 1894, one of the largest commandos in Transvaal history was mobilized under Piet Joubert. Made up of groups from all over the republic, it totalled around 4,000 European and 2,000 African fighters supported by new cannon and Maxim guns. Most of the Europeans were Boers, but some British participated because the 1883 Commando Law had made all white inhabitants of the state liable for military service and enabled the Transvaal to requisition supplies from foreign companies within its borders. Since the uitlanders objected to military service without voting rights, this enflamed tensions between the Transvaal and Britain. The Boer-Gananwa War was fought in four increasingly harsh phases. In the first phase, from May to mid-June 1894, the Boer army isolated peripheral African communities from the Gananwa capital at Blouberg Mountain. In late June, during the second phase, the Transvaal force assaulted the mountain stronghold from all sides, which failed to dislodge the Gananwa as they took shelter in deep caves. During the third phase, from July 1–19, the Boers attempted to bury the Gananwa by dynamiting their caves, which failed because of the area's geology and effective Gananwa small-arms fire. The Boers then resorted to "smoking out" the Gananwa by spraying the bush and caves with paraffin ignited by artillery fire. With the Gananwa refusing to surrender, the Boers besieged the mountain. Many starving and dehydrated Gananwa, their crops destroyed and cattle seized, surrendered at the end of July.²¹

When the famous Venda warrior-leader Makhado died in 1895, his son Mphephu tried to unite their people but failed because a German missionary influenced other Venda chiefs against him. In October 1898, Joubert led a Transvaal army of 4,000 Boers supported by artillery and many Swazi, Tsonga, and Venda allies into Mphephu's territory in the Zoutpansberg Mountains. The Boers build a series of forts close to the Venda stronghold at Swunguzwi Mountain. In late October, a group of Venda fired at some Boers building a fort at Rietvlei, but Venda gunpowder was of such poor quality that the volley did little, and the

attackers were repelled by Boer artillery. On November 16, Joubert launched an attack on three sides of Swunguzwi but after some token resistance, the Venda withdrew under cover of thick mist, and Boers burned Mphephu's capital. Around 10,000 Venda, including Mphephu, eluded the Boers and fled north into British-ruled Southern Rhodesia. This marked the conquest of the last independent African group in the Transvaal and the following year, the town of Louis Trichardt was established in the Zoutpansberg.²²

Although the southern Tswana of British Bechuanaland had already been confined to reserves, shortly after the area was annexed by the Cape in 1895, settlers pushed them into even smaller pieces of land and goaded them into rebellion. A few rebels sought shelter with Christian Tlhaping chief Luka Jantjie, which meant he was also branded a rebel and in August 1897, a 750-strong Cape colonial force invaded his stronghold in the Langeberg Mountains. Under Jantjie's leadership, the Tswana built rock fortifications from where these experienced hunters fired down on attacking colonial troops. Tlhaping resistance was undermined by the contamination of their water supply, essential in this dry environment, by cattle that had died from rinderpest. With African allies from the Transkei as human shields, and supported by artillery and machine guns, Cape settler-soldiers eventually took the Tswana positions and after Jantjie was killed in a last-ditch gunfight, his severed head, fingers, and toes were taken as trophies. A few rebel leaders were hanged, and 2,000 were taken to the Western Cape as indentured labor.²³

SOUTHERN RHODESIA (ZIMBABWE), 1870–1897

In the late 1860s, the Ndebele state, which had moved north into what is now southwestern Zimbabwe 30 years earlier, dominated the local Kalanga and many of the smaller Shona states to the east. After the 1868 death of founding Ndebele leader Mzilikazi, a civil war broke out between supporters of the late ruler's son Lobengula and a faction led by military commander Mbigo Masuku, who believed that Nkulumane, the rightful heir who had gone missing years before, would return. In 1870, Lobengula personally led his forces to victory in battle and became Ndebele king. By 1879, the Shona had obtained firearms through trade from the Venda to the immediate south who had acquired them from the Boers, the Portuguese to the east, or by

working in diamond and later gold mines further south. As Europeans began to favor new breech-loading rifles, the region was flooded with obsolete muzzle loaders. Ndebele raiders began to find it difficult to overcome Shona fortified hilltop strongholds defended by men with guns. In 1879, an Ndebele army sent to punish the rebellious Shona tributary leader Chivi easily dominated the open areas but could not take the hill strongholds. Although Chivi was captured and executed, his group achieved independence from the Ndebele. In 1883, Lobengula launched an attack on the Shona around present-day Harare, which killed his erstwhile ally spirit medium Chaminuka, who had claimed the sole right to grant Europeans hunting privileges in this area. Ndebele power declined and at the end of the 1880s, their raiding parties could no longer penetrate central Shona territory. In turn, Lobengula sent his raiders on long-distance expeditions against the Tawana of Lake Ngami in the west, where they suffered a major setback in 1885.²⁴

Seeking new sources of gold north of the Transvaal, agents of Cecil Rhodes visited Lobengula in 1888 and convinced him to sign the Rudd Concession, which promised the British exclusive access to minerals in his territory in exchange for money; 1,000 Martini-Henry breech-loading rifles; 100,000 rounds of ammunition; and a gunboat on the Zambezi River. Only 500 rifles with some ammunition were delivered, and Lobengula kept them at his capital for fear that rival Ndebele factions would use them to challenge his authority. Since Rhodes and his associates claimed the Ndebele ruled the Shona, it was erroneously believed that the concession extended British authority into Shona territory. Rhodes received a royal charter and formed the British South Africa Company (BSAC), which sent a column of 200 armed Europeans supported by artillery, Maxim guns, and an electric searchlight into Shona country in 1890 and established a series of small posts such as Fort Victoria (today's Masvingo) and Fort Salisbury (today's Harare). Seeing that this was an invasion and not simple mineral prospecting, Lobengula had several of his advisors executed for having supported the Rudd Concession and instructed his warriors to shadow the column but not attack, as he feared colonial firepower. The Shona did not resist this limited European occupation, which had little impact on them.

When it became apparent that Shona country did not have the anticipated gold resources, the BSAC used a July 1893 Ndebele raid on Shona around Fort Victoria as an excuse for war. The BSAC organized three fast-moving columns of mounted troops and wagons to

converge on the Ndebele capital of Bulawayo. The Salisbury column, commanded by Major Patrick Forbes, had 258 European mounted infantry, 115 African allies, 16 wagons, a field gun, two Maxim guns, and two obsolete manual machine guns—a Nordenfelt and a Gardener. The Victoria column, led by Captain Alan Wilson, consisted of 414 European troops, 400 Shona irregulars, 18 wagons, 2 field guns, and 3 Maxim guns. These two columns rendezvoused at Iron Mine Hill in mid-October 1893 and proceeded toward Bulawayo. The Southern Column, originating from Tuli in Bechuanaland, was commanded by Pieter Johannes Raaf and Hamilton Goold-Adams and comprised 450 Europeans, 2 field guns, 5 Maxims, and 1,760 African auxiliaries under the Ngwato Tswana ruler Khama, half of whom were armed with Martini-Henry rifles. BSAC forces combined firepower and mobility by mounting Maxim guns on wagons, which also carried large amounts of ammunition, and during the night, they formed defensive laagers. The conservative Ndebele employed some firearms, but their marksmanship was poor, and they stuck to using the old “chest and horns” formation to attack colonial positions. In the early morning darkness of October 25, about 5,000 Ndebele warriors attacked the combined Salisbury and Victoria column at the Shangani River. While several mounted colonial patrols were driven back to the laager, BSAC firepower cut down the Ndebele, and artillery disrupted their efforts to regroup. The Ndebele lost 500 men compared to just 1 European and 40–50 Africans for the BSAC. The Salisbury and Victoria columns advanced to the Mbembesi River where, on November 1, their single laager was attacked by a large Ndebele force held at bay by BSAC machine guns and artillery that killed between 800 and 1,000. On the same day, as it crossed the Ramokabane River, the strung out Southern Column was saved by its Maxim guns, which repelled an ambush by 600–700 Ndebele under Gambo. As Lobengula led the remnants of his army north toward the Zambezi River, on November 4, the Salisbury and Victoria columns entered Bulawayo, which had been burned by the Ndebele the previous day. The Southern Column arrived 11 days later. During the second half of November, Major Forbes led 270 mostly mounted men, supported by five wagons and four Maxims, in pursuit of Lobengula. Since Forbes’s detachment was slowed by mud and rain, he sent out a mounted patrol of about 40 men under Wilson without Maxim support. On December 4, Wilson’s patrol was trapped on the other side of the swollen Shangani River and annihilated by thousands of

Ndebele warriors. Wilson and his men would be hailed as British imperial heroes and their last stand celebrated as a central event in the white colonization of Southern Rhodesia. Lobengula died of fever in early 1894. The BSAC took Ndebele land and cattle, and banned the Ndebele monarchy. Under company administration, the Shona territory called Mashonaland and the former Ndebele state called Matabeleland were combined as Southern Rhodesia, which developed a colonial economy based on settler commercial farming and some mining.²⁵

In March 1896, some Ndebele rebelled against the BSAC and besieged the colonial town of Bulawayo. Ndebele grievances included oppression by colonial police and recent taxation meant to force them into the colonial economy as cheap labor. Ndebele society was also undermined by rinderpest that was devastating cattle herds across Southern and East Africa. The timing of the rebellion was determined by the absence of a large number of colonial police, who had been captured by the Transvaal Boers during the 1895 Jameson Raid. In Bulawayo, settlers constructed a wagon laager reinforced with sandbags and barbed wire, spread broken glass outside the perimeter, arranged oil-soaked bundles of wood to be set alight during a night attack, and rigged outlying buildings with explosives to be detonated if they were occupied by the Ndebele. Frederick Selous, a famous hunter who had guided the 1890 invaders, and Frederick Russell Burnham, an American scout who had escaped the last stand of the Wilson Patrol in 1893, organized the Bulawayo Field Force that dispatched mounted patrols to rescue beleaguered settlers. Applying lessons from the 1893 war when their massed charges were devastated by colonial firepower, the Ndebele formed small groups that fired rifles from cover, showed improved marksmanship, and withdrew when colonial firepower became concentrated. On April 9, one thousand Ndebele ambushed a colonial patrol of 100 mounted men and a Maxim gun on the Tuli road to Bechuanaland. With the Ndebele firing from concealed positions in the rocks, the Maxim was useless, and it took the British six hours to drive them off. The colonial patrol lost 7 dead, over 20 wounded, and 33 horses killed. While the Ndebele suffered 200–300 fatalities, this was much fewer than many of the 1893 engagements. Around the same time, another colonial patrol from Bulawayo consisting of 100 Europeans and 39 African auxiliaries supported by a wagon-mounted Maxim gun was ambushed by around 1,500 Ndebele on the Shiloh road. During a two-day running battle,

the Ndebele fired from cover, caught the British on the move, attempted to flank them, and focused most of their fire on the Maxim wagon. Unwittingly, the Ndebele broke off their attack just as the patrol's ammunition and food was about to run out. Around 200 Ndebele had been killed compared to 5 Europeans, mostly from the Maxim crew, and an unknown number of African allies. A deadlock developed because the Ndebele could not overwhelm the colonial patrols, and the patrols could not inflict massive casualties on the Ndebele.

In late May 1896, Bulawayo was relieved by two British forces: an imperial force traveling north from Mafeking consisting of 850 mounted men, 45 wagons, 7 field guns, and 10 Maxims under Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Plumer and 150 men accompanied by Rhodes riding southwest from Salisbury. With these reinforcements, the British in Bulawayo, now under Major General Frederick Carrington and his chief of staff Colonel Robert Baden-Powell, sent out more and larger patrols to drive the Ndebele away and seize livestock. On April 25, a patrol under Captain R. Macfarlane used firepower to repel a sustained attack by 2,000 Ndebele at the Umguza River near Bulawayo. The first major colonial offensive against the Ndebele was launched in early June when 3 colonial columns of about 450 men each swept north of Bulawayo and 1 of these charged about 1,000 Ndebele hiding in a line of bush and cut them down as they fled. As a result, the Ndebele rebels withdrew to their rocky strongholds at Ntabazikamambo and the Matopos Hills. At the end of June, Plumer led a force of 752 men, 2 field guns, and 4 Maxims that attacked and seized the isolated hill position at Ntabazikamambo, killed 100 Ndebele, and captured thousands of cattle, sheep, and goats.

British preparations to pursue the Ndebele rebels into the rough Matopos Hills were delayed by the mid-June rebellion of some Shona groups who had suffered oppression and taxation. This was particularly shocking to the British, who believed they had saved the Shona from raiding by the supposedly more warlike Ndebele. Part of the colonial force in Matabeleland was sent to Mashonaland, and several hundred reinforcements were transported by ship from Cape Town to Portuguese Beira and then overland to Salisbury. Despite limited resources, the British continued operations against the Ndebele in the Matopos, which consisted of 2,000 square kilometers of hills, boulders, and caves. After several colonial patrols took heavy casualties in late July trying to dislodge Ndebele fighters from rocky hills, the British

established a series of fortified posts around the Matopos to confine the rebels. During early August, Plumer led an inconclusive sweep of the Matopos with around 900 men supported by 4 Maxims and 6 field guns that fought a major engagement in which 7 Europeans and 100 Ndebele were killed. In late August, Rhodes himself negotiated a settlement with Ndebele leaders in which they surrendered but received amnesty. This enabled the British to concentrate on the Shona rebels. Between June 1896 and October 1897, British forces used artillery and machine gun fire to destroy dozens of isolated Shona hill-top strongholds, and rebels hiding in caves were blow up with dynamite. Although the Shona employed firearms, they were generally obsolete muzzle loaders with inferior ammunition compared to those used by the Ndebele. Many Shona rebels were captured and hung, for example, spirit mediums Nehanda and Kaguvi. Later African nationalist historians saw the Ndebele and Shona rebellion as a unified, coordinated, and forward-looking effort by a new religious leadership. Celebrated as the First Chimurenga (or first struggle for national independence), the memory of the 1896–1897 rebellion inspired future African nationalist insurgents fighting white minority rule in late twentieth-century Rhodesia. However, it appears the two rebellions were related but separate events led by established political authorities who used spirit mediums to mobilize support for an attempt to recover their independence.²⁶

PORTUGUESE EAST AFRICA, 1890–1895

During the scramble, the Portuguese hoped to conquer a strip of south-central African territory (today's Zambia and Zimbabwe) that would link up their old colonies in Angola and Mozambique. This clashed with the British dream of ruling from Cape to Cairo, so in January 1890, London issued Lisbon an ultimatum to withdraw their forces from the strip. Portugal's acquiescence was considered a national humiliation that caused the government to fall and set the stage for the overthrow of the monarchy 20 years later. An 1890 treaty between Britain and Portugal finalized the colonial borders of Angola and Mozambique. Previously restricted to coastal enclaves such as Lourenco Marques (Maputo) and Inhambane, the Portuguese now considered it essential to control the Mozambican interior that, in the south, was dominated by the Gaza state. In the early 1890s, Gaza ruler

Gungunhana tried to secure British protection against the Portuguese, but London refused. An excuse for war came in October 1894 when some Tonga rebelled against Portuguese taxation and meddling, and staged an unsuccessful attack on Lourenco Marques. Two fugitive Tonga leaders took shelter with Gungunhana, who refused Portuguese demands to surrender them. Antonio Enes, commissioner for Mozambique, organized an invasion force consisting of one battalion of newly arrived Portuguese infantry, another battalion of African troops from Angola, a company of paramilitary police, a large force of colonial cavalry, and local irregulars supported by four mountain guns, two Nordenfelt guns, and a fleet of steamers with machine guns on the Limpopo River. Lisbon sent 2,190 men to Mozambique for this campaign, which was its largest overseas expeditionary force of the nineteenth century. The Portuguese purchased horses, mules, oxen, and wagons. They also borrowed ships from the neighboring British colony of Natal. Portuguese regulars were armed with French-made bolt-action, magazine-fed rifles that gave them a massive advantage in firepower over the Gaza. Simultaneously, Gaza was suffering rebellion by subject groups, and many of its young men were working in Natal and Transvaal.

On the morning February 2, 1895, at Marracuene just north of Lourenco Marques, an 800-man Portuguese force camped in Tonga territory was surprised when a returning patrol turned out to be Tonga warriors dressed in colonial uniforms who suddenly attacked, triggering a wider assault by others hiding nearby. Although some Tonga penetrated the Portuguese square (which seemed likely to break), colonial firepower repelled the attackers. Enes then split his force into two columns that were to converge on Gungunhana's capital from Lourenco Marques in the south and Inhambane in the north. On September 8, at Magul, the 600-strong southern column was attacked by 6,000 Tonga and Gaza warriors under the war leader Maguigane. Because mounted scouts had warned of the enemy approach, the Portuguese had built a thorn bush and barbed wire barricade around their square, which may have been the first time a European army used barbed wire as a defensive obstacle. In its traditional crescent formation, the Gaza army repeatedly attacked the Portuguese position. Despite the breakdown of both Portuguese machine guns, colonial rifle fire kept the Tonga and Gaza at least 200 meters away. Hundreds of Tonga and Gaza were killed, compared to just five in the Portuguese column. Vainly hoping for a negotiated settlement,

Gungunhana demobilized 40,000 warriors encamped around his capital in October, only to recall them again on the urging of Maguigane. On the morning of November 7, the Portuguese northern column under Colonel Rodrigues Galhardo, which consisted of 560 Europeans and 500 Africans, was attacked by the main Gaza army of 10,000–15,000 men at Coolela near Gungunhana's capital. However, Gungunhana's army was demoralized by lack of food and was made up partly of unmotivated conscripts from subordinate communities. The Portuguese camp formed square when African scouts warned of the impending attack. Once again, the Gaza army formed a crescent and charged. They came very close to the square but were devastated by colonial machine gun and rifle fire within 40 minutes. Thousands of Gaza warriors became casualties, compared to just 45 Portuguese troops. On November 11, Galhardo's column burned the Gaza capital and in December, a Portuguese force under Joaquim Augusto Mousinho de Albuquerque, later celebrated as a great Portuguese hero, captured Gungunhana hiding near the grave of his grandfather, the Gaza founder Soshangane. Gungunhana was shipped to Lisbon, where he was paraded through the streets and died in 1906 while exiled in the Azores.²⁷

GERMAN SOUTH WEST AFRICA, 1884–1907

The grassland area between the Kalahari and Namib Deserts, near the Atlantic coast of Southern Africa, had been dominated by various Khoisan-speaking Nama groups that had moved north from the Cape and possessed horses and guns acquired from the Dutch. The Nama raided cattle mostly from the Bantu-speaking Herero who lived around present-day Windhoek and the Ovambo further north. During the 1860s, the Herero increasingly challenged the Nama with firearms obtained from European traders seeking cattle for the diamond fields. In 1878 the British, encouraged by Herero requests for protection against the Nama, annexed the important trading outlet of Walvis Bay, which was placed under Cape administration. During the 1880s and 1890s, Hendrik Witbooi, spurred by Christian prophecies, attempted to unite the Nama groups and lead them north, which resulted in years of guerrilla warfare with the now stronger Herero. In 1884, Germany declared a protectorate over the coast and hinterland from the Orange River in the south to the Cunene River in the

north (except the British enclave of Walvis Bay). Although Herero leader Maherero accepted German protection, he renounced this in 1888 as the Germans proved unable to stop Nama attacks. In January 1889, a small German military detachment under Captain Curt von Francois landed at the port of Swakopmund and built a fort inland at Tsaobis. The next year, with reinforcements, they constructed another fort further east at Windhoek, which became the colonial capital. Faced with gradual colonial penetration, Maherero renewed his agreement with the Germans just before his death in 1890, but Witbooi stubbornly refused to submit.

In April 1893, Francois led an attack by 200 German troops on Witbooi's camp at Hoornkranz, where 150 Nama were killed, including many women and children. Witbooi and about 250 armed and mounted Nama abandoned the camp. Based in the Naukluft Mountains, Witbooi's force swelled to 600, of whom 400 had guns and 300 were mounted. They waged a guerrilla war against the Germans by raiding horse posts and supply wagon trains. With 100 reinforcements from Germany, Francois tried to surround the elusive Nama who attacked his rear areas. On February 1–2, 1894, at the Onab Valley, the Germans engaged the Nama with artillery but once again, they melted into the nearby hills. In early 1894, Major Theodor Leutwein took over as German commander and while waiting for 250 additional reinforcements, isolated Witbooi by turning other African groups against him. In late August, Leutwein's force scoured the Naukluft Mountains, capturing waterholes and observation points, and surrounding Witbooi's Nama, who surrendered in early September and accepted a protection treaty.

After Maherero's death, civil war broke out between the followers of the late ruler's sons, Nikodemus and Samuel. In 1896, Leutwein directed German forces to attack the supporters of Nikodemus, some of whom were hanged and had their land and cattle confiscated. With German support, Samuel Maherero became the primary Herero leader and accepted German settlement in the southern part of Herero territory. In mid-1896, the arrival of 400 German troops consolidated colonial control of German South West Africa (SWA; today's Namibia) south of Ovamboland. Given its dry climate and lack of tropical disease, Berlin saw SWA as a place for European settlement like the neighboring British colonies and Boer republics where Africans would provide labor for cattle ranches and mines. German military veterans were granted land and by 1897, there were 2,600 Europeans living in

the colony. Reflecting the colony's settler orientation and open geography, the German Schutztruppe in SWA was almost entirely European, operated as mounted infantry, and included a company riding imported camels used in desert conditions. By 1897, the force consisted of 700 German troops.

Several developments at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries increased pressure on the Herero and Nama. European settlement increased as Boers displaced by the South African War of 1899–1902 entered SWA. In 1903, the German government announced plans to expand white settlement by building a railway through Herero territory and placing the Herero in reserves. With many cattle destroyed by the rinderpest of 1896–1897, many Herero and Nama gave away more land to settlers and became indebted to European merchants. When the colonial administration announced in 1903 that it would cancel the debts in the interest of stability, European merchants hired off-duty soldiers to collect them all at once, which led to mass seizures of livestock and other property from the Herero. This sparked the Herero rebellion that began in mid-January 1904 with a surprise attack on European settlers. Although around 150 European men were killed, Samuel Maherero instructed that Boer men, British men, and all European women and children be spared. At this point, there were about 7,000–8,000 Herero combatants, half of whom possessed firearms and a limited supply of ammunition. The German force consisted of just fewer than 800 regulars, the same number of reservists, 400 armed settlers, and 250 African scouts supported by 5 field guns and 5 machine guns. To make matter worse, at the outbreak of the Herero revolt, Governor Leutwein and the bulk of the Schutztruppe were in the far south suppressing a rebellion by the small Bondelswart community. The Germans gained time because the Herero had no experience storming fortified positions defended by repeating rifles and machine guns. In late January and early February, the Germans relieved the besieged posts at Okahandja and Windhoek, and several companies of marines landed. During February and March, 1,500 men with 1,000 horses, 10 artillery pieces, and 6 machine guns arrived from Germany. With 2,500 men under his command, Leutwein organized two columns that attempted to encircle the Herero during March and April. However, these were withdrawn because of concerted attacks by groups of several thousand Herero that came close to encircling the Germans as well as problems with disease within German ranks.

In June 1904, Lieutenant General Lothar von Trotha, one of Germany's few officers experienced in colonial warfare (he had fought against the Hehe in East Africa and the Boxers in China), arrived in SWA to replace Leutwein. The general brought 2,000 soldiers and 2,000 horses. With a colonial force now 10,000 strong supported by over 30 artillery pieces, Trotha embarked on an offensive against the Herero. Samuel Maherero and his people took refuge in the northeast on the Waterberg Plateau just on the western edge of the Omaheke part of the Kalahari Desert. Since the railway did not extend further inland than Windhoek, German forces took three months to transport men and supplies to the Waterberg. In mid-August, 6 German columns with a total of 1,500 soldiers, 12 machine guns, and 36 cannon converged on the Herero, who had 4,000–6,000 men armed with rifles and thousands more noncombatants. On August 11, the main German column under Trotha advancing from the south overcame stiff Herero resistance to capture the important waterholes at Hamakari and bombarded Herero positions. The next day, Samuel Maherero led his people east through a gap in the German lines and into the Omaheke. Historians disagree over whether the gap was purposely created by Trotha to force the Herero into the desert or was inadvertently opened by the late movement of a German column. Nevertheless, the Herero were driven into the desert and attempted to march 320 kilometers to safety in British ruled Bechuanaland (now Botswana). German soldiers prevented the Herero from using wells, and many died of thirst in the desert.

On October 2, Trotha issued an "extermination order" declaring all Herero in German territory would be shot. The next day, Hendrik Witbooi launched a guerrilla war against the Germans because of German brutality against the Herero, rumors that the Nama would be disarmed, the threatening movement of several hundred German soldiers into Nama territory, and Christian millenarian prophecies. Trotha disarmed the Nama scouts who had been working for the German army and in April 1905 extended his extermination order to Witbooi's people. Avoiding the sort of pitched battle that had gone badly for the Herero, some 1,000–2,000 mounted Nama insurgents fought a guerrilla war consisting of more than 200 small engagements against 15,000 German troops who resorted to scorched earth tactics. Although Nama resistance began to wither after 80-year-old Witbooi was killed in a skirmish in late October 1905, the Germans continued official operations until March 1907, and there was limited fighting for another year. Colonial concerns about eliminating the labor supply

caused the German imperial government to rescind Trotha's extermination order at the end of 1904 but the military cordon that confined the Herero to the desert and kept them away from water sources was not lifted until the end of 1905. Herero and Nama prisoners were herded into concentration camps where they became slave workers for the construction of railways or victims of medical experiments. By March 1907, some 7,600 out of 17,000 concentration camp inmates had died. At Luderitz Bay's Shark Island, perhaps the world's first extermination camp, 3,000 Herero and Nama died from cold, hunger, disease, violence, and exhaustion, and decapitated heads were studied by German race scientists. Some Nama prisoners, including former colonial scouts, were deported to work in the West African German colonies of Togo and Cameroon, where most died of disease. Though the numbers have been debated, it is likely around 60,000 Herero and 10,000 Nama died during the conflict, which represented a large majority of each population. The postrebellion labor shortage in SWA, where the situation was described as "the peace of the graveyard," prompted the Germans to extend their rule north over the Ovambo. The German response to the Herero and Nama rebellions is often considered the first genocide of the twentieth century, which foreshadowed the Holocaust.²⁸

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR, 1899–1902

As the likelihood for a diplomatic settlement of the uitlander issue diminished, in October 1899, the two Boer republics launched a pre-emptive strike on British territories before the British could ship an expeditionary force to the region.²⁹ In the Boer republics, the press saw the war as defending the republican state, rural patriarchs wanted to defend their influence, ordinary Boer farmers wanted to protect their homes, and Boer women wanted to defend their traditional community. Believing minerals a divine reward, some Boers perceived the war as an antialien struggle and dreamed it would result in a greater Boer republic across all South Africa. While some African servants and workers remained loyal to the Boers, many Africans and foreign Europeans saw an opportunity to overthrow the republics. From May to October 1899, around 100,000 blacks and another 100,000 foreign whites fled the Transvaal for the Cape and Natal. On the British side, the aims of the imperial government and mining interests were

to establish a friendly regime in the Transvaal that would join British territories. The British wanted to confine the conflict to South Africa, while the weaker Boers were eager for assistance from Germany and Russia (though this was never a real possibility).

After the 1895 Jameson Raid, the Boer republics used revenues from taxation of mining to purchase over a million pounds worth of modern weapons. The Transvaal spent one third of its budget on the military. Magazine-fed Mauser rifles were imported from Germany: 37,000 for the Transvaal and 13,000 for the Orange Free State. In 1899, the Boers had more than 100 mobile artillery pieces and among them were new German-made Krupp guns that were better than British models. Although some Boer officers were trained in the modern employment of artillery, the republics lacked the capacity to manufacture large munitions and were limited to the 108,000 shells they had at the outbreak of war. During the conflict, they could not acquire more shells because the British blockaded regional ports and pressured European arms companies to boycott the republics. Despite some military improvements, republican forces still relied on raising commandos where individual Boers were called up for unpaid obligatory military service and expected to bring their own horses and guns. Leaders of commandos were elected, and battle plans were discussed and voted on in councils of war. Although motivated by powerful ideas of manhood, Calvinist Christianity, and national freedom, Boer absenteeism became a serious problem. Boer forces lacked a formal logistical system and relied on wives and black servants to tend horses, carry rations, cook, and treat the wounded. Black auxiliaries (*agterryers*), numbering around 10,000 at the war's start, also performed military functions such as scouting and sentry duty. In October 1899, the Boer republics had 55,000–60,000 available men and deployed around 35,000–42,000 in the opening campaign. Through the conflict, the Boers were supported by around 2,000 foreign volunteers that included Germans, Dutch, French, Italians, Irish, Americans, Greeks, Russians, and a Jewish Ambulance Unit.³⁰

British desire for a negotiated settlement meant that their garrison in the Cape and Natal was weak. It consisted of only two cavalry regiments, six infantry battalions, and three field artillery batteries. When war began, the British mobilized quickly and between October 1899 and the end of January 1900, some 112,000 regular soldiers were shipped to South Africa. Despite numerical superiority, the British army had many problems that mostly stemmed from their recent

history of colonial wars against poorly armed indigenous groups. The British had failed to learn from their defeat during the Transvaal Rebellion, which was blamed on Indian Army incompetence. While the British had more artillery than the Boers, the standard practice of firing from forward positions to shock the enemy was not suited to modern warfare. British soldiers had replaced their distinctive red coats with less conspicuous khaki uniforms in the 1880s, and their new Lee series of bolt-action rifles was similar to Boer Mausers. British infantry training had slightly improved during recent years, but most recruits were physically unfit urban men with little experience operating at night or moving over rough ground. Whereas the Boers had developed an effective intelligence network in neighboring British territories, the British knew almost nothing about the strength and location of Boer forces, and they lacked accurate maps. Importantly, British commanders were not experienced in commanding or supplying the massive forces they deployed in South Africa.

Boer plans hinged on quickly winning a two-front war, acquiring international sympathy, and negotiating from strength. Although he had little military experience, Transvaal attorney general Jan Smuts partly conceived the strategic plan of both republics. Despite characteristic disagreement between Boer leaders, their initial plan was to capture all of Natal, making it difficult for British forces to land on the coast. At the same time, they would occupy a large portion of the Cape Colony to cut off the main north-south British rail line. Commandos moved west into Griqualand West and Bechuanaland, south into the Cape, and east into Natal. The war began on October 12, 1899, with a skirmish at Kraaipan railway, where 800 Boers under Koos de la Rey ambushed a British armored munitions train en route to Mafeking (Mafikeng) 50 kilometers to the north.

The Boers concentrated their efforts on Natal because British defenders were closer to the border and the Orange Free State government was not enthusiastic about launching a major invasion of the Cape from its territory. Natal was invaded by a combined force of 14,000 Transvaal Boers under Joubert and 6,000 Free State Boers under Marthinus Prinsloo. The British commander, Major General Sir William Penn Symons, did little to prepare his forces, which did not dig in. On October 19, 1899, a forward Boer unit pushed to Elandsplaagte on the rail line just south of Dundee and Glencoe, captured a British supply train, and cut contact between Dundee and British headquarters at Ladysmith. On October 20, the Boers

bombarded Dundee from high ground, and British artillery could not respond effectively because the Boer guns were out of range. The British repositioned their guns and scattered about 1,000 Boers. Penn Symons led a frontal assault, in which he was killed, that captured Boer positions on Talana Hill and saved Dundee. The Boers had suffered 140 casualties, and the British sustained 546 (this constituted 10 percent of their Natal force). The next day, British infantry and cavalry conducted a pincer movement on Elandslaagte supported by a bombardment of 18 field guns. The 1,000 Boer defenders fled, with many slaughtered by pursuing British lancers. Successful Boer attacks on Lombard's Nek and Nicholson's Nek as well as rumors of Free State commandos massing for a move on Ladysmith caused the British, lacking sufficient manpower to defend such a broad area, to retreat to Ladysmith. Joubert's force, failing to pursue the British aggressively, besieged Ladysmith for the next four months and abandoned the advance on the coast. This terrible error locked the Boers into a protracted siege that did not favor their highly mobile commandos and allowed the British to land forces at Durban.³¹

In pursuit of the second Boer objective to occupy part of the Cape, Transvaal general Piet Cronje led around 9,000 Boers supported by a dozen guns toward Mafeking, the largest rail depot between Kimberley and Bulawayo in Southern Rhodesia. Since the British had neglected Mafeking's defenses, residents called on Colonel Baden-Powell, commander of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Regiment. With 750 trained soldiers and 450 local volunteers but very little artillery, Baden-Powell harassed the advancing Boers and built a ring of trenches and small forts around the town. The siege began on October 14, 1899, and would last for seven months. Cronje made almost no aggressive moves against the British and within a few weeks, many idle Boers had gone home. Only 2,000 stayed behind. In the siege of Mafeking, both sides armed African allies. The Boers re-established their old alliance with the Rapulana Rolong, arming 300 to man the trenches. Baden-Powell, who denied food to trapped African refugees, armed 500 Tshidi Rolong to defend Mafeking's African township.

On October 15, the Free State's general Christiaan Wessels commanded 4,800 Boers in what would turn into a four-month siege of Kimberley. Since this was the headquarters of Rhodes's De Beers Diamond Company, the manpower, engineering skill, and resources of the mining industry were diverted to protect the town. The defenders consisted of 400 British regulars with an artillery company as well as

3,000 volunteers from De Beers. Tunnels were dug as bombardment shelters, 21 meter tall mine waste dumps became fortified observation posts and barbed wire obstacles fronted trenches. Trapped in Kimberley, Rhodes meddled constantly in military issues and set up his own heliograph to send personal messages to higher authorities. As with other sieges in this conflict, whites survived because rations for blacks were cut; almost all of the 1,500 people who died in Kimberley were Africans. Although the Boers had besieged African strongholds in earlier wars, Mafeking and Kimberley were colonial towns with well-armed and fortified defenders, and the Boers lacked enough artillery shells to pound them into submission.³²

On November 1, 1899, commandos from the Free State made a lightning strike across the Orange River into the Cape. They captured the towns of Aliwal North, Dordrecht, Albert, Barkly East, and Colesberg, the last of which was in striking range of the important Naauwport railway junction. The Boers commandeered African labor and property, which led to African resistance, and Cape officials organized a 4,000-man African contingent to guard the Transkei. Despite these Boer successes, they overlooked capturing a bridge on the Orange River, and the much anticipated rising of Cape Boers did not happen.

The two-front strategy proved too ambitious for limited Boer resources and coordination abilities. Although Boer pre-emptive strikes had caught the British off guard, they did not penetrate British territory far enough to create the conditions by which they could force a negotiated settlement. The rapid Boer advance quickly bogged down in a series of protracted and ineffectual sieges. Younger Boer commanders such as Koos de la Rey, Christiaan de Wet, and Louis Botha blamed this on old and lethargic generals like Joubert and Cronje.

The British commander in South Africa, General Redvers Buller of Zulu War fame, arrived at Cape Town on October 31, 1899, along with the first contingents of the British expeditionary force. On the same ship was war correspondent Winston Churchill, who would win notoriety in Britain by escaping a Boer prison camp. Although the initial plan was to begin in the Cape and advance up the railway to Bloemfontein, Johannesburg, and then Pretoria, Buller changed this strategy because he wanted to confront the largest Boer contingent, which was in Natal. Buller divided his 47,000 men into two forces. Lieutenant General Lord Methuen would lead 20,000 men up the

western railway to relieve Kimberley and then invade the Free State while detachments under Lieutenant Generals William Gatacre and William French would drive the Boers out of the Cape Colony. Buller took command of the remaining 27,000 men, who were sent to Natal to relieve Ladysmith.

On November 23, Methuen led his first division of 8,000 men from Orange River Station near the western border of the Free State toward Kimberley via the Modder River. North of the Orange River near Belmont, Commandant Jacobus Prinsloo and 2,000 Boers occupied a hill as they intended to delay the British until Cronje could send reinforcements from Mafeking. Methuen decided to take the hill in a night attack, but bad maps and lack of reconnaissance meant that at dawn, his men were caught in the open in a Boer crossfire. The British swarmed the hill, taking heavy casualties, and the Boers withdrew north up the railway. Although De la Rey brought reinforcements from Mafeking, many demoralized Boers had deserted, which meant that their total force was still 2,000. De la Rey then established fortified positions on an arc of hills near Graspan that, on November 25, were bombarded and overwhelmed by the British. The British suffered 300 casualties, more than double that of the Boers (who once again withdrew). At Magersfontein, the last settlement en route to Kimberley, De la Rey abandoned the defense of hills that were vulnerable to artillery bombardment. He then entrenched 3,000 Boers in a concealed reverse slope position in front of the Modder River. Believing that the Boers were retreating toward Magersfontein, Methuen led his force toward the Modder River on November 28, fell into the ambush, and was pinned down the entire day. Of 10,000 British soldiers, 500 were wounded or killed. Instead of exploiting their success, the Boer war council voted for an orderly night withdrawal. Methuen organized 13,000 men for what he believed would be the final push on Kimberley. At the same time, Cronje sent reinforcements to the Boer positions around Magersfontein Mountain, where De la Rey again chose not to occupy the high ground. Eight thousand five hundred Boers deployed in a crescent-shaped position in low ground with deep concealed trenches fronted by low barbed wire entanglements. The British advanced straight along the railway and on December 11, Methuen ordered a bombardment of the mountain (which is where he thought the Boers were hiding). That night, the 4,000-man Highland Brigade was sent to approach the mountain in preparation for a dawn attack, but as the sun came up, the highlanders were caught

500 meters from the mountain and the Boers, concealed in the low ground, opened fire. To make matters worse, the highlanders were struck by misdirected British artillery. The British withdrew, having suffered 1,000 casualties to the Boers' 250. The Boers held Magersfontein for the next three months.

In the Cape midlands, mounted British troops under French spent three months skirmishing with the Boers around Colesberg. On December 9, 1899, Gatacre attempted a night assault on Stormberg Junction, but his men became lost and exhausted, and in the morning, they had to attack uphill against prepared Boers on the Kissieberg range. The results were disastrous, and the demoralized British retreated. In the confusion, Gatacre forgot to order the withdrawal of a 600-man unit, which ultimately surrendered. Gatacre regrouped his force at Queenstown, where they remained until March 1900. On January 5, 1900, some 4,000 Boer defenders at Colesberg inflicted heavy casualties on a 2,000-strong British force under French that attacked at night.

On the Natal front, in mid-December 1899, Buller led 18,000 men up the railway from Frere toward Ladysmith. Transvaal commander Louis Botha attempted to block the British by constructing a trench system on hills just north of Colenso. News of defeats in the west prompted Buller to attack these positions directly to inflict a decisive punishment on the Boers. The British advanced over open ground toward unknown enemy positions. On December 13, British bombardment of the hills, meant to suppress the Boers while the British moved up, failed to have much impact because of the rocky terrain. On December 15, British artillery commander Colonel C. J. Long, without informing Buller, ran his guns a kilometer ahead of the advancing infantry to blast the Boers at close range. While this had worked against the Sudanese in 1898, Long's artillery encountered intense Boer rifle fire and had to abandon many of their guns, which were captured. Around the same time, an advancing brigade under Major General Arthur Hart was caught in Boer fire from three sides, which inflicted 400 casualties in 30 minutes. Faced with another Majuba, Buller ordered a withdrawal. In total, the British had sustained 1,130 casualties, and the Boers suffered only 40. In Britain, the combined losses at Magersfontein, Stormberg, and Colenso became known as Black Week. Redvers Buller, dubbed "Reverse" Buller by his troops, was removed as overall British commander in South Africa.

Command of British forces in South Africa passed to Field Marshall Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts, who arrived at Cape Town, together with his chief of staff Major General Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener, on January 10, 1900. Just after Black Week, 47,000 British soldiers reached South Africa, and by the end of 1899, another 20,000 regulars and 20,000 volunteers were on their way. On January 10, Buller, who had been retained as commander in Natal, tried another advance toward Ladysmith but was slowed by flooded rivers and too much baggage. The British attempted to outflank Colenso with a series of badly executed attacks. On January 20–21, two British assaults on Twin Peaks were repulsed. In a night attack, the British overwhelmed a small Boer contingent on Spion Kop, from which they intended to fire down on neighboring Boer positions. However, Spion Kop offered little cover for the British, and the hard ground was almost impossible to entrench. The next morning, January 23, the British on Spion Kop were exposed to deadly Boer artillery and rifle fire from surrounding positions, including Twin Peaks. The British plan had backfired. British reinforcements were slaughtered as they were caught in the open, and fear of hitting their own men meant British commanders failed to provide supporting artillery fire on the Boers. Although Buller wanted to continue the catastrophic British operation on Spion Kop, confusion among British officers led to a sudden withdrawal from the position on the evening of January 24. Around the same time, a diversionary attack by the Royal Rifle Corps around the flanks of Twin Peaks and Spion Kop drove off many Boer defenders. On January 25, Louis Botha made a symbolic act by personally leading a small group of Boers unopposed to the summit of Spion Kop. In reality, the Boer defensive line was near collapse as demoralized men began to desert. Both sides had suffered badly, though the British had the worst of it. One thousand one hundred British soldiers were killed or wounded, compared to just over 300 Boers. British casualties were carried away from Spion Kop by stretcher bearers from the Natal Indian Ambulance Corps that included M. K. Gandhi.³³

On February 5, Buller tried to punch through the Boer line at Vaalkranz but was repelled by heavy fire and a Boer counterattack that used smoke from a purposefully set grass fire as cover. The British again withdrew on February 7, having suffered another 400 casualties. On February 17, Buller yet again tried to break through to Ladysmith. This involved a succession of well-rehearsed attacks on a string of

defended hills east of Colenso. Committing his entire 25,000-man force to this operation, Buller ensured that there was better coordination between artillery and infantry, so bombardment stopped just before an assault. The Boer defensive line along the Thukela River collapsed. However, when Buller tried to push his men across a pontoon bridge, they were ambushed and retired after taking 1,400 casualties. On February 27, the British renewed their attack supported by heavy shelling, which caused the Boers to begin a slow withdrawal from Natal. British forces entered Ladysmith the next day.

Roberts radically changed British strategy. Because the main British problem in South Africa was the vast size of the country and open terrain, they would concentrate on trapping the Boers through well-planned and coordinated encircling movements that used deception and surprise. To do this, the British improved their mobility and logistics. Numerical superiority was also important and in early 1900, the British had 180,000 men in South Africa, including contingents from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Soldiers practiced shooting and concealment, subordinate commanders were encouraged to exercise initiative, accurate maps were produced, and African spies spread disinformation among the Boers. A new cavalry division was created, with every infantry battalion contributing one mounted company. Settler volunteers were organized into irregular mounted rifle units. By the end of the conflict, the British had imported half a million horses from various parts of the world into South Africa, of which two thirds would be ridden to death. The British also took over the rail system and created a unified transportation network.

In February 1900, Roberts initiated his offensive in the Cape by moving a huge force west along the railway toward Kimberley and then suddenly diverting east to a point just south of Bloemfontein. Roberts expected that the Boers would pull forces away from Kimberley, Mafeking, the Cape midlands, and Natal to defend the Free State capital, thereby reducing the operational area. Cronje, who had received false reports from African agents of the British, pulled in his 8,000 men to defend Magersfontein because he thought the enemy was making a direct push on Kimberley. This proved incorrect, as on February 11, the British cut east in a wide circle to outflank Cronje's position and then constantly changed direction to confuse the Boers. Between February 11 and 15, the Boers deployed a thin crescent defense to the south and simultaneously French's cavalry secured crossing points on the Orange River. The British then

advanced on Kimberley, causing the Boers to abandon both that town and Magersfontein. On February 17, British cavalry caught up to Cronje's 5,000 retreating Boers on the Modder River near Paardeberg. The next day, 15,000 British and Canadian infantry under Kitchener arrived and immediately assaulted the Boers (who had been reinforced by 1,500 men under Ignatius Ferreira), who responded with heavy fire and a diversionary counterattack on a hill eventually called Kitchener's Kopje. Much criticized as "Bloody Sunday," Kitchener's assault resulted in 1,300 British and Canadians killed or wounded, compared to 300 Boers. Roberts arrived on February 19 and took command. Cronje, although urged by subordinate commanders to withdraw before they were completely encircled, decided to confront the British. Over the next week, the British—who brought up heavy howitzers—inflicted a sustained and intense bombardment on the Boers. On February 27, Roberts launched an aggressive infantry attack that came to within 45 meters of the Boer positions. Groups of Boers raised white flags and within a short time, they had all surrendered, including Cronje. Four thousand Boers were captured (which represented 10 percent of the republican army), and another 4,000 were killed or wounded. Among the British were 1,300 casualties. The Battle of Paardeberg represented a massive blow to the Boer cause.³⁴

News of the disaster at Paardeberg caused many of the Boers in the Cape midlands (under De la Rey and Hendrik Schoeman) and in the west to withdraw toward Bloemfontein. Republican home front morale fell, and many Boer fighters deserted. With Cronje a prisoner and Joubert dead from natural causes, Boer leadership passed to younger and more dynamic commanders. Botha became commandant general of the Transvaal, Christiaan de Wet became commandant general of the Orange Free State, De la Rey was handed more authority, and Jan Smuts was given an opportunity to prove himself in operations.

Although Roberts believed that capturing the republican capitals would end resistance, agrarian Boer society did not value towns. As the massive British army advanced toward Bloemfontein, De Wet mustered 6,000 Boers deployed in a 35-kilometer long front along both sides of the Modder River. They would rely on accurate rifle fire to repel the British. On March 7, 1900, Roberts launched an extended encircling movement around Boer lines. Transvaal president Paul Kruger was visiting the front that morning, and fear that he would be captured by French's flanking cavalry caused a Boer retreat to

Bloemfontein. Roberts's 40,000 men marched toward Bloemfontein, looting, burning farms, and seizing livestock. The advance was delayed for a day when De la Rey, leading 1,500 Boers, clashed with French's 10,000-strong cavalry division at Driefontein, though threat of encirclement caused the Boers to withdraw. Bloemfontein fell to the British on March 13, and Free State president M. T. Steyn fled north by rail. While the capture of this small town did not have much strategic significance, it did have symbolic impact and would support further British advance north toward Pretoria. Problems with hygiene and sanitation among British troops in Bloemfontein caused a typhoid outbreak and by the end of April, 1,000 soldiers had died. Occupying the Bloemfontein area, Roberts demanded that former Boer combatants surrender their arms and take an oath of submission or face confiscation of property.

On March 17, a Boer war council decided to continue the struggle by different means. De Wet urged the commandos to improve mobility by abandoning wagons, children, and older women. Smuts proposed recruiting selfless and patriotic young men who would not worry about leaving their farms. However, from March to July 1900, between 12,000 and 14,000 Boers surrendered. Although some Boer leaders wanted to destroy the Transvaal gold mines to deny them to the British, Kruger prevented this because he believed the Boers would need mine revenue, and some Boer elites had connections to the mining industry. Realizing that the British could not be driven off but that their operations could be made very costly, De Wet launched a campaign to harass British forces around Bloemfontein. On March 31, De Wet and 400 Boers supported by several Krupp guns used undulating ground and night movement to surprise a British detachment near the water pumping station at Sannaspost east of Bloemfontein. The British had neglected to deploy scouts while marching from Thaba Nchu to Bloemfontein. There were 150 British casualties, and 480 were captured. On the Boer side, only 5 were killed and 11 wounded. In addition, the Boers captured several artillery pieces, many rifles and ammunition, and some horses. One reason for this spectacular Boer success was that they shot the horses pulling the British artillery. In early April, De Wet—with 1,500 Boers under his command—took a detachment of 800 and struck the British at Mostert's Hoek near Reddersburg 50 kilometers south of Bloemfontein. Approaching quickly, the Boers suppressed the British position with a light artillery bombardment and when faced with encirclement,

the British surrendered. The British suffered 590 soldiers killed, wounded, or captured. With these sudden successes, Free State Boers who had taken a loyalty oath to the British returned to their commandos, and Free State forces were strengthened by Cape Boer rebels and foreign volunteers such as Irish and Russians. In April, De Wet and 6,000 men besieged Wepener, a town on the border with Basutoland, for two weeks before it was relieved. During the siege, 3,000 Sotho volunteers prevented the Boers from attempting a flanking move against Wepener and under cover of darkness, they delivered supplies to the town and brought out the wounded. Effective scouting enabled De Wet's Boers to escape being trapped by the relief force.

On May 3, 1900, Roberts resumed the delayed British advance to Pretoria, 480 kilometers to the north. At the same time, Buller's force was moving slowly through Natal toward the mountain pass into the Transvaal. Botha took his commandos out of Natal and moved west to the Sand River, where they blew up bridges and awaited Roberts's main thrust. Botha's commandos clashed with French's cavalry for one day but withdrew to avoid encirclement. On May 10, the British main force crossed the Sand River despite Boer resistance and two days later seized Kroonstad, the temporary home of President Steyn (who again ran north). At this point, the British halted for a week to allow supplies to catch up and bridges to be repaired by a corps of African laborers under military command. The Boers had not yet turned to destroying railways, but some Irish volunteers sabotaged British communication lines. British soldiers away from the railway experienced supply problems and ran short on rations. During May, typhoid produced more casualties among British troops than the fighting of Black Week had.

To the west, 700 Rhodesian mounted infantry under Lieutenant Colonel Plumer tried to lift the siege of Mafeking but were unable to do so because they had no artillery. Roberts dispatched a 2,000-man flying column under Colonel Bryan Mahon from Kimberley. Some 1,100 men under Mahon and Plumer—including units of Royal Horse Artillery, Canadian artillery, and Australian infantry—advanced on Mafeking from the north. At this time, the Boer siege force consisted of 1,500 men under General J. P. (Kootjie) Snyman, whose inaction resulted in the capture of a last-minute raiding party of 250 men under Sarel Eloff. On May 17, Mafeking was relieved as the British under Mahon and Plumer arrived. After a brief bombardment, the Boers fled.

The British conquest of the Transvaal now seemed certain. Baden-Powell's Bechuanaland force and Plumer's Rhodesians invaded from the west. The Rhodesian Field Force under General Carrington moved down from the north. Buller's force marched into southeastern Transvaal. French's cavalry in the lead, the growing main body under Roberts advanced from the south. By the end of May, the British had crossed the Vaal River and captured the Vereeniging coalfields, which eased the transportation system because coal no longer had to be brought up from the south. The Boers blew up a bridge but did not damage the coal mines. There were new calls from radicals within the Boer leadership, as well as among the Irish volunteers, to destroy the gold mines, but the conservative Botha would not allow it. Although he had 6,000 men at his disposal, Botha realized that this was not enough to face Roberts' massive force, and he decided to abandon Johannesburg and move further north. The defense of the Rand was left to a few hundred Boers under Ben Viljoen and De la Rey, who dug in around Doornkop. Forgoing artillery support, Colonel Ian Hamilton launched a massive frontal infantry assault that took over 100 casualties but routed the Boers. Most Boers who wanted to continue the fight headed north. The British and Boers agreed to a peaceful handover of Johannesburg at the end of May because of their common need to dominate African workers. Roberts's failure to press the fight against the fleeing Boers may have represented his greatest mistake of the campaign. He had annexed the Transvaal without a military conquest.³⁵

Although they had been expecting a climactic battle that would defeat the Boers, British forces under Roberts entered Pretoria on June 5, 1900, without a fight. Although Pretoria was protected by four small forts linked by a field telephone system, the heavy cannons had been removed for other operations. In addition, 20,000 Boers had deserted, and only 7,000 could be mustered to defend the Transvaal capital. When Botha and Ben Viljoen had proposed capitulation to Kruger at the start of June, De la Rey insisted that he would fight on his own. On June 2, a war council decided to continue the struggle but abandon Pretoria, as it was impossible to defend. Kruger left on a train toward Portuguese territory, and many commandos moved east toward the Magaliesberg Mountains. The British abolished the Boer states by declaring the Orange River Colony and Transvaal Colony, and the neutrality oath was extended to the Transvaal. By the end of June, 8,000 Transvaal Boers had surrendered, and between March and July, 6,000 Free State Boers had done likewise. This

represented one quarter of available Boer military manpower. The Boers who remained in the field derisively called these men Hensoppers (Hands Uppers).³⁶

Roberts sent French's cavalry toward the Magaliesberg to intercept the fleeing Boers, but the north was left open, and many commandos escaped in that direction. On June 7, De Wet, leading 8,000 Boers from the Orange Free State, raided British railway garrisons north of Kroonstad, cutting communications, blowing up bridges, destroying several kilometers of rail line, capturing supplies, and causing around 700 British casualties. Kitchener led a force of 12,000 mounted men that chased off De Wet's Boers, who dispersed. But the damage was done. On June 11–12, at the Battle of Diamond Hill or Donkerhoek, 12,000 British soldiers attacked 5,000 Boers under Botha who were holding hill positions east of Pretoria. Facing British flanking attacks, the Boer left position collapsed, though the right held firm. With the British suffering 180 casualties compared to a dozen Boers, Botha withdrew his force east toward Kruger's railway headquarters at Machadodorp. From the Boer perspective, Diamond Hill represented the end of the conventional phase of the conflict.³⁷

In July, 9,000 Free State Boers—led by Steyn, De Wet, and Marthinus Prinsloo—were almost trapped in Brandwater Basin by two British columns converging from the north and east. On July 15, commandos under Steyn and De Wet broke out and escaped. However, the covering force under Prinsloo fell into chaos (partly because of squabbling subordinate commanders), and 4,500 Boers were compelled to surrender. This also meant that 6,000 horses and 4,000 sheep fell into British hands. This was a disaster equal to Paardeberg. In August, Roberts moved to cut the railway to Portuguese East Africa by advancing a British force east and having Buller's Natal army move northeast from Laing's Nek. West of Pretoria, De la Rey, commanding 7,000 Boers, attacked British posts within a 160-kilometer radius of the Transvaal capital and seized a railhead site at Klerksdorp southwest of Johannesburg. In early August, De la Rey besieged 500 mostly Australian and Rhodesian troops at Brakfontein, near the Elands River, 160 kilometers west of Pretoria. Two relief forces, one under Carrington from Mafeking and another under Baden-Powell from Rustenburg, failed to break through. The Boers, in mid-August, abandoned the siege upon the approach of 10 000 British troops under Kitchener from Pretoria.

By the end of August 1900, Boer forces were divided into three groups: De la Rey in the western Transvaal, Botha in the eastern

Transvaal, and De Wet in the Free State. Constantly on the run, they attacked trains, cut telegraph wires, burned stores, bombarded isolated posts, and temporarily occupied small towns. The guerrilla phase of the conflict had begun. The British strengthened garrisons along railways south of Pretoria. Moving north to reinforce De la Rey, De Wet's men raided across a wide front, which caused the British to briefly evacuate Potchefstroom. Under Methuen, 30,000 British troops pursued De Wet for six weeks and over 800 kilometers but encircling movements and overwhelming numbers could not catch this elusive Boer commander. Clearing the area between the Natal and Delagoa Bay railways, Buller's huge force of 20,000 ran into Botha's 5,000 Boers entrenched along a 60-kilometer front near Machadodorp. The British assault began on August 21, and lasted for five days. With the Boers spread thin, the British exploited gaps in their line, which caused many to surrender and others to flee. This Battle of Dalmanutha (or Bergendal) was the last large engagement of the war. Roberts then occupied Lydenburg, Barberton, Carolina, and Nelspruit.

On September 11, Kruger went to Delagoa Bay and from there exile in Europe, where he died in 1904. Steyn remained in South Africa and went north with 300 men. On September 13, Roberts proclaimed that the war was effectively over. By the end of the month, British forces had taken the border town of Komatipoort, cutting the Boers off from Portuguese territory. Having sent away 3,000 uncommitted Boers and foreign volunteers, Botha split his Transvaal contingent in two, with half under himself and half under Ben Viljoen. At the start of September, Roberts had officially annexed the Transvaal and in October, he disbanded Buller's Natal army. Both Roberts and Buller traveled back to Britain, leaving the now lieutenant general Kitchener in command of British forces in South Africa.

Made destitute by the British scorched earth campaign, many Boers had nothing to lose by rejoining their commandos. By October, 8,000–9,000 Boers, many of whom had surrendered or taken oaths, were back in the field. On October 20, De Wet's men attacked a British column on the railway at Frederickstad. The subsequent battle lasted for five days until British reinforcements arrived from Krugersdorp and the Boers withdrew. In late October, Boer forces attacked small towns with British garrisons such as Jacobsdal. Commanders such as De Wet, De la Rey, and Botha hoped to do enough damage to the British that they would negotiate. At the end of October, Steyn, Botha,

De la Rey, and Smuts agreed to stage a daring attack on the gold mines of Johannesburg to distract the British so that Boer commandos could move into the Cape and Natal to divert British attention from destroying rural Boer society. However, the plan was not put into action. On November 6, Steyn and De Wet were nearly captured on a farm 80 kilometers northwest of Kroonstad and in a desperate rear guard action, they lost 150 men along with artillery, wagons, and horses. From this point on, there would be no further joint strategy. During November, there was fresh Boer resistance in the Orange Free State as British convoys were ambushed and African wagon drivers shot. In mid-November, De Wet attempted to lead a force into the Cape Colony but was prevented by a British column sent after him. On November 23, De Wet's Boers attacked a British garrison at Dewetsdorp, which surrendered after three days of fighting. While the British were concentrating on De Wet, 2,000 Boers under Generals J. B. M. Hertzog and Piet Kritzinger crossed the Orange River into the Cape on December 17. In the Transvaal, Botha and Viljoen recruited more men. In early December, Boers led by De la Rey and Smuts attacked a large British convoy outside Rustenburg, where 120 British soldiers were killed, wounded, or taken prisoner; 20 African wagon drivers were killed or flogged; 115 wagons were burned; and many supplies were seized. On December 13, Smuts, De la Rey, Christiaan Beyers, and Jan Kemp combined forces for an attack on a poorly positioned British camp in Nooitgedacht Gorge in the Magaliesberg. Taking the high ground and with a rare advantage in numbers, the Boers inflicted 640 British casualties, which represented half of the British force. With hungry Boers looting the camp for food and commanders disagreeing over the next move, the Boers did not exploit this success and let the remaining British retreat to Pretoria.

In early January 1901, Botha and Viljoen joined for an attack on seven British garrisons along the Delagoa Bay railway, which failed because the Boers became lost in night fog. In the northeast corner of the Free State, a Boer attack killed an entire British company of 150 men. Around this time, some Boer leaders renewed the scheme of distracting the British by menacing British territory. On January 27, De Wet began to move south, intending to cross the Orange River to link up with Boer rebels. By the middle of February, De Wet was in the Cape and using Colesberg as a base. The British sent 15 columns after him, though they were hampered by poor maps and communications. De Wet's Boers, who had abandoned all artillery and wagons,

eluded the British for six weeks and then moved back into the Free State. Hertzog was sent west from the Free State into Namaqualand, and Kritzinger took 1,000 Boers to raid the Cape midlands. They were eventually pushed back into the Free State by British columns. Botha led another 1,000 men toward Natal to threaten the British supply line but was blocked by 21,000 British soldiers under French. By September 1901, Botha's force had been pushed to the southeast border with Zululand, where the British had raised 10,000–12,000 armed Zulu to prevent Boer infiltration. Botha attacked some British positions in late September and withdrew into the Transvaal while being pursued by 15,000 British troops. In a last attempt to prompt Boer insurrection in the Cape, Smuts led 300 men deep into that colony in August 1901 and temporarily distracted the British but failed to attract enough rebels.

In early 1901, a Boer Peace Committee attempted to end the war, though its members were generally seen as traitors by those still in the field. In late February 1901, Kitchener initiated negotiations with Botha at Middelburg on the Delagoa Bay railway. While Kitchener was ready to make concessions, British high commissioner Alfred Milner wanted unconditional surrender. Botha rejected a British 10-point peace plan.

During the last half of 1901, the Boers broke into small groups to attack British supply convoys and stage dawn or night raids on British camps. The Boers attempted to compensate for their small numbers with new fighting techniques. At the end of May, De la Rey encountered a British column camped at Vlakfontein in the Magaliesberg. The Boers covered their flanking attack by lighting a large grass fire accelerated by gunpowder and then stormed into the camp, firing from horseback and killing or wounding 180 British, compared to 41 Boers. During September and October, De la Rey attacked a British column in the Zeerust area of the western Transvaal, inflicting 200 casualties. The British then pursued De la Rey's force, which attacked their rear guard. On Christmas Day 1901, De Wet led 800 Boers against a British camp at Tweefontein in the Free State. The British had camped on a hill but failed to guard a steep slope that the Boers ascended through a gulley and in the subsequent fighting, the British suffered 300 casualties and lost 500 horses. In February 1902, Colonel Henry Rawlinson directed a British encirclement that produced the surrender of 800 Boers as well as 25,000 cattle and 2,000 horses. In March, De la Rey's force turned on British pursuers in the vast country

between the Mafeking railway and the Magaliesberg. In one incident, the Boers ambushed a British column and inflicted 380 casualties, compared to 50 on their side. A subsequent Boer surprise attack on three British columns at Tweebosch led to a further 200 British casualties, compared to 35 Boers, and the capture of British commander Methuen, who despite his burning of Boer farms was well treated. De la Rey was successful in these engagements because he concentrated on the enemy's weak points, and the British had coordination problems as well as inexperienced soldiers.

By the beginning of 1902, Boer commandos were encountering severe logistical and manpower problems while Kitchener was developing a concerted counterinsurgency campaign. The British established a Field Intelligence Department of 140 officers; 2,300 white civilian agents; and thousands of black spies and scouts. The total British force of 220,000 men was divided into 100 mobile columns, each with around 1,200–2,000 men, that continuously crisscrossed the country searching for Boer commandos, destroying farms, and seizing livestock. Kitchener divided the former republics into small sections by creating a series of fortified blockhouses linked by long barbed wire fences. The flying columns, supported by African scouts and sometimes trains with searchlights, repeatedly swept these cordoned areas, and column commanders were given freedom of action. This strategy sought to enclose the Boers and reduce their mobility. The Boers responded by breaking into smaller groups that were difficult to locate but had less firepower. The British enclosure system sapped Boer morale. At the same time, the British began to recruit Boers for units such as the (Transvaal) National Scouts and the Orange River Colony Volunteers. By war's end, there were 5,500 of these "joiners" who assisted the British with knowledge of local terrain and commando tactics such as muffling hooves and rifles with cloth so that they would make less noise at night, and some infiltrated Boer commandos to gather intelligence. Encouraged by the British, the conflict was developing into a Boer civil war between "bitterreinders" (those who would never give up) on one side, and hensoppers and joiners on the other. These factions represented deep divisions within Boer society because bitterreinders tended to be property owners who had lost everything in the war, and joiners were often landless poor long resentful of commando service.³⁸

Beginning in December 1900, Boer noncombatants affected by the British scorched earth campaign were herded into refugee camps.

For the British military, Boer farms served as intelligence and supply bases that had to be removed, and holding their families hostage pressured hostile Boers to surrender. The camps eventually contained 116,000 Boer old men, women, and children, and squalid conditions meant that 28,000 Boer and 20,000 African inmates died from disease. Boer leaders worried about the survival of their nation. Another factor in the defeat of Boer guerrilla warfare was increased African resistance. Desperate Boer groups turned to raiding African homesteads for food, which prompted Africans to supply intelligence to the British and fight back. On May 6, 1902, a Zulu raiding party attacked a Boer camp at Holkrantz near Vryheid. Although there were 100 Zulu casualties, 56 Boers were killed, and they could not afford such losses. In the north and northwest Cape, the British organized mixed race men into units such as the Namaqualand Scouts and Bushmanland Borderers to fight the Boers. Indeed, African peasants began to occupy Boer farms in the former republics.

By the start of 1902, both sides wanted to end this vastly destructive conflict. The British government, facing criticism at home for the conduct of the war, wanted to avoid further devastation because it might jeopardize the chances of creating a friendly civilian administration in South Africa. As usual, Boer leaders were divided, with Smuts and Botha favoring negotiation, and Steyn, De la Rey, and Hertzog wanting to continue the fight. In April 1902, the Boers reopened talks with the British, who rejected demands that the republics remain independent. At this time, the Boers had 15,000–17,000 men in the field, while the British had 250,000.

Each Boer commando elected a representative to attend peace talks held at Vereeniging from May 15 to 31, 1902. On the last day of the conference, the Boer delegates voted, 54 to 6, to concede independence. British concessions included the return of all prisoners, general amnesty, protection of property rights, nonpunitive taxation, up to £3 million toward reconstruction, the promise of eventual self-government, assurances that black political rights would not extend north from the Cape, and preservation of Afrikaans (South African Dutch) language. Many Boers in the field were horrified. In 1907, the Boers of both the Transvaal and Orange River Colony were granted responsible government. In 1910, the British colonies of the Cape and Natal, as well as the two former republics, combined to form the Union of South Africa, a self-ruling British dominion like Canada and Australia. However, the memory of the war became a powerful

grievance for many Boers and an important factor in the rise of Afrikaner nationalism during the early twentieth century. Around 22,000 British imperial soldiers died out of around 450,000 who had been mobilized for the conflict. Among the Boers, 7,000 out of 70,000 fighters died. In total, approximately 75,000 people perished during the conflict. Some 10,000 Africans served in the Boer commandos, and 100,000 were employed by the British, including 40,000 who were armed. While this conflict has commonly been called the Boer War or the Second Anglo-Boer War, these names seem insufficient given the war's scope. Therefore, historians now tend to use the term South African War.³⁹

Although mineral wealth made the Boer republics targets for British expansion, it enabled them to acquire modern weapons. Ahead of their time, Boer tactics such as fire and movement, and concealed reverse slope defensive positions would become standard modern military practice, and the term “commando” would become shorthand for small highly mobile forces conducting hit-and-run operations. However, republican military organization, logistics, and leadership remained those of a small frontier society. British problems during the South African War originated from a conservative military that had developed during a long series of small colonial wars and lack of experience managing the huge forces needed to overwhelm the Boers. A key difference between these two sides was that the British had the resources, time, and space to overcome their challenges. The Boers did not. Elements of British operations against the bitterreinders—isolating guerrillas from civilian support, cordon and search of specific areas, and use of local allies—would become common in later twentieth-century counterinsurgency campaigns.

ZULU REBELLIONS, 1886–1906

German interest in the Zululand coast during the mid-1880s prompted British action to secure it. In October 1886, the New Republic Boers agreed to limit their territorial ambitions and dropped protection of Zulu king Dinuzulu. In January 1887, a British commission defined the boundary of the New Republic, and in May, the Reserve Territory and central Zululand became the British colony of Zululand. Extending indirect rule from Natal to Zululand, colonial officials planned to gradually diminish the power of African rulers. Dinuzulu refused to appear before the British resident commissioner, and local chiefs

complained about having lost authority over their people within the New Republic. The payment of a colonial stipend to Zulu chiefs divided the royalist (Usuthu) leaders, as some such as Mnyamana accepted it as a sign of submission, but Dinuzulu rejected it. A British mounted infantry company and cavalry squadron were ordered into Zululand in August 1887 to support the mostly black Zululand Police. Dinuzulu repeatedly resisted efforts by colonial officials for him to return cattle seized from a subordinate ruler. In December, the British allowed antiroyalist leader Zibhebhu and 700 men—they did not initially bring women and children because they knew they would have to fight—to return to their old area in Zululand, where they pushed out the Usuthu. In early 1888, the demarcation of a border between the Usuthu and Zibhebhu's people by colonial officials clearly showed bias toward the latter. Dinuzulu withdrew to caves around Ceza Mountain with over 1,000 armed men. Royalist leader Ndabuko, the king's uncle, assembled another 1,000 and vowed to destroy Zibhebhu.

Tensions were enflamed by the upcoming June 1 deadline for hut tax payment. On June 2, a colonial patrol of 66 Zululand Police, 160 mounted British regulars, and 400 Zulu levies from Mnyamana approached Ceza Mountain to arrest Dinuzulu but were repelled. A few days later, Shingana, another uncle of Dinuzulu, left the New Republic with 1,000 men to support the Usuthu rebels around the White Mfolozi River. With reinforcements, British forces in Zululand increased to 300 cavalry, 120 mounted infantry, 440 infantry, 160 Zululand Police, and 200 Sotho cavalry supported by 2 field guns and 2 Gatlings. On the morning of June 23, Dinuzulu and Ndabuko led 4,000 men in an attack on the small colonial fort at Ivuna, which was protected by a few Zululand Police inside and Zibhebhu's 700 men outside. Although the royalists employed the predictable "chest and horns" tactic, Dinuzulu led around 300 horsemen with guns, some of whom were Boers with blackened faces, who charged at the center of Zibhebhu's line. Outnumbered and outflanked, Zibhebhu lost around 300 men but did escape. Capturing 750 cattle, the Usuthu (20–30 of whom had been killed) returned to Ceza Mountain pursued by a few Zululand Police. A column of 500 imperial troops, Zululand Police, and Sotho cavalry reached Ivuna the next day and evacuated its inhabitants. The retiring force was joined by Zibhebhu, 200 men, and 1,500 women and children. A full-scale rebellion erupted along the Lower Mfolozi River as white traders and the

local magistrate were attacked. On July 2, a colonial force of 87 Zululand Police, 190 mounted British regulars, 140 Sotho riders, and 140 Zulu auxiliaries surrounded Shingana's 1,000 Usuthu in the open highlands at Hlophekhulu. Another strong colonial contingent was positioned five kilometers away at Lumbe Hill to prevent a Usuthu withdrawal. At Hlophekhulu, 300 Usuthu were killed and the rest scattered, with Shingana escaping to the New Republic. Throughout the rest of July and into August, several colonial columns intimidated Zulu communities along the Lower Mofolozi and the coast.

In July 1888, the New Republic joined the Transvaal. On August 11, a British punitive expedition under Captain Robert Baden-Powell accidentally wandered across the Transvaal border and mistakenly attacked pro-British Zulu refugees. Usuthu confidence was broken by the defeat at Hlophekhulu, and Dinuzulu's supporters dispersed. By the end of September, imperial units had withdrawn from Zululand, and colonial police took over the hunt for Dinuzulu, who—along with other fugitive Usuthu leaders—surrendered at Pietermaritzburg in Natal but was quickly escorted back to Zululand where all were convicted of treason and imprisoned. From 1890 to 1898, Dinuzulu, Ndabuko, and Shingana were exiled to the Atlantic island of St. Helena.⁴⁰

In the British colony of Natal, 100,000 Europeans and a similar number of Indians dominated around 1 million Africans who were ruled indirectly by their chiefs. The neighboring Zulu Kingdom had been defeated by the British in 1879, torn apart by civil war in the 1880s, and then annexed to Natal in 1898. With the 1893 granting of responsible government, Natal had to organize its own defense and institutionalized the volunteer settler militia through a series of laws, including the 1903 Militia Act that compelled all white men and boys to engage in military training. Although the mineral revolution led to an expansion of settler commercial farming in Natal, the mines pulled away African labor. Following the South African War, confident Natal settlers wanted to complete the subjugation of the African population. In 1905, the Natal legislature, which was controlled by white farmers, tried to propel more African young men into wage labor by imposing a poll tax on adult male Africans on top of the existing hut tax paid by homestead heads.

In early February 1906, a small police patrol skirmished with Africans who were gathering to protest the poll tax south of Pietermaritzburg, the colonial capital, and two white policemen were

killed. The presence of independent African Christian church members at this incident confirmed white paranoia that such movements meant to provoke resistance. Martial law was declared, and a colonial army under Colonel Duncan McKenzie moved through southern Natal flogging people, burning homesteads, and seizing livestock. Seventeen men accused of involvement in the policemen's deaths were either shot by firing squad or hung. To the north, chief Bambatha's people (who were mostly tenants on white farms) experienced crop failure, increased rents, and now the poll tax. When colonial authorities deposed him as chief in early March, Bambatha fled to the bush, where he rallied several hundred men and abducted his appointed replacement, who was also his uncle. On April 4, his followers shot at a white magistrate sent to investigate and the next day, they ambushed some police at Mpanza, killing three Europeans. The rebels moved east across the Thukela River into the former Zulu Kingdom and took refuge in the Nkandla Forest. While chiefs from the sheltered valleys to the north and west of Nkandla joined Bambatha, those of the southern grassland stayed away because their communities would be exposed to colonial firepower. A volunteer settler militia was formed, including a contingent of 500 mounted men from the Transvaal, a Maxim gun and crew sponsored by Castle Beer Company, and Sergeant Major Gandhi's Indian stretcher bearers. On May 3, the Natal Field Force with 5,000 armed men and 150 wagons left Dundee and moved toward the Nkandla Forest in search of Bambatha. Throughout May, the militia destroyed Zulu communities and skirmished with rebels. On the night of June 9–10, the militia discovered Bambatha's camp on the Mome River, artillery was moved to high ground, and the volunteers attacked at dawn. Bambatha's force was defeated, and the chief's severed head was displayed around the colony to intimidate Africans. Of Bambatha's 12,000 followers, 2,300 had been killed and 4,700 taken prisoner.

On June 19, five hundred armed Africans attacked European stores as well as militia 50 kilometers south of the Nkandla Forest in the densely populated valleys of the Maphumulo area. Over the next three weeks, fighting spread east to the settler farms near the coast and south through the sugar-producing areas close to Durban. Once again, the rebels attempted to conceal themselves in densely forested valleys to reduce the effectiveness of colonial horses and firepower. By the end of June, the number of colonial soldiers in Maphumulo was increased from a few hundred to 2,500, with many returning from

operations against Bambatha. In early July, after failing to encircle a Zulu rebel group (which had slipped away), McKenzie's militia rampaged through the Mvoti Valley looting, burning, seizing livestock, and indiscriminately shooting any fleeing Africans. McKenzie then learned that a large rebel force was camped in the Izinsimba Valley and on July 8, he led a night march to position artillery and Maxim guns on the high ground in support of an infantry assault at sunrise. Some 450 Zulu, including key leaders such as Mashwili, were killed with no militia losses. The colonial scorched earth campaign continued throughout the rest of the month and ended the rebellion. During the campaign, colonial soldiers defended their use of "dum dum" bullets (internationally banned because they expanded on impact to inflict terrible wounds) as necessary because savage African warriors could not be stopped by normal ammunition. Hundreds of Africans were convicted of treason and sentenced to flogging followed by two years of hard labor on the Durban docks or northern Natal mines. Among these was Dinuzulu, the rightful Zulu king, who had stayed out of the fighting but was sentenced to four years imprisonment for harboring Bambatha's family.⁴¹

CONCLUSION

During the "scramble," European invaders conquered most of Africa within three decades. African resistance to this process is usually divided into two broad categories. Initially, African rulers who decided to fight, such as Behanzin of Dahomey, Mkwawa of the Hehe, and Lobengula of the Ndebele, confronted the Europeans separately and were usually overwhelmed quickly by superior military technology. A few years later, as forced labor and taxation were imposed on ordinary people, somewhat broader rebellions such as the Ndebele and Shona uprisings in what is now Zimbabwe, the Sierra Leone Hut Tax revolt, and Maji Maji in present-day Tanzania broke out that more seriously challenged colonial rule but eventually collapsed because of continued African division and European firepower. Of course, not all Africans resisted European intrusion, and many actively assisted such as African leaders who allied with colonial forces against their local rivals and ordinary African men who enlisted in colonial armies. The importance of new technology in the European conquest cannot be underestimated as machine guns, barbed wire, and airplanes all

saw their first use in combat during the “scramble.” While African armies tended to consume their own society’s resources, which caused hunger and ultimately undermined resistance, European colonial forces often had formal logistical systems and the most efficient campaigns, such as Wolseley’s operations against the Asante and Pedi, involved considerable preparation and building roads and bridges to facilitate transport and supply. Not all colonial military operations went well, and a few massacres of outnumbered and isolated European troops like the Italians in Dogali in Eritrea, and the British at the Shangani River in Zimbabwe and Isandlwana in South Africa prompted revenge and became celebrated events of colonial mythology. Since desperate resisters sometimes resorted to guerrilla warfare, the French in Madagascar in the 1890s and the British during the South African War pioneered counterinsurgency measures still employed today. Despite cooption by the colonial indirect rule system, the remnants of precolonial African states became irrelevant and their military structures turned into quaint traditions or even criminalized. Under European colonial rule for most of the next 70 years, Africa became a source of cheap cash crops and minerals for the world market, and Africans were profoundly transformed by the experience.

Chapter 3

Africa and World War I, 1914–1918

World War I (1914–1918) represented the largest migration of Africans out of their continent since the transatlantic slave trade, as African colonial soldiers and military laborers served in every operational theater and were employed by most of the main powers. Approximately 2.5 million Africans saw service as soldiers or laborers in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, with around 10 percent (250,000) losing their lives. All the colonial powers used African soldiers and workers during the late nineteenth-century wars of conquest, and with World War I, this existing colonial military system was simply expanded.¹ World War I was fought in every region of Africa. The first shot of the global conflict was fired in German Togoland (now Togo) on August 12, 1914, and the last German forces surrendered in British-ruled Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) on November 25, 1918, two weeks after the Armistice in Europe. Each German colony in sub-Saharan Africa was surrounded by Allied territories, cut off from communication with Berlin, and invaded by Allied forces. This meant that there were campaigns in Togoland, Cameroon, South West Africa (today's Namibia), and German East Africa (the mainland part of today's Tanzania plus Rwanda and Burundi). For the Allies, these invasions usually involved achieving some strategic aim such as denying German naval raiders coastal sanctuary, but they also wanted

to grab German territory, which meant that, in some respects, World War I in Africa represented a continuation of the “scramble” for Africa. In the German colonies, some civilian officials believed that Africa should remain neutral to avoid destroying recently built colonial infrastructure and inciting African resistance, and military officers felt bound by duty to tie down Allied resources that might otherwise be deployed in Europe and to retain a presence in Africa as a bargaining chip in negotiations. In North Africa, the once-dominant Ottoman Empire supported the Sanussi Rebellion against the Italians in Libya and British in Egypt, and Ottoman forces directly attacked the strategically important Suez Canal. Across Africa, the outbreak of global war presented recently colonized people with an opportunity to rebel. Even in areas where there was no fighting, the conflict impacted the daily life of African communities that were often forced to supply recruits, laborers, and agricultural products for the war effort.

AFRICAN SOLDIERS OUTSIDE AFRICA

France was the most active employer of armed African troops during World War I and the only major power to send them to the western front on a large scale. A decade before the war’s outbreak, Paris had made plans to use colonial African troops in the defense of the motherland threatened by a growing German army. When the conflict began in 1914, the French imported over 10,000 North African soldiers to throw into the path of the invading Germans. These soldiers spent the first winter of the war in the trenches without proper cold weather clothing. By November 1918, just over 200,000 black soldiers from French West Africa had fought on the western front, and around 30,000 had died. Although this figure is not much higher than the general casualty rate among French infantry, at times the French high command committed colonial African units to suicidal attacks to spare French lives.² For these African men from rural communities, the horrors of industrialized warfare must have been shocking. The first soldiers on the western front to experience chemical warfare, in April 1915, were Algerians—who abandoned their trenches and fled before giant greenish clouds of poison. A few days later, a Senegalese battalion was ordered to charge into a gas cloud as part of a diversionary attack. Contact with the gas sent the unprotected soldiers (gas

masks were not yet available) into such a frenzy that they shot their white officers and ran to the rear, where they looted supplies and raped nurses. However, it seems that overall, the French African soldiers were no more mutinous than their European counterparts, and when another Senegalese battalion rebelled in 1917, it was not in reaction to racism but part of the war weariness of the entire French army. During the same widespread French mutiny, African reserve battalions were employed to restore order in European units.

French African colonial units played a vital role on the western front, participating in every major battle. Initially, French authorities were slightly skeptical about the military capabilities of West African soldiers and tended to use them as garrison troops to free up French units for the western front or for secondary operations (discussed later in this chapter). In early August 1914, ten West African battalions, some 10,000 men, were shipped to France. On August 21, the first Senegalese troops saw combat on the western front as part of the failed French attack into Alsace Lorraine, where they quickly suffered almost 250 killed and more than 600 wounded. Four battalions of Senegalese were driven by car from France to the Yser River in Belgium as part of the hastily formed line meant to stop the German advance on the Channel. At the small town of Dixmude, in late October and early November 1914, they were heavily shelled and held their position despite attack by vastly superior German numbers. After the battle, the first battalion was reduced to 30 men and 2 officers, the second had 100 men left, the third was at half strength, and the fourth had 50 men and 1 officer. The survivors were amalgamated into a single battalion.

After the war's first year, the French began widespread recruitment in West Africa of soldiers, who were deployed in large numbers on the western front. On July 1, 1916, the French offensive on the Somme River included 21 West African battalions. During 1916, Africans were among French colonial troops that kept a vital supply route open to beleaguered French forces at Verdun. During the Battle of Verdun itself, some French African troops, denied cover and artillery support, were captured by the Germans and spit at their French officers. On October 24, 1916, in the most celebrated French action of the war, French colonial Moroccan and Senegalese troops routed German defenders at Verdun and retook the vital Fort Douaumont. In April 1917, at Chemin des Dames (called the Second Battle of Aisne by the British), a French offensive included 25,000 West Africans

representing 35 out of 41 West African battalions on the western front. Among the few to penetrate the German lines, the African soldiers were slaughtered by Germans with portable machine guns that appeared from trenches to their rear. Of the 10,000 West Africans in the first wave of this ultimately futile assault, 6,000 became casualties. Many West African soldiers broke and ran, and some boarded hospital trains to get away. From mid-1917 until the end of the war, French African battalions were dispersed along the entire western front as shock troops for assaults by larger French forces. While French authorities initially considered Malagasy men insufficiently martial to fight and relegated the 7,500 *tirailleurs malgaches* to defend their island, the losses of Verdun prompted the recruitment of 46,000 soldiers from Madagascar, and there was difficulty in finding enough ships to transport them to Europe.

Seen by white French officers as particularly savage, each West African soldier was issued a large combat knife called a *coupe coupe* and encouraged to use it in hand-to-hand fighting. The Germans, influenced by racism and French propaganda, feared the Africans as headhunters and cannibals. Behind the lines, French authorities kept black African soldiers in racially segregated camps meant to limit their contact with white civilians, particularly women. They were taught simplified French language, which reinforced the paternalistic French perception of them as overgrown children. Given their vulnerability to extreme cold, French colonial African soldiers were withdrawn from the front each winter and sent to camps in the warmer south of France. Six French West African battalions also took part in the disastrous Gallipoli campaign of 1915, where the Allies tried unsuccessfully to take the Ottoman Empire, an ally of Germany, out of the war and open a sea route to supply Russia. West African troops were known for high morale in this campaign despite three out of four men becoming casualties in some units. The involvement of French African soldiers in Gallipoli reflected the French view that the campaign distracted from the main theater. French African troops also participated in the 1916–1917 Allied expedition to the Balkans that supported Serbia against Bulgaria, Germany, and Austro-Hungary. Immediately after the Armistice, French African troops formed the core of the occupation force in the Rhineland. The racist German press dubbed this the “black shame,” accused France of humiliating a defeated Germany, and claimed that the black troops had raped white German women (which caused such outrage in British and American newspapers that they were withdrawn).³

Unlike the French, the British did not employ armed African soldiers in Europe during the war. While British colonial Indian troops were shipped to Europe in 1914 and fought in the opening battles, they were quickly withdrawn, and Indian units from then on fought in the Middle East and Africa. In Europe, the British employed thousands of unarmed African military laborers who (as discussed later in this chapter) unloaded ships, drove supply wagons, and cut timber to make trench supports.

While white Afrikaner nationalists in South Africa opposed sending soldiers to Europe, the patriotic white English-speaking community demanded an opportunity to directly serve Britain. The 5,800-strong 1st South African Infantry Brigade left Cape Town in August 1915 and within a few weeks was training in Britain. The brigade consisted exclusively of white volunteers most, of whom were English and of the middle class. Many were veterans of the South West Africa and/or East Africa campaigns, and some had South African War experience. The prevailing military culture was Scottish, as many had come through citizen force units such as the Cape Town Highlanders and Transvaal Scottish. In early 1916, the South African Brigade, given its many men with desert warfare experience, was sent to Egypt to fight Sanussi incursions from Libya. In mid-April 1916, the brigade was shipped to France for the anticipated Somme offensive. After the Battle of Delville Wood (later called Devil's Wood) in mid-July, 750 South Africans were dead, and 1,500 were wounded, captured, or missing. Of 3,150 members of the brigade who had fought, only 29 officers and 750 other ranks answered roll call on July 21. Some 2,900 newly arrived South African troops reconstituted the brigade, which spent the next year in and out of action at places such as Vimy, Butte de Warlencourt, Arras, Fampoux, and Menin Road. In May 1917 at Fampoux, the brigade suffered heavy casualties for a gain of just 200 meters and dubbed themselves "suicide Springboks." In September 1917, the South African brigade participated in the British offensive in Flanders, eventually known as the Third Battle of Ypres (or Passchendaele), which envisioned a push to the coast to drive the Germans out of Belgium. Instead of the massed shoulder-to-shoulder advance of the Somme, British infantry formed small and fast attack parties to eliminate specific German positions. During the early morning of September 20, the 3rd and 4th South African battalions, preceded by a creeping artillery barrage, advanced over muddy and cratered ground, and took a series of objectives from surprised

German defenders. In this operation, 1,250 South Africans were killed, wounded, or missing out of an original 2,600. At the beginning of 1918, the South African brigade, now only 1,700 strong, was assigned to hold a defensive position at Gouzeaucourt, near Cambrai, in anticipation of a German spring offensive. On the morning of March 21, artillery hammered the South Africans and German assaults overwhelmed their strongpoint at Gauche Wood. Over the next few days, the brigade suffered 900 casualties, and the remaining 700 men were withdrawn north to escape encirclement. When the war ended, the South Africans were on the far eastern point of a general Allied advance, with each of the three battalions having only 300 men.⁴

Consisting of mixed race soldiers from South Africa, the 1st Cape Corps Battalion fought as infantry in East Africa in 1916 and 1917. In April 1918, the 1,000-man unit was shipped from Durban to Egypt to join General Sir Edmund Allenby's coming British offensive against the Turks in Palestine that was meant to take Lebanon and Syria as well. At the end of June, the Cape Corps Battalion joined the British and Indian units of the 160th Brigade deployed in forward positions north of Jerusalem and along the Jordan River. The influenza pandemic was beginning to take its toll and throughout the campaign, the unit maintained only 70 percent active strength. In late September, the Cape Corps was part of an advance against Turkish positions northeast of Jerusalem. With the Turks weakened by desertion, disease, and Allied artillery, the Cape Corps took a number of enemy positions that included well-defended Square Hill. On September 20, four hundred Cape Corps men formed the vanguard of a frontal night assault on an elevated Turkish position. Allied shelling was late and inaccurate, messengers became lost, and the Turks brought up reinforcements to repel the confused attackers. With more than 50 killed and 100 wounded, the Cape Corps pulled back to trenches on Square Hill. In October, the battalion returned to Egypt, where it received replacements from South Africa but saw no further combat. As part of the British garrison, the Cape Corps was involved in suppressing an Egyptian nationalist revolt in 1919.⁵

THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS

Most African soldiers and military laborers were engaged in the war's African campaigns. Thousands of porters kept Allied forces, mostly consisting of African soldiers, supplied during the brief invasion of

Togoland and the longer campaign in Cameroon. African servicemen were less involved in the South African invasion of German South West Africa in 1914 and 1915. The South African government did not recruit armed black soldiers during the campaign, as it feared possible rebellion at home, and it had a large enough white population to satisfy military requirements. Similarly, the Germans, who had recently waged a genocidal counterinsurgency against the Herero and Nama, felt they could not rely on local people. In the German East Africa campaign, the longest and most costly of the war in Africa, the British initially deployed European and Indian units. However, problems with tropical disease and expanded operations in 1916 prompted the British to dramatically Africanize their forces.

Togoland


The shortest and least destructive campaign of World War I in Africa was fought in the small West African German colony of Togoland, a sliver of territory wedged between the much larger British Gold Coast (now Ghana) and French Dahomey (now Benin). The main Allied objective was the capture of Germany's most important overseas wireless station, established at Kamina in June 1914, which enabled Berlin to communicate with its African territories, ships in the South Atlantic, and South America. To defend Togoland, the Germans relied on 152 paramilitary police, 416 regular police, and 125 border guards with outdated 1871-pattern carbines that were supported by four machine guns. Although German acting governor Major Hans Georg Von Doering proposed that the West African territories remain neutral, the Allies saw this as a sign of weakness. On August 12, 1914, two companies of the Gold Coast Regiment (part of the West African Frontier Force or WAFF) seized the port of Lome, Togoland's capital—which was only a kilometer from the Gold Coast border—and landed more forces by ship. Abandoning Lome, the Germans withdrew 110 kilometers north along the parallel road and railway to Kamina and conscripted Africans. The Germans blew up the bridge across the Chra River, the last major obstacle on the way to Kamina, and established a defensive position on its northern bank. Converging on Kamina, the British pursued the Germans north from Lome, another British force advanced east from Kete-rachi on the Gold Coast border, and French troops marched west from Dahomey.

The first and only serious fighting of the Togoland campaign happened on August 22 when northward-bound British forces tried to cross the Chra River and suffered some 17 percent casualties, and the Gold Coast Regiment fled. The Germans, who had sustained only light casualties, withdrew to Kamina, where they destroyed the wireless station on the night of August 24–25 and surrendered the next day. Doering had not tried very hard. There were two other river crossing where he could have staged delaying operations, he opted not to destroy other bridges, he failed to mobilize 200 German reservists, and during the capitulation the British seized 3 machine guns; 1,000 rifles; and 320,000 rounds of ammunition that could have been used to continue resistance. While the French would occupy most of Togoland, a portion was ceded to the British Gold Coast and remains part of modern Ghana.⁶

Cameroon

With British Nigeria to the west and French Equatorial Africa to the east and south, the German territory of Cameroon was surrounded by enemies except the small Spanish possessions of Equatorial Guinea in the south and the island of Fernando Po off the Atlantic coast. Although the bulk of the German presence was around the port of Douala in the east, the Germans planned to abandon the coast because it lacked fortifications, and the swamps and tropical disease of the south would hamper invaders, and concentrated their defense on the grassland plateau of the northern interior. The aim of the Germans in Cameroon was to delay surrender so that they would have a physical presence in Africa at the end of the war. In 1914, the Schutztruppen—German colonial troops—in Cameroon numbered 205 European officers and 1,650 African soldiers. With the addition of German settler reservists and colonial police, the force grew to a height of 1,460 Europeans and 6,550 Africans formed into 34 companies. While the Germans had 60 machine guns, and about half their force possessed up-to-date Mauser rifles, there was a serious shortage of ammunition, which they tried to manufacture locally with mixed results. German commander General Karl Zimmerman had limited communication with his forces.

The main French objective in the campaign was territorial expansion. On August 6, French forces in the southeast seized the German



posts at Singa on the Ubangi River and Bonga on the Congo River, which had been under French control until ceded to Germany by a 1911 agreement. Immediately, and without orders from Paris, the French formed four columns that pressed into Cameroon—one from Singa advanced north up the Lobaye River, another from Bonga moved up the Sanga River, one from Gabon marched from the south, and another from Gabon cut the Germans off from Equatorial Guinea. Although the Belgians initially wanted their territory on the east side of the Congo River to remain neutral, events in Europe prompted them to facilitate the movement of French troops, and 600 Belgian soldiers joined the Sanga column. Because London wanted to deny German cruisers the use of Douala's radio station and port, British operations focused on the coast, which they had dominated before the arrival of the Germans and where local people resented German rule. In late August, before a seaborne expeditionary force was ready to seize Douala, five columns of the Nigeria Regiment (another part of the WAFF) crossed Cameroon's eastern border. Two columns from Maidugari advanced on Mora, one from Yola moved toward Garua, one from Ikom on the Cross River marched on Nsanakang, and another from Calabar moved along the coast. Unwittingly, the Nigeria Regiment columns in the interior attacked the focal point of German defense, where positions consisted of well-built trenches, deep dug-outs, interlocking fields of fire, and traps and barbed wire. By the end of the month, the Nigerians had failed to take Mora and withdrew south, those that assaulted Garua were repelled in confusion and their commanding officer was killed, and the Cross River column took Nsanakang but was subsequently ambushed and took 50 percent casualties, including 8 of its 11 British officers. During September and October, the German forces at Garua began sending patrols to Yola in Nigeria and north to Marua and Mora. Although the Nigerian overland offensive had failed, it revealed that the Germans had left Douala open. In early September, a small flotilla of British vessels grouped around the cruiser HMS *Cumberland* anchored in the Bay of Ambas and for several weeks, small British and German craft skirmished over access to the Cameroon estuary that led to Douala. On September 26, with the channel clear, the British expeditionary force under Brigadier C. M. Dobell—including 2,000 French Senegalese troops—took Douala without a fight as the Germans withdrew inland. On October 6, the Senegalese overcame stiff resistance to seize nearby Japoma Bridge. Dobell's men spent the rest of October securing small

waterways around Douala, where the Germans fought delaying actions. In December, Dobell's force began advancing inland up the northern railway.

The French columns in the south encountered serious problems of resupply and communication. In mid-September 1914, a French column from Gabon attempting to cut off Cameroon from Equatorial Guinea ran into a German force between Oyem and the border. Many of the French officers became casualties, their African soldiers fled, and the Germans advanced into French territory. Because Douala had been taken by the Allies, the Spanish colony became the only point of contact with the outside world for the Germans in Cameroon through which they imported supplies and ammunition up to early 1915. Resuming the offensive in November and December 1914, the French encountered tenacious resistance from withdrawing German forces. In January and February 1915, the Germans, with their core defenses in the northern highlands secure and links to Spanish territory open, launched two attacks meant to ease pressure on their east and west frontiers. On January 5, a German attack on Edea, near Douala, was repelled by heavy fire from French Senegalese soldiers. Although the Germans did not take this position, the assault caused Dobell's force to withdraw south of Dshang, which was on the route north, and abandon a plan to assist the French in the south. On February 24, the Germans took Bertua, which pushed a French column 100 kilometers back down the Sanga River to its confluence with the Kadei River. With European officers and NCOs succumbing to disease and reinforcements denied by the British administration in Nigeria—where there was rebellion (see later in this chapter)—Dobell's expeditionary force settled down to defense.

In February 1915, a French conference in Brazzaville decided to concentrate all columns on taking the trade center of Jaunde (today's Yaoundé) in the southeast (which was wrongly believed to be center of German defenses), and Dobell (nominally the overall Allied commander) eventually agreed to cooperate, though he would have rather focused on starving the Germans by using naval power to blockade the Spanish enclave. In early May, Dobell sent two columns, one French and one British, along each of the two routes running east from Edea to Jaunde. The French column advanced along the railway and the British along a bush track. Both, after the railway ran out, linked up at Wum Biagas for a final push on the objective. Placing 300 men along the track and 275 on the railway, the Germans made Dobell's men fight every day of the advance. After the two columns

rendezvoused, they left Wum Biagas on May 25 with the French in the lead. Disease and hunger had taken a heavy toll on the Allied soldiers—25 percent were killed or wounded from fighting—the Germans were harassing the Allied flanks and rear, and supply carriers usually ran off at the first shots. With the advance on Jaunde slowed to a crawl of 1.5 kilometers a day, it became obvious that Dobell's force would not reach its objective before the rainy season hampered movement. By June 25, his men had been pulled back to Ngwe. Dobell suspended operations until October, let his men recuperate, and focused on the blockade of Spanish territory.

In the south, during April and May 1915, French columns were rendered almost ineffective by problems of supply, communication, and coordination. During June and July, French columns in the east recovered as they converged, received assistance from local people, and entered an area where more food was available. This enabled the French to seize Bertua and Lomie in late June, and Dume in late July. Another important factor was the temporary mutiny of German African troops in the area, who were short ammunition and feared capture, and whose commander had recently been killed. In Nigeria, Governor Frederick Lugard demanded that Allied forces take Garua because the Germans were using it as a base for forays across the border, which undermined British control. As such, heavy artillery—including a naval 12 pounder and a French 95-millimeter (mm) gun from Dakar—was brought up the Benue River toward the Cameroon frontier and Garua. Since the Germans had recently redeployed part of the Garua garrison, the Allies enjoyed vast superiority in numbers and firepower. On June 10, British forces from northern Nigeria and French forces from Chad approached Garua, a heavy bombardment panicked the German colonial troops (half of whom escaped by jumping into the Benue River), and the fort was captured without assault. The lack of rain and relative abundance of food made movement in the north easier than the rest of Cameroon, and on June 28, the British took Ngaundere. Unintentionally, the Allies had undermined the German defensive focus on the north, which was then shifted south to Jaunde and links to Spanish territory. Confusion among the Allied forces gave the Germans time and space to do this. In mid-September, the Germans attempted to drive the French at Bertua and Dume back to the east, but confusion stalled this last major German offensive.

In late August 1915, British and French commanders met at Douala and planned a combined offensive against Jaunde after the rains.

On October 9, Dobell's British column recaptured Wum Biagas and on October 30, the French retook Eseka, and both locations became forward bases for the push on Jaunde. In late November, a 9,700-man column advanced toward Jaunde with a strong contingent marching along the main forest road with supporting elements along the flanks to prevent German harassment. Emerging from the jungle in mid-December and advancing over open ground, the British surged ahead of the French and took Jaunde on January 1, 1916. In November and December 1915, British and French forces took key positions in the north, such as at Banyo, where the Germans had constructed 300 stone emplacements on high ground. With limited quantities of inferior locally made ammunition, the Germans could not present much resistance and fell back. In their determination to capture Jaunde, the Allies had left 200 kilometers of the Cameroon–Equatorial Guinea border unguarded, and French amphibious landings of four companies at Campo in October and December 1915 was countered by the Germans, who prevented them from crossing the Ntem River along the Spanish frontier. In late December, German forces began moving southwest and by mid-February 1916, despite the efforts of a French column from Gabon which closed the gap to just 50 kilometers, 1,000 Germans; 6,000 African soldiers; and 7,000 family members and followers had crossed into the Spanish colony. This was facilitated by the Beti people around Jaunde who, believing the Germans would return, abandoned their villages to deny the Allies labor and food. On February 18, the 155-strong German garrison of fortified Mora in the north, the last German force in Cameroon, surrendered. The Germans in Spanish territory moved to Fernando Po where, still armed and resupplied with 500,000 rounds of ammunition, they awaited return to Cameroon and caused worry among Allied leaders. In February 1916, northern Cameroon was given to the British, who incorporated it into Nigeria. The rest was handed over to the French, who reincorporated the ceded territories of 1911 into French Equatorial Africa and put the army in charge everywhere else.⁷

REBELLION IN SOUTH AFRICA

In 1912, two years after the Union of South Africa, the Union Defence Force (UDF) was created with a permanent force of 2,500 South African Mounted Rifles; an Active Citizen Force of 23,000 volunteers and

conscripts receiving part-time training; and a reserve of local rifle associations and commandos. Given the link between military service and expectation of citizenship rights, the UDF was exclusively white, with black enlistment subject to the special permission of parliament. Britain saw South Africa and the other dominions as a source of manpower to defend the mother country, and the Union government saw Afrikaner rebellion as its primary security threat. Although the early UDF was supposed to combine British and Boer military traditions, Afrikaners became alienated by the use of khaki uniforms, which signified the enemy of the South African War; British grooming standards that banned the manly beard; dominance of English language in training; standardized drill, which undermined frontier fighting qualities; and rigid command structures that replaced councils of war and elected leaders.⁸

Like other British dominions, South Africa entered the Great War through London's declaration of hostilities against Germany in 1914. Almost immediately, Britain requested that South Africa invade neighboring German South West Africa to seize radio stations and harbors that could be used by Germany's naval raiders who were threatening shipping in the southern hemisphere. Ambitious for South African territorial expansion, Prime Minister Louis Botha and Defense Minister Jan Smuts, veterans of the Boer forces that had fought the British from 1899 to 1902, quickly began plans for the offensive. However, the newly formed Nationalist Party under J. B. M. Hertzog, another former Boer military leader, objected to assistance for British imperialism and fondly remembered German support of the Boer republics during the South African War. These feelings were shared by Commandant General C. F. Beyers and many of the senior officers he had appointed to the UDF, who resigned their commissions and gathered at the house of apocalyptic Christian prophet Niklaas Van Rensburg to plan rebellion and the creation of an independent South Africa. Preparations for a September 15, military coup were cut short when Beyers and Boer military hero Koos de la Rey, traveling by car from Johannesburg to Potchefstroom to consult with fellow conspirators, decided to run a police roadblock, and the latter was shot and killed. Botha himself now took command of the UDF and rallied subordinate officers for a campaign in South West Africa. When the South African invasion of the neighboring German colony began in early October, the Upington force under Manie Maritz, a former Boer "bittereinder" who had fled to South West Africa in 1902 rather than surrender, did not move as instructed, which left another

advancing column, A Force under Major General Henry Lukin, dangerously exposed on its flank. In fact, Maritz had been one of the coup plotters and now declared South Africa independent, disarmed loyalist soldiers under his command, promoted himself to general, and made his own treaty with the Germans. On October 11, Smuts declared martial law with strict press censorship, a ban on public meetings, and collection of arms and ammunition. Hertzog's Nationalists avoided direct involvement in the rebellion but sympathized with it.

By the end of October 1914, a total of around 11,500 armed Boer rebels had been mobilized by Christiaan De Wet in the Orange Free State, and Beyers and Jan Kemp in the Transvaal. Although they briefly occupied towns and ambushed trains, the rebels lacked overall coordination. Rejecting offers of imperial assistance or the recruitment of black soldiers, Botha decided to use his force of 32,000 loyalists, mostly Afrikaners, to crush the rebellion. Botha first concentrated on the Orange Free State and on November 12 attacked a force of 5,000 rebels under De Wet at Winburg. Partly encircled, most of the rebels surrendered, though De Wet escaped only to be arrested near Kuruman in early December. Botha then turned on Beyers's and Kemp's rebels in the western Transvaal, and in an attack on Rustenburg seized 400 prisoners and drove the remainder further west. Beyers sent part of the force with Kemp to join Maritz and the Germans. On November 16, near Bultfontein in the eastern Orange Free State, Botha's loyalists routed the rebels under Beyers, who became a fugitive and drowned trying to cross the Vaal River in early December. Once an insurgent group under Jopie Fourie operating near Pretoria was rounded up, the rebellion in the Orange Free State and Transvaal was over.


Kemp and several hundred Transvaal men rode 1,300 kilometers across the Kalahari Desert and arrived in German territory in early December 1914. German governor Theodor Seitz met Kemp and Maritz at the South West African town of Keetmanshoop and agreed to supply them with equipment and food. Just before Christmas, a combined German and rebel Boer offensive crossed the Orange River into South Africa and threatened Upington. Disagreements between Kemp and Maritz, and fear of UDF artillery, prompted Kemp to withdraw from the operation and lead his men back toward the Transvaal. The German commander, Joachim von Heydebreck, wanted to mount a two-pronged attack on Upington with Maritz's force to draw South African troops back from their invasion of South West Africa.

However, Maritz declined to cooperate that closely with German troops, as he believed it would damage support for the republican cause. The Germans then moved west 160 kilometers to attack Ramansdrift and Steinkopf. Leading 1,000 rebels supported by a small German field gun detachment, Maritz moved toward Upington in mid-January 1915. News of rebel failures elsewhere encouraged Maritz to request surrender terms from the South African commander at Upington, Jacobus "Jaap" Van Deventer, who had to seek guidance from superiors. After waiting five days, Maritz launched a badly coordinated attack on Upington that was repelled. Although the Germans tried to take pressure off Maritz by redirecting their offensive toward nearby Kakamas, they encountered firm resistance from South African forces. On January 30, Kemp and most remaining rebels surrendered to government officers near Upington. The rebellion then fizzled, with Maritz and members of the small German organized Afrikaner Free Corps seeking sanctuary in South West Africa.

According to the official South African report, around 1,000 people were killed or wounded during the rebellion. Among loyalist forces, 130 were killed and 275 wounded, while 190 rebels were killed and 400 wounded. The Botha administration showed mercy to the defeated rebels to encourage national reconciliation. Jopie Fourie, who had forgotten to resign his UDF commission, was the only rebel executed for treason. Of the 239 rebels tried and convicted, only around 50 were still in prison by the end of December 1915. De Wet served 6 months of a 6-year sentence, Kemp served 1 year and 9 months out of 7 years, and the prophet Van Rensburg (who was present with rebels near Upington) received an 18-month sentence. Maritz eventually fled to Angola but returned to South Africa in 1923 and served a 3-year prison term. English-speaking whites considered the lenient sentences disgraceful, and emerging black political leaders noticed an obvious double standard when compared to the cruel handling of Zulu rebels in 1906. Afrikaner nationalists lauded the rebels as heroes. In August 1915, seven thousand Afrikaner women staged a march on the Union buildings in Pretoria to demand a blanket amnesty, and Hertzog's Nationalist Party gained 20 new seats in the October 1915 election.⁹

SOUTH WEST AFRICA, 1914–1915

In South West Africa, the Germans had around 2,000 mounted European infantry and a reserve of 3,000 volunteer infantry supported by field



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guns, Maxim guns, railway transport, wireless communications, and three airplanes. However, these forces were dispersed throughout the territory in 132 small units that were later formed into 4 composite battalions. The Germans had plenty of artillery, 46 heavy guns, 11 rapid-firing cannon, 9 light mountain guns, and ample ammunition. However, during the campaign, the artillery ran out of shells because there was no fodder for the draught animals who pulled the wagons. Food supplies were limited because the settlers concentrated on cattle ranching, and agricultural production among the Ovambo in the north was poor because of drought. German leadership was inconsistent—the overall military commander Heydebreck was accidentally killed in November 1914, his obvious successor had been killed in action in late September 1914, the new commander (Viktor Francke) was a reservist without high-level training, and his chief of staff died after falling from

a horse. Although the Germans used wireless communications, this tended to give away their plans to the South Africans who were listening in. Given Germany's genocide against the Herero and Nama, African participation in the defense of the colony was minimal. In 1915, the South African invasion force numbered 45,000 European soldiers supported by 33,000 African, Coloured (mixed race) and Indian unarmed volunteers who worked as transport drivers, railway and road workers, and general labor. Although Union legislation prohibited the arming of black soldiers, some Coloureds familiar with South West Africa formed an armed scout detachment. The open terrain and vastness meant that horse transportation became extremely important. This is illustrated by the fact that at the start of the war, the UDF had one veterinary officer and one veterinary NCO. However, during the South West Africa campaign, this increased to 47 and 450 respectively. Several South African pilots were recalled from the new Royal Flying Corps in western Europe to provide aerial reconnaissance for the invasion. In the arid environment, locating water sources became a key factor for both sides.

The South African attack, planned by Smuts, began on September 14, 1914, when the Royal Navy shelled German installations at the port of Swakopmund. Totalling 5,000 soldiers with 14 guns, the South African force was divided into three contingents, each of which was not strong enough for offensive operations. Five days after the bombardment of Swakopmund, South Africa's C Force landed unopposed at Luderitz. German defenders had withdrawn from the coast because of British naval guns and concentrated on defending the Orange River border in the south. Beginning at Port Nolloth, the 1,800 men of South Africa's A Force under Lukin traveled northeast by rail to Steinkopf, marched to crossing points on the Orange River, and pushed quickly into German territory to secure water sources. On September 24, officials in Pretoria knew about the German move to the south, but this information was sent to Lukin by post—which he did not receive until early October, which was too late. On September 26, a force of about 1,200 Germans with 3 artillery batteries under Heydebreck encircled Lukin's advance guard at Sandfontein and killed, wounded, or captured all 300 men. This happened because the planned movement of Maritz's B Force, now turned rebel, from Upington did not transpire. At the same time C Force, mostly Natal Mounted Rifles under Duncan McKenzie, pushed inland from Luderitz to Grasplatz but was slowed to a crawl by German destruction of the railway and poisoning of wells, as well as soft sand in

which horses sank. In early December, some of McKenzie's mounted troops raided Garub but were repulsed by heavy German fire. C Force eventually took Garub in February 1915 and used it as a base for an attack on the heavily defended Aus, which the Germans abandoned just before it was captured by the South Africans at the end of March. On Christmas Day 1914, South African trawlers landed infantry, mounted riflemen, and artillery at Walvis Bay, a South African-administered enclave, and in mid-January 1915, this force occupied Swakopmund. The Germans fell back to Jakkalswater and Riet in the interior. When the South African invasion had begun in September, a column of 100 mounted British South Africa Police (BSAP) from Southern Rhodesia (today's Zimbabwe) and Northern Rhodesia Police (NRP—from present day Zambia) secured the important bridge over the Zambezi River at Victoria Falls by seizing the adjacent and lightly defended Caprivi Strip in the northeast of German South West Africa. Although Portugal was neutral when the war began, Lisbon quickly dispatched a 1500 strong expeditionary force under Lieutenant Colonel Alves Roccas to guard southern Angola which increased the number of Portuguese troops in the area to 6000–7000. Beginning in October 1914 German patrols, possibly encouraged by pre-war ambitions to seize neighboring Portuguese territory, raided southern Angola and in December Francke led 500 German troops supported by six artillery pieces to briefly capture the town of Naulila.

In February 1915, Botha took command of the northern contingent at Swakopmund with the intention of leading an advance on Windhoek, which was drastically slowed by the reconstruction of destroyed railway and problems acquiring water. The Germans gained time to conduct an orderly withdrawal, establish new defensive positions, and redirect their efforts from the southern to the central region. On March 20, Botha's mounted brigades enveloped four understrength German companies that were holding a 48-kilometer long defensive position in hills west of Jakkalswater and Riet. About 200 Germans were captured, and the rest fled. However, the South Africans were unable to pursue because horses were spent, there was little grass, and water was scarce. With Riet as a depot for supplies arriving from the coast, Botha resumed the advance at the end of April supported by a dozen Royal Navy armored cars that consumed less water than horses. Botha sent 2 mounted brigades—4,300 men with artillery support—north under General Coen Brits to secure the railway junction at Karibib. Another 2 brigades—4,600 mounted men and

artillery—were sent east under General M. W. Myburgh to capture Okahandja. On April 25, a German attack on Trekkopjes, which intended to isolate the South Africans by destroying the railway behind them, failed because German forces became lost in the dark. The Germans were repelled by a South African counterattack undertaken by infantry and armored cars, which German aerial reconnaissance had previously mistaken for water trucks. On May 5, Botha's force captured Karibib railway junction, abandoned by the Germans two days earlier, which brought together the territory's central, southern, and northern rail systems. With the Germans continuing to withdraw, the South Africans occupied Windhoek, along with its strategically important wireless station, on May 12.

In the south, a South African motorized column of 3,000 men under General Carl Berrange crossed the Kalahari and penetrated the eastern border at Reitfontein at the end of March 1915. By the beginning of April, the South Africans had secured all the Orange River crossings, and on April 5, the southern force under Van Deventer seized the German railhead at Kalkfontein. In April, Botha sent Smuts to Luderitz to oversee operations in the south, but this robbed the defense ministry in Pretoria of its head. With McKenzie's C Force advancing surprisingly quickly from Aus, the Germans under Captain Otto von Kleist at Keetmanshoop, a potentially strong mountainous position, feared encirclement and withdrew on April 19, moving north to Gibeon. Kleist did not retreat fast enough, which enabled C Force to advance northeast cross-country from Aus to Gibeon. On the night of April 25, they blew up the railway north of the Germans and shelled an ammunition train. However, a German counterattack caught the South Africans in exposed ground illuminated by moonlight and drove them off. While this enabled Kleist's command to escape north to Rehoboth, 241 out of 800 men became casualties. When Baster communities around Rehoboth, mixed race migrants from the Cape, resisted German livestock seizure and conscription of labor, the Germans retaliated by shooting refugees and burning wagons. Baster leaders, in early April, had offered their military services to Botha, who declined on the basis that it was a white man's war. With Botha's advance from the coast threatening to cut them off, the southern German force left Rehoboth on May 8 and retreated north.

Having lost the southern half of the colony, German forces moved north along the railway, intending to make a stand at Otavi and Tsumeb. At this point, the Germans lacked the wagons needed to

move far from the rail line. It was obvious that the Germans were only delaying the inevitable, though Governor Seitz hoped his forces could remain in the field to claim the territory if the war in Europe ended. Botha rejected a German cease-fire offer that proposed each side occupy half the colony. Imperial objectives had been achieved with control of the coast and Windhoek, but Botha saw an opportunity for South African expansion. Botha and Smuts were concerned that the Germans would resort to guerrilla warfare, as they had done during the South African War, but Francke rejected this option because of overwhelming South African numbers and the potential impact on the small German population.


Botha took several weeks to build up a strong force of 13,000 troops consisting of several mounted brigades and 1 infantry brigade supported by light and heavy artillery; 20,000 horses and oxen; and 500 wagons carrying 3 days' provisions. On June 18, 1915, the South Africans resumed the offensive with a four-pronged northward movement to encircle Otavi. Botha led the central column of two mounted brigades, and McKenzie commanded an infantry brigade that marched straight up the northern railway toward Kalkveld. On the flanks, Myburgh led a mounted brigade in a right hook through Waterberg and toward Tsumeb to block a possible German escape to the northeast, and Brits took his mounted brigade west of the rail line toward Etosha Pan and Namutoni. The German defense of Otavi was entrusted to Major Hermann Ritter, who commanded 1,000 soldiers supported by machine guns and artillery. They were meant to delay the South Africans long enough for Francke to organize defenses at Tsumeb, where the Germans had relocated a large ammunition dump. However, the speed of the South African advance caught the Germans unprepared and although fear of encirclement caused Ritter to deploy his men in depth, their positions were not mutually supporting and their artillery not properly sited. On July 1, Botha's central column of 3,500 men attacked Otavi and within a few hours, a flanking movement caused the Germans to withdraw from the railway and move further north to Gaub, where they joined Kleist's contingent from the south. Had the Germans delayed Botha's column for two days, it would have been forced to pull back for lack of water.

With South African forces converging from all sides and the Angolan border blocked by an African rebellion against the Portuguese which had been stimulated by the German raids of late 1914, the few remaining Germans had nowhere to run. On July 9, after a

few days of exchanging messages with Botha (who stubbornly refused to accept conditions), the Germans surrendered. South African encircling movements and the German tendency to withdraw produced a low casualty rate. Among UDF soldiers, 113 had been killed in action, 153 died through disease or accident, and 263 had been wounded. Of 1,188 German casualties, 103 had died. In all, 4,740 German soldiers—with 37 field guns and 22 machine guns—capitulated. South West Africa fell under Botha's military rule and at the end of the war, it became a South African-administered mandate of the League of Nations. Many German settlers were deported and replaced by poor Afrikaner farmers from South Africa.¹⁰

EAST AFRICA, 1914–1918

The longest and most destructive African campaign of World War I was fought in East Africa. Although the immediate British imperial concern was to deny German East Africa's Indian Ocean coast to German naval raiders, that territory's occupation would complete the British ambition for continuous rule from Cape to Cairo. Using Indian troops, the British planned to swiftly defeat the Germans in East Africa by a seaborne assault on the port of Tanga 80 kilometers from the Kenyan border supported by a simultaneous overland advance. In early November 1914, the 8,000-strong British Indian Expeditionary Force B under Major General A. E. Aitken, consisting of 2 infantry brigades with a mountain artillery battery and some engineers, conducted an amphibious landing at Tanga. German commander Colonel Paul Von Lettow-Vorbeck rushed in 6 companies totalling 1,000 men by rail, which repelled the poorly trained and equipped Indian troops. Unusually, during the battle, an Indian battalion was routed by a swarm of aggressive bees. On November 5, after two days of fighting, the British force withdrew to their ships, abandoning several hundred rifles, 16 machine guns, and 600,000 rounds of ammunition that were badly needed by the isolated Germans. In one of the worst failures of British military history, the British had lost 360 killed and 487 wounded, while the Germans suffered 71 killed, including colonial conqueror Tom von Prince, and 76 wounded. On November 3, four thousand men from British Indian Expeditionary Force C under Brigadier J. M. Stewart who were marching south from Kenya were quickly driven back at Longido by an unexpectedly robust force of 600 German askaris (African soldiers) who caught



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them in a cross fire and 90 mounted German settler volunteers who ambushed their supply column. This success enabled Lettow to send reinforcements to Tanga.

At this point, the Allies had insufficient forces in East Africa for an overland invasion, and German troops began to cross the Kenyan border to raid the Uganda railway. After the Tanga debacle, the British turned to South Africa to lead a protracted conquest of German East Africa, but this had to wait until after the South West Africa campaign and South Africa's October 1915 election, during which Afrikaner nationalists protested involvement in the war. South Africa had territorial interests in East Africa. Smuts imagined that once the German colony was occupied, Britain would give its southern half to Portugal in exchange for the southern half of Mozambique that would be transferred to Pretoria, giving the Transvaal the logical trade outlets

of Beira and Lourenzo Marques. The possibility of employing French colonial troops from nearby Madagascar in German East Africa was rejected by the British who wanted to restrict French territorial claims to West Africa. A recruitment campaign for an East African expeditionary force began in South Africa in November 1915, but results were slow because the excitement of the conflict's early days had subsided. This prompted the December creation of the mixed race Cape Corps. These delays provided Lettow with time to prepare for the coming Allied offensive. At the outbreak of the war, the Germans had 218 European and 2,542 African soldiers in the colony. By January 1916, they had mobilized 2,712 Europeans; 11,367 Africans; and 2,591 auxiliaries. In July 1915, the German cruiser *Konigsberg* was sunk by aerial coordinated indirect fire from British gunboats in the Rufiji Delta. Men, artillery, small arms, and ammunition from the warship were put to use by Lettow's land forces.

The Belgian government believed that if its forces occupied parts of German East Africa, this could be used later to secure the return of territory in Europe, retain control of Congo (seen internationally as a particularly badly ruled colony), and perhaps swap with Portugal for part of northern Angola to expand Congo's Atlantic coastline. In late September 1914, a small German force of 24 European and 152 African soldiers seized Congo's Ijwi Island, which confirmed their control of Lake Kivu. Around the same time, at the request of British colonial officials, a Belgian Force Publique battalion briefly moved into the northeastern part of Northern Rhodesia to deter German attack across the border. In February 1915, General Charles-Henri Tombeur took command of the 15 000 Belgian colonial troops spread over the vast Congo territory, with some troops taking part in the Cameroon campaign in the west. With the Germans in control of Lakes Kivu and Tanganyika, and the British unwilling at the time to invade German East Africa from Northern Rhodesia, Tombeur moved Belgian troops from Congo's south to northeast and began limited operations against the Germans in Rwanda and Burundi in 1915.

Because the Germans dominated Lake Tanganyika with three naval vessels, they could move troops around quickly and counter Belgian and British incursions from Congo and Northern Rhodesia, respectively. As a result, the British shipped two small and fast gunboats called *Mimi* and *Toutou* to Cape Town from where, between July and December 1915, they were transported by railway, tractor, ox wagon, and porters some 4,800 kilometers to the southern shore of Lake

Tanganyika. By February 1916, the *Mimi* and *Toutou* had captured one German vessel and destroyed another, and bombing runs by Belgian floatplanes—supplied by the British—had compelled the Germans to scuttle the largest, the *Graf von Goetzen*, which had already been stripped of weapons for the land campaign. Allied control of Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa paved the way for an eventual three-pronged invasion of German East Africa from British Kenya in the north, the Belgian Congo in the west, and British Northern Rhodesia in the south that would take place in mid-1916.

While the invasion of German South West Africa had been an entirely South African operation, the British War Office played a stronger role in East Africa. With British commander Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien invalided by flu, Smuts succeeded him on February 5, 1916, with instructions to mount a rapid invasion from Kenya. Replacing British officers with familiar South African colleagues J. J. Collyer, Brits, and Van Deventer, Smuts's approach to the offensive reflected his political career as well as his military experience in the South African War and recent South West Africa campaign. He envisioned large and fast sweeping maneuvers by mounted units to envelop the Germans and compel their surrender. This would avoid high numbers of casualties, which were politically unpopular in South Africa. Smuts did not understand that much of German East Africa, with thick bush and disease-carrying tsetse flies, was not suitable for horses. While Smith-Dorrien had planned to conduct extensive local training, develop lines of communication, and wait for the end of the rainy season to begin operations, Smuts launched the offensive immediately—before all his forces had arrived. Another change made by Smuts was that he divided his headquarters in two, with a large logistical section in the rear and a smaller command element (including himself) closer to the fighting. This caused problems in coordinating operations and supply, and Smuts was often distracted by local developments.

In mid-February 1916, before Smuts took control, Major General Michael Tighe, a veteran of British colonial wars in the region, directed the 2nd Division to assault the German position at Salaita, just east of Mount Kilimanjaro near the Kenyan border. Because German forces were much larger than anticipated, the 2nd South African Infantry Brigade was almost surrounded and took heavy casualties, and the attack was called off. In early March, Smuts initiated another attack on Salaita. Two South African brigades, one mounted and one

infantry, under Van Deventer conducted a flanking move north of the objective, while the 2nd Division under Tighe closed in for a frontal attack. The Indian 1st Division under Major General J. M. Stewart moved west of Kilimanjaro to threaten the rear of the German position and block the way to Arusha. With only 4,000 troops against 40,000, Lettow conducted an orderly withdrawal to high ground south of Moshi and west of Taveta. Smuts could not pursue quickly enough because of overgrown terrain and the need to secure rear areas. When it appeared that the Germans were withdrawing down the railway, Stewart was ordered to move toward Kahe to block this, but thick bush and heavy rain slowed his division's movement. After a series of attacks and counterattacks around Moshi, Lettow moved his forces south, remaining close to the railway. In mid-March, Van Deventer's mounted troops followed by a Cape Corps infantry battalion with dozens of supply wagons took the railhead at Moshi, where they linked up with Stewart's 1st Division. The Germans had escaped Smuts's trap, and now torrential rains delayed British-South African movements in the north.

During the third week of March 1916, an impatient Smuts sent South African infantry and mounted troops south under Van Deventer, where they sustained heavy casualties from a German fighting withdrawal down to Lembeni. Tropical disease was beginning to take a heavy toll, and by the end of April, more than half the Cape Corps was out of action. Animal and motor transportation was quickly replaced by thousands of local carriers. By April, Smuts had dismissed Tighe and Stewart, and he reorganized his force into three divisions. The 2nd and 3rd were entirely South African. Emphasizing mobility over firepower, each division consisted of one mounted and one dismounted brigade. Smuts directed the South African 2nd Division under Van Deventer southwest to take Kondoa Irangi, which was accomplished on April 19 when the German garrison withdrew south, as it would menace the central railway. This prompted Lettow to abandon the northern portion of the central railway and regroup to the south. Mustering a force of 4,000 men for an attack on the 3,000 entrenched South Africans under Van Deventer at Kondoa Irangi, Lettow also placed a blocking detachment of 2,500 troops under Major Goerg Kraut northeast in the Pare Mountains. In early May, a German night attack on Kondoa Irangi, impaired by lack of reconnaissance, was defeated with heavy casualties. Lettow withdrew his forces to nearby hills, from where his artillery shelled the South

Africans. Smuts sent reinforcements south, but by June, the immobilized South Africans at Kondoa Irangi were short of food; 1,000 men had succumb to sickness; and only 1,000 out of 4,000 horses were fit. In late June, Lettow's force withdrew southeast to Turiani on the central railway, where they met Kraut's detachment, which had been pushed down to the Nguru Mountains. In mid-July, Van Deventer's men moved south, sending detachments to seize Mpwapwa and Dodoma, and then turned east toward Kilosa to meet up with Smuts's main force. Smuts then sent a column to assault the main German position on the slopes of Mount Kanga, with two other columns moving on Turiani to cut off their retreat. Once again, rough terrain slowed Allied movement and in August, the Germans managed to escape south, with Lettow taking a group to Morogora and Kraut leading men further toward Mahenge. Uncertain about German intentions, Smuts sent columns in various directions. In mid-August, Van Deventer was sent to take Kilosa, a mounted brigade under B. G. L. Enslin moved southwest to Mkata, and Smuts took the main force east of the Uluguru Mountains. Offering little resistance, the Germans withdrew at the end of August, and Smuts took Morogoro without a fight. In early September, a South African division under Brits and a British brigade attempted a joint attack on a well-defended German supply base to the south at Kisiwa. However, lack of communication—the British dropped their wireless down a cliff—meant that they were repulsed with heavy losses. Predictably, the Germans then withdrew.

Smuts's forces were more successful on the coast. During September 1916, they occupied the key port of Dar es Salaam and smaller ones such as Kilwa, Sudi, Lindi, and Mikindani. However, for months, little was done to bring Allied supplies through these ports. Although the Germans had not damaged the railway, it took until the end of the year to establish a supply line between Dar es Salaam and Morogoro in the interior. Allied troops were poorly fed because supply lines were becoming too long; between June and September, 53,000 draught animals died from disease; and motor vehicles were of limited use. Within a few months of arriving in East Africa, most South African units had lost around half their numbers to diseases such as malaria and dysentery, and by the end of 1916, around 12,000 white troops had been invalided home because of illness, exhaustion, and poor nutrition. Although the 9th South African Infantry battalion consisted of 1,135 men in February 1916, by October, its effective strength had

dropped to 116. Conditions were worse for South African black auxiliaries, who were kept working despite sickness. In South Africa, the campaign became unpopular as wasted men returned home after just six months, and there were accusations of neglect. Smuts appointed a court of inquiry but packed it with timid staff officers who dragged out proceedings for months to reduce the negative impact.

By May 1916, the Belgian Force Publique had 719 European and 11,698 African soldiers deployed in eastern Congo, which was the lowest ratio of white to black troops for any force in the campaign. They were organized into three groups: a brigade under Colonel Philippe Molitor north of Lake Kivu on the Uganda border, a brigade under Colonel Frederik Olsen on the Rusizi River between Lakes Kivu and Tanganyika on the border with Rwanda, and a defensive group on the western side of Lake Tanganyika. Lacking artillery and more interested in taking territory than defeating the Germans, Tombeur ordered his men to avoid direct assaults on prepared positions and outflank the enemy, though fast movement was inhibited by a shortage of supply carriers. In mid-April, the two Belgian brigades invaded Rwanda, with the northern one passing through the volcano area toward the administrative center of Kigali and the southern one advancing through Cyangugu toward the royal capital of Nyanza. With just three companies at his disposal, local German commander Captain Max Wintgens evacuated Kigali on May 2. Four days later, Molitor's brigade took Kigali and on May 21, Olsen's men seized Nyanza, where they found the king of Rwanda (Musinga) flying a Belgian flag he had been given by the Germans. The refusal of supply carriers recruited by the Belgians in Rwanda to leave their country caused logistical problems. Olsen's southern brigade continued south into Burundi, took Bujumbura on the north end of Lake Tanganyika (which became its supply base), and advanced along the eastern bank of the lake to seize Ujiji (where Stanley had met Livingstone in 1871) without a fight. Molitor's northern brigade moved east along the south end of Lake Victoria, supported British forces from Uganda that took Mwanza (a port in the lake's south eastern corner) in mid-July, and then turned south in August. At this point, the two Belgian brigades in German East Africa were separated by about 400 kilometers, and supply problems meant they moved slowly. With Belgian and British columns converging from the north and west, and desertion having reduced their strength to just 1,100 men, the Germans in the area abandoned their defensive line around Tabora, which had been

established after the retreat from Rwanda. Molitor's troops captured Tabora on September 19, which represented the limit of Belgian expansion into German East Africa. German commander Kurt Wahle, a retired major general who had been visiting his son in the colony when the war broke out, led his forces southeast toward Iringa, intending to link up with the main body under Lettow.

In late May 1916, the British-led Rhodesia-Nyasaland Field Force—consisting of 2,500 men from Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and South Africa and commanded by Brigadier General Edward Northey—began an advance into German East Africa between the southern end of Lake Tanganyika and the northern tip of Lake Nyasa. Problems of supplying spread out units in a massive area were addressed by using a fleet of some 2,000 canoes to bring food across the swamps of the southern Belgian Congo and by developing a supply route from the Indian Ocean port of Chinde that continued up the Zambezi River and Lake Nyasa. By the start of June, Northey had established his headquarters at Neu Langenburg in German territory and began pushing northeast toward Iringa. Although Northey remained under Colonial Office command until November, he coordinated with Smuts in the north. At the end of September, Northey had 3,800 men who were spread across a 320-kilometer long front and depended on 17,000 reluctant supply carriers. At that time, several companies of the Rhodesia Native Regiment, white-led black troops from Southern Rhodesia, were shipped to the east shore of Lake Nyasa, from where they marched inland to secure the food-producing area of Songea near the border with Portuguese East Africa. In November, Northey suddenly faced much stiffer resistance when local German forces under Kraut joined those from the north under Wahle. To the south of Iringa, the Germans had 350 European and 3,000 African soldiers supported by 9 field guns and 39 machine guns. Caught between Smuts's columns moving down from the north and Northey's men from the southwest, the Germans fought a series of delaying actions to protect an important food growing area. From April to September 1917, a German detachment under Wintgens broke away and marched back north toward Tabora, covering 3,200 kilometers and distracting some 6,000 Allied troops who had been sent in pursuit.

Portugal entered the war against Germany in March 1916, primarily to acquire territory in Africa. Within a few weeks, Portuguese forces had taken the Kionga Triangle on the coast, which the Germans had

seized from them in the 1890s. The Germans retaliated by seizing Portuguese posts inland along the Rovuma River border. The arrival of a 4,600-strong Portuguese expeditionary force at the coastal town of Palma posed a problem for Smuts, who feared that if the Portuguese seized the southern coast of German East Africa, the anticipated territorial swap between Lisbon and Pretoria would become redundant. Smuts ordered the Portuguese force under General Jose Cesar Ferreira Gil to move inland and take food-producing areas just over the border. In late October, 2,700 Portuguese crossed the Rovuma and seized Newala, but after four weeks, disease and resistance by just 840 German troops caused them to retreat. This was the only serious Portuguese operation of the campaign.

By the start of 1917, Lettow had 4,000 men along the Rufigi River, with other detachments—including 2,000 soldiers under Kraut—moving in to strengthen his position. In January 1917, Smuts launched attacks on German garrisons along the Rufigi and Mgeta Rivers, but they were hampered by heavy rain and thick bush. In one of these skirmishes, Captain Frederick Selous, the 66-year-old famous hunter and conqueror of Southern Rhodesia, was killed by a German sniper. In late January, Smuts left his command for an appointment to the Imperial War Cabinet. He prematurely proclaimed victory in East Africa as the South African-led offensive had secured three quarters of German territory and German forces no longer controlled the colony's infrastructure. Smuts was replaced by experienced British general Reginald Hoskins, who left Lettow on the Rufigi until the weather cleared and concentrated on reorganizing the tattered imperial force. European and Coloured South African soldiers suffering disease and hunger were replaced by Africans from the King's African Rifles (KAR), which grew from 3,000 to 30,000 men, and West African units such as the Gold Coast Regiment (which arrived in July 1916) and four battalions of the Nigerian Regiment freed up by the conquest of Cameroon. Tens of thousands of African supply carriers from neighboring colonies were conscripted. While Smuts had claimed that mopping up remaining German resistance would be quick and easy, Hoskins requested more resources from the War Office, warned that the campaign would continue, and planned to trap the Germans in the territory's south. However, at the end of May, as the rains ended and offensive actions became feasible, Hoskins was dismissed by the War Office because of fatigue and the intrigues of Smuts.

Although he had gone home with most of the South Africans in January 1917, Van Deventer was recalled to East Africa to assume overall command and instructed to conclude the campaign quickly because resources were needed for the European theater. Between July and August 1917, Van Deventer, commanding a mostly African and Indian army with a few remaining South African units, launched a series of pincer movements against German positions that resulted in three dozen engagements for control of water supplies and food-producing areas. Fighting continuous delaying actions, the Germans withdrew further south. At Mahiwa, over several days in October, a serious battle resulted in 600 German and 2,000 Allied casualties. While this meant that Van Deventer's advance was deferred for several weeks, the impact on Lettow was much greater, as he could not replace casualties and abandoned scarce ammunition, supplies, and artillery. In November, Lettow led his one remaining column of 300 European and 1,800 African soldiers into Portuguese East Africa, which was embroiled in an African rebellion, to acquire food. During this last phase of the East Africa campaign, there were 52,000 Allied soldiers in the field, including 2,500 South Africans who were mostly serving in support roles. Waiting until after the wet season to pursue the Germans, Van Deventer consolidated his forces in German East Africa and then moved units into Portuguese East Africa, including landing troops at several points along the coast, during July and August 1918, in an attempt to encircle the enemy, who raided as far south as Namacurra near the Indian Ocean port of Quelimane and southern Nyasaland. Elusive as ever, Lettow's column crossed back into German East Africa in late September and moved west toward lightly defended Northern Rhodesia to raid supply bases and the railway.

Lettow first learned about the armistice in Europe on November 12 from captured British messages. On November 25, two weeks after the war had ended, the Germans surrendered to Van Deventer at Abercorn, Northern Rhodesia (now Mbala, Zambia), near the southern end of Lake Tanganyika. During the campaign, Britain had deployed 114,000 European, Indian, and African soldiers, of whom 10,000 died (mostly from disease). Britain also conscripted 1 million African supply carriers, of whom 100,000 perished from sickness and exhaustion. With both sides confiscating their food, the inhabitants of German East Africa and sometimes neighboring colonies suffered terrible famine. Leadership of the East African campaign did not gain

much for South Africa. Pretoria's territorial hopes in the region were ignored by imperial authorities, and most of German East Africa, renamed Tanganyika, became a British-administered mandate of the League of Nations, and Belgium gained the separate mandates of Rwanda and Burundi.¹¹

NORTH AFRICA, 1914–1918

When World War I broke out, Egypt was technically part of the Ottoman Empire, which would eventually side with Germany, yet it was occupied by Britain. In December 1914, in response to the Ottoman sultan's declaration of jihad against the Allied powers, Britain declared a protectorate over Egypt and deposed pro-Ottoman Egyptian ruler Abbas Hilmi II, who was replaced by his uncle Husayn Kamil. Two months earlier, the British had closed the new Egyptian Legislative Assembly out of anxiety that it would become a voice of nationalist discontent with British control. Britain quickly brought in 70,000 Australian, New Zealand, and Indian soldiers to defend the strategically vital Suez Canal. Although Egypt gained higher prices for its exports of cotton and food during the war, food hoarding meant that peasants often went hungry.

In 1915, the Ottoman Empire embarked on a plan to attack the Suez Canal with the aim of blocking Allied shipping and stimulating an Egyptian nationalist uprising. While the head of the German military mission in Istanbul, Major General Otto Liman Von Sanders, opposed the idea because available Ottoman forces would be too small, it was approved because of political considerations. Colonel Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein, German chief of staff to the Ottoman VIII Corps, was placed in charge of the offensive and planned to lead an Ottoman army from Syria and Palestine through the center of the Sinai Desert to avoid the guns of British ships patrolling off the coastal road. On January 14, 1915, a 20,000-strong Ottoman expedition set out across the Sinai Desert supported by 5,000 camels carrying water, large water tanks prepositioned along the route, and Bedouin guides who were hostile to the British. Allied reconnaissance aircraft easily spotted the force, but their aerial bombs exploded harmlessly in the deep sand. On February 2, the Ottomans, under cover of a sandstorm, approached the canal's east bank in three columns between Lake Timsah and Great Bitter Lake. That portion of the canal was defended

by Indian troops supported by two artillery batteries, one British and one Egyptian. As soon as the Ottomans put their first metal pontoon boats in the canal, the sandstorm stopped, enabling British artillery and machine guns to drive them off. Although three boatloads of Ottoman Syrian troops had landed on the canal's west bank, they were eliminated by Indian bayonet charges. At dawn the next day, Indian troops crossed the canal and cleared the Ottomans from the east bank, and British and French gunboats moved into the area to engage an Ottoman artillery battery that had heavily damaged a British warship. On February 4, with the British sending Indian reinforcements, the Ottomans began a fighting withdrawal to the east in which the commander of the failed canal assault, German captain Wilhelm Von Dem Hagen, was killed. Overall, the Ottomans lost 1,400 men, half of whom were prisoners, and the British suffered 150 casualties. The British established a new defensive line on the east bank of the canal, and—lacking water supplies—did not pursue the Ottomans, who returned to Palestine in good order. Egyptian civilians, unaware of the Ottoman attack, did not rise up. While the expedition's German and Ottoman senior officers believed the assault had failed because the more experienced Turkish troops had been held in reserve to exploit a breakthrough, the Ottoman high command blamed the defeat on German incompetence. The Germans never again enjoyed the full confidence of the Ottomans. In July 1916, Kressenstein, with 16,000 troops supported by a fresh delivery of arms, artillery, and airplanes from Germany, made another attempt on the canal to block Allied troops getting to Europe, but his force was defeated in Gaza and lost half its personnel.¹²

In Cyrenaica, part of today's Libya that borders Egypt, the Sanussi Brotherhood advocated a strict interpretation of Sunni Islam that had broad appeal. They had fought French and Italian colonial forces. The core of Sanussi military power was a contingent of Ottoman professional soldiers of diverse origins who had been left behind when the Italians seized the area in 1912. The Brotherhood also spread into Egypt, where it appealed to Egyptian nationalists. When World War I began, the British closed the western Egyptian border, which blocked the Sanussi from Egyptian markets and ports. Eager to gain Western military training and weapons to use against the French and Italians, the Sanussi turned to the Germans and Ottomans. German submarines landed German and Ottoman military advisors who brought arms, money, and decorations for the Sanussi. In November 1915, Nuri Pasha,

Ottoman officer and brother of Minister of War Enver Pasha, led a Sanussi attack on the Egyptian border town of Sollum, where three quarters of the Egyptian garrison, including its commander, joined them. The Sanussi then sent a column to attack British positions along the coast, while another moved inland and tried to capture the chain of oases in western Egypt that led to the Nile. The coastal offensive was driven back to Libya by British armored cars. Although the Sanussi captured a number of oases by March 1916, their advance was held up by an increased Egyptian military presence near the Nile. Alienated by demands for supplies, pack animals, and recruits, Egyptian civilians rejected Sanussi calls for rebellion. In late 1916, the British began to expel the diminishing Sanussi forces from the oases and in February 1917, a motorized British column with armored cars drove the remaining 200 Sanussi back to Libya.

In 1915, the British commander of the Egyptian army, General Sir Reginald Wingate, pressed London to approve a British offensive against the independent sultanate of Darfur, where he falsely claimed that German-Ottoman agents were encouraging an attack on the British in neighboring Sudan. Wingate also realized that the French wanted to expand east from Chad into Darfur and with the winding down of the Cameroon campaign, they would soon have the forces to do so. With permission from his old Sudan colleague Lord Kitchener, Wingate organized the 2,000-strong Western Frontier Force (WFF), which was led by the British but composed entirely of Egyptian army units, some of which were Sudanese. The WFF was under the command of Colonel Philip Kelly and supported by 18 machine guns and a battery of six mountain guns. Approaching the border at Jabal al-Hilla, the column formed a square when attacked by Fur warriors, who were traumatized and driven off by automatic and artillery fire, with which they had no prior experience. Although Ali Dinar, sultan of Darfur, had initially planned to flee his capital of al-Fashir to lead guerrilla resistance in the nearby mountains, his wife and advisors convinced him to confront the invaders. In turn, Ali Dinar ordered the construction of a 1,800-meter long crescent of trenches around the capital to ambush the advancing WFF and overwhelm it with vastly superior numbers before machine guns and artillery took their toll. On May 25, 1916, near the village of Berinja, a British-led Egyptian Camel Corps unit, scouting ahead of the main WFF force, triggered the Darfur ambush. The first shots were misunderstood by the Fur as a signal to attack, and they climbed out

of their trenches and charged over open ground toward the distant WFF square. Some 1,000 out of 3,600 Fur warriors were killed. The next day, after repelling several Fur cavalry attacks, the WFF looted al-Fashir. The sultan led a group of fugitives too weakened by disease to march north across the desert to the Sanussi, and westward retreat had been blocked by the French. A patrol of 100 Egyptian mounted infantry, led by British major Herbert Huddleston, tracked Ali Dinar to the village of Jiuba, where he was killed by machine gun fire. His remaining followers scattered. Darfur was subsequently added to Anglo-Egyptian ruled Sudan.

Fears of nationalist uprising and defections to the Sanussi made the British hesitant to employ Egyptian soldiers in World War I. However, most Egyptian officers remained remarkably loyal to the British, and Egyptians did serve outside their country. In June 1916, the British sent an Egyptian mountain artillery battery to Mecca to assist the Arab rebellion against the Ottomans. British operations against the Ottomans in Palestine and Syria were supported by 170,000 Egyptians in the Camel Transport Corps. Issued a single blanket and no uniform, these men suffered from sickness and exposure, and they were harassed by snipers and artillery. Following a successful experiment in Gallipoli, the British formed the Egyptian Labour Corps, which eventually numbered 98,000 men, some 23,000 of whom served in France, Palestine, and Mesopotamia—where many were lost to disease or artillery fire. During the war, Egyptians peasants, encouraged to stay home by good prices for their crops, were conscripted into the Labour Corps, and had their camels and mules confiscated for use in campaigns in the Middle East.¹³

AFRICAN REBELLIONS

The war presented some Africans with the prospect of rebelling against European colonial rule. In many parts of Africa, the rulers of large centralized states had been overthrown by colonial invasion just a decade or so before and had sometimes been replaced by those willing to work under the colonial powers. Decentralized societies were often disrupted by the imposition of colonial-appointed chiefs, who were usually seen as glorified and opportunistic tax collectors. In West Africa's Sahel region, the predominantly Muslim faith of the precolonial elites, reinvigorated by holy wars or jihads in the early 1800s,

had the potential to mobilize broad resistance against Christian colonial rulers. For many people across the continent, World War I meant increased colonial demands for manpower, resources, and taxation—which caused grievances. Simultaneously, the departure of soldiers and police for the front led to an obvious weakening of the colonial administrative and security apparatus, which created an opportunity for violent protest.

In Nyasaland during 1915, an unlikely rebel leader emerged to fight the British. John Chilembwe was a Baptist minister who had been educated in the United States. He objected strongly to British recruitment of the territory's men as soldiers and porters for the East Africa campaign, and allegedly sent a message to the Germans seeking assistance. The rebellion broke out when Chilembwe's followers killed a white plantation manager with whom they had a long-standing quarrel and mounted his head outside their church. Although the Chilembwe Uprising involved possibly fewer than 200 people, the wartime atmosphere led to swift and overwhelming British reaction. The uprising was quickly put down, and Chilembwe was killed while trying to flee. African nationalist historians see the Baptist minister as having been influenced by the history of John Brown as a martyr in the American abolitionist movement who wanted to strike a blow and die to inspire future generations. Others argue that Chilembwe's actions were brought on by mental stress and physical illness or that the rebels had their own reasons for striking against a plantation manager, and the dead Chilembwe became a convenient scapegoat for colonial maladministration.¹⁴

The prospect of similar rebellion caused paranoid British officials in Northern Rhodesia, who recognized the weakness of their colonial state because of the war, to conduct a reign of terror against employees of African Christian missions. African teachers were conscripted as supervisors for the Carrier Corps in East Africa. Although Westernized and Christian African teachers usually saw themselves as loyal British subjects at the time, wartime fears caused the British to suspect the possibility of another Chilembwe in their midst. Other roots of this suspicion included hostility between the Westernized African teachers and local traditional chiefs who worked for the colonial administration, and the general British distrust of the Dutch Reformed Church, to which many of the African teachers belonged, because of its role in the 1914–1915 Afrikaner rebellion in South Africa. Wartime oppression, particularly labor conscription and food confiscation, led

to the rapid spread in the colony during 1918 of the Watchtower Movement, an African version of the Jehovah's Witness movement in the United States, which preached the imminent second coming of Christ and end of colonialism. After the war, many members of this independent church were arrested and detained by the British. Just after the Chilembwe uprising in 1915, the British in Nyasaland exiled Watchtower leader Elliot Kamwana to the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius and attempted to ban the movement because its members refused to join the army.¹⁵

In the Bongo area of northern Gold Coast, during 1915 and 1916, riots broke out against abusive and corrupt British-appointed chiefs and local police. This was an area, moreover, where resistance to the imposition of colonial rule had continued until 1911, when it had been crushed by a British punitive expedition. Further resentment had been caused when several local shrines associated with past resistance were destroyed by colonial agents. With the outbreak of World War I, the British attempted to recruit young men for the Gold Coast Regiment bound for the Togoland campaign. However, at this delicate point, British control was dangerously weakened when wartime demands led to such a reduction of administrative officials and police that many locals believed the British were pulling out. In the so-called Bongo riots that ensued, many of the colonial-appointed chiefs were toppled. The British responded with overwhelming force, and the chiefs were restored.¹⁶

Around the same time, there were rebellions in parts of Nigeria. In the southeast, around the Benue Valley, the prophet Ellijah II mobilized Igbo people against the British. The main cause for this uprising seems to have been a dramatic decrease in palm oil prices at the beginning of World War I. Colonial rulers had encouraged West Africans in various areas to specialize in the production of one cash crop—such as palm oil, cocoa, or ground nuts—which tended to create an extremely fragile local economy. The uprising petered out when prices rose again. In western Nigeria, several rebellions reflected discontent with a “native authority” system whereby Europeans governed indirectly through appointed African chiefs, which threatened traditional Yoruba power structures. These uprisings were crushed by colonial regiments consisting of African soldiers led by European officers, and in the Egba case, 500 rebels were killed. Unlike the French, the British had cultivated good relations with Muslim rulers in their territories as part of “indirect rule.” Consequently, predominantly Muslim

areas such as northern Nigeria, where the emirs of the old Sokoto Caliphate ruled under British supervision, remained peaceful throughout the war.¹⁷

Recruitment of African manpower for the war often sparked resistance. In 1914, colonial officials in Southern Rhodesia, still administered by the chartered British South Africa Company, told African chiefs and their subjects that the conflict would be a “white man’s war” that would involve only the territory’s settlers. Of course, the settlers, remembering the Ndebele and Shona rebellions of 1896–1897, were hesitant to arm Africans and saw their own participation in the war as a way to earn exclusively white self-government from Britain. However, their small numbers—only 30,000 in 1914—meant that they ran out of recruits quickly and by 1915, the administration was making plans to raise an African battalion—eventually called the Rhodesia Native Regiment—for the East Africa campaign. In some African communities, news that colonial officials were asking for African volunteers for the army turned into a rumor that they would impose conscription. This led to an armed standoff with the Ndebele chief Maduna and his followers. Since experience had taught the colonial officials that small violent incidents could lead to wider rebellion, they isolated Maduna from neighboring chiefs, and conflict was avoided. On the eastern side of the colony, officials arrested some Shona spirit mediums who seemed to be using news of the war to mobilize people for renewed resistance.¹⁸

The rebellion that broke out in parts of Portuguese East Africa in 1917 was similar to many others across the continent, as it was stimulated by labor conscription and a weakening of the colonial state in the face of German raids from the north. Nationalist historians, seeking historical inspiration for more modern independence movements, often identified this uprising as part of a long history of resistance to Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique that would ultimately lead to the liberation war of the 1960s and 1970s.¹⁹

Recruitment of tens of thousands of men in French West Africa led to various forms of resistance. The main problems with French recruiting were that so many men were demanded, which threatened agricultural production, and that it was usually not voluntary. For example, of the 40,000 men recruited in 1915–1916, it was estimated that only 7 to 8 percent were truly volunteers. Chiefs were given financial incentives for delivering recruits, and the result was that they ordered many men from the traditional servile classes to enlist.

It seems certain that many of the African soldiers who fought for France on the western front were actually slaves. Some men tried to escape the army by hiding in the bush, injuring or starving themselves so that they could be judged medically unfit, or fleeing across the border into British territory or independent Liberia. There were widespread and violent uprisings in territories such as Haut-Senegal-Niger, Dahomey, and the Niger Military Territory, where rebel Taureg people, famous for their dark blue robes and camel caravans, seized the desert town of Agades in 1916. These actions were also prompted by rumors that the French were losing the war and would be replaced by the Germans (a common rumor in other regions as well), and by the fact that many local French officials had left for military service. The long-standing antagonism between French colonial officials (whose official rhetoric was assimilationist) and Muslim leaders in these territories, along with the Ottoman declaration of jihad against the Allied powers in 1915, were used by rebel leaders to mobilize followers. The French, assisted at times by the British in northern Nigeria, had to employ thousands of black and white soldiers, who were desperately needed on the western front, in suppressing these rebellions.²⁰

The Volta-Bani War of 1915–1917 in the vast Haut-Senegal-Niger region of French West Africa offers a prime example of African resistance to the French during World War I. The entry of the Ottoman Empire on the German side prompted a local French administrator (who already had a violent reputation) to whip and torture a number of Muslim leaders in public. The conscription of local men into the army during 1915, together with the weakening of French security in an area with a population of around 900,000, caused a league of 11 villages to openly declare war on the French, whom they vowed to expel at all costs. In the initial fighting, the rebels lost around 1,400 people but were able to evict local French forces. Late in December 1915, the French assembled the largest military expedition they had ever put together in West Africa. A thousand soldiers supported by several artillery pieces confronted 10,000 rebels at the village of Yankaso. After the French expended all their artillery shells, they were forced to retreat in the face of overwhelming rebel numbers. In February 1916, an even larger French force of 1,500 colonial African soldiers and 2,000 African auxiliaries, supported by artillery and machine guns, invaded the rebel area. They defeated rebel armies on several occasions, destroyed rebel villages and crops, seized women and

children as hostages, and executed rebel leaders. In some cases, inhabitants of rebel villages fought against inhabitants of loyalist villages in what became a civil war. By the end of 1917, the Volta-Bani area had been "pacified" in a military campaign that had targeted an entire society and had caused the deaths of 30,000 local people and around 300 black and white French colonial soldiers. The French continued to persecute potential rebels well into 1919, when the area was divided into two new administrative territories that in 1960 became the independent states of Burkina Faso and Mali.²¹

THE PLIGHT OF CIVILIANS

World War I was a time of hunger for many African people. The German and Allied armies that pursued each other around the West and East African bush lived off of food produced by the local population, and fighting usually shifted out of areas where food supplies had been exhausted. Although British forces were supposed to acquire food through trade, this was not always a voluntary process, and looting did occur. The Germans, particularly during the drawn out East Africa campaign, were outnumbered and desperate, and they simply confiscated what they wanted, forced villagers to act as porters, and sometimes summarily shot anyone who objected. When the last remaining German column in East Africa moved into northern Mozambique in 1918, its purpose was largely to loot the area's food resources.

In the Ugogo area of central German East Africa, a British official reported that 30,000 out of 150,000 residents had died during a war-time famine that locals still call *Mtunya*, meaning "the Scramble." It is remembered as the worst famine in the area's long history of drought and war-related hunger. Furthermore, it left those who did not have cattle locked in a permanently subordinate position within the colonial economy and vulnerable to future food shortage. The first impact of the war on Ugogo was felt when German officials, around 1915, ordered appointed African headmen to gather grain from their villages and bring it to depots along the central railway. At first, these demands were limited, but when Allied forces invaded German East Africa in late 1915, the Germans also began to demand that the people of Ugogo provide livestock. By 1916, the Germans had taken an estimated 26,000 of the roughly 300,000 cattle in the area. In addition,

the Germans conscripted 35,000 men from Ugogo as supply carriers. When the British occupied the area, they continued the same policy by systematically confiscating food and press-ganging labor. Although the British tended to pay for the grain and livestock they acquired, locals felt they had no choice in the matter. In 1917, the British conscripted 24,000 men from Ugogo into their Carrier Corps. Although British officials knew that lack of rain meant the 1918 harvest would be inadequate to feed the local population, they continued acquiring food and labor. Whole villages were abandoned as starving people searched the countryside for food. Hungry mobs often forced those who still had some livestock to slaughter them for food. People collected roots, fruits, and grass from the bush and boiled their sandals to eat the leather. Those with money could not buy food, as no shops had grain to sell until 1919. Desperate people pawned their children to the wealthy in return for food. It was common to see corpses along paths, and years later, one villager remembered that “the people’s skulls littered the ground like coconuts.” The advent of the influenza pandemic in 1918 and 1919 had a particularly terrible impact because people already weakened by hunger could not resist sickness. When the British finally brought food relief into the area after the war, they required that it be purchased with cash. After local food production began to recover in the 1920s and the rains finally came, the result of the great famine was a stark and permanent gap in society between a few rich families who had retained their livestock or bought relief grain, and the impoverished masses who had nothing.²²

Areas that did not see any fighting also experienced food shortage during the war. The British used Nyasaland as a logistical base for operations in the southern part of German East Africa and Mozambique. From 1916 onwards, the colonial administration in Nyasaland embarked on a campaign to acquire the colony’s whole agricultural surplus. In 1916 and 1917, the colonial state requisitioned Nyasaland’s entire rice crop. Villagers were supposed to be paid, but the prices were below market level and there was little available to buy because the war had caused a decline in imports. In some places, chiefs and headmen, eager to ingratiate themselves with the administration, made voluntary donations of maize and other produce for the war effort. Unfortunately for local communities, these donations were not voluntary. By 1917, almost all the cattle of northern Nyasaland had been taken to feed Allied soldiers. Further hampering agriculture was the absence of so many young men (who were soldiers or carriers

in East Africa), more agricultural labor fell to women, and there was a shortage of hoes to till the land as most iron went to the war effort. These problems, combined with drought in some places and flooding in others, dangerously reduced the amount of food in Nyasaland. People resorted to eating wild roots and grass grains. Hunger made them vulnerable to disease. Bubonic plague broke out in the north and smallpox, previously on the decline, made a massive comeback in the south. All of this was a prelude to the influenza pandemic that hit the region at the end of the war. The same process happened in other areas bordering German East Africa. In 1916, when the British began an offensive against the Germans from the south, northeastern Northern Rhodesia was swept clean of food and labor, and the educational and medical activities of missionaries came to a halt.²³

During World War I, beleaguered France called upon its West African territories to feed the motherland. In 1917, the French minister of production wanted to purchase the entire harvest of his West African territories, particularly sorghum, millet, rice, groundnuts, palm-oil, beans, yams, and manioc. Colonial officials on the ground complained that while they faced demands for greatly increased agricultural production, their efforts were being undermined by the departure of tens of thousands of African farmers for the western front, by administrative problems created by the departure of many European officials for the war, and by low prices paid for crops. In contrast to East Africa, these demands for food seem not to have caused widespread famine.²⁴

THE POLITICS OF LOYALTY

During World War I, the Westernized African elite represented a tiny minority who had achieved success within the colonial educational system, mastered European languages, converted to Christianity, and usually occupied junior positions within the colonial hierarchy such as clerks, teachers, or clergy. While members of this elite tended to see themselves as good British subjects or French citizens, in the early twentieth century, they began to form embryonic political organizations that used very modest methods to advance their interests within the existing system. While they responded to the outbreak of war with the same patriotic fever as many Europeans, the wartime experience strongly shaped their future political development.

Encountering widespread resistance to its recruiting efforts in West Africa, France called upon a leading member of the African elite to supply young men for the army. In January 1918, the French minister of colonies made the surprising but ingenious decision to appoint Blaise Diagne high commissioner for the recruitment of troops in black Africa. Diagne had been the first black Senegalese deputy elected to the French chamber, and he championed equal rights for the assimilated Africans of Dakar. As high commissioner, he was accorded equal status with the governor-general of French West Africa and given superior powers with regard to recruitment. Diagne accepted the appointment because the French government promised him that after the war, the harsh system of traditional law applied to non-Westernized people would be relaxed, increased facilities for the acquisition of French citizenship would become available, improved medical infrastructure would be built, jobs would be reserved for returning veterans, and development projects would be undertaken to improve the life of people in French West Africa. Diagne proved a brilliantly successful recruiter. He toured the territories in the grand style of a governor-general and used African officers and sergeants, their uniforms adorned with medals won on the western front, as recruiting agents. Although his first recruiting drive was meant to enlist 40,000 men, over 63,000 came forward in the first two months. The largest contingent, 21,000 strong, came from the previously rebellious Haut-Senegal-Niger area that earlier French recruiters had abandoned. After the Armistice, the French broke their agreement with Diagne—the promised reforms never materialized. In some circles, Diagne came to be seen as a French puppet who had gained personal advancement by sending his countrymen to the nightmare of the trenches. However, Diagne should be given credit for performing a task Europeans were unable to accomplish and for trying to obtain important reforms in exchange for the military service of men who probably would have been conscripted anyway.²⁵

When World War I began, the Westernized African elite of South Africa was one of the largest on the continent and already had well-developed political organizations that opposed racially discriminatory legislation enacted by the all-white Union government. The South African Native National Congress (SANNC; later renamed African National Congress, or ANC) was formed in 1912 and was the first South African-wide black political organization. However, in August 1914, the SANNC suspended its grievances against the 1913

Native Land Act, which prevented Africans from buying land outside designated reserves, and resolved to offer the Botha government its patriotic assistance. The SANNC delegation, in London seeking imperial intervention in Union affairs, rushed home so that its members could enlist. African newspapers began to publish articles dreaming about the exchange of African military service abroad for increased rights at home.

Walter Rubusana, who in 1910 had been the first African elected to the Cape provincial legislature, and who was also an SANNC executive member, declared he could raise a corps of 5,000 African soldiers under his own command for the invasion of German South West Africa. His offer was not taken up by the South African government because of white anxieties that arming and training Africans for military service would encourage resistance. Established in 1912, the Union Defence Force (UDF) needed parliamentary permission to enlist nonwhite members. The African Political Organization (APO), a group representing Coloured (mixed race) people, mobilized 10,000 potential volunteers. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the failure of a recruiting drive for an all-white unit for the East Africa campaign led to the founding, in December 1915, of the Cape Corps, which consisted of 1,000 armed Coloured volunteers under white officers and represented a radical departure from the principle of an all-white UDF. Responding to white fears that the Cape Corps would lead to an extension of the Cape's idiosyncratic nonracial franchise to other parts of the country, the Botha administration pointed out that this force was paid for by imperial rather than South African funds and therefore would have no local claims.

In June 1916, the Imperial War Council, anxious about a shortage of military labor behind the lines and at the ports for the coming Somme offensive in western Europe, requested African workers from South Africa and other colonies. Botha responded positively, and recruiting began for the South African Native Labour Contingent (SANLC). Realizing that South African whites feared that blacks serving in Europe might return home with potentially dangerous new ideas, Botha did not take the issue to parliament, as the contingent was meant for imperial service. The emerging Westernized African elite, eager to secure political rights by proving their empire patriotism, supported the new unit and were disproportionately represented in its ranks. However, recruiting in rural areas did not go well, and authorities were surprised that after seven months, only 300 of the

supposedly martial Zulu had volunteered. Officials had to threaten chiefs with loss of pay and position before they would force young men to enlist. Half the contingent came from the northern Transvaal, where severe drought made military pay attractive. Falling short of the imperial request for 40,000 workers, South Africa recruited 25,000 men for the SANLC. Around 21,000 of them served in France between September 1916 and January 1918 cutting timber, loading and unloading ships, and maintaining road and rail systems. Since it was politically unacceptable in South Africa for blacks to engage in combat, the German shelling of a SANLC camp was kept quiet. In February 1917, over 600 black SANLC members and a dozen white officers were lost when the *Mendi*, a troopship ferrying them across the English Channel, was accidentally rammed by another vessel and sank. A legend developed that these doomed men, eager to fight for freedom but knowing they would never get the chance, performed African war dances as the ship went down. White officers and NCOs, mostly recruited from the Native Department and Labour Bureau because of their experience controlling Africans, tried to minimize their black subordinates' contact with European civilians, particularly women and soldiers, by keeping them in closed compounds like those for migrant mine workers back home. African servicemen objected to being treated like German prisoners of war and in July 1917, there was a disturbance, ignited by the arrest of a man for doing his laundry outside camp, in which 13 Africans were shot dead by their white South African officers. British officers eventually gave the black servicemen more liberties. In January 1918, Botha abruptly announced the disbanding of the SANLC and by May, it had returned home, where members complained about poor compensation and government refusal to give them war service medals. Although Botha claimed that the contingent was cancelled because of the dangers posed by enemy submarines to troopships, it is likely that protest and breakdown of racial segregation in the camps became a political embarrassment. Westernized African elites considered this a betrayal. Members of South Africa's Coloured community also served as unarmed military labor in Europe. Two battalions of the Cape Corps, largely recruited from Cape Town dock workers, unloaded ships at French ports. Established in June 1916, two thousand men of the Cape Corps Labour Battalion, as part of the British Army Service Corps, transported munitions and supplies from the ports of Le Havre, Dunkirk, and Boulogne to the nearest railway or depot and returned

home in late 1919. Some 3,500 men of the Cape Auxiliary Horse Transport, with a reputation of hard drinking and ill-discipline, not only hauled goods inland from the ports, but also logged in French forests. The hopes of black and mixed race elites that the war represented an opportunity to assert claims on full citizenship were dashed when their cooperation did nothing to improve conditions in South Africa.²⁶

In Bechuanaland, by contrast, African expressions of loyalty to Britain had an important impact on the territory's future. Local African chiefs and Westernized elites strongly opposed proposals for the incorporation of Bechuanaland into the settler territories of either South Africa or Southern Rhodesia, both well known for racial discrimination and exploitation. For 30 years, British rule in Bechuanaland had depended on the cooperation of local Tswana chiefs. When these African leaders contributed significant amounts of money, cattle, and recruits to the British war effort—including more than 1,000 men for the SANLC—it became politically impossible for their territory to be handed over to neighboring settler states. Bechuanaland continued as a separate British protectorate and eventually became the independent country of Botswana in 1966. Similar considerations also played some part in the trajectory of Basutoland (today's Lesotho) and Swaziland from protectorates to independent kingdoms.²⁷

In Southern Rhodesia on the eve of World War I, the relatively recent history of colonial conquest meant that the Westernized African elite was tiny and lacked political organization. The wartime experience changed that and prompted the formation of the territory's first Western-style African organizations. The proliferation of settler patriotic groups during the war influenced the emergence of similar groups among African elites, although not necessarily with the same objectives. The Loyal Mandebele Patriotic Society (LMPS) was formed by African elites in Bulawayo in 1915 and seemed structurally a carbon copy of the many similar groups founded by the colony's settlers. The LMPS members were first-generation African Westernized elites who, despite the violent destruction of the Ndebele Kingdom in the 1890s and the dispossession of its people, were products of missionary education, held junior positions in the colonial state or church, and saw themselves as loyal British subjects. The LMPS portrayed the struggles of the British Empire as its own and appropriated the wartime language of patriotism, albeit with some African symbolism and appeals to Ndebele history. The central aims of the LMPS, however, were different from white patriotic organizations and betrayed

its membership's mission background. It embarked on a morality crusade to pressure colonial officials and police to crack down on prostitution in the African parts of town, which was blamed for the spread of syphilis, and to prevent white men from visiting black women in these neighborhoods (because their mixed race children were often rejected by both white and black communities). Also formed during the war, the Ndebele National Home Movement consisted of members of the Ndebele royal family who engaged legal assistance in an attempt to redress the 1893 British conquest by restoring their monarchy and land. While these early Western-style African political groups were small and moderate, they provided the foundation for the more radical nationalist movements that emerged after World War II. Throughout World War I, various African chiefs in Southern Rhodesia took collections among their people and made cash donations to the British war effort. This money, unlike settler donations to local patriotic funds, was sent to the Prince of Wales Fund in Britain. Officials claimed this was so that Africans would not be confused about how their donations had been spent, but there was concern that Africans would see wartime sacrifice as a future investment in local political rights.²⁸

VETERANS

As historian John R. Morrow relates, "... the wartime experience of fighting with and against Europeans, as well as killing them, provided a new experience for African soldiers." Returning from the western front, veterans of the French colonial army "considered the war terrible, evil, and futile, and concluded that the French had exploited them."²⁹ In Senegal, veterans' associations engaged in local politics during the 1920s to elect Africans to the French government but were often disappointed by continued racial discrimination. In Nyasaland, returning veterans of the East Africa campaign had lost their fear of Europeans and sometimes openly despised them for failure to acknowledge their wartime sacrifices. Nigerian veterans, many of whom had replaced Europeans as noncommissioned officers, came home with increased self-confidence and better fluency in English. They became frustrated with lack of back pay and medals, and denial of a place in the London Peace Parade. During the 1920s and 1930s, Malagasy World War I veteran Jean Ralaimongo, supported by many of Madagascar's other veterans, campaigned for greater access to

French citizenship and equal rights. In the mine compounds of Southern Africa, black veterans displayed an embryonic workers' consciousness by forming societies that performed military drills during off hours. This worried white mine managers, and investigations by colonial officials in Southern Rhodesia reported that while these groups did not pose a threat, they should be discouraged. When the Rhodesia Native Regiment returned home to Southern Rhodesia from East Africa in 1919, the white administration quickly disbanded the unit so that the role of black soldiers in the war would be forgotten. Many disabled veterans—some missing limbs—were given insufficient pensions. Most of these demobilized soldiers went back to their former lives as migrant mine or commercial farm workers, and many acquired jobs with the colonial state such as policemen, messengers, and dip tank supervisors. Their ultimate significance was to strengthen the colonial state. While African veterans were usually more self-confident, assertive, and conscious of the wider world, most of them ultimately returned to their former lives.³⁰

Returning to South Africa, by August 1919, white veterans were demobilized at camps in Durban, Cape Town, Pretoria, and Potchefstroom. A Demobilization Board and Returned Soldier Committees in various towns were established to reintegrate a fairly small number of former white servicemen into civilian life. Many of them returned to former civilian jobs reserved by patriotic employers. While a few right-wing South African veterans joined the Allied Expeditionary Force in Russia that fought the Bolsheviks, others went home and became part of a radicalized mineworkers' labor movement that staged the 1922 Rand Revolt. In September 1919, the Cape Corps was the last South African force to return home and was disbanded in November. Almost 7,000 Cape Corps soldiers had fought in East Africa and/or Palestine, and over 450 had died. Their horizons broadened by travel, Coloured South African veterans perceived themselves as part of a British imperial citizenry of civilized men like those of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and India.³¹

CONCLUSION

World War I was the first global event to directly impact newly colonized Africa, and it signalled the end of the conquest period. Hundreds of thousands of Africans served in the colonial armed forces as soldiers and laborers, and many lost their lives. As historian Melvin Page

points out, the war represented the first “national experience” for Malawians as it did for Africans in other colonies, which were new political and economic entities created fewer than 20 years earlier. Africans who lived in German colonies faced the horrors of war at home and were then handed over to new rulers. In territories where fighting did not actually occur, people were expected to supply the colonial power with resources for the war effort, and some left home for military service elsewhere in Africa or overseas. The most common impact of the war on African communities was lack of food, the consequences of which varied from simple worry to outright cataclysm.

World War I resulted in the last reconfiguring of the political map of colonial Africa, the legacy of which would remain evident for many years. The victorious Allies were meant to prepare their League of Nations mandates for self-determination in the very distant future, but in practice, they simply treated them as spoils of war. Togo and Cameroon were split between the French and British, with the former getting the lion’s share. A sliver of Togo was added on to the neighboring British-ruled Gold Coast, and a piece of Cameroon became part of British colonial Nigeria (though some of it was later returned). This led to Cameroon’s current bilingual administrative system—using English and French—and recent border disputes between Cameroon and Nigeria. Most of German East Africa became British-administered Tanganyika, where an African peasant production economy developed in contrast to the white settler farms of neighboring Kenya. The Belgians took over Rwanda and Burundi, both of which bordered the Belgian Congo, where they would entrench and reinvent existing Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa identities as racial classifications and cultivate the Tutsi as the administrative and intellectual elite. South West Africa was occupied by South Africa, which treated it as a province until the independence of Namibia in 1990. Had it not been for local responses to World War I, Botswana, Burkina Faso, and Mali would probably not exist today as distinct countries.

Regions far away from the main areas of military operations in the German colonies experienced violence and warfare as Africans and Afrikaners rose up in rebellion. Some Africans saw World War I as an opportunity to restore the independence they had recently lost to European conquest. Others chafed under heavy colonial demands for resources and labor, and all witnessed a weakening of the colonial state brought about by the demands and disruptions of the war. The colonial authorities ultimately suppressed all these uprisings,

and most rebels—sometimes even those merely suspected of rebel sympathies—experienced harsh reprisals. Contrary to the views of nationalist historians of the 1960s, there is little evidence that these rebellions represented an attempt to expand the scale of resistance or were aimed at creating a new, forward-looking political order. Rebels usually wanted to recover their old way of life or were pushed into violence by colonial threats to their very existence. The loyalty of the small Westernized African elite was important to colonial governments, but it was usually exploited without the granting of anticipated or even promised reforms.

Several hundred thousand Africans left their home continent during World War I. Those who returned would never see the world the same way again, yet veterans' experiences would not in the main translate into significant new political organizations or action. This can be explained in terms of the postwar direction taken by the colonial state in Africa, where the atmosphere of military occupation that had characterized the previous two decades gave way to routine bureaucratic administration. Forced labor and confiscation of crops, previously common causes for violent resistance, became less frequent in many areas. Africans were increasingly absorbed into the growing capitalist economy as wagedworkers or cash-cropping peasant farmers. During what came to be known as the high tide of colonial rule in the 1920s and 1930s, there would be no further unsettling changes in territories controlled by the colonial powers. The enlarged African colonial armies of World War I were demobilized, with colonial rulers maintaining small local forces for internal security. African protest became less violent and aimed mostly at improving conditions within the existing system. Many more Africans converted to Christianity and there was, for a time, a general acceptance of the colonial status quo.

Chapter 4

The Interwar Period and World War II, 1919–1945

European control in most of Africa stabilized after World War I. During the 1920s and 1930s, colonial security forces and military culture were institutionalized, and new technology such as aircraft were used to pacify the remnants of African resistance in places such as Somalia, Morocco, and Libya. Similar to German aggression in Europe during the 1930s, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 which also depended on the technology of tanks, air power and poison gas illustrated the impotence of the League of Nations and strongly forewarned of an impending world conflict. Hundreds of thousands of Africans served in the Allied and Axis military forces of World War II both inside and outside Africa. Despite extreme racism among Axis leaders, black Eritreans fought for Italy and black West Africans for Vichy France. Important World War II campaigns were waged in and around the Italian colonies in East Africa, which dominated the strategic Red Sea, and North Africa, where control of the Suez Canal and Middle East oil hung in the balance. The division of the French colonies between Vichy and Free French forces meant that there were brief clashes in Senegal, Gabon, and Madagascar. Tens of thousands of Allied African military personnel also served outside their continent such as the many French West African soldiers who defended France in 1940, British colonial units from West, Central and East

Africa who fought in the jungles of Burma against the Japanese, and the South Africans and Free French who struggled up the mountainous Italian peninsula. Racial Discrimination and poor treatment prompted some protests and mutinies by African servicemen but, within the broader context, these were few. Furthermore, Allied demands for African manpower and raw materials for the war effort created the conditions for the rise of independence movements during the 1950s.

COLONIAL MILITARY CULTURE IN AFRICA

Colonial rule led to a dramatic reinvention of African military culture. In most colonies, European authorities established and maintained a small army to deal with internal security and border defense. Informed by broader colonial society, African colonial militaries were racially hierarchical, with Europeans serving as officers and sometimes senior noncommissioned officers, and Africans constituting the rank and file. Given the French rhetoric of assimilation, Africans could become officers in the French colonial army, but in practice there were very few and discrimination meant that they hardly ever progressed past junior officer level. Racial distinctions were often symbolized with different uniforms, equipment, food, accommodation, and pay for Europeans and Africans. For example, in British colonial units before around 1940, Europeans wore long pants and boots while Africans wore shorts and marched with bare feet. The British believed that Africans had naturally hard feet and did not need boots, and this cut the cost of equipping African soldiers. By the start of World War II, most European colonial military authorities had realized that long pants and boots reduced the incidence of tropical disease and made their African troops more effective. One of the most distinctive features of African colonial uniforms was the almost ubiquitous fez that Turkish troops had introduced to Egypt and then Sudan and that was eventually adopted by many colonial forces in sub-Saharan Africa. In British colonies, African soldiers and their wives and children lived in barracks separate from the rest of society while in French territories, African troops could maintain their own homes off their military base. British personnel slept on beds with sheets while African troops slept on bed boards. Additionally, military service introduced Africans to Western concepts of time and hygiene.

Imagined as innately skilled in bush craft and fast runners, African soldiers were often categorized as light infantry called riflemen by the British (as in the King's African Rifles–KAR) and Tirailleurs by the French.

European authorities imagined that certain African ethnic groups possessed inherently martial traits and were targeted for recruitment. This did not always work in practice. In Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), white officers imagined that the Ndebele, who shared a common history and language with the famous Zulu of South Africa and were believed to have dominated the majority Shona before British rule, were natural warriors, yet they tended to avoid military service in favor of traveling south to work in the mines around Johannesburg. While most African soldiers in Southern Rhodesia during the World War I period were migrant workers from Nyasaland (Malawi) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), by the 1940s recruiting patterns had changed and the Karanga Shona, not seen as martial people, began to constitute the majority of recruits for the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) and police, as their area was agriculturally poor. In colonial Kenya, most military recruits came from pastoral or semi-pastoral communities struggling to maintain their historic way of life because of colonial land dispossession or other restrictions. These included the Samburu and Kamba as well as Kalenjin, which was a term invented by the military for the many Nandi-speaking groups. The Maasai, seen as the epitome of a pastoral warrior people, did not respond well to recruiting because they had obtained legal title to their lands, on which they continued a traditional existence. Groups with better access to mission education, such as the Kikuyu and Luo, were suspected of being troublesome “bush lawyers” and had greater employment prospects in civilian life. In Nyasaland, the northern Tonga and Ngoni were considered the premier martial tribes, but ultimately the engagement of northerners in regional migrant labor meant that groups from the south such as the Lomwe and Yao, forbidden to work outside the colony, came to dominate the local KAR. In 1938, the Northern Rhodesia Regiment (NRR) was made up of one third Bemba and one fifth Ila, both considered warrior tribes. French military authorities in West Africa preferred uneducated and obedient Bambara peasants to the Wolof, who had supposedly been contaminated by their long history of contact with Europeans. It was thought that men from the southern forest zones, the last parts of French West Africa to be colonized, did not have enough physical stamina for

soldiering. The British tended to view Muslim Africans as potentially more loyal and disciplined soldiers. While the Igbo, Yoruba, and lower Niger groups of southern Nigeria were deemed nonmartial because of relatively greater access to education and economic opportunities, the Muslim Hausa-Fulani of the isolated and conservative north were preferred as colonial soldiers. The Tiv, Numan, Dakakori, Tangele, and others from remote parts of the Upper Niger or "Middle Belt" were recruited exclusively as infantrymen. In the Gold Coast, the British admired Asante martial abilities but suspected them of disloyalty. As a result, throughout the colonial period, the Gold Coast Regiment (GCR) was mostly recruited from the peoples of the isolated far north such as the Dagomba, Grunshi, Fra-Fra, Kanjarga, Dagarti, and Mamprussi, as well as many men—as much as 60 percent up to World War II—who crossed the border from what is now Burkina Faso in French West Africa. The British preference for Muslim soldiers was disappointed, as Islam had made little impact in the northern Gold Coast. Unlike the police, who were dominated by the southern Fante, the GCR was despised by southerners who saw it as an alien army of occupation. Although the rapid expansion of the GCR during World War II meant that many more southerners and Asante became soldiers, northerners continued to represent the majority. In Uganda, the British recognized the military history of the Baganda but kept them out of the army because they had relatively better education and organization than other groups. Recruits from impoverished northern Uganda, particularly the Acholi, were preferred, as they were seen as innately martial because of their stereotypical height.

Although most African military units were multiethnic, each usually developed a common language. In Kenya and Uganda, KAR African soldiers spoke a militarized version of Kiswahili called KiKAR, and in Nyasaland, they used simplified Chinyanja. British officers were offered African language courses and earned a bonus if successful. Although British officers considered it presumptuous for KAR soldiers to speak English, during the late 1930s, formal English instruction began because it was realized that during wartime, African troops would interact with British personnel with no knowledge of African languages. Language policies followed recruiting patterns as in Southern Rhodesia, where Chinyanja dominated the RAR during World War II because many soldiers came from Nyasaland and changed to Shona in the 1950s as more indigenous men enlisted. Other official military languages included Hausa for the West African

Frontier Force (WAFF), Lingala for the Belgian Force Publique, and Bambara and simplified French for the Tirailleurs Senegalais.¹

TECHNOLOGY AND PACIFICATION IN THE 1920s AND 1930s

Between the world wars, African military resistance to European colonial rule decreased in favor of new protest methods such as Westernized elite associations that wrote letters and petitions, workers' unions that went on strike, and peasant boycotts of colonial marketing boards that reflected social change and usually sought to reform the existing system. The increased technological superiority of the colonial militaries, which now included airplanes and armored vehicles, overcame the few instances of armed resistance. From 1901 to 1904, Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, who called on his Somali people to drive the infidels into the sea and was dubbed the Mad Mullah by colonials, had inflicted a series of military defeats on Ethiopian, British, and Italian forces. In 1904, a British expedition killed 7,000 of Hassan's followers and pushed them inland where, by 1913, they had built a series of stone forts that dominated the interior of the Somali peninsula. Hassan's forces consisted of highly mobile horsemen armed with guns. In August 1913 at the Battle of Dul Madoba in northwestern Somalia, some 2,700 of Hassan's men defeated a 110-strong contingent of the British Somali Camel Constabulary, which lost 36 men, including their commander Colonel Richard Corfield. Hassan's army then attacked and looted the British-ruled port of Berbera. While the British expanded the constabulary into the Somaliland Camel Corps in 1914 to deal with the rebellion, the outbreak of World War I delayed these plans. By 1919, the British had established posts in the mountain passes, but Hassan's rebels still conducted raids and ambushes. After the imperial general staff recommended that it would take two divisions and millions of pounds to pacify the area, the colonial office turned to the newly formed Royal Air Force (RAF), which—eager to prove it should remain a distinct force—promised to complete the operation itself with support from local colonial forces. By the start of 1920, with transport provided by the British aircraft carrier *HMS Ark Royal*, the RAF based in Egypt had assembled Z Force at a series of temporary air fields in British Somaliland. Commanded by Group Captain Robert Gordon, it included 12 biplanes for bombing, 14 motorized support vehicles, and 200 personnel. In late January and early February, the RAF bombed Hassan's forts,

which were then easily taken by the Camel Corps and a KAR battalion on the ground. Terrified by the airplanes, Hassan's rebels scattered, and he retreated to the Ogaden Desert, where he died of natural causes in December. In what the British called "the cheapest war in history," colonial control over Somaliland had been stabilized and Winston Churchill, as colonial secretary, began to think that air power could represent a cost-effective method to control the entire empire. To this end, he put British forces in rebellious Iraq under RAF command.²

Building on the South African Aviation Corps (SAAC) that had been created during World War I, the South African Air Force (SAAF) was established in February 1920 with the arrival of 113 aircraft as a gift from Britain. The first SAAF operations took place in March 1922 when its aircraft performed reconnaissance and bombing missions to help suppress a major uprising by white mineworkers around Johannesburg who objected to the opening of certain jobs to blacks. Two aircraft were shot down by ground fire, two pilots were killed, and another two were injured. Colonel Pierre Van Ryneveld, the first commander of the SAAF, survived the crash of one of the downed planes. It took the action of around 20,000 white troops—mostly Citizen Force reservists—to suppress what would be called the Rand Revolt, which cost 200 lives and led to the electoral defeat of Jan Smuts's South African Party to an Afrikaner Nationalist and Labour coalition in 1924 as well as the strengthening of racial discrimination in the workplace. From May to July 1922, the Khoikhoi Bondelswart community around Kalkfontein in the South African-administered former German colony of South West Africa (today's Namibia) rebelled because colonial seizure of land, livestock, and leaders had forced them to become impoverished workers for white settlers, and a new dog tax threatened their ability to hunt. The rebellion was suppressed by a South African armed expedition of 370 men equipped with motor vehicles and 3 SAAF planes that kept track of Bondelswart movements and bombed their positions. Some 100 Bondelswart men, women, and children were killed and around 500 wounded or captured.³

During World War I, rebel leader Ahmad El Raisuni dominated Spanish Morocco's mountainous northwest. In February 1919, the new high commissioner, General Damaso Berenguer Fuste, sent soldiers deep into the mountains after El Raisuni. Although the Spanish force was defeated at Wadi Ras in July 1919, it continued to advance and occupied the holy city of Chaouen in mid-October 1920.

By July 1921, El Raisuni's men were confined to their mountain stronghold. While Spain had long employed local scouts in Morocco, in 1911, a battalion of indigenous regular infantry led by Spanish officers formed the nucleus of the Indigenous Regular Forces, or "Regulares." The employment of Moroccan soldiers provided Spain with a corps of acclimatized and tough fighters, and it spared Spanish lives. Tensions developed within Spain's officer corps as the Spanish officers of the Regulares gained promotion by combat merit as opposed to officers in Spain, who advanced by seniority. By 1922, the Regulares had been expanded to five battalions, predominantly infantry with cavalry support, stationed in the major coastal towns. Because Spanish conscripts had performed poorly in North Africa, the Spanish Legion was established in 1920 by the reckless and self-aggrandizing Lieutenant Colonel Jose Millan Astray, originally an officer with the Regulares, to provide professional soldiers as shock troops for operations in Morocco. Although modelled on the French Foreign Legion, most of its members were Spaniards organized into a headquarters and three battalions based in the coastal enclave of Ceuta. Francisco Franco, another Regulares officer, was a founding member of the Legion and became its commander in 1923. The Regulares and Legion would constitute Spain's "Army of Africa."

Resistance to Spanish intrusion in the Rif Mountains of north-eastern Morocco had begun in 1909 and was suppressed by a large Spanish force the next year and subsequent co-option of Riffian leaders by the colonial state. In 1920, wealthy local leader Abd el-Karim el-Khattabi, who the Spanish had imprisoned during World War I for aiding German agents against the French across the border, bowed to pressure from those opposed to Spanish rule and rejected his monthly colonial pension. Inspired by Muslim concepts of social and religious reform, Abd el-Karim established the core of a modern army. In January 1921, a Spanish force of 20,000 men based in the eastern coastal city of Melilla advanced inland to try to control the Rif Mountains. In June and mid-July 1921, el-Karim's rebels captured several Spanish outposts. On July 22, after a five day siege, the 4,000 Riffian insurgents overran the primary Spanish base at Annual, poorly located for defense because it was surrounded by high hills, where the Spanish soldiers dropped their weapons and ran away. In the ensuing slaughter, the Spanish lost between 8,000 and 15,000 men, including their commander, General Manuel Fernandez Silvestre, who either committed suicide or was captured and executed. This was the greatest

battlefield defeat inflicted on a European army by Africans during the twentieth century. The Spanish survivors of Annual fled to Monte Arruit but were quickly surrounded and in early August surrendered to the Riffians, who killed many and took 600, including General Felipe Navarro, prisoner. Two battalions of the Spanish Foreign Legion and two of Regulares infantry were quickly shipped to Melilla to defend the vulnerable port. Abd el-Karim considered attacking Melilla but fear of international disapproval made him decide against it. By the start of 1922, the Spanish army in Morocco had increased to 150,000 men, and Legion and Regulares units had retaken most of the outposts lost during the Annual campaign.

With many captured weapons—20,000 rifles, 400 mountain guns, and 129 artillery pieces—and a large ransom gained from the return of Spanish prisoners, el-Karim expanded his regular army and established an administrative system over the various Riffian groups. In 1924, he was declared Amir of the Rif. The Disaster at Annual, as the Spanish called it, provoked a political crisis in Madrid and the rise of General Miguel Primo de Rivera as dictator. He initially wanted to withdraw from Morocco but, under pressure from Army of Africa officers such as Franco, decided only to abandon the interior. During the subsequent withdrawal of Spanish army columns from Chaouen from October to December 1924, some 7,000 Riffian rebels killed somewhere between 2,000 and 18,000 Spanish soldiers in ambushes and harassing attacks.

In April 1925, el-Karim's Riffians, encouraged by success and needing food, invaded the French protectorate to the south, captured outposts, and in early June were just 30 kilometers from Fez—though the failure of an anticipated rising meant they did not attack. Marshal Henri Philippe Petain, World War I hero of Verdun, took command of French forces in Morocco, and the Spanish agreed to co-operate in a massive campaign to subdue the Riffians. In early September, 8,000 Spanish troops, including Franco leading the Spanish Legion, were landed on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco at Alhucemas Bay near the heart of Riffian territory and easily overcame resistance on the beach. It took the Spanish expeditionary force a month to advance eight kilometers to seize el-Karim's capital of Ajdir. Around this time, early October, el-Karim's forces left French territory and moved north. The Riffians, with perhaps 5,000 fighting men, were now trapped as another Spanish force marched from the east and a large French army under Petain moved up from the south. With 200,000 Spanish and

300,000 French troops in northern Morocco, a blockade was imposed on the Rif Mountains during which many inhabitants starved. In early May 1926, the Spanish and French began a joint offensive and late in the month el-Karim, fearing that the Spanish would kill him, surrendered to the French, who sent him to exile on the Indian Ocean island of Reunion and allowed him to settle in Egypt after World War II. A few Riffian rebels continued guerrilla warfare, but by early July 1927, Spanish pacification was complete.

During the late 1920s, as a result of the Rif War, Primo de Rivera reformed the Spanish military, reducing the number of senior officers, eliminating ineffective units, making all promotions based on merit, purchasing modern weapons and equipment, and establishing a military academy with Franco as its first director. The war in Morocco divided the Spanish army between those who served in Spain, the “*Pennisulares*,” and those who served in Africa, the “*Africanistas*.” Given their greater battlefield experience, the Africanista officers of the Regulares and Legion gained promotion, formed a tightly knit promonarchy and antirepublican group, and would lead the nationalist forces in the Spanish Civil War of 1936 to 1939. In October 1934, the Army of Africa was brought to northern Spain to crush a miners’ uprising. During the civil war, it was flown to Spain by German aircraft and formed the professional core of Franco’s nationalist forces, which defeated the less well trained republicans.⁴

By the start of World War I, much of the interior of French Morocco had not been brought under colonial control. Given wartime manpower demands, the French in Morocco pursued a policy of “active defense,” meaning that they would anticipate Berber attacks but not launch major offensives. This changed in 1917 when an ambitious French operation established new French posts and cut the large zone of resistance into three separate pockets. In August 1918, the French suffered a serious defeat when one of their columns sent to control the southeast Tafilalet area, where locals had called for French intervention, was defeated by rebels and abandoned 400 rifles and ammunition. For the first time, the French decided to withdraw from an area they had already occupied and to abandon pro-French Moroccans. In 1919, French forces in Morocco shrank because of postwar demobilization and new military commitments in the Rhineland, Russia, Anatolia, and the Middle East. Although the occupation force returned to its predemobilization strength of 85,000–90,000 men in mid-1920, by 1924 it had again shrunk to 62,000, and Paris planned to further reduce it to 46,000 regulars with

10,000 reserves. For the next 10 years, the French under Resident-General Marshal Louis-Hubert Lyautey adopted a policy to defend the economically and militarily important parts of Morocco, and abandon the Central and High Atlas Mountains.

During the early 1920s, the French in Morocco saw continued hostilities between the Spaniards and Riffians across the border as strengthening their own position. By 1924, however, the French had become concerned that an independent Muslim state in the Rif would try to drive them out of Morocco. In April and May 1925, Riffian forces captured French border defenses after heavy fighting that cost the lives of hundreds of French Foreign Legionaries. With the defection of 20,000 Moroccans, many of whom were armed with French weapons to the Riffians, the French abandoned the border area. Anticipating the arrival of French reinforcements from Algeria and Europe, Riffian leader Abd el-Karim concentrated on the eastern part of northern French Morocco, where he sought to control the Fez-Taza-Oujda road and absorb the local population. After the French suffered heavy losses defending Fez from Riffian advance, French reinforcements began to arrive in late July and decisively turned the tide of the war. On the recommendation of Petain, who had been sent to Morocco to take command, 36 battalions were dispatched from Algeria and the Rhineland. In September, the French launched two offensives, a limited one in the central area to regain lost territory and the main thrust in the east to attract Riffian forces and facilitate a Spanish landing at the Bay of Alhucemas. Lyautey, resident-general since 1912, resigned over what he saw as an unnecessarily expensive and inappropriately massive campaign. Suspended in October with the onset of the rainy season, Spanish and French operations resumed in May 1926 and led to el-Karim's surrender. In late May and June, the French occupied an area south of Taza that had long resisted French rule, and 3,000 Moroccan fighters and their families escaped to the Atlas Mountains, which became a haven for dissidents who staged raids on French-controlled areas.

In the late 1920s, war-weary France returned to the policy of defending useful territory in Morocco while launching small operations that nibbled away at the dissident areas. This changed in 1930 when instability in Germany prompted French metropolitan military authorities to plan to muster all available troops for the defense of the motherland. Since using regulars to guard colonial frontiers was seen as a waste, French officials in Morocco were ordered to decisively

end the dissident problem. To avoid disapproval by tentative civilian politicians in Paris, the initial offensive planned by General Antoine Hure was moderate and involved mostly local irregulars under French command with air and artillery support. In July 1931, this force advanced 15 kilometers along a 100-kilometer wide front into the northern dissident territory, and a more ambitious operation in November advanced another 45 kilometers. In a single night operation in mid-January 1932, French-led forces occupied the important oasis of Tafilalet, which they had abandoned in 1918, and in February, the French captured the last dissident strongholds in the area. This meant that the road between Marrakech and Bou-Denib was open to the French, and the rebel controlled upper central Atlas was cut off. A series of massive French operations from May to July further and dramatically reduced the insurgent areas but created a false sense of confidence about remaining resistance. Problems began when the French penetrated the Tazigzaout area where many dissidents had gathered under the charismatic Muslim religious leader Sidi el-Mekki, who refused to surrender. On August 22, there was an assault by 1,000 colonial irregulars on Tazigzaout Ridge, where they encountered stiff resistance that led to hand-to-hand fighting in which 50 colonial troops were killed. It took the French three weeks of intense combat to take the area, and in the process they suffered 300 casualties that included 75 regulars. Nervous Paris officials threatened to halt operations. The rebels were now split into four tightly encircled pockets in the High Atlas, the blocks of Jabal Sarhro in the south, and the Anti-Atlas in the southwest.

The almost inaccessible Sarhro served as sanctuary for around 1,000 Ait 'Atta warriors and 6,000 of their relatives. These fighters began descending from the mountains to attack French convoys moving between the Atlantic coast and Algeria as well as Moroccans who had accepted colonial rule. As a result, Hure changed his plans for an assault on the High Atlas in the north to moving against the Ait 'Atta in the south. Because the rough terrain restricted the use of artillery, the French recruited 7,000 local Glawa irregulars for an assault of the Sarhro and supported them with nine goums (companies of Moroccan mountain troops called *goumiers*, see later in this chapter) and a small contingent of legionnaires and Moroccan cavalry. In mid-February 1933, the French led irregulars stormed the Sarhro from east and west, but communication difficulties, firm resistance, and the refusal of some irregulars to fight their fellow Moroccans resulted in

heavy colonial casualties. This prompted Hure, in late February, to employ French regulars to spearhead an assault on the last dissident position on the cliff of Bou Gafer, which again led to substantial colonial losses, including the celebrated and aristocratic Captain Henri de Bournazel, who was nicknamed "l'homme rouge" (the red man) because he always wore a bright red cloak while leading Moroccan troops. Unable to take the area by force, the French then besieged the Ait 'Atta whose leader, Assou ou Ba Slam, negotiated favorable surrender terms that included amnesty, continued possession of firearms, exemption from forced labor and excessive taxation, exemption from military service as irregulars for a year, and recognition of his own authority under French supervision. Ten French officers, 150 French regulars, and hundreds of irregulars had been killed during the fighting. Between 1,300 and 2,000 dissidents, three quarters of them noncombatants, lost their lives mostly as a result of aerial and artillery bombardment, as well as lack of water during the siege. In other southern pockets, the capitulation at Bou Gafer demoralized rebels, who also surrendered. The French then focused on the High Atlas and during a two-week operation in June, which cost the lives of 200 colonial troops, occupied the ridges of the Assif Melloul. This split the remaining insurgent zone into two pockets, which the French seized in a series of operations in July and August to gain control of the highest points in the Atlas. Hure gathered a force of 25,000 regulars; 1,700 goumiers (local mountain troops); and 16,000 irregulars to overwhelm the Anti-Atlas in the southwest, which was the last dissident hold out. During late February and early March 1934, a French offensive subdued 50,000 families of the Ait Abdallah and several hundred Ait Hammou refugees from Tafilalet. Some 50 French troops were killed or wounded. With the French finally in control of the entire territory, most regular soldiers in Morocco were sent home.

In 1908 the French, during their conquest of coastal Morocco, had created six goums, which were units of around 150 locally recruited men under 10–15 French leaders who assisted French regular troops. The term "goum" was derived from the Arabic word "qawm," meaning a tribal group. While the early goums contained an ethnic mix of Arabs and Berbers, by the late 1920s, the French began to focus recruitment on the allegedly warlike Berbers of the Central and later High Atlas Mountains. The goums represented an inexpensive method of imposing colonial administration on recently subjugated Berbers and a nucleus for future military expansion. Smaller than

regular battalions, goums could be dispatched to trouble spots more easily, the training of goudmiers was similar to regular Moroccan troops but their maintenance was cheaper, they were considered more dependable when defending isolated posts, and they could be deployed in a conventional or partisan role. By the end of the pacification period in 1934, there were 50 goums with 500 French officers and 8,000 goudmiers. In the late 1930s, the French attempted to make service in the goums more attractive by establishing canteens with items such as tea, sugar, tobacco, and soap at reduced prices and elementary schools where the sons and daughters of goudmiers learned French language and vocational trades. Retired goudmiers were given access to special loans to buy subsidized farms and preferential access to jobs in the colonial administration. In addition, each goudm was expected to create an auxiliary goudm consisting of retired members who performed 21 days of military training per year and could be called to active duty during an emergency. On the outbreak of World War II, there were 57 active and 69 auxiliary goums organized into groups of 3–5 goums each.⁵

With the coming to power in Rome of fascist Benito Mussolini in 1922, the Italians in coastal Libya expanded inland, where they encountered Arab resistance. As early as 1912, at the end of the Italo-Turkish War, the Italians had begun to recruit Libyan Arabs into the Royal Corps of Libyan Colonial Troops, which included infantry and cavalry. While the province of Tripolitania, around the capital of Tripoli, was quickly subdued, in the eastern province of Cyrenaica, prolonged guerrilla resistance was led by Omar Mukhtar. After fighting Italian invasion in 1911–1912, Mukhtar had gone to Egypt but returned in 1923 to command 6,000 rifle-armed insurgents who mostly originated from nomadic Sanussi Arab communities. Mukhtar's guerrillas attacked Italian supply lines and communication facilities, and the Italians responded by poisoning wells or filling them with stone and concrete, and slaughtering the nomads' camels, sheep, and goats. In March 1923, General Luigi Bongiovanni led an Italian offensive against the Sanussi rebels in Cyrenaica. His force consisted of 2 Libyan cavalry squadrons, 2 mountain artillery batteries, a heavy artillery unit to man fortifications, 2 companies of engineers, motorized transport, 2 squadrons of aircraft for bombing and reconnaissance, and 8,000 infantry that included 4 Italian, 5 Eritrean, and 2 Libyan battalions. The Italian force easily seized the towns and dispersed rebel camps in open terrain, but in two engagements in Sirtica, a desert area

between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, it lost 13 Italian officers, 40 Italian soldiers, and 279 African troops. The rebels then took refuge in the forested and mountainous Jebel Akhdar. Over the next four years, Italian forces made repeated forays into the mountains, killing 1,500 men and around 100,000 animals. The fact that the Italians recovered only a few hundred rifles suggests that they were indiscriminately attacking local communities rather than insurgents. The rebels tenaciously clung to parts of the Jebel Akhdar and inflicted some serious defeats on the Italians, such as in March 1927 when a 750-strong Libyan battalion was ambushed and lost nearly half its troops. From July to September 1927, the Italians, led by General Ottorino Mezzetti, embarked on a major sweep of the Jebel Akhdar with a highly mobile force of 10,000 men that included 9 Eritrean battalions, 2 Libyan battalions, 2 Libyan cavalry squadrons, 1 Libyan camel squadron, an armored car squadron, and groups of irregulars. With only 2,000 remaining rebels, Mukhtar's force was dispersed and his major stronghold of Kuf overrun. During this operation, the Italians killed 1,300 men; captured 250 women and children; slaughtered 3,000 camels and 5,000 sheep; and seized 850 camels and 18,000 sheep. The Italians lost just 2 officers, 5 airmen, and 61 African soldiers. In turn, Mezzetti ordered the construction of a series of forts in the Jebel Akhdar to hinder rebel movement and support Italian forces.

Although the rebels had suffered a serious setback, Mukhtar began leading guerrilla attacks on Italian lines of communication. The Italians used radio-equipped trucks, armored cars, and aircraft as well as allied Arab cavalry to hunt down and eliminate mounted insurgent groups. In one 1927 incident, a 400-strong rebel unit on its way to attack Italian forces in Sirtica was spotted and bombed by Italian aircraft, and then it was intercepted by Italian mobile units that killed 226 men and captured 173 rifles. When the rebels were defeated, they would disperse and disappear among the local population. By the end of 1928, Italian authorities admitted that despite major offensives, the insurgents still controlled parts of the country and moved freely at night. In January 1929, Marshall Pietro Badoglio was appointed governor of Libya and after attempts to negotiate a peace were rejected by the rebels, he launched another major offensive. The next year, Italian forces under General Rodolfo Graziani, who had just completed the subjugation of southern Fezzan and Tripolitania, built a 300-kilometer long barbed wire fence along the Egyptian border from Bardia on the coast to the Jarabub oasis. Ten meters wide and five

meters high, the fence was patrolled by aircraft and armored vehicles, it prevented the rebels from moving back and forth across the border, and it blocked supplies coming from sympathizers in Egypt. To reduce potential collaboration with the enemy, Graziani replaced some of his Libyan soldiers with Christian Eritreans, who were despised by the Arabs. To prevent noncombatants from supporting the rebels, 80,000 nomads, almost their entire population in Cyrenaica, were forcibly relocated to a series of squalid concentration camps, where they lived in tents surrounded by barbed wire fences defended by machine guns. Contact with rebels was made a capital offense. Graziani's forces were accused of bombing civilians, killing large numbers of children and old people, raping and disembowelling women, and executing prisoners by dropping them from aircraft or running over them with tanks. A foreign observer estimated that the Italians, during 1930 and 1931, were executing 12,000 people a year in Cyrenaica. In mid-September 1931, Mukhtar was captured when a mounted rebel group was intercepted and dispersed by Italian aircraft, three battalions of Eritrean infantry, and Libyan cavalry. A week later Mukhtar, who was sentenced to death after a trial of 30 minutes, went to the gallows with incredible composure and was hung in front of 20,000 concentration camp inmates. Subsequently, the rebellion fizzled and during the rest of the 1930s, the Italians combined the provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan into one administrative structure called Libya, and about 40,000 Italian settlers were established in what Mussolini called Italy's fourth shore.⁶

The most widespread colonial pacification campaign in sub-Saharan Africa between the world wars took place in French Equatorial Africa in what is now western Central African Republic and eastern Cameroon close to the border with Congo-Brazzaville. During the 1800s, the area became a haven for people fleeing slave raids connected with the Atlantic and trans-Saharan trades and in 1896, Gbaya communities led by French adventurer Alphonse Goujou defeated Muslim Fulbe (Fulani) pastoralists who ruled on behalf of the Germans. After World War I, the entire area came under the French, who contracted portions of it to exploitative concessionary companies who demanded rubber and ivory from locals. In 1924, the French imposed heavy forced labor to build the Congo-Ocean railway and in 1927, they increased taxes. As a result, local prophet Barka Ngainoumbey, called Karnu or "roller up of earth," urged his Gbaya people to refuse to pay taxes and perform labor, predicted that the

French would turn into gorillas, and issued magical hoe handles as protection from bullets. After an altercation between a colonial official and the people of Karnu's village of Nahing, three detachments of African guards, each under a Frenchman, converged on the prophet's home but suddenly withdrew on orders from the governor-general, who believed military action would enflame the situation. Because it appeared Karnu had caused the French to back down, local people with spears and arrows attacked colonial officials and traders. Consequently in October, the colonial state mounted a full-scale war against the people of this region with a column of 300 soldiers marching northwest from the administrative center of Bangui, picking up reinforcements and military commander Major General Albert-Theodore Thiry and Governor-General Raphael Antonetti at the village of Ireman, and inflicting a scorched earth campaign on the Gbaya in which they were forcibly relocated into "protected villages." On December 11, a company of 132 Tirailleurs Senegalais under Lieutenant Boutin attacked Nahing, where Karnu was killed by machine gun fire and his body displayed as proof he did not possess magic. A total colonial force of 1,000 men mopped up islands of resistance and by October 1929, the Lobaye and Haute Sangha areas had been brought under control. Responding to abuse by African colonial guards, the Pana and Karre people around Bocarango, south of Bangui, hid in caves and conducted guerrilla warfare against the French as they had done against the Fulbe. French colonial forces used pepper-laden fires to smoke the rebels out of caves and then cut them down with machine guns. The fighting ended by late 1931 and early 1932. French colonial authorities, concerned about anticolonial critics at home, kept reports about the rebellion out of the French press. Similar to earlier rebellions against colonial rule in the 1890s and 1900s, later Central African nationalists would see the Kongo Wara War (War of the Hoe Handle) as a widespread attempt by a new prophetic leadership to oust the French while others view it as a series of separate disturbances prompted by French military overreaction.⁷

THE ITALIAN INVASION OF ETHIOPIA, 1935

Under Mussolini, Italy became increasingly militaristic and expansionist, and the regime began to talk of avenging the 1896 defeat by Ethiopia. In 1928, the Ethiopian government, concerned about its

sovereignty, rejected an Italian proposal to build a road from the Eritrean port of Assab to Dessie in Ethiopia that would facilitate Italian economic penetration. During the early 1930s, Italy built up military forces in its neighboring colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, and undermined the new Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie by bribing subordinate chiefs. After 1933, Britain and France tried to keep Italy from siding with Nazi Germany by accepting Rome's claims to Ethiopia. As a result, the Italians began to seriously prepare for invasion by improving ports and roads, and building airports and hospitals in their East African territories. In November 1934, at Wal Wal some 100 kilometers inside Ethiopia, an Italian force from Somaliland clashed with an Anglo-Ethiopian expedition surveying the border. Rejecting Mussolini's demand for an apology and monetary damages, Selassie submitted the dispute to the League of Nations, which discussed it for the next 11 months. Deciding to remain neutral in what looked like an unavoidable war, France and Britain declared an arms embargo on Italy and Ethiopia, which impacted the latter much more seriously because it lacked the industrial capacity to manufacture modern weapons. Nazi Germany, eager to thwart Italian objections to its occupation of Austria, secretly sent military aid to Ethiopia that included 3 airplanes; 10,000 Mauser rifles; and 10 million rounds of ammunition. The military situation had changed significantly since 1896. Although Ethiopia had begun to modernize its military during the early 1930s, including the training of the emperor's bodyguard by Belgian advisors and the establishment of a military college by a Swedish mission, little had been achieved. In 1935, Ethiopia's army consisted of somewhere between 350,000 and 750,000 men, of which only a quarter had military training. In addition, they were equipped with 400,000 mostly outdated rifles; 200 extremely old artillery pieces; 50 anti-aircraft guns; and a tiny number of light tanks. With few motor vehicles, Ethiopian army transport relied on horse-drawn carts. The Ethiopian Air Force had a dozen airplanes of different kinds and 4 pilots. In contrast, the Italian army in East Africa numbered around half a million Italian, Eritrean, Somali, and Libyan soldiers supported by 6,000 machine guns; 2,000 modern artillery pieces; 800 tanks; and 600 aircraft.

On October 3, 1935, without a declaration of war and under the command of General Emilio De Bono, nine Italian divisions based in Eritrea invaded Ethiopia while two divisions based in Italian Somaliland opened a southern front. Throughout the campaign, Italy

enjoyed dominance of the air and on the first day bombed Adwa (scene of their 1896 defeat) as a symbolic act. Subsequent League of Nations economic sanctions were half-hearted and because they excluded oil imports, did little to hinder Italy's campaign. Britain could have stopped Italy's war effort by closing the Suez Canal, but it did not. While Ethiopian forces had been withdrawn from the border to avoid the impression they had been the aggressors and to stretch the enemy's supply lines, the Italian invasion was slowed by Ethiopia's poor roads. On October 15, the Italians captured Aksum, about 40 kilometers inside Ethiopia, but it was not until November 8 that they took Mekele, which was 60 more kilometers south. Although Mussolini pressured his commander in East Africa to complete the invasion before the advent of rains that were expected at the end of June 1936, De Bono insisted on proceeding with caution to avoid cutting his supply lines. Mussolini then, in mid-November, replaced De Bono with General Pietro Badoglio, who was authorized to use poison gas in contravention of the Geneva Convention. Organizing resistance, the Ethiopian emperor first fled to Jijiga on the southern front and then proceeded to Dessie in the north, which—despite intense bombing—served as his headquarters for the rest of the war.

During Christmas 1935, the Ethiopians—190,000 men divided into 4 armies—launched a major counteroffensive aimed at isolating Italian forces around Mekele. Losing much of the territory they had gained so far, the Italians were driven back to the Tekeze River, and the Ethiopian western army under Ras Imru Haile Selassie (the emperor's cousin) defeated Italian colonial troops at Dambagwina Pass and advanced to several points on the Eritrean border. Ethiopian troops swarmed the small Italian tanks attempting to kill their two-man crews and rolled boulders down from high ground to block their movement. Between January 20 and 24, 1936, at what became known as the First Battle of Tamben, the Italians employed tanks, aerial bombing, and mustard gas to halt the Ethiopian advance. The Italians then launched a major offensive that began with an attack on the Ethiopian eastern army around Amba Aradam, south of Mekele, and that took heavy casualties from mustard gas and a mass bombardment by 170 airplanes and 280 artillery pieces. Among the dead was the elderly Ethiopian wing commander and minister of war Ras Mulugeta Yeggazu, a veteran of the 1896 Adwa campaign. In turn, at the Second Battle of Tamben from February 27 to 29, the Italians easily inflicted heavy casualties on the Ethiopian central army, which was

compelled to retreat. With the collapse of the Ethiopian eastern and central forces, the undefeated western army under Ras Imru conducted a strategic withdrawal across the Tekeze River pursued by the Italians, who dropped 80 tons of bombs on them as well as mustard gas, and set the countryside on fire with incendiary devices. At the same time, the Italian Air Force bombed international Red Cross hospitals and ambulances treating the many civilian casualties. While the Italian use of gas in the war was reported throughout the world, this news was censored in the Italian press, and the Italian Ministry of Defence denied it until 1995. Contrary to his chiefs' advice that they adopt guerrilla warfare, the emperor led his own army, including his modernized bodyguard, in a determined attack on the Italians at May Chaw in southern Tigray at the end of March that failed because of Italian aerial bombing and gas. As the emperor's men withdrew south, they were subjected to more aerial bombing and gas, and they were harassed by local rebels who had been encouraged by the Italians. The Italian advance continued and on May 5, Badoglio led an Italian mechanized force of 12,500 troops riding 1,800 cars and trucks, called the Iron-Will Column, into the capital of Addis Ababa without a fight. The emperor, with gas burns on his arm, had left a few days earlier bound for exile in Britain. Mussolini quickly declared Ethiopia part of Italian East Africa. On the southern front, where the smaller Italian army was commanded by General Graziani, who had been nicknamed the "Hyena of Libya," there was heavy fighting at Qorahe in the southern Ogaden Desert. During that battle, Ethiopian leader Afawarq Walda Samayat personally manned one of his army's few anti-aircraft guns, which he refused to leave even after suffering a wound that would later turn gangrenous and take his life. The Italians took Qorahe on November 7, 1935, followed by a few other desert posts but did not capture Harar until after the northern forces had taken Addis Ababa. During the fighting, around 10,000 Italian soldiers were killed compared with 275,000 Ethiopians and many more civilians.


Despite Haile Selassie's June address to the League of Nations in Geneva, sanctions against Italy were lifted within days. Across Africa, moderate emerging nationalists were outraged by Italian aggression against the last independent African country and the failure of the great powers to stop it. Ethiopian resistance continued throughout the Italian occupation. During July and August 1936, there were two attempts by Ethiopians forces to recapture Addis Ababa, but they

were both repelled by Italian airpower. Inspired by the hope that an imminent war in Europe might change their fortunes, Ethiopians fought a guerrilla war centered mostly in Shewa, Bagemder, and Gojjam that enjoyed popular support. Under Graziani as viceroy, who was almost assassinated by insurgents, the Italians responded with a reign of terror that included the massacre of thousands of innocent people in Addis Ababa and the indiscriminate use of gas in rebel areas. By 1939, the situation had stalemated, with Ethiopian insurgents in control of the countryside and Italians occupying the towns and forts.⁸

THE EAST AFRICAN CAMPAIGN OF WORLD WAR II

In June 1940, after Germany had occupied France, Mussolini's Italy entered World War II on the Axis side, which meant that there would be fighting in Africa. For Britain, which had long backed Italian colonialism in the Horn, Italian East Africa was now a threat to its strategic shipping route to India via the Red Sea and Suez Canal. Commanded by Amedeo, the Duke of Aosta, Italian forces in East Africa numbered between 250,000 and 280,000. Representing the majority of this force, the Royal Corps of Colonial Troops included many good quality regular Eritrean infantry battalions, daring Eritrean cavalry called Falcon Feathers, and irregular Somali skirmishers. Also included were European units such as two regular infantry divisions—the 40th Division called Hunters of Africa and the 65th Division called Grenadiers of Savoy—one mountain battalion, one highly mobile "Bersaglieri" (light infantry) battalion, various paramilitary "Black shirt" units, and colonial militia. They were supported by 3,300 machine guns; 24 medium tanks; numerous light tanks; 126 armored cars; and 800 artillery pieces. The Italian Air Force in East Africa consisted of 200–300 fighters and bombers that although outdated, were some of the best aircraft in the campaign, had skilled pilots, and had better airfields than the Allies. Given Allied naval power, the Italians in East Africa were cut off from Italy, which meant they had supply problems. The Italian Red Sea Flotilla consisted of 7 destroyers, 5 torpedo boats, and 8 submarines. After 4 of the submarines were lost during attacks on Allied ships in June 1940, the flotilla rarely left port at Massawa, as it was low on fuel and hopelessly outgunned.

When the East Africa campaign began, British forces amounted to around 30,000 men spread across Sudan, Kenya, and British



Somaliland, but control of the oceans meant reinforcements arrived quickly. Under Major General William Platt, the British army in Sudan initially consisted of 3 British regular infantry battalions and 21 companies (4,500 men) of the locally recruited Sudan Defence Force (SDF), though this was dramatically increased by the arrival of the 5th Indian Infantry Division from India in September 1940 and the 4th Indian Infantry Division from Egypt in early January 1941. In Kenya, where British forces were commanded by Major General Douglas Dickinson, the KAR numbered around 3,000 men at the start of the war but by March 1940, had been expanded to 20,000 troops in 4 brigades. In June, the first South African troops arrived in Kenya; by August, the 1st South African Division with 3 infantry brigades supported by armored car units had been formed; and by the end of 1940, there were 27,000 South African soldiers present. In addition, from July 1940, 2 brigades from the Royal West African Frontier Force

(RWAFF)—1 from the Gold Coast and another from Nigeria—were brought in. Two new infantry divisions were formed, the 11th African Division consisting of the Gold Coast and two KAR brigades, and the 12th African Division made up of the Nigerian and two other KAR brigades. Both divisions had some South African support elements. British Somaliland was defended by about 1,400 men of the Somaliland Camel Corps and the NRR, who were joined by several more battalions. With reference to air power, the British had 3 squadrons of obsolete bombers stationed in north Sudan together with 6 biplane fighters at Port Sudan, which were reinforced by a squadron from Egypt and another from South Africa that protected shipping in the Red Sea and supported ground operations across East Africa. In Kenya, 4 South African squadrons—2 of bombers, 1 of light dive bombers, and 1 of fighters—and another light bomber squadron from Southern Rhodesia were assembled.

Fighting began in mid-June when Italian aircraft bombed a Rhodesian airfield and KAR garrison at Wajir in northern Kenya. In turn, the KAR, supported by Rhodesian aircraft, staged a raid on the border outpost of El Wak in Italian Somaliland. In early July, Italian units from Eritrea crossed into Sudan, where they captured the railway junction at Kassala and the British fort at Gallabat but did not advance any further because of fuel shortages. The Italians stationed a brigade at Kassala, which was fortified with antitank defenses and machine gun strong points. Advancing 100 kilometers inside Kenya, the Italians took the British fort at Moyale as well as the villages of Dabel and Buna but stopped because of limited supplies. Italian plans to invade French Somaliland (now Djibouti), which was defended by 7,000 Senegalese and local troops, were suspended when that territory sided with the pro-Axis Vichy government in France. In early August, 25,000 Italian soldiers, commanded by General Guglielmo Nasi and divided into 5 colonial brigades, 3 Black shirt battalions, and 3 bands of African irregulars supported by some tanks and artillery, invaded British Somaliland. The Italians enjoyed air superiority. They were opposed by 4,000 British troops, the Somali Camel Corps and 3 battalions of KAR, NRR, and the Punjab Regiment, led by Brigadier Arthur Reginald Chater. Although the British had some artillery and were quickly reinforced by another Indian battalion and the 2nd Battalion Black Watch Highlanders, they had no tanks or armored cars. As the Italians advanced in three columns, the British pulled back to Tug Argan to establish defensive positions in the hills overlooking the

main road to the capital and port of Berbera. The Italian western column quickly advanced and cut off British Somaliland from French Somaliland, and the central and eastern columns combined for an attack on Tug Argan. In mid-August, the British, now under Major General Alfred Reade Godwin-Austen, withdrew from Tug Argan to Berbera. While a determined Black Watch covering action delayed the Italians, most of the British force was evacuated by ship to Aden. Although the Italians occupied the colony, they had lost 465 men killed and 1,500 wounded compared to just 38 killed and 100 wounded on the British side. The capture of British Somaliland was the only campaign of the war in which the Italians succeeded without the help of other Axis forces. Criticized by Prime Minister Winston Churchill for abandoning the colony too easily, General Archibald Wavell of Middle East Command replied that it had been a classic withdrawal in the face of superior numbers and that suffering high casualties did not indicate good tactics.

After the arrival the Indian reinforcements, the British in Sudan launched an offensive. In early November 1940, an Indian infantry brigade led by Brigadier William Slim, who would later command British forces in Burma, and supported by a dozen light and medium tanks and the RAF, recaptured Gallabat but could not continue to Metemma because nine of the tanks had been knocked out. The Italian Air Force then attacked the area, shooting down seven British aircraft and bombing the ground forces until they withdrew. Over the next few months, Indian troops built dummy airfields and supply depots to convince Italian intelligence that the main British thrust from Sudan would be toward Gondar in Ethiopia and not through Kassala into Eritrea. Around this time, the RAF in Sudan began to receive better aircraft to more effectively challenge the Italians in the sky and harass Italian ground forces. From November 1940 to January 1941, the highly mobile British Gazelle Force, composed of elements of the SDF and 5th Indian Division, raided the Italians around the Sudanese border.

In December 1940, given Italian reverses in North Africa and the Balkans, Rome decided to focus on defending its East African territory, and orders were sent to Lieutenant-General Luigi Frusci to withdraw from Kassala and Metemma along the lowland Sudanese border with Eritrea to more easily defend mountain passes. However, Frusci ignored the instruction because he believed it would damage Italian prestige and Kassala was an important railway center. Given

that the British could decrypt Italian codes, they knew about the intended defensive shift and, in turn, launched an offensive in mid-January 1941. According to Wavell's plan, three British forces would converge on Addis Ababa. British forces under Platt would move south from Sudan through Eritrea and into Ethiopia; those in Kenya, now under Lieutenant-General Alan Cunningham, would advance north through Italian Somaliland and into Ethiopia; and an amphibious force would land on the coast of British Somaliland, retake the colony, and cross the border into Ethiopia. At the same time, Ethiopian insurgents would expand their campaign against the Italians. On January 17, one day before Platt's scheduled attack, Frusci decided to obey orders, and the Italians withdrew from Kassala and dug in on the foothills of the Eritrean Plateau on the road to Agordat. Two days later, the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions from Sudan passed through Kassala, entered Eritrea, and advanced on Agordat. At the same time, Briggs Force, led by Brigadier Harold Rawdon Briggs and consisting of two Indian battalions and two Free French battalions (one Senegalese and one European), crossed into northern Eritrea at Karora, moved south to the defended town of Keren, and linked up with the main invasion force in March. On January 22, elements of the 5th Indian Division outflanked a strong Italian position defended by five battalions at Keru Gorge, where Italian general Ugo Fongoli and 1,200 troops were taken prisoner while others escaped. During the last days of January, the 4th Indian Division with some tank support attacked Agordat, which was defended by 4 Italian infantry brigades supported by artillery and tanks. Although the Italians launched several counterattacks, they were again outflanked and during an escape attempt, 1,000 men and 43 artillery pieces were captured. Two days later, at the start of February, the 5th Indian Division took the town of Barentu, which was located south of Agordat and defended by 8,000 Italians in prepared defenses. Realizing that Platt's British were not heading for Gondar, at the end of January, Italian forces abandoned Metemma, which was then taken by the 5th Indian Division. During the subsequent pursuit of Italian forces sapper Second Lieutenant Premindra Singh Bhagat won the first Victoria Cross of World War II by clearing 15 minefields on 90 kilometers of road over a continuous 48-hour period. Over 9 days, the British had advanced 160 kilometers and taken 6,000 prisoners; 80 guns; 26 tanks; and 400 trucks.

On February 4, the understrength 4th Indian Division attacked the main Italian position at Keren 100 kilometers east of Agordat on the

route to the Red Sea port of Massawa and was repulsed. Concentrating his forces, Platt renewed the attack on Keren from the southwest in early March around the same time that Briggs Force arrived from the north. Led by General Nicolangelo Carnimeo, 23,000 Italian defenders fought tenaciously, which meant it took until the end of the month for the 13,000 British to take Keren. At the Battle of Keren, the Italians suffered 3,000 killed; several thousand wounded or sick; and most of the rest captured while 4,000 British were killed, wounded, or missing. The 5th Indian Division pursued the demoralized Italians and captured Asmara, the undefended Eritrean capital, on April 1. As the Allies advanced, several Italian naval vessels left Massawa and broke through the Allied blockade, with 2 auxiliary cruisers reaching Japan and 4 surviving submarines going around the Cape of Good Hope and reaching the south of France. The Red Sea Flotilla's 6 remaining destroyers were sent on a suicide mission to attack British fuel tanks at Port Sudan, where 2 were sunk by aircraft, 2 others were damaged and scuttled off the coast of Saudi Arabia, and another never made it out of port due to engine problems and was destroyed. Although Red Sea Flotilla commander Rear Admiral Mario Bonnetti had been ordered by Mussolini to defend Massawa to the last man, lack of supplies meant that after initial stubborn resistance, the garrison lost the will to fight. On April 8, elements of the 5th Indian Division and Briggs Force captured Massawa, with the 13th French Foreign Legion Demi-Brigade capturing 14,000 Italian sailors and soldiers. Prior to surrender, the Italians damaged the port facilities and sunk ships in the harbour, which took 13 months for the Allies to reopen.

In early July 1940, the British flew exiled Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie to Sudan to rally insurgents in neighboring Ethiopia. The next month, the British launched Mission 101, led by Colonel Daniel Sandford, which sent military advisors, arms, and ammunition to Ethiopian guerrillas. In January 1941, the 2,000-strong Gideon Force, consisting of a SDF battalion and another of Ethiopian insurgents (many of whom had been in the pre-1936 regular army), crossed into Ethiopia's Gojjam province from Sudan to form the conventional core of rebel forces. Commanded by Major Orde Wingate, who would later win fame leading the Chindits in Burma, Gideon Force was supported by 4 mortars and 18,000 transport camels. In February, Haile Selassie crossed the border and established his headquarters at Mount Belaya, and Gideon Force began attacking Italian forts and patrols.

Local Ethiopian rulers began to declare support for the emperor, rival rebel leaders united under his command, more Ethiopians joined the uprising, and Ethiopians in Italian military service started to desert. In early March, Italian forces retreated southeast and Gideon Force, using loudspeakers to trick the enemy into thinking they were facing a much larger force, took Bure and Dembecha. Given the Allied advance in the south, the Duke of Aosta ordered the withdrawal of 12,000 Italians from Debre Marqos over 300 kilometers to Dessie. In early April, Gideon Force entered Debre Marqos and on May 5, subsequently commemorated as Liberation Day in Ethiopia, Haile Selassie entered Addis Ababa, which had already been taken by South African troops.

In mid-March 1941, British warships landed two Sikh battalions and a Somali commando detachment on both sides of Berbera in Italian-occupied British Somaliland. During this first successful Allied landing of the war, the malaria-plagued Italian garrison of 60 men waited on the beach to surrender. After taking control of the colony, British forces moved west into eastern Ethiopia in late March and joined Cunningham's force from the south around Harar and Direddawa. This meant that the British forces coming up from Kenya could be supplied through Berbera.

In mid-January 1941, Cunningham's force in Kenya began its offensive into southern Ethiopia, hoping to motivate an Ethiopian uprising and distract the Italians from the main advance from Sudan. While the South African 1st Division captured El Yibo and Jumbo, the rebellion did not happen, and the advance was delayed by the start of the rains. The offensive was resumed early the next month with the capture of more southern Ethiopian towns and on February 18, after a 3-day battle, 2 South African brigades captured the Italian fort at Mega. In late January, Cunningham took his main force, the 11th and 12th African divisions, into Italian Somaliland and advanced quickly to the Italian defensive line along the Juba River that was manned by six brigades and six groups of African auxiliaries. The Italians lacked air support, as it had been destroyed by the SAAF. On February 14, Cunningham's men took the port of Kismayu at the mouth of the Juba River, and on February 22, the main Italian position at Jelib was surrounded and routed, with 30,000 Italian troops killed, wounded or run off. Subsequently, the motorized Nigerian brigade of the 11th African Division drove 320 kilometers up the coast and took the capital of Mogadishu on February 25. The entire 11th African Division then pursued the

fleeing Italians north and in mid-March completed a 16-day march from Mogadishu to Jijiga in eastern Ethiopia. From Jelib, the 12th African Division moved up the Juba River and entered Ethiopia. By the end of March, Cunningham's force had linked up with the units that had retaken British Somaliland and converged on Addis Ababa. After a 2,800-kilometer advance in 53 days, Cunningham's men occupied Addis Ababa on April 6, and about a week later, a South African brigade under Brigadier Dan Pienaar along with some Ethiopian scouts were dispatched further north to meet Platt's force from Sudan. On April 20, after a tough battle, Pienaar's force took Dessie on the road north from Addis Ababa to Asmara.

Preventing the joining of Platt's force coming down from the north and Cunningham's coming up from the south was Amba Alagi, a seemingly impregnable Italian mountain stronghold defended by 7,000 men under the Duke of Aosta, who was suffering from malaria. During the first week of May, a brigade from the 5th Indian Division, its other units occupied guarding long supply lines, advanced on Amba Alagi from the east and northwest and in mid-May, Pienaar's South African brigade and Ethiopians arrived from the south to complete the encirclement. There were now 9,000 Indians and South Africans along with 20,000 Ethiopians besieging Amba Alagi. Just before a planned Allied assault, an artillery shell inadvertently ruptured an Italian fuel tank, which contaminated the fortress's water supply. A few days later on May 18, the Italians at Amba Alagi surrendered with "full military honors," which meant they were allowed to march off the battlefield before giving up their weapons and passing over the position intact to the British.


Despite the capitulation of the Italian viceroy who died a few months later, some Italian garrisons held out. In mid-June, an Indian battalion seized the Red Sea port of Assab by amphibious landing. At Jimma, in southwestern Ethiopia, General Pietro Gazzera became the new viceroy but faced increased resistance from Ethiopian insurgents and defections by his colonial troops. On June 21, Gazzera fled Jimma, where 15,000 of his troops surrendered, and on July 3, the general and his last 7,000 men gave themselves up to Free Belgian Forces from the Congo under Major General Auguste-Eduard Gilliaert. At Gondar, 190 kilometers west of Amba Alagi in northwestern Ethiopia, an Italian garrison of 23,000 under General Guglielmo Nasi, the new acting viceroy, held out until November 27, when they surrendered to British and Ethiopian forces. The Italian air force, although

hampered by lack of fuel, continued operations until late October. Some scattered Italian units, hoping that German-Italian forces would triumph in North Africa, conducted a guerrilla war against the Allies in East Africa until Italy surrendered in September 1943.

Ethiopia was administered by the Allies until 1944, when it formally regained independence under Emperor Haile Selassie. French Somaliland, with its Vichy administration, was occupied by Free French and other Allied forces in 1942, and a battalion from that small territory participated in the 1944 liberation of France. In 1949, the United Nations brought back the Italians to administer Italian Somaliland which, upon independence in 1960, joined the former British Somaliland to form the Republic of Somalia. After the Italian defeat at the Battle of Keren, the British administered Eritrea until 1951 when the United Nations, because of the territory's strategic location on the Red Sea coast, ceded it to Ethiopia, which was a reliable British and American ally.⁹

THE NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN OF WORLD WAR II

When Italy declared war on France and Britain in June 1940, it had 2 armies stationed in Libya. The 9 divisions of the 5th Army were located near Tripoli guarding the border with French Tunisia, and the 5 divisions of the 10th Army were stationed in Cyrenaica facing British-occupied Egypt. In total, this represented around 250,000 troops. When France capitulated, the Italians shifted resources from the 5th to the 10th Army, which grew to 10 infantry divisions with a mix of standard, Black shirt, and Libyan battalions. Despite these large numbers, Italian forces in Libya were equipped with outdated and generally small-caliber artillery, and hundreds of obsolete light tanks that were being replaced by medium ones. Dedicated to supporting ground operations, the Italian Libya Air Command had 300 aircraft organized into 4 bomber wings, a fighter wing, 3 other fighter groups, 2 reconnaissance groups, and 2 reconnaissance squadrons. Defending the western border of Egypt was Britain's 36,000-strong Western Desert Force (WDF) that consisted of the understrength 4th Indian Infantry Division and the equally reduced 7th Armoured Division known as the Desert Rats. British tanks were generally superior to the new Italian models. The RAF had 96 obsolete medium bombers, 75 outdated fighters, and 35 other types of aircraft available in the



Middle East. However, the Royal Navy had gained complete control of the Eastern Mediterranean and could bombard Italian coastal positions as well as transport men and material along the shoreline. In mid-June, the British formed highly mobile columns of tanks, infantry, and artillery that raided across the border and seized Fort Capuzzo.

Although Mussolini had ordered Italian forces in Libya to attack the British in Egypt in early August to hopefully coincide with a German invasion of Britain, the overall Italian commander in North Africa, General Graziani, delayed because he did not believe his forces were well enough equipped, particularly in terms of transport, to complete the mission. Threatened with dismissal, Graziani launched the invasion of Egypt in early September 1940. Five Italian divisions advanced directly into Egypt along the coastal road with the mobile Maletti Group, Libyan infantry in trucks, guarding the southern flank. Italian tanks were used to simply escort the infantry, and Italian and British aircraft fought for control of the sky. The bulk of the initial invasion force consisted of most of the infantry, regular and irregular cavalry, and camel riders of the Royal Corps of Libyan Colonial Troops. Because vehicle engines overheated and the Maletti Group became temporarily lost, the slow Italian advance took four days to reach the border and recapture Fort Capuzzo. Deploying an armored screen to their front, the British withdrew to Mersa Matruh about 220 kilometers east of the Libyan border on the coastal road. In mid-September, the 1st Italian Black shirt Division captured Sidi Barrani, 95 kilometers inside Egypt on the coastal road, but the entire advance was halted 10 kilometers further east because of supply and transport problems. Far short of the main British line at Mersa Matruh, the Italians then prepared a series of defensive positions around Sidi Barrani.

A British offensive, Operation Compass, began in early December 1940 with RAF raids on Italian airfields and naval bombardment of Italian positions around Sidi Barrani. The operation began as a large raid that was so successful it expanded into a general westward advance of British land forces from Mersa Matruh. On December 9, an Indian infantry brigade supported by a British tank regiment advanced and took an Italian defensive position at Nibeiwa, south of Sidi Barrani, where the Maletti Group was eliminated and 2,000 Libyan prisoners were taken. Later the same day, several other Italian positions around Sidi Barrani fell. The next day, another Indian brigade with tank support encircled Sidi Barrani, trapping a Libyan division and Black shirt division, which surrendered. Retreating west

along the coastal road to the Libyan border, the surviving Italian forces were bombarded by British warships and pursued by 2 British armored brigades slowed by the large number of prisoners they were taking. By mid-December, the British had advanced to the border, moved through Halfaya Pass into eastern Libya, took Sollum, and once again captured Fort Capuzzo. While the British had suffered fewer than 700 killed and wounded, the Italians had lost 38,000 men killed or captured along with 73 tanks and 237 artillery pieces destroyed or captured. The British offensive was delayed when most of the 4th Indian Division was suddenly transferred to Sudan and replaced by the inexperienced Australian 6th Division, which was lacking its usual armored regiment. At Bardia, 40,000 Italian soldiers—the remnants of numerous mangled divisions—defended a 28-kilometer long defensive perimeter with a permanent antitank ditch, extensive wire entanglements, and concrete strongpoints. Over three days in early January 1941, Australian troops supported by engineers and tanks overcame the Bardia defenses and captured 36,000 Italian prisoners. The British 7th Armoured and Australian 6th divisions then advanced along the coast to Tobruk, which had a 48-kilometer defensive perimeter similar to Bardia, which was surrounded, heavily bombed by air and artillery, and taken in late January. Some 25,000 Italian soldiers along with many tanks and artillery pieces were captured while the Australians suffered 400 men killed, wounded, or captured. After clashing with the newly formed Italian Special Armoured Brigade of 55 updated medium tanks, the Desert Rats took Derna at the end of the month. In early February, with the Italian 10th Army evacuating Cyrenaica, the Australian 6th Division pursued them along the coastal road through Benghazi while the 7th Armoured Division hooked south and cut them off at Sidi Saleh along the Benghazi-Tripoli road. Although some Italian medium tanks from the Special Armoured Brigade almost escaped the trap, they were destroyed by British antitank guns, and the Italians then surrendered. During the 10 weeks of Operation Compass, the British had advanced 800 kilometers; destroyed or captured 400 tanks and 1300 artillery pieces; captured 130,000 Italian and Libyan prisoners, including 22 generals; and destroyed the entire Italian 10th Army. British forces suffered 494 dead and 1,300 wounded. Churchill ordered the British to halt at El Agheila as the Australian 6th Division was sent to defend Greece and the British 7th Armoured Division was withdrawn to Cairo for much needed tank maintenance. The Allied

line at El Agheila was assigned to the raw and understrength British 2nd Armoured Division and the partly trained Australian 9th Infantry Division.

In western Libya during February 1941, the 4 divisions of the Italian 5th Army were reinforced by the arrival of 4 more divisions, including 1 motorized, which brought their total strength in North Africa up to 150,000 men. To prevent the complete collapse of the Italians in Libya, Hitler shipped the German "Afrika Korps" under General Erwin Rommel to Tripoli, with the 5th Light Division arriving in February and March, and the 15th Panzer Division in April and May. Although Rommel's orders were to reinforce the Italian defense, he realized that the British were weak and launched an offensive with his German forces, 1 division plus elements of another, and 3 Italian infantry divisions. British resistance was quickly undermined when the 2nd Armoured Division's fuel depot was mistakenly destroyed to prevent capture. In late March the British were driven east of El Agheila; in early April an Allied defensive position at Mechili was surrounded and 2,700 men captured; and by mid-April, the British and Australians were back at Sollum on the Libyan-Egyptian border. The British 2nd Armoured Division was disbanded, having suffered heavy losses. After encountering stiff resistance, Rommel bypassed Tobruk, where the Australian 9th Division—later replaced by the British 70th Infantry Division supplemented by Polish and Czech troops—was besieged for the next 240 days. The 36,000-strong garrison was supplied by British and Australian ships. Because Tobruk and Benghazi were the only ports between Tripoli in Libya and Alexandria in Egypt, its possession by the British meant that the eastward-advancing Germans and Italians had to maintain long overland supply lines and were constantly threatened from the rear. In mid-June, during Operation Battleaxe, the British 7th Armoured Division attempted to penetrate the Axis defenses along the Libyan border and relieve Tobruk. However, the operation failed because of determined resistance and an Axis counterattack. This disaster led to the reorganization and reinforcement of the WDF, renamed 8th Army under Lieutenant General Cunningham, and the replacement of Wavell with General Claude Auchinleck as British commander in the Middle East.

In mid-November 1941, during Operation Crusader, the 8th Army, with the British 7th Armoured and South African 1st Division in the lead, pushed through Axis defenses around the Libyan-Egyptian border while British forces broke out of Tobruk and joined the offensive.

However, on November 22, an Axis counterattack defeated elements of British armor and South African infantry at Sidi Rezegh, the location of an airfield south of Tobruk. A few days later, Sidi Rezegh was taken in a hard fight by the New Zealand Division, which linked up with the Tobruk garrison. Around this time, Auchinleck replaced Cunningham (who had wanted to withdraw) with Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie, who took over the 8th Army and continued pushing forward in a series of intense battles. In early December, Rommel—realizing that success at Tobruk was unlikely—withdrew Axis forces 16 kilometers west to a defensive line prepared by the Italians around Gazala. In mid-December, Allied Polish, New Zealand, and Indian troops attacked the Gazala line. Fearing encirclement by the British 7th Armoured Division, Rommel ordered another withdrawal all the way back to El Agheila. Unlike the previous Italian retreat along the same route, Rommel's forces escaped because the British were unable to exploit their victory. This left the Axis garrisons of Bardia, Sollum, and Halfaya along the Libya-Egypt border isolated and during January 1942, they were systematically taken by the South African 2nd Division. The capture of Bardia and Sollum liberated 1,246 Allied captives and in all 3 operations, a total of 13,842 Axis prisoners were taken.

In late January 1942 Rommel, with reinforcements of men and tanks, sent out three armored reconnaissance columns from El Agheila, which found minimal Allies forces to his front. Immediately, Axis forces attacked and recaptured Benghazi at the end of the month and Timimi in early February then continued east toward Tobruk. The British 8th Army rallied and established a defensive line, held by a series of brigade-sized boxes with wire and mines, from Gazala on the coast to Bir Hakeim in the south. While both sides spent the next two months building up supplies for an anticipated offensive, the Axis forces had a shorter shipping route from Italy across the Mediterranean to Tripoli and were ready first. In late May, Rommel launched Operation Venezia in which 2 Italian corps supported by artillery conducted a diversionary frontal attack on the Gazala Line while motorized Italian and German forces circled around its southern end. Despite the stubborn defense of the Bir Hakeim box by a Free French brigade, Rommel's tanks gained the upper hand over British armor, and the Gazala Line collapsed. In mid-June, the 8th Army, including the South African 1st Division, withdrew 160 kilometers east along the coast to Mersa Matruh, leaving Tobruk (garrisoned by the South

African 2nd Division) to hold out on its own. On June 19, Rommel's forces penetrated the Tobruk defenses, which had badly deteriorated, and 2 days later, 33,000 Allied troops (including 12,700 South Africans) surrendered. After the fall of Singapore to the Japanese, the loss of Tobruk represented the second largest British capitulation of World War II and was the only incident of the conflict to make Churchill wince. Among the Allied prisoners at Tobruk was Lance Corporal Job Maseko, a black South African military laborer, who was put to work unloading ships in the harbor and sunk a moored German vessel by planting an improvised bomb among some petrol tanks. Given the Gazala reverse, Auchinleck dismissed Ritchie as 8th Army commander and ordered a withdrawal of British forces another 160 kilometers east into Egypt, where a new defensive line was formed at El Alamein where the steep slopes of the Qattara Depression to the south would prevent an Axis flanking attack. Rommel staged several assaults on the Alamein Line at the end of June, but they were undermined by the heavy losses his forces had sustained at Gazala. Confident of success, Mussolini flew to Libya in preparation for a triumphant entry into Cairo.

Like the Gazala Line, the Alamein Line consisted of series of prepared defensive boxes that had not been entirely finished. The South African 1st Division and two Indian divisions manned the coastal sector around El Alamein itself, a New Zealand and an Indian division defended the southern inland sector, and the 1st and 7th Armoured Divisions were held in reserve. During the first days of July 1942, in the First Battle of El Alamein, Rommel launched a major frontal assault by German and Italian divisions on the Alamein Line. The assault was ground down by heavy Allied firepower. On July 4, Rommel ordered his men to dig in opposite the Alamein Line and attacks, counterattacks, and raids continued throughout the month. Although the battle stalemated, the Axis advance on Cairo had been stopped. In August, Churchill replaced Auchinleck with General Harold Alexander as Middle East commander, and Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery became the 8th Army commander. Since the British had broken German codes, Montgomery knew that Rommel planned another offensive against the southern sector of the Alamein Line before the arrival of Allied reinforcements. As such, Montgomery purposefully left a gap in this part of his defenses and redeployed armor and artillery 32 kilometers behind the front on Alam el Halfa Ridge to await the Axis attack at the end of August. Refusing to be drawn out, British tanks remained in their positions

on the ridge, from where they fired down on Axis armor. In early September, heavy losses and supply problems prompted Rommel to abandon this last Axis offensive in North Africa. Although Montgomery decided not to use armor to exploit the Axis defeat in favor of building up for a major offensive, New Zealand troops suffered heavy casualties in a counterattack.

By late October 1942, British forces at El Alamein numbered 220,000 men and 1,100 tanks, including new American models, facing an Axis force of 115,000 men and 560 tanks. On the night of October 23–24, 1942, Montgomery's 8th Army launched Operation Lightfoot with a massive 880-gun artillery barrage of Axis lines. It continued with 4 infantry divisions (South Africans, Australians, Scots and New Zealanders) cutting paths through enemy minefields through which tanks would proceed. The operation's name came from the fact that an infantryman was too light to set off an antitank mine. With the failure of determined Axis counterattacks and a fuel shortage, Rommel ordered a withdrawal. Consequently, on November 2, Montgomery initiated Operation Supercharge, which started with a seven-hour aerial and artillery bombardment of Axis positions followed by an advance of New Zealand and British infantry who cleared paths through minefields for tanks. Axis forces conducted a fighting withdrawal all the way to El Agheila, which was facilitated by the slowness and confusion of the 8th Army. In this Second Battle of El Alamein, the Allies suffered 13,500 casualties, which was a small portion of their total force, while the Axis sustained 37,000 casualties (30 percent of their manpower). This first major Allied land victory against the Germans inspired Churchill's famous remark that it was "the end of the beginning." In mid-December, the Allies attacked the Axis at El Agheila, with the Highland Division and 7th Armoured Division advancing west along the coast and the New Zealanders swinging around from the south. Rommel then orchestrated a withdrawal in which he destroyed abandoned equipment and infrastructure, and laid minefields to delay the Allied pursuit. Much to Mussolini's horror, Rommel planned to concede the open terrain of Libya, where his forces could be encircled, and retreat all the way to Tunisia, where the rougher ground favored defense, the fortified Mareth Line had been built by the French before the war, and he could link up with German forces fighting Allied units coming from the west. Consequently, the 8th Army took Sirte on Christmas Day and entered Tripoli on January 23, 1943. The Western Desert Campaign

involved a series of advances back and forth along the Libyan and Egyptian coastline by Axis and Allied forces. As one side advanced, its supply lines stretched (hindering operations) while the other's contracted (facilitating defense and leading to a reversal of fortunes). Although the combatants in the Western Desert Campaign developed a mutual respect—it was remembered as “war without hate”—anti-Semitic Italian fascists victimized Libyan Jews, who they saw as potential traitors. Three thousand Jews from Tripoli were sent to labor camps; 2,600 Jews from Cyrenaica were detained in the Giado concentration camp, where 562 died of disease before liberation by British forces in January 1943; and hundreds of Jews with British citizenship were deported to Italy and ended up in Bergen-Belsen concentration camp.¹⁰

With the postponement of Allied landings in northern France to 1944, Vichy French territory in North Africa would be occupied with the aim of opening all of the Mediterranean for shipping. The main obstacles to this ambition were the 300 German and 574 Italian aircraft based in Sicily and Sardinia. On November 8, 1942, during Operation Torch, 35,000 American troops shipped directly from the United States landed at Casablanca on Morocco's Atlantic coast; 18,000 American troops from Britain landed at Oran in Algeria; and 20,000 American and British soldiers landed at Algiers. The capture of Oran involved the first U.S. airborne assault of the war by the 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment. While there was brief Vichy resistance, including naval actions, at Casablanca and Oran, Free French forces staged a coup in Algiers just prior to the landing. During mid-November, there was a race for Tunisia as a U.S. and British brigade moved in from the west, which included two parachute drops, and German forces were flown and shipped in. By the end of the month, there were 3 German and 2 Italian divisions in Tunisia, where they clashed with local French forces that sided with the Allies. In late December, Axis forces, which enjoyed local air superiority, had stopped an Allied advance on Tunis. In mid-February 1943, at the Battle of Kasserine Pass, German and Italian forces under Rommel prevented the U.S. II Corps and the British 6th Armoured Division from moving through the Atlas Mountains into south-central Tunisia and drove them back 80 kilometers. In what was the war's first engagement between U.S. and German forces, the former suffered heavy casualties, which resulted in dramatic changes in American unit organization and

leadership and which led to the rise of the dynamic Major General George S. Patton as commander of American II Corps.

Fighting a two-front war in Tunisia, Rommel had to divert units from Kasserine to deal with the British 8th Army advance on the Mareth Line from the east. After the failure of an Axis offensive against the 8th Army called Operation Capri in early March, Rommel asked Hitler for permission to withdraw from North Africa, which was denied. He was placed on sick leave and replaced with Colonel-General Hans-Jurgen von Arnim. In late March, elements of the 8th Army outflanked the Mareth Line, which had been unsuccessfully attacked from the front, causing Axis forces to withdraw northwest to a new defensive line near the city of Gabes. In late March, continued pressure from the 8th Army to the south and the American II Corps from the west obliged Axis forces to leave Gabes and head north. In the north, the Germans launched an offensive against U.S. and British forces pushing west around Medjez, but the Allies quickly regained the initiative. By mid-April, Allied airfields had been moved forward to Tunisia to intercept German reinforcements arriving by air, and British warships from Malta were blocking Axis seaborne resupply. Renewed attacks by the 8th Army from the south pushed the remaining Axis forces into a northeastern defensive enclave around Tunis. During late April and early May, U.S. and British forces, supported by heavy artillery, assaulted the Axis position and after severe fighting, British armor entered Tunis on May 7. A week later, the last Axis resistance ended with the surrender of 230,000 men, many of whom had just arrived from Sicily. Although it delayed Allied shipping through the Mediterranean, Hitler's obsession with holding North Africa wasted Axis manpower and aircraft. Based in North Africa, Allied forces would invade Sicily in July and mainland Italy in September 1943.¹¹

FRENCH AND BELGIAN COLONIES AND WORLD WAR II

Although the mother countries had been occupied by Germany in 1940, exiled French and Belgian forces based in Africa continued fighting. After the fall of France to Germany and the establishment of the pro-Axis Vichy regime of Marshal Philippe Petain, there was confusion about the allegiance of French colonies. As discussed earlier in this chapter, French officials in North Africa initially sided with Vichy.

The same was true in French West Africa, where only Cameroon declared its loyalty to the exiled Free French of General Charles de Gaulle. Conversely, most of French Equatorial Africa (where Chad's black Guianese governor Felix Eboue despised Vichy collaboration with the Nazis) supported the Free French except Gabon. Brazzaville in Congo became the exiled Free French capital where a radio station, military academy, and war-related factories were established. French territories in the Middle East, Indochina, and the West Indies sided with Vichy. Given British concern that the French navy in the Mediterranean would back Germany and Italy, a Royal Navy taskforce conducted a surprise attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir on the coast of Algeria in early July 1940. Although Britain and France were not at war, 1,300 French personnel were killed; a battleship sunk; and 5 other vessels damaged. Subsequently, the British and Free French decided to seize the Vichy port of Dakar, the capital of French West Africa, as it was a better harbor than the Royal Navy's regional headquarters at Freetown, housed the French and Polish government's gold reserves, and could potentially be used by German submarines. Although de Gaulle suggested that a Free French force land at Conakry in Guinea and march 800 kilometers overland to Dakar to rally followers along the way, the British did not have the resources to support such a long operation and favored a direct attack on the port. A British naval force consisting of an aircraft carrier, 5 cruisers, 10 destroyers, and various transports carrying 8,000 Free French troops was sent to Dakar, where it was met by an Australian heavy cruiser that had already engaged a Vichy battleship. Dakar was defended by a new but immobilized French battleship, 2 cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 3 submarines. On September 23, 1940, after several attempts by the Free French to negotiate were rebuffed by Vichy leaders, a naval engagement was fought between the Allied and Vichy warships, with the latter supported by coastal defense guns. That afternoon, fog and Vichy coastal batteries foiled an Allied attempt to land Free French soldiers near Dakar. Surprised by Vichy determination, the Allies abandoned the assault with vessels damaged on both sides and 2 Vichy submarines sunk. This fiasco seriously damaged the credibility of the Free French cause.

In early October 1940, de Gaulle visited Cameroon and Chad to plan Free French attacks against the Italians in Libya. At the end of October and the beginning of November, Free French soldiers crossed from Cameroon into Gabon and seized the interior towns of Mitzic

and Lambarene, where Vichy troops surrendered. British and Free French ships picked up Colonel Philippe Leclerc's Free French troops, including the 13th Foreign Legion Demi-Brigade and Senegalese and Cameroonian soldiers, at Douala in Cameroon and, on the night of November 8, landed them at Libreville on the coast of Gabon. During the operation, a British warship sank a Vichy submarine, a Free French warship sank a Vichy one, and Free French aircraft from Douala bombed the Libreville airport, which was captured after Free French soldiers overcame stiff Vichy resistance. After the Free French captured Port Gentil on November 12, the Vichy governor committed suicide, and Vichy troops surrendered (though most rejected a personal offer from de Gaulle to join him and were detained in Brazzaville for the rest of the war). To facilitate de Gaulle's offensive into Libya, the Free French in Chad built a military headquarters and airfield at Fort Lamy (now N'Djamena) and an advance base 500 kilometers north at Faya-Largeau. Their forces in Chad consisted of 5,000 African tirailleurs and 3 detachments of camel riders with little motor transport to cross 400 kilometers of desert. Beginning in January 1941, the British Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), which employed specially equipped trucks to conduct reconnaissance far behind enemy lines, assisted the Free French from Chad to attack Italian posts in southern Libya. In late February, a French-LRDG expedition of 400 men in 60 trucks, commanded by Leclerc, attacked an isolated Italian fort at Kufra, where the 300-strong garrison of Italian officers and Libyan troops quickly surrendered and were allowed to withdraw northwest. After the battle, Leclerc and his men took the "Kufra Oath" in which they swore to keep fighting until the Free French flag was placed on the Strasbourg Cathedral.¹²

After December 1941, the Allies feared that the Japanese would seize Vichy-controlled Madagascar to dominate the Indian Ocean. South African prime minister Jan Smuts was instrumental in persuading the Allies to launch an invasion of Madagascar known as Operation Ironclad. In March and April 1942, the SAAF conducted aerial reconnaissance of the island, and Durban became the main staging area for naval and amphibious forces that would cross the Mozambique Channel. The invasion force consisted of 5 brigades, 1 South African, 1 East African/KAR, and 3 British. They were supported by 6 RAF and 17 SAAF aircraft, and 46 naval vessels. Out-numbered in most respects, the Vichy French had 2,000 European and 6,000 African soldiers; 6 tanks; 35 aircraft; and 4 warships. In the

first British amphibious landing of the war, the British engaged in heavy fighting to take the port of Diego Suarez in early May 1942. The motorized Seventh South African Infantry Brigade, consisting of 3 battalions, an armored car squadron, and an artillery detachment and commanded by Brigadier G. T. Senescall landed near the captured port in late June and prepared defensive positions to repulse an anticipated Japanese landing that did not transpire. The only Japanese involvement in the invasion of Madagascar occurred at the end of May when submarine launched torpedoes damaged the British battleship HMS *Ramillies* and sunk an oil tanker at port in Diego Suarez. In September, a British and an East African brigade landed at Majunga in the northwest and during the rest of the month the southern half of the island was occupied with little resistance. Late the same month, 2 Pretoria Regiment infantry companies and 2 Royal Marine commandos, led by South African lieutenant colonel C. L. Engelbrecht, embarked on Operation Rose, an amphibious seizure of the southern port of Tulear, where French defenders surrendered without a fight. In late October, South African armored cars led the final assault on Fianarantsoa, which resulted in the official French capitulation on November 5. South African forces were withdrawn in December. During the invasion, 107 Allied soldiers were killed or died of disease, and 280 were wounded. The SAAF flew 401 missions over Madagascar, lost 7 aircraft (including 1 from enemy action), and lost 3 men. In August 1942 British and South African forces were replaced by a Northern Rhodesia brigade that occupied the island.¹³

The armistice imposed on Vichy France by Germany limited the total French army in North Africa to 100,000 men, which meant that the Moroccan force was reduced from 83,000 to 46,600. Vichy authorities assigned many of the returning prisoners from the Battle of France to an expanded goum corps not included in the 100,000 quota and therefore represented a covert military reconstruction. While maintaining the façade of rural auxiliary police, the goums were transformed into an effective fighting force by the inclusion of many professional soldiers who had fought in France, the issue of better weapons and equipment, and reorganization into larger formations. In addition, remote goum posts became secret depots for stockpiling weapons, ammunition, and vehicles. In May 1942, a secret training exercise was held involving 38 goums (companies) and 5,000 goumiers. Just a month after the November 1942 Torch landings in Morocco and Algeria transferred France's main pool of colonial manpower to

the Free French, the first contingent of Moroccan goums came under Allied command in Tunisia, where they performed well as mountain troops, particularly at the Battle of Bizerta in March and April 1943. They would go on to fight for the Allies throughout the Mediterranean.¹⁴

Although the Belgian Army surrendered to the Germans in May 1940, exiled Belgian authorities declared that the Congo would support the Allied cause. With protest crushed by the Force Publique, the Belgian Congo accelerated production of valuable resources for the Allies such as 160,000 tons of copper per year; 9,000 tons of rubber in 1943 and 11,300 in 1944; 12,500 tons of tin in 1943 and 17,300 in 1944; and uranium for the development of atomic bombs. While the war-time expansion of the Force Publique was constrained by lack of European leadership from occupied Belgium, 3 mobile brigades of 6,000 soldiers and 4,000 porters each were dispatched from the colony. In January 1941, a Force Publique brigade was transported by truck, railway, and riverboat some 2,000 kilometers from Congo to Juba in South Sudan and then into western Ethiopia. Blocking the Italian retreat, the outnumbered Belgian colonial force overcame stiff resistance at the Bortai River in May and seized the mountain stronghold of Saio in early July, where they captured thousands of Italian troops (including 8 generals) and took 7,600 rifles; 200 machine guns; 18 cannon; and 250 trucks. Some 500 Force Publique troops were killed in the campaign. In July 1942, a 13,000-strong Force Publique brigade was shipped to southwest Nigeria to prepare for an invasion of the adjacent Vichy French territory of Dahomey (today's Benin), but this was cancelled in November when the territory switched to Free French control. As a result, the brigade was transported to the Middle East, with most shipped around the Cape to Suez and 18 motorized columns, totalling 2,000 men in 850 trucks, drove 6,000 kilometers from Zaria in northern Nigeria through Chad and Sudan to Cairo. While the Congolese troops in Egypt were reorganized and re-equipped along British lines, a shortage of European personnel kept them out of the European and Burma campaigns. Beginning in June 1943, the Force Publique garrisoned the Suez Canal, where they guarded prisoner camps, roads, and storage facilities. In April 1944, the brigade helped suppress fighting between royalists and communists in an exiled Greek brigade. In May, the Congolese were transferred to security duties in Palestine and between September 1944 and January 1945, they were sent home. As discussed later in this chapter, a Force

Publique field hospital participated in the East African, Madagascar, and Burma campaigns. In February 1944, a mutiny by a battalion in Luluabourg in Kasai spread to Jadotville and Kamina but was crushed within six weeks. Foreshadowing later problems within the Force Publique, Congolese NCOs were resentful about poor living conditions and Belgian officer racism compared to their war service outside the colony and conspired with discontented civilian elites who ultimately failed to rise up, and rank-in-file conscripts feared small pox vaccination was meant to kill them so that Europeans could eat their bodies.¹⁵

SOUTH AFRICA AND WORLD WAR II

The growth of Afrikaner nationalism during the interwar years meant that South Africa's entry into World War II on the side of Britain was not guaranteed. By a vote of 80 to 67, the South African parliament chose to assist the imperial parent, and in the same process the pro-British Smuts returned as prime minister. Like other dominions, South Africa was unprepared for war. In 1939, the Union Defence Force (UDF) consisted of 5,500 permanent members and 13,500 reservists in the Active Citizen Force. With no oceangoing naval vessels and only 40 working aircraft, South Africa initially concentrated on local defense and prepared small contingents for imperial service. Three important developments made the war more relevant to South Africa and impelled a military expansion. Italy's entry into the conflict on the side of Germany in 1940 meant there would be fighting much closer to home in North and East Africa, Japan's December 1941 offensive in the Pacific threatened South Africa's Indian Ocean coast, and Germany's submarine campaign in the south Atlantic endangered South African shipping. By 1945, the UDF had grown to 345,000 volunteers, many of whom served in East Africa, Madagascar, North Africa, and Italy. While many South Africans enlisted in the RAF, 44,569 served in the SAAF, which by 1940 had 394 aircraft and by 1945 had 28 active squadrons. With RAF resources stretched thin, South African air power played a key role in the campaigns in East Africa, the Middle East, and Madagascar. As part of the British Empire Air Training Scheme (BEATS), South Africa trained 33,500 RAF personnel at various facilities. Only Canada made a larger contribution to this scheme. Southern Rhodesia also hosted BEATS and trained

10,000 pilots and navigators. Over 9,400 men served in the South African Naval Force, which grew to 78 vessels that performed escort, minesweeping, and reconnaissance in local waters and supported British operations in the Mediterranean.¹⁶

Many Afrikaners were hostile to the idea of fighting another war on behalf of Britain, and some belonged to Nazi-style nationalist organizations. The state responded with a successful recruitment campaign that used weapons displays, newspaper endorsements by sports stars, and patriotic films to link military service to Afrikaner history and culture. In addition, some Afrikaners enlisted to overcome poverty. Of 570,000 white males eligible for military service, 190,000 signed up, of which at least half were Afrikaners. However, many of these soldiers complained about the restrictions of British military discipline, the institutional dominance of English language, and favoritism toward educated urban English speakers.¹⁷

A Directorate of Non-European Services was established for the large-scale mobilization of African, Indian, and Coloured military labor. In 1940, the Cape Corps, the Indian and Malay Corps, and the Native Labour Corps (later called the Native Military Corps or NMC) were created, and eventually 120,000 volunteers served in these units. By the end of 1943, the Cape Corps and the NMC had a total strength of 92,000 men, which represented 37 percent of the UDF. Although South Africa maintained a policy of arming only white soldiers, 2,000 Coloured troops of the Cape Corps were deployed as armed guards at home and in North Africa. As with the SANLC in the Great War, a large number of NMC recruits came from the impoverished northern Transvaal. Others came from Bechuanaland, Swaziland, and Basutoland before those neighboring territories formed their own units. Some Westernized African elites believed, as they had in 1914, that wartime service would advance their political rights, and they recognized the great threat of Nazi racial ideology. Attempts by white superiors to prevent black servicemen from mixing with foreign soldiers and especially white women provoked some resistance and was often not possible because of wartime circumstances.¹⁸

With the Italian Navy threatening shipping through the Mediterranean and Suez Canal, the Cape represented the main west-east shipping route for the Allies for much of the war, and South African ports became important centers for naval supply and repair. From October 1941, a total of 32 German and a few Italian submarines operated in South African waters, and during June and July 1942,

5 Japanese submarines hunted in the waters between Durban and the northern part of the Mozambique Channel. By the end of 1941, coastal artillery batteries had been established at Walvis Bay, Saldanha Bay, Cape Town, Robben Island, Simonstown, Port Elizabeth, East London, and Durban. By June 1942, most of the gun crews were mixed race Cape Corps soldiers. Eventually, antisubmarine cables, depth charge throwers, antiaircraft guns, and searchlights were installed in major ports. SAAF aircraft undertook coastal antisubmarine patrols and eventually took over the RAF Catalina squadron at Durban. Within a 1,600-kilometer radius of the South African coast, Axis forces destroyed or captured 153 ships amounting to 875,000 tons, and the Allies sank only 3 German submarines.

In November 1940, the South African government formed the Seaward Defence Force (SDF), commanded by retired British rear admiral G. W. Halifax, to take over coastal protection and patrol of local waters from the Royal Navy. Developed from an initial core of South African Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve (RNVR), the SDF converted civilian fishing trawlers and whalers—the government had taken over the whaling fleet for war duties in 1939—for antisubmarine, minesweeping, and escort operations. At the end of 1941, the SDF had 1,232 men on 24 minesweepers and 8 antisubmarine ships. Convoys bound for India, Australia, and the Middle East assembled at Walvis Bay, in South African-occupied South West Africa (Namibia), where the SDF maintained a base. SDF ships escorted convoys to the Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar. In May 1940, it undertook the removal of a major minefield off Cape Agulhas that had been laid by the German raider *Atlantis*. In early 1941, on the request of the British Admiralty, the SDF sent four converted whalers, the 22nd Anti-Submarine Group, to the Egyptian port of Alexandria. They immediately began minesweeping and convoy escort off Tobruk, and 1 vessel was sunk. In a short time, another 8 SDF ships, the 166th and 167th Minesweeping Flotillas, went to the Mediterranean, where they patrolled the Libyan coast and supported the Royal Navy intercepting Vichy convoys, with some captured vessels taken to South African ports.

Representing the advent of the modern South African Navy, in August 1942, the SDF and South African RNVR were amalgamated by London into the South African Naval Force (SANF). More and larger vessels were acquired, and the Royal Navy gave South Africa three frigates in exchange for South African sailors who served on

British warships. On March 14, 1945, while on trials in British waters, the frigate HMSAS *Natal* sank German submarine U714. To the east in July 1945, the HMSAS *Barbarke* removed Japanese boom defenses at Rangoon in Burma, and in August 1945, HMSAS *Natal* escorted Allied convoys through the Malacca Straights. Two Royal Navy ships, a salvage vessel and an antisubmarine frigate, operating in the Pacific against the Japanese were entirely crewed by South Africans. In October 1943, the 280-strong Women's Auxiliary Naval Service was established for harbor defense and administration. By the end of the conflict, the SANF consisted of more than 8,000 personnel, of which 3,000 were seconded to the Royal Navy. In total, 329 SANF members died during the war, including 120 who went down with Royal Navy warships. In 1946, SANF became part of the UDF.¹⁹

AFRICAN SOLDIERS OUTSIDE THE CONTINENT, 1939–1945

Out of the 80 divisions that defended France in 1939, 7 were African. African soldiers represented around 9 percent of the French army in France, which was a greater portion than during World War I. In May and June 1940, more than 75,000 West African troops defended France from the German invasion. About 40,000 of them experienced combat; about 10,000 were killed; and thousands more went missing. Among the French colonial forces were 12 regiments from Morocco numbering 90,000 men, of whom 83,000 were indigenous Moroccans. African divisions bore the brunt of the German onslaught on the Aisne, Argonne, and Somme and conducted a tenacious fighting withdrawal. In mid-May, the Moroccan division crossed into Belgium, where it faced heavy aerial bombardment and an armored attack, with some soldiers charging German tanks with bayonets. With the loss of their artillery support, elements of the division conducted a fighting retreat to the French border, where some made a last stand outside Lille and surrendered at the end of May, and others made it to Dunkirk, from where they were evacuated to Britain. A Moroccan cavalry regiment in Belgium in mid-May delayed the German advance but lost half its men, holding out in a small pocket encircled by tanks until late June. Of the many West Africans taken prisoner during the fall of France, between 1,500 and 3,000 were executed by racist Nazi soldiers, which foreshadowed the widespread German war crimes that would be committed in eastern Europe and the Balkans. The Germans tended

to treat white French and British soldiers according to the Geneva Convention. However, black African prisoners were separated from other prisoners and sent to labor camps on the northeast French border with Germany, where they were forced to work in mining and arms manufacturing. Lighter skinned North African prisoners were not separated from their French counterparts.²⁰

African soldiers fought in several other overseas campaigns of World War II, the most famous of which was Burma. The Japanese invaded Burma in 1942 to stop the Allies from using the port of Rangoon to supply Chinese forces further north. Between late 1942 and early 1944, the Allies—mostly British, Indian, U.S. and Chinese troops based in India—launched several failed offensives into Burma that were followed by an unsuccessful Japanese attempt to invade India. British colonial African troops participated in the last and ultimately effective Allied offensive that drove the Japanese out of Burma from late 1944 to mid-1945. The Burma campaign was characterized by jungle warfare, tropical disease, heavy monsoon rains that restricted operations to half the year, and the impossibility of motor transport through the rough terrain that meant units often relied on resupply by airdrop. In 1941, General George Giffard, who had led KAR troops in East Africa during World War I, took over Britain's West African Command and organized the RWAFF into two infantry divisions to counter potential threats from neighboring Vichy French territories. As stated earlier in this chapter, four of these West African brigades fought against the Italians in East Africa. When Giffard became commander of the Eastern Army in India in 1943, he was instrumental in bringing African units to fight in Burma. Arriving in India in August 1943, the 81st West African Division consisted of a brigade from the Gold Coast; another from Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria; and a third solely from Nigeria. This last brigade, the 3rd West African Brigade (with three Nigeria Regiment battalions), was seconded to the British Special Force called Chindits under the controversial Major General Orde Wingate, which penetrated deep behind Japanese lines to disrupt supply and communications, suffering heavy casualties in the process. The rest of the division fought in the Second Arakan campaign from January to May 1944 when during its advance down the Kaladan Valley to threaten the Japanese rear it became the first Allied division in Burma supplied entirely by air. General William Slim, British commander in Burma, believed the 81st Division had too many European officers and NCOs, 50–60 per battalion, which sapped

the initiative of the West African NCOs and troops. Subsequently, the 81st West African Division, including the 3rd West African Brigade, took part in the Third Arakan campaign in December 1944 that finally pushed the Japanese out of that province. In April 1945, the division was withdrawn to India for rest and in August was returned to West Africa for demobilization. Among the 81st West African Division was Major Seth Anthony, a graduate of the Gold Coast's Achimote College and Britain's Sandhurst Military Academy, who was the first black African commissioned officer in the British Army and later a senior Ghanaian diplomat from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. The 82nd West African Division, with one brigade from the Gold Coast and two from Nigeria, arrived in Ceylon in July 1944. During the Third Arakan campaign, the division captured Buthidaung and established a bridgehead on the east bank of the Kalapanzin River, allowing Allied troops to control the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road that had been contested for the past three years. The 82nd Division then crossed a jungle-covered mountain range to link up with the 81st Division near the mouth of the Kaladan River, forcing the Japanese to evacuate the Mayu Peninsula, which they had held for four years. The Japanese then retreated south along the coast but took heavy losses when they were cut off by an amphibious landing of British and Indian troops. In late February 1945, the 82nd Division's 1st and 4th (Nigerian) Brigades suffered heavy casualties in opening routes to Kaw and Kyweguseik, and in March, it cooperated with Indian units to capture Dalet Chaung and the important supply base of Tamandu. In turn, the 2nd (Gold Coast) Brigade became the target of determined Japanese counterattacks and had to retire. The 1st (Nigerian) Brigade then sent long-distance fighting patrols to attack the Japanese flanks, which compelled them to retreat. By the end of May, the 82nd Division, with the 22nd East African Brigade under command, had advanced south from Tamandu and taken Kindaunggyi, Taungup, and Sandoway. During the Burma campaign, the division suffered 2,085 casualties, the highest in Britain's XV Corps.

After the East African campaign and invasion of Madagascar, British East African units were dispatched to Ceylon and then Burma. The 11th East African Division, consisting of three KAR brigades from Uganda, Nyasaland, Kenya, and Tanganyika as well as one battalion from the NRR, completed its move to Ceylon in June 1943 and began transport to Burma at the end of May 1944. In August, as part of an Allied offensive, the division advanced into the wet and

mosquito-infested Kabaw Valley, where British officers hoped East Africans would be less vulnerable to malaria. By mid-December, the division had established a firm bridgehead on the Chindwin River and was then withdrawn to India for rest and further training. Its anticipated deployment to southern Burma did not happen because of Japan's surrender in August 1945. With this division in Burma was a field hospital from the Belgian Force Publique with 20 European and 350 Congolese personnel who had also participated in the East Africa campaign and the invasion of Madagascar. There were also two independent East African infantry brigades deployed in the latter part of the Burma campaign, the 22nd (which consisted of a battalion each of Nyasaland KAR, NRR, and RAR) and the 28th (which was entirely KAR). With limited support units, the 22nd and 28th were used as reinforcements and committed to battle at different times and places. The 22nd Brigade fought in the Third Arakan campaign under the 25th and 26th Indian Divisions, and 82nd West African Division. Although it was the last East African formation to arrive in Burma, it experienced the longest continuous contact with the enemy. When the 11th East African Division was withdrawn, it was replaced by 28th East African Brigade, which was meant to convince the Japanese they were fighting the same force. In February 1945, the 28th staged a mock crossing of the important Irrawaddy River at Chauk that distracted the Japanese from the real crossings elsewhere. Overall, 80,000 West Africans and 46,000 East Africans, including those from the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, served in the Burma campaign. Although most African troops in Burma originated from grassland and forests, the Japanese considered them the best jungle fighters they had encountered. Exploiting racist stereotypes, some African soldiers told Burmese civilians they were cannibals, thinking that the Japanese would hear about this and fear them. Among Nigerian forces in Burma was a remarkable soldier called Chari Maigumeri who, during World War I, had won an Iron Cross for gallantry as a German colonial soldier in Cameroon and then joined the Nigeria Regiment to fight in the last year of the German East Africa campaign. During World War II, he fought the Italians in Ethiopia and the Japanese in Burma (winning the Military Medal), and upon retirement as the Nigeria Regiment's senior warrant officer in 1953, he was made honorary captain.²¹

Recruited from the Southern African British High Commission territories of Bechuanaland (today's Botswana), Basutoland (today's Lesotho), and Swaziland, the African Pioneer Corps (APC) provided

military labor in the Mediterranean region. The fall of Greece and Crete in 1941 cost the British Pioneer Corps 4,500 men, which caused a labor shortage for Middle East Command and prompted the formation of the APC. As during the previous world war, traditional rulers who dominated these territories wanted to ingratiate themselves to the British to avoid being handed over to neighboring white minority-ruled South Africa. During World War I, the people of Basutoland donated enough money to pay for a squadron of 24 Sopwith Camel fighters, and this was repeated in the next war with 17 Basutoland Spitfires. With a lower population, Bechuanaland collected enough money for two Spitfires called *Bechuana* and *Kalahari*. However, African leaders in these territories wanted to do something more substantial for the war effort and worried that their territories' contribution was diminished by their men joining the South African NMC. While the APC was a volunteer force, many of its members had been pressured into enlisting by their chiefs, some of whom joined themselves and became sergeant majors. A total of 10,000 men from Bechuanaland; 22,000 from Basutoland; and 3,600 from Swaziland served in the APC. Basutoland lost 1,216 men, 633 of whom went down with the troopship SS *Erinypura* on its way to Malta in May 1943; Bechuanaland lost 400; and Swaziland lost 122. The main cause of death was disease. Once they were landed at Port Suez in Egypt, APC men were taken to the nearby Pioneer Corps Base Depot and from there labor groups, 6 companies of 350 men each, were dispatched to where they were needed. During the Western Desert Campaign, the British 8th Army was supported by 62 Group in Tobruk, 59 Group at Fort Capuzzo, 44 Group at Bardia, 55 Group at Sollum, 58 Group at Mischiefia, and 73 Group at Mersa Matruh. One of the early jobs of APC soldiers was the construction of defenses in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and the Nile Delta in anticipation of German breakthroughs from the Caucasus in the north that were rendered impossible by the Russian siege of Stalingrad. When the war cooled down in the Middle East, the British War Office wanted the APC to deploy to Burma like most other African units, but the Colonial Office—which needed to keep the confidence of the chiefs in the High Commission territories—refused because many of the men had volunteered to fight Hitler before the Japanese had entered the war. Following the Allied victory in North Africa, APC labor groups accompanied British forces to Malta, Sicily, Italy, and Yugoslavia. Under British officers and NCOs, APC troops performed a wide

variety of tasks such as working port facilities in Tripoli and Tobruk, camouflaging military installations, building dummy tanks, participating in deception movements, constructing and guarding supply dumps, transporting supplies to combat units, generating huge smokescreens for amphibious landings, guarding prisoners, providing security in unstable places such as Egypt and Palestine, forming specialist fire-fighting units, and joining antiaircraft and mountain artillery units. In the mountains of Italy, specially recruited muleteers from Basutoland transported supplies to front-line units and evacuated casualties, and gunners from Bechuanaland took part in artillery barrages. On the request of Swazi king Sobhuza II, the Swazi contingent was kept together throughout the war, with their band carrying the Swazi royal colors made by the Swazi queen mother during the victory parade in Tripoli in May 1943, and its companies generated a 14,000-foot long smokescreen for the Allied landing at Salerno in September 1943, carried ammunition to the British 201st Guards Brigade, and were just behind the first Allied troops to enter Rome.²²

Various African units fought in the Italian campaign. The SAAF played an important role in the invasions of Sicily and Italy, and by the end of 1943, 2 out of 8 Allied air wings and 8 out of 28 Allied squadrons in Italy were South African. After the Second Battle of Alamein, South African troops were withdrawn from North Africa and reformed into the 6th South African Armoured Division. One reason for this was that an armored division had fewer personnel than an infantry division and, therefore, would be easier for the South Africans to maintain given that only whites could be used as armed soldiers. After training in the Middle East, the 18,000-strong South African armored division, including nonwhite support personnel, was transferred to Italy in April 1944 and served under the British 8th Army and the United States 5th Army. Under Major General W. H. E. Poole, it participated in the advance on Rome and Florence, and through the Apennines Mountains to assault the German Gothic Line, suffering 711 killed; 2,675 wounded; and 157 missing. Also present in Italy were 10,000 men of the South African Railway Construction Group who repaired 850 kilometers of track and rebuilt 106 bridges. When British and American forces landed on Sicily in July 1943, the presence of three battalions of knife-wielding Free French Moroccan Goumiers caused Italian soldiers to surrender en masse. In August 1943, the Free French Forces and the French Army of Africa merged to form the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) under

General Alphonse Juin. In September 1943, while U.S. and British troops were landing in mainland Italy, the French 1st Corps consisting of 2 Moroccan infantry divisions, 1 Moroccan light tank regiment, and 3 Goumier battalions invaded Corsica. By the beginning of October, the island was secure but the German garrison had escaped to the mainland. During 1944, the FEC fought in the mountains of Italy, particularly in the First Battle of Monte Cassino and the penetration of the Gustav Line. Under command of the American 5th Army, this was primarily a North African formation in which 60 percent of the soldiers were indigenous Moroccans and Algerians, and 40 percent were French settlers from Algeria. While 9 battalions of Moroccan Goumiers were important in spearheading FEC attacks in mountainous Italy, they developed a reputation for widespread rape of civilian men, women, and children as well as prisoners. In mid-June 1944, during Operation Brassard, the Royal Navy landed the French 9th Colonial Infantry Division consisting of 2 regiments of Tirailleurs Senegalais, a battalion of commandos, and a battalion of Goumiers on the island of Elba just off the coast of Italy. The island was secured after several days of vicious fighting in which the Senegalese used flamethrowers to eliminate German strongholds.

Landed in the south of France in mid-August 1944 as part of Operation Dragoon, the French Army B had four divisions, of which two—the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division and the 9th Colonial Infantry Division—were primarily African. There were nine battalions of goumiers. In the south of France, African soldiers experienced considerable combat such as in the capture of Toulon. The Free French 2nd Armoured Division, formed from the core of units that had attacked Kufra in February 1941 and led by General Leclerc, was modeled on a U.S. armored formation and fought in northwest Europe during 1944 and 1945, including the Normandy campaign, the liberation of Paris, and the invasion of Germany. In late November 1944, the division fulfilled Leclerc's Kufra Oath by taking Strasbourg. Among its 14,500 members were 3,000 Algerians and Moroccans. Although Africans comprised around two thirds of all Free French forces, U.S. and British commanders insisted that a mostly white French unit liberate Paris. The 2nd Armoured Division was selected for this mission because among the Free French units it had the least number of black personnel. Indeed, in September and October 1944, on the orders of de Gaulle, Free French forces in France experienced a process of "whitening" in which black veterans were replaced by young white

Frenchmen and elements of partisan groups. Given that France had been humiliated by defeat and occupation, de Gaulle believed it important for Frenchmen to liberate themselves rather than be seen to be rescued by their colonial subjects. There was also concern that the partisan groups, some with communist leadership, would be more easily controlled within the regular army. Since the Americans, who supplied the Free French with weapons and equipment, had limited de Gaulle's force to 250,000 men, the participation of new white soldiers could happen only if they replaced black ones. During the winter of 1944–1945, Free French authorities, citing the old belief that African soldiers did not perform well in cold weather, confiscated the weapons and sometimes uniforms of thousands of battle-hardened African troops. Denied a role in the upcoming victory, these men were sent to camps in the south of France where they were poorly fed, subjected to harsh military discipline, and waited for ships to take them home. Resentment of poor conditions and lack of back pay for former prisoners (many of whom had been moved straight from German to French detention camps) led to a series of uprisings mostly in southern France. The most serious of these disturbances occurred on December 1, 1944, at Thiaroye near Dakar when 35 ex-prisoners were shot dead and an equal number wounded by French forces.²³

THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR II ON AFRICAN CIVILIANS

While the colonial powers generally did not invest much in Africa during the 1920s and 1930s, this changed during World War II because there was a dramatically increased demand for raw materials. Indeed, the exiled Belgian and Free French governments were largely based in their respective African colonies. In what some historians have called the second colonial occupation, colonial rulers reintroduced forced labor in areas in which it had not existed for decades, and many Africans were evicted from their land to make way for commercial agriculture. With the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia, the Belgian Congo became the chief supplier of rubber for the Allies, and labor practices became almost as oppressive as they had been under Leopold II. In northern Nigeria, the British forced 18,000 men to mine tin. Although the international price of many agricultural goods rose, African peasant producers did not benefit because colonial marketing boards enforced artificially low prices, and

increased profits were directed toward the war effort. Despite this, some African peasants, particularly those selling higher-priced goods such as cocoa and coffee, prospered during the war, and a more noticeable gap developed within some rural African communities.


One of the most important impacts of World War II on Africa was the dramatic growth of cities. Urban wage labor became more popular as some people fled rural areas to escape forced production and others were attracted by jobs building the new harbor and airport facilities for the Allied war effort. Reduced imports from Europe led to the development of a manufacturing industry in South Africa, which during the early 1940s overtook mining as the country's main employer. Because more people flocked to the cities than there were new jobs, they became home to large numbers of unemployed. This became worse with the end of the war and the return of hundreds of thousands of former soldiers in search of work. Africa's newly enlarged cities would provide the mass audience for the elite African nationalist leaders who before the war had modestly requested colonial reform but after it began making more radical demands for independence. During the war, African nationalists were inspired by Allied ideals of democracy and freedom, and looked to specific events such as the 1941 Atlantic Charter, where the leaders of Britain and the United States stated that all people should have the right to self-determination, and the 1944 Brazzaville Conference, where Free French leaders promised equal rights to colonial populations though not complete independence. These ideas were spread by the growing number of African newspapers that circulated during the war among an increasingly literate and urban population. The Fifth Pan-African Congress, held in Britain in 1945, was attended by emerging African nationalists such as Kwame Nkrumah of Gold Coast and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, and issued a call for the independence of Africa that was spread throughout the continent. Immediately following the war, the idea that African soldiers had fought for democracy and freedom yet returned to colonies where they had none of either gained traction among African nationalists and their growing number of urban supporters. This set the stage for the independence struggles of the 1950s and 1960s. While there is a common belief that disillusioned African World War II veterans played a key role in the independence movements, it seems they were no more prominent than other social groups and many, through continued service with the army or police, strengthened the colonial state.²⁴

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Chapter 5

Warfare, the Military, and Decolonization, 1945–1963

At the end of World War II, Britain and France were committed to a gradual process of reform that would lead to self-government for their African territories within the framework of the existing empires. With all the colonial powers on the Western side of the developing global Cold War, African colonies were often incorporated into new regional defense schemes. The independence of Asian countries such as British-ruled India in 1947 and French Indochina in 1954 was also important in creating a context for colonial reform in Africa and established a growing anticolonial block within the United Nations. By the early 1960s, the rise of radical African nationalism with mass support in the continent's cities had caused Britain and France, and ultimately Belgium, to decide to leave Africa quickly and grant full independence to their colonies. While most African countries achieved political independence through negotiation between local nationalist leaders and outgoing colonial officials during the late 1950s and early 1960s, the theme of warfare had been central in setting the stage for this rapid transition. During the mid-1950s, the Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya and the Suez Crisis in Egypt prompted Britain to begin to withdraw from Africa much more quickly and completely than anticipated. For the French, protracted insurgency in Algeria from 1954 to the early 1960s, which caused serious crises at home, played a similar



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role. In the white minority regimes of Southern Africa and the colonies of fascist Portugal, persecuted and frustrated African nationalists launched insurgent campaigns to fight for democracy and independence.

COLONIAL MILITARY REFORMS

During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the British and French, in keeping with their broader colonial reforms, began to slowly and cautiously change the nature of African colonial military service to reduce obvious racial discrimination. One of the most important aspects of

this process was the dilution of the military racial hierarchy by the appointment of African officers, which tended to get bogged down because existing prejudice in colonial society meant few Africans possessed the required Western educational qualifications, and conservative European military authorities resisted change, claiming to enforce high standards. When rapid decolonization suddenly became a reality in the late 1950s and early 1960s, this process was accelerated. However, it was too late. The newly independent African states inherited armed forces with small numbers of undertrained and inexperienced African officers promoted meteorically to fill positions for which they were unprepared. Furthermore, the legacy of colonial military recruiting patterns caused problems of regionalism within the new African states because soldiers tended to come from marginalized areas with imagined martial traditions, and the politicians usually originated from relatively more privileged areas with greater access to education.

In the late 1940s, the French, within the context of reforms such as the abolition of African forced labor, began to transform the *Tirailleurs* Senegalais from a mass of unskilled conscripts to a smaller more professional military consisting mostly of volunteers. Many poor urban men joined the army because of unemployment in the growing cities of French West Africa or to learn a trade or French language. Although French authorities wanted to add more Africans to the officer corps, resistance from traditionalist French officers and reluctance by the best-educated African young men to enlist because they had better opportunities in civilian life slowed the process. In 1955, the French created a special program to train officers from among the most promising African noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and the best graduates of African military schools that had been established for soldiers' children. A number of Francophone Africa's future military presidents graduated from this program, such as Seyni Kountche of Niger, Mathieu Kerekou of Benin, Moussa Traore of Mali, and Seye Zerbo of Upper Volta (Burkina Faso). These military reforms were never completed and by 1960, when most French territories were suddenly granted independence, the French colonial army in West Africa consisted of a rank in file of rural peasants and urban workers commanded by African officers who were either long-serving soldiers or petty bourgeoisie beneficiaries of limited Africanization.¹

As early as the 1930s, the British government had planned to eventually grant self-government within the empire to the West African

colonies of Gold Coast (today's Ghana) and Nigeria because they contained relatively large Western-educated populations. Although these plans were delayed by World War II, the 1948 police shooting of African ex-servicemen protesting for improved benefits in Gold Coast led to widespread rioting that impelled the British to reform the local legislative council so that it came to be controlled by an elected African majority. In 1951, African nationalist leader Kwame Nkrumah was released from detention to become the elected premier of the self-governing Gold Coast, which began a six-year transition to full independence. In Nigeria, which the British had ruled as separate northern and southern territories until 1946, independence was delayed by disagreements between African regional leaders over whether the future country would have a unitary or federal government, or be split into several autonomous states.²

Between 1897 and 1956, the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF), headquartered in Accra, consisted of British colonial military units in Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia. By the mid-1950s, the Nigerian military numbered some 6,400 African soldiers led by 250 British officers. They were divided into five infantry battalions of the Nigeria Regiment (renamed the Queen's Own Nigeria Regiment [QONR] during a 1956 royal visit) stationed at Abeokuta, Enugu, Ibadan, and two at Kaduna, an artillery battery and engineer squadron at Kaduna, a recruit training depot at Zaria, and a headquarters in Lagos. With 5,700 men, the Gold Coast Regiment comprised three infantry battalions, a field artillery battery, support units, and a small communications element on loan from the British Army. While almost all Nigerian and Gold Coast soldiers recruited between the world wars were from the impoverished north and served as infantrymen, a shortage of Europeans during World War II meant that the British began to recruit relatively better educated southerners as specialists such as drivers and mechanics, and this practice continued after 1945. By the early 1950s, the Nigerian and Gold Coast armies were divided between a majority of illiterate infantrymen from the north and a minority of tradesmen and clerks from the south who had basic education. In 1952, at the Command Ordnance Depot in Yaba, Nigeria, a mutiny by 100 mostly southern clerks over poor accommodations was suppressed by military police and northern infantrymen. At this time, the majority ethnic groups were underrepresented in the Nigerian army, with most recruits coming from minority ethnic groups in marginalized areas. Among the

northerners, the number of Hausa, who had previously dominated the force, declined in favor of recruits from the “Middle Belt,” which was the lower part of the northern region inhabited by traditionalist or Christian minorities such as the Dakakori and Tiv. Another major area for recruitment was the Borno area of the far northeast and across the border in French West Africa, which was home to RSM Hama Kim, the senior warrant officer in the Nigerian Army in 1962. Among soldiers from the southeast (called Eastern region), the majority Igbo were outnumbered by members of minority groups from Calabar, Ogoja, and Rivers provinces. In the southwest (called Western region), few of the Yoruba majority joined the army—there were only 700 Yoruba soldiers out of 10,500 in 1966—with most recruits coming from the midwest near the Niger River and particularly from the area’s Igbo minority. Nigerian soldiers of the late 1940s and 1950s were primarily employed in internal security operations such as when two infantry battalions were sent to Gold Coast in 1948 to help suppress nationalist protest, and to assist the Nigeria police during riots in Kano in April 1953, Eastern Nigeria in February 1958, and Ibadan in March 1958. Unlike the French, the British did not send West African soldiers to fight anti-colonial forces in other parts of their empire because in 1953 London had agreed not to send colonial military units outside their territories without permission from the respective territorial governments.

In 1948, influenced by Africanization of the civil service, the RWAFF began efforts to bring more Africans into the officer corps. Although there had been a few African officers in the very early days of the RWAFF around 1900, all officers were white from the era of World War I until World War II when just one West African, Seth Anthony from Gold Coast, received the king’s commission. In 1949, an attempt to establish a West African Military Academy to train Africans as officers failed because African nationalists insisted that all local qualifications be internationally recognized. As a result, Royal Military Academy (RMA) Sandhurst reserved positions for recent West African secondary school graduates to be commissioned after 18 months instruction with preparatory training, making it a total of two and a half years. Serving senior NCOs and warrant officers who completed a 16-week course at Britain’s Mons or Eaton Hall Officer Cadet Schools would be granted short-service commissions that would be converted to regular commissions after 3 years. However, the required educational level and entrance tests (which were more difficult than those for British candidates) were so demanding that

few qualified for these programs. In 1953, the RWAFF established a training school at Teshie in Gold Coast to prepare officer candidates from across the region for training in Britain. Hoping to generate interest in a military career among secondary school graduates, army cadet units were established at Achimota School in Gold Coast in 1954 and the University College, Ibadan in Nigeria and government schools in Zaria in the north, Umuahia in the east, and King's College, Lagos, in the West in 1955. Initially operated by expatriate teachers with military experience, new cadet units were opened at other schools during the late 1950s.

Since most infantrymen were illiterate, most of the first West African officers of the post-World War II era came from technical services, for example, the six out of seven in Gold Coast who were senior NCOs and warrant officers in the Army Educational Service. Becoming the first African officer in the Gold Coast army in 1947, Joseph Arthur Ankrah was from a trading family in Accra, had worked as a military records clerk during the war, became chief instructor in the Education Unit upon commission, took command of the territory's first all-African infantry company in 1956, and after independence became the first Ghanaian commander of the army in 1961 and head of state following the 1966 military coup. In Nigeria, two out of three warrant officers commissioned in 1949 were from technical services, including Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, an Igbo clerk who went on to become head of the Nigerian Army in 1965 and the country's first military head of state in 1966. Until 1956, all the Nigerian senior NCOs and warrant officers to gain commissions were from the south, and most of the initial Sandhurst candidates were northerners who had graduated from the prestigious Government College in Zaria, which had produced the region's tiny educated elite. Young educated men from southern Nigeria and Ghana were not attracted to the Sandhurst scheme because the army was considered a low-status career of which parents disapproved, Sandhurst did not grant university degrees, British personnel earned more money than Africans of senior rank, and the civil service provided a generous car allowance not available in the military. By 1956, only 28 out of 212 officers in Gold Coast and 15 out of 250 in Nigeria were Africans. This compared unfavorably with the civil service, which in Gold Coast from 1946 to 1957 had increased the number of senior African members from 89 to 1,581. Once granted independence in 1957, the Nkrumah government in Ghana embarked on ambitious military expansion, including the

appointment of more African officers of whom, by July 1959, there were 79 in the army and 24 officer candidates training in Britain and Pakistan. In 1958, the Nigerian government, set for independence in two years, gained control of its military forces. With pressure from Nigerian politicians to increase the number of African officers beyond the existing 32, Nigerian authorities sent Nigerian officers to speak at secondary schools, circulated a film featuring a Nigerian candidate at Sandhurst, opened more army cadet units at schools, provided officers with a car allowance, and sent some secondary school graduates on the accelerated officers' course in Britain usually taken by serving senior NCOs and warrant officers. Among the new officers who joined the army in the late 1950s was Zaria-educated northerner Yakuba Gowon, who attended Sandhurst and later led the federal government against Biafran separatists; Oxford graduate Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, one of just three officers with a university degree, who completed the accelerated program and later became the leader of secessionist Biafra; and westerner Olusegun Obasanjo, who also completed the accelerated program and much later became both a military and civilian head of state. The expectation to Nigerianize the officer corps was motivated not just by nationalism, but also by economic reasons because the employment of a British major cost as much as three Nigerian ones. Upon independence in 1960, there were 61 Nigerian officers, of whom 39 were from the Eastern region and only eight from the north. Easterners were beginning to dominate the embryonic Nigerian officer corps because they had a generally higher educational level, the technical services senior NCOs and warrant officers who qualified for officer training tended to come from there, and several secondary schools in that region developed a military tradition. In the federal civil service and senior police ranks, southerners outnumbered northerners by an even wider margin. During the late 1950s, most Nigerian officers served in support units rather than infantry battalions because their educational and military backgrounds made them well qualified for this role, and there was concern among authorities that the mostly northern infantrymen would not accept orders from southern officers. A similar situation continued in Ghana in the late 1950s because most army officers came from the south where young men had better educational opportunities.

The presence of British NCOs in West Africa highlighted continued racial discrimination and was more controversial than the prominence

of British officers. Because overt racial discrimination had been removed from southern Nigeria by the mid-1950s, African nationalists complained that the presence of 336 British NCOs who worked in technical support roles was discriminatory, as they received substantially higher salaries than their Nigerian counterparts (a British sergeant could make more than an African major) and had separate messes and schools for their children. In the Gold Coast assembly, there were objections that British NCOs lived in better quarters than African officers and owned cars, which African officers could not afford. As most African soldiers who became skilled tradesmen left the army for better-paying civilian jobs, the British set up army boys' units where 14-year-olds, usually soldiers' sons, took a four-year course of education and military training. In 1956, the first of these boy soldiers graduated and were sent to army apprentice schools in Britain. A few later became officers.

At the 1953 West African Forces Conference in Lagos, the colonies decided to establish their own separate military forces under the RWAFF umbrella. The next year, the Army Advisory Council was established to maintain West African participation in imperial defense; coordinate uniformity of organization, training and equipment; and discuss coastal defense and the potential of air power. In 1956, nine months before Gold Coast independence, the British West Africa Command based in Accra was broken up, with the respective military forces of each territory becoming separate from one another. This effectively ended the RWAFF. That same year, military forces in Gold Coast were transferred to the government of Kwame Nkrumah who, in 1958, made the Army Advisory Council irrelevant by withdrawing from it. In Nigeria in 1956, units of the defunct RWAFF were reconstituted as the Nigerian Military Forces (NMF). At the 1957 Nigerian Constitutional Conference, it was agreed to hand over NMF command to the Nigerian government, which happened in April 1958. Although Nigerian taxpayers became responsible for financing the force, Britain granted Nigeria half a million pounds over each of the next two years to ease the transition. In 1958, control of the NMF was passed to the British governor-general, who was assisted by a defense council made up of representatives from federal and regional administrations and with the 1959 federal elections, the military was placed under the authority of new prime minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. Around the same time, the single battalion of the Sierra Leone Regiment was transferred to local control, and the British governor of

Gambia decided to transform the single-company Gambia Regiment into the 140-strong paramilitary police unit called the Gambia Field Force to provide internal security during upcoming elections.

In 1960, the new Nigerian government signed a defense agreement with Britain that allowed for the staging of British aircraft in the country and the provision of instructors, equipment, and training facilities. However, just over a year later, it was cancelled because of protest by Nigerian nationalists. From 1956 to 1960, the number of British NCOs and warrant officers was reduced from 336 to 80, and serving British officers were sometimes replaced by retired British officers hired on contract and paid lower Nigerian salaries. Given the army's primarily internal security role, its artillery unit was replaced with an armored car squadron for fast reconnaissance. While a few Nigerian politicians believed that their country needed just a token ceremonial military, many thought Africa's most populous country should have a suitably powerful military. This latter view was given weight by instability in neighboring Niger and Cameroon, and Ghana's 1959 decision to create an air force and navy. Competition with Ghana became important. When Ghana announced plans in May 1959 to replace World War II-era Lee-Enfield rifles with new FN semiautomatic rifles as the British had done, the Nigerian administration reversed an earlier decision to forgo the switch because of cost and purchased the new weapons just before independence. During the 1959 federal elections, the main political parties put forth their policies on the military that reflected regional recruiting patterns. The Northern People's Congress (NPC), based in the home region of most soldiers, advocated military expansion so that Nigeria could act as a stabilizing force in Africa. The National Congress of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), which was popular in the east from where most officers and technical troops originated, promised to improve conditions of service and develop armed forces to protect the country internally and externally. The Action Group (AG) of the mostly Yoruba west, where military service was unpopular, proposed to enlarge the police to handle internal security in a way that would rival the army. With the NPC and NCNC forming a coalition government, the military began independence in October 1960 with a bright future, and the once popularly despised force was transformed into a symbol of national consciousness, modernization, and technical efficiency. To represent this the QONR, during a parade in Sokoto in November 1960, officially returned the flag of Sultan Attahiru II that had been taken as a trophy during the

1903 colonial conquest. Two weeks before independence, the Nigerian government announced that it would send an infantry battalion to serve in the UN peacekeeping force in the troubled former Belgian Congo. From October 1959 to October 1960, all five Nigerian infantry battalions cycled through the British-administered Southern Cameroons—formerly part of the German territory that had been divided between the British and French after World War I—where they conducted bush patrols to drive off insurgents from French-ruled Cameroon who had denounced that territory's upcoming independence as a fraud (see later in this chapter). In February 1961, Nigerian infantry and armored cars patrolled the border with Southern Cameroons after its inhabitants voted to join the new and larger Republic of Cameroon.³

In the late 1940s, the British government believed that its East African territories, given their European and Asian minorities, and relatively small population of Western-educated Africans, would not achieve self-government for many decades. The shortage of officers in the British army led to the introduction of the rank of warrant officer platoon commander (WOPC) during World War II. In East Africa, this was continued into the 1950s, with each KAR company officially having one out of its four platoons led by an African WOPC (though in practice, the ratio was higher). Because few black East Africans had the education level required to enter officer training, the WOPC rank offered a new avenue of advancement for skilled African senior NCOs and warrant officers. While a few East Africans, Ugandan members of the Buganda royal family or medical school graduates, became commissioned officers during the war, they were forbidden to command Europeans, and the experiment was considered a failure and discontinued. In 1947, the British government made it possible for all colonial subjects to receive a commission in the regular British army, which made the previous prohibition on African officers impossible to maintain. The RWAFF granted normal king's commissions to Africans. However, in East Africa, white settler objections meant that an African NCO or warrant officer could become an "Effendi" with a commission from the governor and therefore could command only African personnel, lacked authority to impose disciplinary action, and was not saluted by Europeans. In the late 1950s, with accelerated colonial reforms in the wake of Kenya's Mau Mau uprising and African nationalists accusing the KAR of racial discrimination, the British opened the Queen's Commission to Africans, but those with

appropriate educational qualifications had better prospects elsewhere. It was not until 1958 that the first East African was selected to attend the RMA Sandhurst and in the early 1960s, with independence suddenly imminent, African senior NCOs, warrant officers, and Effendis were sent to a special school in the region to supplement their education and then were quickly elevated to officer status. Commissioned in 1961, one of the first two Ugandan officers was Idi Amin, a semiliterate career soldier from the far north who had joined the KAR as a cook in 1946 and eventually fought against the Mau Mau insurgency. After independence the following year, he was rapidly promoted to captain and major before taking over as commander of the Ugandan Army in 1964. Amin would eventually become one of Africa's most notorious and brutal military dictators.⁴

Until the late 1950s, the Belgian government refused to consider serious political reform for its vast and resource-wealthy Congo territory. After 1945, the Belgians made the Force Publique a more efficient and modernized instrument of control by issuing up-to-date small arms, equipment, and uniforms. In 1955, corporal punishment was eliminated. With the Cold War and the rise of urban African protest during the 1950s, the Belgian Air Force built a large airbase at Kamina in Katanga in 1953 with pilot and parachute training, Belgian metropolitan troops were stationed in the Congo, and a highly mobile Force Publique intervention unit was established. Since these changes were not part of a move toward self-government, they did not involve the appointment of African officers. To raise public support for colonialism, African soldiers were sent on high-profile visits to Belgium, such as during the 1958 World's Fair. In 1953, a military school was opened in Luluabourg in which African candidates would take seven years of academic preparation before attending the Royal Military Academy in Brussels. Following the January 1959 riots in Leopoldville and the subsequent Belgian government announcement that Congo would become independent the following year, military regulations were changed to allow the appointment of African officers. In September 1959, a special school was created for African adjutants (warrant officers), and by 1960, thirty-three had been appointed to that rank and another school established for aspiring African sublieutenants. In April 1960, nineteen African officer candidates were sent to the Royal Military Academy. However, by independence at the end of June 1960, no Africans had been commissioned, and the army remained entirely under Belgian officers. During 1959 and 1960, the

Force Publique was deployed to suppress violence between ethnic groups such as the Lulua and Luba, as well as unrest in Rwanda (see later in this chapter). During a meeting in early July 1960, Lieutenant General Emile Janssens, Belgian commander of the renamed Congolese National Army (ANC), wrote "Before independence = after independence" on a blackboard, which provoked a mutiny by African troops who were disappointed that independence had not brought them material benefits or advancement. This plunged the newly independent state into the chaos of the "Congo Crisis" discussed in the next volume.

After World War I, the Belgian administrators of Rwanda and Burundi used the League of Nations mandate status of these territories as an excuse not to organize a locally recruited military force. In 1926, the Belgians in Rwanda eliminated the traditional military structure by combining each hill community's three chiefs—one for each of the land, cattle, and army—into a single chiefly position. Furthermore, while chiefs under the old system were usually Hutu and Tutsi, all the new chiefs were Tutsi. Because the army chiefs had served as advocates for their men before the king and the traditional military code guaranteed all men property rights in exchange for military service, this abolition allowed the colonial regime to abuse the traditional labor system, create more authoritarian local rule, and reduce the monarch to a figurehead. The Tutsi were transformed from traditional warriors loyal to the king to a Western-educated administrative elite answering to the Belgians. Rwanda and Burundi were occupied by a battalion of Belgian Force Publique, which was part of a brigade based in Stanleyville in northeast Congo. The last vestige of the traditional military of Rwanda was the king's bodyguard, which consisted of archers from the very small, marginalized, and politically irrelevant Twa minority.

In 1959, members of Rwanda's Hutu Power movement, with Belgian approval, seized power from the established Tutsi chiefs and administrators, and overthrew the monarchy in what would be called the Social Revolution. By this time, the Belgians believed that the Hutu majority, with its conservative leadership, would become more cooperative postcolonial partners than the better-educated Tutsi minority, who were beginning to question colonial exploitation. While a Force Publique brigade from Stanleyville under Colonel Guy Logiest was deployed to Rwanda to contain the violence, its soldiers did nothing to stop massacres of Tutsi and sometimes used their firepower to

suppress Tutsi resistance. Sexual violence by Force Publique troops was so widespread that Rwandans began to call rape *gufalinga* in reference to the Belgian-made FN FAL rifles carried by the Congolese soldiers. With the independence of Congo in June 1960, the Force Publique withdrew from Rwanda and Burundi, and the Belgians replaced it with the locally recruited Garde Territoriale du Ruanda-Urundi (GTRU), which was created from scratch. At this time, Rwanda was placed under the military rule of Colonel Logiest, who greatly supported Hutu aspirations. Following the army mutiny in the Congo, former Belgian Force Publique officers were transferred to the GTRU. With 1,200 men, the Garde in Rwanda would have a 700-strong intervention battalion, and each of 10 districts would have a platoon of 50 soldiers. Although the Garde in Rwanda was supposed to reflect the population by consisting of 14 percent Tutsi and 86 percent Hutu, in practice it was almost entirely Hutu because the Belgians had introduced a system of physical requirements called *pignet* that favored the admission of short stocky recruits (who tended to be Hutu) rather than the stereotypically tall and thin Tutsi. Furthermore, many of the soldiers were Hutu from northern Rwanda who were perceived to be larger and stronger than their southern counterparts who dominated the civilian leadership of the Hutu Power movement. In Burundi, with a larger Tutsi minority and no Social Revolution, the Garde consisted of 650 men, half of whom were Hutu and half lower-status Tutsi.

In August 1960, with the Belgian decision to move toward separate independence for Rwanda and Burundi, the GTRU was divided, with part becoming the Garde Nationale Rwandaise (GNR) and another forming the Garde Nationale Burundaise (GNB). Rapid Africanization of the military leadership was now required. In October, Rwandan personnel at the school for NCOs in Bujumbura, Burundi, were moved to Astrida (later Butare) in Rwanda. A month later, a military academy was opened in Kigali where officer candidates studied for a year before proceeding to the military academy in Brussels for another year of training. In late December 1961, the first six Rwandan second lieutenants, five Hutu and one Tutsi, graduated and entered the Belgian commanded GNR. This pro-Hutu force supervised local and national elections in 1960 and 1961, respectively, which witnessed continued violence against Tutsi, thousands of whom fled the country. Both Rwanda and Burundi were formally granted independence in 1962. The next year, Belgian lieutenant colonel Francois Vanderstraeten passed command of the GNR over to Juvenal Habyarimana,

a northern Hutu who had been among the first class of Rwandan officers and would stage a military coup 10 years later. Among the first five Burundian officers in the GNB was Michel Micombero, who in 1965 crushed an attempted coup by Hutu officers and the following year led a takeover by his fellow Tutsi officers, who systematically excluded Hutu from the security forces.

In 1961, exiled Tutsi from Rwanda based in neighboring countries (the most sympathetic of which was Burundi, where 50,000 Rwandan refugees lived) began to organize armed groups bent on retaking power at home. Operating at night, they were called *inyenzi* ("cockroaches"), which eventually became a dehumanizing term for all Tutsi. The movement's leadership was plagued by internal quarrels between monarchists such as Francois Rukeba, leftists such as Gabriel Sebyeza, and apolitical military activists. Some Rwandan exiles went to Communist China for guerrilla warfare training, and the Chinese provided the movement with some funding. One of the insurgent groups in Burundi, led by Tutsi students trained in China, appealed to precolonial military culture by calling itself *Iganguraruge*, which had been a name for the fighting men of famous nineteenth-century warrior king Rwabugiri; individual fighters were called *Intore*, a Kinyarwanda term for a warrior attached to the king's household; and they all swore allegiance to the young exiled monarch Kigeri. Arms were purchased with Chinese money; exiles raided a police station in Ngara, Tanganyika, where they stole weapons and ammunition; and an active training camp was established in Kigamba in Burundi. In March 1962 after a series of *Inyenzi* raids in which some police and civil servants were killed, Rwandan state forces slaughtered 1,000–2,000 civilian Tutsi in Byumba. In late November 1963, some 1,500 Rwandan exiles in Burundi armed mostly with spears, bows, and arrows marched toward the Rwandan border but were intercepted and disarmed by Burundi gendarmes. In late December 1963, the exile leadership, prompted mostly by Rukeba (who wanted to take advantage of problems within the Kigali government), launched a poorly planned offensive. Some 600 insurgents crossed the border from Uganda and were intercepted by the GNR, which killed 300 and handed the rest over to the Ugandan military. Another force from Congo, where the exiles had links with local rebels, crossed the border near Cyangugu, where it was defeated by the GNR, which executed 90 prisoners. Although the anticipated contingent from Tanganyika did not show up, a unit of 200–300 insurgents crossed the Burundi

border at Nemba; captured the police station at Gaka, where they seized weapons and ammunition; and then entered a Tutsi refugee camp at Nyamata, where they were welcomed. The force had grown to more than 1,000 mostly poorly armed people when it arrived at Kanzenze Bridge on the Nyabarongo River just 15 kilometers south of Kigali, where it was dispersed by the superior firepower of a Belgian-led GNR unit with mortars and semiautomatic rifles. Several hundred people lost their lives, including a few Congolese rebels. Consequently, in what might be called the first genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda, the Hutu Power regime of Gregoire Kayibanda organized Hutu civilian militias that carried out a wave of reprisals against the Tutsi population in which 10,000–14,000 were murdered, including all the Tutsi political leaders still inside the country. Burundi was the only country to protest, and the United Nations—foreshadowing events in 1994—remained mute. Although there would be a few more Inyenzi raids from Burundi in 1966, the Tutsi exile movement collapsed amid leadership conflicts and would not launch another significant military operation until 1990. Within Rwanda, the Inyenzi attacks caused the hitherto faltering Kayibanda administration to garner popular support and overcome internal divisions. The GNR, lacking a history of service to the former colonial power, cultivated a reputation as defender of national integrity and quickly grew to 2,500 men and 30-Belgian trained officers.⁵

EGYPT, EARLY ARAB-ISRAELI WARS, AND THE SUEZ CRISIS

At the end of World War II, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt formed a military wing that attacked British military occupiers, Jewish businesses, and the Egyptian government of King Faruk. In 1948, Egypt joined a troubled coalition of Arab states aimed at preventing the creation of the state of Israel. At this time, the Egyptian army was weak because nationalist officers had refused to cooperate with the British Military Mission and did not purchase the weapons it suggested. From 1946, Egyptian members of the Muslim Brotherhood went to Palestine to fight against Jewish Zionists, who they considered part of Western imperialism. Although King Faruk did not prevent this, as he preferred the Brotherhood's activities directed outside Egypt's borders, the Muslim Brothers began to create an army in Palestine that could threaten the Egyptian state. In May 1948, British forces

withdrew from Palestine, and Jordanian forces occupied the territory except those areas defined as Jewish by the United Nations. Around the same time, the Egyptian government declared it would send its military to Palestine to stop Jews from slaughtering Arabs. The only members of the Arab coalition against Israel with any significant military strength were Egypt and Iraq (which were both struggling to establish postwar militaries) and Jordan (whose military was still under British command). In addition, because the Arab armies had largely stayed on the sidelines during World War II, they had few personnel with combat experience, while the embryonic Israeli military had many veterans.

Under the command of General Ahmad Ali al-Muawi and with orders to destroy Jewish resistance, the initial Egyptian expeditionary force consisted of three infantry battalions, a scout battalion, field artillery, a machine gun battalion, and an anti-aircraft battalion with three more infantry battalions in reserve. Colonel Abd al-Aziz, a cavalry officer and lecturer at the staff college, was sent to Palestine to form the Egyptian Muslim Brothers into a battalion of the Egyptian army. On May 10, 1948, al-Aziz, ignoring the advice of his Brotherhood veterans not to directly attack Jewish positions, launched an assault on the besieged Jewish settlement at Kfar Dorom in the Negev Desert in which the Egyptians were slaughtered by concentrated fire and improvised explosives. They were also hit by their own artillery. Egyptian officers blamed the disaster on Brotherhood military incompetence. A subsequent attempt by Egyptian armor to take the settlement was foiled by a single Jewish anti-tank gun. Positioned on the main route into Palestine, the Jewish settlement of Yad Mordechai held out for five days against repeated attacks by a massively superior Egyptian force that took hundreds of casualties and was abandoned only after its defenders ran out of ammunition and water. Abd al-Aziz's Brotherhood fighters moved into Hebron and Bethlehem after the locales had already been captured by the Jordanian Arab Legion. As the main Egyptian brigade moved north toward Tel Aviv, it was first attacked by Israel's recently delivered German fighter planes and then halted at Ashdod by three Israeli battalions that included jeeps with mounted machine guns. Both sides began to mop up resistance behind their lines and consolidate gains before a rumored truce took effect. On June 2, the Israelis took heavy casualties in an amateurish attack on the main Egyptian force at Ashdod, and

the Muslim Brothers suffered a similar fate while trying to capture various settlements. Although a truce was declared on June 10, Egyptian aircraft continued to bomb Israeli positions, including Tel Aviv, and Israeli forces continued to evict Arabs from their villages. During the truce, Egypt's appeals to Britain for arms were denied given the international arms embargo imposed on the combatants, but Israel received shipments of artillery, tanks, and warplanes, and doubled the size of its military. On the eve of the war, Egypt was the only Arab state with a credible air force, which had just been taken over from the British and consisted of two Spitfire fighter squadrons and two transport squadrons. Although the Israelis initially had only a few transport and trainer aircraft, they began to receive German-made Messerschmitt fighters in May, and experienced combat pilots arrived from South Africa, Canada, and Britain.

When the war resumed on July 6, 1948, the reinforced Egyptians focused on taking the Negev Desert, which represented half of newly formed Israel, but this failed because of logistical inefficiency, lack of adaptability by Egyptian officers, and disputes among top commanders. Israeli planes bombed Cairo for the first time and on July 14, the Israelis retook the initiative and attempted to recapture as much of the Negev as possible before the UN Security Council imposed another cease-fire. By the start of the second truce on July 18, the Israelis had recovered some of the Negev, but much of it was still occupied by the Egyptians, who were joined by a contingent from Saudi Arabia and 250 Sudanese veterans of World War II whose impact was minimized by being split up among various units. Because Jordan withdrew from the war and consolidated its control of the West Bank, Egyptian forces were left vulnerable when an Israeli offensive again restarted the war in mid-October. Egyptian troops were split up and besieged in Gaza, Palestine, and Faluja. When the Egyptian warship *Amir Faruk* appeared off the coast of Tel Aviv to stop Israeli supply efforts, Israeli commandos filled two motorboats with explosives, drove them toward the Egyptian vessel, and jumped overboard just before the impact and explosion. The *Amir Faruk* with 500 Egyptian sailors sunk almost immediately. Another truce was declared at the end of October but broken on December 22 by an Israeli offensive that hit the Egyptians hard and prompted Cairo, as the last Arab power left in the fight, to negotiate. This led to a UN cease-fire in early January 1949. With its reputation for having fought bravely against the Israelis, the Muslim

Brotherhood gained popularity in Egypt, where the government, much criticized for its inept handling of the war, imprisoned thousands of them on charging of trying to overthrow the king.

In 1951, the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups launched guerrilla attacks on the British military in Egypt and threatened the security of the Suez Canal. On January 25, 1952, British troops tried to disarm the Egyptian police at al-Ismailiya, who were suspected of assisting the guerrillas and after a five-hour battle, 50 Egyptians were dead and 100 wounded. Subsequent anti-British rioting in Cairo destroyed most British businesses, offices, and clubs. In late July 1952, the Free Officers Movement—led by Colonel Gamal Abd al-Nasser, who had courageously led the defense of Faluja in 1948—orchestrated a bloodless coup in which Faruk was replaced by his infant son Fuad and the army's commander General Muhammad Naguib became the figurehead president. The large commercial estates were dismantled so that peasants could benefit from their own labor, the Ottoman ranks of pasha and bey were abolished, 500 army officers (including many Turko-Circassians) were dismissed, and the Muslim Brotherhood was banned.

With the departure of British troops from the Canal Zone between October 1954 and June 1956, Nasser's regime applied pressure on Israel by closing the canal to Israeli ships, blockading the Gulf of Aqaba, and supplying Palestinian resistance fighters. The Egyptian army was humiliated in February 1955 when an Israeli force led by a young Ariel Sharon staged a raid on an Egyptian military base in Gaza near the armistice line and killed 37 soldiers. Realizing it was not ready for another conflict with Israel, Egypt immediately acquired weapons from the Soviet Union, including T-34 tanks. The rejection of Egyptian requests for weapons from the United States and Britain pushed Cairo closer to the Communist bloc. By 1956, the Egyptian Air Force consisted of 400 aircraft, including British Vampires and Meteors, as well as Soviet MiG fighters and Ilyushin bombers and transports. While there were few trained Egyptian pilots and they had yet to fully master their new Soviet aircraft, they were supplemented by Czechs and Russians. At this time, the Egyptian army consisted of five divisions totalling 90,000 men concentrated mostly in the Sinai Desert and Gaza, with the rest defending the Suez Canal. They were equipped with a mix of British and Soviet armored personnel carriers, armored cars, and tanks, and they were advised by 80 German World War II veterans. Egypt's navy consisted of just

two former British and two former Soviet destroyers with some motor torpedo boats. When the Americans, British, and World Bank withdrew financial support for the Aswan Dam project in 1956 because of Egypt's arms deal with the Soviet Union, Nasser responded by nationalizing the Suez Canal and using the profits to construct the dam. This was a gamble because Egypt's army was unprepared to defend the canal, the bulk of the Soviet weapons had not yet arrived, and the Soviet Union was distracted by rebellion in its satellite state of Hungary. In turn, the British and French, emboldened by Nasser's support for insurgents in their respective colonial territories of Aden and Algeria, conspired with the Israelis, who wanted to conduct a pre-emptive strike against Egypt before the arrival of more Soviet arms.

On October 29, 1956, the Israeli army, supplied with French equipment, invaded the Sinai, which cued British and French forces to occupy the Suez Canal to supposedly protect it from the warring parties. After Egyptian soldiers delayed the advance of an Israeli brigade under Sharon at Mitla Pass, on November 5, the Israelis captured the town of Sharm al-Shaykh at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula, which was important because it controlled access to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Israeli port of Eilat. In the northern Sinai, Egyptian antitank guns and T-34s held off an Israeli armored attack on the crossroads at Abu Aweigila until October 31, when they were outflanked and forced to withdraw. Nasser's November 1 order to abandon the Sinai led to a mass Egyptian retreat toward the Suez Canal during which hundreds of vehicles were abandoned, Israeli warplanes strafed withdrawing columns, and the Israelis took so many prisoners they had to simply disarm and release them. At the end of October, after Nasser rejected an Anglo-French demand that his forces leave the canal, British warplanes based in Cyprus and French ones operating from Israeli air fields in the Sinai began bombing Egyptian positions around the canal as a British and French expeditionary force sailed from Malta. Many of the Egyptian Air Force's aircraft were destroyed on the ground, and in the Gulf of Suez, the British cruiser *HMS Newfoundland* sank an Egyptian naval vessel. On November 5, a joint Anglo-French airborne operation seized Port Said, where Egyptian general Salaheddin al-Moguy rejected a demand for unconditional surrender and issued new Soviet rifles to anyone willing to fight. The next day, the main Anglo-French force, in one of the last great amphibious operations, landed on the beach and moved into Port Said supported by

naval artillery. Aware that the Egyptian regular army would not be able to stand up to the combined Israeli, British, and French forces, Nasser had weapons issued to volunteers, who waged a guerrilla war against the invaders.

Given that the threat of Soviet military intervention seemed likely to trigger another world war, the United Nations imposed a cease-fire and brought in international peacekeepers on November 10. The British and French backed down during the Suez Crisis because the Americans refused to support them and the international community condemned this blatant violation of Egypt's sovereignty. By December 22, British and French forces had withdrawn, and Israel eventually pulled out of the Sinai in exchange for access of its ships to Eilat. The Suez Crisis illustrated that the old colonial powers would have to take a back seat to the two post-World War II superpowers; the United States and the Soviet Union. It also created division among Western states as an alienated France withdrew from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).⁶

INSURGENCY IN KENYA

The Kikuyu people of central Kenya experienced disproportionate dispossession because their fertile land had been favored by European settlers since the early twentieth century and became the White Highlands. Landless Kikuyu became squatters on European commercial farms, where they served as low-paid workers. During World War II, many flocked to the growing city of Nairobi to seek better employment. At the same time, a relatively prosperous Kikuyu peasantry emerged that was loyal to the colonial state. During the 1940s and early 1950s, the moderate Kenya African Union (KAU) urged the colonial administration to eliminate racially discriminatory legislation and increase the extremely small African representation in the colony's legislative council. The failure of this political campaign shifted the momentum to more militant African leaders within the trade unions and among the squatters in the White Highlands.

Although there had been violence within the Kikuyu community since the 1940s, in October 1952, a European woman was stabbed to death near her home, and a Kikuyu senior chief was shot dead in his car. On October 20, newly arrived governor Sir Evelyn Baring declared a state of emergency. The next day, British security forces launched

Operation Jock Scott, which involved the sudden arrest of 180 suspected insurgent leaders in Nairobi, including KAU president Jomo Kenyatta. However, the militant leaders fled to the forest, and the insurgents launched a series of violent attacks over the next few weeks. The British put six of Kenya's leading African nationalists—including Kenyatta—on trial where, despite the prosecution's weak case, they were all convicted of treason and imprisoned. At the start of the emergency, British forces in Kenya consisted of 7,000 men, including 3 British infantry battalions of 39 Brigade flown in from Egypt, 5 KAR battalions (3 from Kenya and 1 from each of Uganda and Tanganyika) of 70 Brigade (East African), an armored car squadron, and a battalion of white settler volunteers from the Kenya Regiment. Within several months, the arrival of the British 49 Brigade with 2 infantry battalions and an engineer regiment increased this force to 10,000 soldiers eventually assisted by an expanded police of 21,000 and a new 25,000-strong Kikuyu Home Guard.

With a decentralized leadership, the Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA) began to form small units in the forests of the Aberdare Mountains and around Mount Kenya, and it organized a passive support wing in other areas. The British called the insurgent movement Mau Mau, though the origin of the term is unclear. With around 12,000 insurgents, of whom 1,200 were armed with rifles, KLFA forces were divided into three zones: the Central and Northern Aberdare Mountains under Dedan Kimathi, the Southern Aberdares led by KAR World War II Burma veteran Stanley Mathenge, and Mount Kenya commanded by Burma veteran Waruhiu Itote (called General China). Although there were attempts by Mau Mau leaders to establish a coordinating structure such as the Kenya Defence Council in August 1953, the insurgency consisted of a series of independent and sometime feuding local groups. The KLFA lacked a formal ideology and theory of revolutionary warfare, most members were illiterate or semiliterate, very few had military experience, there was no external sponsor or cross-border staging area, and weapons consisted of some captured or homemade firearms but mostly spears and machetes. Psychology was important—insurgent recruits were bound to the movement by a ritual oath, and torture and mutilation of victims spread terror. Rebels were supplied with food and intelligence by local sympathizers, groups communicated by "letter boxes" hidden in trees or under rocks, and they were skilled at moving quickly and covertly through the bush. While British officials in the 1950s saw Mau Mau

as a form of psychological disorder caused by the pressures of rapid Westernization, historians of the late twentieth century debated whether it was a local Kikuyu civil war or a Kenyan nationalist movement.

In June 1953, General George Erskine took over British operations in Kenya and created mobile units that attempted to clear insurgents from specific areas that were then patrolled by loyalist forces and police. Both sides committed atrocities such as the two Lari Massacres in 1953 during which KFLA fighters killed 74 Kikuyu men, women, and children by herding them into huts that were then set on fire. This prompted a revenge attack by colonial security forces in which at least 150 civilians died. Launched in late April 1954, Operation Anvil aimed to deprive the insurgents of their source of money, supplies, and recruits in Nairobi. Around 25,000 British troops and police cordoned off Nairobi and swept it sector by sector. All Africans were detained in barbed wire enclosures until their identity was confirmed. Those who belonged to ethnic groups not associated with the rebellion were released while Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru were held. Some 20,000 men were moved to a detention camp for further screening, and 30,000 women and children were evicted to the rural reserves even though many had never been there before. From June 1953 to October 1955, the Royal Air Force (RAF) flew reconnaissance, propaganda leaflet dropping, and bombing missions over Kenya. Lincoln heavy bombers flew 900 missions and dropped 6 million bombs on the forests. Although RAF bombing was often chaotic, it killed around 900 insurgents, and compelled some groups to disband and others to flee from the forests to the reserves.

Through a system they called the Pipeline, British officials color-coded Kenyan prisoners white, grey, or black. The "whites" were the most cooperative detainees, who were returned to the reserves; the "greys" confessed to having taken the Mau Mau oath but were cooperative, so they were moved "down" the Pipeline to local labor camps before eventual release; and the "blacks" were the most uncooperative prisoners, who were sent "up" the Pipeline to special detention camps. In the year after Operation Anvil, the British had little success in obtaining confessions from detainees because the camps were unprepared for the massive number of prisoners. However, by 1955, the Pipeline had become more effective by moving guards around so that they would not establish relationships with prisoners and imposing a relentless regime of interrogation and torture. More

detainees began to confess and became informers within the camps, and some switched sides and became interrogators. While prisoners were forbidden to talk outside their own huts, they developed a covert communication system and killed suspected spies. Living conditions in the camps were terrible, with prisoners suffering malnutrition and typhoid. Although most detainees in the Pipeline were male (there was even a special camp for young boys), a few thousand women and girls were also detained.

Beginning in June 1954 and lasting for the next year and a half, the British forcibly resettled over 1 million Kikuyu in the reserves into 800 “protected villages” surrounded by barbed wire, deep trenches with spikes, and watch towers, and patrolled by the Kikuyu “Home Guard.” Inspired by a similar British counterinsurgency program in Malaya, the protected villages were divided between those suspected of supporting Mau Mau and loyalists who needed protection. Residents of protected villages experienced hunger and sometimes starvation. With food aid directed to loyalist camps, many thousands of children starved to death. In April 1954, General China surrendered and avoided the gallows by trying to arrange the capitulation of others. When General Sir Gerald Lathbury took over command in Kenya in May 1955, there were around 3,000 Mau Mau in the field, and the British 39 Brigade was withdrawn by the end of the year. Lathbury supplemented the large sweeps by employing “counter-gangs” of former insurgents who conducted reconnaissance and infiltrated real rebel groups to kill or capture them. KFLA numbers declined to 900 in early 1956, and Dedan Kimathi, the last active commander, was captured in October, tried, and hung.

In 1956, the British granted a series of reforms in Kenya that increased the amount of land available to the Kikuyu in the reserves, lifted the ban on Africans growing coffee (which had been the profitable preserve of white settlers), raised urban wages for Africans, and permitted the direct election of African members to the legislative assembly. The Mau Mau uprising showed the British government that it would have to use increasingly expensive and publically embarrassing military force to continue colonial rule in Africa. One of the most controversial incidents occurred at the Hola detention camp in March 1959 when 11 prisoners were beaten to death for refusing to work, and the Kenyan administration unconvincingly claimed they had died from drinking poisoned water. As a result in 1960, the British ended the emergency and announced that the concept of shared

African and European “multiracial” rule in Kenya would be abandoned in favor of “one person, one vote” majority rule. This led to independence three years later. In recent years, a debate has arisen over the total number of Kenyans who perished during the Mau Mau emergency. While historian Caroline Elkins maintains that the number could be somewhere between 130,000 and 300,000, demographer John Blacker claims that 50,000, half of whom were children, is a more accurate figure. During the insurgency, the British subjected 1,090 Kenyans to capital punishment. The KFLA insurgents killed at least 1,819 African; 32 European; and 26 Asian civilians. The security forces suffered 600 dead and claimed to have killed 10,500 Mau Mau. The postcolonial Kenyan governments of Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi did not celebrate Mau Mau as a national liberation movement likely because of the presence of former loyalists in their administrations. More recently, KFLA veterans have been declared national heroes and heroines, and in 2010, the government declared October 20, the anniversary of the declaration of the emergency, as Heroes Day. The rehabilitation of Mau Mau in Kenya and the publication of several important books about British atrocities during the crisis led to legal action against the British government. In 2011, a British court ruled that some 12,000 Kenyans attempting to sue the British government for human rights abuses had the right to do so. In June 2013 the British government announced that it would pay £19 million as compensation to around 5000 elderly Kenyans who had been detained and tortured during the Mau Mau rebellion.⁷

REBELLIONS IN FRENCH MADAGASCAR AND CAMEROON

The British–South African occupation of Madagascar during World War II and subsequent Free French demands for resources and labor that caused famine damaged French prestige, and postwar colonial reforms were blocked by the island’s French settlers. A 1946 demand by Malagasy delegates in Paris, influenced by events in French Indochina, for autonomy within the French Union was rejected. Almost as soon as the nationalist–Democratic Movement for Malagasy Renovation (MDRM) was formed in 1946, it was persecuted by French officials and settlers, and its members joined secret societies formed during the war that advocated violence to achieve independence. As a foil, the French formed the puppet Party of the Disinherited in

Madagascar (PADESM) that backed the status quo. On March 29, 1947, about 2,000 nationalist insurgents launched simultaneous attacks on settlers, soldiers, and officials around Moremanga and Manakara. By July, the rebellion had spread across most of the eastern island. However, the cities of Tananarive (Antananarivo), Fianarantsoa, and Diego Suarez (Antsiranana) were not affected. Partially aware of the changing international political climate, naive rebels vainly believed they would receive support from the British, Americans, and United Nations. Although MDRM leaders denied responsibility for the revolt, they were arrested, with some sentenced to death and life imprisonment, and the party was outlawed. Led by World War II veterans, between 15,000 and 20,000 rebels were poorly armed, and lacked coordination and an articulate vision. The arrival of a French expeditionary force in April 1947 increased colonial security force personnel from 6,000 to 18,000 and by late 1948, the number had grown to 30,000. French regular troops sent to the island included Foreign Legionnaires, paratroopers, Senegalese, and North Africans supported by some tanks, warships, and aircraft. Resembling methods used to suppress resistance on the island in the late 1890s, the brutal French counterinsurgency campaign of 1947 and 1948 focused on securing a few small areas from where they expanded their control. Foreshadowing events in Algeria a few years later, French security forces conducted summary executions, tortured suspects, burned villages and their inhabitants alive, threw prisoners out of flying aircraft, and in one May 1947 incident killed 165 Malagasy hostages in a train. The rebels went on the defensive from August 1947, and the last rebel stronghold was taken in November 1948. While some claim that 89,000 out of 4.5 million Malagasy perished during the conflict, mostly from disease and hunger, recent research puts the figure at 30,000, of which a third were killed in fighting. The rebels killed 550 out of 35,000 Europeans on the island; 350 French soldiers; and 1,600 to 1,900 loyalist Malagasy. Although PADESM was successful in the 1947 local elections given the lack of MDRM competition, the rebellion convinced most Malagasy that freedom and full political rights could come only with independence, though within the context of a close relationship with France. Together with defeat in Indochina in 1954 and insurgency in Algeria, the Madagascar revolt prompted France to grant quick reforms in 1956 that introduced universal suffrage in the colonies and elected local administrations that formed the nucleus of a future government. Like many French colonies in

Africa, Madagascar became independent in 1960 with a government that maintained close links with Paris.⁸

As in other colonies, Cameroon experienced increased poverty at the end of World War II that resulted in riots in Douala in September 1945, prompting the tiny French settler minority, more numerous here than in France's other sub-Saharan colonies, to form armed militias. In April 1948, radical African elites and labor leaders from Douala founded the Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC), led by Ruben Um Nyobe, that demanded independence and reunification with British Cameroon. The organization also pointed out that the French were failing in their obligation to prepare the former German colony and UN mandate for self-rule. Supported by the French communist party and sympathetic to those fighting French rule in Indochina and Algeria, the UPC gained popular support in Cameroon's south and west. In 1954, a new French governor actively supported conservative pro-French groups and had security forces harass UPC members. As a result, in May 1955, a wave of violence spread across the southwest, including Douala in which UPC activists destroyed property of regime supporters and army units were brought in from neighboring French territories to restore order. Banned by the French administration in July 1955, UPC leaders went to exile in British Southern Cameroons and formed an armed wing called the National Organization Committee (CNO) that unsuccessfully used sabotage to try to derail the first territorial assembly election in December 1956 that saw the rise to power of pragmatic nationalists willing to work with the French. That month, two companies of French paratroopers were dropped on the southwestern town of Eseka to restore control. The UPC rebellion continued in the southwest, where among the Bassa people of the Sanaga-Martime region near Douala it was coordinated by Nyobe, and among the Bamileke around the center of Bafoussam it was decentralized. When the UPC was banned in British Southern Cameroons in May 1957, the movement's leaders moved to Sudan, Egypt, Ghana, and Guinea, and sought assistance from China.

By December 1957, the CNO had organized military units with "regiments" of 150–200 men and "battalions" of 50. Six battalions operated between the Douala-Yaounde road and Sanaga-Maritime, 5 were active around Eseka, and 3 regiments were located between the regions of Sanaga-Maritime and Bafia. The insurgents sought to cripple the economy by sabotaging the railway and establishing a liberated zone in the southwest that would give them leverage in

future negotiations or serve as a base for guerrilla operations in the rest of the country that would expel the French. While the French initially tried to isolate the UPC militants in the forest by securing roads, railways, towns, and industry, attacks against administration supporters increased and it became obvious that a counterinsurgency campaign was called for. Beginning in November 1957, the French banned periodic markets, closed roads to passenger traffic, and imposed a night curfew on rural communities. In December 1957, Cameroon's prime minister Andre-Marie Mbida visited Paris to request military assistance against the insurrection. In December, the French created the Pacification Zone of Cameroon (ZOPAC) based in Eseka under Indochina veteran Lieutenant Colonel J. Lamberton, and the existing force of six companies of West African Tirailleurs and seven platoons of Cameroon Guard were replaced by several battalions from Chad. Dividing Sanaga-Maritime into a grid of sectors, ZOPAC launched a concerted counterinsurgency that began with relocating the rural population into fortified villages along the roads and railways, and followed with patrols to eliminate the rebels. From January to November 1958, some 2,000 rebels surrendered in Sanaga-Maritime and on September 13, Um Nyobe was killed by French forces, thus ending the Bassa segment of the rebellion.

With Guinea's 1958 rejection of the French Union and the British announcement that Nigeria would become independent within two years, the French adopted the UPC goals of independence and reunification of Cameroon. This led to a UPC split, with a legal faction under former resistance fighter Theodore Mayi Matip winning seats in the assembly and an illegal faction led by Felix-Roland Moumie that created another armed wing, the Cameroonian Army of National Liberation (ALNK), and continued the war in the Bamileke region of the west around Bafoussam. Cameroon gained independence in January 1960 and its first president, Ahmadou Ahidjo, invited French forces to crush the rebels. In mid-February, five French overseas battalions supported by fighter-bombers and armored vehicles and commanded by General Max Briand, a veteran of Indochina and Algeria, began an intensive campaign that crushed the insurgency after eight months. Captured insurgents were publically executed, and Moumie was poisoned by French intelligence in Geneva in early November 1960. While the French claimed to have killed 3,000 guerrillas and suffered 30 soldiers killed, it is likely that thousands more perished in the forest from disease, exhaustion, or hunger. In October 1961, British Southern

Cameroons, after a referendum, was incorporated into independent Cameroon. Ahidjo turned Cameroon into an authoritarian one-party state backed by a strong and loyal French trained military and intelligence service. Sporadic resistance by the remnants of ALNK continued until its leader Ernest Ouandie was captured and publically executed in 1971.⁹

THE ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

During the 1920s and 1930s, an anticolonial movement developed among Algerian Muslims who were dominated by French settlers. On May 8, 1945, the day Nazi Germany surrendered to the Allies, around 4,000 protestors took to the streets of the market town of Setif to demand independence. Violence flared when French police attempted to seize anticolonial banners and then shot demonstrators. Retaliatory attacks by Muslims on French settlers in the countryside left 103 of the latter dead and as many injured. After five days of turmoil, the police and military, including Foreign Legion and Tirailleur Senegalais units, restored order but then conducted a series of reprisals on Muslim communities. Soldiers carried out summary executions, French aircraft bombed remote villages, and a French warship bombed the town of Kerrata. In addition, mobs of French settlers murdered Muslims taken from jails and those not wearing white arm-bands signifying loyalty to France. Although estimates of the death toll vary considerably from 1,000 to 45,000, it appears around 6,000 people were killed in the Setif Massacre. This traumatic event radicalized many Muslims, particularly returning Algerian soldiers who had fought to liberate France.

In 1954, a number of small Algerian independence groups merged to form the National Liberation Front (FLN) with an armed wing called the National Liberation Army (FLA) that would wage a guerilla struggle to expel the French. On November 1, 1954, in what came to be called Bloody All Saints Day, FLA insurgents carried out coordinated attacks against French military and civilian targets across the country, and exiled FLN radio broadcasts from Cairo urged Algerians to join the movement, which aimed to establish an independent state governed on Muslim principles. The FLN/FLA received military support from Nasser's Arab nationalist military government in Egypt. While the French had just withdrawn from Indochina after a

protracted war, Paris rejected calls for independence because Algeria was considered part of France. In August 1955, the FLA massacred 123 civilians, including 71 French, near the town of Philippeville, which prompted revenge attacks by French security forces and settler gangs that killed between 1,300 and 12,000 people. This pushed many formerly moderate Algerian Muslims to support the FLN. The French governor-general, Jacques Soustelle, abandoned reforms meant to appease the independence movement and embarked on an all-out war against the FLN/FLA. Soustelle's successor, Robert Lacoste, disbanded the settler assembly because he believed it made the situation worse, ruled by decree, increased the tempo of counterinsurgency operations, and granted sweeping police powers to the military.

In August and September 1956, FLN leaders within Algeria formed a 34-member National Council of the Algerian Revolution, which contained a 5-person executive Committee of Coordination and Enforcement, to direct political and military activities. In October, the French air force intercepted a Moroccan aircraft bound for Tunis carrying the FLN's external leaders, including decorated World War II veteran Ahmed Ben Bella, who were imprisoned for the rest of the conflict. Beginning in September, the FLA orchestrated a general strike and a series of bombings in Algiers meant to attract greater international and French public attention to its struggle. Directed by General Jacques Massu, French paratroopers broke down the FLA structure and recovered control of Algiers by using torture and strictly controlling the population's movement. The FLA had started with a few hundred guerrillas armed with obsolete German, American, and French small arms. By 1957, it had developed into a disciplined military force with a 30,000-strong conventional army based in neighboring Tunisia and Morocco, and between 6,000 and 25,000 insurgents operating within Algeria. Throughout 1956 and 1957, the FLA conducted hit-and-run attacks on security force patrols and camps, settler farms, mines, factories, and transportation and communication infrastructure. In classic Maoist guerrilla style, insurgent units dispersed after an attack or ambush and melted into the civilian population. Eventually, the FLN/FLA gained control of some mountain areas, where they established administrative structures, collected taxes, and recruited new fighters.

By 1956, there were 400,000 French regular troops in Algeria, including 170,000 Muslim Algerian volunteers. The elite colonial paratroopers and Foreign Legion bore the brunt of most major offensive

operations. During the Algerian War, the French pioneered the use of helicopters to attack ground targets, particularly fleeing FLA insurgents, a strategy that was further developed by the Americans in Vietnam during the 1960s. In 1955, the French military created the Special Administrative Section (SAS) to weaken FLN influence and promote loyalty in Muslim communities. SAS officers, called *kepis bleu* (blue caps), recruited around 180,000 Muslim irregular troops called Harki (Arabic for "war party") who used guerrilla tactics against the insurgents. Some Harkis fought in entirely Harki units under French officers, others were members of mixed units, and some Harki platoons were attached as scouts to larger French formations. A few Harki units conducted "pseudo-operations" in which they posed as FLN members and sought to foster internal conflict among the insurgents or discredit them by committing atrocities. The FLA also conducted pseudo-operations, as the 1,000 Algerian volunteers of the French Force K were actually FLA members or turned by the FLA. Instead of displaying the corpses of FLA members, they actually displayed those of Algerian loyalists killed by the FLA and then defected to join their comrades. In 1957, General Raoul Salan introduced the *Quadrillage* system, which divided country into a series of sectors, each of which had an assigned security force responsible for suppressing insurgents in that area. To hinder insurgent infiltration, he also created the *Morice Line* (named after French defense minister Andre Morice), which was a 320-kilometer-long barrier of electric fences, barbed wire, and mines along the Tunisian border. Although Salan's methods reduced FLA activities, they tied down large numbers of French troops in static defensive positions. Algerian villages suspected of aiding insurgents were subjected to collective punishment, and those too remote to be reached by ground units were bombed from the air. Between 1957 and 1960, some 2 million Algerians were forcibly resettled in fortified villages guarded by the military to prevent them from assisting the insurgents. Because most of the resettled people were moved from mountainous areas to the plains, they struggled to reproduce their old way of life, and living conditions in the fortified villages were very poor. Abandoned villages, orchards, and fields were burned to deny them to the guerrillas. In late 1958, French security forces, now under General Maurice Challe, discarded the *Quadrillage* system in favor of large-scale search-and-destroy operations against FLA strongholds, which had some success.

Fearful that French civilian politicians would withdraw from Algeria, military officers staged a coup in Algiers in mid-May 1958 that established General Salan as head of a ruling junta and demanded French president Rene Coty appoint former Free French leader Charles de Gaulle to head a government of national unity to prevent decolonization. In late May, French paratroopers from Algeria seized the island of Corsica without any opposition. French forces in Algeria planned Operation Resurrection in which they would seize Paris and overthrow the French government if de Gaulle was not appointed or if it appeared communists were trying to seize control. On May 29, just 15 hours before the launch of Resurrection, the French parliament approved de Gaulle's assumption of power. Although de Gaulle quickly visited Algeria and declared that it would always be French, he had doubts about the sustainability of the French presence and embarked on economic, social, and political reforms for Muslims. For the first time Algerian Muslims, including women, were given the vote in a referendum on the draft constitution of France's Fifth Republic, which specified that Algeria was not an integral part of France but associated with it. Worried that de Gaulle would gain support for a compromise among the war-weary Muslim population, the FLN tried to derail the vote by a wave of bombings and raids in France and Algeria, and it established a formal government in exile in Tunis. However, in September 1959, the vast majority of the 80 percent of Muslims who voted supported the new constitution and in February 1959, de Gaulle was elected as the new president of France. The FLN strongly rejected de Gaulle's subsequent offer to end the war and hold elections that would create an Algeria closely linked to France.

Since public opinion in France and internationally was turning against France's continued counterinsurgency war in Algeria, de Gaulle, in September 1959, admitted the possibility of independence. Feeling betrayed, French settlers in Algiers staged an uprising in late January 1960 known as the Week of the Barricades. On the urging of de Gaulle, the French military in Algiers, which initially did not intervene, crushed the rebellion. The leaders of the uprising fled to Franco's Spain where, in conjunction with retired General Salan, they established the Secret Army Organization (OAS) in December 1960 and launched terrorist attacks in both France and Algeria aimed at preventing the latter's independence. After 75 percent of voters in France and Algeria approved Algerian independence in a

January 1961 referendum, de Gaulle's government entered negotiations with the FLN. In late April, four retired generals, including Challe and Salan, attempted to stop the negotiations by staging an ultimately unsuccessful coup against de Gaulle in Algeria and France. As a result, the French government abandoned the interests of the French settlers in Algeria and continued talks with the FLN that led to the Evian Accords, which initiated a cease-fire in March 1962; granted Europeans religious freedom and property rights for three years, after which they would have to choose between French or Algerian citizenship; and gave France the right to maintain military bases in Algeria and special access to Algerian oil. In April 1962, French voters overwhelmingly approved the accords; on July 1, the Algerian electorate almost unanimously voted for independence; and two days later, de Gaulle declared it a reality. From March to June, the OAS tried to scuttle the cease-fire by a vicious bombing campaign against French security forces and Muslims, with targets including schools and hospitals. Beginning in June, FLN supporters began attacks on French settlers and Muslim loyalists such as the massacre of an undetermined number of European civilians in the city of Oran on July 5, the official date of Algerian independence. Tens of thousands of former Harkis and their families were murdered. This led, within a year, to the exodus of 1.4 million people (13 percent of the population), including almost the entire Jewish community and former Muslim loyalists from Algeria.

After independence, Ben Bella became the first president of Algeria, though he was overthrown by a military coup in 1965, the external FLA in Tunisia and Morocco returned home to become the Algerian military, and the FLN established an authoritarian one-party state that lasted until the late 1980s. During the war, 25,600 French security force personnel were killed and some 65,000 wounded; 3,000 French settlers were killed and 7,000 wounded; French authorities recorded that their forces killed 141,000 insurgents, many of whom were probably civilians; some 12,000 FLN members were killed during internal power struggles; around 5,000 people died in France by violence between rival Algerian groups; and French officials claimed that the FLN killed 70,000 Muslim civilians. Debate continues over the total number of deaths during the Algerian War, with the French government claiming that 350,000 died, and the Algerian government putting the figure at well over 1 million and referring to it as a genocide against Algerian people. Some historians maintain that while 700,000 to 800,000 is a

fairly accurate number of the total dead, the war displaced over 2 million people, and it is impossible to know the number who died from starvation or disease in remote areas. In addition, these figures do not include the victims of FLN reprisals after independence.¹⁰

FRENCH COLONIAL AFRICAN TROOPS IN INDOCHINA

Following World War II, France continued its long tradition of employing African troops outside their continent. In 1947–1948, African soldiers were employed as strikebreakers in Nice, France. After the collapse of the Japanese Empire in Southeast Asia in 1945, Viet Minh nationalists led by Ho Chi Minh resisted French attempts to re-establish colonial control over Indochina. Given a 1951 French law that prohibited the employment of French conscripts outside France and African conscripts outside Africa, the French military in Indochina came to rely heavily on volunteers from its African territories. By 1954, French forces in Indochina consisted of 50,000 French; 20,000 Foreign Legionaries (mostly Germans); 20,000 North Africans from Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria; and 18,000 black Africans from West and Central Africa as well as Madagascar. Between 1949 and 1954, there were usually 3 Moroccan goumier battalions stationed in Indochina, where they distinguished themselves fighting in the mountainous north. In October 1950, a 924-man goumier battalion was overrun at Na Kheo with only 369 survivors. During the disastrous siege of Dien Bein Phu in 1954, the 16,000-strong French garrison consisted of French paratroopers, Foreign Legionnaires, and Algerian and Moroccan troops. Of the 634 African prisoners released by the Viet Minh after the French defeat, there were 240 from Guinea, 106 from Mali, 85 from Upper Volta, 67 from Senegal, 60 from Dahomey, 48 from Ivory Coast, 24 from Niger, and 4 from Mauritania. Among French forces in Indochina was career soldier, communications specialist, and World War II Free French veteran Jean Bedel Bokassa, who would become an officer in France in 1956 and the megalomaniacal dictator of the Central African Republic during the 1970s.¹¹

WHITE MINORITY-RULED STATES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Expansion of black economic opportunities in South Africa during World War II impelled fearful whites, in 1948, to elect a Nationalist

Party government that implemented a thorough form of racial segregation called apartheid. Building upon previous legal and customary discrimination, this system was developed during the early 1950s through a series of laws such as the Population Registration Act that categorized all South Africans into a number of racial identities and the Group Areas Act that defined where each group could live. The Bantu Authorities Act further divided the black majority into ethnic groups assigned small and marginalized areas as homelands administered by traditional leaders. Through Bantu Education, black South Africans experienced an inferior form of schooling meant to mold them into subservient low-paid workers. Petty apartheid laws segregated public facilities such as drinking fountains and toilets, and outlawed interracial marriage. Throughout the 1950s, the African Nationalist Congress (ANC) and other organizations staged nonviolent protests against apartheid that usually involved boycotts and the purposeful breaking of unjust laws, particularly the requirement that blacks carry an identity document called a pass. Violent state repression in the early 1960s drove the antiapartheid movement underground and into exile, from where they launched an armed struggle to liberate their country.

During the late 1940s and 1950s, the Nationalist Party administration, through Minister of Defence F. C. Erasmus, embarked on a campaign to Republicanize and Afrikanerize the Union Defence Force (UDF). The Defence Act was amended so that from November 1949, all correspondence would be in both official languages: English and Afrikaans. As a result, unilingual English speakers, including the many migrating to South Africa in the 1950s because of economic problems in Britain, were discouraged from enlistment. Existing English-speaking personnel were pressured to take early retirement, and many resigned during the early 1950s. The number of South African personnel sent to Britain for training was reduced, and a local military academy established for the production of future officers. Although Afrikaners had come to dominate the security forces before World War II, the eventual result of these policies was that by the early 1970s, Afrikaans speakers constituted 85 percent of the army, 75 percent of the air force, and 50 percent of the navy. Those who had been promoted before 1948 were moved out of key positions, and Nationalist Party supporters came to dominate the security forces. General W. H. E. Poole, an English-speaking veteran of World War II, had been scheduled to take over as chief of general staff in 1949, but

Erasmus blocked him. In late 1949, Erasmus ordered the removal of the red tab displayed on military uniforms to indicate World War II service, which had been a politically divisive issue in South Africa. This was resented by the predominantly English-speaking Active Citizen Force members, who ignored the instruction until the early 1950s. By 1952, new flags, rank insignia, and decorations were introduced; the British disciplinary code was rewritten; the rank of lieutenant colonel was renamed commandant, and a new military magazine called *Kommando* was launched. The Office of Military Intelligence in Cape Town was closed without consultation with the Royal Navy, which was based there at the time. And South Africa stopped sharing information with Britain. Even before its 1948 election, the Nationalist Party had declared opposition to African military service, which had been expanded during World War II. In April 1949, Erasmus disbanded the long-established Coloured Cape Corps and the black Native Military Corps. While the 1957 Defence Act retained the state's right to enlist nonwhite volunteers in the defense force, Nationalist Party policy maintained that they would be employed on a very limited basis in logistical roles such as cooks and drivers, and that they would never be armed.¹² Predicting the declaration of a republic in 1961, the 1957 act also renamed the UDF as the South African Defence Force (SADF), the title royal was dropped from Citizen Force regiments, and the designation of naval vessels was changed from Her Majesty's South African Ship (HMSAS) to South African Ship (SAS).

The Nationalist Party's commitment to the western side of the Cold War was demonstrated through the service of South African Air Force (SAAF) pilots in the Berlin Airlift (1948–1949) and the Korean War (1950–1953). As a founding member of the United Nations, South Africa sent a fighter squadron to Korea, where it operated under U.S. command and flew 12,067 sorties, mostly ground attack missions, with a loss of 34 pilots. Unlike other parts of the world, there was no Western-sponsored regional defense organization through which South Africa could develop its armed forces. In 1950, South Africa committed itself to assist Britain in the event of war in the Middle East and as a result, it was allowed to purchase £30 million worth of military equipment. Eventually, Britain delivered 200 Centurian tanks, 20 Comet tanks, several hundred Ferret and Saracen armored cars, artillery, and 9 Canberra bombers. Pretoria also received 40 Vampire and 30 Sabre jets from Canada, and 56 Alouette helicopters from France. In the June 1955 Simonstown Agreement, Britain turned over

its Cape naval facility and command of the South Africa Navy to Pretoria. South Africa agreed to let Royal Navy vessels use the port, and Britain agreed to sell South Africa £18 million worth of naval resources over eight years, which amounted to 2 destroyers, 4 frigates, some minesweepers, and seven coastal defense aircraft. For the British, the agreement secured the Cape sea route to the Middle East and for South Africa, it enhanced sovereignty and naval capability. The acquisition of American-made C-130 transport aircraft in the early 1960s gave the SAAF a significant lift capability.¹³

On March 21, 1960, a crowd of African protestors engaged in passive resistance by showing up at the Sharpeville police station without their passes. The police opened fire, killing 69 and wounding 180. It was now clear that nonviolent civil disobedience was futile against a state willing to use increasingly deadly force. The government banned the ANC and the new Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) in April 1960, and violent state repression continued into the following year. The possible use of violence against the apartheid regime was mentioned by some during the ANC's Defiance Campaign of the 1950s, as activists were aware of armed struggles against colonialism in Kenya and French Indochina. In 1952, the ANC had created a group of dedicated volunteers called Amadelakufa (those who defy death) who performed high-risk assignments such as distributing literature and organizing strikes. It appears that the South African Communist Party (SACP) was the first organization to seriously consider violent tactics, with party military units formed in July 1961 and later that year, five or six activists were sent to China for training. Because there was an overlapping membership between the SACP and ANC, it did not take long for these discussions to carry over into the latter. Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu introduced the armed option to the ANC national executive and in July 1961, after intense opposition from some who remained committed to nonviolent protest, they received permission to establish a military organization, separate from the ANC, that would engage in controlled violence and avoid causing injury. Named Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation, abbreviated as MK), the group was led by a high command made up of Mandela, Sisulu, Joe Slovo, and Raymond Mhlaba, who were also SACP members, with regional commands in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and Durban. Splinter groups were brought into its orbit, and agents were smuggled out of the country through Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Mozambique to acquire military training. World War II veteran

Jack Hodgson, of the Johannesburg command, played a key role in initiating explosives instruction among MK recruits.

On December 16, 1961, MK agents set off a series of explosions across South Africa and published a manifesto declaring war on the apartheid government and stating that they were fighting for democracy. This was embarrassing for ANC president Albert Luthuli, who received the Nobel Peace Prize at the same time and later claimed he had not been part of plans for armed resistance. Mandela secretly left South Africa in January 1962 to undertake military training in Algeria and Ethiopia, arrange for others to follow, and rally support in newly independent African countries. The MK campaign of sabotage continued for the next year and a half with over 200 attacks on targets such as pass offices, power pylons, and police stations in all major cities and many towns. In October 1962, ANC leaders attended a conference at Lobatse in Bechuanaland where, for the first time, they publicly linked the organization to MK and maintained that political policy would determine military strategy. A major weakness of MK as an underground movement was that its leaders had been high-profile activists who were easily located by security forces. On July 11, 1963, police raided a farm at Rivonia near Johannesburg where MK high command had set up its headquarters and many important leaders were arrested and subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment along with Mandela, who had been apprehended earlier. Wilton Mkwayi attempted to reorganize the armed wing, but he was also arrested and received a life sentence. The killing of suspected police informers in the Eastern Cape, in December 1962 and January 1964, led to the arrest and execution of seven MK members. Those MK leaders not in prison, such as Joe Slovo, fled the country and joined the ANC in exile led by Oliver Tambo.¹⁴

Criticizing the ANC for being too accommodating to whites and too moderate in its approach to the apartheid state, radical Africanists split from that organization in 1959 to form the PAC. The people who had gathered at Sharpeville in March 1960 were participating in a PAC antipass campaign and after the massacre, many PAC leaders (including founder Mangaliso Sobukwe) were arrested. After the group was banned in April, members from across the country attended a meeting in Port Elizabeth where John Nyathi Pokela and Mfanasekhaya Gqobose argued that the time had come to take up arms against the apartheid regime. At a PAC conference in Maseru, Basutoland (Lesotho), in September 1961, Ntsu Mokhehle (president

of the Basutoland Congress Party [BCP]) placed a gun on the table and urged the participants to talk only about the armed struggle. At this meeting, the PAC—led by secretary general Potlako Leballo—planned to liberate South Africa by a mass uprising in 1963. At the Maseru conference, the PAC decided that its members should receive rudimentary military training conducted in Basutoland by Gqobose, a World War II veteran, and T. M. Ntandala. During 1961 and 1962, five PAC members were sent to Ethiopia and 26 to Egypt for instruction. According to PAC plans, each town in South Africa would stage its own uprising in 1963 so that security forces would have to deploy over a wide area. At this time, some PAC members, mostly in the Cape, formed military units with the intention of targeting white civilians and stockpiled simple weapons such as machetes and axes. It appears that the name Poqo (Xhosa for “alone”) was first used in 1961 as a secret code word meaning “PAC” that was intended to confuse apartheid agents. With attempts to reorganize the group in 1961, a task force called Lutsha (Xhosa for “youth”) was created from members between 16 and 35 years of age and older people if they were fit. The role of this unit was to eliminate those considered traitors, patrol the streets after dark to kill policemen, collect and manufacture weapons and explosives for the coming uprising, and provide security at PAC meetings. It was around this time that the term “Poqo” became associated with the PAC armed struggle.

On the night of March 16, 1962, in the Cape Town township of Langa, about 50 Poqo members with petrol bombs and bricks ambushed two police vans, resulting in the death of one policeman and the injury of five others. Eventually, the state executed five PAC activists for their involvement in the attack. After the killing of another black policeman there on September 26, 1962, the Poqo attackers visited a traditional healer and acquired white powder to smear over their bodies as protection from bullets. By early 1960, the PAC was active in the Paarl location of Mbekweni, a settlement of migrant black workers from the Eastern Cape, with members practicing military drills, wearing distinctive balaclavas, and greeting one other with the salutation “Mnumzana” (Sir). Male hostel dwellers that joined Poqo were organized into 10-man cells that met once a week, and occasionally there were larger gatherings. Throughout 1962, Poqo targeted informers, policemen, and whites. On April 14, 1962, a battle broke out when police, learning of an impending attack on African municipal employees, intercepted a group of 120 Poqo members, some

armed with guns. Poqo strictly banned women from male hostels and in June 1962, three young women were killed for violating the rule. Two PAC members were ultimately hanged for this. On November 22, armed with axes and machetes, 250 Poqo members assaulted the Paarl police station and when repulsed by small arms fire, attacked houses, shops, petrol stations, and cars. Two white residents and five Popo agents were killed. After this incident, police reinforcements descended on Paarl and arrested 400 people, and Poqo members fled.

Throughout 1962 and early 1963, Poqo launched a violent campaign against headmen, chiefs, and whites in the Transkei homeland, where some chiefs were imposing unpopular government land policies. This campaign climaxed in December 1962 with a failed attempt to assassinate Kaiser D. Matanzima, Thembu chief and homeland politician. Tipped off by informers, the police intercepted Poqo groups at Ntlonze Hill and Queenstown train station. In the subsequent skirmishes, a total of 13 Popo operatives and one policeman were killed. The most highly publicized Transkei attack happened on the night of February 4–5, 1963, when a mob of 60 Popo members killed 5 whites at a road construction camp on the Umtata-Engcobo road. Fifteen people were eventually hanged for their role in this event. The state crushed Poqo activities in Transkei by rigorous police action, arming chiefs with guns and providing them with guards, mobilizing supporters of chiefs into paramilitary units, and launching a local propaganda campaign to discredit the PAC. The anticipated 1963 uprising was aborted when Leballo, on March 27, 1963, gave a press conference in which he boasted that the PAC had 155,000 members ready to overthrow the apartheid state. British colonial police raided the PAC office in Maseru, where they found a list of 10,000 names and handed it over to the South Africa Police, who within a few weeks had apprehended 3,246 suspected Poqo agents.¹⁵

In 1923, Britain had granted Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) responsible government with a qualified voting system that gave the tiny white settler minority internal political power. At that time, Southern Rhodesia's first line of defense was the British South Africa Police (BSAP), a racially hierarchical paramilitary police force in which all white members were superior to all black members, and white reservists could be called on in case of emergency. The colony's participation in both world wars had been carried out by temporary units such as the all-white Rhodesia Regiment (RR) and primarily black Rhodesia Native Regiment (RNR) during World War I and the

primarily black Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) during World War II. All were disbanded at the end of hostilities. Southern Rhodesia's white settlers came to believe that their sacrifices during the world wars obliged Britain to grant them dominion status, a form of full independence like Canada, South Africa, and Australia. In 1947, in the Cold War context, the BSAP's defense role was removed, and Southern Rhodesia established a regular military with a re-formed RAR infantry battalion as its first regular unit employed to guard RAF training facilities in the territory. Mixed race soldiers did not fit well in the white and black racial military hierarchy of Southern Rhodesia and in 1951, they were recruited for the new full-time General Service Corps as unarmed mechanics and drivers.

The 1953 establishment of the Central African Federation, combining Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland led to Salisbury taking an active role in British imperial military activities during the 1950s. Southern Rhodesian whites supported the federation because it gave them control over the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia and the labor of Nyasaland, and the opportunity for future dominion status. Britain invested heavily in the federation as a foil to increasingly hostile apartheid South Africa. Controlled by European officers from Southern Rhodesia, the Federal Army included the RAR as well as three other primarily African infantry battalions from the northern territories: the Northern Rhodesia Regiment (NRR) and 1 and 2 King's African Rifles (KAR) from Nyasaland. At this point, all black soldiers in the Federal Army were regulars, and almost all whites were either young conscripts (only whites had an obligatory period of military training) or part-time reservists of the Royal Rhodesia Regiment (RRR). Not wanting to be left out of the global anticommunist struggle, Southern Rhodesia, in 1951, had sent a small unit of 100 white volunteers to help the British fight insurgents in Malaya. Known as the Malaya Scouts and attached to the British Special Air Service (SAS), this group included several men who would greatly influence Rhodesian counterinsurgency in the 1970s, for example, Peter Walls (who would command Rhodesian forces) and Ron Reid Daly (who would found a counterinsurgency unit that specialized in infiltrating guerrilla groups). In 1952, four hundred RAR soldiers were sent to Egypt to help guard the Suez Canal and during the 1950s, all the African federal infantry battalions rotated through Malaya, where they participated in British counterinsurgency. Such operations brought imperial and international prestige, contributed to the possibility that the

Federation would be granted dominion status by Britain, and indirectly subsidized the Royal Rhodesian Air Force (RRAF) because units on overseas service were paid by London. The RRAF often joined British forces in the Middle East. In 1958, two squadrons of Rhodesian Vampire jets were deployed to Aden to support British operations against local rebels, and from 1959 to 1963, Rhodesian Canberra bombers were positioned on Cyprus. In 1961, Rhodesian transport aircraft helped British troops deploy to Kuwait, which was threatened by invasion from Iraq, and during this emergency, a 13-man section from the new all-white regular Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) was sent to Bahrain for several months to support British tanks.¹⁶

As other African countries gained independence in the late 1950s and 1960s, African nationalist protest throughout the federation became progressively more militant, demanding separate independence for the three territories as majority-rule states. Although black soldiers and police were central in suppressing protest during a series of states of emergency, the long held anxiety of white authorities over the reliability of African troops became much worse following the army mutiny against Belgian officers in Congo. In 1960, the federation created its first exclusively European regular units—an infantry battalion called the RLI, an armored car regiment called the Selous Scouts (not to be confused with a later unit formed in the 1970s), and an elite SAS squadron trained in parachuting and commando tactics. These were recruited mostly from Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and Britain. In 1963, given rapid decolonization, the federation was disbanded and the following year, Britain granted independence and majority rule to Northern Rhodesia (which became Zambia) and Nyasaland (which became Malawi). In Southern Rhodesia, the recently elected white supremacist Rhodesian Front intensified suppression of African nationalists and demanded dominion status from Britain, which refused. Military resources were divided between the former federal territories, with almost all of the RRAF—including helicopters, jet fighters, and bombers—remaining with Southern Rhodesia. At this point, the Southern Rhodesian Army consisted of the SAS, the regular RLI and RAR infantry battalions, and two all-white reserve RRR battalions. In Zambia and Malawi, the former colonial regiments formed the nucleus of new militaries, with the NRR and 2 KAR (a Nyasaland unit based in Northern Rhodesia) renamed the Zambia Regiment and 1 KAR in Malawi renamed the Malawi Rifles (King's African Rifles), keeping its former title in

brackets. Both countries were stripped of air power and without African officers, they quickly sent Africans for officer training but were dependent upon seconded senior British personnel until the early 1970s.¹⁷

CONCLUSION

During the early 1950s, Britain and France were confident of their continued position in Africa and sent African soldiers to fight anticolonial insurgents in Indochina and Malaya. However, warfare in Madagascar, Kenya, Egypt, Cameroon, and Algeria prompted these former great powers to quickly withdraw from their African empires in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Most African militaries were transformed from colonial internal security forces into the defense forces of independent states, though past discrimination and recruiting patterns meant they had few African officers and most of those were rapidly promoted without necessary education, training, or experience. The more suddenly independence happened, the worse this problem tended to be, which meant it was particularly troubling in the Belgian territories and British East and Central Africa. Most of the new African militaries were land forces with little or no naval or air capability of their own. The better-developed militaries of the white minority enclaves of Southern Africa were made even whiter and prepared to meet the challenge of African nationalist insurgency.

Notes

Chapter 1

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Index

- II Corps, American, World War II, 222, 223
- XV Corps, British, World War II, 233
- 1st Armored Division, British, World War II, 220
- 1st Italian Black Shirt Division, World War II, 216
- 1st South African Division, World War II, 207, 212, 218–20
- 1st South African Infantry Brigade, World War I, 141–42
- 2nd Armoured Division, British, World War II, 218
- 2nd Armoured Division, Free French, World War II, 237
- 2nd Hyderabad Lancers, 63
- 2nd South African Division, World War II, 219, 220
- 2nd South African Infantry Brigade, World War I, East Africa, 161
- 3rd Algerian Infantry Division, Free French, World War II, 237
- 3rd West African Brigade (Nigerian), 81st West African Division, World War II, 232, 233
- 4th Indian Infantry Division, World War II, 207, 210, 214, 217
- 5th Army, Italian, World War II, 214, 218
- 5th Army, United States, World War II, 236, 237
- 5th Indian Infantry Division, World War II, 207, 209, 210, 211, 213
- 5th Light Division, German Afrika Korps, World War II, 218
- 6th Armoured Division, British, World War II, 222
- 6th Australian Division, World War II, 217
- 6th South African Armoured Division, World War II, 236
- 7th Armoured Division, Desert Rats, World War II, 214, 217–21
- 7th South African Infantry Brigade, World War II, 226
- 8th Army, British, World War II, 218–23, 235, 236
- 9th Australian Division, World War II, 218
- 9th Colonial Infantry Division, Free French, World War II, 237

- 9th South African Infantry battalion, World War I, East Africa, 163
 10th Army, Italian, World War II, 214, 217
 11th African Division, World War II, East Africa, 208, 212, 213
 11th East African Division, World War II, 233, 234
 12th African Division, World War II, East Africa, 208, 212, 213
 13th French Foreign Legion Demi-Brigade, World War II, 211, 225
 15th Panzer Division, Afrika Korps, German, World War II, 218
 22nd Anti-Submarine Group, South Africa, World War II, 230
 22nd East African Brigade, World War II, 233, 234
 25th Indian Division, World War II, 234
 26th Indian Division, World War II, 234
 27th Bombay Light Infantry, 60
 28th East African Brigade, World War II, 234
 39 Brigade, British, Kenya, 261, 263
 40th Division, Hunters of Africa, Italian, 206
 49 Brigade, British, Kenya, 261
 65th Division, Grenadiers of Savoy, Italian, 206
 70 Brigade (East Africa), Kenya, 261
 70th Infantry Division, British, World War II, 218
 81st West African Division, World War II, 232, 233
 82nd West African Division, World War II, 233, 234
 166th and 167th Minesweeping Flotillas, South Africa, World War II, 230
 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment, U.S. Army, 222

 Abbas Hilmi II, Egyptian ruler, 168
 Abd al-Aziz, Egyptian officer, 256
 Abd el-Karim el-Khattabi, Rif leader, 193–96
 Abdallahi al-Taaisha, Mahdist leader, 8–9
 Abeokuta, Nigeria, 244
 Abercorn, Northern Rhodesia, 66, 167
 Aboasu, Battle of (1900), 36
 Abomey, Dahomey capital, 24, 25
 Abushiri ibn Salim al-Harthi, Arab rebel leader, 46
 Abushiri Rebellion (1889), 46
 Accra, Ghana, 244, 246, 248
 Achimota School, Gold Coast, 233, 246
 Acholi, 190
 Action Group (AG), Nigeria, 249
 Active Citizen Force, South Africa, 149–50, 192, 228, 275
 Adamawa, 32
 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15, 205, 206, 210, 213
 Adegona, Battle of (1892), 24
 Aden, 209, 259, 281
 Aden, Gulf of, 13
 Adwa, Battle of (1896), 8, 14, 15, 202, 204
 Afar, Ethiopia, 10
 African Lakes Company, 62
 African National Congress (ANC; previously the South African Native National Congress or SANNC), 179–80, 274, 276
 African Nationalism, 239, 250
 African Pioneer Corps (APC), 234–36
 African Political Organization (APO), 180
 African Prisoners of War, World War II, 231, 232
 Afrika Korps, German, World War II, 218–23
 Afrikaner Free Corps, 152
 Afrikaner nationalism, 131, 141, 150, 152, 159, 228, 229

- Afrikaner Rebellion (1914–15), 149–52
 Agadir, Morocco, 7
 Agedes, 175
 Agordat, Battle of (1941), 210
 Agterryers, after riders, 113
 Aguibu, Tukolor ruler, 19
 Aguiyi-Ironsi, Johnson, Nigerian officer, 246
 Ahidjo, Ahmadou, Cameroon president, 267, 268
 Ahmad Ali al-Muawi, Egyptian general, 256
 Ahmad El Raisuni, Moroccan rebel leader, 192, 193
 Ahmadu Seku, Tukolor ruler, 17–19
 Ahmed Ben Bella, Algerian nationalist leader, 269, 272
 Ahmed Serif, Sanussi leader, 6
 Airborne landings, 222
 Aircraft, 6, 153, 154, 156, 160, 161, 168, 169, 187, 191, 192, 199–201, 203–206, 214, 216, 222, 225, 226, 228, 230, 249, 257, 258, 262, 265, 270, 275, 281
 Ait 'Atta, Moroccan rebels, 197–98
 Aitken, Major General A. E., British officer, 158
 Akassa, Nigeria, 30–31
 Akitoye, Egba leader, 29
 Akpa, Battle of (1892), 24
Alaska, USS, 39
 Alexander, General Harold, British officer, 220
 Alexandria, Egypt, 3, 218, 230
 al-Fashir, Darfur capital, 170–71
 Algeria, 5, 26–28, 195, 222, 237, 241, 259, 265, 266, 268–73, 277
 Algerian War of Independence (1954–62), 268–73
 Algiers, 222, 269, 271
 Alhucemas Bay, Spanish Morocco, 194, 196
 Ali Bouri, Jolof leader, 17, 18
 Ali Dinar, sultan of Darfur, 170–71
 Aliyu, emir of Kano, 32
 Allenby, General Sir Edmund, British officer, 142
 Alsace Lorraine (1914), 139
 Alston, Lieutenant E., British officer, 65
 Amba Alagi, Battle of (1895), 14
 Amba Alagi, Siege of (1941), 213
 Amedeo, the Duke of Aosta, Italian commander in East Africa, 206, 212, 213
 Amhara, Ethiopia, 10
 Amin, Idi, Uganda officer and military ruler, 251
Amir Faruk, Egyptian warship, 257
 Amofo, Battle of (1874), 34
 Amphibious landings, 149, 158, 194, 210, 212, 213, 225–26, 233, 236, 259
 Andriba, Battle of (1895), 27
 Anglo-Asante War of 1874, 33–35
 Anglo-Asante War of 1895–96, 35
 Anglo-Asante War of 1900, 35–36
 Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–81), 90–94, 114
 Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902), 112–31
 Anglo-French Agreement of 1898, 22
 Anglo-French alliance (1904), 10
 Anglo-German agreement (1890), 57
 Anglo-Ndebele War (1893), 102–104
 Anglo-Zulu War (1879), 79–85
 Angola, 155, 157, 160
 Ankrah, Joseph Arthur, Gold Coast/Ghanaian officer, 246
 Annual, Battle of (1921), "Disaster at Annual," 193–94
 Anstruther, Lieutenant Colonel Philip, British officer, 90
 Antananarivo, Madagascar, 27, 28, 265
 Anthony, Major Seth, British officer, 233, 245
 Antonetti, Raphael, French governor general, 202
 Apartheid, 274–79

- Arab Legion, Jordan, 257
 Arab Rebellion, World War I, 171
 Arab War, Congo Free State (1892–94), 43, 51
 Arab-Israeli War (1948), 256–57
 Arab-Israeli War (1956), 259–60
 Arab-Swahili, 43–46, 50, 54, 60, 62, 63, 65, 66
 Arakan Campaigns, Burma, 232–34
 Arap Moi, Daniel, Kenya president, 264
 Archinard, Louis, French officer, 17, 18, 21
 Arendrup, Soren, Danish colonel, 11
Ark Royal, HMS, aircraft carrier, 191
 Armored cars, 155, 156, 170, 191, 200, 249, 250, 261, 275
 Army of Africa, Spain, 193–195
 Asamoa Nkwanta, 33, 34
 Asante, 22, 33–36, 190
 Ascari, Italian colonial African troops, 12, 15
 Askari, colonial African soldier, 46, 49, 54, 158
 Asmara, Eritrea, 211, 213
 Assab, Eritrea, 203, 213
 Assam, Battle of (1871), 10
 Assou ou Ba Slam, Moroccan rebel leader, 198
 Aswan Dam, 259
 Atbara, Battle of (1898), 8
 Atlantic Charter (1941), 239
Atlantis, German warship, 230
 Attahiru II, Soloko ruler, 32, 249, 250
 Auchinleck, General Claude, British officer, 218–20
 Australia, 120, 123, 125, 130, 168, 184, 217, 224, 230, 280
 Azande, 42
 Baden-Powell, Robert, British officer, 35, 105, 115, 123, 125, 133
 Badoglio, Marshall Pietro, Italian officer, 200, 204, 205
 Bagamoyo, 46, 47
 Baghirimi, 25, 26
 Bagemder, Ethiopia, 206
 Bahta Hagos, Eritrean rebel leader, 14
 Bai Bureh, Sierra Leone rebel leader, 37–38
 Balewa, Sir Abubakar Tafawa, Nigerian prime minister, 248
 Bamako, Mali, 17, 20
 Bambara, 17–19, 21, 189
 Bambatha, Zulu rebel leader, 134–35
 Bambuk, 17
 Bamileke people, 266, 267
 Bandawe, Sergeant, British soldier, 65
 Bandiagara, Battle of (1893), 19
 Bangui, 201–202
 Baratieri, General Oreste, Italian officer, 14
Barbarke, HMSAS, 231
 Bardia, Libya, 200, 217, 219, 235
 Barentu, Eritrea, 210
 Baring, Sir Evelyn, British governor of Kenya, 260
 Barka Ngainoumbey (Karnu), Central African resistance leader, 201–202
 Bassa people, 266, 267
 Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), 278
 Bathurst, Gambia, 38
 Bauchi, 32
 Bechuanaland Protectorate (later Botswana), 97, 103, 104, 111, 114, 182, 229, 234–36, 276, 277
 Bechuanaland Protectorate Regiment, 115
 Bedouin, 168
 Behanzin, 23–25
 Beira, 105, 160
 Belgian Congo, 45, 160, 161, 164, 165, 185, 227–28, 238, 250–52
 Belgians, 9, 41–45, 146, 160, 168, 185, 203, 213, 227–28, 251–53, 255
 Bemba, 62, 189

- Benghazi, Libya, 6, 217–19
 Benin, 30
 Benin Punitive Expedition (1897), 30
 Berbera, Somalia, 10, 191, 209, 212
 Berenguer Fuste, General Damaso,
 Spanish governor of Morocco, 192
 Bergen-Belsen concentration camp,
 222
 Berinja, Battle of (1916), 170–71
 Berlin Airlift (1948–49), 275
 Berlin Conference (1884), 1, 43
 Berrange, General Carl, South
 African officer, 156
 Bersaglieri, Italian light infantry, 206
 Bertua, Cameroon, 147, 148
 Beyers, Christiaan, Boer leader and
 head of Union Defence Force, 127,
 150–52
 Bhaca, 89
 Bhagat, Second Lieutenant
 Premindra Singh, 210
 Biafra, 247
 Bight of Biafra, 29–30
 Bikitsha, Captain Veldtman, Fingo
 leader, 75–77
 Bir Hakeim, Libya, 219
 Bissandugu, Mandinka capital,
 20, 21
 Bizerta, Battle of (1943), 227
 Black Watch Regiment,
 34, 208
 Black Week (1899), 118, 123
 Blacker, John, demographer, 264
 Blantyre, Malawi, 62
 Bloemfontein, Orange Free State
 capital, 121, 122
 Boer-Gananwa War (1894), 100
 Boer-Venda War (1898), 100–101
 Bogos, Ethiopia, 10, 12
 Bokassa, Jean Bedel, Central African
 soldier and ruler, 273
 Bondelswarts, South West Africa,
 110, 192
 Bongiovanni, General Luigi, Italian
 officer, 199
 Bongo Rebellion, Gold Coast
 (1915–1916), 173
 Bonnetti, Rear Admiral Mario,
 Italian officer, 211
 Bonnier, Lieutenant Colonel
 Etienne, French officer, 21, 22
 Bonny, 30
 Borgnis-Desbordes, Lieutenant
 Colonel Gustav, French officer, 20
 Borgu, 31
 Borno, 25–26, 33, 245
 Botha, Louis, South African Prime
 Minister, 98, 116, 118, 119, 121–31,
 150–52, 155–59, 180, 181
 Bou Gafer, Battle of (1933), 198
 Brackenbury, Henry, British officer,
 33
 Brake, Captain H. E. J., British
 officer, 66
 Brand, J.H., Orange Free State
 President, 92
 Brandwater Basin, Boer surrender
 (1900), 125
 Brass, 30–31
 Brault, Captain, French officer, 22
 Brazzaville, 147, 224, 225
 Brazzaville Conference (1944), 239
 Bretonnet, Lieutenant Henri, French
 officer, 26
 Briand, General Max, French officer,
 267
 Briggs, Brigadier Harold Rawdon,
 British officer, 210
 Briggs Force, 210–11
 British Annexation of Transvaal
 (1877), 70, 72
 British Anti-Slavery Squadron, 36
 British Bechuanaland, 97, 101
 British Conquest of Central Africa
 (Northern Rhodesia and
 Nyasaland), 62–67
 British Conquest of East Africa,
 55–61
 British Conquest of Southern
 Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), 101–106

- British Conquest of Sudan, 8–10
 British Conquest of Uganda, 57–59
 British Conquest of West Africa, 29–38
 British Empire Air Training Scheme (BEATS), 228–29
 British Invasion of Ethiopia (1868), 10
 British Kaffraria, 74, 75
 British Occupation of Egypt (1882), 3–5
 British South Africa Company (BSAC), 62, 101–106, 174
 British South Africa Police (BSAP), 155, 279, 280
 Brits, General Coen, South African officer, 155, 157, 161, 163
 Bronkhorstspuit, Battle of (1880), 90–91
 Brussels Declaration (1874), 22
 Buganda, 250
 Buganda Civil War, 55–59
 Bujumbura, 53, 54, 164, 253
 Bulawayo, 103–105, 115, 182
 Bulawayo Field Force, 104
 Bulgaria, 3
 Buller, Redvers, British officer, 33, 79, 82–85, 116–26
 Bulwanyi, Battle of (1889), 57
 Bunkabira, Battle of (1889), 56
 Bunyoro, 55–59
 Burgers, T. F., Transvaal president, 71
 Burkina Faso, 176, 190
 Burma campaign, World War II, 188, 209, 211, 227, 231–35
 Burnham, Frederick Russell, American scout, 104
 Bure, 19
 Burmi, Battle of (1903), 32–33
 Burundi, 44–45, 51, 53–55, 160, 164, 168, 185, 252–55
 Bushman, Major H. A., British officer, 73–74
 Bushmanland Borderers, 130
 Bushi, 51, 52
 Busoga, 59
 Butare (Astrida), 253
 Byumba, Rwanda, 254
 C-130 transport aircraft, 276
 Cairo, 5, 217, 220, 227, 257, 258, 268
 Calabar, 29, 30, 146, 245
 Caldwell, Captain Mackay, British officer, 40
 Cambrai, Battle of (1918), 142
 Cameroon, 112, 137, 143–49, 160, 166, 170, 185, 224, 249, 250, 266–68
 Cameroonians Army of National Liberation (ALNK), 267–68
 Cana, Battle of (1892), 24
 Canada, 120, 121, 123, 130, 184, 257, 280
 Canberra bombers, 275, 281
 Cape Auxiliary Horse Transport, 182
 Cape Coast Castle, 33
 Cape Colony, 75–79, 85–91, 95, 97, 101, 108, 112–31
 Cape Corps, 142, 160, 162, 180–182, 184, 229, 230, 275
 Cape Mounted Rifles (CMR), 85, 89
 Cape Mounted Yeomanry, 88
 Cape Town, 230
 Cape Town Highlanders, 141
 Caprivi Strip, 155
 Carnimeo, General Nicolangelo, Italian officer, 211
 Carrier Corps, East Africa, World War I, 172, 177
 Carrington, Frederick, British officer, 86, 87, 105, 124, 125
 Casablanca, Morocco, 7, 222
 Castle Beer Company, 134
 Cattle-Killing, Xhosa movement (1856–57), 74
 Caudrelier, Commandant P. C., French officer, 22
 Centane Hill, Battle of (1878), 77

- Central Africa Rifles (Central Africa Regiment; CAR), 36, 38, 65, 66, 67
 Central African Federation, 280–82
 Centurian tanks, 275
 Cetshwayo, Zulu ruler, 72, 79–85, 97, 98
 Ceylon, 233
 Chad, 224, 225, 227
 Challe, General Maurice, French officer, 270, 273
 Chaltin, Commandant Louis Napoleon, Force Publique officer, 43–45
 Chaminuka, Shona spirit medium, 102
 Chaouen, Morocco, 193, 194
 Chater, Brigadier Arthur Reginald, British officer, 208
 Cheeseman, Joseph James, Liberian president, 40
 Chelmsford, Lord (Lieutenant General F. A. Thesiger), 78, 79–85
 Chemical warfare, 138, 139, 187, 204–206
 Chemin des Dame, Battle of (1917), 139–40
 Chewa, 65
 Chikuse, Ngoni leader, 66
 Chilembwe, John, Nyasaland rebellion of 1915, 172, 173
 China, 254, 266, 276
 Chindits, 232
 Chinyanja, 190
 Chivi, Shona leader, 102
 Chra River, Battle of (1914), 144
 Churchill, Winston, 9, 116, 192, 209, 217, 220, 221
 Chwa, Daudi, Buganda ruler, 58, 59
 Clarke, Brigadier General C. M., Cape military commander, 87, 88
 Clayton, General, Liberian officer, 39
 Coape-Smith, Lieutenant H., British officer, 65
 Coatit, Battle of (1895), 14
 Cold War, 241, 251, 275, 280
 Colenso, Battle of (1899), 118
 Collyer, J. J., South African officer, 161
 Colville, Henry, British officer, 58
 Combes, Colonel A. V. A., French officer, 20, 21
 Commando system, 100, 113
 Concentration camps, Libya, 201, 222
 Concentration camps, South African War, 129, 130
 Confederation, South Africa, 70
 Congo Crisis, 252
 Congo Free State, 9, 41–45, 51
 Congolese National Army (ANC), 252
 Coolela, Battle of (1895), 108
 Corfield, Colonel Richard, British officer, 191
 Corsica, 237, 271
 Cotonou, 23–25
 Coty, Rene, French President, 271
 Counterinsurgency, British in Kenya (1952–60), 260–64; British in South African War (1899–1902), 129–31; French in Algeria (1954–62), 268–73; French in Cameroon (1957–60), 267; French in Madagascar (1896–1905), 28–29; French in Madagascar (1947–48), 265–66; Italians in Libya (1923–31), 199–201
 Crealock, Major General H. H., British officer, 84
 Cronje, Piet, Boer leader, 115–117, 121
 Cumberland, HMS, 146
 Cunningham, Lieutenant-General Alan, British officer, 210, 212, 213, 218, 219
 Cunningham, Major George, British officer, 58
 Cunynghame, General Arthur, British officer, 77
 Cyanguu, Rwanda, 164, 254

- Cyprus, 5, 259, 281
 Cyrenaica, Libya, 169–70, 199–201, 214, 217, 221
- Dabulamanzi, Zulu leader, 81, 98
 Dagomba, 190
 Dahomey, 23–25, 31, 227
 Dakakori, 190, 245
 Dakar, Battle of (1940), 224
 Dakar, Senegal, 17, 26, 148, 179, 224, 238
 Dalmanutha (Bergendal), Battle of (1900), 126
 Dar es Salaam, 46, 49, 163
 Dardanelles, 6
 Darfur, 25, 170–71
 Dartnell, Major J. G., British officer, 80
 De Albuquerque, Joaquim Augusto Mousinho, Portuguese officer, 108
 De Beers Diamond Company, 115, 116
 De Bono, General Emilio, Italian officer, 203, 204
 De Bournazel, Captain Henri, “The Red Man,” French officer, 198
 De Cristofori, Colonel Tommaso, Italian officer, 12
 De Gaulle, Charles, Free French leader, 224–27, 237, 238, 271–73
 De la Rey, Koos, Boer leader, 114, 116, 117, 121–31, 150
 De Wet, Christiaan, Orange Free State leader, 116, 121–31, 151, 152
 Debre Marqos, Ethiopia, 212
 Decolonization, 241
 Defiance Campaign, South Africa, 276
 Delville Wood, Battle of (1916), 141
 Democratic Movement for Malagasy Renovation (MDRM), 264, 265
 Derna, Libya, 6, 217
 Dessie, Ethiopia, 203, 204, 212, 213
- Dhanis, Commandant Francis, Force Publique officer, 43–44
 Diagne, Blaise, French high commissioner, 179
 Diamond discovery, South Africa, 69–70
 Diamond Fields Horse, 95
 Diamond Hill (Donkerhoek), Battle of (1900), 125
 Dickinson, Major General Douglas, British officer, 207
 Diego Suarez (Antsiranana), Madagascar, 226, 265
 Dien Bein Phu, Battle of (1954), 273
 Dinuzulu, Zulu leader, 98–99, 131–35
 Dithakong, Battle of (1878), 95
 Djibouti, 12
 Dobell, Brigadier C. M., British officer, 146–49
 Dodds, Colonel Alfred-Amedee, French officer, 23
 Dogali, Battle of (1887), 12
 Dogba, Battle of (1892), 24
 Dongola, Sudan, 8
 Doornkop, Battle of (1900), 124
 Douala, Cameroon, 144–49, 225, 266
 Driefontein, Battle of (1900), 122
 Drilling Societies, Southern Africa, 184
 Duchesne, General Jacques, French officer, 27
 Dukwana, Xhosa Christian, 79
 Dul Madoba, Battle of (1913), 191
 Dunkirk (1940), 231
 Dunn, John, white trader and Zulu chief, 79, 83, 85
 Durban, 115, 134, 135, 142, 225, 230
 Durnford, Colonel A. W., British officer, 80
- East African Campaign, World War I, 158–68
 East African Campaign, World War II, 206–214, 227, 234

- East African Rifles, 59, 60
 Eaton Hall, Officer Cadet School, 245
 Eboue, Felix, French governor of Chad, 224
 Effendi, British East African rank, 250
 Egba, 29, 173
 Egypt, 2–5, 6–10, 55, 138, 142, 168–70, 201, 207, 214–23, 227, 230, 235, 241, 255–60, 268, 278
 Egyptian Air Force, 257, 258, 259
 Egyptian Camel Transport Corps, 171
 Egyptian Labour Corps, 171
 Egyptian Navy, 258, 259
 Ekiti, 29
 El Agheila, Libya, 217, 218, 219, 221
 El Alamein, Battles of (1942), 220, 221
 El-Obeid, Battle of (1882), 7
 El Teb, Battle of (1884)
 Elands River, Battle of (1900), 125
 Elandslaagte, Battle of (1899), 114, 115
 Elba, 237
 Elbejet, Battle of (1889), 46
 Elkins, Caroline, historian, 264
 Elijah II, Nigerian prophet, 173
 Eloff, Sarel, Boer leader, 123
 Enes, Antonio, Portuguese official, 107
 Engelbrecht, Lieutenant Colonel C. L., South African officer, 226
 Engida, Ras Alula, Ethiopian leader, 12, 13, 15
 Engugu, Nigeria, 244
 Enslin, B. G. L., South African officer, 163
 Enver Bey (late Enver Pasha), Ottoman officer, 6, 170
 Equatorial Guinea, 144, 146–49
 Erasmus, F. C., South African defense minister, 274
Erinpura, SS, British troopship, 235
 Eritrea, 8, 12, 13, 187, 199, 201, 202, 206–214
 Erskine, General George, British officer, 262
 Eseka, Cameroon, 149
 Eshowe, Siege of (1879), 82
 Ethiopia, 1, 6, 8, 10–15, 25, 202–214, 227, 277, 278
 Ethiopian Air Force, 203
 Evian Accords (1962), 272
 Fampoux, Battle of (1917), 141
 Fante, 33–36, 190
 Faruk, Egyptian ruler, 255, 258
 Fashoda Incident (1898), 9–10
 Faya-Largeau, Chad, 225
 Fernandez Silvestre, General Manuel, Spanish officer, 193
 Fernando Po, 144, 149
 Ferreira, Ignatius, Boer leader, 121
 Ferreira Gil, General Jose Cesar, Portuguese officer, 166
 Fez, Morocco, 7, 194, 196
 Fezzan, Libya, 200
 Fianarantsoa, Madagascar, 226, 265
 Fighting Kopje, Pedi stronghold, 71, 73, 74
 Fingo (Mfengu), 75–79, 89–90
 Fingoland, 75
 Fletcher, Corporal William, British engineer, 64
 FN rifles, 249, 253
 Fode Kabba, Gambian rebel, 38
 Fode Silla, Gambian rebel, 38
 Fongoli, General Ugo, Italian officer, 210
 Forbes, Major Patrick, British officer, 103
 Force Publique, Belgian Congo, 42–45, 53, 160, 164, 191, 227–28, 234, 251–53
 Force Publique mutinies, 44–45, 228
 Fort Archambault (Sahr), 25, 26
 Fort Burgers, Transvaal, 72–74

- Fort Capuzzo, Libya, 216, 217, 235
- Fort Douaumont, 139
- Fort Jameson, 66
- Fort Johnston (Mangochi), 63, 64
- Fort Lamy (Njamena), 26, 225
- Fort Manning (Mchinji), 66
- Fort Salisbury (Harare), 102
- Fort Victoria (Masvingo), 102
- Fort Weeber, 72
- Fotheringham, Monteith, British agent, 62
- Fourie, Jopie, Boer rebel leader, 151–52
- France, Battle of (1940), 231
- Francke, Viktor, German officer, 153, 155, 157
- Franco, Francisco, Spanish officer and dictator, 193, 194, 195, 271
- Franco-Dahomey War, First (1890), 23
- Franco-Dahomey War, Second (1892–94), 24, 25
- Free French, World War II, 187–88, 210, 219, 222–27, 236–38
- Free Officers Movement, Egypt, 258
- Freetown, Sierra Leone, 36–38, 224
- French conquest of Dahomey (1890–94), 22–23
- French, Lieutenant General William, British officer, 117, 118, 120–124, 128
- French Conquest of Madagascar (1895–97), 26–29
- French conquest of West Africa, 17–26
- French Employment of African Soldiers, World War I, 138–40, 174–75
- French Equatorial Africa, 149
- French Expeditionary Corps (FEC), World War II, 236, 237
- French Foreign Legion, 23, 193, 196, 197, 211, 225, 265, 268, 269, 273
- French occupation of Morocco (1911), 7
- French occupation of Tunisia (1881), 5, 14
- French Union, 264, 267
- French West Africa, unification, 22
- Frontier Armed and Mounted Police (FAMP), later renamed Cape Mounted Rifles, Cape Colony, 75–79, 85
- Frontier Force, Liberia, 40–41
- Frontier Police, Sierra Leone, 37
- Frusci, Lieutenant-General Luigi, Italian officer, 209, 210
- Fulani, 33, 190, 201
- Futa Bondu, 17, 18
- Futa Jalon, 19, 20
- Gabes, Tunisia, 223
- Gabon, 23, 146–49, 187, 224, 225
- Galhardo, Colonel Rodrigues, Portuguese officer, 108
- Gallabat, Battle of (1889), 8, 13
- Gallabat, Battle of (1940), 209
- Gallagher, John, historian, 2
- Gallieni, General Joseph-Simon, French officer, 28, 29
- Gallipoli campaign (1915), 140, 171
- Gamal Abd al-Nasser, Egyptian officer, 258–60, 268
- Gambia, 38, 67, 232, 244
- Gambia Field Force, 249
- Gambia Regiment, 249
- Gambo, Ndebele leader, 103
- Gananwa, 100
- Gandhi, M. K., 119, 134
- Garde Nationale Burundaise (GNB), 253, 254
- Garde Nationale Rwandaise (GNR), 253, 254, 255
- Garde Territoriale du Ruanda-Urundi (GTRU), 253
- Gardener gun, 103
- Garua, Cameroon, 146, 148, 225
- Gatacre, Lieutenant General William, British officer, 117, 118

- Gatling gun, 2, 5, 11, 82–85, 132
 Gauche Wood (1918), 142
 Gaza, 257, 258
 Gaza, Battle of (1916), 169
 Gaza state, 106–108
 Gazala Line, 219, 220
 Gazelle Force, 209
 Gazzera, General Pietro, Italian officer, 213
 Gbaya people, 201–202
 Gcaleka Xhosa, 75–79
 Geneva Convention, 204, 232
 Genocide of the Herero and Nama, 111–12, 154
 Genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda, First (1963), 255
 Gentil, Emile, French agent, 25, 26
 German conquest of East Africa, 45–55
 German East Africa, 46–55, 58, 60, 137, 143, 158–68
 German East Africa Company, 46
 German-Nama War (1894), 109
 German occupation of Burundi, 54–55
 German occupation of Rwanda, 53–54
 German South West Africa (Namibia), 97, 99, 108–112, 137, 143, 150, 152–58, 180, 185
 Germany, Nazi, 203, 229, 232
 Gideon Force, World War II, 211, 212
 Giffard, General George, British officer, 232
 Gilliaert, Major General Auguste-Eduard, Belgian officer, 213
 Gingindlovu, Battle of (1879), 83–84
 Giriama, 60
 Gladstone, William, British prime minister, 92
 Glyn, Colonel Richard, British officer, 77, 80
 Gobaze, Ethiopian leader, 10
 Godide, Zulu leader, 81
 Godwin-Austen, Major General Alfred Reade, British officer, 209
 Gojjam, Ethiopia, 206, 211
 Gold Coast (Ghana), 33–36, 38, 67, 143, 185, 190, 244–49
 Gold Coast Regiment, 143–44, 166, 173, 190, 208, 232, 233, 244
 Gold discovery, South Africa, 99
 Goldie, George, 30, 31
 Gombe, 32
 Gondar, Ethiopia, 13, 209, 213
 Goold-Adams, Hamilton, British official, 103
 Gordon, Charles, 8, 25
 Gordon, Group Captain Robert, RAF officer, 191
 Gordon Highlanders, 93
 Gothic Line, Italy, 236
 Goujou, Alphonse, French adventurer, 201
 Goumiers, Moroccan mountain troops, 197–99, 226–27, 236, 237, 273
 Goundam massacre (1894), 22
 Gouzeaucourt (1918), 142
 Gowon, Yakuba, Nigerian officer, 247
 Gqobose, Mfanasekhaya, antiapartheid activist, 277, 278
Graf von Goetzen, German warship, 161
 Graham, General Gerald, British officer, 8
 Grant, William, British official, 58
 Graziani, General Rodolfo, Italian officer, 200–201, 205, 206, 216
 Grebo, Liberia, 38–41
 Griqualand West, 114
 Griqualand West Rebellion (1878), 94–95
 Guinea, French, 267
 Gun War, Lesotho (1880–81), 85–88
 Gundat, Battle of (1875), 11
 Gungunhana, Gaza ruler, 107–108
 Gura, Battle of (1876), 11
 Gustav Line, Italy, 237

- Habyarimana, Juvenal, Rwandan officer and president, 253, 254
 Halfaya, Libya, 219
 Halifax, Rear Admiral G. W., British officer, 230
 Hamdan Abu Anga, Mahdist leader, 13
 Hamilton, Colonel Ian, British officer, 124
 Hamu, Zulu leader, 97
 Hannington, Bishop James, 55
 Harar, Ethiopia, 13, 205, 212
 Harki, Algerian Loyalists, 270, 272
 Hart, Major General Arthur, British officer, 118
 Hausa, 32, 34, 42, 190, 245
 Hehe Wars (1891–98), 46–50, 111
 Helicopters, 270, 275, 281
 Herero, 108–112
 Herero and Nama Rebellion, German South West Africa (1904–1907), 50, 110–12
 Hertzog, J. B. M., Boer military leader and prime minister of South Africa, 127, 128, 130, 150, 152
 Hicks, Colonel William, British officer, 8
 Hitler, Adolf, 218, 223, 235
 Hlophekhulu, Battle of (1888), 133
 Ho Chi Minh, 273
 Hobson, Thomas, 2
 Hodgson, Jack, antiapartheid activist, 277
 Hodgson, Sir Frederick, British governor of Gold Coast, 35
 Hoe Handles, War of (1927–32), 201–202
 Hola Detention Camp, Kenya, 263
 Holkrantz, Battle of (1902), 130
 Holland's Shop, Battle of (1877), 76
 Hope, Hamilton, Cape official, 88
 Hopkins, A. G., historian, 2
 Hoskins, General Reginald, British officer, 166
 Hotchkiss guns, 14
 Huddleston, Major Herbert, British officer, 171
 Humbert, Lieutenant Colonel Gustave, French officer, 21
 Hure, General Antoine, French officer, 197, 198
 Husayn Kamil, ruler of Egypt, 168
 Hut Tax War, Sierra Leone (1898), 37–38
 Hutu, 52, 54, 185, 252–55
 Ibadan, 29, 244, 246
 Ibeka, Battle of (1877), 75
 Ife, 29
 Igbo, 190, 245, 246
 Ijebu, 29
 Ijesa, 29
 Ijwi Island, 50, 51, 160
 Ila, 189
 Ilorin, 31
 Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC), 57, 59, 60, 63
 India, 60, 63, 92, 114, 158, 168, 169, 184, 207, 209, 220, 230, 232, 233, 241
 Indian and Malay Corps, South Africa, 229
 Indian Expeditionary Force B, World War I, 158
 Indian Expeditionary Force C, World War I, 158
 Indigenous Regular Forces, Spanish Morocco, 193
 Indochina, 241, 264–68, 273, 276
 Influenza, 142, 177–78
 Ingogo, Battle of (1881), 92
 Inhambane, 106, 107
 International Africa Association, 41
 Iraq, 192, 256, 281
 Iringa, Tanzania, 48, 49, 165
 Irish volunteers, South African War, 123, 124
 Iron-Will Column, Italian, 205
 Isandlwana, Battle of (1879), 80–81

- Islamic Law, 8
 Israel, 255–60
 Italian Air Force, 206, 209, 213, 214
 Italian Campaign, World War II, 235, 236, 237
 Italian conquest of Eritrea, 12
 Italian Libya Air Command, 214
 Italian pacification of Libya (1927–31), 199–202
 Italian Red Sea Flotilla, 206, 211
 Italian Special Armoured Brigade, World War II, 217
 Italo-Ethiopian War, First (1895–1896), 13–15
 Italo-Ethiopian War, Second (1935–36), 202–206
 Italo-Turkish War (1911–12), 5–6, 199
 Italy, 5–6, 8, 188
 Iteso, 59
 Itote, Waruhiu (General China), Kenyan rebel leader, 261, 263
 Ivory Coast, 20, 21, 35, 38, 40
 Ivuna, Battle of (1888), 132
 Izinsimba Valley, Battle of (1906), 135

 Jabal Sarhro, Morocco, 197–98
 Jadotville, Belgian Congo, 228
 Jaja, 30
 Jameson Raid (1895), 99, 104, 113
 Janssens, Lieutenant General Emile, Belgian officer, 252
 Jantjie, Luka, 101
 Japan, 211, 220, 225, 226, 228, 229, 232–35, 238, 273
 Jaunde (Yaounde), Cameroon, 147–49
 Jebel Akhdar, Libya, 200
 Jelib, Battle of (1941), 212, 213
 Jenne, 19
 Jerusalem, 142
 Jihad, 6, 7, 38, 168, 171, 175
 Jijiga, Ethiopia, 204, 213
 Joalland, Lieutenant Paul, French officer, 26
 Joffre, Commandant J. J. C., French officer, 22
 Johannesburg, 116, 124, 125, 127, 150, 189, 192, 276, 277
 Johnson, Captain C. E. J., British officer, 64
 Johnston, Harry, British official, 63
 Jolof, 17, 18
 Jordan, 256, 257
 Joubert, P., Boer military leader, 71, 72, 90–93, 100–101, 114–16, 121
 Jubaland, Kenya, 60
 Juin, General Alphonse, Free French officer, 237

 Kaarta, 18
 Kabarega, Bunyoro ruler, 55, 58, 59
 Kabego, ruler of Ijwi Island, 51
 Kabuwoko, Battle of (1897), 58
 Kaduna, Nigeria, 244
 Kaguvi, Shona spirit medium, 106
 Kagwa, Apolo, Buganda Protestant leader, 55–59
 Kairouan, Tunisia, 5
 Kakungulu, Semei, Buganda Christian leader, 56–59
 Kalabani Hill, Battle of (1880), 88
 Kalanga, 101
 Kalema, Buganda ruler, 56
 Kalenga, Hehe fort, 47–49
 Kalenjin, 189
 Kamba, 60, 189
 Kamina, Belgian Congo, 228, 251
 Kamina, Togoland, 143–44
 Kampala, Uganda, 54, 57, 60
 Kamwana, Elliot, Watchtower leader, 173
 Kandolo, Sergeant, Force Publique mutineer, 44
 Kanjogera, Rwanda queen mother, 53
 Kano, 32, 245
 Kanzenze Bridge, Battle of (1963), 255
 Kapalaga, Buganda Muslim leader, 56

- Karibib, South West Africa, 155, 156
 Karonga, Malawi, 62, 63, 65, 66
 Kasa Mercha, Ethiopian leader, 10
 Kasai, Belgian Congo, 44, 228
 Kassala, Sudan, 13, 208
 Kasserine Pass, Battle of (1943), 222
 Katanga, Belgian Congo, 42
 Kayibanda, Gregoire, Rwandan president, 255
 Kelly, Colonel Philip, British officer, 170
 Kemp, Jan, Boer leader, 127, 151, 152
 Kenedugu, 19, 21
 Keniera, 20
 Kenya, 59–61, 159, 161, 185, 189, 206–214, 233, 241, 250–51, 260–64, 276
 Kenya African Union (KAU), 260, 261
 Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA), 261–64
 Kenya Regiment, 261
 Kenyatta, Jomo, African nationalist leader, 239, 261, 264
 Kerekou, Mathieu, military ruler of Benin, 243
 Keren, Battle of (1941), 210–11
 Khama, Ngwato Tswana ruler, 97, 103
 Khambula, Battle of (1879), 82, 83
 Khartoum, 8, 10
 Khoms, Libya, 6
 Kigali, 164, 253, 254, 255
 Kijikitile Ngwale, Maji-Maji prophet, 49
 KiKAR, military language, 190
 Kikuyu, 60, 189, 260–64
 Kikuyu Home Guard, 261
 Kilima, Burundi rebel leader, 54–55
 Kilosa, Tanzania, 47, 163
 Kilwa, 49, 163
 Kim, RSM Hama, Nigerian soldier, 245
 Kimathi, Dedan, Kenyan rebel leader, 261, 263
 Kimberley, 96, 115
 Kimberley, Siege of (1899–1900), 115–21
 Kimpuki, Corporal, Force Publique mutineer, 44
 King, J. G., British official, 64
 King's African Rifles (KAR), 61, 67, 166, 189, 190, 192, 207–214, 225–26, 232–34, 250–51, 261, 280, 281
 Kintu, Gabriel, Buganda Christian leader, 56–59
 Kionga Triangle, East Africa, 165–66
 Kirkham, John, British officer, 10
 Kismayu, Somalia, 212
 Kitchener, Horatio Herbert, 8–10, 119–31, 170
 Kitebi, Battle of (1889), 56
 Kiwewa Mutebi II, Buganda ruler, 56
 Klob, Lieutenant Colonel Jean-Francois, French officer, 26
 Kobina Chere, Asante rebel leader, 36
 Koegas, 94, 95
 Kofi Kakari, Asante ruler, 33
 Koitalel Arap Samoei, Nandi leader, 61
 Koko, Brass ruler, 30
 Kombo, Soninke Kingdom, 38
 Kondoa Irangi, Battle of (1916), 162–63
 Kong, 22
 Koniakary, Tukolor town, 18
Konigsberg, German warship, 160
 Kopakopa, Arab-Swahili leader, 62, 63, 65
 Korean War (1950–53), 275
 Kosoko, ruler of Lagos, 29
 Koundian, Tukolor fort, 17, 18
 Kouno, Battle of (July 1899), 26
 Kouno, Battle of (October 1899), 26
 Kountche, Seyni, military ruler of Niger, 243
 Kousseri, Battle of (1900), 26
 Kraaipan, 114

- Kraut, Major Goerg, German officer, 162, 163, 165, 166
 Kritzinger, Piet, Boer leader, 127, 128
 Kru, 40–41
 Kru Rebellion, Liberia (1915–16), 41
 Kruger, Paul, Transvaal president, 99, 121–26
 Krupp guns, 71, 113, 122
 Kufit, Battle of (1885), 13
 Kufra, Battle of (1941), 225, 237
 Kumasi, 34–36
 Kyari, Borno ruler, 25
- Lacoste, Robert, French governor general of Algeria, 269
 Lado Enclave, 45
 Ladysmith, Siege of (1899–1900), 114, 115, 117–20
 Lagos, 29, 35, 244, 246, 248
 Laing's Nek, Battle of (1881), 91
 Lake Albert, 51
 Lake Chad, 25–26
 Lake Kivu, 50–53, 160, 164
 Lake Kyoga, 59
 Lake Ngami, 102
 Lake Nyasa (Malawi), 55, 62–67, 161, 165
 Lake Rukwa, 48
 Lake Tanganyika, 42, 44, 51, 53, 54, 66, 160, 161, 164, 165, 167
 Lake Victoria, 55, 56, 57, 164
 Lamberton, Lieutenant Colonel J., French officer, 267
 Lamy, Major Amedee-Francois, French officer, 26
 Langa Attacks (1962), 278
 Langeberg Rebellion (1897), 101
 Langi country, Uganda, 59
 Lanyon, Lieutenant Colonel William Owen, Cape official, 94, 95
 Lari Massacres (1953), Kenya, 262
 Lathbury, General Sir Gerald, British officer, 263
 League of Nations, 158, 168, 185, 187, 203–206, 252
- Leballo, Potlako, antiapartheid activist, 278, 279
 Leclerc, Colonel Philippe, Free French officer, 225, 237
 Lee series rifles, 114, 249
 Lenin, Vladimir, 2
 Leopold II, Belgian king, 9, 41–46, 238
 Leopoldville (Kinshasa), 41, 42, 251
 Lerothodi, Sotho leader, 86–88
 Lesotho (Basutoland), 85–88, 90, 123, 182, 229, 234–36, 277–279
 Leutwein, Major Theodor, German officer, 109–111
 Lewanika, Lozi ruler, 62
 Liberia, 1, 21, 36, 38–41, 175
 Liberian-Grebo War (1875–76), 39
 Liberian-Grebo War (1893), 40
 Libreville, Battle of (1940), 225
 Libya, 5–6, 138, 141, 169–70, 199–201, 214–25
 Libyan Jews, World War II, 222
 Lindi, 46, 163
 Lingala, 42, 191
 Loango, Gabon, 9
 Lobengula, Ndebele ruler, 101–104
 Logiest, Colonel Guy, 252, 253
 Lokoja, Nigeria, 30
 Lome, Togo, 143
 Lomwe, 189
 Long, Colonel C. J., British officer, 118
 Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), 225
 Longido, Battle of (1914), 158
 Louis Trichardt, Transvaal town, 101
 Lourenco Marques (Delagoa Bay–Maputo), 70, 106, 107, 126, 128, 160
 Loyal Mandebele Patriotic Society (LMPS), 182, 183
 Lozi, 62
 Luba, 252
 Luderitz, South West Africa, 112, 154, 156

- Lugalo, Battle of (1891), 47
 Lugard, Frederick, British officer, 31, 32, 57, 62, 63, 148
 Lukin, Major General Henry, South African officer, 151, 154
 Lulua, 252
 Luluabourg (Kananga), 44, 228, 251
 Lunda, 66
 Luo, 61, 189
 Luthuli, Albert, antiapartheid activist, 277
 Lyautey, Hubert, French officer, 28, 196
 Lydenburg, 71, 72, 90

 Maasai, 46, 60, 61, 189
 Macfarlane, Captain R., British officer, 105
 Maconco, Burundi rebel leader, 54–55
 Madagascar, 26–29, 140, 160, 183–84, 187, 225–26, 230, 233, 234, 264–66, 273
 Maduna, Ndebele leader, 174
 Mafeking, Siege of (1899–1900), 115, 123
 Mafeking (Mafikeng), 96, 97, 105, 114, 125
 Mafeteng, Siege of (1880), 86, 87
 Magersfontein, Battle of (1899), 117–18
 Maguigane, Gaza leader, 107–108
 Maguire, Captain C. M., British officer, 63
 Magul, Battle of (1895), 107
 Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad, 7–9, 25
 Mahdists, 7–13, 43
 Mahenge, Battle of (1905), 49
 Maherero, Herero leader, 109
 Maherero, Nikodemus, Herero leader, 109
 Maherero, Samuel, Herero leader, 109–112
 Mahiwa, Battle of (1917), 167
 Mahmadu Lamine, 17

 Mahon, Colonel Bryan, British officer, 123
 Maidugari, Nigeria, 146
 Maigumeri, Chari, Nigerian soldier, 234
 Maji-Maji Rebellion, German East Africa (1905–1906), 49–50
 Majuba Hill, Battle of (1881), 93
 Majunga (Mahajanga), Madagascar, 27, 226
 Makanjira, Yao leader, 63–65
 Makhado, Venda leader, 100
 Makua, 63, 65
 Malawi Rifles (King's African Rifles), 281
 Malaya, 263, 280
 Malaya Scouts, Southern Rhodesia, 280
 Maletti Group, Italian force, World War II, 216
 Mali, 176
 Malindi, 60
 Malta, 223, 235, 259
 Mambwe, 62, 63
 Mamprussi, 190
 Mampuru, 71, 74
 Mandela, Nelson, 276, 277
 Mandinka Empire, 19–23
 Mankurwane, Tlhaping leader, 96
 Manning, Captain William, British officer, 64
 Maoism, revolutionary theory, 269
 Maqoma, Tini, 75, 78, 79
 Maqoma, Xhosa leader, 78
 Marchand, Major Jean-Baptiste, French officer, 9, 10
 Mareth Line, Tunisia, 221, 223
 Margesson, Captain E. C., British officer, 66
 Maritz, Maine, Boer rebel leader, 150–52, 154
 Marrakech, Morocco, 7, 197
 Martial Tribes, 189–90
 Martini-Henry rifle, 87, 102, 103
 Maryland, Liberia, 39–40

- Maseko, Lance Corporal Job, South African soldier, 220
 Maseru, Battle of (1880), 87
 Masina, 18, 19
 Massawa, Red Sea port, 10, 12, 15, 206, 211
 Massu, General Jacques, French officer, 269
 Matanzima, K. D., South African homeland leader, 279
 Mathenge, Stanley, Kenyan rebel leader, 261
 Matopos Hills, 105–106
 Matshana, Zulu leader, 80
 Mau Mau Emergency, Kenya (1952–60), 241, 250, 251, 260–64
 Maurice, John Frederick, British officer, 33–34
 Mauritius, 66, 173, 230
 Mauser rifles, 41, 113, 114, 144, 203
 Mawlay Abd al-Aziz, Moroccan ruler, 7
 Mawlay Abd al-Hafiz, Moroccan ruler, 7
 Mawuki, Battle of (1888), 56
 Maxim gun, 2, 31, 32, 35, 36, 66, 100, 102–106, 134, 135
 Mayi Matip, Theodore, Cameroon politician, 267
 Mazrui Rebellion (1895), 60
 Mbarak bin Rashid, Swahili rebel leader, 60
 Mbida, Andre-Marie, Cameroon prime minister, 267
 Mbigo Masuku, Ndebele leader, 101
 Mbuyazi, Zulu leader, 79
 McGregor, Captain, Fingo levy leader, 76
 McKenzie, Colonel Duncan, Natal officer, 134–35, 154, 156, 157
 Mditshwa, Mpondomise leader, 89–90
 Mechili, Libya, 218
 Mega, Battle of (1941), 212
 Meinertzhagen, Richard, British officer, 61
 Mekele, Ethiopia, 14, 204
 Mekonnen, Ras, Ethiopian leader, 14, 15
 Melilla, Morocco, 193–96
 Mende, Sierra Leone, 37–38
 Mendi, British troopship, 181
 Menelik, Ethiopian emperor, 13–15
 Mengo, Buganda capital, 56–59
 Mersa Matruh, Egypt, 216, 219, 235
 Mers-el-Kebir, Algeria, 224
 Messerschmitt fighters, 257
 Methuen, Lieutenant General Lord, 116, 117, 126, 129
 Meyer, Lucas, Boer leader, 98
 Mezzetti, General Ottorino, Italian officer, 200
 Mhlaba, Raymond, antiapartheid activist, 276
 Mhlonhlo, Mpondomise leader, 88–90
 Micombero, Michel, Burundian officer and ruler, 254
 Mikindani, 46, 163
 Military reforms, late colonial period, 242–55
 Millan Astray, Lieutenant Colonel Jose, Spanish officer, 193
 Milner, Alfred, British high commissioner in South Africa, 128
Mimi, British gunboat, 160–61
 Mission 101, World War II, 211
 Mkwawa, Hehe ruler, 46–49
 Mkwai, Wilton, antiapartheid activist, 277
 Mlozi, Arab-Swahili leader, 62, 63, 65
 Mnyamana, Zulu leader, 82, 132
 Mogadishu, Somalia, 212, 213
 Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, “The Mad Mullah,” 191
 Mokhehle, Ntsu, antiapartheid activist, 277–78
 Molitor, Colonel Philippe, Belgian officer, 164, 165

- Mombasa, 60
 Mome River Gorge, Battle of (1906), 134
 Monrovia, 39–41
 Mons, Officer Cadet School, 245
 Monte Cassino, Battles of (1944), 237
 Monteil, Commandant Parfait-Louis, French officer, 22
 Montgomery, Lieutenant General Bernard, British officer, 220, 221
 Montshiwa, Tshidi Rolong leader, 95–97
 Mopti, 19
 Mora, Cameroon, 146, 149
 Morice Line, Algeria, 270
 Morland, Colonel T. L. N., British officer, 32
 Morocco, 6–7, 29, 139, 192–99, 226, 227, 231, 237, 269, 272, 273
 Morocco, resistance to French (1917–1934), 196–99
 Morogoro, Tanzania, 163
 Morrow, John R., historian, 183
 Mosego, Pedi stronghold, 70, 71
 Moshi, German East Africa, 162
 Mossweu, Kora leader, 96
 Mostert's Hoek, Battle of (1900), 122
 Moumie, Felix-Roland, Cameroon rebel leader, 267
 Mount Elgon, Kenya, 60
 Mount Kilimanjaro, 161, 162
 Mount Mangoche, Malawi, 64
 Mpande, Zulu king, 79
 Mpangile, Hehe leader, 48
 Mpeseni, Ngoni leader, 66
 Mphephu, Venda leader, 100–101
 Mpondo, 89
 Mpondomise, 88–90
 Mpwapwa, Tanzania, 46, 47, 163
 Msiri, Yeke leader, 42
 Muhammad Ali, 7
 Muhammad bin Khalfan (Rumaliza), Arab-Swahili raider, 51
 Muhammad Naguib, Egyptian general and president, 258
 Muhumuza, Rwanda rebel leader, 53, 54
 Munzinger, Werner, Swiss adventurer, 10
 Muronrunkwere, Rwanda queen mother, 50
 Musinga, Rwanda ruler, 53–54, 164
 Muslim Brotherhood, 255–60
 Mussolini, Benito, Italian dictator, 199, 202, 204, 205, 206, 211, 216, 220, 221
 Mustafa Kemal, Ottoman officer, 6
 Mutesa, Buganda ruler, 55
 Mwanga, Buganda ruler, 55–59
 Mwasi, Chewa leader, 65
 Mwezi Gisabo, Burundi ruler, 54–55
 Myburgh, General M. W., South African officer, 156, 157
 Mzilikazi, Ndebele ruler, 101
 Nafadie, French fort, 20
 Nairobi, Kenya, 260–64
 Nama, 108–112
 Namaqualand Scouts, 130
 Nandi, 58, 60–61, 189
 Navarro, General Felipe, Spanish officer, 194
 Nasi, General Guglielmo, Italian officer, 208, 213
 Natal, British colony, 72, 79–85, 90–94, 107, 112–35
 Natal, HMSAS, 231
 Natal Field Force (1881), 91–94
 Natal Field Force (1906), 134–35
 Natal Indian Ambulance Corps, 119
 Natal Mounted Rifles, 154
 Natal Native Contingent (NNC), 80, 82, 84
 Natal Native Horse, 80
 National Congress of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), 249

- National Liberation Army (FLA),
 Algeria, 268–73
 National Liberation Front (FLN),
 Algeria, 268–73
 National Organization Committee
 (CNO), Cameroon rebel group,
 266
 National Scouts (Transvaal), 129
 Nationalist Party, South Africa,
 150–52, 192, 273–275
 Native Military Corps (NMC), 229,
 235, 275
 Ndabuko, Zulu royalist leader, 132,
 133
 Ndebele, 62, 97, 101–106, 182, 183,
 189
 Ndebele and Shona Rebellion
 (1896), 104–106, 174
 Ndebele National Home Movement,
 183
 Ndondakasuka, Battle of (1856), 79
 Ndorwa, 50, 52, 53
 Ndungutse, Rwanda rebel leader, 54
 Nehanda, Shona spirit medium, 106
 Negev Desert, 257
 Neset Bey, Ottoman officer, 6
 New Imperialism, 2
 New Republic, Boer state, 99, 131,
 132, 133
 New Zealand, 120, 168, 184
 New Zealand Division, World War
 II, 219, 220, 221
 Newdigate, Major General E.,
 British officer, 84
Newfoundland, HMS, British
 warship, 259
 Ngaundere, Cameroon, 148
 Ngcayecibi, War of (1877–78), Ninth
 Cape-Xhosa War, 75–79
 Ngoni, 47, 49, 62, 64, 66, 189
 Ngwato Tswana, 97, 103
 Niagassola, French fort, 20
 Niger, 249
 Niger Coast Protectorate, 30, 31
 Niger Delta, 29–31
 Nigeria, 144, 147, 149, 173–74,
 183, 185, 190, 227, 238,
 244–50, 267
 Nigeria Regiment (Queen's Own
 Nigeria Regiment; QONR), 146,
 166, 208, 232–234, 244, 249, 250
 Nigerian Constitutional Conference
 (1957), 248
 Nigerian Military Forces (NMF), 248
 Nigmann, Captain Ernst, German
 officer, 49
 Nioro, Tukolor town, 18
 Nkonde, 62, 63
 Nkore, 52, 56, 58
 Nkoronko, Rwanda military leader,
 51
 Nkotakota, Malawi, 65
 Nkrumah, Kwame, African
 nationalist leader, 239, 244,
 246–48
 Nkundiye, ruler of Ijwi Island, 51, 52
 Nooitgedacht, Battle of (1900), 127
 Nordenfelt gun, 8, 103, 107
 North African Campaign, World
 War II, 214–23
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 (NATO), 260
 North Charterland Exploration
 Company, 66
 North End War, Nyasland (1887–88),
 62
 Northern People's Congress (NPC),
 Nigeria, 249
 Northern Rhodesia, 62, 66, 137, 160,
 161, 165, 167, 172, 173, 178, 189,
 226, 233, 234, 280–82
 Northern Rhodesia Police (NRP),
 155
 Northern Rhodesia Regiment
 (NRR), 189, 208, 226, 233, 234, 280,
 281
 Northey, Brigadier General Edward,
 British officer, 165
 Nsanakang, Cameroon, 146
 Ntabazikamambo, 105

- Ntandala, T. M., antiapartheid activist, 278
- Ntsikana, Xhosa Christian leader, 79
- Nupe, 31
- Nuri Pasha, Ottoman officer, 169, 170
- Nyabingi movement, 53–54
- Nyamata, Rwanda, 255
- Nyamwezi, 48, 54
- Nyasa Anti-Slavery and Defence Committee, 63
- Nyasaland (Central Africa Protectorate), 36, 63, 167, 172, 177–78, 183, 185, 189, 190, 233, 234, 280–82
- Nyonyintono, Henry, Buganda Catholic leader, 56
- Obasanjo, Olusegun, Nigerian officer and head of state, 247
- Odahsu, Battle of (1874), 34
- Ogaden, 13, 192, 205
- Oil Rivers Protectorate (Niger Coast Protectorate), 30
- Ojukwu, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu, Nigerian officer and leader of Biafra, 247
- Okahandja, South West Africa, 110, 156
- Olsen, Colonel Frederik, Belgian officer, 164
- Omar Mukhtar, Libyan resistance leader, 199–201
- Omdurman, Battle of (1898), 9, 10
- Omdurman, Sudan, 8
- oNdini, Battle of (1883), 98
- Operation Anvil (1954), 262
- Operation Battleaxe (1941), 218
- Operation Brassard (1944), 237
- Operation Capri (1943), 223
- Operation Compass (1940–41), 216, 217
- Operation Crusader (1941), 218–19
- Operation Dragoon (1944), 237
- Operation Ironclad (1942), 225–26
- Operation Jock Scott (1952), 261
- Operation Lightfoot (1942), 221
- Operation Resurrection (1958), 271
- Operation Rose (1942), 226
- Operation Supercharge (1942), 221
- Operation Torch (1942), 222
- Operation Venezia (1942), 219
- Opobo, 30
- Oran, Algeria, 222, 272
- Orange Free State, 70, 85, 87, 91, 92, 95, 112–31, 150–52
- Orange River Colony, 124
- Orange River Colony Volunteers, 129
- Osman Digna, Sudanese leader, 8, 13
- Otavi, South West Africa, 157
- Ottoman Empire, 3, 5, 6, 10, 138, 140, 142, 168–71, 175
- Ouandie, Ernest, Cameroon rebel leader, 268
- Oujda, Morocco, 7, 196
- Ovambo, 108, 109, 112, 153
- Ovonranwen, Benin king, 30
- Oyo, 29
- Paardeberg Battle of (1900), 121
- Pacification Zone of Cameroon (ZOPAC), 267
- Page, Melvin, historian, 184–85
- Pakistan, 247
- Palestine, 255–60
- Pan-African Congress, Fifth (1945), 239
- Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), South Africa, 276, 277, 278, 279
- Pangani, Tanzania, 46
- Party of the Disinherited in Madagascar (PADESM), 264–65
- Patton, Major General George S., American officer, 223
- Pearson, Colonel C. K., British officer, 81, 82, 83
- Pedi, 70–74
- Pedi War, First (1876–77), 71–72

- Pelzer, Mathieu, Force Publique officer, 44
 Penn Symons, Major General Sir William, British officer, 114, 115
 Petain, Marshal Henri Philippe, French officer, 194, 196, 223
 Peters, Karl, German agent, 46, 57
 Pienaar, Major General Dan, South African officer, 213
 Pipeline, Kenya, 262–63
 Pirie Bush, 78, 79
 Platt, Major General William, British officer, 207, 210, 211, 213
 Plumer, Lieutenant Colonel Herbert, British officer, 105, 106, 123, 124
 Poguessa, Battle of (1892), 24
 Pokela, John Nyathi, antiapartheid activist, 277
 Pomeroy-Colley, George, British officer, 34, 91–94
 Ponthier, Commandant Pierre Joseph, Force Publique officer, 44
 Poole, Major General W. H. E., South African officer, 236, 274
 Poqo, South Africa, 278, 279
 Port Loko, Sierra Leone, 37
 Port Sudan, 208, 211
 Porto Novo, 23–25
 Portuguese, 63, 66, 70, 101, 105, 155, 165, 242
 Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique), 106–108, 124, 125, 159, 165–67, 174, 176, 276
 Portuguese-Gaza War (1894–95), 107–108
 Potchestroom, 90, 91, 126, 150
 Prempeh, Asante ruler, 35, 36
 Prempeh II, Asante ruler, 36
 Pretoria, 91, 123, 124, 153, 154, 156
 Pretoria Convention (1881), 94, 96
 Pretoria Regiment, 226
 Pretorius, Commandant General M. W., Boer military leader, 71
 Primo de Rivera, General Miguel, Spanish dictator, 194, 195
 Prinsloo, Marthinus, Orange Free State leader, 114, 117, 125
 Protected Villages, Kenya, 263–64
 Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, 31, 33
 Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, 31
 Pseudo-operations, 263, 270
 Pulleine, Colonel H. B., British officer, 80
 Punjab Regiment, 208
 Qorahe, Battle of (1936), 205
 Quadrillage system, Algeria, 270
 Quelimane, 167
 Raaf, Pieter Johannes, 103
 Rabih ibn Fadl Allah, Sudanese slaver and Borno ruler, 25–26, 33
 Rainianjalahy, Malagasy general, 27
 Rainilaiarivony, Malagasy prime minister, 27
 Ralaimongo, Jean, World War I veteran, 183–84
Ramillies, HMS, 226
 Ranavalona III, queen of Madagascar, 27
 Rand Revolt (1922), 184, 192
 Rawlinson, Colonel Henry, British officer, 128
 Rawson, Rear Admiral Harry, British officer, 30
 Red Cross, 205
 Rehoboth, South West Africa, 156
 Reid Daly, Ron, Rhodesian officer, 280
 Remington rifle, 11
 Republic of Goshen, 96, 97
 Republic of Stellaland, 96, 97
 Reserve Territory, Natal, 97–99, 131
 Reunion, 29
 Rharhabe Xhosa, 75–79
 Rhineland, 140, 195
 Rhodes, Cecil, 63, 99, 101–106, 115–16

- Rhodesia Native Regiment, 165, 174, 184, 279
- Rhodesia Regiment (Royal Rhodesia Regiment), 279, 280
- Rhodesia-Nyasaland Field Force, World War I, 165
- Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR), 189, 190, 234, 280
- Rhodesian Air Force (Royal Rhodesian Air Force; RRAF), 281
- Rhodesian Field Force, South African War, 124
- Rhodesian Front, 281
- Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), 281
- Rif Mountains, 7
- Rif Wars (1921–27), 193–96
- Rinderpest, 51, 104, 109
- Ritchie, Lieutenant General Neil, British officer, 219, 220
- Rito, War of (ca. 1880), 51
- Ritter, Major Hermann, South African officer, 157
- Roberts, Field Marshall Lord Frederick Sleigh, British officer, 119–26
- Roberts, Joseph Jenkins, Liberian president, 39
- Robinson, Ronald, historian, 2
- Rocadas, Lieutenant Colonel Alves, Portuguese officer, 155
- Rolong Tswana, 95–97, 115
- Rommel, General Erwin, German officer, 218–23
- Rorke's Drift, Battle of (1879), 81
- Rowlands, Colonel Hugh, British officer, 73
- Royal Air Force (RAF), 191, 192, 208, 209, 214, 216, 225, 228, 230, 262, 280
- Royal Corps of Colonial Troops, Italian, 206
- Royal Corps of Libyan Colonial Troops, 199–201, 216
- Royal Military Academy, Belgium, 251, 253
- Royal Navy, British, 60, 154, 155, 216, 224, 230, 231, 237, 275, 276
- Royal Niger Company, 25, 30, 31
- Royal Niger Constabulary, 30
- Royal Rifle Corps, 119
- Rubusana, Walter, South African black political leader, 180
- Rucunshu, Battle of (1896), 53
- Rudd Concession (1888), 102
- Rukeba, Francois, Rwandan rebel leader, 254
- Russia, 14, 113, 123, 140, 184, 195, 235
- Rutarindwa, ruler of Rwanda, 53
- Rwabugiri, ruler of Rwanda, 50–53, 254
- Rwampembwe, Rwanda military leader, 51
- Rwanda, 44–45, 50–54, 160, 164, 168, 185, 252–55
- Sabre jets, 275
- Sadik Bey, Tunisian ruler, 5
- Sahati, Battle of (1887), 12
- Saint Louis, Senegal, 17
- Saio, Battle of (1941), 227
- Sakalava states, Madagascar, 27
- Salaheddin al-Moguy, Egyptian general, 259
- Salaita, Battle of (1916), 161, 162
- Salan, General Raoul, French officer, 270, 271, 273
- Salema, Arab-Swahili leader, 62, 63, 65
- Samayat, Afawarq Walda, Ethiopian leader, 205
- Samburu, 189
- Samori Toure, 17–23, 37
- Sandfontein, Battle of (1914), 154
- Sandford, Colonel Daniel, British officer, 211
- Sandile, Xhosa ruler, 75–79
- Sangu, 47, 48
- Sandhurst, Royal Military Academy, 233, 245–47, 251

- Sannaspost, Battle of (1900), 122
 Sanussi, 6, 138, 141, 169, 170, 171, 199
 Sardinia, 222
 Sarhili, Xhosa ruler, 75–79
 Saudi Arabia, 257
 Schoeman, Hendrik, Boer leader, 121
 Schutztruppe (German Colonial Troops), 46, 110, 144
 Seaward Defence Force (SDF), South Africa, 230
 Sebyeza, Gabriel, Rwanda rebel leader, 254
 Second Colonial Occupation, 238–39
 Secret Army Organization (OAS), 271–72
 Sefu, 43, 44
 Segu, Tukulor capital, 18, 19
 Seitz, Theodor, German governor of South West Africa, 151, 157
 Sekhukhune, Pedi ruler, 70–74
 Selassie, Haile, Ethiopian emperor, 203–206, 211, 212, 214
 Selassie, Ras Imru Haile, Ethiopian leader, 204, 205
 Selous, Frederick, British hunter and explorer, 104, 166
 Selous Scouts, Rhodesian armored car unit, 281
 Semmes, Alexander A., U.S. naval officer, 39
 Senegal, 183, 187
 Senescall, Brigadier G. T., South African officer, 226
 Setif Massacre (1945), Algeria, 268
 Seychelles, 35, 36, 59, 230
 Sfax, Tunisia, 5
 Shangi, Battle of (1896), 53
 Shark Island, concentration camp, 112
 Sharon, Ariel, Israeli officer, 258, 259
 Sharpeville Massacre (1960), 276, 277
 Shaykan, Battle of (1883), 8
 Shepstone, Captain Theophilus Junior, Natal officer, 80
 Shepstone, Theophilus, British official, 72
 Shewa, Ethiopia, 12, 13, 14, 206
 Shingana, Zulu royalist leader, 132, 133
 Shona, 101–106, 174, 189
 Sicily, 222, 223, 235
 Sidamo, 13
 Sidi Barrani, Egypt, 216
 Sidi el-Mekki, Moroccan rebel leader, 197
 Sidi Rezegh, Battle of (1941), 219
 Sierra Leone, 19, 21, 22, 36–38, 40, 232, 244
 Sierra Leone Regiment, 248
 Sikasso, 19, 21, 22
 Sikh troops, 36, 63–65, 212
 Simonstown, 230
 Simonstown Agreement (1955), 275–76
 Sinai Desert, 168, 258, 259
 Sirte, Libya, 221
 Sirtica, Libya, 199–200
 Sisulu, Walter, antiapartheid activist, 276
 Siyolo, Xhosa leader, 78–79
 Slim, Brigadier William, British officer, 209, 232
 Slovo, Joe, antiapartheid activist, 276, 277
 Smit, Commandant Nicolaas, Boer military leader, 71, 91–94
 Smith-Dorrien, Sir Horace, British officer, 161
 Smuts, Jan, 114, 121, 122, 127, 128, 130, 150–52, 154, 156, 157, 159–66, 192, 225, 228
 Snider rifle, 33, 57, 86, 89
 Snyman, General J. P. (Kootjie), Boer leader, 123
 Sobhuza II, Swazi king, 236
 Sobukwe, Robert, antiapartheid activist, 277

- Social Revolution (1959), Rwanda, 252–53
 Sokoto Caliphate, 19, 31–33, 174
 Sokoto city, 32, 249, 250
 Sollum, 170, 217–219, 235
 Somali Camel Constabulary, 191
 Somalia, 10, 15, 67, 191, 214
 Somaliland, British, 191, 192, 206–214
 Somaliland, French (Djibouti), 208, 209, 214
 Somaliland, Italian, 202, 206–214
 Somaliland Camel Corps, 191, 192, 208
 Somme, Battle of (1916), 141, 180
 Songea, Tanzania, 49, 165
 Soninke, 38
 Soustelle, Jacques, French governor-general of Algeria, 269
 South Africa, Republic of (apartheid), 275–80
 South Africa, Union of, 130, 131, 149–52, 159, 160, 163, 164, 167, 168, 179–82, 228–31, 235, 239, 257, 273–75
 South African Air Force (SAAF), 192, 208, 212, 225–26, 228, 230, 236, 275, 276
 South African Communist Party (SACP), 276
 South African Defence Force (SADF), 275
 South African Military Academy, 274
 South African Mounted Rifles, 149
 South African Native Labour Contingent (SANLC), 180–82, 229
 South African Naval Force (SANF), 229–31
 South African Navy, 276
 South African Railway Construction Group, 236
 South African Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve (RNVR), 230
 South African War (1899–1902), 112–31
 South West Africa, South African administered (Namibia), 192, 230
 Southern Cameroons, British, 250, 266, 268
 Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), 62, 99, 101–106, 122–25, 155, 165, 166, 174, 182, 184, 189, 190, 208, 228–29, 279–82
 Soviet Union, 258, 259
 Spanish Civil War (1936–39), 195
 Spanish Legion, 193–95
 Spanish Occupation of Morocco, 7
 Special Administrative Section (SAS), “Kepis Bleu,” Algeria, 269
 Special Air Service (SAS), 280, 281
 Spion Kop, Battle of (1900), 119
 Spitfires, 135, 257
 Square Hill (1918), 142
 Stairs, Captain William, British officer, 42
 Stanley, Henry Morton, 41, 164
 Stanleyville (Kisangani), 42, 252
 Stewart, Major General J. M., British officer, 158, 162
 Steyn, M. T., Orange Free State president, 122, 123, 125–27, 130
 Stokes, Charles, British gun runner, 56, 57
 Stone, General Charles Pomeroy, American officer in Egypt, 5
 Stormberg Junction, Battle of (1899), 118
 Suakin, Sudan, 8
 Submarines, 169, 181, 206, 211, 224–26, 228, 229, 230
 Sudan, 7–10, 13, 44, 45, 55, 57, 170–71, 206–214, 227, 257
 Sudan Defence Force (SDF), British, 207, 209, 211
 Suez Canal, 3–5, 12, 138, 168–70, 187, 204, 206, 227, 229, 235, 241, 258, 259, 280
 Suez Crisis (1956), 241, 259, 260

- Swahili, 60
 Swakopmund, 109, 154, 155
 Swazi, 71–74, 80, 100
 Swaziland, 182, 229, 234, 235
 Sweden, 203
 Sword, Captain D. W., British officer, 32
 Swunguzwi Mountain, Venda Stronghold, 100–101
- T-34 tank, 258, 259
 Tabora, 164, 165
 Tafilalet, Morocco, 195, 197, 198
 Tamai, Battle of (1884), 8
 Tamatave, Madagascar, 27
 Tambala, Ngoni leader, 66
 Tamben, First Battle (January 1936), 204
 Tamben, Second Battle (February 1936), 204–205
 Tambo, Oliver, antiapartheid activist, 277
 Tanga, 46
 Tanga, Battle of (1914), 158, 159
 Tanganyika, 168, 185, 233, 250–51, 254
 Tangele, 190
 Taureg, 22, 175
 Tawfiq Pasha, Egyptian ruler, 3, 5
 Taytu Betul, Ethiopian empress, 14
 Tazigzaout Ridge, Battle of (1932), 197
 Tel al-Kabir, Battle of (1882), 5
 Tel Aviv, 255–60
 Temne, Sierra Leone, 37, 38
 Ternan, Colonel Trevor, British officer, 61
 Teshie, Gold Coast, 246
 Tetela, 42
 Tewodros, Ethiopian emperor, 10
 Thembu, 89
 Thiaroye Massacre (1944), 238
 Thiry, Major General Albert-Theodore, French officer, 202
- Tighe, Major General Michael, British officer, 161, 162
 Tigray, Ethiopia, 10–14
 Timbuktu, 21, 22, 26
 Tippu Tip, 43
 Tirailleurs Malgaches, 140
 Tirailleurs Senegalais, 9, 10, 17, 22, 23, 26, 138–41, 146–49, 191, 202, 210, 225, 237, 243, 265, 267, 268
 Tiv, 190, 245
 Tlhaping Tswana, 94–97, 101
 Tobruk, Libya, 6, 217–20, 230, 235, 236
 Togoland (Togo), 112, 137, 143–44, 173, 185
 Tombeur, General Charles-Henri, Belgian commander, 160, 164
 Tonga, 62–66, 107–108, 189
Toutou, British gunboat, 160–61
 Trade Wars, Sierra Leone, 37
 Transkei Rebellion (1880), 88–90
 Transvaal, 70–74, 90–100, 107, 112–31, 133, 150–52, 229
 Transvaal Colony, 124
 Transvaal Field Force, 73–74
 Transvaal Rebellion (1880–81), 90–94, 114. *See also* First Anglo-Boer War
 Transvaal Scottish, 141
 Traore, Moussa, military ruler of Mali, 243
 Treaty of Addis Ababa (1896), 15
 Treaty of Bardo (1881), 5
 Treaty of Bissandugu (1887), 20
 Treaty of Fez (1912), 7
 Treaty of Fomena (1874), 35
 Treaty of Ouchy (1912), 6
 Treaty of Vereeniging (1902), 130
 Treaty of Wuchale (1889), 13
 Tripoli, Libya, 5–6, 199, 214, 218, 219, 221, 236
 Tripolitania, Libya, 199–201
 Tsaobis, South West Africa, 109
 Tsarasoatra, Battle of (1895), 27
 Tsate, Pedi Stronghold, 71–74

- Tshaneni, Battle of (1884), 98–99
 Tsitsa Gorge, Battle of (1880), 89, 90
 Tsumeb, South West Africa, 156, 157
 Tswana, 101, 102, 182
 Tug Argan, Battle of (1940), 208–209
 Tukolor Empire, 17–21, 32
 Tulear, Madagascar, 226
 Tunis, 223, 271
 Tunisia, 5, 214, 222, 223, 227, 269, 272, 273
 Tutsi, 52, 185, 252–255
 Twa, 185, 252
 Tweebosch, Battle of (1902), 129
 Tweefontein, Battle of (also known as Battle of Groenkop, 1901), 128
 Typhoid, 122, 123
- Uganda, 59, 61, 190, 233, 250–51, 254
 Uganda Agreement (1900), 59
 Uganda Rifles, 60
 Ugogo, Tanzania, 176–77
 Ujiji, 51, 53, 164
 Ulundi, Battle of (1879), 84–85
 Um Nyobe, Ruben, Cameroon rebel leader, 266, 267
 Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation; MK), 276, 277
 Umtata, 89
 Union Defence Force (UDF), 149–52, 154, 158, 180, 228, 229, 231, 274
 Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC), 266–67
 United Nations, 214, 241, 250, 255–57, 260, 265, 275
 United States, 222, 239, 258, 265, 275
 Upington, South Africa, 150, 151, 154
 Urabi Pasha, Egyptian nationalist leader, 5
 Urbanization, 239
- Vampire jets, 258, 275, 281
 Van Deventer, Jacobus, South African officer, 152, 156, 161, 162, 167
 Van Rensburg, Niklaas, prophet, 150, 152
 Van Ryneveld, Colonel Pierre, South African officer, 192
 Vanderstraeten, Lieutenant Colonel Francois, Belgian officer, 253
 Vansina, Jan, historian, 53
 Venda, 100–101
 Verdun, Battle of (1916), 139, 194
 Veterans, World War I, 183
 Vetterli rifles, 14
 Vichy France, 187, 222–27
 Victoria Falls, 155
 Viet Minh, 273
 Viljoen, Ben, Boer leader, 124, 126, 127
 Vlakfontein, Battle of (1901), 128
 Volta-Bani War (1915–17), 175–76
 Von Arnim, Colonel-General Hans-Jurgen, German officer, 223
 Von Beringe, Captain Friedrich Robert, German officer, 54
 Von Bethe, Captain Heinrich, German officer, 54
 Von Dem Hagen, Captain Wilhelm, German officer, 169
 Von Doering, Major Hans Georg, German commander in Togoland, 143–44
 Von Francois, Captain Curt, German officer, 109
 Von Goetzen, Graaf Gustav Adolf, German Governor of East Africa, 49–50, 52, 54
 Von Grawert, Captain Werner, German officer, 54
 Von Hassel, Captain Theodore, German officer, 49
 Von Heydebreck, Joachim, German commander South West Africa, 151, 153, 154
 Von Kleist, Captain Otto, German officer, 156
 Von Kressenstein, Colonel Friedrich Freiherr Kress, German officer, 168, 169

- Von Lettow-Vorbeck, Colonel Paul,
German commander in East
Africa, 158–68
- Von Prince, Tom, German officer,
48, 49, 158
- Von Prince, Magdalene, 48
- Von Ramsay, Captain Hans, German
officer, 53
- Von Sanders, Major General Otto
Liman, German officer, 168
- Von Schele, Freiherr, German
governor of East Africa, 48
- Von Tettenborn, Lieutenant
Maximilian, German officer, 47
- Von Trotha, Lieutenant General
Lothar, German officer, 111–12
- Von Wissman, Herman, German
officer, 46
- Von Zelewski, Emil, German officer,
46, 47
- Voulet, Captain Paul, French officer,
26
- Wadai, 25
- Wahle, Kurt, Major General,
German officer, 165
- Waima, Sierra Leone, 37
- Wakeddi Field Force, 59
- Walamo, 13
- Walls, Peter, Rhodesian officer,
280
- Walvis Bay, 108, 109, 155, 230
- Warrant Officer Platoon
Commander (WOPC), British
rank, 250
- Warren, Charles, British officer,
95, 97
- Washington, Booker T., 41
- Watchtower movement, 173
- Waterberg, Battle of (1904), 111
- Wavell, General Archibald, British
officer, 209, 210, 218
- Week of the Barricades (1960),
Algeria, 271
- Wepener, Siege of (1900), 123
- Wessels, Christiaan, Orange Free
State general, 115
- West Africa Command, British,
248
- West African Forces Conference
(1953), 248
- West African Frontier Force (WAFF;
later Royal West African Frontier
Force or RWAFF), 31–33, 36,
143–44, 146, 166, 191, 207, 208, 232,
244, 245, 248, 250
- West African Regiment, Sierra
Leone, 36, 38
- West India Regiment, 34, 37, 38
- Western Desert Force (WDF), World
War II, 214, 218
- Western Frontier Force (WFF),
Sudan, World War I, 170–71
- Whydah, 24
- Willcocks, Colonel James, British
officer, 36
- Williams, Captain W. H., British
officer, 57
- Wilson, Captain Alan, 103, 104
- Windhoek, 109–110, 155–157
- Wingate, General Sir Reginald,
British officer, 170
- Wingate, Major General Orde,
British officer, 211, 232
- Wintgens, Captain Max, German
officer, 164, 165
- Witbooi, Hendrik, Nama leader,
108–112
- Wollo, Ethiopia, 12
- Wolseley, Sir Garnet, British
commander, 5, 8, 33, 34, 35, 73–74,
84, 85, 90, 91
- Wolseley Ring (Asante Ring), 34
- Women's Auxiliary Naval Service,
South Africa, 231
- Wood, Henry Evelyn, British officer,
34, 82, 84, 94
- Wum Biagas, Cameroon, 147–49
- Xhosa, 74–79

- Yaa Asantewa, Asante queen
mother, 35, 36
- Yaba Mutiny (1952), Nigeria, 244
- Yamba-Yamba, corporal, Force
Publique mutineer, 44
- Yao, 63–66, 189
- Yeggazu, Ras Mulugeta, Ethiopian
leader, 204
- Yeke, 42
- Yemen, 6
- Yohannes, Ras Mengesha, Ethiopian
leader, 14
- Yohannes IV, Ethiopian emperor,
8, 10, 11, 12, 13
- Yola, 32, 146
- Yoruba, 23, 29, 173, 190, 245, 249
- Young, Major Charles, U.S. army
officer, 41
- Ypres, Third Battle of
(Passchendaele, 1917), 141–42
- Yser River, Battle of (1914), 139
- Zambia Regiment, 281
- Zanzibar, 27, 42, 43, 45, 46, 60, 63
- Zarafi, Yao leader, 63–65
- Zaria, Nigeria, 32, 227, 244, 246
- Zayla, Somalia, 10
- Zerbo, Seye, military ruler of Upper
Volta (Burkina Faso), 243
- Zibhebhu, Zulu leader, 97–99, 132
- Zimmerman, General Karl, German
commander in Cameroon, 144
- Zinder, Niger, 26
- Zomba, Malawi, 63, 65, 66
- Zubeira, emir of Yola, 32
- Zulla, Red Sea port, 10
- Zulu Civil War, 97–99
- Zulu Colonial Police, 72
- Zulu Kingdom, 73, 79–85, 90
- Zulu Rebellion (1888), 131–33
- Zulu Rebellion (1906), 133–35
- Zululand, British Colony, 131–35
- Zululand Police, 132, 133

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A Military History of Africa

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A Military History of Africa

Volume 3

**The Era of Independence: From
the Congo Crisis to Africa's World
War (ca. 1963–)**

Timothy J. Stapleton



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*To Anna M. Stapleton, Berthe Kayitesi,
and Oceane Kayitesi-Stapleton*

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Contents


Introduction	ix
Chapter 1 North Africa, 1963–	1
Chapter 2 West Africa, 1963–	39
Chapter 3 East Africa, 1963–	77
Chapter 4 Central Africa, 1963–	151
Chapter 5 Southern Africa, 1963–	227
Notes	287
Selected Bibliography	301
Index	311

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Introduction

From the late 1950s to 1990, most African countries became independent in one of two ways. Many experienced a negotiated handover of power from European colonial rulers to African nationalist politicians while a few, the Portuguese colonies and white settler-ruled territories in Southern Africa, endured protracted warfare between stubborn colonial states and radical African liberation movements. The new African governments, emerging mostly in the 1960s, had to quickly transform their usually small, land-based, and European-led colonial security forces into the national and modern military structures expected of a sovereign state, with many founding small air forces and navies. While the recruitment of supposed martial tribes from remote areas continued for a few years, many African governments eventually adopted regional recruitment quotas in an effort to create more representative militaries as national institutions.

The military relationship between former colonial rulers and new African states varied considerably. Britain kept a low military profile in its former colonies between 1964 when it crushed army mutiny in newly independent East Africa and 2000 when it intervened to suppress rebellion in Sierra Leone. It also helped in the integration of new defense forces in postconflict states such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. Seeking to maintain commercial interests and protect the use of the French language, France divided its colonies into



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Cartographic Section

many small impoverished states that would depend upon a series of economic and technical agreements with Paris, including defence treaties in which the former colonial master helped each develop a small modern military. France left a significant military presence in some of its former colonies such as Djibouti, Senegal, and Gabon and maintained a highly mobile intervention force that conducted numerous operations across Francophone Africa, usually to prop up friendly governments. Although Belgium practiced a similar but less robust

policy of military involvement in its former colonies, the French extended their military protection to Francophone Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi during the 1970s. Since the mid-1990s, reduction in the size of the French military, along with increasing international and domestic disapproval of unilateral intervention, has prompted France to adopt a policy of military intervention in Africa in conjunction with international bodies such as the European Union.¹

The emergence of independent African states took place within the global context of the Cold War between the capitalist United States and communist Soviet Union, and their respective allies who quickly sought to replace the former European colonial rulers as the primary external sponsors of new African states. Much of Africa became dominated by either U.S.- or Soviet-supported authoritarian regimes, which often lasted for decades, opposed by rebels backed by the other superpower. The developing military structures of postcolonial Africa usually reflected these external alliances. In Africa, the Cold War often turned hot, with local conflicts becoming proxy wars between the superpowers. The Sino-Soviet rivalry was also imported to Africa as China attempted to show leadership in the world revolutionary movement by offering military support to African insurgent groups and socialist regimes. While China's economic involvement in Africa is now seen as a recent development, its military relationship with parts of the continent stretches back to the early 1960s. Cuba, a small Caribbean island economically besieged by the United States, punched far above its weight in Africa by supporting rebel movements and governments with socialist agendas, and during the late 1970s and 1980s maintained large conventional expeditionary forces in Angola and Ethiopia. Attempting to undermine its Muslim and Arab enemies in North Africa, Israel provided military supplies and training to a number of states and rebel groups south of the Sahara.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War, Africa's dictatorships lost their superpower support, and those that did not bow to demands for democratic reforms collapsed under rebellion. For much of Africa, as with other parts of the world, the end of the Cold War caused instability, with more civil wars and failed states. Deprived of superpower sponsorship, which had simply required assuming the correct ideology and rhetoric, African military leaders of the post-Cold War era sustained their efforts by looting valuable natural resources such as diamonds or hardwood and enslaving local communities to do so. The rise of Islamic militancy

in parts of North, West, and East Africa—particularly after the September 2001 attack on the United States—led to expanded U.S. military involvement in the continent facilitated by the creation of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007, which remains headquartered in Germany because no African country except Liberia would host it.

The most studied aspect of postcolonial African military history is the phenomenon of military coups and regimes that was particularly prominent in West Africa but also happened elsewhere. By the mid-1980s, some 40 percent of the continent and 60 percent of its population was under military rule. Inspired by the study of military government in Latin America and the Middle East, political scientists and others asked why, within a few years of independence, did the new African militaries stage coups and counter coups. During the 1960s and 1970s, some debated whether these military regimes were progressive agents for effective change or conservative and reactionary. An important factor in the rise of coups was the weakness of African states, and all military coup plotters justified their takeovers by claiming that the previous civilian government had been incompetent or corrupt. Providing context, scholars pointed out that most precolonial African societies had not distinguished between civilian and military institutions, and that the purpose of colonial militaries from which the postcolonial ones evolved had been intimately political because they were meant to maintain internal security. Perhaps one of the most important points about military coups in Africa, and likely elsewhere, is that they happened after civilian politicians had tried to secure their positions by politicizing the military through promoting or favoring ethnic kinsmen or particular units. Furthermore, military coups usually did not involve the entire command structure of the military seizing control of the government but a politicized element—those of a particular rank or members of a certain unit or service—doing so for a specific reason that could provoke a counter-coup by a rival military faction with different motives.²

While the nature of warfare in postcolonial Africa has ranged from limited insurgencies to large conventional conflicts, some common factors have emerged. Given the weakness of most African militaries, relatively small foreign intervention forces, whether mercenaries or state troops, have sometimes had a disproportional impact. In a tragic “tit-for-tat” fashion, the governments of neighboring African countries often try to destabilize each other by sponsoring rebels in each

other's territories. Long-term exiled rebels ("warrior refugees") support themselves by involvement in other people's wars. Parts of Africa are literally awash with small arms because during the Cold War, the superpowers generously armed their allies and after 1991, impoverished former Soviet states sold weapons at discount prices. Most post-colonial African wars have been fought with light weapons such as assault rifles, light machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and light mortars because more sophisticated systems such as heavy artillery, armored vehicles, and combat aircraft are expensive; African personnel usually lack the training to operate them; and sometimes they are not suitable for local conditions. With the exception of the large air campaigns that characterized Egypt's involvement in the Arab-Israeli wars, the presence of a small number of combat aircraft in the ground support role sometimes had a dramatic impact on military operations in Africa. Naval warfare has not represented much of a feature of postcolonial African conflicts because most countries possess tiny coastal forces or no navies at all, though riverine and lake "brown water" campaigns have taken place in Guinea-Bissau, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Nigeria. Though not a new phenomenon, the use of child soldiers in the continent's wars became increasingly common after around 1990 as the population became generally younger and poorer, and African military leaders more desperate. Unpaid child soldiers are cost-effective, are easily manipulated by indoctrination and sometimes drugs, do not understand fear or the value of human life, and replacements are abundant among displaced communities. The popular idea that the rise in the number of child soldiers has been facilitated by the development of light modern small arms is questionable because most African child soldiers—like their adult colleagues—carry the ubiquitous and aging Soviet-made AK-47 that, at around 10 pounds, weighs the same or more than bolt action rifles from World War I or World War II and twice that of 1940s vintage sub-machine guns. African child soldiers are not armed with newer U.S.-made assault rifles that, with plastic parts and lighter ammunition, weigh about 6 pounds.³

Warfare in postcolonial Africa has had cataclysmic results such as widespread destruction of property and infrastructure, disruption of food production, spread of famine and disease, and many millions of deaths. In some places like eastern DRC, rape of women has become common and in others like Angola, land mines have rendered many people amputees. The endemic nature of violence in some places resulted in millions driven from their homes, with many fleeing across

international borders to live in squalid refugee camps that became recruiting centers for rebel leaders and bandits.

Various international organizations have attempted to resolve or minimize African conflicts through orchestrating negotiations and assembling multinational military peacekeeping missions. The first United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions took place in Africa—Egypt in 1956 and Congo in 1960—and similar forces of greatly varying sizes, capabilities, and mandates have been active on the continent up to today. During some of its military interventions of the 1970s and 1980s, France sought legitimacy by fielding small “Inter-African” forces from its former colonies turned dependable African allies. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) (renamed the African Union [AU] in 2002) encouraged and to some extent supported the African nationalist armed struggles against Portuguese colonialism and white settler rule in Southern Africa but until recently struggled to muster the resources to form multinational intervention or peacekeeping forces. Since the 1990s, regional African international bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), led by regional powers Nigeria and South Africa respectively, have had more success in intervening to end civil wars or monitor settlements. In 2003, the AU began working on forming an African Standby Force consisting of a mobile reaction brigade from each region that could respond to crises, with the first deployments taking place in late 2012–2013 in Central African Republic (CAR) and eastern DRC. The main practical problem with deploying multinational African forces has been that most African militaries lack the means to project their power very far beyond their borders by air or sea, and in many instances, Western powers have contributed airlifts or private aircraft have to be chartered.

Returning to a geographic structure, this volume surveys the history of warfare and military institutions in postindependence Africa. Once again, the limitation of a geographic approach is that the connections between certain conflicts such as the civil wars in DRC and Sudan in the late 1990s and early 2000s might not be readily apparent because they are covered in different chapters. On the other hand, a geographic focus minimizes repetition and allows for a detailed overview of events in specific countries many of which have not been well covered by Western journalists. It should be noted that some countries located on regional frontiers have been assigned different regional

chapters from Volume 1. Given the nature of postcolonial warfare, it makes more sense to talk about Rwanda as part of Central Africa (when it could easily be considered in East Africa) and Angola as part of Southern Africa (when it is also a Central African country). While the most challenging period to write about in an historical synthesis is the most recent because events have yet to be studied by scholars and sometimes change rapidly, this volume attempts to cover relevant military developments in Africa to early 2013.

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Chapter 1

North Africa, 1963–

With the exception of Algeria, which won independence from the French in 1962 after a long and bloody liberation war, most of North Africa gained autonomy from Europe during the 1950s and before countries south of the Sahara. Focusing on Algeria, France responded to the growth of nationalism in Morocco and Tunisia by granting these countries independence in 1956. The British administered Libya after expelling the Italians during World War II and granted independence in 1951 with the head of the Muslim Sanussi Brotherhood as king. Egypt had become an independent but British-occupied kingdom in 1922 following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In 1947, British forces in Egypt withdrew to the strategic Suez Canal and in 1952, army officers led by Gamal Abd al-Nasser overthrew the monarchy and declared a republic that would be ruled by military officers for the next 60 years. The most prominent subject in the military history of post-World War II North Africa is Egypt's involvement in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973, the first two of which are covered in the previous volume of this text. After defeat in the last of these conventional conflicts, Egypt effectively ended Arab attempts to crush Israel by making peace with Tel Aviv and switching from Soviet to American sponsorship. From the late 1960s, eccentric Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi acquired massive amounts of Soviet military equipment and began patronizing revolutionary movements

in every region of Africa (he is mentioned in every chapter of this volume) and around the world. The withdrawal of Spain from Western Sahara in the mid-1970s triggered a Moroccan invasion countered by a protracted insurgency that seems to have permanently divided the territory. With the end of the Cold War, the rise of militant Islamist movements challenged the authoritarian regimes of North Africa and were particularly devastating in Algeria in the 1990s. Defeated Algerian jihadists influenced the rise of similar groups in the rest of the Maghreb and down into West Africa, which, after the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, led to increased U.S. military interest in North Africa and the Sahara. The impact of the “Arab Spring”—in which popular protest overthrew long-standing authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya in 2011—on military developments in North Africa remains to be seen. It is worth noting that in the case of Tunisia and Egypt the militaries did not intervene to prop up their respective dictators.

EGYPT

After the Islamic Kingdom of Yemen joined the Cairo-led United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958, Yemeni students and military officers studied in Egypt, where they absorbed Nasser’s secular Arab socialism. While Nasser expelled Yemen from the UAR in December 1961, the death of Yemeni ruler Imam Ahmad ibn Yahya in September 1962 sparked a civil war in which supporters of his son Imam al-Badr were confined to the mountains by republican officers led by Colonel Abdullah al-Sallal, who staged a coup and requested Egyptian assistance. By October, 8,000 Egyptian troops with artillery, armor, and air support were in Yemen, where they outnumbered their republican allies holding the areas around the cities of Taiz, Sana’a, and Hodeida. While Nasser viewed Yemen as a base from which to foster revolution across the Arabian Peninsula, his army became embroiled in a complex conflict without clear objectives. The United States and Britain did not recognize Yemen’s republican regime because London viewed the Egyptian occupation as a threat to its neighboring protectorate in Aden. Under Field Marshall Abd al-Hakim Amir, who treated Yemen as his personal fiefdom, the Egyptian army struggled to expand its area of control against independent-minded communities with a long history of shifting alliances and resistance to foreign invasion.

The Egyptians had to contend with unfamiliar mountainous terrain, lack of maps, reliance on untrustworthy local scouts, linguistic and religious differences with the Yemenis, and the demoralizing Yemeni practice of mutilating enemy dead. While Nasser's force controlled the air and held an advantage in firepower and communications, the bombing of royalist villages and accusations of use of poison gas drove Yemenis to the rebel cause and undermined international support. Absent trust in his Yemeni republican allies, Nasser insisted that all military aid from sympathetic socialist countries be funnelled through Egypt, which retained most of the material, and in November, 400 Soviet military technicians arrived in Yemen. In response to the royalist guerrilla war of ambushes and land mines, the Egyptians tried to hold a triangle of territory between the three cities, with republican forces attempting to advance outside. However, the insurgents penetrated the triangle and besieged Sana'a. The royalists were supported by Pakistan and Iran, which sent small arms; Saudi Arabia, which provided weapons, money, and instructors; and Jordan, which dispatched 60 officers.

In February 1963, the Egyptians launched a major offensive to occupy most of Yemen and its towns as well as seal the border with Saudi Arabia. In the east and south, Egyptian infantry and tanks seized their objectives, and in the north, paratroopers captured the town of Sadeh in royalist territory and constructed an airstrip to fly in an infantry brigade. While Egypt sent increasing numbers of troops to Yemen to stabilize the republican regime, royalist insurgents infiltrated back into their former areas. In the remote mountains, Egyptian and royalist fighters concluded "live-and-let-live" agreements as a result of which both sides reported false combat activity to placate their superiors. At the same time Al-Sallal's regime became unpopular, and he relied on a bodyguard of 3,000 Egyptians to protect him from numerous assassination attempts. In 1964, the Egyptians and Republicans changed tactics by concentrating on protecting a limited number of important areas and pursuing Imam al-Badr, who was forced into Saudi Arabia. Although thousands of Royalists had been killed, Royalist forces led by Prince Muhammad Husayn went on the offensive in January 1965 and over the next six months drove Egyptian and Republican troops out of many towns and strongpoints that Egyptian paratroopers tried to relieve. After Nasser threatened to invade Saudi Arabia in retaliation for its support of the rebels, the two powers came to an agreement to reduce

foreign forces in Yemen and by November, there were only 20,000 Egyptians troops there.

Since the Yemenis themselves could not agree on a settlement, the war continued and by 1966, the Egyptians were carrying out a scorched earth campaign that depopulated the countryside, and Republican troops started to become more effective. During the war, the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) conducted air strikes on suspected royalist communities, sometimes on the Saudi border, and its long-range bombers—commanded by General Hosni Mubarak—flew missions directly from Egypt to Yemen and back again. The Saudi Air Force was not ordered to intervene in Yemen because it was initially staffed by Nasser sympathizers, some of whom defected to Egypt. The Americans provided the Saudis with warplanes but agreed to take them back if the Saudis attacked Yemen first, and the Egyptians promised to not bomb Saudi Arabia or Jordan unless attacked first. Given the destruction of the Egyptian army by Israel in 1967, Egyptian troops were pulled out of Yemen to protect the homeland, which led to Al-Sallal being overthrown by his own military. With the departure of the last Egyptian soldiers in December 1967, the Royalists again besieged the capital of Sana'a. Released from detention in Cairo, Republican general Hassan al-Amri organized the city's defense and appealed for direct Soviet support, which enabled him to break the siege. The insurgency fizzled out by the end of 1968 as the Saudis cut off financial aid, foreign fighters left, and Royalist leaders fought among themselves.

In early 1967, violence flared in the demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria as armed Israeli settlers expanded north and were bombed by Syrian artillery. In retaliation, Israel launched a series of attacks on Syria that destroyed six aircraft and 30 defended positions. Syria then invoked its November 1966 mutual defense pact with Egypt and in May 1967, Nasser ordered UN personnel to leave the Sinai Desert, where he sent two Egyptian divisions. Given the small size of this force and the presence of many Egyptian troops in Yemen, it is unlikely Nasser planned to invade Israel; rather, he most likely wanted to display solidarity with Syria. During the 1960s, Egypt's growing population meant that it had a 200,000-strong military composed mostly of conscripts who had some combat experience in Yemen, but the officer corps lacked initiative and interest in the troops. At the same time, the Egyptian military was completely re-equipped by the Soviet Union, with 500 Soviet instructors teaching rigid

Soviet-style battle plans. The EAF now consisted of various Soviet-supplied MiG and Sukhoi fighters, with the MiG-21 as the most advanced, and Ilyushin 28 and TU 16 bombers provided the strategic attack force.

On June 5, 1967, the Israeli Air Force (IAF), equipped with 200 fighters that included French-made Mirage and Super Mystere jets, conducted a pre-emptive strike that destroyed the air forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Rather than starting with the Egyptian radar installations in the Sinai, the Israeli pilots had flown out over the Mediterranean Sea before turning southeast to hit the Egyptians from behind. They attacked at 8:45 a.m. after the regular Egyptian dawn alert had ended and during a radar crew shift change. The IAF lost 26 aircraft and destroyed 400 Arab planes, mostly on the ground. In the preceding weeks, Egypt had increased its ground forces in the Sinai, commanded by Lieutenant General Abdul Mohsen Murtagi, with four infantry divisions covering routes into the Sinai, a Palestinian division of the Egyptian army defending the Gaza Strip, and two armored divisions behind the lines as a mobile reserve. However, units were moved around so often that officers did not give orders to dig trenches, there was little food and fuel, and mechanical problems rendered most tanks inoperative. Formed into three groups under Generals Abraham Tal, Ariel Sharon, and Abraham Joffe, the Israeli ground forces conducted daily training and maintenance, and planned to use British-made Centurion tanks to break through the Egyptian defenses and move behind their lines. On the morning of June 5, as the Israeli air strike took place, the Tal group attacked Gaza, and the Sharon group attacked Abu Aweigila and Umm Qatf. Encountering stiff resistance from Egyptian antitank gunners who destroyed many Israeli tanks, Tal's group—supported by air strikes—broke through to the Suez Canal on June 9. Hundreds of Egyptian prisoners were massacred by Israeli commandos. In the south in the important crossroads area of Abu Aweigila and Umm Qatf, the Israelis overcame determined defenders by staging a coordinated assault on the night of June 6 in which helicopter-borne paratroopers destroyed Egyptian artillery followed by a massive Israeli artillery barrage that facilitated a wider breakthrough.

Many Egyptian senior officers fled as soon as the Israelis attacked. Three days into the war, the Egyptian army in Sinai was ordered to retreat, which caused soldiers to abandon their equipment as they ran west toward the canal, but they often found the mountain passes

blocked by the Israelis. While Egyptian defenders kept Ismailiya Pass open, which allowed Egyptian armor to escape, a major battle took place at Mitla Pass as Sharon's group blocked the retreat of the Egyptian 6th Division. On June 8, the war's fourth day, the Israelis attacked Ismailiya Pass with Centurion tanks in a frontal assault against inferior Egyptian Soviet-made T-54s and T-55s. Israel's lighter American-made M47 Patton tanks moved through loose sand to attack the rear. Egyptian armored vehicles attempted to move through the pass and were hit by napalm dropped by Israeli aircraft unopposed in the sky. Thousands of Egyptian infantry died of thirst and exposure while trying to cross the desert on foot. Overwhelmed with prisoners, the Israelis took their weapons and told them to walk to the canal. While a UN-sponsored cease-fire was declared on the evening of June 8, the Israelis advanced until they reached the canal the next day. Egyptian field marshal Abd al-Hakim Amir was blamed for the defeat, placed under house arrest, and allegedly committed suicide. Victory in the Six Days War, which Tel Aviv claimed to have launched to protect itself from annihilation, gave Israel the buffer zones of Sinai and Golan Heights against its respective enemies Egypt and Syria, and seizing the West Bank gained it control of the region's water resources.

After the 1967 conflict, Israel constructed the defensive Bar Lev Line along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. The line consisted of two 8- to 10-meter-tall parallel sand embankments with 33 observation posts. From 1967 to 1970, Egypt tried to rebuild its army's morale by limited operations, including small raids and sniper fire against the Israeli line. In March 1969, Nasser renounced the cease-fire, and Egyptian artillery bombarded Israeli positions along the canal for 80 days while Egyptian commandos probed the line in search of weaknesses. Israeli air strikes against Egyptian positions, important because of Israel's shortage of artillery, were limited by Nasser's deployment of Soviet surface-to-air missiles. Because the French had imposed an arms embargo on Israel after the Six Day War, the IAF acquired U.S. F-4 Phantom fighters and A-4 Skyhawk attack jets, which prompted the Soviets to send Egypt advanced SAM-3 surface-to-air missiles and crews, as well as fighter pilots. In July, an air war began in which the Egyptians lost 20 MiGs in dogfights with Israeli jets, and 5 Israeli planes were shot down by the SAM-3s. In November 1969, the IAF destroyed the Egyptian air defense system and by January 1970, it was striking deep inside Egypt, including a helicopter-borne commando raid that brought a four-ton Soviet radar

apparatus back to Israel. In August 1970, the United States and Soviet Union, concerned that they were being drawn into a potentially cataclysmic nuclear war by their respective proxies, negotiated a 90-day cease-fire that failed to reopen the Suez Canal and gave the Egyptians time to replace their air defenses.

With Nasser's death in September 1970, Vice President Anwar Sadat, a member of the 1952 officers movement, became president. Except for EAF commander Mubarak, who became vice president, most military officers were removed from government and the officer corps was encouraged to abandon politics to focus on defeating Israel. In May 1971, Sadat had possible rivals within the military arrested. Around the same time, a radical Islamist group emerged that kidnapped and killed a cabinet minister, and attacked the military academy. Under Sadat, Egypt abandoned its leadership of Arab nationalism and dismantled the broader UAR to become the Arab Republic of Egypt.

In the middle of 1972, Sadat expelled Soviet personnel from Egypt because he was concerned about their growing influence and the low quality of Soviet arms. Given Israeli arrogance after 1967, they did not notice Egyptian and Syrian preparations for a major offensive, which was impelled by the sense that détente between the United States and Soviet Union would impede future action. While Egypt gained Syrian and Soviet support by presenting plans for the recapture of the Sinai, Sadat's real aim was to occupy both sides of the Suez Canal. Egyptian military readiness was undermined by Sadat's purge of the officer corps after the discovery of a coup plot in October 1972, rivalries between his generals, and the ill health of Minister of War General Ahmad Ismail Ali, who Nasser had dismissed twice for incompetence. Beginning with a massive barrage by 2,000 Egyptian artillery pieces against Israeli defenses on the canal's east bank, Operation Badr caught the Israelis by surprise because it was launched on October 6, 1973, during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, which was also the anniversary of a great military victory by the Prophet Muhammad in 626 CE. Three Egyptian armies were involved. The First formed the reserve and consisted of two mechanized divisions located around Cairo; the Second was made up of three infantry, one armored and one mechanized infantry division facing north Sinai; and the Third comprised two infantry and two armored divisions facing south Sinai. On the west bank of the 160-kilometer canal, the Egyptians pushed five divisions forward and held another five in reserve while

the Israeli Bav Lev Line on the east bank was manned by one division. The Egyptians used water cannon to cut gaps in the Israeli sand embankments through which tanks passed, and troops used rope ladders to climb the obstacle. After 12 hours, they had penetrated a kilometer beyond the line. Only 208 Egyptians were killed crossing the canal. With a foothold on the east bank, the Egyptians deployed 10 bridges transported on Soviet-made amphibious vehicles and 50 ferries that allowed 80,000 soldiers and many vehicles to cross the canal that day.

Since the EAF was out of range of Israel, it struck airfields and air defenses in Sinai while Syrian planes attacked air bases inside Israel. The Egyptians operated under the cover of a massive air defense system with hundreds of missiles; 2,500 radar-guided antiaircraft guns; and many shoulder-launched missiles and mobile guns. Egyptian pilots were ordered to complete their ground attacks, avoid dogfighting the highly trained Israeli fighter pilots; and return immediately to the air defense umbrella over the canal. Although Libya's Gaddafi was not trusted enough to be informed about the offensive, among the EAF were 30 Mirage jets donated by Libya. Given the lack of Libyan pilots, they were mostly flown by Egyptians. By the end of the war, half had been shot down. During the first three days of the operation, numerous Israeli armored counterattacks were repelled because the Egyptians used new Soviet antitank weapons and the Israelis failed to mass their tanks, which contradicted their standard practice. By October 9, the Egyptians had advanced 10 kilometers into Sinai, and the Israelis abandoned efforts to retake the Bar Lev Line and devoted their resources to confronting the more menacing Syrian ground offensive. Beginning on October 6, Egyptian destroyers and submarines blocked ships bound for Israel from entering the Red Sea by passing through the straits between Yemen and Somalia, and several Israeli oil tankers coming from Iran (a U.S. ally) were destroyed. In the Mediterranean, Egyptian missile boats harassed Israeli shipping and clashed with Israeli missile boats equipped with superior electronic systems that interfered with Soviet-supplied Egyptian missiles.

With the defeat of the Syrians on the Golan Heights, where they lost 1,000 tanks, Egypt was pressured by Damascus and Moscow to advance into the Sinai beyond the cover of its air defense shield. Israel used the delay in the Egyptian response to move 60,000 troops and 500 tanks to the Sinai, and the Americans quickly sent antitank guided missiles and replacement aircraft armed with cluster bombs and

laser-guided missiles. On October 14, 1973 armored forces from the Egyptian Second Army advanced east toward Khatima, Mitla, and Giddi Passes; suffered heavy losses from Israeli air strikes; and clashed with Israeli tanks in defensive positions. In a massive tank battle, Egyptian forces tried to outflank Israeli defenses but were intercepted by mobile Israeli armored groups, and Egypt lost 300 tanks on the first day of fighting. On October 16, the Egyptians sent a Moroccan brigade to reinforce the Third Army in the Sinai, where it was almost surrounded. Around this time, Egypt deployed its reserve by sending the First Army across the canal, leaving it without significant force on the west bank. After the successful defense of the Sinai passes, Israeli forces under Sharon counterattacked on October 15, crossed west of the canal north of the Great Bitter Lake, and destroyed unprotected Egyptian air defenses. Repeated Egyptian air and ground attacks on Sharon's bridgehead were defeated, and 10,000 Israeli troops broke out to the west on October 19. While the Egyptian Third Army was cut off on the east bank, Israeli attacks on the south end of the canal were driven off at the towns of Ismailiya and Suez. The Soviets continued to supply Egypt but rejected Sadat's request for direct intervention, as they did not trust him following the expulsion of Soviet military personnel. With the Syrians withdrawn to a secondary defensive line and his own forces in disarray, Sadat accepted a cease-fire that began on October 22, but over the next two days, the Israelis completed their encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army. During the conflict, the United States, given tensions with the Soviet Union, increased its nuclear alert status for only the second time since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. In the negotiated settlement of 1978, the Egyptian government, which told its people it had won a great victory and thus restored the pride of its armed forces, regained a demilitarized Sinai in return for abandoning support for the Palestinian cause. This led to Sadat's 1981 assassination by radical Islamists and his replacement by Mubarak. During the October War, the mostly inexperienced Egyptian officers, many appointed because of loyalty to Sadat, commanded from the rear, which made them slow to respond to unfolding events. The Israeli officers, on the other hand, led from the front and demonstrated impressive initiative. Furthermore, Egyptian communication was limited, and there was no coordination with Syria.¹

Following the 1973 October War, Libya's Gaddafi accused Egypt of betraying the Arab cause. During 1976, Sadat bolstered the few guards

along the Libyan border by dispatching two mechanized divisions from the Suez Canal and Nile area, and 80 combat aircraft (including new MiG-23s) were sent to the westerly Mersa Matruh Airbase. Egyptian forces along the western border now equalled the size of Libya's entire military, and Gaddafi responded by sending 3,000–5,000 troops and 150 tanks to the border. Egypt held its forces back because it did not want to alienate the Soviet Union (Gaddafi's sponsor) and oil-rich Persian Gulf states, and its military needed time to prepare the logistics, transportation, and communications needed for a conflict in the western desert. Seeing Sadat's hesitancy as weakness, Gaddafi continued to provide Libyan training camps to Egyptian Islamist insurgents who staged cross-border raids. Ignoring a May 1977 Soviet warning of imminent Egyptian invasion, the Libyans did not prepare their forces but continued border skirmishes and artillery duels that led to intense fighting in mid-July. By July 1977, there were 40,000 Egyptian troops on the frontier organized into 3 divisions and 12 commando battalions while the Libyans, with a total military of 32,000 personnel, deployed 5,000 soldiers organized into 7 or 8 battalions in 3 brigade groups. On July 21, a Libyan tank battalion raided the Egyptian border town of Sollum, where it was ambushed by two Egyptian divisions and took 50 percent casualties before retreating. At the same time, Libyan Mirage jets bombed Egyptian border villages. Later the same day, Egypt launched an offensive with air strikes against the main Nasser airbase in eastern Libya, which did minimal damage even though many Libyan aircraft were parked on the runway. Conducting a reconnaissance-in-force, an Egyptian mechanized division advanced along the coast some 15 kilometers inside Libya toward Musa'ad, destroyed 60 Libyan tanks and armored personnel carriers, and returned to Egypt at the end of the day. Over the next two days, the Egyptians and Libyans exchanged artillery fire, Libyan aircraft flew 10 to 20 sorties against Egyptian ground forces massing around Sollum, 3 EAF squadrons of Su-20s and MiGs struck Libya's Nasser and Kufra airbases (once again doing little damage), and 12 battalions of Egyptian commandos staged airborne raids on Libyan radar installations and training camps along the border, including at Kufra, Jaghub, and Tobruk. On July 24, the Egyptians launched a combined airstrike and helicopter commando raid against Nasser airbase, which finally damaged some Libyan Mirages that had not been removed. Other airstrikes and raids continued along the frontier. That same day, Sadat suddenly declared a cease-fire and although skirmishing

continued for two more days as the forces disengaged, both sides reduced their border garrisons. In this short border conflict, the Libyans lost 400 troops, 30 tanks, 40 armored vehicles, and 20 Mirage jets, while the Egyptians lost 100 men and perhaps 4 aircraft.

After making peace with Israel in the late 1970s, Egypt severed ties with the Soviets and became a major recipient of military aid from the United States. Because U.S. equipment was expensive, Egypt retained its vast quantity of Soviet arms and equipment but gradually shifted them to inferior units. Large numbers of U.S. personnel went to Egypt as instructors on weapons and operations, and many Egyptian officers attended courses in the United States. In 1980, Egypt and the United States began a series of biennial training exercises in Egypt called Operation Bright Star—which eventually grew to include air and naval elements along with amphibious assaults—that was joined by forces from other countries such as Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Jordan, and Kuwait. The Americans considered these exercises important enough that they continued them immediately following the September 2001 terrorist attacks and during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite American training and assistance political connections remained primary in determining promotion within the Egyptian military. Although the threat of war with Israel was gone, Egypt continued to use conscription to maintain the largest military in the Arab world and Africa as it provided employment for young poorly educated peasants. By 2006, the Egyptian armed forces numbered 490,000 with an equal number of reservists. Given its poor technical skills, the Egyptians relied on a large U.S. presence during the late 1980s and 1990s to maintain the U.S.-supplied F-4E Phantom II and F-16 fighters. Egyptian pilots allegedly avoided flying their aircraft out of fear of accidents and when they did, they ignored the avionics. During the 1980s, Egypt acquired aging U.S. M60 main battle tanks and between 1992 and 2010 as part of a long standing ambition to establish an arms industry, it manufactured 950 up-to-date M1AI Abrams main battle tanks under licence from the United States.

With the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Egypt deployed ground forces to Saudi Arabia as part of the U.S.-led Operation Desert Shield. During the U.S.-driven liberation of Kuwait and invasion of southern Iraq in 1991 (Operation Desert Storm), Egypt supplied the second largest Arab contingent comprising the Third Mechanized and Fourth Armoured Divisions, and the brigade-sized 20th Commando Regiment. Consisting of 40,000 personnel, this Egyptian contingent had

converted to U.S. armored vehicles with 450 M60A3 tanks, 600 M113 armored personnel carriers, and some M109 self-propelled howitzers. Positioned between the U.S. 1 Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) that would conduct a diversionary attack into southeastern Kuwait and VII Corps that would sweep into southern Iraq, the Egyptians were directed to invade western Kuwait and turn east to intercept retreating Iraqi units from the southeast along the Basrah-Jahrah highway. Given that part of the Egyptian mission was to prevent Iraqi armor from attacking the flanks of 1 MEF or VII Corps, and the Americans were not fully confident in their abilities, the U.S. armored First Cavalry Division was positioned behind them. Although the Egyptians were meant to begin their advance on the operation's second day, 1 MEF's attack on the first day exceeded expectations and prompted U.S. general Norman Schwarzkopf to instruct the Egyptians to move early, which the Egyptian commander refused until ordered to do so by Cairo. Attacking two Iraqi infantry divisions depleted by desertions and American airstrikes, the Egyptians halted when they encountered a flaming trench obstacle and instead of crossing, waited 10 hours for the fire to burn out. The Egyptians advanced the next day against almost no Iraqi resistance but insisted on stopping when hit by limited artillery fire. They rejected U.S. advice that they should employ counterbattery fire because they had surpassed the daily allocation of shells. Upon resuming the advance, the Egyptians moved slowly against very little opposition, which allowed Iraqi armor to retreat, and U.S. units had to be reassigned to cover the flank of 1 MEF, which had moved far ahead. On the third day, the Egyptians declined an order to abandon their initial objective and turn early toward Jahrah, and when they finally agreed were so slow that American units were sent instead. Instructed by Schwarzkopf to participate in the entry of Arab forces into Kuwait City, the Egyptian commander objected (until Mubarak intervened) that it was not part of his original orders.²

In February 2011, following widespread prodemocracy protests in Cairo, Mubarak handed power to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) headed by Field Marshall Mohamed Hussein Tantawi. Continuing protest and international pressure prompted the SCAF to lift its state of emergency and allow civilian elections. In June 2012, Mubarak was found guilty of having ordered the killing of protestors and sentenced to life imprisonment, and the SCAF handed over power to elected civilian president and Islamist Mohamed Morsi, which raised questions about Egypt's peaceful relations with Israel and its



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potential support for Palestinian insurgents in adjacent Gaza. However, widespread protest against the Morsi government prompted the military to overthrow it in early July 2013 and install a civilian transitional administration.³

LIBYA

During World War II, the British undermined Italian rule in Libya by establishing the Libyan Arab Forces (LAF), which consisted of five

battalions from Cyrenaica's Sanussi Brotherhood, which had a long history of fighting both the Italians and British. Under British officers, the LAF guarded military facilities and prisoners, and one battalion was involved in the 1942 recapture of Tobruk. The LAF was disbanded after the war, and most of its members transferred to the paramilitary Cyrenaica Police Force, which patrolled what became a British protectorate. With Libyan independence in 1951, most of these men joined the new Royal Libyan Army of Sayyid Amr Muhammad Idris, the Sanussi leader turned Libyan king. The king and his British officers came to distrust the Libyan army officers, as many were influenced by Nasser's Free Officers Movement in Egypt. Encouraged by the United States and Britain to modernize his forces as a counter to the new revolutionary regimes of the region, Libya's king established a navy in 1962 and an air force the next year, which resulted in the recruitment of more educated yet alienated urban people. Idris controlled his military by placing loyal but unqualified Cyrenaicans in all command positions; limiting the force to 6,500 lightly armed troops; and creating the paramilitary National Security Force (NSF) and Cyrenaica Defence Force (CDF) that totaled 14,000 Cyrenaica Sanussi equipped with artillery, armored cars, helicopters, and antitank weapons.

Frustrated by the corrupt squandering of the country's oil wealth and the king's failure to support the Arab cause in the 1967 Six Day War, Nasserite junior army officers led by Captain Muammar Gaddafi overthrew the government in September 1969. Ensuring loyalty to his revolution, Gaddafi had every officer above colonel and a few lower ranking ones who were associated with the monarchy dismissed, imprisoned, or murdered. All Sanussi were discharged, and the police were disarmed. Gaddafi's goals included Arab unification and the destruction of Israel, the strengthening of Islamic states and Muslim minorities, and the eradication of Western—particularly U.S. and British—imperialism. To achieve these aims, Libya would create a military capable of projecting power in the Middle East and North Africa, and stockpile weapons for the poorer Arab countries. At the time, Libya possessed the small forces mentioned earlier in this chapter, and its 400-man air force had just 10 U.S.-made F-5 jet fighters. Immediately, Gaddafi merged the remnants of the NSF and CDF—many personnel having been dismissed for loyalty to the previous regime—with the army and embarked on a recruiting campaign that resulted in a 20,000-strong military by 1970. Officers were encouraged to improve their education and technical skills, and Gaddafi used oil

revenue to purchase 110 Mirage fighters from France. In 1972, Gaddafi formed a militia called the Popular Resistance Forces. The same year, to facilitate his dream of an Islamic State of the Sahel and Arabize the region, Gaddafi established the Islamic Arab Legion consisting of foreigners from interior West African states such as Tuaregs from Mali and Niger, as well as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis who had come to Libya as migrant workers but were forced into the military. Elements of the legion supported Palestinian fighters in Lebanon and, as discussed in subsequent chapters, were involved in Libyan intervention in Uganda, Chad, and Darfur.

After 1973's October War, Gaddafi decided to compensate for the departure of Egypt from the Arab cause by dramatically increasing the size of the Libyan military. Libyan arms purchases increased from \$60 million in 1970 to \$2.3 billion in 1979, and conscription was imposed in 1978. By 1983, the air force had 4,000 personnel and 555 combat aircraft, including 60 Mirages, 175 MiG-23s, and the first MiG-25s sold beyond eastern Europe. The army swelled to 55,000 men and 3,000 tanks. Libya's rapid acquisition of advanced weapons systems far exceeded its military's capability to handle them, which meant that, for example, in 1977 there were 200–300 trained crews for 2,500 tanks and 150 pilots for 550 aircraft. Equipment maintenance was usually neglected, with half of Libya's vehicles usually out of operation. Complex armored vehicles and aircraft were left to bake in the hot desert. Gaddafi imported large numbers of foreign technicians. Two thousand Soviets manned radar stations and air defense systems; Soviet, Cuban, Syrian, Pakistani, and North Korean pilots flew Libyan fighters; and all the MiG-25s were flown by Soviets. After Libya's air force participated in the 1973 war with Israel, France could no longer serve as Gaddafi's main weapons supplier, though it did sell him some AMX-30 tanks and more Mirages over the next few years. France was replaced by the Soviet Union, which would provide two-thirds of Libya's arms, though Gaddafi also purchased antiship missiles from Italy and Soviet-made tanks, fighters, and surface-to-air missiles from Syria. With three different coup attempts in 1975, Gaddafi conducted widespread purges of the officer corps, particularly at the higher levels. Undermining the military's ability to move against him, Gaddafi forbade standing units larger than a battalion, posted his cronies to command positions regardless of ability, frequently transferred officers so that they would not bond with subordinates, and placed "people's commissars" and informants in

units. A number of intelligence and security organizations took over internal security, and the military focused on supporting Libya's foreign policy by developing conventional warfare capability.

Gaddafi's support for Palestinian and other international terrorist groups—along with massive arms importation from the Soviet Union—made Libya a major target of the anticommunist Reagan administration in the United States during the 1980s. Gaddafi's claim to the entire Gulf of Sirte (also known as the Gulf of Sidra), which stretched 500 kilometers from Tripoli to Benghazi, was contrary to international law and opposed by the massive air and naval forces of the United States. In August 1981, most of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, comprising 15 ships that included 2 aircraft carriers and 150 aircraft, was sent to the Gulf of Sirte to enforce freedom of navigation. Of Libya's 550 combat aircraft, fewer than 200 were operational and were less advanced than the American F-14 Tomcat fighters. In addition, Libya's 150 pilots were not as experienced as their American counterparts. The Libyans flew 72 sorties to shadow the U.S. fleet and on August 19, two Libyan SU-22 jets attacked two superior F-14s and were easily shot down.

In January and February 1986, the United States, during Operations Attain Document I and II, once again deployed two carrier groups from the Sixth Fleet to the Gulf of Sirte to provoke Libya, which had supported a number of international terrorist attacks. Better prepared, the Libyans now had 700 combat aircraft (including some more advanced models) and new Soviet SA-5 surface-to-air missiles. However, lack of trained personnel meant that there was no coordination between Libya's aircraft and air defense system, much of its air defense was shut down at night, and there were as few as 100 trained pilots. The Libyan pilots demonstrated their poor flying skills during several hundred sorties that shadowed the U.S. planes. Further pressuring Libya in March, the United States increased its naval force to 3 carriers with 250 aircraft and 23 other ships in Operation Attain Document III. Up to this point, U.S. aircraft had flown over the gulf, but its ships had not entered the area. Toward the end of March, the U.S. cruiser USS *Ticonderoga* and two escort ships crossed the northern border of the Gulf of Sirte, which Gaddafi had called the Line of Death and was met by 5 Soviet-made Libyan patrol boats with outdated missiles, one of which was destroyed by U.S. aircraft as it began an attack run. On the same day, the Libyans fired several SA-5 missiles at American F-14s but missed. That night, U.S. aircraft destroyed the

Libyan air defense system around the gulf, sank another patrol boat, and damaged two others (which killed 72 Libyans without any U.S. casualties). Gaddafi retaliated by orchestrating terrorist attacks in Europe, including the bombing of a West Berlin nightclub popular with U.S. military personnel. This prompted the Americans to launch Operation El Dorado Canyon in mid-April 1986 in which 18 U.S. Air Force F-111 fighter-bombers accompanied by four electronic warfare planes bombed targets in Libya's western Tripolitania region. These included the diving school at Sidi Bilal, the military part of Tripoli International Airport, and a barracks where Gaddafi was spending the night. In addition, several dozen U.S. Navy aircraft struck an airfield and barracks in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi. Based in Britain but forced to fly around mainland Europe for diplomatic reasons, the F-111s used mid-air refueling to complete a 10,300-kilometer round trip in 13 hours, which represented the longest fighter combat mission in history. Despite a warning from the Italians, Libya did not prepare for the attack, and its air defenses downed just one F-111. The air raid destroyed between 3 and 5 of Libya's 13 Il-76 transport aircraft at Tripoli, 14 MiGs and 2 helicopters at Benghazi, and dozens of air defense installations. In January 1989, the Americans sent a naval carrier group to the southern Mediterranean near Libya in response to Gaddafi's construction of a chemical weapons production facility. After 2 American F-14s shot down 2 Libyan MiG-23s that appeared to be attacking, Gaddafi grounded his air force for the rest of the American operation.⁴

During the 1990s, given the fall of his Soviet sponsor, Gaddafi began to improve relations with the West by admitting responsibility for the bombing of a civilian airliner over Scotland in 1988, surrendering two agents for trial in the Netherlands, and paying compensation to victims' families, which resulted in the lifting of international sanctions against Libya. The U.S. and British governments seemed eager to rehabilitate Gaddafi as a way to secure Libyan oil. After the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the 2003 U.S.-Anglo invasion of Iraq, Gaddafi renounced his weapons of mass destruction programs and cooperated with U.S. and British intelligence efforts to hunt Islamist militants. In the context of popular uprisings against authoritarian rulers in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt, Libyan protesters demanding human rights and democracy clashed with security forces in Benghazi in February 2011. As the rebellion spread, various anti-Gaddafi militias were formed by students, teachers, lawyers,

and security force deserters. They established the National Transitional Council (NTC) as an alternative government with a military called the National Liberation Army (NLA). In March, with support from the United Nations, a NATO military coalition assembled naval and air elements to impose a coastal blockade and no-fly zone on Libya to prevent Gaddafi from gaining external assistance and using air power to bombard the rebels. Furthermore, the United States, France, and Britain facilitated rebel operations by using air strikes against Gaddafi's ground forces, particularly armored vehicles and naval vessels. NTA ground forces were given small arms and ammunition by Egypt, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and France, and communications equipment and medical supplies by the United States and Britain. Defecting with their MiGs, former Gaddafi pilots formed the Free Libyan Air Force, which attacked Gaddafi's patrol boats and supported NLA ground operations. Gaddafi's longtime use of mercenaries from sub-Saharan African countries led to widespread violence against black migrant workers. In August, the rebels—with continued NATO air support—launched an offensive that captured coastal cities and culminated in the seizure of Tripoli. In late October, NTC forces overcame heavy resistance to take the Gaddafi stronghold of Sirte, where the deposed dictator was captured and instantly killed. Periodic fighting continued across the country as some former rebel militias refused to lay down their arms. Libya's instability was demonstrated on September 11, 2012 when Islamist militants attacked the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi killing four Americans including Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens.⁵

TUNISIA

The military history of postcolonial Tunisia is different than most of its neighbors. Upon the country's independence from France in 1956, the Tunisian army was created from the 850-strong Bey's Guard and 1,300 Tunisian personnel who transferred from the French army. One-year obligatory military service for young men was introduced the following year. In 1958, another 4,000 soldiers transferred from the French to the Tunisian army. The Tunisian air force was founded in 1959 with the acquisition of training aircraft and in 1965, it purchased a dozen Italian-made light attack jets. Furthermore, a small Tunisian navy was created in 1960. President Habib Bourguiba, who had been

elected as prime minister in 1957, immediately abolished the monarchy and declared a one-party republic. He maintained that Tunisia could never become a credible military power and that building a sizable armed force would waste valuable resources and encourage military coups. He excluded the military from politics by relying on former members of the French colonial army to inculcate a loyalist and apolitical spirit, excluding members of the rural anticolonial militia, appointing a civilian as minister of defense and, as of January 1957, formally outlawing political activity by military personnel (including stripping their voting rights). During Bourguiba's 30-year rule in Tunisia, senior military officers played no role in public life, and the public knew little about the armed forces—which was different from Egypt, Algeria and Morocco. The involvement of some officers in unsuccessful coups in 1957 and 1962 strengthened the president's determination to form a Western-style apolitical military. During the 1970s, Bourguiba dismissed a civilian defense minister for involving military personnel in preparation for a conference of the ruling party, Neo Destour. Because the military's size and funding was limited, Bourguiba relied on a national guard and gendarmerie under the interior ministry to maintain internal security, and he relied on alliance with France to deter external attacks from neighboring Algeria and Libya.

The Tunisian military experienced its first combat during the 1961 Bizerte Crisis. In June 1961, Bourguiba—seeking to bolster his nationalist credentials—demanded France withdraw from the Tunisian port of Bizerte, which had not been included in the 1956 independence because it supported French operations in Algeria, and imposed a blockade on the important naval port. As Tunisian troops in the south claimed territory in the Sahara, their colleagues at Bizerte shot down a French helicopter and hit base headquarters with artillery fire. As a result, in July, three French warships forced their way into the port, and warplanes from an aircraft carrier destroyed Tunisian artillery. Some 7,000 French paratroopers and marines were landed at the naval base, from where an armored column burst out into the city to defeat Tunisian forces. In four days of urban combat, 13 French soldiers and 670 mostly civilian Tunisians lost their lives. Given international condemnation, the French agreed to negotiate the handover of Bizerte, which they returned to Tunisia in 1963 after the end of the Algerian war.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a series of crises thrust the Tunisian military into prominence. During the 1970s, France lifted its

ban on selling weapons to Tunisia, and it also provided training to Tunisia's military and internal security forces. In late January 1980, fifty Tunisian revolutionaries, sponsored by the Gaddafi regime, crossed the border from Libya and attacked the frontier town of Gafsa, killing 40 people before the security forces regained control. Responding to a call for assistance from Tunis, the French sent transport planes and military advisors, three French warships and five submarines began patrolling the Tunisian-Libyan coast, and the United States quickly sent two transport planes to deliver armored vehicles. This brief crisis inspired the United States and France to help modernize the Tunisian armed forces over the next few years, and during the 1980s (given conflict between the United States and Libya), Washington became Tunis's primary military sponsor. During this period, Tunisia acquired from the United States 89 M-60 tanks, 120 M113 armored personnel carriers, almost 100 towed 105-millimeter (mm) and 155-mm howitzers, 9 C-130 transport aircraft, and 18 F-5 fighters.

In 1978, 1981, and 1984, Tunisia's military assisted the beleaguered interior ministry to suppress internal protest caused by economic problems. As a result, the military was granted higher budgets, and some senior officers were appointed to government positions. In 1984, Brigadier Zine al-Abdine Ben Ali, trained in France and the United States, was appointed director of national security in the interior ministry and within a few years, he became minister of the interior, prime minister, and member of the ruling party's politburo, which definitively broke the military's exclusion from politics. In 1982, perhaps to deflect Arab criticism of his connections with the West, the increasingly erratic Bourguiba allowed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to establish its headquarters in Tunis after it had been expelled from Lebanon. At the start of October 1985, the PLO office in Tunis was bombed by eight IAF F15s in Israel's most long-distance military mission, called Operation Wooden Leg, since the 1976 raid on Entebbe in Uganda. Because it was obvious that Israeli air operations over the Mediterranean, including mid-air refueling, could not have happened without U.S. knowledge and possibly cooperation, relations between Tunis and Washington suffered but quickly healed given mutual hostility toward Gaddafi's Libya.

Supported by many elements of society—including the military—Ben Ali staged a bloodless coup in November 1987 to remove the sick and unstable Bourguiba, who seemed intent on fostering conflict with

emerging radical Islamist leaders. Although the military became more involved in politics, Ben Ali established a personal power base and gradually replaced the military officers who had helped him take power with a civilian administration. The few officers who remained in the regime were Ben Ali's old colleagues from his days in the St. Cyr French Military Academy. During the 1990s, he attempted to eliminate Tunisia's growing Islamist movement by increasing funds for internal security (including the police, intelligence service, and military) and purging officers with suspected Islamist sympathies. In the early 1990s, the army was reorganized into three mechanized brigades, each with one armored and two mechanized infantry battalions along with artillery and air defense elements. The army also included a desert specialist Saharan brigade, a special forces brigade, and an engineer unit.

Before the September 2001 attacks, the Americans staged more joint exercises with Tunisia than any other Mediterranean country. After 2001, Washington provided Tunis with more military training and supplies, and in return Tunisia delivered intelligence on radical Islamist networks in North Africa and Europe, and political support for the war in Afghanistan. On the other hand, hundreds of radicalized Tunisian young men traveled to Iraq to fight the U.S. occupation. In January 2011, head of the army General Rachid Ammar refused to obey President Ben Ali's order for his troops to fire on the protestors who had taken to the streets amid the beginning of the Arab Spring. Subsequently, Ben Ali fled the country, and General Ammar assured the public that the military would not act outside its constitutional role and that it would protect the popular revolution. Today, Tunisia maintains the smallest military in North Africa with a 27,000-strong army (of which some 22,000 are conscripts completing a year of service); an air force with 3,500 personnel supporting the same 18 F-5s it has had since the 1980s and a small fleet of helicopters; and a navy of 4,500 sailors to patrol the coast with 18 missile and torpedo patrol craft, along with 2 dozen small patrol boats.⁶

ALGERIA

Leftist Algerian academic Mohamed Harbi remarked that postcolonial Algeria "was not a state with an army, but an army with a state." Since independence in 1962, all Algeria's seven presidents came to power

with military support, and three of the longest-serving presidents were military officers when they assumed office. The Army of National Liberation (ALN), the armed wing of the National Liberation Front (FLN)—which was divided between rival factions of internal insurgents and an external conventional force based in Tunisia and Morocco—had fought the French for eight years. When France withdrew, the ALN became the military of the newly independent country. Ahmed Ben Bella, decorated for bravery as a Free French soldier fighting in Italy during World War II and later an FLN founder imprisoned by the French, became president of Algeria in 1963 with the backing of the ALN's external wing. Colonel Houari Boumedienne, leader of the external forces, became minister of defense and quickly transformed the ALN into a professional military called the People's National Army (ANP). He integrated former internal guerrillas into the formal structures of the external forces (which led to several failed mutinies), sent uneducated personnel to foreign military academies or dismissed them, employed a core of 250 Algerian junior officers who had served in the French colonial army but deserted to the ALN in the last years of the independence struggle, encouraged a sense of national unity by moving units around and introducing political commissars, and recruited younger, better-educated soldiers and junior officers who had not been politicized by the liberation war.

In 1956, during the independence war, the ALN had decided to begin the development of a future modern Algerian military by sending personnel to sympathetic countries such as the Soviet Union, China, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria for training as aircraft pilots and technicians, naval crews, and underwater divers. Created upon independence and given increased importance after the 1963 border war with Morocco (see later in this chapter), the Algerian air force sent more personnel abroad for training; acquired Soviet-built aircraft such as MiG-17 light bombers, MiG-21 interceptors, Su-7 fighter-bombers, Antonov transports, and transport helicopters; and in 1966 established a new air base with training school at Tafraoui. Several squadrons of Algerian MiGs were sent to support Egypt against Israel from the Six Day War of 1967 to the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The Algerian navy was formed in 1963 with two British-built minesweepers and three torpedo boats to secure the coast. Four years later, the navy acquired several missile boats from the Soviet Union. Algeria's air and naval capabilities were enhanced when France turned over the previously leased Mers el-Kebir naval base in 1968 and Bou Sfer air base in 1970.

In June 1965, after Ben Bella attempted to reduce military influence by creating a popular militia that reported directly to the president, Boumedienne took power in a bloodless coup with military support and appointed a ruling revolutionary council that included the ANP's entire general staff, the country's five commanders of military regions, and four former internal insurgent leaders. A failed coup by a former internal insurgent commander in 1967 prompted Boumedienne to concentrate power in his own hands by reducing the size of the council, removing former internal insurgents from positions, and taking control of the military away from the general staff and giving it to the Ministry of Defence (over which he retained personal authority). Boumedienne attempted to create the appearance of a civilian regime by appointing a largely civilian council of ministers to administer mundane government affairs. In addition, military officers in government, including the president, never wore uniforms in public. At the same time, the regime celebrated the ANP as the successor of the ALN, which had won independence and now represented a stabilizing influence. During Boumedienne's socialist industrial revolution of the 1970s, the army's journal became an important medium for official discourse, ANP officers filled key positions in the administration (including a third of the council of ministers), and the new constitution of 1976 assigned the military the role of defending the "Socialist Revolution."

When Boumedienne died suddenly in December 1978, the Ministry of Defence assumed administrative control of the state, and the ANP organized an FLN congress at which Colonel Chadli Benjedid was selected as the new president over two prominent civilian candidates and ratified by a national vote in January 1979. Benjedid, who had joined the liberation struggle early and commanded the Oran military region since 1964, also assumed the post of general secretary of the FLN and appointed military officers as FLN coordinator and prime minister. Lacking the commanding personality of the late Boumedienne, the new president attempted to control the military by playing rival groups of officers against one another, which encouraged factionalism. To further professionalize the ANP along Western lines, Benjedid favored the group (or "clan") of officers who had deserted from the French army late in the liberation war, which alienated those who had fought against the French from the start and who wanted a popular military with a wider national role. In the early to mid-1980s, military influence and independence increased as

military clans competed for control of the FLN, more officers were appointed to civilian administrative positions, Benjedid gave power back to the general staff and for the first time promoted officers to the rank of general (the previous highest rank had been colonel), which the old ALN had banned to avoid creating an elite group.

Between 1975 and 1988, Algeria spent US\$9 billion of oil money on weapons and military equipment mostly from the Soviet Union, including 400 T-62 and T-72 tanks, 320 armored personnel carriers, 920 infantry fighting vehicles, and 65 SA-6 surface-to-air missiles. At the same time, 1,000 Soviet personnel worked in Algeria as instructors and technicians, and several thousand Algerians were trained in the Soviet Union. As part of its own expansion into the Mediterranean, Moscow provided Algiers with more missile boats in the late 1970s. During the 1980s, the Soviets provided 6 submarines, 3 frigates, and 3 corvettes all equipped with missiles, which greatly enhanced the Algerian navy's capacity to project power. The Algerian air force replaced its older Soviet-made aircraft with dozens of upgraded MiG-21 and new MiG-23 fighters along with 48 Mi-24 helicopter gunships. During the early 1980s, to avoid complete military dependence on the Soviets and further develop force projection, Algeria purchased 17 C-130 transport aircraft from the United States (which enabled it to create parachute units) and 12 fast attack boats and 2 amphibious landing vessels from Britain (to add to 1 acquired from the Soviets), which allowed the navy to form several marine infantry battalions. Algeria's military build-up during this period happened within the context of supporting insurgents fighting Moroccan forces in neighboring Western Sahara (see later in this chapter) and deterring Moroccan cross-border attacks. During the mid-1980s, the ANP was reorganized to include specific armored formations, and it updated its command structure. By the early 2000s, it had 2 armored divisions each consisting of 3 armored regiments (95 tanks and 30 infantry fighting vehicles each), a mechanized regiment (with 30 tanks, 30 infantry fighting vehicles, and 60 armored personnel carriers), an artillery group with 120 guns, a reconnaissance battalion, an air defense battalion, and support elements. Furthermore, there were 2 mechanized divisions each consisting of 3 mechanized regiments with similar support elements to the armored divisions, an airborne division of 5 airborne regiments, an independent armored brigade, and 4 or 5 independent motorized infantry brigades.

In October 1988, ANP units killed 500 people while suppressing protest in all of Algeria's major cities brought on by the economic crisis following the collapse of oil prices a few years before. As a result, Benjedid embarked on multiparty democratic reforms, military personnel withdrew from the FLN's central committee, and the new constitution of 1989 downgraded the role of the ANP from protector of the revolution to defender of the country's borders. The success of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a populist party supported by the growing urban poor, in subsequent local elections and the likelihood of it coming to power at the national level threatened the ANP and prompted its return to politics. In 1990, General Khaled Nezzar was appointed to the "civilian" position of minister of defense, which marked the first time since 1965 that this post was not occupied by the president. In June 1991, the military violently broke up the occupation of two main squares in Algiers by FIS supporters protesting new electoral laws that seemed to hinder their chance of success, and many of the party's leaders were imprisoned. With the appointment of General Larbi Belkheir as minister of the interior, military officers were in charge of the two key ministerial positions. Nezzar, Belkheir, and others promoted by the president came from the secular and Francophone background of the old French army and reacted strongly against the Islamist FIS. The success of the FIS in the first round of national assembly elections in December 1991 led to a meeting of all senior military officers, the general staff, regional commanders, and gendarmerie and intelligence chiefs, who agreed to act before the second round. They feared that if the FLN lost, they would be dismissed from the military, and the ANP might split because some troops would likely support a legitimate FIS government.

In January 1992, the Algerian generals convinced President Benjedid to resign, cancelled the elections, and declared a state of emergency. The military then appointed a series of civilian figurehead presidents such as Mohamed Boudiaf, a founder of the FLN, who was assassinated in June 1992 after announcing he would eliminate corruption (which directly threatened many ANP officers, who had gained control over the country's oil revenue). The FIS was banned, and thousands of its members were imprisoned. Its remaining supporters formed several armed groups, the Islamic Armed Movement (MIA) in the mountains and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in urban areas, and quickly launched a guerrilla struggle against the state. Prominent among the more radical Islamist insurgents were recently

returned veterans of the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In 1993, the more radical GIA declared war on the FIS and MIA, which it considered too moderate, and targeted anyone associated with the government or civil society such as civil servants, teachers, journalists, intellectuals, and artists. MIA military strategy focused on attacking the security forces and sabotaging state infrastructure. In March 1994, in a major victory for the insurgents, more than 1,000 Islamist prisoners staged a mass breakout from Tazoult prison.

As the war continued, the Algerian military split into two factions—those led by the army's chief of staff General Mohamed Lamari and supported by unions and feminist groups who wanted to eradicate the rebels, and those who favored negotiation led by the minister of defense, General Liamine Zeroual (who became head of the High Council of State in 1994). While Zeroual had the revolutionary legitimacy that came with his long career in the old ALN, most of the senior Algerian generals during the 1990s were former French junior officers who had deserted to the insurgents. After negotiations with the FIS failed in October 1994, Zeroual embarked on a new strategy by promoting officers from the eradication camp such as Lamari, forming armed self-defense militias in towns where guerrillas were active, and prohibiting the media from reporting on the conflict. In February 1995, security forces killed between 96 and 230 Islamist prisoners during a riot at Sekardji jail, which might have been orchestrated by the state to justify the killings (which were really revenge for the explosion of a large car bomb outside the primary police station in Algiers the previous month). During a weeklong battle in mid-March, the military killed several hundred Islamists southwest of Algiers in what might have started as a planned ambush of a large convoy bringing insurgents to the capital.

Although the ANP had lost its main Soviet weapons supplier in 1991, it soon began buying equipment and spare parts from Russia and other former Soviet republics and in 1994, purchased helicopter night-vision systems, communications equipment, and small arms from French defense firms. The Algerian state responded to the insurgency by expanding its paramilitary forces from 30,000 in 1986 to 181,200 in 2004, including 60,000 in the army's gendarmerie; 20,000 in the interior ministry's Directorate of National Security Forces; 1,200 in the mechanized Republican Guard; and 100,000 in local defense groups. Most of the fighting of the civil war was done by these paramilitary troops. Around the same time, the strength of the

conventional military dropped from a peak of 170,000 in the mid-1980s to 120,000 in 1995; about half of these were conscripts. At the height of its activity, the GIA had 2,000–3,000 full-time insurgents organized in units of 50 to 100, and other factions were smaller.

In 1994, the GIA declared violence-plagued Algiers a liberated zone, proclaimed an Islamic caliphate, and extended its attacks to Algerians in France, which began with the hijacking of a French airliner in December 1994 that was stormed by French security forces in Marseille. In the Algerian countryside, the moderate FIS, MIA, and other groups reorganized as the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), which condemned GIA killing of civilians and favored pluralistic democracy. In a November 1995 election, Zeroual defeated several Islamist candidates to become president, which reflected popular sentiment in favor of secularism and an end to violence. The election results led to conflict and assassinations within the AIS and GIS, which were now engaged in large battles against each other.

Between April 1997 and the end of 1998, several dozen massacres were carried out in Algeria that targeted entire villages and urban neighborhoods, particularly the areas south and east of Algiers where the FIS was popular, and involved the killing of men, women, and children. The death toll for each massacre varied from around 50 to several hundred. Although there has been debate about the identity of the perpetrators, the GIA claimed responsibility for some massacres and seems to have adopted an ideology that anyone not fighting the government was an apostate and should be killed. Prompted by the massacres, the AIS declared a cease-fire with the government at the end of September 1997 and over the next three years negotiated amnesty for its members and disbanded. A year later, disagreement over the massacres within the GIA led to the breaking away of the new Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) led by former army paratrooper Hassan Hattab and mostly active in the forests of eastern Algeria. After Zeroual's sudden resignation, independence war veteran Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected president in April 1999 after all the other candidates withdrew from the campaign because of vote rigging allegations. Under Bouteflika, the Algerian parliament passed the Civil Harmony Act in September 1999, which allowed insurgents not guilty of murder or rape to avoid prosecution if they surrendered. Violence declined as many former rebels returned to civilian life. By 2002, the GIA had been effectively destroyed by internal conflict and successful army operations that were facilitated, after

September 2001, by U.S.-supplied night vision equipment and the freezing of GIA and GSPC finances. Antar Zouabri, who had led the GIA since 1996, was killed in a gunfight with security forces in February 2002. Re-elected in 2004 with the support of several major parties, Bouteflika expanded the amnesty program under the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which pardoned rebels and soldiers, and resulted in the surrender of around 400 GSPC fighters in 2005. In pursuing an amnesty program, Bouteflika benefited from the retirement and death of many of the generals who had dominated Algeria during the 1990s. While the Algerian government claims that 150,000 people were killed during the civil war, a recent study puts the figure at 44,000 dead or disappeared between 1992 and 2002. In February 2011, the Bouteflika regime—amid the Arab Spring protests—cancelled the almost 20-year state of emergency.


While the civil war of the 1990s shifted the Algerian military's focus from potential conventional warfare with Morocco and Libya, the post-2000 Bouteflika administration began to rebuild the country's conventional armed forces. Despite its enhanced security cooperation with the United States, Algeria continued to purchase most of its weapons systems from Russia (e.g., two dozen MiG-29 interceptors in 1999, 38 Su-24 ground attack jets in 2001, 36 Mi-24 helicopter gunships upgraded in South Africa in 2002, and 42 Mi-171 transport helicopters with night-vision equipment in 2003). The spending spree increased as they drew closer to 2010 with 305 T-90 tanks, 28 Su-30MKA multirole fighters, a dozen YAK-130 training aircraft, and 2 new improved Kilo class submarines. Determined to remain the largest African naval force in the Mediterranean, the Algerian navy has recently begun a modernization program by refitting its older Soviet-made frigates and Kilo-class submarines in Russia, and ordering new vessels such as 2 frigates from Germany, 2 corvettes from Russia, and an amphibious landing ship from Italy.

As the last active Algerian insurgent group after 2002, the GSPC continued attacks on security force personnel in the east and expanded south into the Sahara with a contingent under Amari Saifi, another former paratrooper, kidnapping 32 German tourists and fleeing into Mali, Niger, and Chad. In August 2003, Hassan Hattab was ousted as GSPC leader by the more militant Nabil Sahraoui, who announced his allegiance to the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, which resulted in closer security cooperation between the United States and Algeria. After Sahraoui was killed in combat with Algerian security

forces in June 2004, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud took over and in January 2007 attempted to assume a wider role in international jihad by changing the name of GSPC to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and engaged in smuggling and kidnapping for ransom in the border areas of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad. These activities impelled the United States to expand security links in the region beginning with Flintlock 2005, the largest U.S. military training exercise in Africa since World War II, in which 1,000 U.S. troops and the forces of seven countries conducted a fictional operation to pursue terrorists across Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad. This grew into the broader American Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). In the early 2010s, AQIM expanded south into West Africa by cooperating with Boko Haram Islamist militants in northern Nigeria. A splinter group, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), joined the Taureg Rebellion in Mali (see Chapter 2). In mid-January 2013, an AQIM splinter group, responding to French military intervention against their colleagues in Mali (see Chapter 2), seized the Tiguertourine gas plant in eastern Algeria, where they took 800 hostages. A sudden raid by Algerian special forces secured the facility and killed 29 militants, but 39 foreign hostages lost their lives.⁷

MOROCCO AND WESTERN SAHARA

In 1956, with the independence of Morocco, 14,000 former members of the French colonial army and 10,000 from the Spanish were amalgamated into the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR). About 2,000 former French officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were retained on short-term contracts until Moroccan officers graduated from military academies in France, Spain, and Morocco. Also founded in 1956 with the initial help of France (which supplied training aircraft), Morocco's Royal Air Force acquired a dozen MiG-17 fighters and four Il-28 bombers from the Soviet Union until Morocco's 1966 alliance with the United States prompted it to obtain several dozen American-made F-5 fighters, six C-130 transports, and various helicopters. In 1960, a small Royal Navy was formed with some patrol vessels to secure the coastline. The French helped create a royal-controlled Moroccan military to foil the aspirations of radical nationalists who might threaten their interests in the country. King



UN Cartographic Section

Mohammed V became supreme commander of the FAR and appointed his eldest son Crown Prince Hassan as chief of staff and royalist Ahmed Reda Guedira as the first defense minister. Symbolizing the close association between the monarchy and the military, members of the royal family regularly appeared at public events wearing military uniform. The former French and Spanish colonial personnel, constituting the FAR's core, remained loyal to the monarchy because they

were hostile to leftist nationalists, saw the king as protecting them from nationalist accusations of colonial collaboration, and mostly originated from rural Berber families hostile to the predominantly urban Arab nationalists. Furthermore, Hassan rewarded senior officers with promotion, additional positions such as governors of troublesome areas, and land and property abandoned by Europeans upon independence. Indeed, the FAR was deployed throughout the country in the same manner as the colonial army because its primary mission remained internal security.

In 1961, Hassan became king and in 1965, he suspended the constitution and dissolved parliament for the next five years because he believed he would remain in contact with his subjects through the military, which represented all sections of society. In 1965, the military suppressed protest in Casablanca and in 1968, King Hassan II took more direct control of the FAR by creating the Royal Military Household, which made the Ministry of Defence superfluous. During the 1960s, the FAR was expanded and by 1970, it accounted for a fifth of the national budget. Two failed coup attempts in 1971 and 1972, the last of which involved an air force F5 fighter attacking the king's airliner, made Hassan aware that he had become too dependent on the military, and he began to cultivate allies among civilian politicians. After the FAR was purged of officers suspected of coup plotting and promotions were frozen, Hassan centralized military authority at the royal palace by taking the positions of minister of defense, and chief and deputy chief of staff, assuming the administration of all military regions that were formally abolished, and relegating the National Defence Administration to logistical matters. The king also increasingly rewarded loyal officers with land and patronage to tie them to his regime, and kept the military busy by sending a contingent to fight against Israel in October 1973 and on various peacekeeping missions generally supportive of French interests in Africa. Paramilitary forces were formed to act as rivals to the FAR, ammunition supplies were placed under the authority of the civilian interior ministry and secured by its own guards, recruitment for the officer corps was extended beyond rural Berbers, and the royal guard enlisted Arab men from the home area of the royal family.

When violent demonstrations against continued Spanish rule broke out in the Ifni enclave in April 1957, Spanish dictator Francisco Franco dispatched two Spanish Legion battalions. In October, 1,500 Moroccan troops began to encircle Ifni by occupying nearby villages, and Franco

sent another two battalions of legionaries. In late November 1957, Moroccan soldiers attacked Ifni and stormed several Spanish outposts but were unable to take the center of Sidi Ifni. At the outpost of Tiluin, 60 Spanish indigenous colonial troops with European officers were repeatedly attacked by several hundred Moroccans, who were held back by Spanish bombers and the parachute drop of 75 Spanish reinforcements. The siege of Tiluin was lifted in early December by elements of the Spanish Legion. An attempt to send a platoon of legion paratroopers by truck to relieve the siege of Telata ended badly as they were surrounded by the Moroccans and were saved by the Telata garrison, which broke out and headed back to Sidi Ifni in early December. The Moroccans were unable to take Sidi Ifni, which was besieged until June 1958, as it was supplied by sea and defended by 7,500 entrenched troops.

Further down the coast in the much larger territory of Spanish Sahara, Morocco sponsored the formation of the Saharan Liberation Army, which consisted of 2,500 Moroccan soldiers with automatic weapons and mortars. It attacked the Spanish garrison at El Aaiun in mid-January 1958 but was compelled to retreat. The next day, two legion companies performing a reconnaissance at Edchera were ambushed by the Moroccans, who suffered heavy casualties in the intense fighting and had to withdraw. In February, a joint force of 9,000 Spanish and 5,000 French troops supported by 150 aircraft launched an offensive against the Saharan Liberation Army. Bombed from the air, the insurgent mountain stronghold of Tan-Tan fell first, leaving 150 liberation fighters dead. Formed into a motorized brigade, three legion battalions drove the insurgents from Edchera and advanced to Tarfurdad and Smara in the north. Cooperating with French forces from Fort Gouraud across the border in Mauritania, Spanish troops from El Aaiun moved south and destroyed liberation army units between Bir Nazaran and Ausert. The war ended in early April when Spain granted Morocco the strip of territory called Tarfaya (or Cape Juby) along the frontier of Spanish Sahara. Continued international pressure led Spain to cede the Ifni enclave to Morocco in 1969.⁸

In October 1963, conservative monarchist Morocco fought a short war with revolutionary and newly independent Algeria over the mineral-rich Tindouf and Bechar border areas that France had given to Algeria in the early 1950s. Moroccan troops seized several border towns, but these were quickly recaptured by the Algerians (who were supported by Egypt and Cuba). The lightly armed veterans of the

Algerian independence war fought a hit-and-run campaign against the largely French-equipped Moroccan conventional army that built fortified sand walls supplemented with land mines and electronic detection devices. Morocco failed to reconquer the border areas and although the war ended with an Organization of African Unity (OAU)–sponsored cease-fire, it resulted in years of enmity between the two countries.⁹

When Morocco became independent in 1956, its king claimed neighboring Spanish Sahara (now Western Sahara) and French-ruled Mauritania. In 1973, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) was formed to fight for the independence of Spanish Sahara, and small insurgent groups began attacking remote Spanish outposts. Algeria began arming and training POLISARIO because it wanted an outlet on the Atlantic Ocean and was concerned about the growth of Morocco's power if it occupied Spanish Sahara. In November 1975, Morocco organized the Green March of 350,000 Moroccan civilians and 20,000 soldiers to claim the Spanish territory, but they were halted at the border by 30,000 Spanish troops and minefields. In the north, a few people were killed when some of the marchers clashed with POLISARIO. Given pressure from the United Nations, Franco's terminal illness, and the growth of POLISARIO, Spain withdrew from the territory at the end of February 1976 and agreed that the area would be divided between Morocco and Mauritania. Immediately, POLISARIO declared the independence of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic.

In a secret deal, Morocco agreed to take the northern two thirds of the territory while Mauritania gained the southern third. With 10,000 insurgents and staging areas across the border in Algeria, POLISARIO launched a guerrilla war against the new occupiers. In addition to small arms, POLISARIO received a few Soviet-made T-55 and T-62 tanks, as well as armored personnel carriers from Algeria, Libya, and probably the Soviet Union. Because the Mauritanian Tuareg and Izarguen desert people were sympathetic to POLISARIO and the Mauritanian army consisted mostly of southern blacks who did not want to fight in Western Sahara, the early POLISARIO campaign focused on sending motorized columns of 100 fighters from Algeria into Mauritania. In June 1976, a large POLISARIO column with 100 vehicles and 600 fighters attacked the Mauritanian capital of Nouakchott and bombed the presidential palace. As it withdrew, part of the force was surrounded and destroyed by Mauritanian security

forces. The POLISARIO's secretary general El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed (also known as El Wali) was killed. Under the new leadership of Mohamed Abdelaziz, POLISARIO increased its attacks in Mauritania and in May 1977 briefly seized the mining town of Zouerate, where the local garrison gave up without a fight and the insurgents kidnapped six French technicians. In turn, the Mauritanian government allowed Moroccan troops and French military advisors to be flown into that town and other parts of the country. However, the rebels continued to attack railways, mining facilities, and military bases. In December, France sent Jaguar ground attack jets and Breguet Atlantique long-range reconnaissance aircraft as well as more advisors to assist the Moroccans in Mauritania, who numbered 10,000 troops, with a squadron of U.S.-made F-5 fighter-bombers. Although French air power and Moroccan ground troops posed serious problems for POLISARIO, Mauritanian resentment of foreign troops and ethnic tensions within its armed forces led to a coup in July 1978. The new Mauritanian military government agreed to a ceasefire with POLISARIO and recognized the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, which prompted Morocco to extend its rule over the southern part of the former Spanish territory also known as Western Sahara.

In January 1979, POLISARIO launched Operation Houari Boumedienne in honor of the recently deceased Algerian leader, which involved regular attacks against Moroccan forces in Western Sahara and periodical raids into southern Morocco. Fast-moving POLISARIO columns of 400–600 light vehicles with 2,000–4,000 fighters fought battles against ungainly Moroccan columns of 1,000 vehicles that included tanks and armored cars. The insurgents besieged isolated Moroccan garrisons, which had to be supplied by air, and they attacked the southern Moroccan town of Tan-Tan three times in 1979. While POLISARIO used Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles to down several Moroccan F-5s and a C-130 transport, lack of air defense capability forced the insurgents, in 1981, to employ smaller columns operating by night. Between 1981 and 1987, Morocco built a 2,700-kilometer-long system of sand walls (that were augmented by electronic detection equipment, strong points, and aerial patrols) from the Moroccan border southward that protected the economically useful parts of Western Sahara—settlements and phosphate mines—closer to the coast and confined POLISARIO to the inland area along the Algerian and Mauritanian borders. The wall was heavily

subsidized by Saudi Arabia in return for Moroccan diplomatic support for efforts to recognize both Israel and a Palestinian state.

The beginning of Morocco's campaign to control the former Spanish Sahara in 1975 served to keep the FAR out of politics because it was busy fighting and the war was popular with military officers, who saw their budget increase dramatically during the late 1970s. In 1980, given military reverses against the POLISARIO insurgents attributed to micromanagement of the military by the king, operational command in Western Sahara and two thirds of the units in the FAR was given to General Ahmed Dlimi. Although the FAR's performance improved, Dlimi was killed in a mysterious car accident in 1983 and buried unceremoniously, which raised the possibility of his involvement in another coup attempt. King Hassan divided the late Dlimi's powers between some senior officers close to the royal family, lifted the ban on promotions to reward officers who had performed well in Western Sahara, and in 1985 appointed his eldest son, Crown Prince Sidi Mohammed, chief of staff.

Between 1975 and 1988, given the context of the Western Sahara war, Morocco purchased US\$4 billion of weapons from France, which represented half of all its military acquisitions. The most expensive items included 39 Mirage fighters that performed effective attacks on insurgent positions and were equipped with electronic countermeasures to defend against rebel surface-to-air missiles, 24 Gazelle helicopter gunships that protected the flanks of moving ground forces, and 24 light attack jets. French armored vehicles—including more than a hundred 155-mm self-propelled howitzers, 350 armored personnel carriers, and 30 light tanks—augmented Moroccan firepower and mobility, and 250 French military instructors assisted the FAR. At the same time, Morocco purchased US\$900 million of military hardware from the United States, most of which went through the Military Foreign Sales program, which provided low-interest loans and grants. The most expensive items were 20 F-5 fighters aimed at deterring incursions by the large Soviet-equipped Algerian air force but proved vulnerable to insurgent surface-to-air missiles (which shot down about a dozen). The most important U.S.-supplied aircraft were 15 C-130 transports and 2 refueling aircraft that allowed the Royal Air Force to supply isolated garrisons. In 1980, one of the C-130s was converted into a flying reconnaissance and command center with antimissile technology that could detect insurgent units on the ground and dispatch combat aircraft. A network of U.S.-made ground surveillance

and air defense radar systems was also vital. The Moroccan army's firepower and mobility was further enhanced by U.S. equipment that included 100 M-48 tanks, 420 M-113 armored personnel carriers, and 55 155-mm towed and self-propelled howitzers. Potential air attack from Algeria was discouraged by 60 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns and 37 surface-to-air missile batteries. In 1982, three American experts spent two months in Morocco advising on the employment of F-5s in the war, a 20-man team of American counterinsurgency specialists trained a Moroccan battalion in commando tactics, and more than 1,500 Moroccan personnel were trained in the United States in fields such as combat flying, counterinsurgency, and command and control. The remaining US\$1 billion of military equipment bought by Morocco included 121 light tanks from Austria, 70 armored personnel carriers and 10 transport aircraft from West Germany, 28 training aircraft from Italy, and around 100 Eland armored cars and Ratel infantry fighting vehicles from apartheid South Africa.

By 1990, the Moroccan forces in Western Sahara numbered 150,000 troops with more than 300 U.S.- and French-made tanks, more than 250 artillery pieces, and 40 multiple rocket launchers. The war developed into a series of POLISARIO armored column raids on the wall, which periodically broke through, and withdrawing insurgents were pursued by Moroccan attack helicopters. Gaddafi's support for POLISARIO was halted in 1984 when King Hassan of Morocco agreed to a future merger between his country and Libya (which never happened). The 1989 creation of the Arab Maghreb Union consisting of Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya isolated POLISARIO. The end of Soviet and Algerian support with the collapse of the former and civil war in the latter along with military stalemate led to POLISARIO agreeing to a ceasefire in September 1991 monitored by a small UN force. However, a promised referendum on the future of Western Saharan has been constantly delayed by failed negotiations between Morocco and POLISARIO. Western Sahara appears permanently divided between the Moroccan west and the POLISARIO east. Proindependence protests broke out in Moroccan-occupied parts of Western Sahara in October 1999, May 2005, and (perhaps influenced by events in Tunisia and Egypt) February 2011 all of which were crushed by security forces. With the winding down of the Western Sahara war in the early 1990s, Moroccan arms purchases decreased by half, with the United States becoming the chief supplier. Acquisitions from France were abruptly reduced.

Upgrading the FAR was still important, and during the early 1990s, it acquired 300 surplus M-60 tanks from the United States and augmented its navy by purchasing 2 missile corvettes from Italy and 4 missile frigates from Spain.

Coming to power in July 1999, King Mohammed VI, the FAR's former chief of staff, dismissed his late father's powerful interior minister Driss Basri in October and placed his intelligence services under military officers. The new monarch increased the number of generals and gave the FAR a higher public profile, including the first military parade since the early 1970s. Civilian politicians became increasingly concerned with military corruption. By 2000, some maintained that half the wealthiest people in Morocco were FAR and interior ministry personnel who profited from arms purchases, interests in the fishing industry, and involvement in smuggling between Western Sahara and the Canary Islands. In 2005, the king appointed the first civilian, Yassine Mansouri, as head of the external security services with a mandate to prevent corruption by supervising foreign military purchases. While the civilian government banned three newspapers in December 2000 for listing senior military officers among those who had committed human rights violations in the 1970s, civilian politicians had gained confidence and in 2006 ended the practice of parliament passing the military budget without discussion. Although an alleged scheme by Islamists to infiltrate the air force was discovered in 2006, the divided and nonviolent nature of Morocco's Islamist movement made it less a security concern than in neighboring countries. Because Morocco was a long-established American ally, increased security cooperation with the United States after September 2001 did not represent as much of a change as it did for other Maghreb regimes.¹⁰

CONCLUSION

Recent events such as the killing of the American ambassador in Libya and the taking of a gas plant in Algeria by Islamist militants do not bode well for stability in North Africa. With North African governments embroiled in the Arab Spring, the vast and almost stateless Sahara Desert has become a sanctuary for Islamist insurgents who freely cross meaningless international borders and sustain themselves through smuggling and kidnapping for ransom. Instability in North


Africa is internationally worrying because it could easily impact the Middle East, southern Europe, and West and East Africa. Also worrying is Libya's dominance by rival militias and questions about Egypt's future relations with Israel. Given its oil wealth, North Africa is home to some of Africa's largest and most powerful militaries with significant mechanized forces, and air and naval capabilities that could potentially help stabilize the region. However, these forces have a recent history of poor military leadership, involvement in politics, and technical incompetence. Despite a decade of increased U.S. military assistance, the potential for regional military cooperation remains questionable.

Chapter 2

West Africa, 1963–

While the decolonization of West Africa during the late 1950s and early 1960s was mostly peaceful and happened through negotiation, the postcolonial era turned increasingly violent. Building on the former colonial armies, newly independent West African states established and expanded their own military structures, including new air and naval elements to defend their sovereignty and pursue foreign interests. However, within a few years, military coups, countercoups, and military regimes became more common than anywhere else on the continent. The major West African conflicts of the Cold War era were the Nigerian Civil War of 1967–1970 and the African nationalist insurgency against Portuguese colonial rule in Guinea-Bissau, which also drew in neighboring Guinea, from the early 1960s to Lisbon's withdrawal from Africa in 1974. With the instability brought about by the end of the Cold War, a series of terrible civil wars engulfed small countries along the coast such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire, and marginalized people such as those in the Casamance region of Senegal and Tuaregs in northern Mali and Niger waged protracted and increasingly intense rebellions against the state. At the same time, impoverished West Africa was the only part of the continent where a regional international organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), staged vigorous though controversial multinational military interventions meant to end internal state conflicts.

WEST AFRICA



Map No. 4242 UNITED NATIONS
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF WEST AFRICAN MILITARIES

Kwame Nkrumah decided that Ghana, which became independent from Britain under his leadership in 1957, should develop the “best equipped and most efficient armed forces in modern Africa,” as he believed only coercion would liberate other parts of the continent from colonial and white minority rule.¹ While Ghana’s defense budget in 1957–1958 was US\$9.35 million, by 1965 it had quadrupled to \$47 million, which represented 8.4 percent of total spending, as Nkrumah doubled the size of his military and purchased modern weapons. Increased salaries meant that there were more applicants than positions in the military. In 1960, the former Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) training institution at Techie was transformed into the Ghana Military Academy. In 1958, against British advice, Nkrumah established the Ghanaian Navy with Israeli assistance. By 1967, the embryonic navy had 827 personnel, 2 new 600-ton corvettes, 2 coastal defense craft with 40-millimeter (mm) guns, 2 coastal mine-sweepers with 40-mm and 20-mm guns, 1 training ship, and a maintenance vessel. There were also 4 Soviet-made fast patrol boats rumored to have Russian crews who delivered weapons and ammunition to insurgent groups in neighboring territories. Despite the lack of an obvious threat, the Ghanaian Navy was organized as an antisubmarine and minesweeping force, with antismuggling and search and rescue duties secondary. A company from Yugoslavia was contracted to build a naval port at Sekondi, which proved to be much more expensive than anticipated. The Ghanaian Air Force (GAF) was created in 1959 with a flying school opened at Takoradi, which initially had an Indian commander and Israeli instructors. However, the next year, training was shifted to the Royal Air Force (RAF). Israel had been eager to reduce its isolation by assisting newly independent African countries but by 1961, Nkrumah began criticizing Israeli colonialism. By 1965, the GAF had 900 personnel along with 70 aircraft and helicopters of diverse origin, including 7 Italian-made jet trainers and 46 Canadian-made bush planes. While the Ghanaian Army in 1957 consisted of 5,700 former RWAFF soldiers organized into 3 infantry battalions and an armored reconnaissance squadron, by 1965 it had expanded to 14,600 men in 5 infantry battalions of the newly renamed Ghana Regiment (formerly the Gold Coast Regiment), 1 paratroop battalion, and a reconnaissance battalion. In 1966, Ghana had the largest army in West Africa and the eighth largest on the continent.

In 1961, Nkrumah suddenly dismissed all the British officers seconded to the Ghanaian military, including its commander Major General H. T. Alexander, and rapidly promoted Ghanaian officers. The reason for this appears to have been related to the 1960 deployment of a brigade of 2,394 Ghanaian soldiers as UN peacekeepers in the former Belgian Congo. Although Nkrumah was enthusiastic that Ghana should take a leading role in African affairs, other new African governments pointed out that most of the officers in the Ghanaian army were white, and Ghanaian soldiers were mocked by their Congolese counterparts (who had mutinied against their Belgian officers). In January 1961 in Congo, the newly appointed and relatively inexperienced Ghanaian lieutenant colonel David Hansen proved unable to prevent the mutiny of his battalion over pay issues and rumors of transfer from Accra in the south to Tamale in the north, and his soldiers beat him with rifle butts and left him for dead. The new commander of the Ghanaian military, Major General Stephen J. A. Otu, and his deputy, Brigadier Joseph A. Ankrah, had each just 14 years of experience as officers, and most newly promoted majors and lieutenant colonels had six years of total service and some just two. As a result, Nkrumah turned to Canada because it was seen as nonimperialist and shared a common British military tradition with Ghana. Between 1961 and 1976, the Canadian government, eager to help newly independent African states and counter possible Soviet moves on the continent, sent a military assistance team of 30 officers to Ghana that took up key training and staff positions at the military academy, military hospital, air force, Ministry of Defence, army headquarters and airborne school. During roughly the same period, 1960 to 1966, Chinese guerrilla warfare experts operated training camps in Ghana for insurgents from Ivory Coast, Niger, and Cameroon. In 1965, the largest of these camps was at Obenemasi with 17 Chinese instructors and 210 African students.

As Nkrumah's relations with the United States declined and he began to distrust the armed forces and police, he transformed the President's Own Guard Regiment (POGR) from a small ceremonial unit to a 1,200-strong operational battalion by 1964, with a second battalion established the following year. It was trained and armed by the Soviets and equipped with 24 light artillery pieces, 21 medium mortars, 15 anti-aircraft guns, and 20 heavy machine guns. Under Nkrumah's direct control and stationed around the presidential palace, the POGR became a rival of the Canadian-trained Ghanaian

Army. In February 1966, while Nkrumah was out of the country, the Ghanaian Army staged a coup and easily overpowered the POGR. Soviet and Chinese instructors fled. The POGR was reduced to a single battalion and brought under military authority. The involvement of many Ghanaian officers in the ruling National Liberation Council meant that the military was neglected in the late 1960s, and colonial recruiting patterns meant there was still sharp division between the mostly northern enlisted men and southern officers.²

In 1960, after a negotiated transition, Britain granted Nigeria independence as a federal state. From 1958 to 1965, the Nigerian Army grew modestly from 7,600 to 10,500 personnel. A number of units were created such as two batteries of artillery, which had been disbanded in 1958, a second squadron of armored cars, a Federal Guards company for ceremonial duties, and a sixth infantry battalion of the Queen's Own Nigeria Regiment (QONR). Contrasting with Ghana, Nigeria did not spend lavishly on its military—its spending amounted to 4–5 percent of the annual federal and regional budgets between 1959 and 1966, and grew from £4 million to £6 million in the same period. Attempting to make the hitherto northern-dominated army more representative of the country as a whole, a recruiting quota was introduced in 1958 that required 50 percent of new soldiers come from the north and 25 percent from each of the west and east. Although it would take years for a regional balance to be achieved, the Yoruba of the west continued to eschew military service and in 1965, a special campaign was launched to recruit them. Easterners seemed eager to join the military, for example, in 1962 a crowd of 690 volunteers besieged the Enugu barracks to fill 15 vacancies. The quota system was unpopular in the traditional colonial recruiting area in the north and an effort to evenly distribute recruiting across the north was unpopular in the Middle Belt, which had previously supplied most recruits. The 1961 introduction of regional recruiting quotas for officers caused complaints from the east, where there were many qualified candidates. Orders were issued for units down to platoon level to mix ethnic groups, though at times this was difficult because most easterners, given their literacy, had been posted to technical services. Military service became more attractive as from 1958 to 1960 pay was raised and from 1960 to 1963 soldiers received large bonuses for service in Congo. While all Nigerian officer candidates were trained in Britain during the first two years of independence, after 1962, many were sent to Canada, Australia, India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and the

United States. The Nigerian Defence Academy, offering a full three-year training program, was opened in 1964 at Kaduna with Indian instructors. More changes happened when Nigeria became a republic in 1963. The old RWAFF ceremonial uniform of a red fez, zouave jacket, red cummerbund, and khaki shorts—which a Nigerian politician described as suitable for performing monkeys—was replaced by a modern green uniform with long-sleeved jacket, long trousers, and peaked hat. On unit and rank insignia, British crowns were replaced by republican eagles, and the old RWAFF palm tree was swapped for an eagle and star. The titles “Royal” and “Queen’s Own” were dropped. By the end of 1963, all battalion commanders were Nigerian; during 1964, all staff positions at headquarters were assigned to Nigerians; and the last seconded British officer left in August 1965. In February 1965, command of the Nigerian armed forces was transferred from British major general Sir Christopher Welby-Everard to Nigerian major general Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi. In 1964 the only volunteer reserve unit—an engineer squadron—was disbanded because it consisted mostly of white employees of the Jos tin mines and had first admitted blacks at independence.

In 1956, at the insistence of nationalists who wanted a future independent Nigeria to have a substantive navy, the British transformed the 250 men and 11 assorted vessels of the colonial Marine Department into the Nigerian Naval Force (NNF), which was later renamed Naval Defence Force (NDF) of Nigeria. The British officially transformed the NDF into the Royal Nigerian Navy in 1958, the designation “royal” was removed in 1963, and the following year the Nigerian Navy (NN) was formally established through an act of parliament with bases in Lagos and Calabar. Purchased in September 1965, the Dutch-built frigate *NNS Nigeria* (later renamed *NNS Obuma*) became the NN’s first capital ship. The creation of the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) was prompted by Nigeria’s lack of air transport to send peacekeepers to Congo and Tanganyika in the early 1960s. In 1962, the first 10 Nigerians were sent for pilot training with the Ethiopian Air Force, and the following year, 16 went to Canada, 6 to India, and 84 to West Germany. The NAF was officially founded in April 1964 with a West German training team, and its first commander was West German colonel Gerhard Kahtz, who had been a German fighter pilot during World War II. With an operational base at Kaduna and administrative headquarters in Lagos, the NAF acquired French helicopters and various fixed wing training and light transport planes. Immediately,

Nigerian officers began to understudy German officers to prepare the NAF for Nigerianization. In 1965, local pilot training was launched at Kaduna and by the next year, some 500 more personnel had been trained in Germany. With Nigeria's first military coup of January 1966, the German team suddenly withdrew, and command of the NAF passed to Sandhurst-trained Lieutenant Colonel George Kurubo, who came from the army and had no air force background. With the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War in 1967 (discussed later in this chapter) the three-year-old NAF acquired Soviet-made ground attack jets such as the MiG-15 and MiG-17, and medium transport aircraft. After Kurubo became ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1967, Colonel Shittu A. Alao, who had been trained in Germany, became the first pilot and professional air force officer to command the NAF, which he did through the height of the civil war during which the force experienced dramatic growth.³

Unlike most former French colonies in West Africa that established their own militaries with assistance from Paris from 1960, Guinea's rejection of the French Union in 1958 prompted its immediate independence and a rapid withdrawal of French military installations, resources, and personnel. Around 10,000 of the 22,000 Guineans serving in the French army in 1958 opted to remain with France, while the rest were demobilized and repatriated. Ahmed Sekou Toure, Guinea's independence movement leader and now president, was hesitant to absorb all the returning former soldiers into the embryonic Guinean military, as he suspected they remained loyal to France and would attempt to replace his regime with one friendly to Paris. A 2,000-strong People's Army of Guinea was created by combining some carefully screened returning soldiers with members of the local *gendarmerie*. The remainder of the demobilized former French soldiers were advised to join the ruling Guinea Democratic Party (PDG) and participate in national development programs. In 1959, the Toure administration, to maintain the loyalty of former soldiers, established the National Veterans' Association (which involved veterans in local affairs, development projects, and party activities), and within four years, most had returned to their villages.

Throughout the 1960s, the PDG politicized the Guinean military, which was increasingly seen as an organization of "militants in uniform" who assisted with civic projects such as construction of roads, bridges, and buildings; cultivation of crops on state farms; and manufacturing of boots and uniforms. In 1967, a directorate of economic

action was added to the army's command structure. Each of the army's four infantry battalions was assigned to one of the country's four military zones, with company and platoons dispatched to administrative regions. The only concentration of army units was in the capital, which was garrisoned by an armored battalion with 1940s vintage Soviet-made tanks and armored personnel carriers as well as an engineer battalion. The army also possessed World War II-era Soviet artillery. During the 1960s, an air force was created with 10 Soviet MiG-17 jet fighters, along with a few trainers, light transports, and helicopters. A small navy was established in 1967 to patrol the coast and rivers, and it was equipped with Soviet- and Chinese-made torpedo boats, patrol boats, and light landing craft. In 1960, the National Military Academy was founded in Conakry to train selected NCOs to become officers with primary emphasis on the context of the Guinean revolution. By 1975, Guinea had an army of 5,000 personnel; an air force of 300; and a small navy of 200.

In 1961, the PDG established the Popular Militia to defend the revolution by cracking down on black-market activities and smuggling. During the mid-1960s, the militia—composed of young men and women—was issued distinctive uniforms and assigned specific tasks under supervision from the Guinean army and Cuban advisors. With the discovery of a coup plot within the army in 1969 and subsequent purge of senior officers, the government announced that the militia would take on an armed military role, which was justified as a cost-effective way for impoverished Guinea to counter the alleged constant threat of invasion. While the militia in Conakry became a large full-time force, reserve units were formed in villages, factories, and schools with the goal to create a 100-strong paramilitary unit for each of the country's 4,000 villages. Arms were distributed to the reserve militia, and training teams of regular militia would rotate around the villages, spending three months in each.

Given Guinea's break from France, most of its military equipment was supplied by the Soviet Union, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and the People's Republic of China. A large number of Guinean personnel were sent to these countries for training, such as in 1972 when 65 air force personnel went to the Soviet Union to train as pilots, navigators, and technicians, and 331 from all the services went to China. The Soviets and Chinese also used Guinea as a conduit to supply weapons to a friendly regime in Mali and insurgents fighting the Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau. Between 1963 and 1967, when Soviet influence

temporarily declined, the United States and West Germany provided military equipment and the latter trained three companies of Guinean military engineers. Aside from this brief period, a large number of Eastern bloc advisors were based in Guinea, with the Soviets helping to establish the air force, Cubans working with the militia, and Chinese training the navy. In the early 1960s, the Soviets lengthened the runway at the Conakry-Gbessia airport to allow for modern jet aircraft. In return, Guinea permitted the Soviets to use a part of the airfield to service its reconnaissance aircraft patrolling the south and mid-Atlantic. However, Guinea refused to allow the Soviets to use the airport for flights to Cuba during the October 1962 missile crisis. In 1973, the Cubans built a second jet-usable airfield at Labe. The Soviets considered Guinea of strategic importance because of its location on the Atlantic Ocean's narrowest point between North America and Africa. After a Portuguese amphibious raid on Conakry in 1970, relations with the Soviets improved, and they sent Guinea more up-to-date military equipment and stationed a naval force off its coast. Following Toure's death in 1984, Lieutenant Colonel Lansana Conte, deputy head of the army and veteran of the French army in Algeria in the 1950s, staged a coup that seized power from a transitional PDG government and overcame a counter coup the following year. Under Conte, the Guinean regular military was expanded to 14,000 personnel, of which 9,700 served in the army, which—in addition to the existing formations—created elite units such as a parachute battalion, a commando battalion, and presidential guards. Alliances with the Soviet Union and China were dropped, and military relationships involving training and joint exercises established with the United States, France, and European Union.⁴

In 1975, ECOWAS was formed to facilitate economic cooperation and development among its 16 member states. ECOWAS became divided between Anglophone countries, led by Nigeria as the region's largest economic and military power, and Francophone countries that remained close to France. Recognizing that security was linked to economic integration, ECOWAS members established a protocol on non-aggression in 1978 and a protocol on mutual assistance on defence in 1981, which prompted the creation of the Defence Committee and Council, and raised the possibility of establishing an allied armed force. While these initial security agreements were created in a Cold War context that imagined an external threat or conflicts between member states, the post-Cold War situation raised new regional challenges involving the collapse of authoritarian regimes and a spate of

civil wars. In 1990, the regional organization created a nonstanding multinational military force called ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to intervene in the Liberian civil war (which will be discussed later in this chapter). This was the first time a regional international body intervened in a conflict without UN authorization and represented the first attempt by a regional African organization to end a conflict using local resources, personnel, and funds. However, it raised questions about whether ECOWAS had the right to get involved and if unelected military regimes such as in Nigeria at the time could legitimately promote peace and democracy. With the majority of personnel and resources, and usually its commander coming from Nigeria, ECOMOG was opposed by the governments of Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), who were supporting Liberian rebel leader Charles Taylor. A 1992 attempt to encourage more Francophone participation with the addition of 1,200 Senegalese troops to the Liberian mission, financed by the United States as a reward for Senegal breaking with all other sub-Saharan African countries to join the 1991 Gulf War, backfired when the killing of six of them by Taylor supporters prompted Dakar to withdraw its contingent the following year. Similarly, the 1994 arrival of Organization of African Unity (OAU) contingents from Tanzania and Uganda seemed a promising way of watering down Nigerian dominance in ECOMOG, but they were quickly withdrawn because of lack of resources and support. West Africa experienced Africa's largest number of post-Cold War civil conflicts but at the same time was, as a region, the most proactive in launching armed interventions to try to restore peace. After the first Liberian civil war, ECOMOG intervened in Sierra Leone in 1997, Guinea-Bissau in 1999, Liberia again in 2003, and Cote d'Ivoire in 2004. Arguably, within West Africa, ECOWAS filled a gap created by UN Security Council unwillingness to act dynamically in Africa and the OAU's lack of resources. Although ECOMOG missions were (and still are) called "peacekeeping," they usually involved robust military action to separate hostile factions or support an established government. In addition, ECOMOG troops have been criticized for brutality and widespread theft.⁵

THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967–1970

In the colonial period, the British ruled the large and populous territory of Nigeria as three separate regions. Although Nigeria has a vast number of ethnicities, each region was associated with a major

ethnic group—the Igbo in the east, the Yoruba in the west, and the Hausa-Fulani in the north. The east and west regions, located close to the southern coast, became relatively more prosperous, became predominantly Christian, and had a significant Western-educated elite. On the other hand, the impoverished north was predominantly Muslim and controlled by conservative local rulers who governed on behalf of the British.

During the 1950s, the decolonization process in Nigeria was characterized by negotiation between outgoing British and emerging political leaders from each of the three regions over what form the independent state would take. In 1960, Nigeria became independent as a federation of three regions and because northerners represented a majority, they dominated the federal government. The development of an oil industry in the Niger Delta in the east at this time encouraged northern leaders to drop ideas of separating from Nigeria and created resentment among easterners that their wealth was being stolen. In January 1966, a group of mostly Igbo army officers led by Major Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu staged a coup that ousted the civilian politicians from the north who were accused of electoral fraud and eventually brought General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, another Igbo, to power. Yoruba and Hausa leaders were killed, including Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a northerner, and the Sardauna of Sokoto, a northern traditional leader. It also appeared that Igbo officers were being promoted within the army that had been predominantly northern since colonial times. This promoted a counter coup by northern army officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Murtala Mohammed that installed Lieutenant Colonel Yakuba Gowon, a northern Christian, as military ruler. Many southern army officers, including Ironsi, were killed, and the September massacre of over 10,000 Igbo living in the north resulted in 1.5 million refugees flooding into the eastern region. With the federal government's failure to stop the killings, the eastern regional administration under military governor Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu refused to recognize Gowon as head of state. At the January 1967 Aburi Conference in Ghana, both sides agreed to a nonviolent resolution to the crisis. Regions would gain "con-federal" status without a boundary change, all members of a supreme military council would have veto power, all regions would have to agree on major decisions, salaries would be paid to displaced people, and the federal head of state would be recognized as commander of the armed forces.

Nevertheless, by mid-March, both Gowon and Ojukwu had reneged on aspects of the agreement.

On May 30, 1967, Ojukwu, authorized by the Eastern Region Consultative Assembly and Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders, declared the secession of the eastern region as the independent Republic of Biafra (named after the geographic Bight of Biafra) with its capital at Enugu. Around the same time, Gowon declared emergency powers (including press censorship and a ban on political activity) and reorganized the large regions into 12 smaller states. When Biafra declared independence, the federal government began mass military mobilization and acquisition of weapons. On July 6, 1967, the federal forces launched an offensive to suppress the Biafran secession. In what was initially called a police action, federal units in the north formed the First Infantry Division and advanced south into Biafra in two columns. The left column (on the east side) captured Garkem-Ogoja on July 12, and the right column (on the west side) took Nsukka on July 14. Biafran forces had put up stiff resistance at Nsukka but were plagued by lack of ammunition. During July and August, Biafra responded by invading the mid-western region west of the Niger River with the aim of threatening the federal capital of Lagos to distract federal forces in the north. Three Biafran battalions advanced through Benin City and eventually halted at Ore, 160 kilometers east of Lagos, on August 21 with just one federal battalion of recruits standing in their way.

The Biafrans had believed that the mixed Yoruba and Igbo population of the mid-west would support them, but this backfired because the invasion and subsequent looting discredited Biafra's claim to be acting in self-defense. Brigadier Victor Banjo, commander of the invasion force whose Yoruba ethnicity was hoped would appeal to mid-westerners, was discovered to be conspiring against Ojukwu and executed. Under orders from Gowon, Brigadier Murtala Mohammed assembled and took command of the new Second Infantry Division, advanced eastward through the mid-west, and on September 22 drove Biafran forces out of Benin City and ultimately to the east bank of the Niger River. Between October and December, the Second Infantry Division made three unsuccessful attempts to cross the river and capture the Biafran city of Onitsha, suffering heavy casualties and losses of equipment. Mohammed launched these disastrous amphibious assaults against the advice of senior officers and army headquarters, each attack was announced by bugle calls meant to inflict fear on the

enemy, and he reputedly used a soothsayer to determine the timing of the operations. Around the same time, federal soldiers from the Lagos garrison—called the Third Infantry Division and later renamed Third Marine Commando Division—were landed on the coast of the Niger Delta, capturing the cities of Bonn and Okrika on July 26 and Calabar on October 13. Bonny was an important oil industry terminal, and its capture blocked supply ships' access to Biafran-controlled Port Harcourt. Because Biafra had no significant navy, the Nigerian Navy controlled the coastal waters, which left Port Harcourt airport as the secessionists' only link to the outside world. On October 4, the First Infantry Division, advancing down from the north, captured the Biafran capital of Enugu. Biafran forces were now surrounded and restricted to the Igbo heartland, which was packed with refugees.

Because the need for oil trumped Cold War rivalries, the federal government received military support from both Britain and the Soviet Union. Although the United States banned the sale of arms to both sides, pro-Biafran journalists, humanitarian organizations, and missionaries used television and print media to gain sympathy from the U.S. public. No country provided official military assistance to Biafra. French president Charles de Gaulle openly expressed compassion for Biafra, and France sought to take over British oil interests there. As a result, France covertly sent military supplies to Biafra through its former colonies of Cote d'Ivoire and Gabon. The humanitarian services of French doctors in Biafra, including future foreign minister Bernard Kouchner, and their criticism of Nigerian army violence against Biafran civilians led to the establishment of *Medecins sans Frontier* (Doctors without Borders). Desperate for friends on the continent, colonial Portugal and white-ruled Rhodesia also provided clandestine support to Biafra. Apartheid South Africa also backed Biafra and late in the war sent a small special forces team under Commandant Jan Breytenbach to train Biafran partisans to operate behind federal lines. Only four African countries—Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Zambia, and Tanzania—formally recognized Biafra.

From the beginning of 1968, the war became a stalemate, with the gradually shrinking and overcrowded Biafra blockaded by federal forces. The federal army was expanded to 70,000 men equipped with British small arms and armored vehicles, and the air force received Ilyushin 28 bombers and MiG-17 fighters from the Soviet Union. The besieged Biafrans built airstrips on straight roads and tried to import supplies. In early 1968, Mohammed finally abandoned his plan to

cross the Niger River and took Onitsha by having his Second Infantry Division move around via the Enugu-Onitsha road. However, with Biafran forces harassing its supply lines and its demoralized soldiers abusing civilians and looting, the division never recovered as a fighting force, and Mohammed was replaced. A Nigerian offensive from April to June 1968 further reduced Biafran territory. At the end of April, the Third Marine Division under Sandhurst-graduate and Congo Crisis veteran Colonel Benjamin Adekunle, supported by artillery, initiated a large crossing of the Cross River from Calabar to Port Harcourt, which was taken on May 19. Fighting through the area's swamps, the division advanced northeast, taking Aba in August and Owerri in September. To the north, the federal First Division advanced cautiously, capturing Abakaliki and Afikpo. The arrival of French weapons enabled the Biafrans to regroup at the end of 1968, and they stubbornly held Uli airfield, surrounded federal units at Owerri, and threatened Aba.

The federal forces then focused on maintaining the blockade to starve Biafra into submission. Biafran leaders and Western humanitarian organizations accused the Gowon regime of genocide against the Igbo by preventing food deliveries. Nigerian authorities responded that airlifts of food aid were also being used to deliver weapons and ammunition. Desperate Biafran forces began to employ foreign mercenaries such as German Rolf Steiner, who was a veteran of the French Foreign Legion in Indochina and Algeria, and commanded a Biafran Commando Brigade that raided the federal airfield at Enugu in late May 1968. Furthermore, Swedish pilot Carl Gustav von Rosen, who had flown for the Red Cross during the 1935 Italian invasion of Ethiopia and for Finland during the 1939 Russian invasion, used French assistance to form the "Babies of Biafra" squadron of five light propeller-driven aircraft fitted with rockets for ground attack. While the Nigerian government criticized Biafra's use of mercenaries, many of its Soviet-supplied aircraft were flown by Egyptian and other foreign pilots. In April and May 1969, the Nigerian First Division went on the offensive and captured the new Biafran capital of Umuahia. In June, Biafra launched a desperate offensive meant to knock the federals off balance. Owerri was retaken, and Von Rosen's squadron damaged oil and ammunition storage facilities. They also raided federal airfields and destroyed Soviet-made warplanes. Nevertheless, Biafra did not have the resources to exploit success, and Nigerian forces quickly recovered. In December 1969, federal commanders

initiated a final offensive that would end the war. In January 1970, the Third Marine Commando Division, now under Colonel Olusegun Obasango, who has been described as the most capable officer of the war, pushed up from the coast with armored vehicles and penetrated Biafran lines. On January 9, federal troops once again captured Owerri and on January 13 took Amichi, which was the last Biafran-held town. Ojukwu flew to exile in Cote d'Ivoire, leaving General Phillip Effiong, Biafra's army commander, to formally surrender.

Biafra did not have enough resources or international support to challenge the large and well-supplied Nigerian forces. The federal military had expanded from around 8,000 personnel just before the war to 120,000 in 1968 and 250,000 in 1970. Starting the war with 3,000 troops and ending with 30,000, Biafra was easily blockaded because it had very limited air combat, air defense, and naval capabilities.

Although estimates of civilian fatalities vary from 500,000 to 3 million, it is clear that the overwhelming majority were from the eastern region and died from starvation or disease related to the federal blockade. While some claim that this represented federal government-imposed genocide against the Igbo, it is clear that there was no policy of extermination and the many civilian casualties were the tragic result of warfare and siege meant to suppress separatist Biafra. The estimates of total combat casualties range from 90,000 to 120,000. Famously declaring that there was "no victor and no vanquished," Gowon embarked on a campaign of postwar national reconciliation, launched a reconstruction program in the east, and outlawed ethnically based political parties. However, resentments lingered because during the war many Igbo had lost their property in other regions, many did not get back previous government jobs, minimal compensation was offered for useless Biafran currency, and the easterners maintained that they were not receiving their just share of oil revenue which was squandered by subsequent military regimes.⁶

During the 1970s, Nigeria's military government, attempting to buy loyalty, used oil money to maintain a 200,000-strong armed forces, which was far larger than required in peacetime and dramatically increased military spending. Decades after the civil war, violence continued in to plague Nigeria, particularly the southeast. After periodic border skirmishes between Nigerian and Cameroonian forces in the late 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s over the disputed and oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula in the southeast, the international court ordered that Nigeria cede the small territory to Cameroon, which it eventually

did in 2006. Half of all Nigeria's oil wealth is generated from the Niger Delta territory of the Ogoni minority, whose fishing economy has been spoiled by oil pollution and who derive little benefit from the petroleum industry. In the early 1990s the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) presented the military government with demands for greater political representation, a share of oil revenues, and protection for their environment. When this was rejected, MOSOP and its supporters resorted to riots and limited violence that resulted in the death of four conservative chiefs. As a result, in 1994, the regime of General Sani Abacha arrested nine MOSOP leaders, including celebrated author Ken Saro-Wiwa. They were convicted in a farcical and internationally condemned trial and then hung. With Abacha's sudden death and the transition to democratic rule in the late 1990s, separatist movements re-emerged in Nigeria's southeast. In 1999, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MAS-SOB) was established but made little progress because its leader, Ralph Uwazurike, was charged with treason, and federal forces arrested other key members. Around the same time, armed groups using small high-speed boats, the most prominent of which was the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), began raiding oil industry facilities and kidnapping expatriate oil workers in the Delta area around Port Harcourt, with ransom money from the oil companies used to buy more weapons. This resulted in oil companies hiring private security contractors and the Nigerian government, which was dependent upon oil revenue, launched a major offensive in the Delta during 2009 and then offered insurgents amnesty. This riverine counterinsurgency campaign led to the formation of the Nigerian Navy's elite Special Boat Service modeled on the British unit of the same name and also on the U.S. Navy SEALs. From 2009, a radical Islamist group called Boko Haram (Hausa language for "Western education is sinful") emerged in Nigeria's northeast within the context of poverty, unemployment, state corruption, and existing tensions between Muslims and Christians, and sought to impose a "pure" Muslim society. Launching a campaign of bombing and assassination, Boko Haram prompted a brutal security force response, which some say exacerbated the problem and led the federal government to declare a partial state of emergency in the north. In addition, the United States, concerned about possible links between Boko Haram and the international jihadist network Al-Qaeda—including militants across the Sahara—has begun cooperating with Nigerian security

forces. At the start of 2012, Boko Haram split with members in the north-central area of Kano, forming the Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Lands (also known as Ansaru), which appeared to have a more international orientation involving cooperation with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magrib (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA; see Chapter 1) and kidnapping of Western foreigners. In May 2013, with a dramatic increase in Boko Haram shootings and bombings during the previous year, the Nigerian government declared a state of emergency in the northeast states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa near the Cameroon border around Lake Chad and dispatched a military force of over 2,000 soldiers that used artillery and air strikes against militant strongholds.⁷

INSURGENCY IN PORTUGUESE GUINEA, 1961–74

The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) was founded in 1956 to peacefully campaign for the autonomy of these small Portuguese West African territories. The group's leader, Amílcar Cabral, and many of its key members came from the Cape Verde islands. While PAIGC initially used peaceful means, the 1959 Portuguese massacre of 50 striking dockworkers prompted Cabral to flee to the neighboring and recently independent Republic of Guinea under sympathetic pan-Africanist president Toure, where he established a headquarters and declared the beginning of an armed struggle for independence. Developing a broad socialist philosophy that responded to local conditions and united mixed race Cape Verdeans and ethnic Balante from the mainland, PAIGC maintained political control of its military and used well-trained political cadres to mobilize rural people. From 1963 onward, areas that came under PAIGC control were administered by elected councils which did not have to be made up of party members, and attempts by armed insurgents to seize power or property were suppressed. PAIGC's military campaign focused on interior rural areas that were politically prepared and then infiltrated by insurgents who would confine Portuguese forces to towns and attack communication lines. At first, groups of 30 insurgents attacked Portuguese posts and economic facilities, but there was to be no widespread violence against Africans who supported the colonial administration. Although Guinea was not economically valuable to Portugal and had

no significant settler community, Lisbon felt that its loss would undermine control of much larger Angola and Mozambique. During the counterinsurgency campaign, Portuguese attempted to turn the Muslim Pula (Fulani) against the Balante and employed the territory's extensive network of waterways as an alternative transport system to roads where ambush was likely.

Between 1961 and 1963, PAIGC and its short-lived rival Front for the Liberation and Independence of Portuguese Guinea (FLING) staged small raids on military posts and business warehouses. PAIGC began a serious military campaign in January 1963 with the surrounding of the interior towns of Buba, Fulacunda, and Tite, and by the end of the year controlled 15 percent of the territory, including the island of Como. Its military units grew from 30 to 100 men and by 1971, the armed wing had 6,000 members. Based in the Republic of Guinea and Senegal from 1966, PAIGC insurgents were armed and trained by Cuban, Soviet, and Czechoslovakian instructors. PAIGC divided the territory into three regional commands—north, south, and east—each of which was further divided into sectors. Field hospitals in the Republic of Guinea and Senegal treated wounded insurgents, some of whom were evacuated to eastern Europe. PAIGC attacked Portuguese barracks, airfields, and ports, and made extensive use of land mines and ambushes along roads. At times, PAIGC attacks were supported by Republic of Guinea field artillery firing across the border and from 1971 by the insurgent's own 122-mm rocket launchers.

The Portuguese military presence in Guinea increased from a few infantry companies in 1963 to 30,000 men, half of whom were locally recruited, in 1971. After a failed attempt to recapture Como in 1964, Portuguese strategy focused mostly on defending a series of strong points. Between 1964 and 1968, the Portuguese under General Arnaldo Schulz reasserted control of major roads and forced rural people into protected villages to separate them from insurgent influence, which created popular resentment. In 1968, General Antonio de Spínola took command in Guinea and aided by personnel trained by the Americans within the context of their war in Vietnam, initiated a massive development program called Better Guinea that included tarring roads, and building hospitals and schools. The fortified village scheme was continued but made voluntary. Although ordered to eradicate the insurgency, Spínola personally negotiated with PAIGC, trying to convince them to join the reformed Guinea. Simultaneously, Spínola—greatly aided by the arrival of French-made Alouette

helicopters—stepped up operations against the insurgents. When an area was identified as having an insurgent presence, it would be bombed and strafed by aircraft, and then swept by a force of 60–100 soldiers landed by 12–16 helicopters. At times, Spínola would be the first to jump off a helicopter and was known to personally lead bush patrols. While the Portuguese did not engage in “hot pursuit” across the border, they organized a November 1970 amphibious raid called Operation Green Sea by 200 Portuguese commandos and 200 Republic of Guinea exiles on Conakry, where 26 Portuguese prisoners were rescued and 5 PAIGC supply boats destroyed. However, Cabral and Touré could not be found. The raid was condemned by the UN and OAU, and the Soviet Union sent warships to the Guinean coast to prevent further attacks. Within the Republic of Guinea, a paranoid Touré purged his government and security forces, with many executed and imprisoned.

In 1973, Cabral was assassinated in Conakry by rivals within his own organization, and Portuguese involvement was strongly suspected. That same year, PAIGC acquired Soviet SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles that, possibly employed by Cubans, began downing Portuguese aircraft. With Nigerian-supplied Soviet heavy artillery, PAIGC bombarded Portuguese posts from ranges beyond which the obsolete Portuguese guns could retaliate. Portuguese garrisons of 120–1,000 men began to live under siege conditions, Portuguese pilots refused to fly over certain areas, and Portuguese control was reduced to the capital and a few towns. Spínola, who had realized as early as 1968 that a military victory was impossible, attempted to get the Lisbon regime to join a peace process initiated by Senegalese president Leopold Senghor. When this was rejected, Spínola resigned in 1973. In September 1973, PAIGC officially declared the independence of Guinea-Bissau, which was then admitted to the United Nations. The April 1974 coup in Lisbon led to democratization in Portugal and sudden independence for its African colonies, including Guinea-Bissau, where Luís Cabral (the late Amílcar’s brother and a co-founder of PAIGC) became the first president. Fighting continued for a few months until an agreement was reached that gave the Cape Verde islands a separate independence, and Portuguese forces withdrew late in the year. While the death toll in the Guinea-Bissau independence war is not known, Portugal admitted to losing 1,875 metropolitan troops, and it is likely that between 6,000 and 8,000 African colonial soldiers and around 12,000 insurgents were killed. It appears that shortly after the independence of Guinea-Bissau, PAIGC

was responsible for the massacre of many Africans who had served in the Portuguese forces.⁸

CIVIL WARS ALONG THE COAST

In 1980, Master Sergeant Samuel Doe staged a military coup that seized the Liberian state and overthrew the long ruling Americo-Liberian elite who were the descendants of freed slaves from the United States. Subsequently, Doe ruled the country for the benefit of his small indigenous Krahn ethnic group and superficially transformed himself into a civilian president. Supported by some Franco-phone African countries and Libya, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, invaded Liberia from neighboring Cote d'Ivoire in late December 1989 and received support from the Gio and Mano ethnic groups that had been brutally oppressed by the Doe regime. The poorly trained and incompetent Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) were unable to stop the NPFL advance to the outskirts of Monrovia, where a faction calling itself the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) broke away. Concerned about killing and destruction, ECOWAS dispatched a peacekeeping force called ECOMOG of several thousand mostly Nigerian and some Ghanaian troops supported by light artillery and mortars that failed to stabilize the situation. Taylor's NPFL refused to cooperate with ECOMOG because of its Nigerian dominance, and Doe was captured and tortured to death by the INPFL. Although the NPFL was not strong enough to take Monrovia, it established a radio station and parliament, and it supplied iron ore and timber from its area of control to foreign companies in exchange for weapons. In October 1992, the NPFL, based at Firestone's huge rubber plantation and employing artillery captured from the AFL, launched an offensive against Monrovia that was repelled by ECOMOG air-to-ground attacks. Suffering heavy casualties, the strength of ECOMOG was increased to 14,500 men who supported an interim government in Monrovia but declined to advance into NPFL territory for fear Taylor would resort to guerrilla warfare. The 1994 capture of the port of Buchanan by ECOMOG represented a serious blow to Taylor's economic links with the outside world. While the INPFL declined, other groups emerged to challenge Taylor such as the United Liberian Movement for Democracy (ULIMO), which ultimately split into a mostly Krahn-oriented

ULIMO-J headed by Roosevelt Johnson and a mostly Mandingo ULIMO-K under Alhaji Kromah. Several other factions developed such as the Central Revolutionary Council (which had split from the NPFL) and the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) (which had broken from the AFL). ULIMO-K was supported by mining companies in western Liberia, and the LPC was supported by timber exporting to Cote d'Ivoire. During the four years of fighting, ECOWAS sponsored a series of negotiations, all of which failed because of Taylor's stubbornness.

By the middle of 1995, ECOMOG (in particular Nigeria's troubled military regime of General Sani Abacha) and the NPFL were tired of war and agreed to the Abuja Accords, which imposed a cease-fire, created a transitional government with representatives of all factions, and promised general disarmament and ultimately elections. Because ECOMOG was not strong enough to enforce the cease-fire and disarmament, in April 1996, NPFL and ULIMO-K joined forces to attack ULIMO-J, which was supported by AFL and LPC. Some 1,500 people were killed in Monrovia at this time. Initially, ECOMOG soldiers ran away from the violence, but the force was strengthened and under two new Nigerian generals—John Inienger and Victor Malu—it re-established order and renewed disarmament. In July 1997, Taylor won a general election largely because he threatened to resume the war if he lost. During the war, most factions lacked discipline, and combatants dressed in bizarre costumes that included shower caps, carnival masks, Rambo T-shirts and women's wigs. Some faction leaders assumed eccentric personae such as ULIMO-J's Joshua Milton Blahyi, who adopted the nom-de-guerre General Butt Naked because he believed fighting without clothes would protect him from bullets. He led the Butt Naked Brigade. After the war, he became a Christian evangelist and founded his own church in Liberia. At least 40,000 fighters involved in the civil war were under the age of 15 and desensitized with traditional initiation rites corrupted with cannibalism and violent videos. Lacking training as peacekeepers, ECOMOG troops gained a reputation for looting and rape that earned them the nickname "Every Car or Movable Object Gone." The result of the Liberian civil war was the destruction of much of the country's limited infrastructure; the death of around 200,000 people mostly from starvation and disease; the flight of 800,000 refugees to neighboring states; and the internal displacement of some 1.25 million people.⁹

In 1985, Sierra Leone's longtime authoritarian ruler Saika Stevens retired and was replaced by army commander General Joseph

Momoh. By 1990, Sierra Leone's economic problems had been worsened by the arrival of more than 100,000 refugees from Liberia and cross-border attacks by Taylor's NPFL that wanted to force Sierra Leone to withdraw its contingent from ECOMOG and close ECOMOG's base at Freetown. As a result, Sierra Leone deployed 2,000 soldiers for hot pursuit operations into Liberia. However, Taylor then sponsored the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by former army corporal Foday Sankoh and some former student radicals, which launched an insurgency against the Sierra Leonean government in July 1991 and captured several towns in the south and east. With support from Guinean and Nigerian troops; a 1,000-man Liberian army contingent that had fled across the border; and British and U.S. logistical assistance, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) recaptured most of the territory but failed to destroy the RUF. In April 1992, a coup led by Captain Valentine Strasser overthrew General Momoh, and there was a brief clash with Guinean troops who supported the latter. During 1992, the RUF looted resources in the area it controlled, particularly diamonds in the mining town of Koindu, and skirmished with the SLA and Guinean troops along the Liberian border. In early 1993, the SLA took Koindu and later, assisted by ULIMO from Liberia, re-established control over much of the border. With new Israeli-trained units and expanded to 14,000 personnel, the SLA continued its operations against RUF during late 1993 and early 1994, taking a rebel base in the north and recapturing towns in the east. All of this was paid for by stripping captured areas of resources. The acquisition of mercenaries from Burkina Faso and deserters from the SLA gave the RUF a new lease on life in early 1994. Financing its operations by looting, sale of diamonds, and kidnapping, the RUF periodically surrounded the southeastern town of Kenema and in November began harassing the roads leading to the northeastern town of Kabala. In January 1995, the RUF took several important diamond mines and around the same time launched attacks on the towns of Bo, Kambia, and Marampa, the last of which was just 100 kilometers from Freetown. The conflict displaced 750,000 people who fled to Freetown or neighboring countries. As the RUF's extremely violent methods undermined its once popular support, villages formed home guard militias based on Poro secret societies and traditional Mende hunting groups known as Kamajors. People began to refer to armed men as "sobels" who were soldiers by day and rebel bandits by night. At this point, the SLA was supported by two contingents from the Guinean army and a Nigerian unit in Freetown.

After former British army Gurkhas from Nepal hired as mercenaries failed to counter the RUF, the Sierra Leonean government turned to South African-based security company Executive Outcomes (EO) in March 1995. EO supplied 500 military advisors and 3,000 combat troops—mostly white and black veterans of the “Border War” in Angola and Namibia—and several Russian-made Mi-24 helicopter gunships. In turn, the Sierra Leonean government was able to re-establish control over much of the country beginning with Marampa, then several mining installations, and (in July) a number of smaller towns, including Koindu. These last operations also involved ULIMO-K fighters from Liberia. Although the RUF received weapons from Taylor’s NPFL in exchange for diamonds, SLA communications blocking reduced this cooperation and led to the elimination of RUF camps. Frustrated by their inability to completely defeat the RUF, elements of the SLA led by Brigadier Julius Maada-Bio overthrew Strasser in January 1996, secured a cease-fire, and arranged an election that brought Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to power as the head of an eastern-southern coalition. Under financial pressure, the Kabbah government ordered the withdrawal of the EO contingent before a neutral monitoring force could be put in place, which gave the RUF space to recover. Possibly to prevent an RUF coup, SLA major Johnny Paul Koromah and his Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which included some RUF members, seized power in May 1997. When the ECOMOG force in Freetown, consisting mostly of Nigerians with some Ghanaians and Guineans, attempted to crush the AFRC, fighting erupted with the SLA and RUF, and a Nigerian warship bombarded the capital before rebels drove it off. Some 6,000 RUF fighters, including its Small Boy Units and NPFL veterans from Liberia, entered Freetown’s suburbs, where they looted and raped, and fought ECOMOG soldiers from house to house. The only faction to support President Kabbah was the Kamajors militia in the south, which attempted to capture diamond-producing areas. By March 1998, ECOMOG forces had secured Freetown, and the RUF withdrew to the countryside. During Operation No Living Thing, the AFRU and RUF once again attacked Freetown in January 1999, which compelled the Kabbah administration to make serious concessions to end the war.

In the subsequent Lome Peace Accord of July 1999, RUF leader Sankoh became vice president of Sierra Leone and minister of its mines in exchange for an agreement to demobilize and disarm the RUF under the supervision of a joint ECOMOG-UN peacekeeping

force. In December, the UN Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) began arriving in the country to oversee the implementation of the Lome Accord. Initially planned as a multinational force of 6,000 troops, UNAMSIL was expanded to 11,000 in February 2000 and 17,500 in March 2001, making it the largest UN peacekeeping mission at the time. Despite these numbers, UNAMSIL personnel in the diamond-producing areas were often disarmed and taken hostage by the RUF, which again threatened Freetown. In early May 2000, Britain launched Operation Palliser, which saw a task force consisting of the First Battalion Parachute Regiment and elements of the Special Air Service (SAS), Special Boat Service, and Royal Engineers flown to Freetown, where it secured the airport with a view to evacuating all British, Commonwealth, and European Union citizens, and allowing aid to reach the country. However, task force commander Brigadier David Richards saw an opportunity to defeat the RUF and stabilize the country. In mid-May, an RUF attack on the village of Lungi Lol near the airport was repulsed by the Parachute Regiment's Pathfinder Platoon, leaving 30 rebels dead and no British casualties. That same day, Sankoh (whose guards had shot protestors in Freetown) was arrested and kept in British custody, where he died of a stroke in 2003 while awaiting trial for war crimes by a UN-backed court. In June, the Parachute Regiment battalion was replaced by the Royal Marines of 42 Commando, who bolstered patrols by local police and UNAMSIL. On September 10, a British force consisting of 50 SAS operators and 130 paratroopers staged a helicopter assault called Operation Barras, which rescued six British soldiers and a Sierra Leonean officer who had been captured by a rebel gang called the West Side Boys. British advisors took control of SLA operations, and in November 2000, a British amphibious exercise was held on the coast of Sierra Leone to demonstrate continued commitment to the country. By May 2001, over 16,000 rebels had been disarmed, and the RUF had entered into the political process. By March 2002, more than 50,000 had been disarmed, and the RUF ceased to exist as a fighting force. The successful British intervention in Sierra Leone encouraged the Tony Blair administration to launch a new policy of robust military action that would arguably lead to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.¹⁰

As president of Liberia, Taylor did not cooperate with ECOMOG in demobilizing around 35,000 former fighters who were integrated into the AFL without appropriate training and began to prey on the civilian population. The security situation in Monrovia declined as critics

of Taylor were murdered, the AFL attacked a ULIMO-J camp in September 1998, ethnic Krahn political leaders were arrested or fled the country, and food prices rose (causing popular discontent). A disagreement developed over rebuilding the Liberian army because the head of ECOMOG, Major General Malu, insisted that the Abuja Accords had given him the responsibility while Taylor contended that it was his constitutional right as president to create an armed force. At this time, ULIMO fighters were still active along the Liberia-Guinea border. In early 1999, the governments of the United States, Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone began to accuse Taylor of engaging in diamonds-for-arms deals with the RUF in neighboring Sierra Leone. This led to UN sanctions against the Taylor regime, including a ban on diamond exports and an arms embargo. Taylor dismissed around 2,500 Krahn from the AFL and created the paramilitary Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) that was technically part of the police but served as his personal armed force under the command of his son, Chuckie Taylor. Trained by South African private security contractors, the ATU consisted of former NPFL and RUF members, as well as mercenaries from Burkina Faso and Gambia.

In April 1999, armed groups based in Guinea (likely the remnants of ULIMO-K) began raids into northern Liberia. The government of Guinea declared that its troops were not involved in the fighting and accused Taylor's Liberian soldiers of crossing the border. In October 1999, ECOMOG began its withdrawal from Liberia; destroyed 20,000 assault rifles and 3 million rounds of ammunition; and dismantled security checkpoints around Monrovia. In July 2000, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), a rebel group made up primarily of Mandingo who had been oppressed by Taylor's regime because of their association with ULIMO-K, took credit for the attacks from Guinea. Probably in retaliation for Taylor's support for insurgents in Guinea, the Conakry administration of Lansana Conte supplied LURD with weapons and ammunition in exchange for coffee, cocoa, and diamonds. In addition, several LURD leaders lived in Conakry and were associated with the Guinean government. By May 2001, LURD had taken control of Lofa County and were pressing south toward Monrovia, with Taylor claiming that UN sanctions prevented his forces from effectively countering the rebellion. Taylor's foreign allies deserted him as Libya's Gaddafi, in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, was seeking to improve his relations with the West, and Burkina Faso's Blaise Compaore did

not want to be associated with the increasingly disreputable Liberian conflict. When LURD seized the city of Gbarnga, which had served as Taylor's headquarters during his rebellion against the Doe regime, in May 2002, its forces were only 25 kilometers from Monrovia. By September, after ECOWAS denied Taylor's request for military intervention, Liberian state forces gained some ground against LURD when they recaptured Tubmanburg and some other towns. This was explained in terms of possible arms purchases from Nigeria and Taylor's employment of former RUF mercenaries from Sierra Leone who had been trained in Burkina Faso. Among LURD forces was 22-year-old Colonel Black Diamond, who led a unit of armed women who had been raped by Taylor's troops. In April 2003, as Taylor's forces and LURD battled for control of the area around Monrovia, rebels from a new group called the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), made up of former Doe loyalists, crossed the border from their Cote d'Ivoire sanctuary and attacked the southwestern town of Zwedru, which caused more people to flee toward the capital. Rebel groups now controlled 60 percent of Liberia, and the United Nations became concerned that its humanitarian operations could not access most of the country. In June, Taylor was indicted by the UN-backed Special Court on Sierra Leone for his alleged support of the RUF during that country's civil war.

As LURD forces entered the outskirts of Monrovia in June 2003, negotiations between the Taylor government and both rebel groups began in Accra. An activist group called Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace had pressured Taylor to attend the talks, and some of its members refused to leave the Ghanaian presidential palace until a settlement was reached. In late July, as LURD engaged in intense combat in the heart of Monrovia that would leave 1,000 dead and MODEL captured the port of Buchanan, Taylor announced that he would leave the country, and a U.S. naval amphibious force that included 2,300 marines sailed from the Mediterranean to the Liberian coast. With the arrival of the first contingent of Nigerian ECOWAS Mission to Liberia (ECOMIL) peacekeepers in early August, fighting in the capital subsided as LURD forces withdrew and a small team of U.S. marines landed to make arrangements for the arrival of humanitarian relief. On August 11, 2003, Taylor resigned as president and departed for exile in Nigeria, leaving his vice president Moses Blah as transitional leader. Although representatives in Accra agreed to form a national transitional government under businessman Charles

Gyude Bryant, fighting between the factions continued, and 200 U.S. marines who had been landed to facilitate the flow of aid were withdrawn after just 11 days. With some 3,500 West African peacekeepers in Liberia by mid-September, ECOMIL lacked the capacity to advance into rebel areas and focused on controlling Monrovia. At the start of October, the first of an ultimately 15,000-strong UN peacekeeping force known as UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which would absorb ECOMIL personnel, arrived in the country with a mandate to assist the transitional government establish its authority. Although the rebel leaders announced the end of hostilities, low-intensity violence continued for some time. In 2006, at the request of newly elected Liberian president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Nigeria returned Taylor to Liberia, from where he was sent to Sierra Leone and ultimately The Hague in the Netherlands where, in 2012, he was convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity for his involvement with the RUF.¹¹

After the 1995 death of Felix Houphouët-Boigny, who had ruled Cote d'Ivoire for 33 years, civil war broke out in the once stable former French colony. By this time, about a quarter of all Ivoirians, mostly based in the northern half of the country, were first- or second-generation immigrants from poorer countries to the north, such as Burkina Faso and Mali, who had come south to work on cocoa plantations. Like other West African countries, Cote d'Ivoire was divided between a predominantly Muslim and relatively marginalized north and a mostly Christian and better off south that was home to the economic capital of Abidjan. The transition to democracy led to controversy over who qualified to vote, with popular northern leader Alassane Quattara barred from running for president because of his foreign parentage. Xenophobic violence flared. In September 2002, predominantly northern military personnel mutinied, seized control of the northern half of the country, and launched attacks in Abidjan, where former military ruler Robert Guei was killed. Known as the Patriotic Movement of Cote d'Ivoire (MPCI), the northern rebels retained control of that region and established a capital at Bouake. That same month, the French launched Operation Unicorn in which a 4,000-strong expeditionary force, with UN approval, moved to separate the northern-based rebels from supporters of President Laurent Gbagbo who held the south. In November, two new rebel groups—Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West (MPIGO) and Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP)—took control of the western part of the country. All the rebel groups formed an alliance known as the

New Forces. In late January 2003, representatives of all the factions met at Linas-Marcoussis in France and agreed that a unity government would be formed with Gbagbo remaining as president and the rebels taking over the ministries of defense and interior, that French troops would control a "peace line" between the north and south, and that the factions would work together to resolve conflicts over citizenship and land rights. In February 2004, the United Nations established a multinational peacekeeping force called UN Operations in Cote d'Ivoire (ONUCI) to oversee the January 2003 agreement. Absorbing ECOWAS troops already on the ground, ONUCI would reach a total of around 6,000 by the end of the year and receive support from the 4,000 French of Operation Unicorn.

By May 2004, delays in implementing the peace agreement and outbreaks of violence had prompted the rebels to withdraw from the unity government. Both sides turned against the French, with Gbagbo loyalists criticizing them for protecting the rebels and not honoring previous defense agreements with the government of Cote d'Ivoire, and the New Forces blaming them for blocking their capture of Abidjan. In early November, Gbagbo ordered an air strike on the rebel center of Bouake, which also hit a French position, killing 9 soldiers and wounding 31. Although Gbagbo claimed this had been an accident, French president Jacques Chirac ordered the seizure of the Yamoussoukro airport and the destruction of the Gbagbo air force, which amounted to two Russian-made Su-25 ground attack aircraft and three helicopter gunships, and two other helicopters shot down over Abidjan. The next day, anti-French riots broke out in Abidjan, with machete-wielding mobs attacking a French school and residential area, and erecting roadblocks. Supported by armored vehicles, helicopters, and swift boats positioned at the city's bridges, French troops under General Henri Poncet took control and killed between 20 and 60 people in the process. The next year, Poncet was suspended from command over accusations that he had been involved in the murder of a local bandit leader called Firmin Mahe. Charges were dropped in 2010.

The division of Cote d'Ivoire into north and south zones continued until October–November 2010 when long-delayed elections took place five years after Gbagbo's term had expired. Although it was widely and internationally recognized that Quattara won the poll, Gbagbo declared himself the victor and refused to leave office, which prompted renewed violence in Abidjan. In March 2011, the New

Forces renamed themselves the Republican Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (RFCI) and launched a major offensive that captured towns and entered Abidjan at the end of the month. At the beginning of April, UN and French helicopters began attacking pro-Gbagbo artillery and armored vehicles, explaining that this was meant to protect civilian lives. Given the impact of sanctions and lack of pay, most of Gbagbo's 50,000-strong military deserted, leaving him just 2,000 presidential guards and student supporters to defend the besieged presidential palace. It appears that during the fighting, both sides employed mercenaries recruited from Liberia. On April 11, RFCI fighters supported by French helicopters, armored vehicles, and special forces stormed Gbagbo's residence and arrested the recalcitrant president, who was handed over to the United Nations. In November 2011, Gbagbo was flown to The Hague, where he faced International Criminal Court charges of crimes against humanity for murder and rape committed by his forces between December 2010 and April 2011. Some see this as victor's justice because both Quattara and Gbagbo supporters have been accused of committing massacres during Cote d'Ivoire's second civil war.¹²

Once under Portuguese colonial rule, the Casamance region was taken over by France in the late nineteenth century and became part of independent Senegal in 1960, forming a strip of territory between Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. Casamance's Diola people began to feel marginalized by Senegal's Wolof majority. Formed in 1982 under the leadership of Roman Catholic priest and former political prisoner Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) staged protests to demand independence for the region. In December 1982, separatist protestors took to the streets in the regional capital of Ziguinchor, replacing Senegalese flags with white ones and distributing pamphlets. The government of Leopold Sedar Senghor responded by imposing a curfew on the city and arresting hundreds of people. In turn, the MFDC acquired weapons and formed an armed wing called Atika ("Warrior" in Diola language) that began attacks on state military infrastructure in Casamance in 1990. The insurgents received covert support from elements of the military in Guinea-Bissau, as soldiers from that country were often not paid, and people from Casamance had helped in the struggle against the Portuguese in the 1960s and early 1970s. They also received support from Gambia, where President Yahya Jammeh shared the same ethnicity as the Casamance rebels. Some insurgent

leaders had experience as French colonial soldiers in Indochina and Algeria. Violence continued throughout the 1990s as the Senegalese army in Casamance destroyed crops, summarily executed suspected rebels, evicted entire villages, and pursued insurgents into Guinea-Bissau (which in May 1990 resulted in a clash between troops of both countries). A 1993 cease-fire between state and separatist forces led to a split in the MFDC, with a radical faction escalating the war in the late 1990s by acquiring better weapons from Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, and planting land mines. While Casamance's formal agricultural and tourism economy suffered because of the violence, state and rebel forces exported the region's timber to support their efforts, and the rebels exchanged cannabis for weapons in other countries. The Senegalese army suffered serious defeats in July 1995 when a rebel attack on the village of Babonda killed 23 soldiers and in August 1997 when another 23 were killed in an ambush. Despite many attempts at negotiation during the early 2000s and Father Diamacoune's renunciation of separatism, fighting intensified in late 2010 and early 2011 when about 100 rebels attempted to capture the town of Bignona. Because the previously lightly equipped rebels were now employing some artillery, and a secret arms shipment meant for them was discovered on an Iranian ship in Lagos, Nigeria, the Senegalese government accused Tehran of supporting the MFDC, presumably to undermine a predominantly Muslim yet pro-Western state. With the continuation of violence into 2013, the Casamance rebellion is West Africa's longest running conflict. By around 2008, some 3,500–5,000 people had died as a result of the fighting; at least 748 have been killed or wounded by land mines; and tens of thousands have fled to the regional capital and across state borders.¹³

In January 1998, troops from Guinea-Bissau discovered a major arms cache when they deployed along the border to prevent Casamance insurgents from entering their country. This led President Joao Bernardo "Nino" Vieira, a veteran of PAIGC's war against the Portuguese who had overthrown Luis Cabral in 1980, to dismiss the head of the armed forces, Brigadier Ansumane Mane. In June, following Vieira's re-election, Mane orchestrated a mutiny by troops who seized strategic locations in the capital, including the airport, and demanded new polls. Several days of heavy fighting followed as Vieira loyalists, supported by 1,300 troops from Senegal and 400 from Guinea, failed to regain control. Some 200,000 people fled the capital, and foreigners were evacuated by ship to Senegal. After negotiations organized by

the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) and ECOWAS in September collapsed, violence continued, and most of Vieira's loyalists deserted to the rebels. In January 1999, at another set of talks hosted by ECOWAS in the Nigerian capital of Abuja, both sides agreed to a cease-fire, a general disarmament, the formation of a national unity government, and the replacement of Senegalese and Guinean troops with a 750-strong ECOMOG force. Despite a brief resumption of fighting in February, the terms were carried out by March. However, the next month, the National People's Assembly released a report that exonerated Mane of supplying weapons to the Casamance rebels and implicated Vieira's presidential guard in this activity. In May, before a planned election could be held in December, a military coup toppled Vieira, who fled to the Portuguese embassy and eventually sought refuge in Portugal to avoid prosecution for supplying arms to the Casamance separatists. In a January 2000 election, the hitherto opposition Social Renewal Party overturned 26 years of PAIGC rule and formed a government under Kumba Iala. Dismissed as head of the military, Mane fled to the west of the country and was killed by state forces in November 2000. After Iala was overthrown by yet another military coup in 2003, Vieira returned to the country and was re-elected for a third presidential term in 2005. Within the context of Guinea-Bissau becoming a major transit point for cocaine smuggling between Latin America and Europe, conflict developed between Vieira's private militia and the military under his rival General Tagme Na Waie. At the beginning of March 2009, renegade soldiers, believing the president had arranged the recent bombing that killed Na Waie, shot Vieira to death outside his house. After several attempted coups, the Guinea-Bissau military once again toppled an elected civilian government in April 2012.¹⁴

CONFLICT IN THE SAHARA-SAHEL

Upon independence from France in 1960, Mali had a small army consisting of around 1,200 personnel organized into two Saharan motorized infantry companies, two reconnaissance companies, and an engineer company plus a tiny air force with several training and transport aircraft. During the 1960s, Mali's socialist president Modibo Keita received Soviet military assistance that enabled him to double the size of the army and expand the air force to include six Soviet-made jet

fighters and several transports and helicopters. In 1962, Tuaregs, a historically nomadic Saharan community split between several newly independent countries, began hit-and-run attacks on Mali government targets. While the aim of this First Tuareg Rebellion was the creation of a new state called Azawad in northern Mali, northern Niger, and southern Algeria, the roughly 1,500 rebels were not unified, had no coherent strategy, relied on camels for transport, and employed obsolete small arms. With their new Soviet weapons, the Malian military crushed the insurgency by 1964, but the brutality of the campaign alienated many Tuaregs who had stayed out of the fighting, and many fled to neighboring countries. Given economic problems, Keita was overthrown by a military coup led by young Lieutenant Moussa Traore, which turned Mali toward the West.

After independence, both Mali and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) claimed the natural gas- and mineral-rich Agacher Strip. Border skirmishes in 1974 and 1975 resulted in OAU mediation that was accepted by both sides. In 1983, Marxist-inspired Captain Thomas Sankara, a veteran of the earlier frontier clashes who saw himself as an African Che Guevara, seized power in Upper Volta and renamed the country Burkina Faso (Land of Upright Men) to symbolize a promised national rebirth that included a rejection of French neocolonial influence and a revisit of the Agacher Strip issue, which rekindled tensions with Mali. Accusing census officials from Burkina Faso of violating its territory, the military government in Mali launched attacks on Burkinabe border posts and police stations on Christmas Day 1985. Although the Burkina Faso forces counterattacked, the Malian military was better prepared, capturing several villages and conducting an air strike on the Burkinabe town of Ouahigouya. With mediation from Nigeria and Libya, a cease-fire was declared on December 30 ending what has become known as the Christmas War in which somewhere between 60 and 300 people were killed. In 1986, both countries accepted a decision from the International Court of Justice that split the strip between them.

In Mali and Niger, Tuareg communities had been devastated by the severe droughts of the early 1970s and mid-1980s, and many went north to Libya to work in the oil industry. Some acquired military experience as members of Gaddafi's regular forces or "Islamic Legion" that fought in Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and parts of Africa. A downturn in Libya's oil sector in the mid-1980s as well as the disbanding of the Islamic Legion and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan

in the late 1980s led to the return of many radicalized Tuareg men to their home countries. As a result, in 1990, a number of different Tuareg groups with perhaps several thousand fighters launched a second rebellion in which they used light vehicles and Soviet-made small arms, likely supplied by Libya, to attack state facilities and flee to cross-border sanctuaries. In May 1990, a Tuareg raid on a Nigerien police station in Tchin-Tabaradene resulted in an army massacre of several hundred Tuaregs, which inspired the creation of two armed insurgent groups—the Front for the Liberation of Air and Azaouak and the Front for the Liberation of Tamoust. Although rebel attacks were limited, foreigners were evacuated from the tourist center of Agadez, the uranium mining area in the Air Mountains, and the trading town of In-Gall. The rebellion began in Mali in 1990 with Tuareg attacks on state infrastructure around Gao and army reprisals, which led to a full-scale rebellion by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA) and the smaller Arab Islamic Front of Azawad (FIAA). Malian state forces initially embarked on a brutal counterinsurgency campaign that did not go well because unlike the rebels, they had no major external sponsor. This prompted the Traore government to negotiate with the rebels and conclude, with Algerian mediation, the Tamanrasset Accords, which included cease-fire and prisoner exchange, withdrawal of insurgents to specific areas, reduction in state forces in the north, disengagement of the army from civil administration in the north, integration of rebels into state forces, creation of a semiautonomous area around Kidal, and guarantee of proportional funding for the north. After a March 1991 military coup that led to a change of government in Mali, several Tuareg factions that had rejected the Tamanrasset Accords stopped fighting under the National Pact peace treaty. The military integration process experienced early problems, as in 1994 Tuaregs in one unit mutinied and killed a dozen of their colleagues, and many Tuaregs did not have the formal education needed to progress within a regular military. Around 1994, non-Tuareg communities in the north that had been armed by the state during the second rebellion still feared Tuareg banditry and organized themselves as the Malian Patriotic Movement, also known as Ganda Koi, which attacked Tuaregs. Though the state suppressed Ganda Koi within a year, northern communities continued to struggle over scarce resources. The April 1995 Ouagadougou Accords ended the fighting in Niger as the state promised to absorb some Tuareg insurgents into the military and help return others to productive civilian life.¹⁵

Long delays in implementing aspects of peace agreements in Mali and Niger led to another series of Tuareg uprisings from 2006 to 2009. Frustrated Malian Tuaregs who had fought in the 1990s formed the Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC) in 2006 and attacked towns in northern Mali. Assisted by Algeria, this group entered into a new agreement with the Malian government in June, which promised to continue the integration of Tuaregs into the military, that Tuareg soldiers would patrol their own areas, and that more development projects would be undertaken in the north. In Niger, various small groups and deserters from the army joined together to form the Nigeriens' Movement for Justice (MNJ), which demanded a greater share of the area's lucrative uranium mining, as well as better representation in the government and military. In February 2007, MNJ began a series of attacks on the Nigerien military and foreign mining facilities, including the main airport in northern Niger at Agadez and an army post in the Air Mountains where 15 soldiers were killed and 70 captured in June of that year, and the kidnapping of one Chinese and four French nuclear engineers. The government of Niger declared a state of emergency in the Agadez region, which limited press freedom and personal liberties, and restricted access by international humanitarian organizations. In June 2008, a government combined ground and air offensive was launched against MNJ positions in the Air Mountains. In the heavy fighting of November, the MNJ accused the government of ethnic cleansing of Tuareg communities, and each side blamed the other for planting land mines.

Inspired by the rebellion in Niger, splinter groups from Mali's ADC led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga again took up arms against the state in 2007, raided towns and in September ambushed government convoys, and besieged Tinzaouaten, a town on the Algerian border, where they fired on a U.S. C-130 transport aircraft delivering supplies. They withdrew with the arrival of Mali army reinforcements. With elements of the ADC denouncing the splinter groups and the MNJ rejecting an alliance with them, Bahanga's faction was renamed the North Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change (ATNMC). By August 2008, Libya and Algeria—regional rivals—had brokered a peace deal between the Malian government and most former ADC factions except that of Bahanga, who fled to Libya. However, in December, Bahanga returned to northern Mali, and his ATNMC attacked a government post at Nampala, near the Mauritanian border some 500 kilometers north of the capital Bamako, which resulted in the death of 10–20 state soldiers

and an unknown number of rebels. Amadou Toumani Toure, Mali's president and former parachute battalion commander who had led the 1991 coup, denounced Bahanga's group as bandits and drug smugglers. In January and February 2009, the Malian military embarked on an offensive against Bahanga's camps in the northeast that drove his perhaps 165 fighters into Algeria. Around the same time, other ADC factions began to report to assembly areas, where they retained their arms and waited for promised integration into state forces.

Although peace in Niger seemed unlikely at the start of 2009, the situation was changed by the Malian settlement, new mining deals that would make Niger the world's second largest producer of uranium, and international pressure brought about by the kidnapping of two Canadian diplomats and four European tourists. In negotiations sponsored by Libya during May and June 2009, the Nigerien government and the rebels, including the MNJ and two groups that had split from it, agreed to a cease-fire and disarmament.

With the 2011 collapse of Gaddafi's regime in Libya, many Tuareg former members of the Libyan military returned home to northern Mali, bringing heavy weapons with them. In October, these fighters formed the core of the new National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which also attracted Tuareg veterans of the 1990–1995 and 2006–2008 insurgencies, rebels from other groups such as the Fula and Arabs, and defectors from state forces. Between January and March 2012, the MNLA captured all major towns in the north and the Malian military, despite some attempted counterattacks and resupply by American airdrops, was forced to withdraw. The MNLA claimed to have shot down a Mali air force MiG jet fighter with a ground-to-air missile brought from Libya, and more heavy weapons and armored vehicles were captured from the defeated Mali army. At the same time, Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith), an Islamist Tuareg group seeking to establish sharia in the region, seized control of northeast Mali. In Bamako, news of rebel victories incited revenge attacks on Tuaregs and popular anger toward the Toure administration, which was blamed for the poorly equipped condition of the Mali security forces. In late March, a military coup led by Captain Amadou Sanogo overthrew Toure and within a month, through ECOWAS mediation, a new government under civilian politician and former national assembly speaker Diounounda Traore had been formed and vowed to continue the war against the rebels. Taking

advantage of the government's crisis, the rebels seized the major northern centers of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu, and on April 6, MNLA officially declared the independence of Azawad, which no other country or international organization recognized. Clashing with the secular MNLA, Islamists from the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), a recent split from the Algerian Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magrib (AQIM), and Ansar Dine took control of Gao in late June and Timbuktu in early July and proceeded to damage or destroy historic tombs and shrines considered heretical, provoking widespread international condemnation. With ECOWAS and UN plans to send an international intervention force delayed and Bamako likely to fall to Islamist rebels, France responded to an urgent call for help from Mali's government and launched a sudden military intervention called Operation Serval in January 2013 supported by British and U.S. airlifts. In the open desert, French air power based in nearby Chad devastated the insurgents and their vehicles, allowing the 3,000-strong French mechanized ground force, accompanied by demoralized remnants of the Mali army and supported by Chadian forces, to quickly recapture Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. Advancing French forces were greeted by cheering crowds tired of living under the insurgents' strict sharia, there were disturbing reports of Malian soldiers executing rebel suspects, and it was found that the retreating Islamists had destroyed irreplaceable historical documents in Timbuktu. Beginning in February, Islamist and Taureg insurgents launched guerrilla attacks on French and allied forces in northern Mali including the use of suicide and car bombs.¹⁶

CONCLUSION

By the early 2010s, most of the civil wars that had plagued West African coastal countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire over the previous two decades had been resolved by external intervention. However, peace is tenuous given dire poverty, weak states and security forces, and questions about eventual UN withdrawal. At the same time, West Africa's marginalized northern belt along the Sahara Desert has become destabilized by radical Islamist insurgents such as those in northern Nigeria and Mali who cooperate with similar movements in North Africa and beyond. While ECOWAS staged dynamic interventions along the coast where troops could be

moved easily by ship, its slow response to the 2012–2013 Mali crisis raises concerns about its future ability to undertake multinational operations in the vast Sahara, where expensive air power and transport are important and that would risk enflaming religious tensions across the region.

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Chapter 3

East Africa, 1963–

Postcolonial East Africa has been the scene of some of the longest wars in African history, some of which have transcended Cold War and post-Cold War influences. In the early 1960s, most East African states had small infantry-based armies inherited from the colonial powers but within a few years and with outside help, they developed fairly large but differently organized armed forces with armor, naval, and air elements. The conflict between north and south Sudan began in 1955 with a protracted southern insurgency that lasted, with a short break, until 2005 and continues today as two independent states struggle for control of an oil-rich border. The long conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia illustrates the opportunistic nature of foreign military sponsorship in Africa as the Soviet Union and the United States swapped local proxies during the late 1970s, the Americans directly fought Somali warlords in the early 1990s, supported them in the post-September 2001 struggle against radical Islamists, and encouraged an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. While Uganda experienced many years of either southern or northern insurgency, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) that emerged in 1986 in northern Uganda and spread to several neighboring countries remains Africa's most stubborn and infamous rebel group. The history of warfare in postcolonial East Africa also highlights the insidious trend of African governments backing insurgencies in their neighbors' territories in retaliation for their neighbors doing the same to them. Furthermore, East Africa has

commanded by the central government. The old system of raising provincial levies was disbanded, and traditional military titles and commands were replaced with British ranks. The military academy, briefly launched in 1935, was recreated on the Sandhurst model with British instructors until 1951. All officers and most troops of this volunteer force were from the highland Christian Amhara people, who looked down on lowlander Muslims as less martial. In 1953, Emperor Haile Selassie established a defense ministry that unified the command of the army, air force, and new navy. Although the 8,000-strong Imperial Guard, with nine infantry battalions and some light armored vehicles, was technically the army's First Division, in practice it received orders directly from the emperor and was allocated special funds and equipment. Not including the Imperial Guard, the army consisted of three infantry divisions of 8,000–12,000 men each. By the early 1970s, the army had a total of 37,700 men organized into the four previously mentioned divisions plus five artillery, two tank, two mechanized, two motorized, and two engineer battalions along with an airborne company and a signals squadron. In 1959, the emperor created an army reserve under the provincial governors that in some ways represented a throwback to the traditional system. Young men between 18 and 25 years of age had to complete an initial three months of training and a subsequent two months of annual military service. Unpaid and billeted in villages, they hunted bandits and suppressed small revolts.

Between 1951 and 1954, three battalions of the Ethiopian Imperial Guard served sequentially in the Korean War as part of the U.S. Seventh Division. Some 5,000 Ethiopians served in these "Kagnew" ("to bring order or overthrow") Battalions, with 120 killed in action and 536 wounded. The Korean War experience resulted in a 1953 agreement that saw Addis Ababa gain the services of an American Military Assistance Advisory Group. The United States began to see Ethiopia as a valuable ally given the creation of Israel, Nasser's revolution in Egypt, and growing Soviet influence in the Middle East. Between 1946 and 1972, the United States gave \$180 million worth of military aid to Ethiopia and between 1953 and 1968, there were 2,500 Ethiopian personnel trained in the United States. Initially, the Americans focused on training and equipping the Ethiopian army but by the 1960s, their influence spread to the air force and navy. The Ethiopian military would be equipped with U.S. uniforms, small arms, heavy weapons, tanks, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled

artillery, and naval craft. The 1953 federation with Eritrea, with its Red Sea coast, also influenced Ethiopia's growing alliance with the United States. It prompted formerly landlocked Ethiopia to create a small navy based at the strategic Red Sea port of Massawa with Norwegian and eventually U.S. advisors, and U.S.-made patrol boats. By the early 1970s, the navy possessed a single 1,800-ton training ship (formerly a U.S. World War II seaplane tender), five patrol boats equipped with missiles, four torpedo boats, one coastal mine sweeper, four harbor defense craft, and four landing craft. Although it had just 750 sailors, the navy symbolized Ethiopia's regional power status and was initially commanded directly by the emperor and then his grandson Rear Admiral Iskendar Desta. Furthermore, in 1953, Ethiopia permitted the United States to operate a radio listening post called Kagnew Station in Asmara, Eritrea's capital, which monitored orbiting Soviet spacecraft.

Although Ethiopia had established a small military air wing in the early 1930s which was destroyed by the Italians, the emperor created a modern Imperial Ethiopian Air Force (IEAF) in 1946 with the assistance of Sweden, which provided a training team and 18 Saab training aircraft along with two squadrons of Saab light bombers. Between 1946 and 1956, the IEAF was commanded by Swedish aviation pioneer Carl Gustaf von Rosen, who had been a Red Cross pilot during the 1935 Italian invasion and was killed on the ground during the 1977 Ogaden War (see later in this chapter). Swedes commanded the IEAF until 1962, when Ethiopian brigadier Asefa Ayene took over. In 1951, the IEAF organized its first operational unit with a dozen Firefly fighter-bombers acquired from Britain. Beginning in 1953, the United States took an increasingly active role in the IEAF, which it introduced to the jet age. Ethiopians were sent to the United States to train as jet pilots, and between 1957 and 1960, the United States provided Ethiopia with its first T-33 jet trainers and F-86 Sabre jet fighters. The Americans, sometimes through their ally Iran, continued to deliver Sabres to Ethiopia and by 1970, the IEAF operated five squadrons of them. Cold War rivalries resulted in an arms race in the Horn of Africa. Because the Soviet Union gave MiG-17 jet fighters to newly independent Somalia in 1964, the Americans countered between 1966 and the early 1970s by supplying Ethiopia with 23 of the latest F-5 jet fighters. The IEAF's lift capability was provided by the Americans, with a dozen C-47 transports delivered in 1956, 3 DC-4 military airliners in 1961, and 18 C-119 "Flying Boxcars" in the early 1970s. The IEAF

established an air base and training center at Dabre Zeit (50 kilometers south of Addis Ababa) and became self-sufficient in aircraft maintenance. By 1970 the IEAF—with 43 combat aircraft and 2,569 personnel—was one of Africa's most effective air forces and a symbol of U.S. aid to Ethiopia.

The rise of protest against Ethiopia's imperial rule in the 1960s led to the development of a several thousand-strong paramilitary counterinsurgency unit called the Emergency Police (EP) that was trained by Israel. The EP suppressed an attempted coup by the commander of the Imperial Guard in 1960 and hunted insurgents in Eritrea. Furthermore, it trained members of Southern African liberation movements, such as South Africa's Nelson Mandela in 1961.

With the 1974 revolution that overthrew Haile Selassie, the Ethiopian military remained intact but was taken over by a clique of officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and it changed from the tool of an autocratic state into a dictatorial military government with socialist ideology. From 1974 to 1978, the military regime called the Derg (council) executed, imprisoned, or dismissed about a third of the officer corps, which caused disorganization. The Derg's warming relations with the Eastern bloc prompted the United States to stop arms shipments in 1976 and close Kagnew station the next year. Recognizing that the four uniformly equipped divisions were not suitable to confront Ethiopia's diverse security threats and environments, the regime organized regional commands, with the Northern command in Eritrea, Tigray, and Gondar trained and equipped for mountain warfare, and the Eastern command in the Ogaden Desert constituted into a highly mobile mechanized force. The army was expanded by a Fifth Division trained as a parachute counterinsurgency force by Israel, an Eighth Division that was an enlarged police paramilitary force under military command, and a women's army corps for logistical support. With growing insurgencies in the north and increasing tensions with Somalia in the east, the Derg instituted compulsory service in a people's militia and formed a National Revolutionary Operations Command (NROC) that directed all military, police, and militia activities and could commandeer state or public resources. With the 1977 Somali invasion of the Ogaden (see later in this chapter), Ethiopia mobilized some 300,000 militia who were trained with the assistance of Cuban instructors and formed into five new Militia Divisions. Some 100,000 militia were sent east as members of the Second and Fifth Militia Divisions known as the First Revolutionary Liberation Army,

and over 150,000 were dispatched north to Eritrea as the First and Fourth Militia Divisions known as the Second Revolutionary Liberation Army and to Tigray as the Third Militia Division. By 1979 the regular army, which had absorbed many of these conscripts, had grown to eight divisions with a total of 140,000 personnel.

Soviet and Cuban intervention during the Ogaden War led to the rapid Sovietization of the Ethiopian military in terms of organization, terminology, weapons, and equipment. During that conflict, a Supreme Military Strategic Committee of seven Ethiopians, eight Soviets, and three Cubans directed military operations. While the old divisional structure remained, the concept of a mission-oriented task force was introduced, with a typical example entailing three brigades, one of which was mechanized supported by a tank battalion and helicopters. In 1983, the Derg obliged all able-bodied men between 15 and 34 years of age to serve in the military when called up in several yearly intakes. In 1989, the military consisted of half a million people, with 373,782 regulars; 73,809 militia; and 72,199 conscripts. Though the force's regional composition was broadened by conscription, most senior officers and generals were of Amahara origin. By 1990, Ethiopian ground forces comprised 24 infantry divisions, 4 mountain divisions, 5 mechanized divisions, 2 airborne divisions, 3 artillery brigades, 4 tank brigades, 12 commando and parachute brigades (including one trained by North Korea), 7 multiple rocket launcher battalions, and 10 paramilitary brigades. A system of reserves was introduced, with strategic reserves encompassing 3 mechanized brigades based at Tatek outside Addis Ababa, a tank and an artillery brigade at Adama (90 kilometers south of the capital), and a parachute brigade at the Dabre Zeit. Tactical reserves of mechanized and commando brigades were stationed at key points in Gondar, Tigray, and Eritrea. Operations were facilitated by special engineer, communications, logistics, and technical units. The Ethiopian Air Force (EAF) grew to 11,318 personnel organized into 3 fighter-ground attack, 2 fighter-bomber, 3 air defense, an attack helicopter, a transport helicopter, and 3 missile regiments plus 3 training squadrons and a counter-insurgency squadron. With its 3 main air bases at Dabre Zeit, Asmara, and Dire Dawa—and other small airfields throughout the country—the EAF augmented army operations with firepower and transport. The main supplier of aircraft was the Soviet Union, and many of the EAF's personnel were trained there. Increased to 4,750 sailors, the navy operated 5 squadrons of missile, torpedo, and patrol

boats, and a marine commando unit at bases in Massawa and Assab. From 1975 to 1981, the navy supported ground forces by transporting 61,000 men; 6,000 tons of weapons and supplies; 36,000 tons of drinking water; and more than 2,000 armored vehicles.

A new series of training centers with Ethiopian, Soviet, Cuban, and East German instructors was established, for example, the Hurso Military School in Harar for infantry junior officers, the Arba School in the same area that offered tactics courses, the Staff and Command College in Holeta, and many others that specialized in armor, artillery, logistics, engineering, health, communications, and weapon and equipment maintenance. Between 1978 and 1988, about 1,000 Soviets supervised by a lieutenant general were present in the Ministry of Defence and all Ethiopia's military branches; 4,000–5,000 Cubans focused on medical services and training; and 400 East Germans developed internal security. Between 1977 and 1991, the Derg purchased or otherwise acquired a huge amount of military equipment (mostly from the Soviet Union), including 300 aircraft and helicopters; 17 naval vessels; 1,700 tanks; 2,975 armored personnel carriers; 4,000 military vehicles; 41,740 light machine guns; 1,172 artillery pieces; 3,915 mortars; 14,738 antitank weapons; 1,605 antiaircraft guns; 400 rocket launchers and missiles; and 1.5 million assault rifles. By 1991, military spending accounted for half the annual budget. Much of the weapons and equipment sent by the Soviets was obsolete or inappropriate for Ethiopia where, for example, fewer tanks and air defense systems—and more helicopters—would have been better. Lack of maintenance and repair became a terrible problem because the Soviets did not provide enough spare parts, the Ethiopians became dependent upon Soviet technicians, and the inflow of weapons and equipment outpaced existing facilities and technical skills. Vehicles with easily fixable problems were abandoned, aircraft engines were shipped to the Soviet Union for repair (which was costly and took too long), massive military spending left little money to repair poor roads (which in turn wore out military vehicles), and military gasoline was corruptly sold.¹

In April 1960, Italian and British Somaliland were united as the independent Republic of Somalia, and the various colonial security units became the Somali National Army (SNA) under Colonel Daud Abdulle Hirsi, a veteran of British colonial forces who died five years later. Initial military support by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was so inadequate that Mogadishu searched for other foreign sponsors.

In 1961, Somalia, because it had a Western-style government and wanted alliance with the Western powers, rejected military assistance from Eastern bloc Czechoslovakia. Somalia had difficulty obtaining military support from Western countries because its pan-Somali ambitions seemed to threaten neighboring pro-Western Ethiopia and Kenya, which had ethnic Somali populations, and Ethiopia already served as the main Western ally in the region. Mogadishu's backing for Somali insurgents in northern Kenya alienated Britain. In 1963, the United States, Italy, and West Germany offered Somalia an assistance package valued at US\$10 million that would train and equip a 5,000- to 6,000-strong military for internal security. Mogadishu rejected this and accepted a US\$32 million Soviet package that would support a 10,000-man army and create a small air wing with jets. However, the Somali government did not want to be completely dependent upon the Soviets and until 1969, the Somali police were trained by Italy and the United States, and equipped by Britain and West Germany. Taking power in 1969, Said Barre's military regime accelerated Somalia's military expansion and Soviet assistance. By 1970, the Somali military consisted of 12,000 personnel with 10,000 in the army; 1,750 in the air force; and 250 in the tiny navy. This represented the fourth largest military in sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Ghana (which had much larger populations). Somalia's total military personnel rapidly grew to 20,000, which sparked criticism from Ethiopia's emperor that the Soviets were encouraging Somali aggression and fueling a regional arms race. Somalia ranked first in sub-Saharan Africa in percentage of gross national product spent on the military, which translated into a quarter of its annual budget. What the Somalis lacked in personnel, they made up for in armor, mobility, and air power. In 1970, the SNA had 150 Soviet-made T-34 tanks, which were obsolete World War II castoffs but packed a punch by East African standards. Five years later, it possessed 250 tanks, T-34s, and newer T-54s, along with 300 armored personnel carriers. By 1976, Somalia's air force flew 50 Soviet-made MiG fighters, including 24 supersonic MiG-21s and several Ilyushin bombers, which gave it among the most lethal air strike capability south of the Sahara. Ethiopia, Somalia's chief rival, had a much larger army but possessed only 12 medium and 50 light U.S.-made tanks, 100 armored cars and personnel carriers, and 37 combat aircraft. Up until 1962, most Somali officers were trained in Britain or Italy; from 1962 to 1977, the Soviets organized most officer training; and in 1980, Somalia founded its

own military academies in Mogadishu and Kismayo. Up until the 1977–1978 Ogaden War, the SNA enjoyed a positive reputation in Somali society because it was considered less influenced by clan divisions and less corrupt than civilian institutions. However, as discussed later in this chapter, a failed coup in 1978 prompted Barre to promote officers from his own clan and by the late 1980s, the SNA was seen as his personal force.²

When the British East African territories became independent in the early 1960s, they inherited a relatively small defense establishment based almost entirely on the infantry battalions of the King's African Rifles (KAR). Rejecting a British-proposed regional federation that might have preserved British control of defense, each new country converted its KAR units into a national regiment, with the two battalions in Tanganyika becoming the Tanganyika Rifles in 1961, the single battalion in Uganda becoming the Uganda Rifles in 1962, and the three in Kenya becoming the Kenya Rifles in 1963. In late January 1964, the African soldiers of newly independent Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda mutinied over low pay, lack of promotions, and the continued presence of British officers. Reluctantly, East African political leaders were compelled to call upon their former British masters to subdue the soldiers' protest. Units of Britain's 24 Brigade, a strategic reserve for the Middle East based in Kenya, easily disarmed the mutineers in Jinja, Uganda, and Lanet, Kenya. In Tanganyika, where the rebellion had started, British aircraft carrier HMS *Centaur* arrived off the coast from Aden and landed Royal Marines by helicopter at Dar-es-Salaam's Colito Barracks, where the mutinous battalion surrendered after a brief skirmish in which two mutineers were killed and nine wounded. Subsequently, marines were helicoptered inland to Tabora, where the second protesting battalion was waiting to capitulate. In the wake of the mutinies, the three former British territories developed very different and much larger militaries.

In Kenya, where the British provided considerable funding and military assistance given the large population of British subjects, Jomo Kenyatta's government retained the British tradition of a professional, apolitical military. Since the Kenyan army continued recruiting from imagined martial tribes such as the Kamba and Kalenjin until 1969 when district recruiting quotas were introduced, the military had little connection with the primarily Kikuyu urban political class. Conversely, the new navy and air force was composed largely of Kikuyu, as these services required better-educated recruits. In the mid-1960s,

Kenyatta transformed the police paramilitary unit into a 2,000-strong military force called the General Services Unit (GSU) made up primarily of his Kikuyu ethnic group and used to suppress protest. Nairobi and London concluded a defense agreement that turned over British military facilities to Kenya after the withdrawal of 24 Brigade in late 1964, posted 150 British officers and NCOs to train and provide logistics to the Kenyan military (which was politically acceptable because Kenyan officers filled all command positions), and gave Britain access to Kenyan airfields, the Mombasa port, and training areas. Annual training visits by British battalions discouraged coup plotting by Kenyan officers and invasion by expansionist Somalia. Combined with other substantial funding, Britain gave Kenya £4.5 million for military training and expansion, and another £250,000 to fight Somali insurgents in the north during the Shifta War (see later in this chapter). Britain discouraged other foreign powers from granting military assistance to Kenya, and 10 million marks from West Germany had to be kept secret and used only to buy British equipment. Seconded British officers served as heads of the army, navy, and air force, and chief of staff until 1966, when World War II veteran Brigadier Joseph Ndolo became the first Kenyan army commander. In 1969, he became the first Kenyan chief of staff. In 1972, Lieutenant Colonel J. C. J. Kimaro became the first Kenyan navy head and the next year, Colonel Dedan Gichuru achieved a similar distinction in the air force. Kenya continued to send many officer candidates to Sandhurst.

By the end of the 1960s, the Kenyan army had grown from three former KAR battalions to a 5,000-strong brigade group with 4 infantry battalions, a support battalion with heavy artillery, a parachute company, and 10 tanks. While extensive British assistance ended in the late 1970s, Kenyan defense spending increased, and it gained U.S. support. By the early 2000s, the Kenyan army consisted of 18,000 personnel organized into 1 armored brigade with British-made Vickers tanks purchased in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 2 infantry brigades, an independent infantry battalion, 1 artillery brigade, an air defense battalion, 2 engineer battalions, an airborne battalion with a British-trained special forces component, and an air cavalry battalion with light helicopter gunships. In the late 2000s, given American desire to pursue Islamist radicals in neighboring Somalia and concerns about the involvement of the Kenyan paratrooper battalion in human rights abuses against land rights protestors around Mount Elgon, Washington

began helping the Kenyan military to develop a separate and elite Special Operations Force consisting of special forces operators and a Ranger Strike Force. By 2010 the United States had spent more than \$14.7 million on equipping and training the new force which numbered several hundred personnel and was meant to grow to around 900. The other services consisted of a navy with 1,000 personnel, an air force with 3,000, and the GSU with 6,000. In 1964, the Kenyan Air Force (KAF) was established with a flying school and trainer aircraft, and in 1974, it acquired its first combat jets, the British-made Hunter, followed by American F-5 fighters in the late 1970s (which are still in service today). After some of its members were involved in a failed coup in 1982, the KAF was renamed 82 Air Force and placed under army control until 1994, when it was reinstituted as a separate service. While the Kenyan Navy operated a former British training vessel and two patrol boats in the mid-1960s, by the early 2000s, it had 4 missile boats, 4 patrol boats, 3 amphibious landing vessels, and 1 support vessel. Because of threats to international shipping from Somali pirates, the French gave the Kenyan Navy an offshore patrol vessel in 2011, and Kenya took delivery of the Spanish-made KNS *Jasiri*, which is the largest ship in its fleet, in August 2012. Both vessels are capable patrolling well out into the Indian Ocean.

After the 1964 East African mutinies, pan-Africanist ideology and lack of British assistance prompted Tanganyika leader Julius Nyerere to dismiss the entire military inherited from Britain and form a highly politicized defense force within a socialist one-party state. By June 1964, all British military personnel had left Tanganyika and at Nyerere's invitation, a Nigerian battalion ensured security while the new force was created. In late April 1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar joined to form Tanzania, and the island's People's Liberation Army (PLA) was folded into the new Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF). Almost all the officers of the new TPDF, including its first commander Sam Hagai Sarakikya (who was promoted from captain to brigadier), were British-trained former KAR soldiers who modeled the new force on British traditions. A massive recruiting campaign abandoned the old emphasis on martial tribes and took urban unemployed Tanzania African National Union (TANU) party members, many of whom deserted after a few weeks. By September 1964, the TPDF had 1,000 trained soldiers and by 1967, there were 4,000 men organized into 4 battalions. With its poorly trained troops along with uniforms and arms from Cuba and the Eastern bloc, the former PLA

was incompatible with the rest of the force and remained distinct throughout the 1960s. Nyerere initially balanced external military influences by receiving Soviet artillery and antiaircraft guns in addition to Chinese small arms and instructors, having Israelis train officer candidates, increasing the number of officer candidates sent to Sandhurst, and requesting a Canadian military mission that supervised the expansion of the TPDF army and the planning of a military academy. When a deal with West Germany to help create an air force collapsed over the continued presence of an East German embassy in Zanzibar, the Canadian team stepped in and formed a small air wing with some transport capability. The Canadians were withdrawn in 1969 because Ottawa objected to Nyerere's proposal to develop a combat air force to deter the Portuguese and Rhodesians from using Tanzanian airspace, and Canada's NATO ally Portugal was fighting Tanzania-based insurgents in Mozambique. Tanzania became militarily dependent upon China, which created an armored element of 20 T-59 and 14 T-62 tanks in the early 1970s, trained pilots in China, constructed an air base at Ngeregere west of Dar es-Salaam, and delivered 12 MiG-17 fighters in 1974. From 1965, the Chinese helped develop a TPDF navy to secure the country's 800-kilometer coast by training personnel, building a naval base in Dar es-Salaam, providing 4 patrol boats in 1966, and another 10 torpedo and gunboats in 1971. During the early to mid-1970s, Tanzania acquired 7 more patrol boats from the Soviet Union. Committed to the liberation of white minority-ruled southern Africa, Nyerere provided sanctuary to numerous armed African liberation movements also supported by China and the Soviet Union. The TPDF became heavily politicized with a chief political commissar, a Department of Political Education, 20 percent of training time devoted to political indoctrination, company commanders who chaired unit party cells, and all recruits coming from the TANU youth league. In 1977, the military academy was merged with TANU's party cadre school. Beginning in 1965, all secondary school and university graduates were obliged to complete two years of national service that began with three months military training. This is where the regular TPDF drew its recruits from. In 1965, a People's Militia was established as a reserve of trained personnel that could be mobilized during emergencies and ensured that the TPDF did not monopolize deadly force. Military personnel were often posted to other government departments and during the 1970s, sometimes more than a third of Nyerere's cabinet was composed of army officers.

In Uganda, Prime Minister Milton Obote wanted to use the northern-dominated army inherited from the British to crush southern political rivals and expand it to protect the country's borders with unstable Congo and Sudan. Obote ordered all British military personnel out of the country by the end of 1964, promoted Ugandan junior officers, gave soldiers generous pay raises, re-enlisted all the dismissed mutineers, and continued the colonial practice of recruiting supposedly martial and taller northerners (because they were from his region). When London denied his request for military aid similar to Kenya, Obote turned to Israel, which sent a training team to Uganda and put officer candidates through a six-month course at Jinja. In October 1964, the Israeli Military Training Mission created the Ugandan Air Force by donating several observer/trainer aircraft and 3 DC-3 transports. After Congolese aircraft attacked villages in western Uganda in 1965, the Israelis supplied 12 Fouga Magister trainer/ground attack jets. The Israelis built an air base at Nabiswere, 100 kilometers north of Kampala, and an airfield at Arua near the Sudan border. By 1972, they had trained more than 30 pilots and hundreds of technicians. Israel introduced armor to the Ugandan army by providing some old American-made Sherman tanks captured from Egypt in 1967, and Israelis instructed Ugandan artillerymen and put an entire brigade through parachute training. The army's deputy commander, Colonel Idi Amin, trained in Israel and proudly wore Israeli parachute wings, though he had never jumped. As discussed later in this chapter, the Israelis began to use Uganda as a staging area for supplying southern Sudanese insurgents. Obote attempted to balance the Israeli presence by importing Chinese small arms and in 1965, he signed a contract with the Soviet Union under which 25 Soviet military advisors were sent to Uganda by 1967; the Soviets trained 250 Ugandan soldiers, 20 pilots, and 50 air force technicians; and the Soviets provided the Ugandans with 2 MiG-15 and 4 MiG-17 jet fighters, communications equipment, artillery, and trucks. Obote increased military spending by 400 percent and by 1965, the Ugandan army had expanded from 2 to 4 battalions.

The Ugandan officer corps split into two politicized factions. The northerner supporters of Obote, which included Amin and three out of four battalion commanders, and southern junior officers loyal to army commander and KAR veteran Brigadier Shaban Opolot, who was a northerner but jealous of the prime minister's relationship with Amin. Propelled by accusations that Amin had used Ugandan

military support for Congolese rebels as cover for smuggling gold and ivory, Obote sent his northern army faction to arrest the southern politicians and army officers, including Opolot. Subsequently, in May 1966, Obote directed the army, now headed by Amin, to attack the palace of Sir Edward Mutesa, ruler of the southern Kingdom of Buganda and the country's ceremonial president, who fled to Britain. Although Obote made himself president with arbitrary powers, including military appointments, he depended on Amin and the army. This allowed Amin to create a personal power base within the military by founding the armored Malire Regiment positioned close to the capital and composed of his Kakwa ethnic group from far northern West Nile, broadly recruiting from groups loyal to him such as those from West Nile and across the border in southern Sudan, appointing his acolytes as company commanders, and commissioning 28 NCOs after just one month officer training. Increasingly scornful of educated and comparatively wealthy civilians, undisciplined troops set up roadblocks to extort money from motorists, fought university students, and ignored traffic regulations. A fearful Obote packed the paramilitary police with members of his own Langi and Acholi ethnic groups, and armed the National Union of Youth Organizations. With no southern officers, the Ugandan army became polarized between the northern Langi and Acholi officers favored by Obote, and the far northern rank and file cultivated by Amin.

Accused by Obote of embezzlement, Amin used the Malire Regiment's tanks and 1,500 southern Sudanese guerrillas to stage a coup in late January 1971 when the president was out of the country. Amin organized mass executions of Langi and Acholi personnel at army bases across Uganda. He expanded military relations with Israel during 1971. Hundreds of Ugandan soldiers, officers, and technicians trained there (including many put through a condensed paratrooper course); more Israeli flying and armored instructors came to Uganda; and more Israeli weapons were smuggled to southern Sudanese rebels. In July 1971, Amin visited Israel to ask for the cancellation of Uganda's US\$2 million debt and presented a plan to invade Tanzania to conquer the port of Tanga, for which he requested US\$10 million worth of weapons, including American F-4 Phantom and A-4 Skyhawk jets, and speedboats to carry an invasion force across Lake Victoria. With his proposal rejected by Israel and seeking to gain OAU recognition, Amin expelled all Israelis in early 1972. He quickly rediscovered his Muslim faith, visited Libya and Saudi Arabia to raise

funds, began assisting the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), adopted anti-Semitic rhetoric, applauded the killing of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics, and accepted Soviet-made MiG jets and a 300-man Palestinian bodyguard from Libya's Gaddafi. Amin also turned to the Soviet Union to sponsor his military expansion and in 1974 and 1975, Uganda received US\$500 million worth of Soviet arms, including 8 MiG-17 and 12 MiG-21 jets, 2 transport helicopters, 60 T-34 and T-55 tanks, 100 armored personnel carriers, 6 mobile bridges, 6 patrol boats, 9 radar units, 50 antiaircraft guns, 250 surface-to-air missiles, and 200 antitank missiles. At the same time, around 700 Ugandan military personnel trained in the Soviet Union and 100 Soviet instructors were in Uganda, but the relationship soured in 1975 when Amin condemned Soviet intervention in Angola.³

THE OGADEN WAR, 1977–1978

By 1945, ethnic Somalis lived in five East African states: British, Italian, and French Somaliland; British Kenya; and independent Ethiopia. Independent in 1960, the Republic of Somalia united former British and Italian Somaliland. In a 1958 referendum, French Somaliland had voted against joining Somalia and became Djibouti in 1977. Pan-Somalism, the desire to unite Somalis in one nation-state, incited insurgency along Somalia's borders with Ethiopia and Kenya during the 1960s. In 1963, Somali nomads formed the Ogaden Liberation Front (OLF), which demanded the Ethiopian government grant their region autonomy. Armed by Somalia, the insurgents attacked police outposts and the disorganized Ethiopian military garrison. In February 1964, Haile Selassie sent his U.S.-equipped Third Division to the Ogaden, where it defeated the rebels and advanced to the border to engage the SNA. In March, an OAU-mediated agreement ended the conflict, which had claimed 2,000 lives and halted Somalia's sponsorship of the OLF. Although Third Division commander General Aman Mikael Andom, a British-trained veteran of the guerrilla war against the Italians, earned the title Lion of the Ogaden for his victory, he was dismissed for disobeying orders not to cross into Somalia. While the Ethiopian government improved health and education in the Ogaden region, sporadic clashes continued between insurgents and security forces. Somali irredentism encouraged Ethiopia and Kenya to sign a defense pact in 1964. From 1963 to 1967, in the Shifta (or



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Bandit) War, security forces in northern Kenya conducted a brutal counterinsurgency campaign against small groups of poorly armed Somali insurgents, which involved herding the population into protected villages, creating a “prohibited zone” along the border, and making unlawful possession of a firearm punishable with death.

From 1969, Barre aspired to form a Greater Somalia by sponsoring the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) and Oromo rebels in Ethiopia's Ogaden Desert. Assisting the Barre regime, the Soviets gained a naval base at Berbera on Somalia's northern coast that would threaten Western oil shipments in the Gulf of Aden. By 1977, Somalia's 35,000-strong army had 7 tank battalions with 300 Soviet-made tanks, and 22 mechanized infantry battalions with 350 armored personnel carriers. These were supported by 180 artillery pieces and 55 combat aircraft. Training was provided by 4,000 Soviet personnel stationed in Somalia. In 1974, a military coup overthrew the pro-Western Ethiopian emperor and created a period of instability in which separatist movements gained strength. Barre now had an opportunity to take the Ogaden. Although the Ethiopians outnumbered the Somalis in soldiers, the latter had more mobility provided by more tanks, vehicles, and aircraft. Furthermore, Ethiopia's best units were tied up fighting insurgents in northern Tigray and Eritrea.

In early 1977, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam emerged as head of Ethiopia's ruling Derg and launched offensives against separatists in Eritrea, which would deprive Ethiopia of access to the sea if independent, and the Ogaden. As a Marxist-Leninist, and despite previous military training in the United States, Mengistu expelled U.S. military advisors and by mid-1977 imported Soviet weapons. In June 1977, five thousand Somali soldiers posing as WSLF insurgents attacked towns in eastern Ethiopia and were repelled. In mid-July, Somalia launched an all-out invasion of Ethiopia with mechanized infantry and tanks supported by air power, and quickly gained control of the Ogaden lowlands. Ethiopian defenses dissolved except at the industrial city of Dire Dawa, where Somali attacks were repulsed in July and August. After several weeks of attacks and counterattacks, the Somalis captured Jijiga in mid-September. With the Ethiopians in retreat and some having mutinied, Somali forces took the strategic Marda Pass. From late September 1977 to late January 1978, the Somalis repeatedly attacked the city of Harar but failed to penetrate Ethiopian lines. Ethiopian pilots dominated the air, two armored divisions from Yemen arrived to support Ethiopia, and the Somalis moved into the highlands (which favored defense).

In late 1977, the Soviets, initially supplying both sides, threw their weight behind Ethiopia. Reasons for this included the failed Soviet attempt to arbitrate the conflict; Barre's expulsion of 6,000 Soviet advisors; Mengistu's ideological suitability to Moscow; and the fact that

Ethiopia represented a stronger ally. In December 1977 and January 1978, the Soviets sent a billion dollars' worth of armaments to Ethiopia, including aircraft, helicopters, tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, air defense systems, and guided antitank missiles. More than 1,000 Soviet advisors arrived, some of whom had been in Somalia a few weeks before. Transported by the Soviets, Cuban combat units arrived, increasing from a few hundred men in December to 3,000 in January and 18,000 in February. They came not only from Cuba, but also from missions in Congo-Brazzaville and Angola. The Mengistu regime rapidly mobilized 100,000 recruits. An Ethiopian-Cuban offensive, directed by Soviet general Vasili Petrov, began on February 1. With a Cuban armored brigade in the lead, an Ethiopian division moved north to outflank Somali defenses around the Marda Pass. They linked up with another force of infantry and armor landed by helicopter behind Somali lines, and retook Jijiga in early March. Two Ethiopian brigades attacked the Marda Pass and after three days of combat, the Somalis retreated. The former Soviet naval base at Berbera was bombed from the air to prevent the dispatch of Somali reinforcements. Over the next three weeks, the Ethiopian-Cuban troops drove the defeated Somalis back to the border and occupied the last frontier post on March 23. While Ethiopia and Somalia each lost over 6,000 troops, the number of civilians killed in the Ogaden War remains unknown. Border skirmishes continued for the next three years, and the WSLF resumed guerrilla warfare supported by Somalia. Cuban intervention in the Ogaden War represented Fidel Castro's second major military victory in Africa in three years and greatly enhanced his reputation on the continent. Unwilling to get drawn into Ethiopia's counterinsurgencies, Castro reduced the Cuban garrison to 11,000 in 1982 and 4,000 in 1984. He completely withdrew in 1989.⁴

ERITREA'S WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1960–1991

After the Italians had been expelled during World War II, Eritrea was administered by the British military. Eritreans were divided about their future, with highland Christians favoring union with Ethiopia and lowland Muslims wanting independence. In 1952, the United Nations—without consulting the Eritreans—federated the territory to Ethiopia, which annexed it a decade later. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) was formed by exiled nationalists in Cairo in 1960, and a

year later its military wing, under former Italian colonial soldier Hamid Idris Awate, launched hit-and-run attacks on the Ethiopian presence. Although Awate died after being wounded in combat in 1962, the recruitment of Eritreans who had served in the Sudanese army and police enhanced the ELF's effectiveness, and it began to form autonomous zones similar to the FLN in Algeria. From 1962 to 1965, the ELF grew from 250 to 2,000 insurgents. It maintained a fleet of small speedboats that ferried supplies across the Red Sea from Yemen. Because the ELF operated mostly in the predominantly Muslim north and west of Eritrea, it received external support from Muslim Arab states, and some of its fighters were trained in Syria and Iraq. With arms and training from the United States and Israel, Ethiopia pursued a counterinsurgency that included large sweeps of the Muslim lowlands and a divide-and-rule strategy to win the loyalty of Christian highlanders. However, the Ethiopian Second Division's brutal "pacification" campaigns from 1967 to 1970 alienated everyone, including Christians. By 1974, the Ethiopian army in Eritrea was confined to towns and formed convoys to travel on roads.

During the early 1970s, the ELF's military failures and Muslim dominance led to the splitting away of three factions, which—in 1973—united as the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), a revolutionary socialist movement with a mostly Christian and well-educated leadership. Between 1972 and 1974, the ELF and EPLF fought each other as well as the Ethiopians. While the EPLF utilized small fast-moving guerrilla bands, it consistently tried to concentrate its forces to liberate Eritrea area by area. Its focus on waging a conventional war from secure bases meant that the military leadership came to dominate the movement. The overthrow of Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 and the invasion of the Ogaden by Somalia in 1977 provided the ELF and EPLF with opportunities. In December 1974 and January 1975, both rebel groups attacked the Eritrean capital of Asmara, provoking a violent Ethiopian response. More recruits joined, and weapons were captured. In 1977, the EPLF took major towns along the eastern escarpment and coastal plain, including Naqfa, Keren, and Dekemhare, and the ELF captured the central highland towns of Mendefera and Adi Qwala, as well as the western market towns of Agordat and Tessenei. With almost all Eritrea in rebel hands, the Ethiopians retained only Asmara and Massawa. From 1975 to 1978, the EPLF grew from 5,000 to 30,000 insurgents, while the ELF expanded from 5,000 to 40,000 but was less disciplined and organized.

With massive Soviet and Cuban military assistance that led to victory against Somalia, the Ethiopian Mengistu regime launched a major offensive against Eritrean separatists during the second half of 1978 that included 120,000 troops and hundreds of tanks. While the ELF was fatally weakened by trying to stand against the Ethiopians, the EPLF conducted a fighting withdrawal north along with many inhabitants from the towns it had occupied and formed a new defensive line in the mountains around Naqfa, where they were joined by ELF survivors. Between 1978 and 1983, the Ethiopians initiated seven separate offensives in which some 30,000 Eritreans and more than 50,000 Ethiopians were killed. The EPLF held off the Ethiopians and in December 1979 successfully counterattacked, capturing many weapons. In 1980 and 1981, the EPLF finally eliminated the ELF. In January 1982, Mengistu launched the Red Star Campaign, his regime's largest offensive, to crush insurgents in Eritrea, Tigray, and Gondar (but in practice, it was conducted only in Eritrea). Partly planned by Soviet advisors, the campaign was of such magnitude that all government departments relocated from Addis Ababa to Asmara. Some 136,500 conscripts and militia joined the 30,000–40,000 Ethiopian troops already in Eritrea supported by tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft. The Ethiopian forces attacked the EPLF in its northern stronghold of Sahel Province, concentrating on Naqfa. Although the EPLF suffered 15,000 casualties, the Ethiopians were repulsed with 37,176 casualties and in September, the insurgents embarked on a counteroffensive and expanded into western Eritrea, where they replaced the defunct ELF.

The EPLF did not have powerful foreign backers. Sudan supported it because of Ethiopia's sponsorship of southern Sudanese rebels, and some of its leaders (for example, Isaias Afewerki and Romedan Mohamed) were trained in China, where they learned Maoist guerrilla warfare. By the late 1980s, the EPLF had mobilized support from the Eritrean diaspora in Europe and North America. The EPLF emphasized political education, with every unit assigned a political commissar; egalitarianism in the daily life of its members; and training, with each recruit receiving four to six months of instruction. By the mid-1980s, women's units constituted one third of the army. In 1987, the EPLF introduced conscription of young men and women in areas it controlled, which produced greater ethnic and religious diversity but caused discipline and training problems. In 1987, it formed a naval element of high-speed boats acquired from Arab countries and established a staging area at the small Sudanese port of Aqiq just north of

the Eritrean border. The next year, insurgent vessels mounted hit-and-run attacks on the Ethiopians in Assab and Massawa. On the other side, Ethiopia's experienced troops were wasted in frontal attacks on Naqfa and replaced by young conscripts, commanding officers were executed when operations failed, and Mengistu's personal interference led to officer resentment. During the famine of the mid-1980s, when the war stalemated, the EPLF used conventional forces to defend its base areas and sent guerrillas to raid Ethiopian airfields, ammunition dumps, and fuel depots around Asmara and Massawa. EPLF commandos raided Asmara airport, where they destroyed 12 aircraft in February 1982, 30 in May 1984, and 40 in January 1986. The Ethiopians increasingly fortified the airport and conducted reprisals against nearby communities.

The decline of Soviet sponsorship in the late 1980s fatally weakened Ethiopian forces. In December 1986, the EPLF went on the offensive and captured Ethiopian positions below Naqfa. In March 1988, the EPLF achieved its greatest victory by enveloping the Ethiopian 21st Division at the town of Afabet, where 18,000 Ethiopian troops were killed or captured and a massive amount of heavy equipment taken, including 50 tanks, 100 trucks, 60 artillery pieces, and 20 anti-aircraft guns. With retreat rendered impossible by burning tanks in Ashirum Pass, the Ethiopian 29th Mechanized Brigade was bombed by its own air force to prevent the capture of its armor. In what BBC journalist Basil Davidson called the greatest triumph by any liberation movement since Dien Bien Phu, the Battle of Afabet shifted the military balance toward the EPLF, which gained control of northern and western Eritrea. After Afabet, EPLF long-range artillery began shelling Asmara airport, forcing the EAF, in May, to move its operations to Mekele in Tigray. Making peace with Somalia, the Ethiopian regime moved army units from the Ogaden to Eritrea where, in mid-May 1988, they drove back rebel forces around Keren and established a new front line north of Massawa. In 1989, the EPLF assisted Tigrayan insurgents to push Mengistu's forces out of Tigray, which cut off their land connection to central Eritrea. Back in Eritrea around the same time, the EPLF broke through Ethiopian defenses and advanced down the east side of the country, to which the EAF responded by bombing civilians.

In early February 1990, in Operation Fenkil (which was its largest of the war), the now almost 100,000-strong EPLF overwhelmed Ethiopian positions at Semhar and captured Massawa, where the rebel

navy destroyed nine Ethiopian vessels. In mid-February, after the EPLF repelled Ethiopian seaborne reinforcements, the Eritrean rebels seized Massawa's islands in an amphibious operation supported by artillery from the mainland. During the Battle of Massawa, 3,000 Eritrean and around 9,000 Ethiopian troops perished. The Mengistu regime responded during April and May with intense aerial bombing of Massawa which destroyed port facilities and food aid, and killed hundreds of civilians. After the capture of Massawa, 140,000 Ethiopian troops were trapped in central Eritrea and had to be supplied by airlifts to Asmara, which came under insurgent artillery fire. In April and May, the EPLF drove the Ethiopians back to a new front between Segeneiti and Dekemhare. Between February and May 1991, EPLF forces moved to secure the Denkel coastline to ensure control of the port of Assab, block Ethiopian access to the sea, and distract Ethiopian forces from battles elsewhere. At the beginning of April, at Berasole, the EPLF engaged Ethiopian reinforcements, eliminating 2 brigades and destroying or capturing 48 tanks. In 1991, the EPLF navy established concealed bases in the Bure Peninsula and extended operations along the coast. In late May 1991, the EPLF staged its final offensive and after a three-day battle at Gura, it seized Dekemhare. With the departure of Mengistu from Addis Ababa, Ethiopian forces in Eritrea fled, allowing the EPLF to take Asmara and Assab without a fight at the end of May, and head off their retreating enemies at Barentu, where many personnel and heavy weapons were captured. Following its military victory, the EPLF formed a provisional government in Eritrea, and a UN supervised referendum in late April 1993 resulted in overwhelming support for independence declared a few days later. EPLF leader Isaias Afewerki became Eritria's first president, and the former insurgent group renamed itself the Peoples' Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) and quickly established a single-party authoritarian state. Loss of life during Eritrea's independence war included 10,000 ELF and 70,000 EPLF insurgents; an estimated 150,000 Ethiopian soldiers; and 100,000 Eritrean civilians.⁵

INSURGENCY IN ETHIOPIA'S TIGRAY PROVINCE, 1974–1991

During the late 1970s, four rebel groups with different agendas fought each other in Ethiopia's northern Tigray province, which was weakly controlled by the military regime. By the early 1980s, the Tigray

Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF), with a relatively well-educated and socialist but pragmatic leadership, had emerged as the surviving insurgent movement and favored self-determination for all Ethiopia's peoples. After victory in the Ogaden War, the Mengistu state increased its control of Tigray, where it imposed unpopular land reform, forcibly resettled peasants away from rebel areas, terrorised urban intelligentsia, and oppressed the Ethiopian Orthodox Church—all of which alienated civilians. In the areas it dominated, the TPLF cultivated support by establishing a series of autonomous local associations for peasants, women, and youth, and gained international legitimacy by founding the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) to coordinate food aid in Tigray and refugee camps in Sudan. In the early 1980s, the TPLF had more recruits than it could manage and sent 3,000 to train with its EPLF ally. When Mengistu launched the Red Star Campaign in Eritrea in 1982, the TPLF sent four brigades, half its full-time combat strength, to assist the EPLF. Until 1989, the TPLF focused on guerrilla warfare and was not committed to holding territory like the EPLF, which it criticized for moving too rapidly into conventional operations. The government of Sudan, motivated by Mengistu's sponsorship of south Sudanese rebels, allowed the TPLF to cross the border and access refugee camps but not establish military bases. Mengistu's counterinsurgency in Tigray, which involved disrupting agriculture and trade, burning crops, and denying food aid, created a catastrophic famine during the mid-1980s. Between 1984 and 1985, the TPLF secretly used international famine relief money to purchase weapons. From 1985 to 1988, the EPLF broke relations with the TPLF, which meant that the latter had to rally 100,000 peasants—without heavy equipment—to build a new road to re-establish a supply line with Sudan. While the mid-1980s famine weakened the TPLF inside Tigray, it gave the somewhat isolationist insurgents international contacts and strengthened their relationship with rural communities. Better harvests in 1987 allowed the TPLF to resume control of the countryside and besiege towns.

Following the March 1988 EPLF victory at Afabet, the TPLF launched a major offensive in May aimed at breaking the stalemate in the province and demonstrating its military prowess so that the EPLF would see it as an equal partner. The TPLF campaign began with the capture of the army's communications center at Mugulat in the northeast, continued with attacks against military bases at Axum and Adwa in central Tigray (where relief forces were compelled to retreat),

and culminated in the capture of the western town of Endaselasie, which housed army headquarters and was defended by 35,000 government troops. According to insurgents, the state lost 10 brigades and more than 7,000 soldiers were captured. Demoralized government forces retreated to the provincial capital of Mekele in Tigray's southeast. Mengistu ended the long conflict with Somalia and dispatched units from the eastern frontier to the north. In August 1988, the Derg mounted a massive counteroffensive involving 150,000 troops that recaptured all the Tigrayan towns and massacred civilians.

During September and December 1988, government efforts to open supply lines between Asmara and Endaselasie were frustrated, and in early February 1989, the TPLF defeated the elite Commando Division and overran its command center east of Endaselasie. In late February, TPLF forces supplemented by an EPLF armored brigade retook Endaselasie and killed or captured 12,000–13,000 state troops. The capture of heavy weapons and vehicles in western Tigray enabled TPLF guerrillas to transform into a conventional army that occupied the remaining towns in the province as battered state forces retreated. In May 1989, Mengistu foiled an attempted coup by his generals and around the same time, the reformist Gorbachev administration terminated Soviet support. In 1989–1990, the TPLF formed a coalition of anti-Mengistu rebels known as the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which included the Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization (OPDO) consisting mostly of Oromo former government soldiers captured in Tigray. When 10,000 Tigrayan fighters deserted because they objected to advancing beyond their province, the EPRDF suspended operations in 1990 and convinced its members to continue the war to stop the regime's aerial bombardment and retain contact with the Ethiopian Church. In late February 1991, the EPRDF and EPLF launched Operation Tewodros, which expelled the regime from Gondar and Gojjam in the west. This was followed up by Operation Walleligne in May, which captured Wollo and moved into eastern Ethiopia. Mengistu delayed rebel progress by directing his forces in Eritrea to attack Tigray, but his army was collapsing and in May, he fled to Zimbabwe. In late May, the EPLF captured Asmara and four days later, EPRDF fighters and EPLF mechanized units took Addis Ababa. Consequently, the EPRDF and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) formed a transitional government under TPLF chairman Meles Zenawi, who seemed favorable to the Western powers, as he had recently renounced socialism. However,

the OLF quickly resumed its insurgency against the Ethiopian state. Under a new constitution, Zenawi was elected prime minister in 1995 and 2005, and he developed an officially multiparty system that was in practice highly authoritarian.⁶

THE ETHIOPIA-ERITREA WAR, 1998–2000

After Eritrea separated from Ethiopia, the two disagreed over ownership of the Badme border area, which was in the Ethiopian region of Tigray. In early May 1998, after some border skirmishes, two Eritrean infantry brigades supported by tanks and artillery invaded Badme and expelled Ethiopian militia and police. The Eritreans also seized the nondisputed Ethiopian border town of Zalambessa. Mobilizing its forces within a week, Ethiopia counterattacked, which led to four weeks of intense fighting along the border with tank and artillery duels. The war escalated in early June with the Ethiopian Air Force bombing Asmara and Eritrean aircraft retaliating against Mekele. Stalemate developed as both sides were reinforced and entrenched along the 1,000-kilometer border. Over the next few months, both countries mobilized a total of half a million troops and spent hundreds of millions of dollars on new weapons systems such as fighter jets from the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe. After Eritrea rejected a U.S.-Rwanda peace plan in February 1999, Ethiopia launched a massive offensive and after five days of fighting penetrated Eritrean fortifications, retook Badme, and advanced 10 kilometers into Eritrea. At the end of that month, Eritrea accepted an OAU peace plan requiring both sides to withdraw to prewar positions. However, neither complied. In mid-March, Ethiopian forces attacked south of Asmara, but entrenched Eritrean troops held them off, inflicting hundreds of fatalities and destroying at least 20 tanks.

In mid-May 2000, when negotiations collapsed, Ethiopian forces marched through the mountains, which enabled them to break through Eritrean defenses, cross the Mereb River, and cut the Barentu-Mandefera road, which served as the main supply line for Eritrean forces in the west. The Ethiopians then turned east, moved behind Eritrean lines at Zalambessa, and came within 100 kilometers of Asmara and threatened coastal Assab, and the Ethiopian Air Force bombed around the port of Massawa. The defeated Eritrean government accepted an OAU peace plan that involved the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, now in possession of a quarter of Eritrea,

to prewar positions, which included possession of Badme. Throughout the war, Ethiopia expelled more than 75,000 Eritreans and Ethiopian citizens of Eritrean origin. Between 70,000 and 100,000 people died, and almost a million were displaced. The conflict spread as Eritrea began supporting the Somalia-based OLF fighting for independence from Ethiopia and Somali Islamists battling Ethiopian invasion. Between 2000 and 2008, the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), numbering 4,000 international troops at the height of its strength in 2002, patrolled a 25-kilometer-wide strip along the Eritrean side of the border. Although an international border commission eventually found that Badme belonged to Eritrea, Ethiopian forces did not surrender it, and tensions between the two countries continue.⁷

THE MILITARIES OF ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA AFTER 1991

In 1991, the EPRDF transitional government disbanded the existing Ethiopian military and relied on its own mostly Tigrayan fighters. In 1993, the government began forming a professional multiethnic Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) and demobilized many former guerrillas, though Tigrayans continued to dominate the officer corps. Given that Eritrea's separation meant the loss of a coastline, Ethiopia had no further use for a navy. In 1996, the ENDF adopted formal ranks and conventional units. This transition, assisted by the United States, was delayed by the Ethiopian-Eritrean War of 1998–2000, when the Ethiopian military was dramatically increased from 100,000 to 250,000 in a few months; another 100,000 militiamen were mobilized; and many former officers and pilots from the Mengistu regime were re-enlisted. During the war with Eritrea, the ENDF hired several hundred former Soviet personnel to maintain and operate new military equipment, and some of these worked in senior command positions. Most of these contractors were replaced by Ethiopians in 2000 and within a few years, only a few Russian technicians remained. In 2002, the United States established the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti to combat Islamist terrorism in the region and in January 2004, a U.S. military base was established in Ethiopia. The continuing border tensions with Eritrea and repeated U.S.-backed military interventions in Somalia made it difficult for the Ethiopian government to embark on a planned reduction of its armed forces, which—in 2004—totalled 180,000 personnel, all of whom were

volunteers. The restructured ENDF was divided into a headquarters at Addis Ababa, which maintained a reserve of 2 divisions with 3 brigades each, and 3 military regions each with a corps of 2 divisions and a mechanized brigade. In the early 2000s, the Ethiopian army had 250 tanks, 400 armored reconnaissance and personnel carriers, 400 towed artillery pieces, 50 multiple rocket launchers, and 370 surface-to-air missiles. The Ethiopian Air Force had 48 combat aircraft, 25 armed helicopters, and 12 transport helicopters.⁸

In the early 1990s, the EPLF was transformed into the Eritrean Defence Force (EDF) with army, air, and naval elements. While the EPLF in 1991 was a 95,000-strong army with 12 infantry brigades, 1 tank brigade, artillery and engineering units, and a militia, the basic organizational element was small, and there were no formal ranks or insignia. In 1995, the EDF adopted ranks, regulations, and a distinct officer corps. By 1996, given costs, the Eritrean government had reduced the regular EDF to 45,000 personnel. Eritrea requires all men and women who are 18 years old to complete national service, which includes six months of military training and 12 months in reconstruction and development programs. This brings Eritrea's total military personnel to around 170,000. As during the independence war, conscription was meant to promote national unity by bringing together people from diverse backgrounds. Beginning in 2002, the posting of conscripts to government businesses led to dissatisfaction and mass desertion. The government responded by having all students complete their last year of high school at Sawa military camp. At independence, the EPLF navy became the Eritrean navy and gained most of the vessels of the defunct Ethiopian navy. By the mid-1990s, it had developed into a small professional force with 45 vessels tasked with keeping foreign fishing boats out of Eritrean waters. Although the EPLF had no air power during the independence war, in 1991, it captured the Ethiopian airfield at Asmara, where five MiG fighters, two helicopters, and a few light aircraft were turned into the nucleus of the new Eritrean Air Force. After Ethiopia bombed the Asmara airport in 1998, Eritrea purchased 16 MiG-29 fighters and sent air crews for training in Ukraine.⁹

CIVIL WAR IN SOMALIA, 1978–2013

Losing the Ogaden War weakened the Barre regime. In 1978, one month after the conflict's end, a group of disgruntled army officers

(mostly from the Majeerteen clan in Somalia's northeast) failed to overthrow Barre. Those conspirators who escaped execution fled to Ethiopia, where they formed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which developed a military wing with support from Ethiopia and Libya. Between June and August 1982, the SSDF and Ethiopian forces invaded central Somalia and captured several towns, which threatened to divide the country in two. The arrival of U.S. military aid in Somalia prompted the Ethiopians and Somali rebels to withdraw. Given internal conflicts, SSDF military operations against the Barre regime stopped in the mid-1980s. In 1981, Somalis from the Isaaq clan formed the Somali National Movement (SNM), also based in Ethiopia, from where it launched an insurgency inside the clan's northwestern home area. In January 1982, the SNM conducted its first operation by raiding Mandera Prison near Berbera, where it freed hundreds of political prisoners and captured weapons at a nearby armory. The Barre regime responded by declaring a state of emergency in the north, which involved imposing a curfew, preventing movement out of the region, banning the sale of gasoline to civilians, and closing the border with Djibouti to prevent the rebels from escaping. While Barre changed his tactics the next year by lifting the emergency and offering insurgents amnesty, the SNM conducted dozens of attacks against state forces in northern Somalia in the mid-1980s, to which the regime responded by executing civilians.

In April 1988, Mengistu and Barre, facing escalating rebellions and declining superpower support, withdrew troops from their border and stopped supporting insurgents in each other's country. In May, SNM forces left bases in Ethiopia and embarked on an offensive that over the next few months took most of northern Somalia, except the cities that were besieged. Deprived of Ethiopian assistance, the SNM captured weapons, ammunition, and vehicles from the Somali army, and more Isaaq clan members and military deserters joined. Toyota pickup trucks mounted with heavy weapons, called technicals, provided mobility and firepower, and a small fleet of armed speedboats patrolled the northern coast. Half a million people fled northern Somalia for Ethiopia or Djibouti, and the Barre regime formed a militia of Ogadeni Ethiopian refugees to fight the SNM, rewarding them with abandoned businesses and land. In 1989, Ogadeni soldiers in the south mutinied and created the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), which joined the rebellion against Barre. During the late 1980s, Barre repressed the Hawiye clan of central and southern Somalia because

its many top government and military officials had begun to question him. In 1987, exiled Hawiye members in Ethiopia formed the United Somali Congress (USC), which fought against Barre but split between the Abgal subclan originating from Mogadishu and Habar Gidir subclan led by former regime general Mohamed Farrah Aidid. During the fighting in Mogadishu, Barre ordered artillery to bomb Hawiye neighborhoods, which provoked a major uprising that caused the dictator to flee the capital in late January 1991. The SNA and other state security forces were disbanded, with personnel joining various militias. Aidid's forces entered Mogadishu and pursued Barre, who fled to the southwest, where he rallied his Marrehan clan under the banner of the Somali National Front (SNF). In May, military pressure from the USC forced Barre to flee to Kenya, and he died in Nigeria in 1995. With various groups fighting in the south, the USC took control of the southern port of Kismayo in April, lost it later that year, and recaptured it in 1992. The Abgal and Habar Gidir USC factions fought for control of Mogadishu until July, when they agreed to form an interim government with the former's Ali Malhi as president and the latter's Aidid as chairman. In May 1991, the SNM—in control of the north and with popular support—declared that the formerly British colony would separate from the chaotic south and become the Somaliland Republic.

In September 1991, heavy fighting erupted between the USC factions and other groups in Mogadishu and by March 1992, it had caused 14,000 deaths. The 5,000 fighters of Ali Malhi's Abgal group controlled the northern sector and were challenged by 10,000 men of Aidid's Habar Gidir group. The Arab League, Islamic Conference, OAU, and United Nations all failed to convince the faction leaders to stop fighting. Civil war and drought forced Somalis to flee and by August 1992, there were 500,000 in Ethiopia; 300,000 in Kenya; 65,000 in Yemen; 15,000 in Djibouti; and 100,000 in European countries. The United Nations estimated that at least a quarter of Somalia's population, 1.5 million people, could starve. Mogadishu and other southern ports were dominated by bandits and warlords who blocked the delivery of international famine relief. The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) had been created in April to supervise a cease-fire that never took effect and in July, its 500 peacekeepers—mostly from Pakistan—were prevented by Ali Malhi and Aidid from delivering aid.

In November 1992, when Aidid demanded that UN forces leave and threatened to resist further deployments, the United States decided to launch Operation Restore Hope (also known as United

Task Force or UNITAF) as a U.S.-led and UN-authorized multinational mission to create a safe zone in southern Somalia for humanitarian assistance. In early December, U.S. Navy SEAL operators landing on the beach at Mogadishu for reconnaissance were greeted by camera-wielding reporters. Subsequently, two battalions of U.S. marines used amphibious and helicopter landings to seize Mogadishu's harbor and airport, the port of Kismayo, and a number of inland airports. Of the UNITAF's 37,000 personnel, some 25,000 were American, with smaller contingents from Pakistan, France, Belgium, Italy, Canada, Australia, Nigeria, Morocco, Zimbabwe, and others. Food distribution centers were quickly established, and aid reached the population. Although U.S. marine general Joseph P. Hoar announced in mid-December that his forces would not disarm Somalia militiamen, early the next month, U.S. forces began to pursue technicals and raid weapons caches to facilitate the operation as well as protect military personnel and Somali civilians. The operation resulted in several scandals—Belgian soldiers were accused of torturing Somali children, Italians were accused of raping Somali women, and the March 1993 murder of a Somali teenager by Canadian troops led to the disbanding of the Canadian Airborne Regiment.

In May 1993, UNITAF was replaced by UNOSOM II, which consisted of 22,000 soldiers and 8,000 civilians with the aim of disarming militias, imposing stability, rebuilding infrastructure, and assisting in the establishment of a new government. Although most U.S. forces withdrew, the UN peacekeepers were assisted by a U.S. quick reaction force stationed on ships off the coast. When Aidid's militia killed 24 Pakistani peacekeepers in June, the United Nations launched a determined search for him, which resulted in further violence across Mogadishu. In August, after Aidid's militia employed improvised explosive devices against U.S. vehicles, the Clinton administration authorized Operation Gothic Serpent in which 160 elite Delta Force operators and Army Rangers supported by 16 helicopters were sent to Mogadishu to capture Aidid. On October 3, the U.S. task force staged a failed raid on a Mogadishu hotel where Aidid was supposedly hiding in which two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down, and 18 personnel were killed, with some of their corpses dragged through the streets by angry Somalis. The incident has been immortalized as Black Hawk Down, or the First Battle of Mogadishu. The beleaguered Americans, engaged in the most intense close combat their forces had experienced since the Vietnam War, were rescued by

an armored column of U.S., Malaysian, and Pakistani peacekeepers. Three days later, the Clinton administration—bowing to public outrage in the United States—abandoned the hunt for Aidid and in March 1994, U.S. land forces withdrew from Somalia. In November 1993, the UN Security Council, given the failure of peacekeeping in Somalia, voted to terminate UNOSOM II and in March 1995, U.S. naval vessels assisted in the final departure of UN forces. This debacle led to what has been called the Somalia Syndrome, in which Western states hesitate to intervene in war torn countries for humanitarian purposes. After Aidid was killed in battle in 1996, his son Hussein Mohamed Farrah, who had participated in Operation Restore Hope as a U.S. marine, took over leadership of the Habar Gidir militia.

Somalia became a “failed state.” Between 2000 and 2006, two successive transitional central governments were formed in Baidoa but did not have authority outside the southern town. At the same time, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which had emerged in the mid-1990s, gained control over much of the south, including Mogadishu, as it restored order through sharia and challenged secular warlords. In the north, the self-ruling areas of Somaliland and Puntland (the latter declared in 1998) remained relatively stable. In 2006, the Mogadishu warlords formed the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), which—given the U.S. campaign against militant Islamists—was funded by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Beginning in March 2006, the ICU and the ARPCT fought for control of Mogadishu and in early June, during the Second Battle of Mogadishu, the former gained the upper hand, and remaining warlords either surrendered or fled to Ethiopia. The ICU stabilized Mogadishu for the first time in 15 years and spread to other cities such as Kismayo, which was captured in late September. In late December, ICU forces supplemented by 500 troops from Eritrea advanced on the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) at Baidoa. However, the TFG was saved by a large Ethiopian force with tanks, attack helicopters, and MiG fighters that crossed the border and repelled the Islamists. It appears that the George W. Bush administration in the United States, concerned that Somalia would turn into a haven for international Islamist terrorists, had encouraged Ethiopian prime minister Zenawi to invade. The retreating ICU militia suffered a series of quick defeats at several other towns, forces from Puntland descended from the north to join the campaign against the Islamists, and within a week, TFG and Ethiopian forces occupied Mogadishu and Kismayo without a fight.

In January 2007, with UN support, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established to support the TFG, and the next month, 1,500 Ugandan troops arrived in Mogadishu. By October 2008, AMISOM had 3,700 personnel in Mogadishu consisting of 2,000 Ugandans and 1,700 Burundians. Ethiopian and AMISOM troops in Somalia, supported by periodic U.S. airstrikes, faced an increasing ICU insurgency. Ethiopian forces, accused of brutality against Somali civilians, withdrew in January 2009 after the TFG absorbed a moderate faction of the ICU. However, Al-Shabaab, the extremist ICU youth movement, continued the struggle with heavy fighting in Mogadishu and central Somalia in May and June 2009. By January 2010, Islamist insurgents were in control of most of southern Somalia, including Kismayo and Baidoa, and the TFG and 5,300 AMISOM troops were confined to part of Mogadishu. Between 2008 and 2010, some 22,000 people died in the fighting; over 1 million were displaced; and 475,000 fled to other countries. During the late 2000s, the TFG began to rebuild a Somali National Army (SNA) with arms and equipment donated by the United States and training funded by the European Union. In November 2011, given Al-Shabaab's involvement in a bombing in Uganda and kidnapping of foreigners in Kenya, East African leaders agreed that the Islamist group represented a threat to regional security and planned a joint military operation to eliminate it. By August 2011, Al-Shabaab, suffering internal dissent, had been driven from Mogadishu by TFG forces and AMISOM, which had been increased to 9,000 troops mostly from Uganda and Burundi, with a few hundred from Nigeria and Djibouti. Largely funded by the United States, AMISOM's soldiers were motivated by earning US\$1,000 per month instead of their usual \$50 to \$100, and by November 2011, around 500 had been killed. Beginning in 2010, Ethiopian forces made increasingly deeper forays into Somalia in support of the TFG and in February 2012, they assisted in the recapture Baidoa. Despite a UN arms embargo, Eritrea continued to supply Al-Shabaab as a proxy against Ethiopia. In October 2011, TFG and Kenyan forces launched Operation Linda Nchi against Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia and in June, the Kenyan troops were absorbed into AMISOM, raising its total to 18,000. In September 2012, as the TFG met in Mogadishu to select a president, the Kenyan navy bombarded Kismayo (where Al-Shabaab generated revenue by exporting charcoal to the Arabian Peninsula), and by the start of the next month, the port was occupied by Kenyan-TFG forces. In these operations, the Kenyan military was

supported by French and U.S. air transport as well as U.S. aerial drones from southern Ethiopia. As Al-Shabaab continued to control the countryside and raid AMISOM-TFG forces, rival militias with a regional separatist agenda began fighting each other for control of Kismayo in June 2013.

During the late 2000s, Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden increased dramatically, with 35 successful hijackings in 2008 and 47 in 2009, which resulted in US\$120 million in ransom payments. While the rise in piracy was related to lack of state control and accessibility of weapons, some contend that the destruction of local fishing by foreign ships and dumping of toxic waste meant that coastal people had few options. Responding to the pirate threat, shipping companies hired armed guards and in 2008, a multinational antipiracy naval fleet that included U.S., Canadian, European Union, Russian, Pakistani, Indian, and Chinese vessels formed off the Horn of Africa. This was the Chinese Navy's first deployment outside the Asia-Pacific region since the 1400s. In 2009, the Somali TFG re-created the Somali Navy, defunct since 1991, though after three years it would have just three small boats because funds were diverted to rebuild the army to battle Al-Shabaab. With money from the United Arab Emirates and training from the Japanese coast guard, the Puntland administration formed the Puntland Maritime Police Force in 2010 to conduct overland raids on coastal pirate bases.¹⁰

SUDAN'S FIRST CIVIL WAR, 1955–1972

The British had ruled Sudan as two distinct territories—the predominantly Muslim north, and the Christian and traditionalist south. In 1956, the British granted Sudan independence as a single country dominated by the north. The previous year, a mutiny by members of the Sudan Defence Force in the south was suppressed, but fugitives fled to the bush and started a limited insurgency. With the 1958 military takeover in Khartoum and subsequent promotion of Muslims and repression of southern Christians, educated southerners absconded to other countries, where they created the Sudan African Nationalist Union (SANU) as a separatist organization and others joined the mutineers in the bush. Inside south Sudan, a number of insurgent groups collectively known as Anyanya (“snake venom”) did not coordinate operations, sometimes fought one other, and

tended to recruit and fight within their own specific areas. In the early 1960s, the Anyanya lacked external support and armed themselves by ambushing army patrols, raiding police stations, and accepting security force deserters with weapons. The first major Anyanya operation happened in January 1964 when a group under Bernadino Mou Mou attacked Wau, capital of Bahr al-Ghazal province, killing a dozen soldiers and capturing many automatic weapons. In 1964, Anyanya insurgents, totalling around 5,000, captured arms being transported through southern Sudan for the Simba rebels in eastern Congo (see Chapter 4). The following year, the defeated Simbas fled into south Sudan, where the Anyanya confiscated their 6,000 small arms. Ordered by Khartoum to harass educated southerners, the Sudanese army garrison in the southern town of Juba massacred 1,400 civilians in mid-July 1965. Many southerners bolted to refugee camps in Uganda and Congo but others, particularly security force deserters, joined the Anyanya. The government responded by driving the rural population of the Equatoria region into 33 "peace villages" near the towns, where hundreds died of disease and hunger. In the areas of Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile that bordered on northern Sudan, the state formed ethnic militias to counter the rebels. The Anyanya failed to politicize the peasants of southern Sudan and alienated them by stealing livestock. Anyanya leaders developed a distain for the movement's exiled and educated political leaders, and some banned English among insurgents to symbolize a rejection of intellectuals. Anyanya received erratic support from Ethiopia and Uganda because these governments did not want to be seen backing separatist movements, as they were fighting similar groups at home. SANU leader Father Saturnino Lohure was killed by Ugandan soldiers while trying to cross the border in 1967.

The first attempt to unify the rebels occurred in August 1967 with the formation of the Southern Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG) in Angundri, 48 kilometers southwest of Juba. However, within a year, it collapsed because of internal conflicts and the departure of its leader, Aggrey Jaden, for Kenya. Under Jaden, the SSPG had appointed the illiterate and militarily inexperienced Major General Emedio Tafeng Odongi as commander in chief of the Anyanya National Armed Forced (ANAF), but this was resented by chief of staff Colonel Joseph Lagu, a former lieutenant in the Sudanese army who had deserted to the rebels in 1963. After Arab defeat in the 1967 Six Day War, Lagu had written the Israeli government offering to open

another front against the Arabs in southern Sudan in return for military support. In December of that year, he visited Israel for training and to plan Israeli airdrops. In 1968, Lagu established his headquarters at Owiny-ki-Bul in eastern Equatoria and with the breakdown of the SSPG, he became the sole beneficiary of Israeli assistance. Lagu visited Israel again in January 1969 and arranged an Israeli military assessment team to come to Equatoria and two Israeli supply drops per month. In June, the Israelis gained permission from pro-Western Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie to establish an Anyanya training camp in Ethiopia and smuggle weapons into Upper Nile because Sudan was supporting separatists in Eritrea. While Ugandan prime minister Milton Obote reneged on an agreement to let the Israelis use his country's airspace to supply Lagu's rebels, Ugandan military commander Idi Amin, who was from the northern Uganda–southern Sudan border, secretly facilitated Israeli deliveries to Owiny-ki-Bul. In January 1971, the first Anyanya officers arrived in Israel for courses on weapons, explosives, radio communication, management, and medical care. To conceal their role, the Israelis gave Lagu's insurgents Soviet- and Chinese-made small arms that had been captured from Arab armies. As the sole conduit for Israeli sponsorship, Lagu extended his authority over all the Anyanya groups, formed a unified military command, and renamed the ANAF the Southern Sudan Liberation Front (later renamed Southern Sudan Liberation Movement [SSLM]). In the late 1960s, German mercenary and Biafra War veteran Rolf Steiner arrived to assist the Anyanya, but the Israelis suspected he was a Nazi and arranged his departure to Uganda where, in 1971, he was arrested and sent to Khartoum to face several years' imprisonment. Abandoning Jaden's policy of ethnically mixed units, Lagu restructured the Anyanya into ethnic formations, with Bari Anyanya in central Equatoria, Dinka Anyanya in Bahr al-Ghazal, and Nuer Anyanya in Upper Nile.

While Anyanya activities in 1966–1967 consisted of attacks on remote government stations, night raids on the fringes of defended towns, and ambushes of convoys, the installation of a radio network in 1968–1969 allowed Lagu to coordinate operations. In 1970, the insurgency expanded with the Anyanya mining all main roads in Equatoria and shelling Juba. Khartoum responded by dispatching Soviet advisors, weapons, and Soviet-made aircraft and helicopters to the south. In September and October 1970, the Anyanya conducted a large coordinated attack on the town of Morta, which—after a battle

that inflicted heavy casualties on both sides, including the loss of several government helicopters—changed hands several times but was eventually secured by the rebels. Consequently, Khartoum launched a counteroffensive in 1971 that did not achieve much except that Sudanese soldiers supported by two battalions of Egyptian commandos overran Owiny-ki-Bul. The Anyanya retaliated by destroying a large Sudanese military base at Naupo in western Equatoria in May 1971, where Israeli antitank guns proved effective against Soviet-supplied armor and by the end of the year, the conflict had stalemated. While Equatoria's forests, mountains, and valleys were suitable for guerrilla warfare, the dry grasslands and seasonal flood plains of Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile meant that insurgents conducted stealthy night raids and security forces were restricted to forays from defended posts along navigable rivers and more lethal air attacks against rebels caught in the open. The hitherto poorly armed Nuer Anyanya of Upper Nile had limited their operations to the provincial capital of Malakal and ambushes of river traffic, but this changed in 1970 with a synchronized offensive that ambushed army road convoys and sank a steamer on the Sobat River. In December 1970 and January 1971, the Nuer Anyanya captured Pocahalla, where they killed 120 Sudanese soldiers and seized a large amount of weapons and ammunition. Around the same time, Anyanya in Bahr al-Ghazal mined the major roads, ambushed an armored column at Tead-Adhol, and destroyed the important railway to Wau.

The Anyanya, totalling 13,000 fighters, controlled the countryside yet were unable to dislodge state forces from fortified towns. This deadlock prompted Khartoum, under Colonel Ja'afar Muhammad Numayri (who had come to power in a 1969 coup), to negotiate with the insurgents and in March 1972, the belligerents signed an agreement in Addis Ababa that ended the war and granted southern Sudan some autonomy. Lagu and other SSLM leaders abandoned the goal of complete independence because the international political climate in Africa was hostile to secession and attempted breakaways in Nigeria and Congo had been violently suppressed. It was also agreed that within five years, the composition of the Sudan People's Armed Forces (SPAF) would mirror the country's population distribution, and that half of the 12,000 personnel of the Southern Command would be former Anyanya fighters. Many insurgents suspected that Lagu had sold out when he was appointed a major general in the SPAF and member of the ruling politburo.¹¹

SUDAN'S SECOND CIVIL WAR, 1983–2005

In the predominantly northern SPAF, the vast majority of rank and file came from the west, while most officers were from Nile groups, particularly the Shaiqiya. There was strong opposition within the military to the integration of southern “terrorists,” and some officers resigned while others, given the vague wording of the Addis Ababa agreement, believed the arrangement would expire in five years. By July 1973, there were 6,200 Anyanya—around 2,000 from each province—who had been retrained for incorporation into a conventional army. Major General Lagu also received instruction, as did the well-educated Captain John Garang de Mabior, who undertook advanced training at Fort Benning in the United States. The SPAF Southern Command was reorganized into six battalions of former Anyanya and five of state troops. There were some problems, as former Anyanya mutinied in Juba in December 1974 and Akobo in March 1975, and a company deserted from Wau in an abortive bid to restart the rebellion. Other potentially violent incidents were defused by the intervention of Southern Regional president Abel Alier and Lagu, and by 1976, Southern Command consisted entirely of mixed units. The 7,600 former Anyanya not integrated into the military were given government jobs involving roads, forestry, and agriculture until funds ran out in 1974.

In the early 1980s, Numayri, pressured by Islamist political opponents, undercut the Addis Ababa agreement with an aggressive program of Arabization and Islamization. Many former Anyanya soldiers had become disillusioned with the SPAF because their education and training were inferior to state troops who had better career prospects, and most former Anyanya who applied to enter the military college were rejected. To eliminate the concentration of southern soldiers in the south, Numayri—in late 1982—ordered three battalions from the Southern Command transferred to the north and west. In January 1983, the 105th Battalion refused to leave and in mid-May, elements of the SPAF Armoured Division arrived by river steamer and attacked the mutineer garrisons at Bor and Pibor. After a day of intense combat, the 105th troops, including their commander Major Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, withdrew into the bush, and the battalion’s garrison at Pochalla crossed into Ethiopia. In early June, Numayri declared Republican Order Number One, which abrogated the Addis Ababa agreement by replacing the elected Southern Regional

Government with three unelected and powerless provincial administrations. Arabic became the only official language, the proportional representation of southerners in the military was cancelled, and units from the south were ordered to other regions. By July, more than 2,500 southern soldiers had deserted to a rebel base at Bilpam in Ethiopia, and 500 others were hiding in the bush in Bahr al-Ghazal. These deserters joined with the few Anyanya fighters who had not accepted the Addis Ababa pact, and continued a campaign of banditry throughout the 1970s and early 1980s known as Anyanya II.

At the end of July 1983, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), with Colonel John Garang as political and military leader, released its manifesto to overthrow Numayri and establish a federal Sudan. Because it needed external support from Mengistu's Ethiopia, which was fighting Eritrean separatists, the SPLM/A could not claim independence as a goal, which alienated many older Anyanya II leaders, who rejected Garang. In May 1984, SPLA and Ethiopian forces tracked down and killed Nuer Anyanya II leader Samuel Gai Tut. In late 1984, Khartoum began to arm the 300 Anyanya II fighters of William Abdullah Chuol, who formed a progovernment Nuer militia in Upper Nile and attempted to cut the SPLA's supply lines to Ethiopia. The SPLM/A had little presence in Equatoria, where it was considered a Dinka army, and in January 1985, two SPLA columns—each consisting of 1,500 poorly trained fighters—penetrated the area, where they were defeated by the state army and local militias. However, by the end of the year, the SPLA had established its internal headquarters on the Boma Plateau in eastern Equatoria near the Ethiopian border. Garang decided to attack Sudan's most successful development projects. In early February 1984, Anyanya II fighters allied to Garang attacked the Chevron camp at Rub Kona near Bentiu, which caused the oil company to withdraw from Sudan. Later the same month, the SPLA Jamus Battalion destroyed the base of a French company digging the Jonglei Canal, which ended the project.

Despite a 1985 military coup in Khartoum that overthrew Numayri, Islamic law remained, and the southern insurgency continued. By 1985, the SPLA had 10,000 fighters in southern Sudan and another 20,000 recruits in Ethiopia. The price of Ethiopia's support for the SPLA was participation in Mengistu's campaigns against separatist insurgents such as the Gambella People's Liberation Front (GPLF) and the Muslim OLF backed by Khartoum. Since Sudan's 56,000 military personnel were poorly armed, inadequately supplied, and

demoralized, they remained on the defensive in the south and by the end of 1985 held only the fortified towns. The SPLM/A and most southerners boycotted Sudan's April 1986 elections, which brought to power a moderate Islamist coalition led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, who promised to reform Islamic law and achieve peace but failed. Negotiations between Sadiq's administration and the SPLM/A were suspended in August 1986 when an ethnic Shilluk SPLA unit used a Soviet-made SAM-7 missile to down a Sudan Airways civilian aircraft, killing 60 passengers and in revenge the regime sent Anyanya II militia to destroy Shilluk villages. While the SPLA had fought progovernment local militias during 1985 and 1986, Garang changed his tactics in 1987 to entice them to his side. In Equatoria, the SPLA created mobile units that prevented the army from extorting food, and in Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile, they lessened their own food demands. These reforms and state violence against civilians enhanced SPLA popularity.

During 1986 and 1987, the SPLA—expanding rapidly and including child soldiers—captured Pibor, Ayod, and Jokau; attacked Bentiu, Fashoda, Kapoeta, and Maridi; and destroyed the fuel depot at Malakal airport. The government responded by mobilizing the Baqqara militia, the Murahiliin, which attacked Dinka people who had moved north because of drought and took their cattle. In late March 1987, at Ed Daein in southern Darfur, some 1,500 Dinka were locked inside railway cars and burned to death. With 250,000 Dinka fleeing south, the SPLA launched an offensive in January 1987 that drove the Murahiliin north into southern Kordofan, where 150 were killed and 4,000 cattle recovered. After the failure of the latest offensive, Sadiq appointed the Baqqara general Fadlallah Burma Nasr as minister of defense in February 1987. He armed the southern Baqqara youth with assault rifles and directed them to deprive the SPLA of support by slaughtering the Dinka of Bahr al-Ghazal. Later in 1987, the SPLA expanded north when the Volcano Battalion under Yusif Kuwa moved into the eastern Nuba Hills, besieged Talodi, and recruited many people. Around the same time, the SPLA helped the Dinka around Wau defend themselves against the army and ethnic Fartit militia led by Major General Abu Qurun (also known as Our Hitler among state forces). The short-lived SPLA capture of Kurmuk, a town on the Sudan-Ethiopian border 720 kilometers southeast of Khartoum and close to a hydroelectric project that supplied most of the capital's electricity, in November and December 1987 enflamed

northern Arab hatred of southern "black Africans," and incited Libya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan to pledge military support for Sudan. With peace talks going nowhere, some Anyanya II joined the SPLA in January 1988, although a Bul Nuer group in the west Upper Nile was transformed into a government militia assigned to protect the Bentiu oil fields. Garang's authoritarian leadership provoked resentment that led to imprisonment and executions in late 1987 and early 1988. In 1988, Garang moved SPLA headquarters from Bilpam in Ethiopia to the Boma Plateau in Sudan's eastern Equatoria.

The army offensive of 1988 was initially successful, as in June it destroyed a large SPLA camp in Upper Nile and at the start of July recaptured Torit. Beginning in March 1988, the progovernment Murahiliin attacked Dinka communities, killing men, raping women, enslaving children, stealing livestock, and burning homes, schools, and clinics. As famine worsened, the SPLA destroyed bridges, mined roads, and ambushed convoys to prevent food from reaching army-held towns. By August, more than 3 million southerners had fled north, and there were 300,000 starving refugees in Ethiopia. By the end of the year, over 250,000 people in the south had died. The return of the rains ended the famine and bolstered the SPLA, which launched an offensive in early 1989 that captured a series of towns. In late January, the important Upper Nile center of Nasir fell after both sides took heavy losses; in late February, Torit was recaptured; in March, Parajok, Nimule, Mongalla, and Gemmaiza fell; in April, Akobo was taken; and in May, Waat was overrun. In January, the SPLA devastated a combined SPAF and Murahiliin force in the Nuba Hills and in March, the insurgents were reinforced by the arrival of Yusuf Kuwa's New Kush Battalion. By July, the SPLA controlled a massive area from northern Bahr al-Ghazal to eastern Equatoria, besieged Juba, and reduced Murahiliin raids.

In November 1988, talks between Khartoum and the SPLM/A in Addis Ababa had produced a tentative agreement that was never implemented because in June 1989, Sudan's paratrooper brigade and army engineers, backed by the hardline National Islamic Front (NIF), overthrew Sadiq and put Brigadier Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir in power. The new regime was determined to enlarge the armed forces to facilitate Arabization and Islamization. However, in 1990, economic problems limited the increase of the SPAF to 65,000 (rather than the desired 78,000), and lack of spare parts and maintenance meant that the dramatically expanded air force flew fewer aircraft. Under NIF

pressure, the military government imposed conscription to create a paramilitary People's Defence Force (PDF) of 150,000 young draftees in 1991. With little military training and considerable Islamic indoctrination, the PDF became the cannon fodder for the state's war in the south. After the SPLA inflicted heavy casualties on the PDF in Blue Nile Province, the conscript force would be thrown into combat only after the regular army had failed, and some of the better PDF units became Public Order Police used to suppress civilian protest in the north. When the SPLA again captured Kurmuk in October 1989 but were quickly expelled by army units diverted from the south, the military regime gained the impression it was winning the war. During most of 1990, both sides agreed to a cease-fire. The victory of Sudanese-backed Tigrayan rebels in Ethiopia in May 1991 was a disaster for the SPLA because it lost its external training camps, supplies, radio station, and political office. Anticipating Mengistu's fall, the SPLM/A resettled 250,000 southern Sudanese refugees from Ethiopia back to different parts of southern Sudan in February 1991. At this time, the SPLM/A had become thoroughly militarized, there was no effort to promote social or economic development or political consciousness in areas it controlled, and SPLA forces often abused civilians.

In late August 1991, three senior SPLA commanders in Nasir—Lam Akol Ajawin, Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon, and Gordon Kong Cuol—declared Garang's removal because of dictatorial leadership and that they would pursue southern independence. They acquired military support from Khartoum's Upper Nile governor, who hoped to destabilize the insurgents. Most SPLA commanders refused to join the coup, which left Lam, Riek, and Gordon with only the Nuer SPLA units around Nasir, the Bul Nuer militia, and the Luo Nuer Anyanya II, which they formed into the SPLA-Nasir. The attempted coup became an ethnic Nuer versus Dinka conflict. In late September, around Ayod, the SPLA-Nasir forced the SPLA to retreat and began killing Dinka civilians until the arrival of SPLA reinforcements that pushed north from Bor to Kongor and destroyed large amounts of supplies and fuel delivered by government aircraft to the SPLA-Nasir. Against the advice of his senior officers and with many of his men armed by Khartoum, Riek launched a Nuer counteroffensive that pushed to Bor, where thousands of Dinka civilians were killed or mutilated in the Bor Massacre. Subsequently, Garang assembled a large SPLA force from Torit that drove the SPLA-Nasir back to Ayod with heavy losses. Exploiting the conflict between SPLA and SPLA-

Nasir, the army launched its own offensive in February 1992 in which SPLA-Nasir allowed it to pass through its territory to seize Pochalla, Pibor, Bor, Kapoeta, and the important Torit, which compelled Garang to withdraw his headquarters to Chikundum in the forested Didinga Hills. In June and July, the SPLA responded to government gains by assaulting Juba but were repelled with heavy casualties. In the subsequent chaos, some SPLA commanders absconded to the SPLA-Nasir, including Major Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, who had escaped a six-year imprisonment for plotting against Garang. In March 1993, the SPLA-Nasir was renamed SPLA-United and for the rest of the year fought the SPLA around Kongor, Ayod, and Waat. A state offensive in June fumbled as a heavily armed SPAF column with air support failed to take Rumbek but fared better in the Nuba Hills where, by late August, the SPLA was evicted from all towns. During 1993 and 1994, the SPLA-United, armed by Khartoum, caused serious problems for the SPLA in Bahr al-Ghazal and eastern Equatoria. Despite its military success, SPLA-United began to fall apart as Riek favored the Jikany Nuer in conflicts with the Luo Nuer over pasture and the latter acquired weapons from the government. The SPLA-United could not resolve the contradiction of claiming to fight for southern independence yet accepting assistance from Khartoum. Attempting to bolster his failing leadership, Riek dismissed SPLA-United leaders who had accepted government support and founded the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A) in October 1994. Rejected by other Sudanese opposition leaders and expelled from Ethiopia, Riek and Kerubino went to Khartoum in April 1996, where they signed a peace charter that accepted a federal Sudan and the vague promise of a future referendum in which the south could determine its political future. With a few loyal Nuer fighters, Riek's SSIM/A continued to fight the SPLA.

Given the loss of Ethiopian sponsorship and internal violence, Garang renewed his leadership by hosting the SPLM/A's first national convention at Chikundum in April 1994, at which 500 delegates endorsed southern self-determination and planned civilian administration in liberated areas. With the collapse of SPLA-United, defections from the SSIM/A, and quarrels between the government's SPAF and PDF, the SPLA won a series of military victories in Equatoria in July and October 1994, Bahr al-Ghazal in February 1995, and the Nuba Hills in May 1995. During the first months of 1995, state forces suffered 9,000 killed and 15,000 wounded, most of whom were PDF

conscripts. In October 1995, the SPLA retook Parajok and Owiny-ki-Bul, and in November they recaptured Obbo, Panyikwara, Ame, Moli, Pageri, Loa, and Kit. After the failure of a government offensive on the Kit River in mid-December, the SPLA launched a dry-season offensive that captured a string of towns, including Aswa in January 1996, Khor Yabus and Chali in southern Blue Nile, and Pachalla in March. The advance was halted by the onset of rains in April. Army morale deteriorated as in early 1996, two SPAF battalions refused to leave their garrisons for the countryside, another surrendered to the SPLA southeast of Rumbek, and Bashir purged 162 officers.

In January 1997, the SPLA's 13th Division embarked on Operation Black Fox, its annual dry-season offensive, which captured Kurmuk and Qaissan on the Ethiopian border, and other centers in southern Blue Nile, which prompted a predictable public outcry in Khartoum. A government mechanized column retook Kurmuk and several southern Blue Nile towns but was routed by the SPLA, which devastated a 2,000-man brigade and captured large amounts of weapons and equipment. North of the Blue Nile at Khor Gana and Yakuru, a counterattack by five battalions of SPAF and PDF was repelled by the Tana Brigade of the SPLA's 13th Division. With the failure of the government counteroffensive, the SPLA launched Operation Thunderbolt in March 1997 that swept through Equatoria, killing 8,000 state troops and capturing another 1,700. After the SPLA mauled the West Nile Bank Front (WNBFF)—Khartoum-backed Ugandan rebels who had fled the Ugandan invasion of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC; see Chapter 4)—in battles around Morobo and Yei, the government's Juba garrison tried to secure the Juba-Yei road but were repulsed. SPLA victories continued with the capture of Amadi, Lui, and other areas in central Equatoria; Rumbek and Wunrok in Bahr al-Ghazal in April; and Tonj and Warrap in May. In April, the government sponsored a union of six different southern factions opposed to the SPLA, including Riek's SSIM/A and Kerubino's SPLA-Bahr al-Ghazal, but this failed because of incompetent leadership. In July 1997, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a loose coalition of antiregime groups, established a Joint Military Command with Garang as commander in chief and SPAF defector Lieutenant General Abd al-Rahman Sa'id as deputy.

In October, Bashir ordered the conscription of 70,000 Khartoum students, which provoked outrage from parents and mass desertion from training camps, and state employees were offered bonuses to

enlist in the PDF. Bashir created a puppet Council of the South with Riek as head and national vice president, and the commanders of the progovernment southern factions were absorbed into the regular army as general officers. Lam Akol, commander of the Shilluk SPLA-United, made peace with the government in September 1997 and secured the area around Malakal on the White Nile. Insulted by his appointment as Riek's deputy, the now major general Kerubino of the SPLA-Bahr al-Ghazal returned to the SPLA and in late January 1998 led an assault, supported by 2,000 fighters sent by Garang, on Wau that captured most of the provincial capital for two days before the arrival of government reinforcements with artillery and air support. After ten days of fighting, the SPLA was pushed out of Wau, where state forces massacred hundreds of Dinka civilians. During 1998, the oil-producing area of western Upper Nile was plagued by violence between Riek's SSIM/A (renamed the South Sudan Defence Force [SSDF]) and the South Sudan Unity Movement/Army ([SSUM/A]; founded by Bul Nuer militia leader Paulino Matip in reaction to Riek's appointment to lead the Council of the South). Riek's credibility was destroyed when, in January 1999, he formed the United Democratic Salvation Front to run in the upcoming national election in which all registered parties committed to defend national unity and support Islamic law. Nuer militia leader Gatwic Gatkuoth broke with Riek to create SSDF-2 and in April 1999, Khartoum transferred support from Riek to Matip, which led to more fighting. The many defections from his forces prompted Riek, at the end of December 1999, to resign from the Council of the South and resume fighting for southern independence. In January 2002, after long negotiations, he returned to the SPLM/A as vice president. Believing Garang had not given him enough support for the failed attack on Wau, Kerubino went to Nairobi in November 1998, where he provoked gun battles among Sudanese exiles. The next month, Kerubino joined Matip's progovernment group in the Upper Nile, where he was killed in combat with the SPLA in September 1999. In 1994, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a northern Ugandan rebel movement, crossed into southern Sudan and acquired weapons and supplies from the SPAF in exchange for fighting the SPLA in Equatoria. The LRA established a series of fortified camps in the border area, the largest of which was 40 kilometers south of Juba at Jabalain, which was captured by the SPLA in mid-September 1998. Khartoum's

support for the LRA resulted in closer relations between the SPLM/A and the Ugandan government of Yoweri Museveni.

During the late 1990s, Khartoum tried to emerge from international isolation by expelling Islamist terrorists such as Osama bin Laden, initially offered to the Americans who did not follow up, and gained wealth from oil production in western Upper Nile secured by Nuer militia and facilitated by a Canadian, Chinese, and Malaysian oil consortium. In November 1998, the government launched its dry-season offensive earlier than usual by using 2,000 SPAF regulars to seize eight SPLA airstrips in the Nuba Hills, which were not recaptured until March 1999. In March 2000, the army returned with eight regular divisions that destroyed Nuba villages and displaced 14,000 civilians until repelled by an SPLA counteroffensive the next month. During another army offensive in January 2001, the SPLA were almost expelled from Nuba. In January 2002, the Bashir regime and SPLA signed a U.S.-sponsored agreement in Geneva that imposed a cease-fire in the Nuba Hills that was quickly violated by the government but resumed in March when Khartoum agreed to halt aerial attacks on civilians and promised to abolish slavery. The SPLA was more successful in the southern Blue Nile and eastern Sudan where, through the NDA, it had allied with insurgents of the prodemocracy Umma Liberation Army and the Beja Congress, which fought dispossession from historic grazing lands by wealthy commercial farmers. In April 1999, the 1st NDA Unified Brigade and the SPLA New Sudan Brigade defeated the SPAF garrison at Dar al-Umda Hamid, took Umbireiga near Kassala, and repelled a government effort to recapture Kurmuk, Ulu, and Meban. Re-establishing diplomatic relations with Eritrea and Ethiopia in January 2000, Khartoum launched an offensive along the border in March that displaced 160,000 people. In November, the SPAF attacked Hamesh Koraib northeast of Kassala and inflicted heavy losses on the SPLA New Sudan Brigade, which was driven off. However, during 2001, the campaign in eastern Sudan stalemated.

In May 2000, as the SPLA moved forces to the Nuba Hills, southern Blue Nile, and eastern Sudan, the SPAF took the initiative in Bahr al-Ghazal, regaining control of the railway and rebuilding bridges. In January 2001, the government embarked on an offensive in northern Bahr al-Ghazal that involved the SPAF, PDF, and Baqqara Murahiliin; defeated the SPLA; destroyed villages; seized livestock; and replaced Dinka farmers with Baqqara herdsman. The SPLA retaliated by

opening a new front in remote western Bahr al-Ghazal in May and June, where they captured Raga and Daym Zubayr. However, they withdrew in October because supply lines were too long and the local population was hostile to a perceived Dinka invasion.

By 2000, Khartoum was spending US\$500 million a year, half its annual budget, to improve Sudan's military. A shipment of tanks arrived from Poland on the same day that Sudan exported its first barrel of oil. During 2000, Khartoum signed weapons acquisition agreements with Bulgaria and China, with the latter becoming the regime's chief arms supplier, and military delegations visited from Iraq, Iran, and Kazakhstan. At this time, the SPAF consisted of 104,000 personnel, including 20,000 conscripts, and the PDF numbered 15,000, with 85,000 reserves. In 2002, the government spent US\$665 million on its military. However, the SPAF officer corps, still dominated by the Shaiqiya, had deteriorated because advancement was determined by Islamist ideology and nepotism, and during the isolationist 1990s, there had been no opportunities for advanced training in the West or Arab countries. The SPAF remained demoralized because it preferred to defend towns, officers did not trust their soldiers (who largely came from rebellious Nuba and Darfur), and resentful conscripts from the Nile towns looked down on the regulars. The SPAF's 280 tanks were mostly obsolete Soviet and Chinese T-55s, often restricted to the South's poor roads where they were vulnerable to ambush and suffered shortages of spare parts and technicians. The air force consisted of 3,000 personnel and a mixed fleet of a half dozen Antonov transports used as bombers by rolling explosives out the back, Soviet- and Chinese-made fighters flown by foreign mercenaries, and Soviet-made Mi-24 attack helicopters acquired from Belarus in 2002 that proved effective against insurgents. During the rainy season, SPAF garrisons were supplied by a mixed collection of transport planes (including three US-made C-130s) that were vulnerable to SPLA surface-to-air missiles and during the dry season, supply convoys were often waylaid.

The SPLA was strongly opposed to oil from southern Sudan being extracted by foreign companies for the northern-dominated regime. During 2001, the SPAF, Baqqara Murahiliin, armed Chinese oil workers, and Afghan-Arab fighters expelled civilians from the West Nile to make way for oil production. In August 2001, SPLA commandos briefly seized oil facilities at Heglig and sank an oil industry barge on the White Nile. In turn, Lundin Petroleum Company built an all-weather road from Bentiu to Ler, which the SPAF used to move tanks

and armored vehicles into SPLA territory. In February 2002, the government sent forces from Nuba and Kassala up the road to counter an offensive by the SPLA. In eastern Equatoria, in June, the government initiated an intense aerial bombing campaign. Following the breakdown of another cease-fire in September, the SPLA recaptured Torit, which was retaken by government forces the next month.

After years of failed negotiations, Bashir and the SPLA became more serious about peace in 2002. Khartoum wanted to improve its relations with the United States, which was aggressively pursuing Islamist terrorists after the September 2001 attacks; casualties and conscription had made the war unpopular in the north; and spending oil revenue on the military worsened an already troubled economy. Although the SPLA had been strengthened by the end of the internal Nuer-Dinka conflict and developed into an effective fighting organization, oil money meant Khartoum could continue the war, which the long-suffering southern civilians desperately wanted to end. In June 2002, at talks held in Machakos, Kenya, facilitated by Kenyan special envoy Lieutenant General Lazarus Sumbeiywo and supported by the United States, Britain, Norway, and Italy, the Bashir regime agreed that within 6 years, there would be a referendum in the south on self-determination, and the SPLM/A renounced its commitment to a secular Sudan by accepting Islamic law in the north. While Baqqara Murahiliin attacked villages in western Upper Nile, Bashir and Garang met for the first time in Kampala in July 2003 and committed to a peace process. In October 2003, Lam Akol rejoined the SPLM/A, which sparked fierce fighting around Malakal in which tens of thousands of Shilluk were displaced. During the previous 20 years of civil war, more than 2 million people had lost their lives, and 4–6 million had been displaced internally or had moved to refugee camps in neighboring countries. Delayed by the outbreak of rebellion in Darfur in 2003, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed by the Bashir government and the SPLA in Nairobi in January 2005. It established an autonomous Government of South Sudan (GOSS). The CPA also stipulated that the north and south would maintain separate security forces, with the 91,000 northern troops in the south withdrawing in 2.5 years, and SPLA forces leaving the north's Nuba Hills and southern Blue Nile within 18 months. A 21,000-strong integrated force, half from the SPAF and half from the SPLA, would be created over the next 6 years and form the nucleus of a new 39,000-strong national armed forces if South Sudan decided against independence. At the end of July 2005,



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Garang—now national vice president and GOSS president—was killed in a helicopter crash in the south. In January 2011, southern Sudanese voted overwhelming for independence and in July, South Sudan became a new state with Juba as its capital. The SPLM's Salva Kiir Mayardit, who had joined the Anyanya in the late 1960s and later became military commander of the SPLA, became its first president.¹²

Conflict between Sudan and South Sudan emerged over border oil fields and how much Juba would pay Khartoum to export its oil through northward running pipelines. With financial assistance from the United States and Britain, the SPLA transitioned from a guerrilla force into the conventional army of South Sudan. By 2010, the SPLA numbered 140,000 divided into 10 divisions stationed across the country, with 10,000–14,000 soldiers each. These included around 50,000 former SSDF fighters of Paulino Matip who were integrated into the SPLA—with their leader made deputy commander—as a result of the Juba Declaration of January 2006. During 2007, a special forces or “commando” brigade of 3,500 men was established, trained by foreign contractors, and deployed where needed as independent units. In 2008, the SPLA purchased at least 100 T-72 tanks from Ukraine, of which 33 were temporarily delayed when the ship delivering them to Kenya was hijacked by Somali pirates. Advanced by African standards, these tanks were/are suitable for operations along the all-weather roads of the oil fields, yet their effectiveness was diluted by deployment in groups of 8 along the border. In 2010, the SPLA possessed limited artillery crewed by infantry who lacked knowledge of indirect fire and was increasing its inadequate air defense capability. In March 2010, elements of the 3rd and 5th divisions in Lakes Province and Western Bahr al-Ghazal mutinied over lack of food and pay, but this was resolved by special funds from the president's office. Because the SPLA had been an entirely land-based force, GOSS established an air force in 2008 and purchased its first aircraft, 10 Russian-made transport helicopters, in 2010. These would do little to challenge Sudan's jet fighters and attack helicopters. After the 2005 CPA, Khartoum maintained the SPAF at 100,000 personnel organized into 6 infantry divisions, 7 independent infantry brigades, a mechanized division, an independent mechanized brigade, an armored division, and an airborne division. In the context of the arms race between Sudan and South Sudan, Khartoum purchased more advanced Chinese Type 96 tanks, additional Russian Mi-24 attack helicopters, and ground attack jets. In May 2011, forces from Sudan drove the

SPLA out of the disputed oil-producing border town of Abyei but withdrew the next month and were replaced by 4,200 Ethiopian troops of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). At the end of March 2012, South Sudan forces crossed the northern border to seize the oil-producing town of Heglig, and Sudan's air force responded by bombing Heglig and Bentiu in the south, which damaged oil facilities. Sudan's parliament passed a resolution calling for the reconquest of the south, and Uganda threatened to intervene on behalf of South Sudan. A few weeks later, as the SPLA withdrew from Heglig, Sudan's army advanced a few kilometers south of the border. In September, both governments signed an African Union-brokered agreement in Addis Ababa that reopened oil exports and promised a demilitarized zone along the border. In early June 2013, Khartoum accused Juba of sponsoring Sudanese Revolutionary Front insurgents operating in Kordofan and announced that it would again cut off South Sudan's oil exports.¹³

REBELLION AND GENOCIDE IN DARFUR

When Sudan became independent in 1956, the marginalized western region of Darfur was home to two rival communities—Arab pastoralists who considered themselves purist Muslims and non-Arab cultivators who practiced a form of Islam that integrated traditional beliefs. After Gaddafi took power in Libya in 1969, he conspired to make Darfur part of his planned Islamic State of the Sahara. Endeavouring to install a friendly regime in Khartoum, Gaddafi supplied weapons and training camps in southern Libya to Sadiq al-Mahdi's 2,000 Baqqara fighters supported by Libya's Islamic Legion. When Sadiq's July 1976 coup failed, Gaddafi began to develop his own military presence in Darfur. After their 1980 defeat by a Libyan-backed government in Chad, Hissene Habre's 10,000-strong Armed Forces of the North (FAN) moved into western Darfur where they gained control and received support from Sudan, Egypt, and the United States. In 1981, five thousand fighters from Libya's Islamic Legion occupied northern Darfur, and the United States supplied the Numayri regime with arms to confront them. The military regime that overthrew Numayri in April 1985 established friendly relations with Gaddafi and allowed 200 Libyan agents to work in Khartoum but did not permit the Islamic Legion to dominate Darfur. Gaddafi ended his support for the rebel SPLA and provided Khartoum with weapons, light vehicles, and air

support. Elected as president of Sudan in April 1986, Sadiq maintained good relations with his former patron but rejected the idea of Darfur becoming part of Libya. Using Darfur as a staging area for operations in Chad, the Libyans built a road from Kufra to Kudum in northern Darfur, which brought in more Libyan regulars and Islamic Legionaries who recruited and armed local Baqqara Arabs. During 1986, Habre—now in power in Chad—dispatched his renamed Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT) to expel the Islamic Legion from northern Chad and drive them back into northern Darfur. Subsequently, Gaddafi re-equipped the Islamic Legion and northern Chad's Arab Volcan Army rebels based at the Sudanese border town of Geneina, who dominated all of western and northern Darfur, and in November 1987, both forces moved across the border into Chad. Around the same time, Gaddafi began supporting an emerging Arab supremacist organization in Darfur called the Arab Gathering, which was armed and trained in Kufra, and assisted by Baqqara militia in southern Kordofan and Darfur who were mobilized by Khartoum's extremist NIF. With Arab Gathering publications urging the extermination of Darfur's non-Arab inhabitants, Gaddafi supplied small arms to the Arabs of central and southern Darfur. In turn, the non-Arab Fur people created the Federal Army of Darfur with 6,000 fighters armed by Chad.

In 1988 during the War of the Tribes, the Federal Army of Darfur was devastated by Rizayqat Arabs armed by Tripoli and Khartoum. Fur survivors were massacred in what a Bahrain newspaper called genocide. As Gaddafi rejected Sadiq's demands for a Libyan and Chadian withdrawal, Khartoum lost what little control it had in northern, western, and central Darfur. In April 1989, FANT commander Idriss Deby failed to overthrow Habre in Chad and fled to Darfur with his followers. Financed and directed by Gaddafi, Deby created a force of FANT defectors, Islamic Legion, and Chadian and Darfur Arab mercenaries known as the Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) based in Darfur. Beginning in May 1989, Arab forces (including the Islamic Legion) used their superior firepower to massacre the Fur, such as 3,000 at Nyala and 1,500 around Jabal Marra. Violence spread southwest to the border with Chad, where Chadian refugees used Libyan-supplied arms to attack the Fur. After the Baqqara Arab leaders boycotted a traditional peace conference, fighting continued with several hundred killed on both sides, and 50,000 Fur sought protection at Nyala. The violence escalated when, in late June, Habre's FANT raided 160 kilometers inside Darfur in pursuit of MPS and then withdrew.

The pro-NIF Bashir regime that overthrew Sadiq in late June 1989 gave Gaddafi and his Islamic Legion a free hand in Darfur. In mid-October 1989, Habre's Chadian forces staged Operation Rezzou, in which they penetrated almost 200 kilometers into Darfur and engaged the MPS and Islamic Legion in a week-long battle around Kudum during which hundreds of villages were destroyed and many civilians killed or wounded. The Islamic Legion suffered heavy casualties and withdrew to Libya. Needing Libyan oil and weapons to fight insurgents in southern Sudan, Bashir signed an agreement with Gaddafi that promised to make Sudan's Darfur and Libya's Kufra into an integrated region. Around the same time, March 1990, Deby's MPS launched an invasion of Chad from Darfur that overwhelmed FANT positions on the border and took 1,000 prisoners. In early April, Habre's FANT embarked on a counteroffensive, but Deby's rebels withdrew into Darfur followed by Chadian soldiers who again burned villages and displaced civilians before withdrawing. With the excuse of violence between Arabs and Fur during the April invasion, Bashir ordered the detention of non-Arab dissident leaders, including 130 Fur, and Sudanese soldiers began assisting Baqqara militia against the Fur. In November 1990, Deby's MPS again crossed into Chad and seized the capital from Habre, who had lost his French support because of human rights abuses.

Since the MPS and their Libyan allies moved to Chad, Bashir gained control of Darfur. During 1992, the Fur were forcibly disarmed and in 1994, Darfur was reorganized into a number of new states (with the Fur a minority in each). During 1998, conflict erupted between Arab Bani Husayn herders and non-Arab Masalit farmers whose traditional leaders had recently been stripped of authority by Khartoum. Several hundred Masalit were killed, more than 100 villages were destroyed, and 5,000 Masalit fled to the border town of Geneina or into Chad. When fighting resumed in January 1999 despite a peace agreement and compensation, Khartoum declared that the Masalit were SPLA collaborators and dispatched the Arab militia that killed over 2,000; burned granaries; stole livestock; and drove 40,000 refugees into Chad, where many were killed in cross-border raids. In 2000, the mostly non-Arab police in Darfur were disarmed by the government and their weapons given to Darfur Arab leader Musa Hilal, who recruited 2,000 Chadian Arabs and Baqqara who came to be known as Janjaweed ("evil horsemen").

In July 2001, Fur and Zaghawa activists met in the Jabal Marra area, where they swore on the Koran to oppose Arabization in Darfur.

In November, funded by Darfuri residents of Khartoum, they opened military training camps and made contact with Masalit leaders. These guerrillas conducted their first operation in late February 2002 by attacking a remote mountain garrison. In February 2003, around 300 rebels—now calling themselves the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF)—temporarily captured Gulu, the capital of Jabal Marra Province in western Darfur, and attacked other security force posts. In mid-March the DLF, renamed the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), once again briefly took Gulu in a battle that claimed the lives of 195 Sudanese soldiers. A second Darfur rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), was formed in the Netherlands in August 2001 by Darfuris who had lived in Khartoum, retained a commitment to Islamic law as opposed to the secular SLM/A, and fought for a utopian Sudan in which all people and regions would be equal. After the SLA's second attack on Gulu, government agents arranged a cease-fire, but it was violated within days by Arab militia who murdered a Masalit leader and Sudanese attack helicopters that devastated the town of Karnoi. In late March 2003, the SLA took the important Masalit town of Tine on the Chad border and embarked on operations that illustrated the inadequacy of the few thousand Sudanese soldiers in Darfur. In late April, a combined force of SLA/JEM with 33 trucks mounted with heavy weapons raided the El Fasher airport, where they destroyed helicopters and Antonov bombers, and captured an air force major general. Another SLA contingent outside Kudum captured four tanks and apprehended the colonel in charge of intelligence in north Darfur. A month later, north of Kudum, the SLA eliminated a Sudanese battalion, killing 500 and taking 300 prisoners. In mid-July, the SLA attacked Tine again and a few weeks later temporarily occupied Kudum, seizing arms and ammunition.

In October 2002, Khartoum had sent some 5,000 Janjaweed, trained and armed by the Sudanese army in camps in north Darfur, to southern Darfur to drive the Fur from their ancestral home. A typical Janjaweed group consisted of around 100 horsemen that would attack a Fur community just before dawn, kill and mutilate the men, rape the women, kill or capture the children, destroy homes and infrastructure, burn fields, and steal livestock. By the start of 2003 hundreds of Fur had been killed, thousands injured, and tens of thousands displaced. During 2003 the Janjaweed, supported by Khartoum's attack helicopters and bombers, slaughtered more Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit. In late August north of Kudum, the Sudanese army inflicted heavy losses on the SLA, which

lost two senior commanders. Consequently, the SLA signed a cease-fire in September to gain time to rebuild, but fighting quickly resumed. In late December 2003 and January 2004, JEM fighters repelled two Janjaweed attempts to retake Tine and inflicted heavy casualties. In mid-February, three days after Bashir declared the rebellion suppressed, the insurgents shot down two army helicopters, and in the subsequent weeks raided near El Fasher (the capital of North Darfur) and blocked the road from Khartoum to Nyala (the capital of South Darfur). SLA and JEM now had around 27,000 fighters. With a purge of 25,000 Darfuri personnel from the Sudanese regular army in February and their replacement by PDF conscripts, the Janjaweed accelerated their persecution of the non-Arab population, who were pursued into Chad. By this time, at least 30,000 had been killed; 200,000 had fled to Chad; 1 million had been driven from their land; and 350,000 were expected to die within a year from hunger and disease. International aid agencies were outraged when Khartoum denied them access to the region.

Although a cease-fire was facilitated by Chad's Idriss Deby in April 2004, it was rejected by SLM/A and JEM. The next month, Sudan's foreign minister refused a UN demand to disarm the Janjaweed as long as the rebels had weapons. Despite public outcry in Europe and North America, the United States was reluctant to act because it was embroiled in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Britain and France were hesitant to alienate Islamist Sudan. By August 2004, the African Union Mission to Sudan (AMIS)—125 cease-fire monitors and 305 troops from Rwanda and Nigeria—had been airlifted to Darfur by the United States. While AMIS grew to 7,000 personnel by April 2005, it was too small and not properly equipped to protect civilians and aid workers who were harassed by Janjaweed and bandits. The UN Security Council had demanded that Khartoum halt military operations and disarm the Janjaweed, and at the end of August, Secretary General Kofi Anan reported that Sudan had failed to stop attacks on civilians. In September, the Bush administration in the United States declared that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed were conducting genocide in Darfur but avoided committing its military by referring the matter to the United Nations to satisfy the international law requirement to act against genocide. Similarly, the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly that genocide was taking place in Darfur. However, the AU heads of state, Arab League, Organization of Islamic Conference, and Sudan's government maintained that there was no genocide in Darfur.

In early May 2006, with 200,000 people dead and 2.5 million displaced in Darfur, U.S. pressure on negotiators at the drawn out peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria produced a Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signed by the Bashir government and the larger SLM/A faction of Minni Arku Minnawi but not the smaller SLM/A faction of 'Abd al-Wahid al-Nur and JEM. At the end of June, the two insurgent groups that had not signed the DPA plus the new Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) of Ahmad Ibrahim Diraig (an exiled former governor), and Fur founded the National Redemption Front (NRF) in Asmara, Eritrea, under Diraig's leadership. As Bashir delayed the reinvention of AMIS as a larger UN peacekeeping force, violence in Darfur escalated during 2006, and aid organizations began to withdraw. In November, the Sudanese army and Janjaweed were twice defeated by the NRF, banditry and fighting between SLM/A factions increased, and in late December, the Janjaweed clashed with the NRF and the new SLA/Group 19 at El Fasher. Submitting to mounting demands from the United Nations, AU, Western democracies, and China (which had been accused of facilitating genocide in Darfur by selling weapons to Sudan), Bashir eventually accepted a combined AU-UN peacekeeping force. In October 2007, the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) began to deploy 20,000 soldiers and 6,000 police into which the 9,000 AMIS members were absorbed. UNAMID remained a mostly African force with personnel from Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Ethiopia, South Africa, Egypt, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, and Gambia. UNAMID was commanded by Nigerian general Martin Luther Agwai from 2007 to 2009, and Rwandan lieutenant general Patrick Nyamvumba from 2009 to 2013 and is currently led by Tanzanian lieutenant general Paul Ignace Mella. With 24 400 military, police and civilian personnel, UNAMID is currently the world's largest peacekeeping force and continues to take casualties from rebel and bandit attacks.

In addition to capturing weapons and equipment from government forces, rebel groups in Darfur gained military support from some external sources. In retaliation for Khartoum's support of Islamist rebels in Eritrea, Asmara armed and funded Darfuri insurgents until 2006, when an offer of cheap Sudanese oil prompted it to change sides. In early 2003, the SPLA began to arm and train Darfuri rebels as

part of an anti-Khartoum insurgent alliance, and in 2010, the government of South Sudan began sponsoring JEM in the context of its conflict with Sudan over disputed oil fields. Gaddafi, who had fallen out with Bashir in the early 1990s over Khartoum offering sanctuary to Islamist radicals but who still wanted to make Darfur part of greater Libya, supplied the rebels through Chad. Although President Deby of Chad initially remained neutral in the Darfur conflict, the slaughter of his fellow Zaghawa people across the border led him to arm the rebels and provide staging areas in Chad. When Khartoum organized and armed Chadian rebels who crossed the frontier and launched a bloody but unsuccessful attack on N'Djamena, Deby declared he would no longer help insurgents from Darfur.

The July 2008, ICC indictment of Bashir for crimes against humanity, to which genocide was added later, made the Khartoum strongman determined to cling to power, enhanced his relationship with Arab and African governments who refused to enforce the arrest warrant, and emboldened Darfuri rebels who made increasingly unrealistic demands for financial compensation for displaced people. Negotiations held in Sirte, Libya, in October 2007 failed because several rebel leaders refused to attend and those held in Doha, Qatar, in 2008 and 2009 produced an agreement between Khartoum and JEM that neither side followed. A new round of talks in Doha in 2011 produced an agreement between the government and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), a coalition of 10 rebel groups created the previous year, that established a compensation fund for victims, brought Darfuri representatives into the central government, and established a Transitional Darfur Regional Authority to administer the area until a referendum to determine its status within Sudan. However, JEM and several SLM/A factions rejected the deal and vowed to continue the war, though a general reduction in fighting allowed many to return home. There remains considerable disagreement over the number of deaths in Darfur from 2003 to 2010, with the Khartoum regime claiming 20,000 and U.S. Darfur advocacy groups putting the figure at 544,000. In 2010, Belgian researchers estimated that 298,000 people had perished mostly from disease and hunger caused by displacement; 60,000 of them had been killed in violence, mostly during 2004; and the death rate steadily declined from 2004 to 2008.¹⁴

INVASION AND CIVIL WAR IN UGANDA

In 1971, Uganda's army commander Amin overthrew Prime Minister Obote while he was abroad and established what would become a notoriously brutal dictatorship. Just as Obote had victimized the southern Baganda, Amin quickly massacred several thousand northern Acholi and Langi soldiers associated with the former regime and elevated men from his far northern West Nile area on the Sudan border. In 1972, Amin expelled Uganda's 80,000 Asians and seized their businesses, which caused economic crisis. During the rest of the decade, the increasingly paranoid and megalomaniacal dictator ordered the murder of several hundred thousand people. A number of exiled anti-Amin groups emerged in neighboring Tanzania during the early 1970s, such as Kikosi Maalum (Kiswahili for special force) led by the deposed Obote and the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) led by southerner Yoweri Museveni. Claiming parts of adjacent Kenya, Rwanda, and Tanzania, Amin expanded the Ugandan military to an official strength of 20,000 with two brigades of four battalions each plus a mechanized battalion with several dozen obsolete Soviet and American tanks and armored vehicles, a commando unit, an artillery regiment, and a small air force with some MiG-21 fighters and light helicopters flown by Libyans and Palestinians. In reality, much of Amin's military hardware was not maintained because there were no qualified technicians, professional officers had been killed and replaced by unqualified former junior NCOs, most battalions were shorthanded with just 200 troops each, and by the late 1970s, most Ugandan soldiers were mercenaries from Sudan, Zaire (now DRC), and Rwanda.

Given that Amin's initial Israeli sponsors refused to back his expansion plans, he switched to a Muslim alliance that led to the arrival of 400 Libyan soldiers in 1972, and Palestinian military advisors and millions of dollars from Saudi Arabia in 1974. In June 1976, Amin allowed an Air France airliner hijacked by Palestinian and German terrorists to land at Entebbe airport, where most passengers were released, leaving 100 Israelis and non-Israeli Jews as hostages. Protected by Amin's troops, the hijackers demanded the release of Palestinian prisoners in Israel and other countries. In early July, Israel mounted Operation Thunderbolt in which 100 commandos, landed at Entebbe at night in 4 C-130 aircraft that had flown 4,000 kilometers from Israel with a refueling stop in Kenya, staged a daring 90-minute raid that rescued

most hostages and flew them to Israel. During the operation, all 8 hijackers, 45 Ugandan soldiers, 3 hostages, and Israeli commander Lieutenant Colonel Yonatan Netanyahu—whose brother Benjamin later became Israeli prime minister—were killed. Thirty Ugandan MiG-17s and MiG-21s were destroyed. Libya's Gaddafi replaced 11 of Uganda's MiG-21s free of charge. The Israeli raid illustrated Amin's military vulnerability, and the humiliated dictator blustered against Kenya and unleashed a wave of violence against his people.

Throughout Amin's reign, there were tensions with Tanzania. In September 1971, Amin—claiming that pro-Obote insurgents were using Tanzania as a base for raids into Uganda—sent his soldiers across the border and briefly occupied the Tanzanian town of Mutukula, where they killed civilians and looted. The next September, a large force of armed Ugandan exiles crossed the border from Tanzania but was defeated by Amin's troops. In retaliation, the Ugandan air force bombed Bukoba and Mwanza in Tanzania. Distracting his military from internal strains that had led to a failed coup, Amin sent 3,000 troops to occupy Tanzania's northwestern Kagera region (located between Rwanda and Lake Victoria) in late October 1978. At this time, the TPDF consisted of 17,000 personnel comprising 1 tank, 2 artillery, 1 engineer, and 10 infantry battalions. Tanzania's Chinese- and Soviet-supplied tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery, and its small air force of a few MiG-17 and MiG-21 jets and helicopters were generally better maintained than those of Uganda. In November, 8,000–10,000 TPDF troops, including a battalion from sympathetic Mozambique and supported by artillery, drove the Ugandans out of Kagera. During December 1978 and January 1979, Ugandan forces, with artillery on high ground on their side of the border, continued to harass the TPDF defenses. Because blatant Ugandan aggression presented President Nyerere with an opportunity to remove the unstable Amin, Tanzania mobilized reserves to expand its army to 45,000 and encouraged Ugandan exile groups to form the Uganda National Liberation Front/Army (UNLF/A) to join the campaign. Amin was supported by an airlifted Libyan expeditionary force of 2,500 regulars and Islamic Legionnaires with T-54 tanks, armored personnel carriers, multiple rocket launchers, MiG-21 fighters, and two Tu-22 bombers.

In late January 1979, the TPDF, preceded by artillery bombardment, began a cautious advance into Uganda that was intended to reduce casualties and allow time for Amin to be removed internally. Preceded

by 1,000 exiled UNLA troops under Major General Tito Okello (a World War II KAR veteran) and Lieutenant Colonel David Oyite-Ojok, the Tanzanian invasion force under Major General David Musuguri consisted of 5 infantry brigades with 1,000–1,500 men each with armored vehicles and included Mozambican artillery. Mozambique's participation was informed by the assistance that Nyerere's Tanzania had given the governing Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) during its struggle against Portuguese colonial rule. The Tanzanian invasion of Uganda was conducted by two converging forces, with one advancing along the west coast of Lake Victoria through Masaka to Entebbe and Kampala, and another moving inland through the military base at Mbarara, swinging northwest to Fort Portal near the Zaire (DRC) border, and returning east to Kampala. Amin's untrained, unpaid, and demoralized troops did not put up much resistance and usually fought from within armored personnel carriers easily surrounded by Tanzanian soldiers and destroyed by antitank weapons. Masaka, bombarded with 1,000 Tanzanian artillery shells, and Mbarara were abandoned by Amin's troops and captured in late February. As Amin's forces withdrew from southwest Uganda, the UNLA grew, with returning exile leader Museveni attracting recruits from his home area.

In mid-March, the Tanzanian lakeside invasion force reached Lukuya, north of which lay a massive swamp crossed by a 20-kilometer causeway easily defended from the other side. Hoping the Ugandans would retreat, TPDF 201 Brigade was directed to advance up the causeway while 208 Brigade swung west around the swamp. Just as 201 Brigade had secured Lukuya and was preparing to move onto the causeway, a Libyan brigade with 15 tanks and some Ugandan units charged down the causeway into Lukuya, intending to launch a counterattack toward Masaka. Although neither side had expected the encounter, Libyan multiple rocket fire drove the terrorized Tanzanians out of Lukuya. Because the Libyans did not continue their advance, the regrouped Tanzanian 201 Brigade rejoined by 208 Brigade conducted an enveloping night attack on Lukuya supported by artillery fire that routed the Libyans and Ugandans, and killed 200 of each. Subsequently, Gaddafi sent Amin more weapons and 2,000 poorly trained militia reinforcements who were not told they were going into combat. In early April, Tanzania's 208 Brigade under Major General Mwita Marwa, another former colonial KAR soldier, evicted the Libyan defenders of Entebbe airport and a few days later, the UNLA

and Tanzanians took Kampala in a single day. By mid-April, Amin's forces were retreating north through Jinja, and 8,000 fled to Sudan and Zaire. Amin escaped to Libya and then Saudi Arabia, where he died in 2003. The war officially ended in early June as the TPDF tried unsuccessfully to control the chaotic countryside. The death toll included 375 Tanzanian soldiers, of which 96 were killed in action; 150 UNLA fighters; around 600 Libyans; about 1,000 of Amin's troops; 1,500 Tanzanian civilians from Kagera; and 500 Ugandan civilians.¹⁵

A Uganda provisional government was established under UNLF leader Yusuf Lule with Museveni as defense minister and backed by 8,500 remaining TPDF troops. As the new national army, the UNLA became divided between the 1,000 fighters trained in Tanzania and loyal to former prime minister Obote, and the many southern youth Museveni had recruited during the invasion. Although Museveni had about 9,000 FRONASA insurgents when the war ended, only 4,000 were accepted into the new army, and many of those were sent to Tanzania for training, posted throughout the north, or abused to compel their resignation. In June 1979, Lule was deposed by Godfrey Binaisa, who dismissed Museveni. In May 1980, Binaisa, who had tried to sack army chief of staff Oyite Ojok, was overthrown by a "Military Commission" that included Museveni, Oyite Ojok, and Okello. Condemning the December 1980 election that returned Obote to power as fraudulent, Museveni launched an insurgency in southern Uganda, where his Popular Resistance Army (PRA) combined with Lule's Uganda Freedom Fighters (UFF) to establish the National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A). At the same time, another insurgency was launched in northern Uganda's West Nile district by former Amin regime members organized into the ethnic Aringa Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) under Brigadier Moses Ali that fought the UNLA inside Uganda and the mostly Kakwa Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) that retreated into Sudan and Zaire. UNRF gained control of West Nile from 1980 to 1982 but were subsequently driven into Sudan by the UNLA that massacred local civilians.

In early February 1981, Museveni led 35 men, including Rwandan exiles Fred Rwigema and Paul Kagame, in a narrowly unsuccessful raid on the military police academy at Kabamba and staged hit-and-run attacks over the next two months. As a student radical during the late 1960s, Museveni had visited FRELIMO's liberated zones of Mozambique where he received guerrilla warfare training and North Korea where was instructed on small arms. Between April and

July 1981, he suspended NRA military operations to focus on gaining support and recruits from rural communities, rally former FRONASA members who deserted the army and university students from Kampala, and wait for the Tanzanian occupation force to withdraw. By July, Museveni had 200 fighters armed mostly with captured weapons and a few small arms sent by Libya. As the NRA expanded, it established six distinct units named after African nationalist leaders (for example, Kwame Nkrumah and Eduardo Mondlane) and historic Ugandan resistance leaders (for example, Kabarega and Mwanga), each of which was responsible for a specific part of the Luwero Triangle, where the insurgency unfolded northwest of Kampala. In 1983, the NRA formed a mobile force, initially commanded by Museveni and then his brother Salim Saleh (Caleb Akwandwanaho), which attacked army barracks and posts to capture weapons, leaving the zonal units to concentrate on defense and recruitment. The NRA stressed political education, which taught insurgents about the reasons for the war and the importance of not alienating civilians. In its early days, the NRA suffered from tensions because the primarily Baganda rank and file from the Luwero Triangle resented domination by former FRONASA leaders (who were Banyankole and Bakiga from the southwest), deserters from the UNLA looked down upon those without formal military experience, and intellectuals resented taking orders from less-educated superiors. In December 1981, the NRA held a general meeting of all ranks at Kanyanda at which it underwent a dramatic reorganization that delayed resumption of operations. Consisting of all unit commanders, a National Resistance Army Council became responsible for command structure and administration, and sat jointly with the leadership's National Resistance Council. Each unit would have a policy and administrative committee made up of the commanding officer and all officers and department heads. It would meet twice monthly to assist the commander. Every unit had distinct committees for food, finance, health, and internal discipline, and a hierarchy of political commissars from platoon to battalion level who educated the insurgents and sympathizers and ultimately reported to the NRA Chief Political Commissar who was also minister of local government. A series of regular meetings was created to ensure leaders stayed in touch with the rank and file who, in turn, felt their views were being considered. Importantly, the NRA developed a code of conduct that imposed the death sentence for murder of a civilian, rape, spying for the enemy, and disobedience of orders resulting

in loss of life. Lesser punishments were authorized for theft, claiming individual credit for success, abusing civilians, and promoting tribalism. A system of unit tribunals and courts-martial was established, with every punishment performed in public with the reasons explained. Problems related to ethnicity declined as the Baganda fighters gained more experience and advanced in rank. The NRA's structure and code of conduct allowed it to mount one of the most successful insurgencies in African history. As Museveni's rebels gained control of territory, they formed elected local councils that took charge of administration, and provided support and intelligence to the insurgents. In addition to its regular fighters, the NRA recruited a part-time militia of Local Defence Units (LDUs) that collected information, protected civilians gathering food, helped carry casualties to safety, and enforced law and order.

By 1982, Obote's UNLA numbered 10,000 augmented by advisors and instructors from Tanzania, North Korea, Cuba, Ethiopia, and a Commonwealth team that included British, Canadians, and Australians. In June 1982, the Obote government launched Operation Bonanza commanded by Oyite Ojok, which involved five UNLA battalions and represented the first serious move against Museveni's rebels in the Luwero Triangle. The offensive failed because the NRA cut army supply lines and struck isolated units. In January 1983, the state embarked on a second Operation Bonanza in which 7,000 UNLA soldiers in nine battalions attempted to use the two main roads that defined the Luwero Triangle to encircle the NRA. With only one weapon for every 10 of its now 4,000 insurgents, the NRA retreated north toward the Singo plain in March. They were accompanied by 1.5 million refugees fleeing atrocities by the UNLA's mostly northern Acholi and Langi soldiers. When Oyite Ojok was killed in a helicopter crash in December, the encircling operation lost momentum, and ethnic conflict flared in the UNLA.

The NRA regrouped and in February 1984, its Mobile Force successfully attacked Masindi Barracks just north of the Triangle, where more than 200 security force personnel were killed at the cost of just 5 insurgents. Museveni's hitherto poorly armed fighters captured 765 rifles, 140 mines, 10 machine guns, a few mortars, and a considerable amount of ammunition. In 1984, the NRA included 1,500 mostly Tutsi Rwandan exiles (see Volume 2, Chapter 5) who had been resident in Uganda since the early 1960s but discriminated against and 3,000 child soldiers, many of whom were under 12 years of age. At the start of January 1985, the NRA Mobile Force staged another attack on

Kabamba, capturing 600 rifles and much ammunition. Immediately following this raid, NRA units were pursued by a new UNLA Special Brigade under Lieutenant Colonel John Ogole, a recent graduate of the U.S. Army Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, that was made up of the best soldiers who had fought in the north supported by North Korean-manned multiple rocket launchers. The pursuit was terminated in mid-January when NRA forces defeated Ogole's brigade at major clashes around Birembo and Kirema. In April 1985, Rwigema, now deputy NRA commander, opened another front around Fort Portal in the foothills of western Uganda's Ruwenzori Mountains. Because Rwigema took the NRA's sick and injured (as well as many civilians) west, the Mobile Force was freed from protective duties in Luwero so that it could focus on fighting the UNLA's Special Brigade. During June, the Special Brigade pursued Saleh's Mobile Force through the Luwero Triangle, trying to pin it down and destroy it with superior firepower, including heavy mortars. However, late that month, Ogole's UNLA troops fell into a prepared Mobile Force ambush at Kembogo, where it lost 200–300 men and was routed. The NRA lost 23 men and from that point, the UNLA lost the will to fight. In late June, the NRA staged simultaneous attacks on UNLA barracks at Jinja and Magamaga east of Kampala. The UNLA responded by massacring civilians and establishing detention camps in the Lowero Triangle where suspected insurgent sympathizers were executed. In the Triangle, by the middle of 1985, some 300,000 people had been killed and 280,000 had fled to Sudan, Rwanda, and Zaire. In southern Uganda, the UNLA acted like a northern army of occupation, which drove civilians to support the mostly southern and disciplined NRA.

The Obote regime was plagued by violence between Langi and Acholi elements within the UNLA and international pressure to end human rights abuses in Luwero. In late July Obote, a Langi, was overthrown by Acholi officers Brigadier Basilio Olara Okello and army commander Major General Tito Okello. After negotiations with the new military regime failed, the NRA undertook major operations in the west, where Kasese and Fort Portal were seized and entire UNLA units surrendered. The NRA sieges of Mbarara in September and Masaka from September to December created time to form new units armed with captured weapons. By November, a series of small NRA operations, patrolling, and mining of roads had forced the UNLA back and gave the insurgents control of southern Uganda from the Nile in

the east to Lake Victoria in the south. In late November, the UNLA assembled 10,000 troops and dispatched two large forces from Kampala to reopen the roads to Masaka in the south and Masindi in the west. The NRA repelled these attacks at Katonga Bridge 80 kilometers southwest of Kampala and near Masindi, with government forces taking heavy casualties. In late 1985, the NRA received its first significant external support, which allowed it to create 2 new battalions and increase the fighting strength of the 10 existing ones from about 600 to 1,500 each. In September, the Libyans airdropped 800 rifles and 800,000 rounds of ammunition, and in December, the Tanzanians delivered 5,000 rifles and 1 million rounds of ammunition. Museveni had lobbied Gaddafi for help, and Nyerere was concerned that the Okellos were recruiting veterans of Amin's regime. Around Kampala, 10,000 mostly southern NRA fighters faced 15,000 demoralized and poorly trained mostly northern UNLA troops. Without appropriate training, the 26-year-old Saleh and his officers planned a divisional assault on Kampala, which was executed in late January 1986. Approaching from the west, 4 NRA battalions gained a foothold in the capital's suburbs and pushed the UNLA toward 2 other NRA battalions and a 500-strong special task force that circled around to the north, east, and south. The Okellos did not prepare an urban defense and after heavy fighting, the UNLA escaped east along the Jinja road, which Saleh ordered the embattled special task force to leave open. The UNLA marched north pursued by the NRA, which captured Lira in late February, Gulu in early March after an intense three-day battle, and Kitgum in mid-March. The remnants of the UNLA then crossed into Sudan.¹⁶

With Museveni's seizure of power and the transformation of the predominantly southern NRA into Uganda's state military, insurgency spread in the north. In southern Sudan, Acholi soldiers from the defeated UNLA formed the Uganda Peoples' Democratic Army (UPDA) with assistance from Khartoum and in August 1986 launched a guerrilla war in northern Uganda's Acholi region. The NRA's brutal counterinsurgency campaign alienated the Acholi population, and former Acholi soldiers who had gone home joined the UPDA (which terrorized civilians to gain support). Within traumatized Acholi society, the Christian-based Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) led by medium Alice Auma (who was possessed by a male spirit called Lakwena) emerged to purify society from witches and evil spirits, and also to fight the government. The HSM military wing was called the Holy

Spirit Mobile Force (HSMF) but in practice, there was no difference between the two. In November 1986, the UPDA lent Alice Auma 150 fighters. Eventually many UPDA insurgents, frustrated by the failure of their secular group to capture the region's towns, gravitated to the HSMF. Lakwena's soldiers were ritually cleansed upon joining and after battle, and they followed a code of conduct called Holy Spirit Safety Precautions that forbade theft, killing, sex, lying, tobacco, and alcohol. Injury or death in battle was explained as a punishment for sin. The HSMF did not fight a guerrilla war but employed Holy Spirit Tactics that combined conventional warfare with beliefs that holy oil would render soldiers invulnerable to bullets, thrown rocks would turn into grenades, and the best attack formation was in the shape of a cross. Partly inspired by the British army, the HSMF was organized into four massive companies, each divided into platoons of 50 to 80 men. Lakwena, acting as "chairman," gave orders to an overall "commander of forces" under whom were the three regular company commanders who each represented a spirit with specific duties for the movement—intelligence, provision of weapons and transport, and supply of food and uniforms. Headquarters Company consisted of sections such as the chairman's office, quartermaster, armory, medical, signals, agricultural production, visiting women and children, and exorcism. The civilian Frontline Coordination Team and War Mobilization Committee liaised with community elders, organized moral education, and gathered food and medicine. Although the HSMF initially allowed men and women to become soldiers, as more men joined, women were relegated to support roles and seen as a source of evil. After several surprising battlefield victories against the NRA in late 1986, the 7,000- to 10,000-strong HSMF marched south toward Kampala. In July and September 1987, the HSMF sent some of its best fighters back to Acholiland to capture UPDA and former UNLA soldiers, who were asked to join the movement and killed with machetes if they refused. Along with competition over food from Acholi communities, this led to fighting between the HSMF and UPDA. As Lakwena's soldiers moved south, they entered non-Acholi areas where they did not enjoy popular support, which led to abuse of locals. In October 1987, the NRA's superior firepower inflicted a crushing defeat on the HSMF at Jinja, just 50 kilometers from Kampala. Alice Auma fled to Kenya, and surviving HSMF fighters retreated in disarray to Acholiland.

Some former HSMF members joined the Lord's Army led by Severino Lukoya (Alice Auma's father, who had not participated in her

movement), which grew to around 2,000 men and women, and fought a guerrilla war against the NRA in Acholiland's Kitgum District. Less centralized than the HSMF, the Lord's Army was divided into religious, medical, and military departments. In 1992, Lukoya was captured by the government, which imprisoned him for three years. In January 1987, Joseph Kony (allegedly a cousin of Alice Auma) emerged as a rival medium around Gulu, and his followers fought the HSMF when he refused to join the ultimately disastrous march toward Kampala or provide food. After October, some former HSMF adherents rallied around Kony, who devised his own Holy Spirit Safety Precautions and Holy Spirit Tactics, including the belief in spiritual protection from bullets. While Alice had led a large army, Kony's force consisted of many small quasi-independent groups that fought guerrilla-style against the NRA. In May 1988, the NRA and UPDA made peace, but a dissatisfied section of the latter led by former UNLA Brigadier Justine Odong Latek joined Kony's Lord's Army. As military commander, Latek partially secularized Kony's movement, which was renamed the Uganda People's Democratic Christian Army (UPDCA) and abandoned Holy Spirit Tactics for classic guerrilla warfare. After Latek was killed in battle with the NRA in 1989, Kony changed the group's name to Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and religious rhetoric returned. As the insurgency unfolded, the LRA preyed on Acholi communities by extorting food. They also abducted young boys who became child soldiers and young girls who worked as porters and were given to fighters as wives (Kony, unlike Alice, permitted sex).

By early 1988, the NRM, now the government in Kampala, had expanded its system of Regional Councils and LDUs to the north, with the latter recruited from former UNLA and UPDA soldiers. In Acholiland, those associated with the southern NRM state were targeted by the LRA. In March 1991, the Museveni government, prompted by a World Bank loan that was conditional on security, launched a massive four-month counterinsurgency campaign against the LRA called Operation North under Lieutenant General David Tinnyefuza. The NRA imposed a media blackout on Acholiland, all Acholi political leaders and activists were arrested, and tens of thousands were detained to discover insurgents in a process that involved looting, rape, torture, and murder. The state press-ganged thousands of Acholi men into local militias called Arrows Groups, as they were literally armed with bows and arrows that were abandoned by the NRA when it declared victory in July. The subsequent LRA counteroffensive

devastated the outgunned Arrow Groups, and suspected government loyalists had their noses, lips, ears, and/or limbs cut off.

Following Operation North's failure, the NRM government and LRA engaged in lengthy negotiations that collapsed in early February 1994 when Museveni gave the insurgents an ultimatum to surrender in seven days. Some allege that Museveni wanted the conflict to continue because it allowed him to exploit fear of northern barbarity to rally political support in the south ahead of the 1996 election. The LRA had used the lull in the fighting during the talks to forge an alliance with Sudan's government, which wanted to destabilize Uganda for its sponsorship of the SPLA. Khartoum provided the LRA with military support and bases in southern Sudan, and trucked supplies for them through the Central African Republic (CAR) and Zaire to northern Uganda. Since the LRA needed additional manpower to fight both the SPLA in southern Sudan and the NRA in northern Uganda, they abducted more young people. When Acholi civilians widely rejected the brutal LRA, Kony embarked on a campaign to recreate Acholi society by slaughtering all but the young and attacked communities to gather food and prisoners. Expanded from several hundred to 2,000 insurgents, the LRA escalated attacks, for example, in May 1995 at Atiak trading center in northern Gulu District where LDUs were defeated, homes burned, and almost 300 killed. Although a Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF, the NRA's new name from 1995) barracks was located nearby, the soldiers did not respond until the LRA had withdrawn. The UPDF crossed into southern Sudan to conduct joint operations with the SPLA against the LRA and Sudanese army such as in September and October 1995, and April 1997. In 1996, following a sadly common counterinsurgency approach, the UPDF began herding rural Acholi into "protected villages" near larger centers where cultivation was impossible, food was provided by humanitarian organizations, and movement was strictly controlled. By 2003, 1.5 million people lived in these squalid rural prisons and suffered high mortality rates.

Other insurgencies erupted in Uganda in the mid-1990s, mostly with Sudanese support. After Museveni's 1986 victory, West Nile experienced a brief period of reduced violence as FUNA dissolved and UNRF members were incorporated into the NRA. However, there were complaints that former UNRF members had not been given appropriate ranks in the NRA, UNRF veterans were being harassed by the government, and West Nile remained underdeveloped

compared to the south. The West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), with former Amin and UNLA soldiers led by ex-FUNA member Colonel Juma Oris, emerged in 1994 and based just over the Zaire border initially offered unemployed young people money to join and began harassing the NRA. Allying with the LRA, WNBF copied their tactics of abducting and brutalizing civilians, which undermined its popularity. In Zaire in August 1995, the Sudanese army and WNBF seized several centers from the SPLA to disrupt their supply lines. The next year, ethnic Aringa members of the original anti-Obote UNRF split from the WNBF and founded UNRF II under Major General Ali Bamuze. In 1996, Sudanese agents in Zaire forged the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) from three different Ugandan dissident groups—alienated and impoverished Ugandan Muslims, right-wing Baganda monarchists, and long-term Bakonjo and Baamba rebels in the Ruwenzori Mountains whose sporadic rebellion called Rwenzururu had first started against the British in the 1950s. Lacking broad appeal, the eclectic ADF launched an insurgency in western Uganda by paying poor people to enlist. The presence of all these Ugandan rebels across the border prompted Uganda to join Rwanda, now effectively ruled by former NRA officer Paul Kagame, to overthrow Zaire's Mobutu regime in 1996 and 1997 (see Chapter 4). By February 1997, around 750 WNBF fighters had returned to Uganda, where they surrendered and were later incorporated into the UPDF. In February 1997, Sudanese agents tried to distract the UPDF by having UNRF II rebels attack Midigo in West Nile. Moving north to escape encirclement by the Ugandan and Rwandan armies and the SPLA in Zaire, a 4,000-strong WNBF column entered southern Sudan and were making for Yei when they fell into an SPLA ambush in which 2,000 were killed and 1,000 captured. The survivors, including a wounded Juma Oris, fled to the Sudanese army garrison at Juba.

With the friendly government of Laurent Kabila installed in Kinshasa, Uganda and Rwanda could more easily deal with exiled insurgents in what was now the DRC (formerly Zaire). During mid-April 1998, a joint force of 6,000 Congolese, Ugandan, and Rwandan soldiers attacked the ADF around Beni in North Kivu province of eastern DRC, but the rebels escaped. One of the UPDF's first actions when it again invaded the DRC in August 1998, during the Second Congo War (see Chapter 4), was to clear Garamba National Park of elements of WNBF, SPLA deserters, Sudanese soldiers, and former Mobutu troops. As early as 1996, Major General Katumba Wamala,

UPDF commander in West Nile, had undermined the WNBF by working with local communities to convince rebels to surrender and by 1998, military defeat in Zaire and southern Sudan had ended the group's insurgency. Given the end of the Second Congo War, reduced support from the Sudanese government, and a Ugandan amnesty act (see later in this chapter), UNRF II signed a peace deal with the Museveni government in 2002 that led to 2,000 fighters returning from southern Sudan to receive resettlement packages. Seven hundred of them were incorporated into the UPDF. In December 2005, some 3,500 Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) soldiers and 600 UN Mission in DRC (MONUC) support troops with helicopter gunships, in Operation North Night Final, hunted down a remaining ADF unit in the DRC's North Kivu area and killed 86 fighters. Evolving into a rogue mining operation in the Ruwenzori Mountains, the ADF crossed into Uganda in March 2007 and conducted several attacks aimed at controlling border trade. The Ugandan government claimed that a July 2010 explosion in Kampala was the work of Muslim ADF rebels assisted by international Islamist militants from Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab fighters at war with a mostly Ugandan AU force in Somalia.

Uganda's January 2000 Amnesty Act and LRA offers to negotiate represented a possible end to the conflict in northern Uganda. However, the September 2001 attacks on the United States prompted Museveni to seek a military solution because Washington labeled the LRA, backed by the Islamist regime in Khartoum, a terrorist organization, and the 2002 Uganda Anti-Terrorism Act limited amnesty. Under U.S. pressure, Khartoum abandoned Kony and permitted the UPDF to cross into southern Sudan to hunt the LRA. In March 2002, Museveni took personal command of Operation Iron Fist in which 10,000 UPDF troops, some recently returned from eastern DRC and supported by helicopter gunships, crossed into Sudan, where they were assisted by the SPLA in attacking LRA bases. While the UPDF and SPLA killed hundreds of LRA abductees and Sudanese civilians, Kony and his lieutenants escaped into northern Uganda, where by June they had expanded operations into new areas just south of Acholiland where children became "night commuters" who avoided capture by leaving their villages to sleep in larger more secure centers. The Museveni government responded by forming local militias—the 12,000-strong Arrow Boys among the Iteso and the 9,000-strong Amuka (Rhino) groups among the Langi—who were recruited from former rebels,

soldiers, police, criminals, and sometimes children; given 45 days of training by the UPDF; and armed with assault rifles. Although Acholi living in these areas were associated with the LRA and victimized, the militias were more successful than the UPDF in reducing LRA activity because they knew local languages and terrain. In March 2004, the UPDF launched a second Operation Iron Fist in southern Sudan that was more successful than the first in forcing fleeing LRA leaders to abandon abductees. By mid-2004, some 5,000 adult former LRA rebels had accepted amnesty. Although the government unilaterally declared several short cease-fires in 2004 to allow the LRA to discuss amnesty and negotiation, Kony's insurgents continued attacks on civilians. In 2003, Museveni had referred the LRA situation to the ICC, which—in July 2005—issued arrest warrants for the LRA leadership, including Kony, which some claim made them less willing to negotiate and release prisoners who might become witnesses. In September 2005, given the end of Sudan's civil war, LRA elements led by Vincent Otti, Kony's second in command, moved into northeastern DRC and over the next two years established camps in the forests of Garamba National Park, where they stockpiled food and cultivated crops. Talks between the Ugandan government and LRA began in Juba in July 2006. The next month, both sides agreed to a truce, and LRA rebels began moving to assembly areas in South Sudan's Equatoria region. The difficult negotiations—during which Kony had Otti executed in October 2007 for trying to make his own deal—eventually produced an agreement that Kony, in April 2008, refused to sign because he wanted the ICC warrants dropped plus money and a senior government position.

During the 2007 negotiations, a LRA band had moved west to the remote and lawless CAR and made contact with other armed groups there. With the collapse of the Juba talks in early 2008, the LRA unearthed weapons caches and kidnapped young people along the forested border of DRC, CAR, and South Sudan, which added 1,000 recruits to its remaining 600 insurgents. After clashes with the SPLA and UPDF in South Sudan, the LRA left its assembly areas and rallied in the DRC's Garamba National Park. With the departure of the LRA for the South Sudan–DRC–CAR border, security in northern Uganda improved, and rural people began returning home. In January 2006, MONUC, the UN force in DRC, had conducted a secret operation to capture Otti and expel the LRA from Garamba National Park that ended disastrously with the death of eight Guatemalan special forces

personnel. This discouraged MONUC from undertaking further operations against the LRA. Threatened by the buildup of Congolese forces in the town of Dungu close to the park, the LRA began attacking villages and from September to November 2008, they killed 167 civilians, abducted 316 children, and displaced 17,000. In October 2008, the 2,200 Congolese troops supported by 200 MONUC personnel at Dungu conducted Operation Rudia ("return" in Kiswahili) to confine Kony's rebels to the park, cut their supply lines, and encourage desertions. However, the operation failed because of poor communication and coordination. When the LRA attacked Dungu in November, the Congolese army withdrew, leaving behind the small MONUC detachment that could not protect the local population, which formed its own self-defense units. At the time, MONUC could not spare additional resources because it was busy with operations in the Kivu area. In mid-December 2008, with planning and communications assistance as well as fuel from the United States, the joint forces of Uganda, DRC, and South Sudan launched Operation Lightning Thunder in the Garamba area to destroy LRA camps and forces, rescue prisoners, and capture LRA leaders. MONUC was informed of the operation just hours before it began. Lightning Thunder was supposed to begin with a surprise air strike by Ugandan MiGs on Kony's base camp on the western side of the park followed by an immediate ground attack by the UPDF. However, poor weather meant that the jets were substituted with slower and noisier attack helicopters that reduced surprise, and transport problems meant that the ground attack was 72 hours late. LRA forces escaped the park and between late December 2008 and mid-January 2009 attacked surrounding communities, supposedly protected by Congolese and South Sudanese troops on their respective sides of the border, where they killed 815 Congolese and 50 Sudanese civilians in what has been called the Christmas Massacres. In addition, 700 people, including 500 children, had been kidnapped, and 130,000 fled their homes. Lightning Thunder officially ended in March when most UPDF troops left DRC. In May, 6,000 FARDC (Congolese) troops transported and supplied by MONUC and assisted by the UPDF staged Operation Rudia II, which had more success in killing and capturing some LRA leaders and dispersing the rebels into smaller isolated groups, though attacks on civilians continued. Consequently, most LRA groups moved to eastern CAR, with some smaller bands remaining in northeastern DRC and South Sudan. In 2009, Ugandan troops began operations against the LRA in the CAR; in 2011, the United States

trained a FARDC commando battalion specifically to hunt the LRA; and late that year; the Obama administration in the United States, given public outrage against Kony, dispatched 100 Special Forces advisors to the DRC-CAR–South Sudan border to help local forces pursue the LRA. After spending much of 2011 regrouping, the remaining 150–300 LRA fighters escalated their attacks and abductions in the CAR during 2012. It is suspected that the LRA is engaged in gold smuggling and receives covert support from Sudan, given renewed conflict with South Sudan. To avoid detection, LRA commanders discarded satellite and cellular phones, communicate by runners and written messages left under rocks and on trees, and use temporary camps. From 2008 to 2012, Kony's rebels killed more than 2,600 civilians; kidnapped over 4,000; and displaced 400,000 in the region. In addition, the African forces tracking the LRA, particularly the Ugandans, have been accused of abusing civilians. In March 2012, the AU, with EU support, declared a regional initiative to eliminate the LRA by forming a 5,000-strong regional intervention force integrating soldiers already in the region with Uganda playing a leading role.¹⁷

CONCLUSION

Into the 2010s, there are fewer wars occurring in previously wartorn East Africa than at any time in the previous 30 or 40 years. However, a partly successful though still incomplete AU campaign, aided by the West, against Islamist militants in Somalia has spread bombing and kidnapping to Uganda and Kenya, and Somali piracy has prompted international naval intervention. Attempts to eliminate elusive LRA remnants drag on, African peacekeepers in Darfur face sporadic violence, and border tensions between Sudan and South Sudan, and Ethiopia and Eritrea persist. While many East African states maintain relatively large ground forces, they usually possess limited air power and almost no significant air transport capability, and coastal countries are only beginning to venture into the Indian Ocean.

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Chapter 4

Central Africa, 1963–

From independence, Central Africa's authoritarian rulers politicized their states' militaries by packing them with personnel from their own ethnic group or region, and paranoia about military coups prompted them to create large and supposedly elite presidential guard units that worked outside the security force hierarchy. The general incompetence of Central African militaries, caused by lack of training and resources as well as poor leadership, resulted in their becoming dependent on foreign "advisors" who often participated in operations. Given the region's poor military structures, Central Africa has experienced repeated military intervention by former colonial rulers France and Belgium, and the landlocked geography meant that these were sometimes sudden airborne operations. After the Cold War, Central Africa experienced some of the world's most deadly violence brought on by the collapse of authoritarian states and rabid competition over natural resources for the world market. The 1994 genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda represents the worst genocide since the Holocaust, and the 1998–2002 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Civil War, also called Africa's World War because of the many countries involved, represents the world's deadliest conflict since World War II. While the region has a long history of UN peacekeeping operations with, for example, thousands of Indian troops serving in the DRC in the early 1960s and again in the 2000s, these usually did

little to reduce violence. Central Africa has become the continent's most troubled region, with most of its countries having suffered armed conflict, and some cities such as N'Djamena in Chad and Kisangani in DRC experiencing a series of urban battles and millions displaced at different times.

THE CONGO CRISIS

During the 1950s, Belgian colonial rulers failed to prepare Congo for independence. The many Belgians in the civil service meant that few black Congolese gained administrative experience or Western education. With most of the rest of Africa moving toward independence, Congolese political movements emerged along regional and ethnic lines. When the Belgians finally decided to decolonize, they did so with only six months preparation, intending for a weak Congo to be dependent upon their assistance. At the end of June 1960, the first independent government was led by Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, a pan-Africanist of the Congolese National Movement (MNC) based in the northeast around Stanleyville (now Kisangani), and President Joseph Kasavubu of the ethnic irredentist Bakongo Alliance (ABAKO) in the west centered on the capital of Leopoldville (now Kinshasa). In early July, African soldiers mutinied against their Belgian officers, which led to attacks on Belgian civilians. Within a few days, the colonial Force Publique had been renamed Congolese National Army (ANC), Belgian commander Emile Janssens was replaced with former medical orderly Victor Lundula (who became a major general), journalist and former soldier Joseph Mobutu was made a colonel and chief of staff, the officer corps was rapidly Africanized with most experienced noncommissioned officers (NCOs) gaining commissions, and all personnel were promoted one rank. Some Belgian officers were retained as advisors, and order was restored to the garrisons at Leopoldville and Thysville in the west. Within the ANC, Mobutu cultivated a personal power base by channelling money from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), United Nations, and Belgium to favorite officers and exiling unreliable units to remote locations.

The Congolese army mutiny provided an opportunity for regional separatists. Albert Kalonji proclaimed himself "emperor" of the diamond mining area of South Kasai. In the mineral-rich southern province of Katanga, Moise Tshombe declared secession that was



supported by Southern African and Western mining interests as well as the Belgians. Belgian soldiers disarmed ANC units in the region and organized a Katanga military with white mercenaries from Belgium, France, South Africa, and Rhodesia who acquired the nickname “les affreux” or “the frightful ones.” A Belgian naval task force was dispatched to Congo and in mid-July 1960, Belgian troops intervened in Leopoldville, Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi), Luluabourg (now Kananga), and other towns to protect Belgian civilians, which led to Congolese and wider African claims that they were recolonizing the country. Demanding Belgian withdrawal, Lumumba called for UN assistance and warned that if this failed, he would turn to the Soviet Union. In late July, Belgian troops were replaced by multinational peacekeepers of the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), which undermined Lumumba’s authority by seizing the country’s airports, disarming soldiers loyal to him, and refusing to crush Katanga separatism because it was an internal issue. In August, Lumumba asked for Soviet military support, which—given the Cold War context—convinced the Americans and Belgians to eliminate him. At the end of that month, 1,000 ANC soldiers were transported to South Kasai in Soviet-supplied vehicles and aircraft, where they massacred thousands of Luba civilians and ended the secession. Although the first ONUC troops, mostly Swedish, entered the Katanga capital of Elisabethville in mid-August, they did not act against Tshombe’s regime. Late that month the ANC, with its Soviet vehicles, made a poorly organized foray into Katanga and was repelled by the white mercenary-led Katanga army. Using the pretext that Lumumba had been responsible for “genocide” in South Kasai, President Kasavubu dismissed the prime minister, who in turn dismissed the president. In October Mobutu, conspiring with American and Belgian officials, used the military to place Lumumba under house arrest in Leopoldville. After trying to escape to Stanleyville, where his armed loyalists were rallying under Deputy Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba was recaptured, publically beaten, and detained at the military camp in Thysville. The ousted prime minister was then flown to Katanga where, in January 1961, he was killed by a firing squad commanded by a Belgian mercenary working for Tshombe, who was in direct contact with Belgian officials. Lumumba’s corpse was dissolved in acid.¹

ONUC represented the United Nations’ first peacekeeping mission with real combat capability and was initially transported to Congo

by the U.S. Air Force. At its core were African troops from Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Liberia, Morocco, and Tunisia who were reinforced by others from Sweden, India, Ireland, Malaya, and Canada. Of the African forces involved, Nigeria and Ethiopia provided the most men, while Ghana provided the highest proportion of its military—by 1963, three out of its five battalions had completed two 6-month tours, with some personnel having done three. Although Ghana's Nkrumah signed a secret pan-Africanist union with Lumumba in August 1960, Ghanaian soldiers in Congo came under UN command and were ultimately used to undermine the prime minister. While Ghanaian colonel Joseph Ankrah saved Lumumba's life by personally disarming a rebellious ANC soldier intent on killing him and driving him to safety under fire, a Ghanaian company secured the Leopoldville radio station in September and prevented the prime minister from addressing his people. In November at the village of Niemba in Katanga, Luba fighters ambushed an Irish patrol that they mistook for Belgian, killing 9 out of 11 peacekeepers. The next month, three Nigerian infantry platoons under Lieutenant Colonel Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi based at Bukavu rescued Austrian medical personnel who had been taken prisoner by some 300 Congolese soldiers who had also mistaken them for Belgians. Stationed at Manono in northern Katanga, a Nigerian battalion under British lieutenant colonel Rollo Price protected trains from attack by Luba fighters from Kasai and in late December repelled a pro-Lumumba force from Stanleyville that had invaded Kivu and was heading into Katanga. By January 1961, Nigerian and Ghanaian battalions in the Congo experienced discipline problems as soldiers became demoralized about the failure of the United Nations to support Lumumba and their continued subordination to seconded British officers. In late April 1961, a UN detachment of Ghanaian soldiers, their British officers, and some Swedes based at Port Francqui in Kasai were attacked by ANC troops, who killed 48 peacekeepers (including 44 Ghanaians). A few months later, three Ghanaian soldiers were hacked to death when attempting to prevent Luba rebels from seizing two Lulua railway employees. Kasai's Luba rebels mistook Ghanaian troops for their local Lulua rivals, as many bore similar facial scarification. As a result, ONUC stopped deploying small isolated detachments throughout the country. In November, the 13-man Italian crew of a transport aircraft delivering two armored cars to Malayan peacekeepers at Kindu in Kasai were killed and dismembered by ANC soldiers. The participation of some

6,000 Irish soldiers in ONUC, their country's first foreign military deployment, led Dublin to invest more in up-to-date weapons, equipment, and armored vehicles. The presence of 1,900 Canadian personnel, mostly communications specialists numbering no more than 500 at any one time, in ONUC prompted Soviet criticism that the mission was not neutral because Canada was a NATO member.²

Lumumba's death prompted the UN Security Council, in February 1961, to authorize ONUC to act forcefully to prevent civil war in Congo, which UN peacekeepers eventually interpreted as justification for crushing Katanga's secession. In Katanga, violence continued between Tshombe's forces, bolstered by more white mercenaries (including French veterans of the Algerian war) and Luba fighters allied to Leopoldville and former ANC elements. From March to June 1961, the Indian 99th Infantry Brigade commanded by Brigadier K. A. S. Raja arrived in Congo by air and sea, and was sent to Katanga to bolster ONUC's fighting ability. After ONUC arrested and repatriated several hundred mercenaries in August during Operation Rum Punch, Tshombe confronted the United Nations with evidence that its officials had been conspiring to remove him from power. Tension escalated when, in mid-September, 150 Irish peacekeepers protecting civilians at Jadotville were besieged by a much larger Katangese force that included white mercenaries and were bombed by one of Tshombe's three mercenary piloted Fouga Magister jets purchased from France. Resupplied by helicopter, the Irish troops refused to surrender. Operation Morthor, an ONUC attempt to seize control of Elisabethville, was defeated by Tshombe's forces, which captured UN peacekeepers and conducted aerial bombing of UN positions across Katanga. Although ONUC had reached a peak of 20,000 personnel in Congo by July 1961, most of its soldiers were equipped with World War II-vintage bolt-action rifles, transported in soft-skinned vehicles with improvised armor, and had no combat air support. Katanga forces possessed new semiautomatic Belgian rifles, heavy machine guns, mortars, and armored cars, and they enjoyed some support from the small Katanga Air Force. On his way to negotiate a cease-fire, UN secretary general Dag Hammarskjöld was killed on September 18 when his plane crashed in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). In October 1961, elements of Mobutu's ANC passed through Kasai to invade Katanga but were repulsed and during their retreat sacked Luluabourg. U.S. policy toward Katanga changed as the Eisenhower administration had tolerated it as an anticommunist bastion, but John

F. Kennedy—taking over in February 1961—saw it as a neocolonial embarrassment and favored establishing a friendly regime in the entire Congo. Kennedy offered U.S. jets to the United Nations to destroy the Katanga Air Force but this offer was declined. In October, the United Nations created its own air force in the Congo composed of Ethiopian U.S.-made Sabre and Swedish Saab jet fighters and British-built Canberra bombers from India. During a long but failed negotiation process in 1962, Katanga acquired propeller-driven ground attack aircraft, and ONUC brought in air defense resources and reconnaissance planes to determine the location of enemy airfields. At this time, ONUC had 16,000 personnel in Congo, with India providing the largest contingent. Violence again flared between UN and Katanga forces in late December 1962. Following the downing of a UN helicopter, ONOC forces in Katanga commanded by Indian major general Dewan Prem Chand conducted Operation Grand Slam. ONUC aircraft flew 76 sorties that quickly destroyed most Katanga aircraft while ONOC ground forces consisting of the Indian 99th Infantry Brigade now under Brigadier R. S. Noronha and a Swedish battalion advanced and scattered Tshombe's mercenaries. Defying orders from UN headquarters in New York, a battalion of India's Rajputana Rifles crossed the Lufira River under sniper fire by using rubble from a bridge demolished by Tshombe's troops. This enabled the 99th Brigade to capture Jadotville on January 1, 1963, which prevented Katangese forces from making a stand there. With his last French and South African mercenaries fleeing into Angola, Tshombe and his remaining troops surrendered on January 21 and allowed UN forces to enter the last separatist stronghold of Kolwezi. With UN support, Katanga rejoined Congo and although Katangese troops were supposed to be integrated into the ANC, many fled to Angola or took jobs in the mines or on Tshombe's farms in the Rhodesias. The last 6,000 ONUC personnel, now under Nigerian major general Aguiyi-Ironsi, withdrew in 1964.³

In January 1962, the ANC occupied Stanleyville and arrested Gizenga who, following Lumumba's death, had declared an independent state in the northeast. Late the next year, pro-Lumumba leaders Pierre Mulele, Christopher Gbenye, and Gaston Soumialot along with emerging local warlords in Congo's eastern provinces of Orientale and Kivu established the National Liberation Council (CNL), based in the neighboring and leftist Republic of Congo-Brazzaville, to oppose the Leopoldville government. The impending UN withdrawal

opened a space for rebellion. Trained in guerrilla warfare in China, Mulele entered his western Congo home area of Kwilu in July 1963, where he recruited fighters from his own Mbundu and Gizenga's Pende ethnic groups who had been victimized by the state and, in January 1964, attacked government posts, missions, and businesses. In January 1964, Soumialot established a CNL staging area in Burundi, where he made contacts with exiled Tutsi activists from Rwanda, organized recruiting in neighboring Kivu, and arranged arms shipments from China. During May and June, the eastern rebels took the towns of Uvira and Fizi, and the Lake Tanganyika port of Albertville. Taking the name Simba ("lion" in Kiswahili), these eastern insurgents often fought with spears and machetes, and used traditional charms as protection from bullets. Tshombe, the former Katanga separatist turned prime minister of the Congo, was assisted by the U.S. CIA in rapidly creating a Congolese Air Force with Cuban exiles piloting T-28 ground support aircraft, helicopters, and transport planes. While ANC troops and aircraft were rushed to Kwilu and re-established control by April, fighting there continued until December. In early August, in the east, a Simba force under Nicholas Olenga captured Stanleyville from 1,500 ANC troops who retreated because their commander, Colonel Leonard Mulamba, had just left to take charge of defending Bukavu. Controlling about half the country, the CNL proclaimed the People's Republic of Congo as an alternative to Kasavubu's Leopoldville regime, which was portrayed as a Western puppet. In addition to Congo-Brazzaville and Burundi, the Simbas received support from Algeria, Egypt, and Tanzania, and their government was officially recognized by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and China. In Stanleyville, the Simbas slaughtered between 1,000 and 2,000 Congolese Westernized elites at the Lumumba Monument but generally ignored local whites and foreigners. In mid-August, a Simba attempt to capture Bukavu, which threatened their supply lines with Burundi, was repelled by Colonel Mulamba's ANC, which engaged in house-to-house fighting with close air support from Cuban exile pilots. Three U.S. senior officers, advisors to the ANC, were present at the battle.

Guided by Belgian colonel Frederic Vandewalle, Tshombe recruited white mercenaries mostly from South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and France, some of whom he had employed in Katanga, as shock troops for the ANC. By mid-October 1964, there were about 400 white mercenaries in the Congo and within a year, there would be around 1,500.

Eventually, Tshombe would have three mercenary units: 5 Commando under Mike Hoare, which consisted mostly of South Africans and Rhodesians; 6 Commando led by Bob Denard and made up mostly of French veterans of Indochina and Algeria; and Jean “Black Jack” Schramme’s Belgian 10 Commando. Tshombe also called his former Katangese soldiers to return from exile and again take up arms for him, but this time in support of the ANC. At the end of August, Hoare, a South African–based World War II veteran who had worked for Tshombe in 1961, led a failed attempt by some 30 mercenaries to rescue 120 Belgians at Albertville (now Kalemie) on the south shore of Lake Tanganyika, which was taken a few days later by an ANC battalion under Colonel Kakuji. Assuming operational command, Vandewalle directed three motorized columns of white mercenaries, black Katangese soldiers, and Belgian army advisors—with air support—to converge on Stanleyville. After a 5 Commando company led by Siegfried Muller, a German World War II veteran, took Mbandaka on the Congo River in mid-September and moved east to combine with Belgian-led ANC units to capture Boende in late October, the Simbas in Stanleyville took whites and foreigners hostage. Around the same time, another 5 Commando company and 1,000 ANC troops under Colonel Mulamba were flown to the Bukavu area, where they recaptured Uvira and Goma. In early November, the main motorized ANC column under Vandewalle, which consisted of four mercenary companies and a Cuban exile platoon from 5 Commando under Hoare; 1,000 ANC troops; and Belgian advisors and logistics teams moved north and took the town of Kindu after a long battle and then advanced toward Stanleyville. Approved by Kasavubu, Tshombe; and Mobutu, a multinational airborne rescue mission was initiated—that involved a fleet of 12 U.S. C-130 transport aircraft that brought 545 Belgian paratroopers of the Para-Commando Regiment to a staging area at Kamina air base in southern Congo. On November 24, 1964, in Operation Dragon Rouge, 350 Belgian paratroopers under Colonel Charles Laurent were dropped on Stanleyville by 5 American aircraft and a few hours later, Vandewalle’s main column arrived with close air support. Some 1,600 hostages were rescued. The mercenaries of 6 and 10 Commando prevented Simba reinforcements from reaching Stanleyville. Four days later, in Operation Dragon Noir, U.S. aircraft dropped 225 Belgian paratroopers on Paulis (Isiro) to the northeast, where they rescued 335 hostages as ANC ground forces arrived. During the Dragon operations, 1,995 hostages were rescued

and 63 killed; 3 Belgian soldiers lost their lives; and around 10,000 Simba rebels were killed. Although two other Dragon rescue operations had been planned for the Simba-held towns of Bunia and Watsa, international condemnation of Dragon Rouge and Dragon Noir prompted the Belgians to cancel them against the wishes of the Americans. Vandewalle and other Belgian personnel returned home, leaving Hoare in charge of the anti-Simba campaign. During the subsequent Operation White Giant, which aimed to retake the rest of the northeast and block Simba arms supplies from Uganda and Sudan, Hoare's 5 Commando and 1,000 Katangese ANC troops supported by the Cuban-piloted Congolese Air Force seized Bunia in late December 1964 and the rebel stronghold at Nioka in mid-March 1965 while at the same time a mercenary naval force on Lake Albert took nearby Port Mahagi. Hoare's men destroyed the only truck-capable bridge on the Congo-Sudan border in mid-May and at the end of the month captured the towns of Dungu and Watsa, the latter defended by 1,200 Simbas because it contained a gold mine important for their weapons purchases. Assisted by Denard's 6 Commando, Hoare then launched Operation Violettes Imperiales, which during June, captured the towns of Niangara, Bili, Bondo, and Buta in northern Orientale Province, which secured the border with pro-Simba Central African Republic (CAR).

The Simba rebellion was now reduced to isolated pockets. In April 1965, Che Guevara led a 200-strong Cuban contingent into eastern Congo via Tanzania to support Congolese and exiled Rwandan rebels under the leadership of young Laurent Kabila. With Cuban planning, the rebels executed a series of ambushes and in late June, a 200-man unit that included 44 Cubans attacked the ANC garrison at Bendera, where many of the Rwandan insurgents refused to fight because they claimed sickness. Those insurgents that did participate fled as soon as the first rounds were fired, and the entire rebel force ran off when strafed by Cuban-piloted aircraft. In late July, in a well-planned operation, Cuban and Rwandan fighters blew up an important bridge on the road between Bendera and Albertville just as ANC vehicles were crossing it. Around this time, the Leopoldville regime assigned Schramme's 10 Commando to prevent infiltration across the Congo River from Congo-Brazzaville, Denard's 6 Commando to secure Orientale Province with its Uganda and Sudan borders, and Hoare's 5 Commando to crush the remnants of the Simba rebellion in the Fizi-Baraka area near Lake Tanganyika. Because most

of Hoare's men's contracts had expired, 5 Commando was rebuilt with new mercenaries from South Africa and Rhodesia who were trained at Elisabethville in Katanga before being dispatched to Albertville for operations along the west shore of the lake. Beginning in September 1965, the CIA arranged for two U.S.-made SWIFT boats (16-meter-long vessels with heavy machine guns) with Cuban exile crews to patrol Lake Tanganyika to intercept rebel supply boats from Tanzania. In late September, Hoare's 5 Commando, supported by Cuban exile-piloted ground attack planes and Cuban exile-crewed SWIFT boats, conducted an amphibious assault on the lakeside town of Baraka, which was taken after five days of heavy fighting. During the first half of October, Hoare's mercenaries and the ANC moved inland and captured Fizi and Lubonja, and late in the month they attacked Guevara's mountain camp. At the end of October, 2,000 rebels and 45 Cubans retook Baraka. Hoare's forces, after days of intense combat and with air support, captured it again. Around the same time, 80 kilometers south, another mercenary-ANC force took Yungu, the last rebel-held lake port, which pushed the rebels and Cubans inland to Kibamba. By staying on the offensive and threatening to cut them off from their cross-lake supply lines, Hoare forced the Cubans and Congolese-Rwandan rebels to fight conventional battles rather than guerrilla warfare. With the Rwandans wanting to quit and local farmers leading Hoare's men to rebel locations, Guevara and the Cubans realized there was no prospect of revolution in Congo and staged a night evacuation across Lake Tanganyika in three heavily armed motor boats. Hoare would later write several books about his Congo campaigns, which would make his name synonymous with white mercenaries working in Africa.⁴

In November 1965, ANC commander Mobutu, supported by most military officers, overthrew President Kasavubu and established a U.S.-backed anticommunist dictatorship. Dismissed as prime minister, Tshombe fled to Spain. While Hoare and many of the South African-Rhodesian mercenaries left the country that same month, the remaining French-speaking mercenaries in eastern Congo extorted protection money from miners and businessmen, and Schamme's 10 Commando—which he called Leopard Battalion—based at Yumbi on the Congo River, established a quasi-feudal state on the border of Bandundu and Equateur provinces. The overthrow of Tshombe, integration into a reformed national army, deployment far from their home province, and demands for higher salaries caused discontent among the former Katangese soldiers. In January 1966, rumors spread

that Katangese troops deployed near the Uganda border had mutinied. A widespread mutiny among Katangese soldiers in the east broke out in July with demands for higher wages and the dismissal of ANC head General Louis Bobozo. While the mutiny in Bukavu dissolved quickly, the 2,000-strong Baka Regiment under Colonel Ferdinand Tshipola seized the Stanleyville airport and the western part of the city. The Baka Regiment was an original Katanga unit that had returned from Angola in 1964, and there was talk that Mobutu planned to disband it. In late September, ANC forces led by Schramme evicted the Katangese mutineers from Stanleyville and after a negotiated surrender, some of them were summarily executed and Tshipola sentenced to death. Because employing white mercenaries was expensive and politically embarrassing for an African government, and the Simba rebellion had been crushed, Mobutu announced in July 1966 that he would not renew his mercenaries' contracts. Facing dismissal, Denard and Schramme conspired with the exiled Tshombe to stage a coup in Stanleyville and then take the rest of the country. However, the U.S. CIA had invested too much in Mobutu to see him fall. As the plan was about to unfold in early July 1967, the plane meant to fly Tshombe back home was hijacked and forced to land in Algeria, where the erstwhile Katangese leader was imprisoned and died of "heart failure" two years later. Unaware that their political support had vanished, Denard's and Schramme's mercenaries and Katangese troops seized Stanleyville, Bukavu, and Kindu. With exile Cuban-piloted aircraft bombing the mutineers and ANC reinforcements brought in by U.S. C-130 transport planes, Mobutu's forces (which included Israeli-trained paratroopers) retook Stanleyville in early August, and the mercenaries regrouped at Bukavu. Denard, who had been wounded and flown to Rhodesia, went to Angola, where he assembled a Katangese force that invaded Congo by bicycle but was quickly driven back across the border by the ANC. While the mutineers held out at Bukavu, the arrival of some 15,000 ANC reinforcements prompted Schramme and his 130 mercenaries, 800 Katangese soldiers, and their 1500 dependents to cross into Rwanda in early November and surrender to local officials. Although Congolese demands for their extradition were ignored and the white mercenaries repatriated, some Katangese soldiers later accepted an amnesty and returned home, where many were killed. Similarly, in 1968, the fugitive Kwilu rebellion leader Mulele accepted an amnesty from Mobutu, who then had him tortured and killed.⁵

MOBUTU'S MILITARY AND THE SHABA INVASIONS

When Mobutu changed the name of Congo to Zaire in 1971, the Congolese military became the Armed Forces of Zaire (FAZ). During the early 1970s, the FAZ expanded to seven brigades located at major centers, and hundreds of Zairean officers were trained in Western countries. Although Mobutu embarked on an “authenticity” campaign that involved changing place names and encouraging aspects of African culture, the military culture of the FAZ remained entirely European in character. It depended heavily on foreign personnel such as 300 Belgians working in the Ministry of Defence, Italians supporting the air force, Americans helping with transport and communications, Israelis training airborne forces, and British instructing engineers. While many of the former Force Publique NCOs who had become senior officers upon independence retired around 1972, the discovery of an alleged coup plot in 1975 prompted Mobutu to conduct the first of a series of purges of the officer corps in which many graduates of training in the United States and Belgium were executed. In 1972, Mobutu placed the 20,000-strong police under military authority and in 1975, he created the elite Kaymanyola Division, trained by North Koreans and consisting of men from various ethnic groups. The name came from a 1964 battle in which troops under Mobutu's command captured an important bridge.⁶

After the mutinies of the late 1960s, many Katangese troops returned to Portuguese ruled Angola, where they established the Front for the National Liberation of Congo (FNLC) under former Katanga police commander Nathaniel Mbumba. Given that Mobutu supported his brother-in-law Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA; see Chapter 5), the Portuguese employed the Katangese fighters who they called Black Arrows against African nationalist insurgents. With the sudden withdrawal of the Portuguese in 1974, Mobutu sent Zairean troops into Angola to support the FNLA's bid to seize power which was also backed by the United States and apartheid South Africa. This plan backfired—the FNLA was eliminated, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) took power, and its Cuban allies sponsored the Katangese FNLC exiles in their struggle against Mobutu. Indeed, FNLC Katangese exiles had been present among MPLA forces during the key Angolan Civil War battles of 1975 such as at Quifangondo against the FNLA, Zairean troops and Portuguese mercenaries and at

Benguela against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angolan (UNITA) and South African forces. While Mobutu and Angolan MPLA leader Agostinho Neto signed the Brazzaville Accords in February 1976, which theoretically normalized relations between the two countries, the former continued assisting the FNLA remnants based in Zaire, UNITA rebels in southern Angola, and insurgents in Angola's Cabinda enclave, and the latter continued support for FNLC.

On March 8, 1977, two thousand FNLC fighters riding bicycles crossed from Angola to the Zairean province of Shaba (formerly Katanga), split into two columns heading north and east, captured several towns (including the manganese mining center of Kisenge), and advanced along a railway to within 30 kilometers of Kolwezi. The invaders' goal was not the secession of Shaba but the overthrow of Mobutu's regime. Many Zairean soldiers, their pay stolen by their officers, deserted. On the invasion's second day, a 94-man company from Zaire's 2nd Airborne Battalion was ambushed at Malonga and ran away, abandoning its heavy machine guns, mortars and a 75-mm cannon. On March 12, two battalions of the 11th Brigade of the new Kaymanyola Division was flown to Shaba, where they joined the 2nd Airborne. Although it fell apart on its first contact with the FNLC, the composite force under Colonel Monkoti rallied, advanced west from Kolwezi toward Kasaji, and when ambushed held together, suffering 2 dead and killing 15 rebels. Overall, the Zairean units fought a series of isolated and failed counterattacks. Mobutu dismissed army chief of staff Colonel Mampa Ngakwe Salamayi (who he had sent to take charge in Shaba) along with his entire staff and took a personal role in directing operations. By the end of the month, Zairean forces in Shaba, now under Brigadier Singa Boyenge Mosambay, were reinforced by the 12th Brigade of the Kaymanyola Division, which arrived at Kolwezi by railway from Kamina, and two battalions of the Airborne Division were sent to the area. However, stalemate developed as the Zairean forces failed to dislodge the rebels, who could not advance.

Mobutu, portraying himself the victim of communist attack, appealed to his old allies. However, Belgium was displeased with him for nationalizing some businesses, and Jimmy Carter's administration in the United States, with its emphasis on human rights, was hesitant to help an oppressive regime. However, the anticommunist king of Morocco provided Mobutu with a 1,500-strong parachute brigade flown to Shaba by the French, who had recently become Zaire's chief external

sponsor. In addition, Egypt provided pilots and mechanics for Zaire's French-built Mirage jets, Saudi Arabia sent money, and the Belgians and Americans contributed supplies. Between mid-April and the end of May, Zairean and Moroccan troops with air, artillery and armor support launched a two-pronged offensive that gradually pushed the FNLC into Angola. Although the local Shaba population had not risen up to support the rebels, Mobutu's forces conducted brutal reprisals, particularly against the ethnic Lunda, from which most of the FNLC had originated, and about 200,000 people fled across the border. After the near disaster of Shaba I (or the Eighty Day War), Mobutu purged his officer corps; reorganized and streamlined the military, which reduced its size by a quarter; stationed the entire Kaymanyola Division in Shaba with its headquarters in Kolwezi; engaged French instructors to train an entirely new parachute unit; and brought in French, Belgian, and American advisors. The Sino-Soviet rivalry impacted Mobutu as he gained sympathy from China against the Soviet-Cuban backed FNLC, which caused the Americans and Belgians to renew their close relationship with Zaire. Undeclared, the FNLC in Angola grew from 2,000 to 5,000 fighters, with recruits coming from refugees.

Within Shaba, FNLC agents gained support from the oppressed population and recruited 500 militiamen who established weapons caches smuggled from Zambia and prepared to guide invading rebel units to their targets. Because the border with Angola was heavily guarded by most of the 8,000 Zairean soldiers in Shaba, the FNLC planned to cross into Congo from Zambia and focus on the rapid seizure of key mining centers such as Kolwezi and Lubumbashi (formerly Elisabethville). On May 11, 1978, three thousand to 4,000 FNLC fighters, organized into 11 "battalions" of 300 men each, invaded with a force of 1,000 heading to Mutshatsha to cut the railway and the rest advancing on Kolwezi. Two days later, the FNLC surprised the Kaymanyola Division's 14th Brigade at Kolwezi, which collapsed to allow the rebels to overrun the airfield and destroy Zairean military aircraft, including 5 to 7 Italian-made ground attack planes. The FNLC were now in control of Kolwezi, which was home to 2,500 Europeans and 89 Americans mostly associated with the mining industry. Upon the insistence of French officials, the 311th Airborne Battalion, which had been formed six months earlier with French instruction, and the 133rd Infantry Battalion were airlifted to Lubumbashi by Zairean C-130 and civilian transport aircraft. Under direct orders from Mobutu, who was eager to restore public confidence, a company of

the 311th under U.S.-trained Captain Mosala-Monja was dropped on Kolwezi on May 16 in the hope that it would seize the military headquarters and be relieved by the unit's two other companies that were advancing 150 kilometers overland from Lubumbashi. Hopelessly outnumbered, Mosala-Monja's men were gunned down as they landed, with the fortunate ones going off course into the nearby bush. The remaining pockets of Zairean 14th Brigade soldiers fled, and the FNLC began murdering European civilians. That evening, the 311th commanding officer, French-trained Major Donat Lieko Mahele, arrived at the Lualaba Bridge some 25 kilometers from Kolwezi with just 1 company and his headquarters because his other company had been held in reserve. Instructing the 133rd company guarding the bridge to join his column, Mahele pressed on, overcame two enemy ambushes, and controlled the Kolwezi airfield by the middle of the next day. Around the same time, French pilot instructors began flying Zairean Mirage strikes against the rebels.

Since most of the Americans near Kolwezi were evacuated by their construction company, the Carter administration cancelled an alert given to the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division for a possible rescue in Zaire. On May 19 and 20, during Operation Leopard, 700 paratroopers of the French 2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment (2 REP) under Colonel Philippe Erulin were dropped directly on Kolwezi by overloaded Zairean transport aircraft, where they rescued hostages, killed about 100 rebels, and destroyed two armored cars that had been captured by the FNLC. This was 2 REP's first combat jump since it had been destroyed at the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu in Indochina, and the foreign legionnaires were eager to restore their martial reputation. In an entirely separate Operation Red Bean, two Belgian parachute battalions with support elements, totalling 1,180 men (some of whom were veterans of the 1964 Dragon operations) under Colonel Rik Depooter were landed in two waves by Belgian C-130s at Kolwezi airfield on May 20. The Belgians had initially planned a parachute jump but at the last minute, when they learned the French were already in Kolwezi, Depooter opted for a combat landing, which would get all his troops on the ground and organized much faster, thus giving them more time to rescue hostages. Unlike their 1964 experience, the Belgians took along a surgical team to treat injured hostages in addition to 28 jeeps and 26 three-wheeled vehicles to patrol outside town and intercept rebel reinforcements. The Belgians advanced into the town, where they narrowly avoided "friendly fire" incidents with the

French. The two uncoordinated airborne forces had different missions—2 REP was to support Mobutu's regime by expelling the rebels from Kolwezi, and the Belgians were to evacuate the expatriates. While the French accused the Belgians of forcing some expatriates to leave, and the Belgians accused the French of too hastily using force against Congolese, the Belgian medical team assisted the French, and the French allowed the Belgians to use their Zairean transport aircraft for evacuation. Other countries supported the operation, including the Americans who flew fuel into the staging areas at Kamina and Lubumbashi, the British who sent a flying hospital, and the Italians who dispatched a C-130 with spare parts for the Belgian aircraft. By the end of the next day, the French were mopping up pockets of resistance in Kileleshwa; the Belgians had evacuated 2,000 expatriates; and the FNLC was retreating toward the border.

The French paratroopers, who had received their own light vehicles, pursued the rebels in the last days of May and were flown back to Corsica in early June. 2 REP had captured 163 rebels and killed 252, seized many weapons, and suffered five dead and 25 wounded. In Kolwezi, during this Shaba II, several hundred Congolese civilians and 160 foreign residents had been killed. The Belgians evacuated 2,300 civilians without suffering any casualties. One of their battalions was flown home on May 22 and the other—reinforced with additional mortars, antitank resources, medical teams, and logistical support—remained for two months as an interim security force, though it was forbidden to assist Zairean units in combat. In July, the Belgians in Shaba were replaced by a Western-backed "Inter-African" force transported by the U.S. Air Force. It consisted of 1,500 Moroccan troops and contingents from conservative former French colonies, including 600 from Senegal, 390 from the Central African Empire, 110 from Cote d'Ivoire, 44 from Gabon, and a few from Togo. The Inter-African force secured Shaba for 15 months while Mobutu rebuilt his discredited military with French and Belgian assistance. Although Mobutu and Carter accused the Cubans of instigating the Shaba invasion, Castro had tried to delay or prevent it because the crisis took international attention away from the South African parachute assault on Cassinga in southern Angola less than two weeks earlier, and 5,000 Cuban troops had been recently shifted from Angola to Ethiopia to intervene in the Ogaden War. While Mobutu ordered reprisals in Shaba, his mining economy was in tatters, which meant that he bowed to demands from his Western allies to release some political prisoners and place

his economy under Western supervision. Furthermore, Zaire and Angola came under pressure from their external sponsors to end the Shaba conflict, which led to a nonaggression pact in which they promised to refrain from supporting exiled rebels from one another's countries. Angola repatriated FNLC insurgents with the assistance of Cuban troops, and Zaire halted support for Angolan insurgents, which meant the collapse of Roberto's FNLA.⁷

After the suppression of the eastern rebellion in 1965, Laurent Kabila formed the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) with small insurgent bases in the remote forests of South Kivu west of the Mitumba Mountains. By 1982, the PRP had established basic economic and social infrastructure in the area and was indoctrinating its inhabitants with revolutionary socialist ideology. In November 1984, about 50 PRP fighters occupied the Lake Tanganyika port of Moba in northern Shaba and urged the overthrow of Mobutu. Two days later, the town was retaken by a battalion of the 31st Parachute Brigade in an operation that caused between 10 and 50 deaths. While Mobutu accused Tanzania of harboring the PRP insurgents and threatened cross-border "hot pursuit" operations, Kabila insisted that it was based inside Zaire and staged a second attack on Moba in June 1985 that was easily repelled. In retaliation, the FAZ arbitrarily arrested, tortured, and killed local inhabitants.

The FAZ conducted a number of foreign deployments during the 1980s. In November 1981, the 746-strong 311th Parachute Battalion joined OAU peacekeepers in Chad and in 1983, the United States airlifted three Zairean battalions to Chad where, with air support from Zairean Mirages, they fought northern rebels and their Libyan allies for two years. Troops from Chad were trained in Zaire. In 1986, two companies of Zairean paratroopers deployed to Togo to stabilize the long-standing pro-French regime of President Gnassingbe Eyadema, a veteran of the French army in Indochina and Algeria, after a failed coup. In 1990, as will be discussed later in this chapter, elements of Mobutu's presidential guard were sent to Rwanda to combat an invasion by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). By 1987, Mobutu was again involved in supporting UNITA rebels, with the CIA using Kamina air base as a transit for arms shipments.⁸


By the late 1980s, the FAZ had 52,000 members, including Zaire's police. The Shaba invasions and imagined coup plots caused Mobutu to rely increasingly on officers from his home Equateur Province and his relatively small Ngbandi ethnicity, which—by 1980—accounted

for some 90 percent of Ministry of Defence personnel. As the primary FAZ element, the army consisted of two divisions, seven independent brigades, and a logistical corps. Of these, the most combat ready was the Special Presidential Division (DSP), which had been created in 1977 as a brigade with Israeli instructors. Expanded to divisional size, the DSP maintained five brigades with artillery support and some parachute capability, had the best equipment and weapons, was well fed and regularly paid, received cash awards, depended heavily on French advisors, and originated overwhelmingly from Mobutu's ethnic group. The DSP was mainly used to harass the political opposition and crush demonstrations such as in May 1990 when it attacked university residences in Lubumbashi and caused many deaths. Although the Shaba-based Kaymanyola Division had an official strength of 10,000, in reality it was composed of 4,200 soldiers and lacked logistical support. Of the division's three brigades, the 11th and 12th were seriously understrength, leaving the 14th (stationed in Kolwezi) as the only effective unit because it had been re-equipped, retrained, and reorganized by the French in 1984–1985. Formed in 1978, the 31st Parachute Brigade was trained, organized, equipped, and commanded by French officers and NCOs. It represented one of the FAZ's best units and its only mobile reserve, and comprised three battalions. Two of these battalions were based at N'Djili Airport near Kinshasa (formerly Leopoldville), and another was at Kamina in the south. In 1988, a new 32nd Parachute Brigade was formed with a 1,000-strong battalion training at the capital in preparation for deployment to Kitona in the northern Bas-Congo region. The First Armoured Brigade, located at Mbanza Ngungu some 165 kilometers southwest of Kinshasa, consisted of 1,300 men with 100 Chinese-made tanks, only 30 of which were operational. Established in 1979 by Chinese instructors and specializing in counterinsurgency, the 41st Commando Brigade was based at Kisangani (formerly Stanleyville) with just 1,200 troops formed into three operational battalions responsible for defending Zaire's vast eastern frontiers. It suffered from underfunding and desertions. Among the most neglected FAZ units, the 1,500-strong 13th Infantry Brigade at Kalemie (formerly Albertville) on Lake Tanganyika was unable to respond when rebels seized Moba in 1984. The 1,700-strong 21st Infantry Brigade at Lubumbashi was assigned the defense of eastern Shaba, and the 2,200-man 22nd Light Infantry Brigade was stationed at Kamina. The Zaire Air Force, consisting of 2,000 personnel, suffered serious maintenance problems that meant it

could fly only three out its five C-130 transports (which limited parachute drop capability) four Mirage fighters, and four ground attack planes. In addition, only 20 percent of pilots were fully trained, and there was no air defense capability. Created with U.S. assistance in 1977, the 1,600-strong Zairean Navy was the smallest but perhaps best trained FAZ element, with six SWIFT boats based at Kalemie on Lake Tanganyika, several riverine craft at Kinshasa to patrol the Congo and Ubangi Rivers, and five Chinese-made Shanghai-class patrol boats at Banana on the mouth of the Congo River, from where they patrolled the Atlantic coast. Following border clashes between Zaire and Zambia in 1984–1985, Mobutu created a paramilitary Civil Guard to secure the borders, counter smuggling and “terrorism,” and impose internal order. Initially trained by West Germans and Egyptians, the Civil Guard grew to 10,000 by the early 1990s, fell under Mobutu’s direct control, and was used to suppress urban protest. A culture of corruption dominated the FAZ. Usually promoted because of loyalty to Mobutu, officers stole subordinates’ pay and sold military equipment requisitioned for phantom units, and neglected enlisted personnel sold military fuel on the black market, which impeded military transport. In 1988, the U.S. CIA concluded that “the Zairean military, after 23 years under President Mobutu, has become a weak, ineffective force that is incapable of defending the country’s borders or of containing more than limited internal disorders.”⁹

CIVIL WAR IN CHAD

Independent in 1960, the former French territory of Chad faced a problem common to many African countries in that it had a relatively poor and arid north with a predominantly Muslim population and a comparatively prosperous south with Christian-traditionalist inhabitants. In 1968, the northern-based National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) launched an insurrection against the southern-dominated government of President Francois Tombalbaye, who appealed to France. Because Chad had been the first African territory to support the Free French in 1940, President de Gaulle sent 3,000 Foreign Legionnaires there in April 1969. The Tombalbaye regime was also supported by a small unit from Zaire, Israeli military instructors, and U.S. equipment. Up to 1972, FROLINAT used Eastern bloc tanks and antiaircraft missiles from Egypt, Algeria, and Libya to capture key northern towns, including Faya-Largeau, and kill 50 French and 500 Chadian



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troops. In 1973, Gaddafi's Libya annexed the supposedly uranium-rich Aouzou Strip just over its border with Chad and established an air base there protected by surface-to-air missiles. Since this action was not opposed by Tombalbaye, Gaddafi reduced his support for FROLINAT.

Given France's desire for Libyan oil, Paris decreased its military support for Tombalbaye in the early 1970s, which led to his death

in a 1975 coup in which General Felix Malloum took over. Because Malloum was much less accommodating to Gaddafi, Libya renewed its relationship with FROLINAT and sent troops south into Chad. At this time, the French military presence involved several hundred advisors in Chadian uniform who sometimes took part in fighting and protected Malloum from internal coups. Gaddafi's intervention provoked a split in FROLINAT, with the anti-Libyan minority forming the Armed Forces of the North (FAN) under Hissene Habre and the pro-Libyan majority establishing the People's Armed Forces (FAP) under Goukouni Oueddei. With Libyan-supplied small arms, rocket launchers, mortars, and recoilless rifles, FAP began an offensive against the government in June 1977 in which it quickly seized many northern towns except Ounianga Kebir, which was successfully held by French troops. The Chadian army lost 300 men, and the rebels captured additional weapons and equipment. With Malloum and Habre agreeing to form a unity government, FAP and the Libyans launched an offensive in January 1978 that captured the remaining government strongholds, including Ounianga Kebir and Faya-Largeau. The latter, defended by 5,000 Chadian soldiers, was taken after a short intense battle in mid-February by 2,500 rebels supported by 4,000 Libyans who mostly provided armor, artillery, and air support. In February 1978, France launched Operation Tacaoud, aimed at protecting Chad's capital of N'Djamena by the quick arrival of 2,500 troops mostly from 3rd Parachute Regiment of Marines (3 RPIMA) and 2 REP along with armored cars, artillery, gunship and transport helicopters, and eight Jaguar ground support jets. In mid-May, after a short cease-fire, FAP attacked the town of Ati, which was 430 kilometers northeast of N'Djamena and defended by 1,500 government troops. Over a two-day battle, Chadian armor and French troops relieved the town and repelled the insurgents, who suffered heavy losses. After a similar defeat at Djedaa in June, FAP had lost 2,000 men, abandoned its heavy weapons, and retreated north. During these battles, the French enjoyed complete air superiority because Libyan pilots refused to fly. A few months later, when Gaddafi backed a failed attempt to overthrow Oueddei within his organization, FAP expelled all Libyan troops and advisors in northern Chad.

In mid-February 1979, fighting erupted in N'Djamena between the FAN of Prime Minister Habre and state forces of President Malloum. The French did nothing as Oueddei's FAP entered the capital in support of Habre and remnants of the Chadian army fled south. During

this First Battle of N'Djamena, some 2,000–5,000 people were killed and 70,000 displaced. Pressured by France and Nigeria, which wanted to see Libyan forces out of the region, the three Chadian factions formed the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) in March with Oueddei as president. Following a foray across the border by 2,500 Libyan troops in June that was repelled by Chadian and French forces, the GUNT was expanded to include more pro-Gaddafi factions, and the French were supposed to be replaced by Inter-African peacekeepers. In March 1980, the 10-day Second Battle of N'Djamena erupted between Habre's FAN and Oueddei's FAP, which led to civilians again fleeing the city and the small remaining French and Zairean forces proclaimed neutrality. After Habre's FAN seized Faya-Largeau, Oueddei signed a Treaty of Friendship with Libya that included a mutual defense article that allowed Libyan forces to enter Chad. Consequently in October, Libyan troops were flown to the Aouzou Strip, which they—in cooperation with FAP—used as a staging area to capture Faya-Largeau, from where a force of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery began a 1,000-kilometer southward advance toward the capital. In early December, this force of 7,000–8,000 Libya troops (including Gaddafi's Islamic Legionnaires) entered N'Djamena, which they secured by the middle of the month. Habre's FAN withdrew to Chad's eastern frontier with Sudan's Darfur region and received assistance from Egypt, Sudan, and the United States. At the same time, Oueddei lost credibility within Chad by agreeing to merge his country with Libya. However, by late 1981, Oueddei had asked the 14,000 Libyan troops in Chad to leave because they had begun to support the primarily Arab Volcan Army in the north and clash with FAP. Eager to win favor with the OAU, Gaddafi surprisingly complied, and all Libyan forces were withdrawn from Chad by the end of November and were replaced with an OAU Inter-African Force (IAF) of 3,275 personnel mostly from Zaire, Nigeria, and Senegal.

The Libyan absence provided Habre's FAN with an opportunity to launch an offensive from Darfur that was unchallenged by the IAF. In early June 1982, Habre's fighters defeated Oueddei's GUNT forces in a hard battle 80 kilometers north of the capital and proceeded to seize N'Djamena without a fight, destroy elements of the old Chadian armed forces in the south, and secure most of the country. Libya stayed out of the conflict—Gaddafi rejected Oueddei's plea for help because he no longer trusted him. Subsequently, Oueddei re-established the GUNT in Tibesti in northern Chad and assembled 3,000–4,000 fighters from

various militias that merged as the National Army of Liberation (ANL) under the military command of southerner General Negue Djogo. In December 1982 and January 1983, the ANL repelled a series of attacks by Habre's forces on Tibesti. In turn, Gaddafi again began supporting Oueddei. In June 1983, some 3,000 ANL fighters, plus several thousand Libyans who provided artillery and logistics support, took Faya-Largeau and other northern towns on the route to N'Djamena. Condemning the latest Libyan intervention, France sent weapons to Habre in late June, the first contingent of 250 Zaïrean paratroopers arrived in early July to support Habre's forces, and the United States delivered food aid to N'Djamena. Reorganized as the Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT), Habre's military moved north and inflicted a crushing defeat on the GUNT-Libyan army south of Abeche, which led to the recapture of many northern towns, including Faya-Largeau at the end of July. Gaddafi responded immediately by dispatching Su-22 and Mirage jets from his Aouzou air base along with Tu-22 bombers stationed further north in Libya to bombardment Faya-Largeau. Over the next 10 days, in an impressive feat of logistics, Gaddafi flew personnel and armored vehicles into northern Chad, ultimately assembling 11,000 troops near Faya-Largeau. On August 10, three thousand to 4000 GUNT/ANL fighters—with the Libyans providing armor, air, and artillery support—assaulted Faya-Largeau, which was defended by 5,000 FANT soldiers under Habre. Battered by Libyan firepower, Habre left 700 soldiers behind to delay the enemy advance and withdrew south with the rest of his men. France, alarmed by this aggressive Libyan invasion, launched Operation Manta in mid-August that quickly brought 2,700 French troops supported by Jaguar ground attack aircraft to N'Djamena. Supporting the Habre regime but unwilling to help it retake the north, the French announced they would not tolerate any GUNT or Libyan forces south of the 15th parallel. Because the Libyans were unwilling to fight the French, Chad became effectively divided between the south ruled by Habre with French support and the north ruled by Oueddei with Libyan support. With OAU-sponsored negotiations going nowhere, GUNT and Libyan forces attacked a FANT outpost on the 15th parallel in late January 1984 and were repelled by French air power. The French brought more troops to Chad and moved their defensive line slightly north to the 16th parallel. An agreement between Paris and Tripoli to mutually withdraw their forces resulted in a complete French evacuation by November 1984, but 3,000 Libyan troops remained in northern Chad.

Between 1984 and 1986, Libya built an air base at Ouadi Doum in northern Chad, constructed roads, and increased its occupation force to 7,000 troops; 300 tanks; and 60 aircraft, and Habre's regime in the south received greater support from the Reagan administration in the United States. Concerned that the northern GUNT was being eroded by defections to Habre, Gaddafi launched an offensive in mid-February 1986 involving 5,000 Libyan and 5,000 GUNT fighters that attacked FANT positions along the 16th parallel with the intention of pushing south to the capital. However, three days later, Habre's FANT, with new equipment from France, counterattacked and pushed the GUNT-Libyan forces back. The next day, February 14, France responded to the Libyan attack by launching Operation Epervier (Sparrow Hawk), which brought 1,200 French troops and some Jaguar aircraft to N'Djamena. Gaddafi had miscalculated that the French government would not embark on a costly military intervention so close to its legislative election, when in fact this made President Francois Mitterrand more determined to respond to Libyan aggression. Two days after French troops arrived in Chad, French Jaguars flying out of Bangui in CAR bombed the Libyan air base at Ouadi Doum, and Gaddafi retaliated by having a single Tu-22 from Aouzou fly 1,000 kilometers under French radar to bomb the N'Djamena airport. In March, the GUNT alliance collapsed and in August, fighting erupted between Libyan troops and Oueddei's FAP faction, which seized Tibesti and declared support for Habre. After Gaddafi sent 2,000 Libyan troops supported by tanks and combat aircraft to attack Tibesti, Habre dispatched 2,000 FANT soldiers north to join the FAP troops, and France parachuted them supplies and declared that it would no longer be constrained by the 16th parallel.

With the union of Habre's and Oueddei's forces, a civil war was transformed into a national war against Libyan invaders. The FANT now had 10,000 personnel with a fleet of desert-adapted Toyota pickup trucks armed with heavy machine guns, cannon, and French-supplied Milan guided antitank missiles. Without their Chadian allies (who usually performed reconnaissance and infantry assaults), the 8,000 Libyan soldiers and 300 tanks in northern Chad were confined to isolated desert outposts. Beginning in early January 1987, in the "Toyota War," Chadian forces commanded by General Hassan Djamous performed a series of quick pincer movements that overcame many Libyan positions and forced them to withdraw from northern Chad. In August, the FANT entered the Aouzou Strip but

were repelled by a major Libyan counterattack during which the French refused air support to the Chadians. On September 5, a mobile column with 2,000 Chadian soldiers under Djamous penetrated 90 kilometers inside Libya, where they attacked the Maaten al-Sarra air base and easily overcame its 2,500 defenders equipped with tanks, artillery, and fortifications. The Chadians killed 1,700 Libyans; took 300 prisoners; dug up the runway; and destroyed 70 tanks, 30 armored personnel carriers, radar equipment, many surface-to-air missiles, and 26 aircraft. The FANT raiding force returned to Chad that night having suffered 65 dead and 112 wounded. This daring raid removed Libyan airpower in the region in preparation for a Chadian assault on the Aouzou Strip, which was aborted as French concern over the widening of the war and a new conciliatory approach by Gaddafi resulted in an OAU-brokered cease-fire in mid-September. During the Toyota War, Libya lost 7,500 dead; 1,000 captured; and US\$1.5 billion worth of equipment destroyed, including 800 tanks and armored vehicles. The FANT lost no more than 1,000 troops. Blaming the Americans and French for his embarrassment at Maaten al-Sarra, Gaddafi sanctioned the bombing of a U.S. airliner that blew up over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988 and a French airliner that was destroyed over Niger in September 1989. In June 1988, U.S. Special Forces, with the permission of Chad's government, enacted Operation Mount Hope III in which two Chinook helicopters flew 800 kilometers to recover a crashed Libyan Mi-24 Soviet-made attack helicopter that provided valuable intelligence. Libya and Chad normalized relations in 1989 and submitted the Aouzou Strip dispute to the International Court of Justice, which—in 1994—awarded the area to Chad. Libyan troops withdrew.

In 1989, Habre, suspecting a coup plot, ordered the killing of Djamous, and his predecessor Idriss Deby fled to Sudan, where he established the Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) with help from Khartoum and Tripoli. The MPS invaded Chad in March 1990 but turned back when French troops and aircraft arrived in the area. Disillusioned with Habre, the French did nothing when Deby again crossed the border in November with 2,000 MPS fighters who took Abeche and N'Djamena, killed several hundred government troops, and drove Habre to exile. Deby eventually became an elected but authoritarian president. From 2003, Deby's regime was challenged by numerous rebel groups in eastern Chad armed by the government of Sudan in retaliation for Chad's support for insurgents in Darfur.

The situation was complicated by the settlement of several hundred thousand Sudanese and Chadian refugees in camps along the border. Twice—in April 2006 and February 2008—the eastern rebel coalition traveled 1,000 kilometers in light vehicles to assault the capital (though both times they failed to capture it). During the 2008 Battle of N'Djamena, a 1,000-strong French force provided intelligence as well as logistical and medical support to the Chadian army, which was personally led by Deby, and French soldiers guarded the airport, from where they evacuated 1,300 foreigners. In January 2010, the governments of Chad and Sudan signed an agreement to stop backing rebels, and the border was reopened after seven years. In February 2008, the European Union Force (EUFOR) deployed 3,700 troops, half French, under Irish lieutenant general Patrick Nash to protect civilians and ensure humanitarian aid in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR, where 200,000 refugees from neighboring Darfur sought sanctuary. Between March 2009 and the end of 2010, EUFOR Chad-CAR was absorbed into the UN Mission in the CAR and Chad (MINURCAT) under Senegalese major general Elhadji Mouhamedou Kandji.¹⁰

CIVIL WAR AND GENOCIDE IN RWANDA

During the 1960s and 1970s, tens of thousands of mostly Tutsi Rwandan refugees living in Uganda were discriminated against by the regimes of Milton Obote and Idi Amin. The Hutu Power regimes in Rwanda, first under Gregoire Kayibanda and then Major General Juvenal Habyarimana (who staged a coup in 1973), refused to let the refugees return because they claimed the densely populated country had no space. Frustrated young Rwandans joined the anti-Amin and Tanzania-based Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) in the late 1970s and then, after Obote's return to power in 1980, the National Resistance Army (NRA) of Yoweri Museveni, which fought a guerrilla war in southern Uganda. Recruitment of Rwandans into the NRA was facilitated by the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (RANU) created by Rwandan exiles in Uganda in 1979 and moved to Nairobi, Kenya, in the early 1980s, from where it developed networks among the Rwandan diaspora. Among the small NRA unit that initiated operations in February 1981 was Museveni and Rwandan exiles Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame (see Chapter 3). Obote's subsequent denunciation of the NRA as a foreign Rwandan group and his

victimization of Uganda's Rwandan refugee community encouraged more exiles to join Museveni. When the NRA seized Kampala in January 1986, its 14,000 personnel included some 4,000 Rwandans who, as early recruits, represented the movement's most experienced troops. In 1987, RANU returned its headquarters to Kampala and with the popular Rwigyema as president, it recruited more Rwandan exiles from across the region and changed its name to Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to reflect a new militancy. The objective of the RPF was the removal of the Habyarimana regime and the return of perhaps 600,000 refugees to Rwanda. The Rwandans who held senior positions in the NRA now had senior positions within the Ugandan military, including Major-General Rwigyema, who as deputy defense minister and deputy army commander in chief was second only to Museveni; Major Kagame, who was head of military intelligence; Peter Baingana, who was in charge of medical services; and Major Chris Bunyenyezi, who was a brigade commander. Although the proportion of Rwandan exiles in the dramatically expanded Ugandan military declined during the late 1980s, their presence within the officer corps grew as many gained commissions because of combat experience. Initially, it appeared that the Museveni government would recognize the contribution of Rwandans to the liberation of Uganda from a series of brutal regimes by making it easier for them to receive citizenship. However, local politicians criticized Museveni's government and military as dominated by foreigners, and this was particularly sensitive in the turbulent north, where two Rwandan senior officers—Bunyenyezi and Stephen Nduguta—were accused of gross violations of human rights during counterinsurgency operations. In turn, Museveni began to remove Rwandans such as Rwigyema and Kagame from prominent positions, with the latter sent on a course in the United States. While some contend that the Rwandan exiles had initially joined the NRA as a plan to use Uganda as a staging area for an eventual invasion of Rwanda, it seems most had resolved to stay in their country of residence, and it was only the sudden re-emergence of xenophobia in Museveni's Uganda that prompted them to reclaim their lost country.¹¹

During September 1990, Rwigyema gathered Rwandan members of the Ugandan army near the Rwandan border using the cover that he was organizing a parade for Uganda Independence Day. On October 1, 1990, some 2,500 out of 4,000 Rwandan-Ugandan soldiers, led by Rwigyema and other senior officers, seized the border post at Kagitumba and invaded Rwanda. Calling themselves Inkotanyi

("those who struggle together"), they were armed with heavy machine guns, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, and light cannon taken from the Ugandan army along with radio communication vehicles stolen from Museveni's bodyguard. However, they had no armored vehicles or heavy artillery, and carried limited fuel and ammunition because they expected quick victory. Although the 5,200-strong Rwanda Armed Forces (FAR) was equipped with armored cars, artillery, and helicopters, it had no recent combat experience and was surprised by the attack, which allowed the RPF to quickly advance south 60 kilometers to seize the town of Gabiro. The RPF's problems mounted as supply lines from the Ugandan border became overstretched, the Ugandan government erected roadblocks to prevent other NRA Rwandan soldiers from joining the invasion, and the border roads were flooded by civilian Rwandan refugees trying to return home. On the invasion's second day, Rwigyema was murdered by two of his officers during a quarrel over tactics. Trained in guerrilla warfare in Mozambique during the late 1970s, Rwigyema had wanted to advance slowly to gain popular support, but Majors Bunyenyezi and Peter Banyingana favored a lightning seizure of power. Both were later executed in Uganda. In early October, the FAR staged a fake RPF attack on Kigali as pretext to arrest thousands of suspected rebel sympathizers (most of whom were Tutsi) and prompt foreign intervention. During that month, FAR soldiers massacred Tutsi civilians.

Since France and Rwanda had signed a military cooperation agreement in 1975, Paris supported Habyarimana and his FAR. French authorities tried to discredit the RPF by calling them *Khmer Noir* ("Black Khmers"), a reference to the genocidal *Khmer Rouge* in 1970s Cambodia, and believed they were part of a broad plan to expand Anglophone, particularly U.S., influence in the region. In addition to the delivery of French artillery, mortars, and other equipment to the FAR, Paris quickly dispatched 125 members of the 8th Parachute Regiment of Marines (8 RPIMA) based in CAR to begin Operation Noroit (North Wind) to protect French citizens and block the RPF route to Kigali. This French contingent was reinforced by another 400 paratroopers from various regiments. French troops bolstered the FAR by directing artillery, guarding the Kigali airport, providing logistics, maintaining and flying helicopters, facilitating radio communications, and supervising internal security duties such as interrogations and roadblocks at which they ordered Rwandan

civilians to show their identity cards to prove if they were Hutu or Tutsi. Habyarimana put the head of the French military mission, Lieutenant Colonel Gilles Chollet, in charge of operations, which effectively made him untitled FAR commander. Belgium sent around 400 troops to Rwanda to protect its citizens, but they were withdrawn after a few weeks because there was no apparent threat. Zaire's Mobutu, an ally of Habyarimana, sent 1,000 members of his supposedly elite DSP under General Mahele to bolster the FAR, but within a few weeks, the Kigali regime asked for the contingent's withdrawal because its looting, rape, and terrorism of civilians had made it an embarrassment. An FAR counteroffensive supported by French-piloted attack helicopters began on October 7, and by the end of the month, the leaderless RPF (enduring heavy casualties and desertions) had been pushed back to the northeast Akagera National Park, where some soldiers starved to death. A small RPF unit under Major Nduguta and Captain Kayitare reached as far south as the Rusumo-Kayonza road near the Tanzanian border but was cut off from the main body.

In late October, Kagame returned from the United States and assumed military command of the beleaguered RPF. Obtaining permission from Museveni to cross through Ugandan territory on a single night, now Major General Kagame led his men in a grueling march to the Virunga Mountains in northern Rwanda, where they spent two months reorganizing. At an altitude of 5,000 meters and with only light clothing, several RPF soldiers died of cold. Simultaneously, a small RPF contingent remained in the northeast. Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe, a Hutu former FAR officer exiled after a failed 1980 coup, was appointed RPF chairman to help dispel the obvious predominance of Tutsi in the movement. As recruits from the Rwandan Tutsi diaspora flocked to the RPF, at first mostly from Burundi but eventually from Zaire, Tanzania, Europe, and North America, tensions developed between the increasingly heterogeneous and relatively well-educated rank and file and the primarily Ugandan commanders who had less formal education but considerable fighting experience. Arguably, the relatively high educational level of its soldiers (half were secondary school graduates and one fifth had attended university) and the combat experience of its leaders contributed to the RPF's subsequent military success. The RPF grew from 5,000 in early 1991 to 12,000 at the end of 1992 to 25,000 in April 1994. With Museveni's administration looking the other way, Ugandan army officers

supplied their former comrades with ammunition, weapons, and equipment. Funded by the Rwandan diaspora and facilitated by Uganda, the RPF also purchased cut-rate ammunition and weapons from recently independent and impoverished former Soviet republics. The FAR was dramatically expanded from 5,200 in October 1990 to 30,000 by the end of 1991 to 50,000 by the middle of 1992. France supplied the FAR with artillery, mortars, antitank guided missiles, radar, armored vehicles, and attack helicopters. France also arranged arms deals with Egypt and South Africa. Aside from a few foreign drifters, the new FAR recruits were Hutu landless peasants or unemployed urban youth. Undergoing a short 15-day training course, they could not handle their weapons properly and when engaged by the enemy fired wildly in all directions. The combination of advanced weapons, and poorly educated and trained soldiers meant that French advisors had to take an active role in operations. For example, French advisors would set up and aim artillery then have a Rwandan soldier push the firing button. Although Rwanda received a credit of US \$41 million from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1991 and imposed a special tax to pay for its war effort, by the end of fiscal year 1991, there was a budget deficit of US\$188 million.¹²

On January 23, 1991, Kagame led an RPF raid on the northern town of Ruhengeri because it was the hometown of many key members of the Habyarimana regime. One thousand mostly political prisoners were liberated from the local prison, and a large amount of weapons and munitions were captured. The Habyarimana administration responded by massacring between 300 and 1,000 Tutsi civilians in the northwest. Following the Ruhengeri raid, the RPF launched a guerrilla war against the state of Rwanda. Regional peace talks produced a March 1991 cease-fire that was ignored as both sides engaged in a low-intensity conflict around the northern Byumba area. The RPF closed the road to Uganda, which meant landlocked Rwanda's imports and exports had to move along the longer and more expensive road through Tanzania. While the FAR focused on bombarding suspected rebel mountain camps, RPF fighters simply hid in the forests and under rocky overhangs and then conducted hit-and-run attacks. Neither side took negotiations seriously because the FAR was confident in French assistance, and the RPF believed it could not be dislodged from the Virungas. In November 1991, the latest cease-fire was aborted by an FAR offensive in the Virungas, which was a complete failure. This prompted the RPF to launch its first major

offensive since October 1990 and by early 1992, it had gained control of the agriculturally productive Byumba area, which put great economic and political pressure on the Habyarimana regime. By April–May 1992, the FAR was in disarray, with desertion in some battalions surpassing 50 percent. In late May and early June, FAR units at Ruhengeri and Gisenyi in the north mutinied over lack of pay and rumors that peace would mean the loss of their jobs. The once disciplined force then engaged in drunkenness and abuse of civilians separate from officially organized massacres. Conversely, Hutu peasants fled areas that came under RPF control, which raised questions about the group's popular legitimacy.

In April 1992, Habyarimana introduced multiparty democracy, which saw the emergence of anti-Tutsi extremists such as the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR) and pushed the RPF into serious negotiations because it did not want to be seen as blocking a settlement. Around 1992, Hutu Power groups formed "civil defense" militias such as the ruling National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development's (MRNDD's) Interahamwe ("those who work together") and the CDR's Impuzamugambi ("those with a common purpose") trained by French military advisors. Internationally sponsored negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania, produced a shaky cease-fire that lasted from July 1992 to February 1993 and was monitored by a Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) with personnel from Francophone and Anglophone countries outside the region: Senegal, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Mali. Because NMOG reported cease-fire violations to the OAU's new Joint Military-Political Commission in Ethiopia, the delegates at Arusha were not distracted. A breakdown in the Arusha negotiations led to the January 1993 killing of 300 Tutsi civilians in northern Rwanda and in early February, the RPF launched a wildly successful offensive in which it captured Ruhengeri, doubled the territory under its control and advanced to within 23 kilometers of Kigali. The demoralized FAR collapsed, and the capital was saved by the timely arrival of 600 French reinforcements supported by French operated FAR artillery. On February 20, the RPF unilaterally declared a cease-fire because it did not want a direct confrontation with the French, and a major battle over Kigali would unite the city's inhabitants behind Habyarimana and eliminate the chance of a negotiated settlement. Almost the entire population of the newly occupied RPF areas, some 800,000 people, fled south to avoid what they had been told was a return of Tutsi feudal oppression. Indeed, the RPF killed

local officials and their families in retaliation for previous massacres. In April, both sides returned to the Arusha process because Habyarimana's expanded FAR had been discredited and the United Nations, taking a leading role for the first time, urged the RPF to negotiate. At Museveni's suggestion, the UN Security Council established an 81-member UN Observer Mission to Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) in June to ensure the RPF was not using Ugandan territory for military purposes, which represented the first military cooperation between the United Nations and OAU. Additionally, the RPF agreed to withdraw from the territory it had conquered in February, which was designated a demilitarized zone (DMZ) and initially patrolled by NMOG. As the Arusha negotiations progressed, within Rwanda, anti-Tutsi hatred was further enflamed by propaganda broadcasts from the recently launched Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM).

In early August 1993, Habyarimana's regime, moderate opposition groups, and the RPF signed the Arusha Accords in which they agreed to form a transitional government of all political parties, allow the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees, and create an integrated military with command positions down to battalion level shared equally by the RPF and FAR, and personnel amounting to 40 percent RPF and 60 percent FAR. The security forces would be significantly reduced and divided between a 13,000-strong army under an FAR commander and a 6,000-strong gendarmerie under an RPF commander. The hitherto dominant Hutu Power clique would lose its long-standing control of the military, which the "Hutu Ten Commandments" that were published in an extremist newspaper in 1990 insisted on being exclusively Hutu. At Kagame's insistence, RPF representatives in Kigali's transitional parliament were protected by a 600-strong RPF battalion. The implementation of the agreement and the situation in the DMZ would be supervised by 2,500 peacekeepers of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) commanded by Canadian lieutenant general Romeo Dallaire, former commander of UNOMUR, which had no intelligence unit, no ability to investigate violence, and only two combat-capable infantry battalions (one Belgian and another Ghanaian). In October 1993, as UNAMIR began to arrive in Rwanda, the Tutsi-dominated army in Burundi murdered the democratically elected Hutu president and massacred tens of thousands of Hutu, which forced about 200,000 Hutu refugees into Rwanda. For Rwanda's Hutu extremists, this illustrated the dangers of a possible Tutsi-RPF takeover. In December 1993,

as stipulated in the Arusha agreement, Operation Noroit concluded with the withdrawal of the main French intervention force, but French military advisors supplemented by French mercenaries remained with the FAR. In January 1994, Dallaire reported to UN headquarters in New York that a local informant had told him of a Hutu extremist plan to assassinate members of the transitional government and eliminate the Tutsi population, and he asked for reinforcements and additional equipment for UNAMIR. However, given the lack of strategic interest in Rwanda by Western powers and the recent disastrous U.S. intervention in Somalia, UN head of peacekeeping and later secretary general Kofi Annan ignored the warning.

On the evening of April 6, 1994, the aircraft carrying Habyarimana and Burundian president Cyprien Ntaryamira was approaching Kigali airport when it was destroyed by a surface-to-air missile. While some claimed that the RPF shot down the plane to provoke a resumption of hostilities in which they would seize the entire country, most experts maintain that the event represented the start of a Hutu extremist coup within the Habyarimana administration led by Ministry of Defence official Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, who quickly formed an interim government and planned to eliminate the Tutsi population to avoid sharing power. Almost immediately after Habyarimana's death, Hutu militias and FAR elements erected roadblocks in Kigali and began the systematic slaughter of Tutsi. Because not all FAR officers had been included in the conspiracy (including the army head Colonel Marcel Gatsinzi, who was soon dismissed), some fighting broke out between FAR units. It is likely that the FAR officers from the north, the home of many within Habyarimana's inner circle, were party to the conspiracy while those from the south were not. Within a very short time, the massacres spread to other parts of the country and over the next three months, almost 1 million people, mostly Tutsi, were murdered. On April 7, the FAR presidential guard disarmed, tortured, and killed 10 Belgian UNAMIR soldiers guarding interim prime minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a moderate Hutu, who was also murdered and sexually mutilated. This precipitated the sudden withdrawal of the Belgian paracommando battalion (2 Commando) from UNAMIR and despite Dallaire's request for a 5,000-strong force that could stop the massacres, the United Nations ordered the mission reduced to just 270 personnel. However, Ghanaian brigadier Henry Kwami Anyidoho, UNAMIR deputy commander, and the Ghanaian battalion of 456 troops remained in Kigali, where they protected UN

headquarters and escorted humanitarian relief convoys. By the time UN authorities realized their mistake in mid-May and ordered the expansion of UNAMIR to 5,000, it was too late to influence events in Rwanda because the RPF had taken the initiative.

Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles Kayonga, the RPF battalion in Kigali left the parliament building on April 7 and established a defensive position along the northern route into the city, from where they repelled FAR attack. On April 8, the main RPF force in the north launched a three-pronged offensive. One group moved west to Ruhengeri, where it engaged the FAR in an ultimately stalemated battle but protected the right flank of the main southward advance. A second group moved down the eastern border toward Kibungo, encountered little resistance, and reached the Tanzanian border on April 22, which secured the main force's left flank. The main RPF force, with most of its heavy weapons, moved south and by April 11, its leading elements had begun to slowly encircle Kigali, causing Bagosora's interim government to flee to Gitarama, leaving new FAR chief and defense minister General Augustin Bizimungu in charge of the capital's defense. At this time, the RPF battalion in Kigali moved to threaten the airport. On April 8, French advisors with the FAR cleared vehicles from the Kigali airport's runway to allow the nighttime landing of French transport aircraft carrying a 544-strong intervention force consisting mostly of two companies of 3 RPIMA from CAR and a company of 8 RPIMA from Gabon plus a small special forces element under Colonel Henri Poncet. Over the next two days, about 500 Belgian paracommandos and a company of Italian paratroopers were also landed at the Kigali airport and were joined by the Belgian battalion that had left UNAMIR. Called Operation Amaryllis by the French and Operation Silverback by the Belgians and Italians, this intervention was meant to quickly evacuate European civilians. French special forces ventured 10 kilometers south of Kigali to rescue 94 children and 34 adults from an orphanage set up by Agathe Habyarimana, the late president's widow and a central figure in genocide planning. By April 14, when RPF forces began mortaring the airport, French, Belgian, and Italian forces had flown out with 2,000 civilians, including the Habyarimana entourage.

With the RPF offensive, divisions within the FAR disappeared, but the sudden absence of French advisors and allies undermined its fighting ability. Tightening its grip on the capital, the RPF forced the closure of Kigali airport on May 6, cut the Kigali-Gitarama road on

May 16, and captured the airport and military camp on May 22. Attempting to relieve pressure on its new headquarters at Gitarama, the FAR launched a counteroffensive south of Kigali on June 6 that was easily defeated by the RPF. With the subsequent capture of Gitarama on June 13, the RPF launched an offensive in Kigali from the northern, eastern, and southern suburbs with heavy fighting continuing until July 3 when the FAR, out of ammunition, withdrew from the capital with most of its inhabitants. During June, the RPF's eastern prong reached the southeastern corner of Rwanda and turned west to push FAR units along the Burundi border. It captured Butare at the start of July. With the loss of the capital and the FAR routed, Kagame quickly turned his main force north to seize Ruhengeri and Gisenyi in mid-July. In late May, with 15,000 out of its 20,000–25,000 troops engaged in the battle for Kigali, the RPF had begun to recruit young Tutsi genocide survivors and exiles from Burundi, who were eventually blamed for revenge killings.

On June 23, the French—with UN approval—launched Operation Turquoise, which was officially meant to create a refugee sanctuary in southwestern Rwanda until the arrival of reinforcements for UNAMIR. The zone was occupied by a force of 2,550 French soldiers and 500 from Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Mauritania, Egypt, Niger, and Congo-Brazzaville supported by 100 armored personnel carriers, a battery of heavy mortars, 10 helicopters, 8 Jaguar and Mirage ground attack jets, and 4 Mirage jet fighters for reconnaissance. Because the United States turned down a French request for air transport, Paris supplemented its own air force with hired civilian passenger jets and huge Antonov and Iluyshin aircraft from Ukraine and Russia to lift most of the massive intervention force to its staging area at the town of Goma on Zaire's border with Rwanda. Operation Turquoise was commanded by General Jean-Claude Lafourade in Goma with his deputy General Raymond Germanos (who was later disgraced for possessing child pornography) based at Cyangugu in southwest Rwanda. Although the RPF objected to the intervention of their old French enemies posing as humanitarians and the establishment of the Turquoise zone blocked the RPF advance westward along the Burundi border, there were no clashes between the two forces. Among the hundreds of thousands of refugees who passed through the French area on their way to eastern Zaire were retreating FAR elements complete with weapons and equipment, Hutu Power militia, and senior planners of the genocide. Indeed, the genocide continued

within the Turquoise zone, with French troops assisting Hutu militia to locate hiding Tutsi. In a particularly notorious incident in late June, a French reconnaissance detachment arrived at Bisesero near the western town of Kibuye, where they convinced Tutsi who had used bows and arrows, spears, and clubs to fight off Hutu death squads to come out of the forests and hills in which they had been hiding. Suddenly, the French troops left the area and returned three days later to find between 1,000 and 2,000 Tutsi murdered. The French soldiers of Operation Turquoise were divided between the elite marines and Foreign Legion paratroopers who had assisted the FAR and wanted to continue their fight against the Tutsi and others outraged at what they saw. With the withdrawal of Operation Turquoise in late August and its replacement by Ghanaian UNAMIR peacekeepers, RPF forces occupied southwestern Rwanda, which completed their takeover of the country. While Operation Turquoise saved between 10,000 and 17,000 people, the poorly armed and pathetically small UNAMIR saved twice as many. In July, the RPF formed a government with Hutu RPF member Pasteur Bizimungu as president and Kagame as vice president and minister of defense. Exiled to refugee camps in eastern Zaire, former FAR and Interahamwe began to establish an armed Hutu Power movement bent on retaking Rwanda.¹³

CIVIL WAR AND GENOCIDE IN BURUNDI

When Burundi gained independence from Belgium in 1962, its constitutional monarchy tried to balance Hutu and Tutsi representation in government. However, in 1965, with the assassination of the first Hutu prime minister and the king's refusal to appoint another Hutu prime minister despite the victory of Hutu candidates in an election, Hutu army officers staged a coup that was crushed by Tutsi military personnel. In 1966, Captain Michel Micombero led a coup that overthrew the monarchy, established a republic, and cultivated an army dominated by southern Tutsi officers. Micombero ruled through a National Revolutionary Council of 17 officers, 12 of whom were Tutsi. In late April 1972, Hutu insurgents crossed from Tanzania into Burundi, where they captured armories in Nyanza-Lac and Rumonge and slaughtered several thousand Tutsi and some Hutu who refused to join them. Some rebels then moved into the Vugizo commune near Bururi, where they declared a "People's Republic," but a week later they were overwhelmed by a military offensive. In early May, Mobutu sent 200 Zairean



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paratroopers to secure Bujumbura airport and protect Micombero, who declared martial law, and more than 500 of 600 Hutu military personnel were executed. At the end of May, as operations against the insurgents continued, army elements and Tutsi youth militia, encouraged by radio hate propaganda, massacred 100,000–200,000 Hutu throughout the country. By August, when this genocidal violence stopped, several hundred thousand mostly Hutu had fled to Zaire, Rwanda, and Tanzania, and almost all educated Hutu were dead or exiled.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Burundi was ruled by several Tutsi military regimes. By 1985, some 96 percent of the Burundian Armed Forces (FAB) was Tutsi, as were two-thirds of students at the University of Bujumbura. The dominant Tutsi officers ensured their children would have the qualifications to follow them into the officer corps by favoring their Bururi home in terms of education. In 1976, Micombero, who had lost international legitimacy because of the 1972 genocide, was overthrown by Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, whose restrictions on the pro-Hutu Catholic Church caused such international embarrassment that he was ousted in 1987 by Major Pierre Buyoya. In 1980, Burundian Hutu exiles in Tanzania led by Remy Gahutu established the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU) with an armed wing called the National Forces of Liberation (FNL) that sought to overturn minority Tutsi domination at home. In August 1988, the murder of a Hutu family in Kirundo province led to the killing of 300 Tutsi. The army responded by launching an operation that killed 20,000 Hutu and drove tens of thousands to neighboring countries. With the massacre jeopardizing aid money from disapproving Western governments, Buyoya appointed a commission of inquiry that ultimately led to the creation of a national unity government in 1991 with 12 Hutu and 12 Tutsi ministers, though the key posts of defense, foreign affairs, and the interior remained with the latter. Although discrimination against the Hutu in the education system was removed, the Tutsi army refused similar reforms, and two minor Hutu revolts that broke out in 1991 were brutally repressed.

Political liberalization led to a June 1993 election won by the predominantly Hutu and moderate Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU). However, the assassination of Burundi's newly elected Hutu president, FRODEBU's Melchior Ndadaye, by elements of the Tutsi army in October resulted in violence between Hutu and Tutsi in which 50,000–100,000 died and the flight of many Hutu refugees into Rwanda. In April 1994, the next Hutu president, Cyprien Ntaryamira, was killed in the same plane crash as Rwandan president Habyarimana, and thousands of Rwandan Tutsi escaped genocide by crossing into Burundi. Over the next two years, in what has been called a creeping coup, elected FRODEBU officials were rendered powerless by intimidation and violence orchestrated by the security forces and Tutsi extremists. In early 1994, street gangs in Bujumbura became polarized between Hutu and Tutsi, and the gangs allied themselves with respective political-military leaders. In April 1994, a Hutu

militia called Intagoheka ("those who do not sleep") began attacks on the Tutsi army and in June, some FRODEBU leaders founded the National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD) with an armed wing called Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) that swore to fight until the army was restructured and there were internationally supervised negotiations. Beginning in early 1995, the FDD launched attacks on the army, particularly in Cibitoke and Bubanza provinces, where they installed alternative local governments and collected taxes. Between March and June 1995, the army ethnically cleansed Bujumbura by driving masses of Hutu into the nearby hills and across the border into Zaire. From July to September 1995, PALIPEHUTU's armed wing massacred Tutsi civilians in Cibitoke province, which provoked army retaliation against Hutu. While most of the 15,000–25,000 civilians killed during 1995 were Hutu murdered by the army or Tutsi militia, the number of Tutsi and military personnel killed by the rebels increased in the second half of the year. In early 1996, there were attacks on military posts and Tutsi civilians in the south and southwest, probably by the small National Liberation Front (FROLINA) that had split from PALIPEHUTU in 1989. Beginning in February 1996, the army resettled rural communities in concentration camps to deprive the rebels of civilian support and by the middle of 1997, some 300,000 people lived in them. By the middle of 1996, eleven out of 15 provinces experienced civil war, the army was under severe pressure, and Burundi's FRODEBU president Sylvestre Ntibantunganya was impotent.

In July 1996, Buyoya came to power in another coup. While the army NCOs and radical Tutsi militia had wanted the militant Bagaza to take charge, army officers backed the relatively moderate Buyoya as more acceptable to the international community. Around the same time, the Rwandan intervention in eastern Zaire (see later in this chapter) destroyed CNDD-FDD bases in South Kivu, which led to increased violence in Burundi's south as retreating rebels passed through to Tanzania and during 1997 and early 1998, Burundi's western provinces were the most impacted by the war because they bordered on Tanzania. It appears that during 1997, some 5,000–10,000 civilians were killed by the army and rebels, and Minister of Defense Colonel Firmin Sinziyoheba announced that all Hutu males of military age were the enemy. On New Year's Eve 1997, CNDD-FDD rebels attacked Bujumbura airport and the nearby Gakumbu military camp. While the army claimed that 100 rebels and four


soldiers had died in the fighting and that the rebels had killed 200 civilians, the CNDD-FDD countered that state forces had massacred 500 civilians. Buyoya pursued both military and diplomatic means to end the war. He introduced one-year compulsory military service for secondary school and junior university students, though in practice all admitted were Tutsi. The Burundi army grew from 13,000 personnel in 1993 to 30,000 in 1996 and 45,500 in 2002. With almost half the annual budget going toward the military, a war tax was imposed on civil servants and farmers. An August 2000 peace agreement facilitated by South Africa's Nelson Mandela stipulated that Buyoya would rule for 18 months followed by 18 months under FRODEBU's Domitien Ndayizeye, but this was rejected by the armed wings of CNDD and PALIPEHUTU, which demanded their own representation in negotiations. The agreement committed the parties to form a new integrated National Defence Force (FDN) in which no group—Hutu, Tutsi, or the very small Twa minority—would have greater than 50 percent representation, with 40 percent of the officer corps reserved for the CNDD-FDD. In October, 700 troops of the South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) deployed in Burundi to protect exiled leaders returning to engage in the peace process.

Violence continued such as in late December 2000 when FNL rebels stopped a bus outside Bujumbura, separated Hutu and Tutsi passengers, and killed 20 of the latter plus a British aid worker. Between October and December 2000, the army launched an offensive against the FNL in Tenga forest near Bujumbura in which 200 rebels and 20 soldiers were killed. However, in February 2001, the rebels regrouped and renewed attacks on the capital to which the army responded with another offensive involving artillery and ground attack jets in December, which—according to the government—killed 500 insurgents with the loss of 28 soldiers. The peace process in Burundi was delayed by officials in Kinshasa allowing the CNDD-FDD to re-establish staging areas in South Kivu, the rebel groups fought each other, and they were internally split between moderate and radical leaders. The primary difference between the two main rebel organizations was that CNDD-FDD had external bases and support, and wanted democratic reform, while PALIPEHUTU-FNL was largely based within Burundi and pursued a pro-Hutu agenda. In December 2002, Pierre Nkurunziza, former university lecturer and commander of FDD, agreed to a cease-fire that would lead to his CNDD

becoming a political party and integrating its fighters into the army. This was accomplished within the context of regional peace talks aimed at ending external intervention and civil war in neighboring DRC. With the United Nations unwilling to commit peacekeepers to Burundi because it was not clear if there was peace to keep, the African Union (until recently the OAU) embarked on its first peace-keeping mission in April 2003 (called African Union Mission in Burundi [AMIB]) with 3,300 troops, including 1,600 from South Africa; 858 from Ethiopia; and 228 from Mozambique. Under South African major general Sipho Binda, AMIB protected the transitional government, secured demobilization centers, and enabled displaced people to return home. With Ndayizeye's assumption of power in May 2003, a peace agreement was signed in Pretoria in October. Since the radical FNL of Agathon Rwasa refused to participate, the war continued in the predominantly Hutu area outside Bujumbura. In August 2004, FNL insurgents massacred 153 Congolese Tutsi (Banyamulenge) refugees at Gatumba on the DRC border and around that time began to rely heavily on child soldiers. Given the peace agreement, in June 2004, AMIB was absorbed into the UN Peace Operation in Burundi (ONUB), commanded by South African major general Derrick Mgwebi, which grew to 4,500 troops and 1,000 civilians by 2005. Within a year, these forces had demobilized some 20,000 fighters. In 2005, CNDD won Burundi's first elections since 1994, and Nkurunziza became president. The following year, FNL agreed to the cease-fire. Although there was a brief battle between the army and FNL in Bujumbura in April 2008, the rebels eventually entered a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process, and dropped the name PALIPEHUTU because the use of ethnic names in political parties had been outlawed. During 2005, the process of integrating former FAB, FDD, and other armed groups into the new FDN began, mixed units were formed quickly, and the next year Belgian personnel began training officers (particularly to improve the skills of the former rebels). In 2009, the Netherlands began providing senior management and planning courses, and the involvement of Burundian soldiers in fighting Islamist militants in Somalia resulted in some U.S. training. From April 2009, some 2,250 former FNL fighters joined the FDN, which (given demobilization) was now 28,000 strong. However, by 2010, Hutu were still underrepresented among senior officers and in specialized units such as aviation, air defense, armor, and logistics.¹⁴

THE FIRST CONGO WAR 1996–1997

During the early to mid-1990s, Mobutu, given the end of the Cold War, lost his long-standing U.S. support and clung to power in Zaire by engaging in attempted political reforms that went nowhere as the economy and state crumbled. In eastern Zaire's North and South Kivu provinces, violence flared over citizenship and control of land. Several groups of Rwandan origin had settled in eastern Zaire, including Tutsi pastoralists called Banyamulenge ("people of Mulenge"), who had moved there during the nineteenth century; Hutu and Tutsi laborers called Banyarwanda ("people of Rwanda"), who had been sent there as labor by Belgian colonial rulers during the 1930s; and mostly Tutsi refugees from Rwanda's 1959 Social Revolution. While the Banyamulenge had initially joined the Simba rebellion of the mid-1960s, the slaughter of their cattle by insurgents caused them to change allegiance to Mobutu, who rewarded them with administrative positions. In addition, many of the 1959-era Tutsi refugees were financially better off than locals and could afford to buy land and open businesses. This led to bitter resentment and from 1963 to 1966, there was a wave of violence by "indigenous" Nande and Hunde people in North Kivu against anyone with Rwandan origins, both Hutu and Tutsi. Beginning in March 1993, with economic crisis and hunger, these tensions resurfaced in North Kivu with "indigenous" groups attacking Hutu and Tutsi. In the Masisi area, the Banyamulenge represented the majority and organized a successful defense. Around 1,000 people from each of the "indigenous" and "immigrant" communities were killed and tens of thousands displaced. The arrival of Mobutu's dreaded DSP calmed the situation, and a series of meetings in late 1993 and early 1994 restored order. However, the situation was quickly destabilized by the arrival of some 700,000 Hutu refugees, including soldiers and militia, from Rwanda at the end of the 1994 genocide. People of Rwandan origin, both historic and recent, now represented a majority in North Kivu, and the previous local alliance between Hutu and Tutsi broke down. In August 1995, the Zairean government ordered the expulsion of all refugees and immigrants from Rwanda and Burundi including the long residing Banyamulenge. In turn, many recent refugees fled to the Masisi and Rutshuru areas where they conflicted with "indigenous" people who feared that their homes would become part of future "Hutuland." Violence escalated in early 1996 as Hutu militias attacked Hunde and Tutsi, and



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Hunde militias (called Bangilima) attacked Hutu and Tutsi. Tens of thousands were driven from their homes and many Tutsi fled to Rwanda. In February 1996 the FAZ launched Operation Kimia (silence) which saw around 1,000 paratroopers and civil guards with armored vehicles deployed to Masisi to disarm all factions. However,

lack of communications equipment and guidance from Kinshasa meant that the operation failed and violence increased again in April. From May to September 1996 the FAZ embarked on Operation Mbata (slap) which was meant to bring order to Rutshuru. Hundreds of unpaid Zairean soldiers, including the DSP, engaged in summary executions, displayed decapitated heads on poles, and embarked on a spree of looting along the Rwandan border. Different FAZ units seemed to side with whichever faction paid them—FAZ paratroopers favored the Banyamulenge, the DSP supported the Hunde, and generally most FAZ elements backed the Hutu. Despite the arrival of 200,000 refugees from Burundi in 1993 and 500,000 from Rwanda in 1994, the situation in South Kivu remained somewhat stable until June–July 1996, when attacks began on the Banyamulenge (who subsequently armed themselves). Around the same time, elements of the former FAR and Interahamwe in eastern Zaire began to reorganize and rearm by collecting a “war tax” from refugees, buying back weapons from the FAZ that had been confiscated when they had first crossed the border, and working through the governments of Zaire and France to have arms delivered to Goma despite a UN embargo. Beginning in early 1995, exiled Hutu Power fighters based in eastern Zairean refugee camps began to infiltrate western Rwanda, particularly around the towns of Cyangugu, Kibuye, and Gisenyi, where they ambushed buses and raided schools.¹⁵

The victimization of the Banyamulenge in South Kivu provided Rwanda, now under the RPF, with an excuse to intervene in eastern Zaire against the former FAR and Interahamwe intent on returning home to finish the Tutsi genocide. As early as 1995, Kagame recruited some 4,000 Zairean Tutsi, including Banyamulenge, into the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). In June 1996, the RPA trained Banyamulenge rebels in northwest Burundi and the next month, some 700–800 soldiers “deserted” from the RPA to infiltrate South Kivu, which was reminiscent of the 1990 RPF defection from the Ugandan army. During late August and September in South Kivu, Zairean troops clashed with Banyamulenge rebels and Rwandan soldiers, RPA infiltration continued through Burundi, and the FAZ in Bukavu and the RPA in Cyangugu exchanged mortar and rocket fire. This prompted further violence against Banyamulenge, and many more fled into Rwanda. In October, the Zairean government officially accused Rwanda and Burundi of invading its territory. During this early phase of the war, the FAZ put up a fight but was undermined by the same tactics the

RPA had used in Rwanda in 1994, which involved the infiltration of a target town, its gradual encirclement, and leaving a gap through which demoralized Zairean soldiers could flee. The FAZ was officially 75,000-strong in 1996, but many units were not at full strength, including the elite DSP, which had 7,000 instead of the official 15,000 personnel. Many FAZ generals were not professional soldiers but corrupt businessmen or politicians in uniform, and the general collapse of the Zairean state and economy meant that the military suffered worse than ever from lack of pay, nepotism, poor training, and inferior equipment. The undisciplined FAZ was quickly pushed back by the Banyamulenge rebels and RPA soldiers who, with the capture of Uvira and Bukavu at the end of October, took control of South Kivu. Around this time, and facilitated by the allied governments of Rwanda and Uganda, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) was formed as a coalition of anti-Mobutu groups with the Banyamulenge rebels at its core. Veteran insurgent Laurent Kabila returned from Tanzanian exile as leader.

While the Banyamulenge rebellion had begun as a self-defense action in South Kivu, the RPA objective in supporting it was to eliminate the refugee camps in both South and North Kivu, which represented a security threat to Rwanda. In September, the RPA began to bombard these camps from across the border and in late October, RPA units—sometimes supported by armored vehicles and mortars—launched attacks on them in which some civilians were killed and others forced to flee. By the end of October, some 600,000 people had assembled at Mugunga camp, 20 kilometers west of Goma in North Kivu, making it the largest refugee concentration in history. In early November, the RPA took Goma by advancing across the border at Gisenyi and landing in boats on Lake Kivu. Later in the month, they seized Masisi and Butembo, and in early December, they captured the Bukavu-Goma road junction. In mid-November, given international talks about dispatching a Canadian-led UN peace-keeping force to the region to protect the camps, the RPA forcefully dismantled the remaining camps, including Mugunga. Hundreds of thousands of people returned to Rwanda, others withdrew deeper into Zaire pursued by the AFDL and RPA, and it is likely that large numbers were massacred. Further north, units of the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) crossed into Zaire at the end of November to seize the important border post at Kasindi and on Christmas Day, they helped AFDL rebels capture Bunia, which is the center of the Ituri

region of Orientale Province. The UPDF incursion was explained as pursuit of the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF), which was conducting an insurgency in western Uganda. Support for the Banyamulenge rebellion and its RPA sponsors enabled the Tutsi military regime in Burundi to eliminate the South Kivu bases of the FDD. Embroiled in its own guerrilla war, Burundi's support for the Zairean "rebellion" was limited to the use of its territory by the RPA, and the Burundi military conducted only one major operation in eastern Zaire when, in mid-September 1996, it attacked Burundian rebels and refugees on the Ruzizi plains. The result of this first phase of the conflict was the establishment, within Zaire, of a buffer zone about 800 kilometers long and 100 kilometers wide along the borders of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. Guilt over failure to stop the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the RPA's banning of journalists from operational areas meant that the international community did not respond to the invasion of Zaire by its eastern neighbors.

The conflict entered a new phase with the intervention of Angola. Concerned about UNITA rebels using Zaire as a conduit for smuggling diamonds and weapons, Luanda decided to widen the scope of the eastern rebellion to topple Mobutu's government in Kinshasa. After the failed Katangese exile invasions of Shaba in the late 1970s, these rebels and eventually their sons had been incorporated into the Angolan army, where they were known as Tigres. In mid-February 1997, Angola airlifted several battalions of between 2,000 and 3,000 Tigres to Kigali, from where they were driven to Goma and then Bukavu. The Tigres played a key role in the two-pronged AFDL advance on Kisangani that fell on March 15. At the same time, some of them moved south to Bukavu, Kalemie, and Kamina on their way into Shaba (Katanga). In early April, with permission from Zambia, Tigres were flown into Ndola, from where they crossed the Zairean border and took Lubumbashi from the west, possibly with the assistance of 1,000 Zambian troops. Although the Angolan government initially denied Zairean accusations of involvement, Angolan army units crossed the border and took Tshikapa in southwestern Zaire on April 23 and captured Kikwit a week later during their northwest advance on Kinshasa. The AFDL and its Rwandan and Ugandan allies were moving on Kinshasa from the east and the Angolans from the south. Mobutu's soldiers usually did not resist and as the rebels and their allies approached a town, the FAZ would loot it, retreat in stolen vehicles, and in a few instances sell their

weapons and ammunition to the enemy before leaving. During the campaign, Kabila incurred a debt of US\$39 million with Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI) for weapons, equipment, and supplies that were transported by the Zimbabwe Air Force, which also lifted rebel troops. It appears the United States may have provided intelligence, communications, air transport for supplies, and perhaps special forces advisors to the AFDL and its Rwandan and Ugandan allies. In early 1997, Kabila began to recruit and train his own soldiers, mostly teenagers called *kadogo* ("little ones"), who numbered 18,000 within a year, to develop his own military capacity and dilute the obvious dominance of Zairean and Rwandan Tutsi in his ranks.

In December 1996, Mobutu attempted to rebuild the crumbling FAZ by putting the respected General Mahele in charge. With funds from France and Kuwait, which Zaire had supported during the First Gulf War, Mobutu bought new military equipment for the FAZ, part of which was sold to UNITA by corrupt generals and some of which could not be used (for example, aircraft from China that no one knew how to assemble). In early 1997, soldiers were paid for the first time in years, and some 26,000 teenagers were recruited for a planned counteroffensive that failed after a few days. Several thousand UNITA fighters supported the FAZ during the fighting around Bunia in December. At the Battle of Kenge, the last engagement of the war (which was fought 70 kilometers from Kinshasa in early May), UNITA delayed the advance of the Angolan army for a week and then withdrew into Angola. The retreating former FAR-Interahamwe elements also fought the AFDL-RPA until late February and early March, when some fled west to other countries and others hid in isolated pockets of vast eastern Zaire. A desperate Mobutu employed a group of European mercenaries called the White Legion commanded by Colonel Christian Tavernier, a Belgian who had worked with Mike Hoare in the 1960s and had links to French intelligence. The mercenaries consisted of two elements. One was made up of a few dozen French mercenaries personally led by Tavernier who, in January and February, failed to stop the AFDL and Ugandan army advance at Watsa in the northeast and were temporarily detained by Zairean military intelligence before leaving the country. The other section, based at Kisangani from January 1997, comprised between 100 and 280 Serbian fighters who trained FAZ soldiers and flew four Mi-24 attack helicopters, several transport helicopters, and four ground attack aircraft that bombed rebel positions. When the rebels and their allies broke

through the Kisangani defenses in mid-March, the Serbians tried to stop FAZ troops from retreating, which resulted in an exchange of gunfire between the erstwhile colleagues and the quick departure of the mercenaries on their helicopters. In mid-May, with the AFDL and allies closing on Kinshasa, a sickly Mobutu fled the country followed by many of his associates and Kabila, based at Lubumbashi, declared himself president and changed the name Zaire to Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Around the same time, General Mahele, who was trying to negotiate a peaceful surrender to the rebels, was shot dead by Mobutu's son, who then absconded to Congo-Brazzaville. On May 20, Kabila and AFDL forces entered the capital, which ended the First Congo War. Exiled to Morocco, Mobutu died of cancer in September.¹⁶

THE SECOND CONGO WAR, OR AFRICA'S WORLD WAR, 1998–2002

After Kabila came to power, his AFDL formed the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) to replace the defeated FAZ. There was initial confusion because all former rebel officers were called commander, and it was unclear who reported to whom. The FAC was not a national force but a collection of factions such as Congolese and Rwandan Tutsi directed by the RPA, Katangese Tigres, former FAZ personnel emerging from appalling conditions in "re-education" camps, and Kabila's kadogo (child soldiers). Initially, there was no minister of defense or chief of staff to resolve conflicts. After Masasu Nindaga, the de facto head of FAC and also an RPA member, was dismissed and arrested in late November 1997, Kabila formally appointed Rwandan lieutenant colonel James Kabarebe as acting chief of staff.

Kabila's takeover in Kinshasa did not end eastern DRC's problems. Although Kabila signed security agreements with his eastern neighbors, Ugandan and Rwandan officials believed he was not committing enough troops to control exiled rebel groups in the border region. Beginning in October 1997 and continuing into 1998, former FAR-Interahamwe known as the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR) conducted guerrilla attacks within Rwanda. Reorganizing its forces in the northwest under Colonel Kayumba Nyamwasa, the RPA launched an aggressive counterinsurgency campaign that involved cutting down banana trees 200 meters on each side of roads to prevent

ambush (which reduced local food production), summarily killing repatriated ex-FAR members to prevent their recruitment by the rebels, purchasing a small fleet of Mi-24 attack helicopters from Ukraine piloted by mercenaries, and publicly executing by firing squad 22 genocide perpetrators in April 1998. While the ALIR established bases inside Rwanda, it also used the eastern DRC as a sanctuary, which provoked the RPA to cross the border. The RPA officially withdrew from DRC in September 1997 but beginning in mid-December, it formally returned to North Kivu and in early 1998, soldiers from Rwanda and Burundi patrolled Uvira, Fizi, and Bukavu. In eastern DRC, the Congolese and Rwandan Tutsi FAC troops called themselves liberators but behaved like foreign occupiers by humiliating traditional leaders; seizing houses, land, and vehicles; and stealing money, cattle, gold, and coffee that were taken to Rwanda and Uganda. Locals began to mockingly refer to the Rwandan troops as “soldiers without borders,” and a number of anti-Tutsi groups were formed, with the previously ethnic Hunde Mai Mai fighters broadening into a local self-defense militia. Attempting to diversify FAC forces in the east, Kabila sent non-Tutsi personnel to the region, but the Katangese refused orders from the Tutsi and vice versa. In December 1997, non-Tutsi and Tutsi army elements fought each other in Kalemie and Baraka. Feeling that it was not their war, the non-Tutsi FAC members were indifferent about fighting the Mai Mai militia and former FAR-Interahamwe. In December 1997, FAC soldiers, firing their weapons into the air to simulate a battle, let hundreds of ex-FAR Hutu fighters pass through Bukavu en route to Rwanda. In February 1998, several hundred Banyamulenge FAC soldiers in Bukavu, refusing transfer to other posts around the country, deserted with their weapons and ammunition, and returned only when Kabarebe permitted them to remain in their home area. RPA actions against former FAR and Interahamwe impacted Congolese civilians. For example, between July and September 1997, it appears that RPA raids were responsible for 2,000 civilian deaths in the Kivus. In November, some 2,000 inhabitants of South Kivu were arrested by Rwandan and Burundian soldiers, and the adult men among them were never seen again. This led to retaliation by local militias such as the Mai Mai against RPA and Burundian troops. In the northeast, Ugandan officials were suspected of smuggling out gold, diamonds, and timber, and in early July the UPDF, in its campaign against ADF rebels, established an operational base at Ntabi some 15 kilometers inside the DRC.¹⁷

In Kinshasa, opposition activists criticized the increasingly authoritarian Kabila regime for allowing foreigners to dominate

the FAC and control the east. In mid-July 1998, Kabila—eager to gain legitimacy—appointed his brother-in-law Celestin Kifwa as the new chief of staff and relegated Kabarebe, who he suspected of plotting a coup, to the lesser post of presidential military advisor. Late the same month, Kabila's newly established defense ministry announced that Rwandan and other foreign military personnel were to leave the DRC and three days later, 600 RPA soldiers were flown from Kinshasa to Kigali. At the start of August, Major Sylvain Mbuki, an intelligence officer in the Goma based FAC 10th Brigade, announced on the radio that the army had decided to remove Kabila for corruption and mal-administration. The next day, the 12th Brigade in Bukavu joined the rebellion. With RPA support, the rebels easily seized Goma, Bukavu, and Uvira, and overcame limited resistance in the Fizi-Baraka area. At Kinshasa's Tshatshi and Kokolo military camps, there was intense fighting in which loyalist FAC massacred Banyamulenge and Rwandan troops who had not already left. In Kisangani, loyal FAC elements initially defeated the rebels. In Bukavu, the RPA executed 48 Katangese Tigre officers who had opposed the rebels, which prompted many Tigres to return to Angola to fight UNITA. Ten days after the uprising began, the rebels adopted the name Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), which had been conceived in Kigali as a Rwandan proxy supported by the Clinton administration in the United States, which sympathized with the RPF because of its inaction during the 1994 genocide and had fallen out with Kabila over human rights. On August 5, the RPA hijacked civilian airliners and cargo planes at Goma airport and forced the pilots to transport 1,200 Rwandan soldiers under Commander James, a nom de guerre for Kabarebe, some 2,000 kilometers west to Kitona, where several thousand former FAZ members undergoing "re-education" joined them. Because this audacious operation threatened Kinshasa, which was just 350 kilometers away, FAC units in western DRC were prevented from moving east to suppress the RCD rebellion. In mid-August, this western force of Rwandan, Banyamulenge, and ex-FAZ seized the port of Matadi and the Inga power plant, where they shut off electricity to the capital, which they began to infiltrate.

With his former foreign sponsors turning against him, Kabila requested assistance from the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), which the DRC had recently joined. This led to a dispute within SADC, with Botswana and South Africa objecting to propping up an unelected government and Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia dispatching forces. Zimbabwe intervened because Kabila had

incurred a huge debt to ZDI, recent Zimbabwean investments in the DRC had to be protected, the governing former liberation movement objected to the expansion of Western backed Rwanda and Uganda, and President Robert Mugabe saw an opportunity to retake regional leadership lost to postapartheid South Africa. Remaining consistent in supporting Kabila, Angola was worried about an emerging relationship between UNITA, Uganda, and Rwanda. Namibia participated because its ruling South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) had a long alliance with Angola's government and a similar history of enmity with UNITA. Several Angolan battalions were flown to the Cabinda enclave by cargo plane and crossed into western DRC on August 22. With artillery, tanks, MiG-23 fighters, and Mi-17 helicopters flown by South African mercenaries, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) significantly outgunned the lightly armed Rwandan contingent, which was cut off and lost half its men in the first two days of fighting. The Angolans quickly took Kitona and other key areas. Rwandan survivors were evacuated by air from Matadi, and many rebels crossed the border into UNITA territory in Angola. The Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) initially concentrated on the defense of Kinshasa, with the first battalion arriving there on August 20, and the number of troops rapidly grew to 2,800. At the same time, Zimbabwe Air Force (ZAF) jets destroyed a rebel motorized column from the west that was heading toward the capital, and ZDF troops successfully defended Kinshasa airport during a three-day battle. At this time, residents of Kinshasa began to form "self-defense committees" armed with machetes, sticks, and tires for burning people, and they killed suspected rebel infiltrators or anyone that they thought looked like a Tutsi.

Despite disaster in the west, the eastern rebellion continued supported by nine Rwandan and five Ugandan battalions that took Kisangani, Moba, Watsa, and Kalemie by early September 1998. The key center of Kindu fell in mid-October, which meant Kabila's forces had no airport in striking distance of Rwanda, and the route to the diamond-rich Kasai region and a possible link with UNITA in Angola was open. In mid-November, in northern DRC's Equateur Province, the Ugandan army sponsored a new rebel group called the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) led by Jean-Pierre Bemba, who had links to the old Mobutu regime (which had derived its support from that region). Because the MLC initially had no troops of its own, Ugandan soldiers and allied Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels defeated FAC units, Ugandan ADF rebels, and a 1,000-

strong expeditionary force from Chad that had been flown in on Libyan aircraft and lost 250 casualties and 400 captured. Illustrating the international complexities of the second DRC conflict, Chad intervened at the behest of Sudan, which sided with Kabila to undermine Uganda for supporting SPLA rebels in southern Sudan. Libya provided transport for the Chadians because Gaddafi wanted to be seen as a continental African, not an Arab, leader. The government of Sudan also recruited a unit of former FAR-Interahamwe and another of Idi Amin's former Ugandan army troops who were living in Juba in south Sudan and were sent to the DRC, where some were captured at Kindu. The fall of Kindu prompted Zimbabwe and Angola to dramatically expand their forces in DRC, including the arrival of additional Chinese-made Chengdu F-7 and British-built Hawk fighter jets from Zimbabwe, and Angolan Mi-24 attack helicopters. Kabila's regime recruited former FAR and Interahamwe from neighboring countries such as CAR and Congo-Brazzaville, gave them weapons and training, and sent them to fight in the east and north. Burundian FDD fighters were enlisted from refugee camps in Tanzania, trained and equipped in Zimbabwe, and sent to their new base in Lubumbashi. During the first half of 1999, the RCD-RPA alliance advanced in Kasai and North Katanga toward the diamond mining center of Mbuji-Mayi. They initially approached Mbuji-Mayi from the south but were halted by the 2,000 Zimbabwean defenders of Kabinda in January 1999 and then tried coming around from the north but were again blocked by another 3,000 Zimbabweans at Lusambo in June. The fighting around Mbuji-Mayi also involved some 8,000 former FAR-Interahamwe flown in on Angolan and Zimbabwean aircraft. In the north around the same time, the newly recruited MLC army consisting largely of young boys (many of whom originated from CAR) supported by UNITA and 6,000 Ugandan soldiers gained control of all Equateur but could not take Mbandaka, the control of which was central in proceeding down the Ubangi and Congo Rivers to Kinshasa. In January 1999, Namibian and Angolan transport planes brought 1,000 FAC troops to Bangui in CAR, from where they pressed south into Equateur supported by Sudanese Antonov bombers from Juba, which caused the MLC to withdraw from towns close to the border. The involvement of forces from Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad, and Sudan in the DRC inspired U.S. assistant secretary of state Susan Rice to call the conflict the first African World War.

In February 1999, the rebels launched their only combined offensive of the war, which involved some 60,000 fighters from the MLC, UPDF,

RCD, and RPA. The objectives of the MLC-UPDF in the north were Gbadolite, Mbandaka, and then Kinshasa, while the RCD-RPA in the east was to seize Mbuji-Mayi, Kamina air base, and Lubumbashi. The MLC-Ugandans pushed the Congolese troops back into CAR and took the late Mobutu's hometown of Gbadolite in July. The RCD-Rwandans expanded their control of northern Katanga in mid-March and killed 200 Zimbabwean soldiers who counterattacked too soon at Eshimba just east of Kabinda. However, FAC and allied defenses held, and the offensive lost momentum. Although UNITA forces had advanced northeast from the Angolan border toward Mbuji-Mayi in October, they were withdrawn because of setbacks inside Angola. A stalemate developed in which a static "front line," in reality a series of pockets where enemy forces opposed one another rather than a continuous war zone, ran from Mbandaka in the northwest through Kananga (formerly Luluabourg) and Mbuji-Mayi to Pweto in the southeast. In Equateur Province, Bemba's MLC remained popular as locals anticipated the return of a northern-dominated regime, and disciplined Ugandan troops behaved well. However, in the east, the RCD lacked legitimacy because it was seen as a puppet of Rwanda, its leadership quarrelled, and RCD-RPA troops victimized communities in a continuing conflict with enclaves of Mai Mai and ALIR fighters. While they had served as the spearhead of the 1996–1997 campaign, many Banyamulenge leaders now felt that Rwanda was cynically using them for its own reasons, opposed the RPA occupation, and rejected the RCD. In early 1999, Banyamulenge fighters under Patrick Masunzu began fighting the RPA and eventually allied with their old Mai Mai enemies.

In August 1999 and May–June 2000, soldiers from Uganda and Rwanda, along with their respective rebel clients, fought each other in Kisangani. The once steadfast Uganda-Rwanda alliance deteriorated because Kampala believed the DRC should have an independent government while Kigali favored installing a proxy regime. The RCD split into pro-Uganda RCD-Kisangani and pro-Rwanda RCD-Goma factions, and officers from the occupying armies competed for loot. As the war continued, most external forces began to steal the DRC's mineral resources such as diamonds, coltan, and cassiterite. For example, in 2000, Uganda exported US\$90 million worth of gold, yet it had no significant domestic gold production, and a UN investigation revealed that the armies of Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe were involved in theft of DRC minerals. While these countries had initially

intervened in the DRC for security or political reasons, the war ultimately degenerated into opportunistic economic exploitation.

The Lusaka Agreement of July 1999, in which all the major actors agreed to a cease-fire and peace process monitored by the new UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), resulted in a temporary reduction of fighting in the conventional warfare zones of western Equateur and northern Katanga. However, violence between militias and their sponsors continued in North and South Kivu in the east and Orientale in the northeast. The Ugandan creation of a separate Ituri Province, originally part of Orientale, caused conflict between ethnic Hema pastoralists and Lendu cultivators because the Ugandans appeared to favor the former. In the Kivus, three different Mai-Mai militias, the former FAR-Interahamwe of ALIR, RCD-G, the Rwandan army, Burundian FDD rebels, and the Burundian army fought each other in constantly changing and ambiguous alliances. The Mai-Mai fighters who were supposed to protect locals from foreign invaders often attacked and pillaged local communities, the exiled Hutu groups from Rwanda and Burundi were meant to be allies but sometimes fought each other, and the RPA who claimed to have entered the DRC to combat former FAR-Interahamwe sometimes protected them to preserve an excuse for intervention.

Kabila's stubbornness in negotiations and Western sympathy for Rwanda and Uganda delayed the deployment of UN peacekeepers and meant that in late 1999, the war resumed on the main fronts. Both major rebel groups attempted to advance down different rivers toward Kinshasa, with the MLC-Ugandans on the Ubangi and the RCD-G-Rwandans on the Tshuapa. In late November 1999, FAC and ZDF, attempting to rescue 3,000 Congolese, Zimbabwean, and Namibian soldiers besieged at Ikela airport, launched an offensive up the Tshuapa from Boende and fought an intense battle to take Bokungu. Despite employing attack helicopters, Antonov bombers, and gunboats, FAC and ZDF approached Ikela but could not capture it. They eventually negotiated with the Rwandans for the trapped garrison to be supplied by air. In January 2000, Kabila dispatched an offensive northeast up the Ubangi River, which quickly failed as MLC forces and their Ugandan allies counterattacked and captured new towns such as Dongo and Imese along the border with Congo-Brazzaville. With the formation of the North Korean-trained FAC 6th Brigade and the Rwandans and Ugandans fighting each other in Kisangani, Kabila launched another offensive up the Ubangi in May

in which Congolese gunboats seized boats from Congo-Brazzaville and CAR to carry their troops. FAC units recaptured Dongo and Imese in late July, but they had fallen into a trap as MLC-Ugandan forces, bolstered by UNITA artillery, had withdrawn to Libenge, from where they mounted a well-prepared counterattack in early August. Kabila's river barges were destroyed by mortar fire, and FAC columns moving along the riverbank were successfully ambushed. In one afternoon, more than 900 FAC soldiers and 20 Zimbabwean advisors were killed. As a result, the FAC withdrew, and MLC captured Lubonga some 60 kilometers from Mbandaka, which was the key to moving on Kinshasa. By this time, some 120,000 refugees had fled to Congo-Brazzaville. Kabila's foreign allies became frustrated because they had not been informed about the ultimately disastrous offensive, and the president himself seemed the main obstacle to diplomatic efforts to end the increasingly costly war that stolen minerals could no longer earn enough to pay for. In October, Zimbabwe—with its recent economic collapse related to the occupation of white owned commercial farms at home—withdrawed most of its aircraft from the DRC.

Given their failure to advance down the Tshuapa River, the Rwandans abandoned the goal of establishing a puppet government in Kinshasa and focused on securing the mineral wealth of Kasai and Katanga. When Kigali, where Kagame had recently become president, announced in August 2000 that it would withdraw its troops 200 kilometers from the front line, the diplomatically incompetent Kabila exploited the opportunity by initiating an offensive in northeast Katanga with a combined force of two FAC brigades augmented by large numbers of Rwandan former FAR-Interahamwe and Burundian FDD rebels, Mai Mai militia, and Zimbabwean artillery and mechanized units. In October, this FAC and allied force captured Pepa, bombed Kalemie, and staged an amphibious attack on Moba from Lake Tanganyika. The RCD-G and RPA immediately staged an effective counterattack that recaptured Pepa in early November and pushed south to grab the much-contested town of Pweto at the start of December. About 60,000 refugees and 5,000 pro-Kabila troops fled into neighboring Zambia, including 3,000 FAC and 200 Zimbabweans (who were disarmed and returned to DRC), and 1,900 Burundian rebels who avoided disarmament by using barges on Lake Mwelu to cross back to the DRC. The RCD-G-RPA was prevented from moving on Lubumbashi by Zimbabwean reinforcements flown by ZDF transport planes right up to the front line at Lake Mwelu. By the end of

December, 2000 Angolans, 600 Zimbabweans and 1,200 FAC troops held positions outside Pweto, which was defended by six RCD-G battalions supported by two RPA brigades. Kabila's military failures meant that his weary external allies had to send additional forces to the DRC, which—by this time—included 12,000 Zimbabweans; 7,000 Angolans; and 2,000 Namibians. On the other side, the two main rebel groups were backed by 10,000 well-equipped Ugandan troops and 17,000–25,000 lightly armed Rwandans.

In Kinshasa in mid-January 2001, the failure of the FAC offensives caused tensions that led to the assassination of Kabila by his own bodyguards, who had not been paid for some time and were perhaps colluding with the government of Angola, which wanted new leadership. Immediately, Joseph Kabila, the late president's son, took power with the backing of Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. Around the same time, the new Bush administration in the United States, free of guilt related to the 1994 genocide, appeared less sympathetic to Rwanda and insisted it honor the Lusaka Agreement. The young Kabila engaged in a series of international meetings facilitated by former Botswana president Ketumile Masire and South African president Thabo Mbeki throughout 2001 and 2002, which resulted in foreign forces pulling back from the front line. In mid-March, the rejuvenated peace process was threatened when RCD-G and RPA forces took the Lake Tanganyika town of Muliro, but subsequent condemnation by the UN Security Council had a moderating effect on Kigali. In April 2002, at Sun City in South Africa, the Kabila regime and the MLC signed an agreement to form a unified multiparty government and hold elections, which was rejected by RCD-G. Violence continued such as in May in Kisangani, where RCD-G forces under General Gabriel Amisi and Colonel Laurent Nkunda crushed an attempted mutiny by former FAZ personnel by summarily executing 160 people and harassed UN officials sent to investigate; in June in South Kivu, where the RPA fought Masunzu's Banyamulenge who had withdrawn to the Haut Plateau; and in August in Ituri, where Hema and Lendu militias continued their struggle. Rwanda and Uganda recognized that their military involvement in the DRC was no longer worthwhile, as it was costing them precious Western support. At the end of July, Kinshasa and Kigali signed the Pretoria Accord in which the former promised to dismantle and disarm former FAR-Interahamwe groups in eastern DRC, and the latter agreed to withdraw its forces. This was followed by the September Luanda Agreement in which the

DRC and Uganda made peace, and the latter committed to bringing its forces home. By late October 2002, most foreign forces had left the DRC except the Ugandans, who withdrew in June 2003, which allowed the internal factions to negotiate. In mid-December 2002 in South Africa, all the major DRC parties consisting of the Kabila regime, MLC, three RCD factions, Mai Mai militia, and unarmed civil society representatives signed the Global and Inclusive Accord (AGI) in which they agreed to a shared government with Kabila as president, to integrate the armed groups into a new military, and to hold elections within two years. The settlement was ratified by all parties at another meeting in Sun City in April 2003. While there were just 200 UN peacekeepers in the DRC in December 2000, the renewal of negotiations meant this number increased to 2,400 by October 2001 and 4,200 by the end of 2002. At that time, most MONUC soldiers, commanded by Senegalese major general Mountaga Diallo, came from South Africa, Uruguay, Morocco, Senegal, Tunisia, Ghana, and Bolivia. They monitored the withdrawal of foreign forces; supervised the voluntary disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement process (DDRRR) for the various “negative” factions such as former FAR-Interahamwe; and patrolled the Congo River to re-establish civilian traffic. Though debates rage on, it has been estimated that between August 1998 and November 2002, some 3.3 million people died as a result of conflict in the DRC, with the vast majority attributed to disease and hunger related to displacement and state collapse.¹⁸

CONTINUING CONFLICT IN THE DRC

In 2003, the command structure of the new integrated DRC armed forces was created with chief of staff Lieutenant General Liwanga Mata and air force commander John Numbi appointed by President Kabila, army commander Sylvain Mbuki by RCD-G, navy commander Dieudonne Amuli Bahigwa by MLC, and regional military commanders by different groups. In late 2004, the new national military was officially titled the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC). Former combatants undertook an integration process in which they reported to one of a number of orientation centers around the country operated by the National Commission for Demobilization and Reinsertion (CONADER), where women, children, and the sick

were immediately demobilized and combatants given a week to decide if they wanted a demobilization package of US\$110 up front and US\$25 per month for a year or to continue within the new military. Those entering FARDC were sent to one of a number of integration centers for 45 days of training (later increased to 90) as soldiers in one of 18 new integrated brigades, each of which would have a set quota of members from the former belligerent groups. Each brigade would consist of 2,500 men, including three battalions of 720 each. Leaders of all the factions grossly inflated the numbers under their command to collect salaries of ghost personnel and withheld the best soldiers from integration. In 2005, some 240,000 combatants were being paid, though South African accountants believed that there were actually around 120,000. By the end of 2005, six integrated brigades had been created, with the Belgians training and equipping the first one at Kisangani, which graduated in June 2004; the Angolans training and equipping a second at Kitona along with a commando battalion sent to the east to fight the Ugandan LRA; the South Africans and Belgians training a third at Kalemie; and the Congolese and MONUC training the remaining three. Although CONADER determined the ranks of personnel from the former rebel factions, skills and experience varied enormously, with an ex-FAZ general having attained that rank after a 20-year career while a Mai Mai fighter with no formal education could assume that title within a year. Kabila tried to control the military by establishing his *maison militaire* ("military house") in February 2002 that operated outside the interim government's hierarchy and by posting elements of the 12,000-man Special Presidential Security Group (GSSP)—which reported directly to the president—to key points across the country. In early 2010, the United States, under the auspices of its new Africa Command, began a nine-month process to train and equip a new 750-strong Light Infantry Battalion, eventually called 391st Commando Battalion, that would serve as a rapid reaction force and a model for the professionalization of other FARDC units. The battalion also received instruction in human rights and agricultural production intended to make it self-sufficient in food. It was eventually deployed to help root out the elusive LRA in the northeast.¹⁹

Tensions in Ituri worsened during 2001 with the split of RCD-K into a supposedly pro-Hema RCD-ML (Liberation Movement) and the allegedly pro-Lendu rump of RCD-K. The Ugandan withdrawal during the first half of 2003 increased violence between Hema and Lendu militias over control of the gold-producing province. In April 2003, MONUC deployed an 800-strong battalion from Uruguay

in Bunia, but this force (although it saved many lives) was insufficient to stop the fighting. At this time, MONUC had just 4,700 troops to monitor the peace process in what was, at the time, Africa's second largest country. When the last Ugandan troops left in June, Lendu militias and the Hema Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) led by Thomas Lubanga (a former Ugandan client now supported by Rwanda) fought each other over Bunia, resulting in thousands of civilians fleeing to the local MONUC headquarters and airport. In addition, two UN observers were killed. Both Hema and Lendu militias massacred civilians of the other ethnicity. Consequently, the United Nations approved an Interim Emergency Multi-national Force (IEMF) for Bunia to secure the airport and protect the town's residents and displaced people until relieved by an expanded MONUC. Arriving in early June, the IEMF under French brigadier general Jean-Paul Thonier consisted of 1,400 mostly French troops from 3 RPIMA supported by armored vehicles, heavy mortars, 2 helicopters, 150 French and Swedish special forces operators, French and British engineers to upgrade the Bunia airport, and a Belgian medical team. France hesitated to intervene unilaterally because of its strained relations with Rwanda and the ongoing operation in Cote d'Ivoire. Because Bunia's airport was small and in poor condition, IEMF headquarters was located at Entebbe airport in Uganda, where there were another 800 personnel, and close air support and reconnaissance were conducted by French aircraft flying out of Entebbe in Uganda and N'Djamena in Chad. Another 1,000 French troops in other parts of Africa acted as a reserve. Called Operation Artemis, this was the European Union's first autonomous military operation outside Europe. While the IEMF quickly established control of Bunia, where they killed around 20 militiamen in various skirmishes in mid-June and forbade the carrying of weapons, nothing was done to disarm the militias, who simply hid their arms or left the vicinity.

In early September, the IEMF departed, and Bunia was occupied by the 2,500-strong MONUC Ituri Brigade consisting mostly of soldiers from Bangladesh. By November, with the arrival of a battalion from Nepal and one from Pakistan, the Ituri Brigade had grown to 4,500 and included attack helicopters as well as armored vehicles. While MONUC peacekeepers maintained Bunia as a "weapons-free" zone and quickly expanded out of town, militia violence restarted in October 2003 and continued during the next year. As MONUC conducted more aggressive patrols and sweeps, it came under repeated militia attack. When nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers were killed in an

ambush in late February 2005, MONUC changed its policy of voluntary disarmament and launched large cordon-and-search operations by troops from Pakistan, Nepal, and South Africa supported by Indian attack helicopters to forcefully disarm the militias. On the first day of March, UN peacekeepers attacked a base of the Lendu Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI) at Loga, northeast of Bunia, killing 50–60 fighters. In March, the UPC's Lubanga, who was detained by the Congolese Interim government, became the first person ever arrested on an International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant and was sent to The Hague, where he was eventually found guilty of conscripting child soldiers under the age of 15 and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. While only 2,000 militiamen had been voluntarily disarmed, a UN ultimatum to surrender weapons or join the national army led to 15,600 out of an estimated 20,000 disarmed by late June. By April 2005, MONUC had 16,500 peacekeepers in the DRC, with the largest contingents being 3,760 from Pakistan; 3,544 from India; 1,745 from Uruguay; 1,397 from South Africa; 1,285 from Bangladesh; and 1,146 from Nepal. In November 2006, after a national election won by Joseph Kabila, the last three Ituri militia groups (including FNI), with a total of 5,000 fighters, agreed to surrender their weapons and release 700 child soldiers in exchange for amnesty and integration into the army. In February 2007, the FNI became the last militia group to begin handing in their weapons to UN officials.

The 2002 Pretoria Agreement did not end conflict between Rwanda and exiled Rwandan Hutu groups based in North and South Kivu. While Rwanda had defeated the ALIR during the 1998 invasion of eastern DRC, the 2001–2002 peace process allowed former FAR-Interahamwe elements who had been mobilized by the Kabila regime to re-establish themselves in that region as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). Despite a UN arms embargo on North and South Kivu, as well as Ituri, weapons still entered the region because of lack of control by the administration in faraway Kinshasa and continued links between armed groups and the governments of DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda. When the DRC government stopped support for the FDLR in 2002, these Hutu rebels obtained weapons and ammunition from the Mai Mai militia and corrupt FARDC commanders. The Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF; the new name of the RPA) officially evacuated eastern DRC in September 2002 but left behind a small covert presence to combat exiled Hutu militants and exploit natural resources. Between 2003 and 2007, Rwanda

convinced some important FDLR officers such as General Paul Rwarakabije to join the RDE, and some 7,000 fighters returned home. However, the continued presence of 5,000 FDLR members in eastern DRC provided Kigali with a continued excuse to intervene in that country. Some Congolese Tutsi officers and their troops from RCD-G, with Rwanda's encouragement, refused to integrate into the FARDC and claimed to protect local Tutsi from the FDLR. In May 2004, General Laurent Nkunda (a Congolese veteran of the RPF's 1994 campaign in Rwanda) led 1,000–1,500 dissident troops from Goma to Bukavu, where his colleague Colonel Jules Mutebutsi had orchestrated a mutiny by 300 soldiers against the local FARDC commander General Mbuza Mabe. Occupying the town, Nkunda's men killed several hundred loyalist troops and civilians, and raped and looted. Despite having 1,000 peacekeepers in Bukavu and Indian attack helicopters on call, MONUC's local commander Swedish brigadier general Jan-Gunnar Isberg ignored his orders because of confusion in New York and Kinshasa, and he allowed the rebels to take the local airstrip. Diplomatic pressure by the United Nations, United States, and Britain on Rwanda to stop interfering in the DRC resulted in Nkunda and Mutebutsi withdrawing from Bukavu to North Kivu in mid-June. Regaining control of Bukavu, the FARDC took revenge on local Banyamulenge, and 3,000 fled to Rwanda. Responding to the Bukavu crisis, MONUC sent its best units to the Kivus in late 2004 with an Indian brigade based in Goma and a Pakistani brigade centered in Bukavu, and in early 2005, a divisional headquarters was established in the east under Dutch major general Patrick Cammaert. In late 2004, Rwandan troops crossed the border to attack the FDLR and supplied weapons to Nkunda's fighters, which enabled them to repel an FARDC offensive. More than 100,000 civilians were displaced. At the end of March 2005, following a MONUC demand for the FDLR to disarm, the group's chairman Ignace Murwanashyaka renounced the 1994 genocide and violence, and asked to return to Rwanda to participate in politics. This request was dismissed by Kigali. In early 2005, MONUC's Pakistani troops in South Kivu launched Operation Night Flash, which was a series of night patrols to protect Congolese villages from attack. Beginning in July 2005 and continuing into 2006, MONUC and FARDC launched cordon-and-search operations Falcon Sweep, Iron First, and Virungu Clearance to forcefully disarm the FDLR, but results were minimal because the insurgents moved deeper into the bush. Although Kinshasa issued arrest warrants for Nkunda

and Mutebutsi for rebellion and crimes against humanity, Tutsi insurgent ranks swelled by more desertions from the FARDC, and Nkunda mounted an offensive in January 2006 that enlarged his territory and displaced more civilians. In July, just before the national elections, Nkunda attempted to portray himself as a legitimate political leader struggling to protect minorities by announcing the formation of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). Defeating another FARDC offensive at the end of 2008, Nkunda signed a peace agreement in January 2009 that involved a cease-fire, the return of civilians to their homes, and amnesty. However, he continued to insist on FDLR disarmament.


In late October 2009, the CNDP renewed hostilities against the Congolese government by seizing a major military camp near the Virunga National Park, which it used as a staging area for a southward advance that seized Rutshuru and continued toward Goma, pushing back FARDC forces despite support by UN helicopter gunships and armored vehicles. In Goma, fleeing FARDC soldiers looted and civilians, enraged at UN impotence, threw rocks and Molotov cocktails at MONUC troops. In early November, Nkunda's rebels seized Kiwanja, 45 kilometers north of Goma, after a two-day battle with Mai Mai and FDLR fighters backed by FARDC mortars. After several days of artillery and mortar exchanges between the CNDP and FARDC, the former took Rwindi in the Virunga National Park in mid-November as government soldiers retreated in disorder. While the Mai Mai initially supported the government, they began to attack FARDC troops who were retreating too easily and looting communities. A few days later Nkunda, at the behest of UN special envoy and former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, halted the advance and withdrew some 40 kilometers to create a buffer zone with government forces with which they entered negotiations in Nairobi. At the same time, fighting continued between the CNDP and Mai Mai fighters who re-entered Rwindi and attacked in other areas, dislodging some 100,000 people. In January 2009, the CNDP split with General Bosco "The Terminator" Ntaganda, a Congolese Tutsi who had fought with the RPF in the early 1990s and served as head of military operations for the UPC in Ituri, assuming leadership of a faction that agreed to integrate with the FARDC and transform their group into a political party. Unable to defeat the CNDP militarily, the Kabila administration made a deal with Rwanda to allow its forces to cross the border to engage the FDLR if they removed Nkunda. Late that

month, Nkunda and his remaining three battalions were defeated by a combined FARDC-RDF operation involving 3,500 Rwandan troops to clear rebels from the border area, and the fugitive general was arrested when he fled into Rwanda. The FDLR regrouped, attacked villages, and clashed with the Congolese army in South Kivu. During 2010, several attacks by Mai Mai fighters that killed four Indian UN peacekeepers and wounded more led to public pressure in India for the withdrawal of its 4,248 troops and 19 helicopters from the DRC. In 2010, the United Nations renamed MONUC the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) to reflect that it was now working in support of an elected government. With 19,000 uniformed personnel under Indian lieutenant general Chander Prakash, it was the United Nations' largest and most costly peacekeeping force at the time. Beginning in 2005, MONUC's credibility was undermined by several scandals in which some of its personnel were accused of sexual exploitation of Congolese civilians and supplying weapons and ammunition to rebel groups such as the FNI and FDLR for gold, ivory, and drugs. In early April 2012, about 300 former CNDP fighters led by General Ntaganda deserted from FARDC, citing poor pay and conditions (but likely they were motivated by rumors that Ntaganda was about to be sent to The Hague to face criminal charges of employing child soldiers and that his men would be transferred out of North Kivu). Calling themselves the March 23 Movement (or M23) in memory of the day in 2009 when they joined the political process, the mutineers under the military leadership of Colonel Sultani Makeenga took shelter in the Virunga National Park but then seized control of Rutshuru and several other towns near Goma. In July 2012, M23 fighters defeated a government offensive supported by UN attack helicopters, FARDC's U.S.-trained 391st Commando Battalion failed to contain them, and Rwanda's relations with the United Nations and United States soured over accusations it was supplying the mutineers. In late November 2012, FARDC units fled, and MONUSCO peacekeepers did nothing as M23 occupied Goma on the Rwandan border and withdrew on December 1 with a considerable assortment of heavy weapons and ammunition. Subsequently, the UN announced that it would dispatch a special intervention brigade in eastern DRC that would take vigorous action against armed groups such as M23. The brigade would consist of 3000 troops mostly from South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi commanded by Tanzanian brigadier general James Mwakibolwa and potentially supported by aerial drone

surveillance. With the battle-hardened M23 fighters threatening to defend themselves if attacked, the intervention brigade began a slow deployment that was still taking place in mid-2013. In March 2013 Bosco Ntaganda, perhaps because of a split within M23, surrendered to authorities in Rwanda and was passed to the ICC in The Hague.²⁰

THE MILITARY AND VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)

A decorated veteran of France's colonial army who fought with the Free French in Europe during World War II and served in Indochina during the 1950s, Jean-Bedel Bokassa became commander of the 500-strong Central African Armed Forces (FACA) of the newly independent CAR in 1963 and became the country's first colonel the following year. CAR president David Dacko, fearful of the increasingly ambitious Colonel Bokassa (who was also his cousin), established a 500-member paramilitary police and a 120-man presidential security guard under separate leadership. Given Dacko's growing relationship with China and the country's worsening economy, Bokassa and fellow Indochina veteran Captain Alexandre Banza staged a military coup on New Year's Eve 1965 in which paramilitary police commander Colonel Jean Izamo was arrested and later died in prison. The deposed Dacko was imprisoned until 1969, when he was released to serve as Bokassa's political advisor until 1976, when he fled to France. Promoted to lieutenant colonel and appointed minister of finance, Banza objected to Bokassa's extravagant spending and cultivated support in the army for another coup. In turn, Bokassa sent FACA units loyal to Banza to border areas and posted his own supporters to the capital, where he convinced the French government to station 80 paratroopers to protect the regime. In April 1969, Banza attempted to overthrow the government but was arrested, beaten by Bokassa, and executed by firing squad. The progressively megalomaniacal Bokassa promoted himself to general in 1971, declared himself president for life in 1972, and crowned himself emperor of the renamed Central African Empire in 1977 in a lavish and farcical ceremony that cost more than the country's annual budget at a time when there were food riots in Bangui. During the late 1970s, the obviously unstable Bokassa lost French support by warming to Libya's Gaddafi and particularly when his security forces massacred 100 children protesting a requirement that they purchase expensive school uniforms displaying the emperor's picture.



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On September 20, 1979, the French launched Operation Barracuda in which 130 special forces operators from 1 RPIMA, accompanied by Dacko, landed in transport aircraft at Bangui airport, which they quickly seized. They were followed by helicopters carrying 200 marine paratroopers from 3 RPIMA based in Gabon and 400 from 8 RPIMA based in Chad. Bokassa's troops surrendered without a fight, and the republic was re-established under Dacko. The former emperor spent seven years in exile in France, returned home in 1986 (where he was sentenced to death, though this was commuted to 20 years imprisonment), and in 1993 he was released from prison under a general amnesty. Bokassa died of natural causes three years later.²¹

After Barracuda, French forces remained in CAR to support the Dacko regime. The French built an air base called Camp Beal at the Bangui airport, re-established an old French base at Bouar in the country's west that had been abandoned in 1965, and French Secret Service officer Lieutenant-Colonel Jean-Claude Mantion became Dacko's "proconsul." In 1981, Dacko, following a disappointing election result, handed power to military chief-of-staff General Andre Kolingba, another veteran of the French colonial army, who formed a military regime. Retaining Mantion, who was given considerable authority, Kolingba expanded the presidential guard and foiled a coup attempt in March 1982 by two prominent brigadiers sympathetic to opposition leader and former Bokassa minister Ange-Felix Patasse, who was exiled. Politicizing the country's regional division of the southern riverine area and the northern savannah, Kolingba used his southern-dominated army to destroy the coup plotters' home villages in the north. By 1993, Kolingba had molded a military in which 70 percent of the personnel originated from his own southern Yakoma ethnic group, which accounted for 5 percent of CAR's population. Under Kolingba, CAR became a major staging area for French military activity in Africa during the 1980s and early 1990s.

In the post-Cold War atmosphere of the early 1990s, Kolingba was pressured by France, which had declared it was no longer Africa's policeman, to grant democratic reforms in line with many other African countries. Consequently, Patasse came to power in a 1993 election and was CAR's first head of state from the northern region. Patasse transferred the many Yakoma in the presidential guard to the regular military and replaced them with members of his own northern Sara-Kaba ethnicity. In mid-April 1996, some 200 soldiers protested three months without pay by occupying the Bangui radio station, where

they took hostages, which led to a clash with the presidential guard in which 7 were killed and 40 wounded. The mutineers surrendered after four days, and French troops patrolled Bangui. One month later, another larger mutiny broke out in the city involving several hundred soldiers led by their NCOs that resulted in looting. The French responded with Operation Almandin II, which evacuated several thousand foreigners, protected French economic interests, and forced the mutineers to return to their barracks after negotiating with the government. Forty-three people had been killed and 200 wounded. While a unity government was installed with the aim of reforming the military, the process was derailed when hundreds of soldiers again mutinied and occupied Bangui's southern suburbs. During the now predictable French intervention to restore order, mutineers killed two French soldiers, which led to French reprisals in which many civilians were killed. The French Socialist opposition reacted with outrage, which was unusual when it came to military actions in Africa. In turn, France increased its military presence in CAR from 1,400 to 2,300 troops and Paris, dodging accusations of neo-colonialism, announced these troops could be replaced by a multinational peacekeeping force.

After the signing of the Bangui Accords in late January 1997 in which the mutineers were to be accommodated in the government, 750 soldiers from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, Chad, and Togo deployed to Bangui as the Inter-African Commission to Monitor Implementation of the Bangui Accords (MISAB). France funded the deployment and supported MISAB logistically. Another mutiny erupted in Bangui in May and June 1997 in which 100 people were killed and 60,000 fled. MISAB soldiers responded to the killing of one of their Senegalese colleagues by firing indiscriminately into Bangui neighborhoods where the mutineers were using civilians as human shields. President Patasse created a special force under Martin Koumtamadji, a former rebel in southern Chad also known as Colonel Abdoulaye Miskine, that functioned outside military command to fight bandits who were operating in the north because of the collapse of the state. Furthermore, Patasse hired former French agent turned mercenary Paul Baril to form a 30-man presidential bodyguard and the now 1,000-strong presidential guard was supplemented by a militia recruited from the north. Paris withdrew its forces from Bouar in December 1997 and Bangui in March 1998. France left 200 troops at Bangui air base to support MISAB, which by this point had lost 6 soldiers in combat, and in April 1998, they were all absorbed into the

1,350-strong UN Mission for the Central African Republic (MINURCA), which was to provide security for planned elections. The last French soldier left CAR in February 1999. With Patasse's disputed electoral victory in September 1999, MINURCA withdrew in April 2000, leaving behind 70 civilian UN officials without military support. In December 2000, the opposition organized a general strike by civil servants who had not been paid in five months and demanded the president's resignation. In late May 2001, a heavily armed military force attacked the presidential residence but was repulsed. General Kolingba (who had finished second during the 1999 election) and 20 army officers took responsibility for the failed coup and fled to Uganda, which led to the slaughter of at least 300 Yakoma in Bangui and the flight of 50,000 people. Libya's Gaddafi then sent Patasse 100 bodyguards. Despite its previous ill discipline, the military did not join the attempted coup because it had been successfully restructured, which meant that the total personnel had been reduced from 4,000 to 3,000, of which 40 percent were Yakoma. In August, the increasingly paranoid Patasse ordered the arrest of his defense minister Jean-Jacques Demafouth, whose restructuring had reduced the presidential guard from 1,200 to 800, for suspected involvement in the coup plot. He was acquitted by a court in 2002.

In early November 2001, Patasse tried to have his presidential guard and Libyan bodyguards arrest military chief of staff General Francois Bozize on suspicion of participating in the failed coup, but the general took refuge with his ethnic kinsmen at a battalion in northern Bangui. He then fled to Chad and eventually France, where he declared the formation of an insurgent movement. Filling the void created by the French departure, Patasse requested the deployment of a force from Gaddafi's Community of Sahel Saharan States (CEN-SAD), which arrived in Bangui in December 2001 and consisted of 300 soldiers from Libya, Sudan, and Djibouti. In late October 2002, three weeks after the recently reinvigorated Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) had approved a force for CAR to replace the one from CEN-SAD, Bangui was raided by 150 of General Bozize's rebels. They were repelled by Libyan troops and two Libyan ground attack jets, and several hundred fighters from Jean-Pierre Bemba's MLC that was based across the border in northern DRC. Patasse had links with the MLC because it recruited in CAR and had fought Chadian soldiers in the DRC. Eyeing the oil wealth of northern CAR, Chad's Idriss Deby supported Bozize's rebellion, and Chadian troops invaded the north, where they looted communities. Patasse

launched an offensive in the north with FACA and MLC troops who conducted a campaign of massacre and rape. In December 2002, the pro-Patasse Libyan and CEN-SAD forces were replaced by ECCAS's less friendly 300-strong Multi-National Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC) made up of soldiers from Congo-Brazzaville, Chad, and Gabon. Bozizi's rebellion was directly supported by Chad's presidential guard, armed by Joseph Kabila's regime in DRC (which wanted to undermine Bemba's ally), funded by President Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo-Brazzaville, and tacitly supported by President Omar Bongo in Gabon. With a few CAR junior officers and a force consisting largely of Chadians, Bozize's two rebel columns seized Bangui in mid-March 2003. FACA and FOMUC troops did not resist, and Patasse fled to Togo. While France refused Patasse's requests for military assistance, Paris embarked on Operation Boali, in which 300 soldiers were sent to Bangui to protect French and foreign citizens, as well as support the new regime. As General Bozize declared himself president and defense minister, the Chadian troops who had put him in power looted Bangui of vehicles and jewelry. The resulting public anger in the capital resulted in Chad sending another 500 soldiers, who were eventually absorbed into FOMUC. Indeed, Bozize's 80 bodyguards were all Chadians, and CAR's only working transport aircraft had a Chadian pilot.

After Bozize won elections in May 2005 that were widely seen as fair, separate rebellions broke out in the northwest and northeast. The northwest rebellion was orchestrated by former members of the ousted Patasse regime as former presidential guards formed the Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD) under the political leadership of Demafouth, and the Democratic Front for the Central African People (FDPC) was established by Colonel Abdoulaye Miskine. These insurgents attacked the military, which responded with extreme violence toward the local population. The rebellion was also facilitated by the redeployment of Chadian forces from its southern border with CAR to its eastern border with Sudan. Expedited by Gaddafi, the Sirte Accords of February 2007 stopped the fighting by granting rebels amnesty and promising them integration into the state military. Despite indictment by the ICC for war crimes committed in northern CAR during 2002 and 2003, Miskine was appointed advisor to the president (he declined the position). The insurgency in the northeast was led by disaffected elements from the Bozize regime and centered on the isolated Vakaga area that given lack of government control had become a staging area for Sudanese-

sponsored rebels from eastern Chad and the LRA from Uganda. At the end of October 2006, some 50 rebels from the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), a coalition of three northeastern rebel groups, drove 60 FACA troops out of Birao, the administrative center of Vakaga, capturing arms, ammunition, and numerous vehicles. By the end of November, they had taken the towns of Ouanda Djalle and Sam Ouandja the administrative center of Ndele in the Bamingi-Bangoran area and were venturing southeast. The French army in CAR, increased by 100 troops, transported and supervised FACA units that launched a counteroffensive at the end of November and recaptured all the northeastern towns by early December. These operations were supported by an 18-man French Operational Assistance Detachment (DAO) that included a medical team positioned at Birao. When UFDR forces attacked Birao at the start of March 2007, the French DAO was surrounded and saved by two French Mirage jets from N'Djamena that destroyed rebel vehicles. On the night of March 4–5, an advance party of 10 French paratroopers from 3 RPIMA dropped on Birao and made contact with the besieged team. The next night, 58 French paratroopers performed a high-altitude, low-opening (HALO) jump from 4,000 feet to secure the undefended Birao airstrip, where transport aircraft landed a 130-strong company that quickly retook the town. In France's first parachute operation in Africa since Kolwezi in 1978, no French troops were lost, but 6 FACA and some 30 rebels were killed. The French government was embarrassed when the United Nations reported that after its paratroopers had secured Birao, FACA troops burned civilian houses and two weeks after the operation only 600 of the 14,000 inhabitants had returned. Given French intervention, UFDR operational commander General Damane Zacharia signed a peace agreement with the Bozize regime in which the rebels would participate in local administration, receive cash, and join FACA. In August, Bozize entered into an agreement with Sudan in which the latter promised not to back CAR rebels and the former reopened the border. In June 2008, at Libreville in Gabon, the Bozize government and three rebel groups—APRD, FDPC, and UFDR—signed a global peace agreement that imposed a cease-fire and began a long process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of insurgents. In 2008, Jean Pierre Bemba (who had fled DRC following his failed election bid and violence between his bodyguards and state forces) was arrested in Belgium and transported to the The Hague, where he was put on trial for crimes committed by his forces in CAR during 2002 and 2003.

The European Union, prompted by crisis in Darfur, launched a project in 2006 to stabilize the neighboring CAR by rejuvenating its military. Of the FACA's 5,000 personnel, some 800 would be demobilized because they had long past retirement age, which also meant the top-heavy force would lose 27 colonels and 7 generals. In November 2006, a new recruitment system was introduced that took equal numbers from each of six military regions to balance the military's ethnic composition and under French supervision, merit-based examinations were introduced for officer selection. However, in 2007, only 1,200–1,500 FACA personnel were ready for operations, and most of these were members of the presidential guard. To re-create the military as a national force and diversify its food sources so that it would not have to prey on civilians, FOMUC troops established a new barracks in each of the military regions that was occupied by a FACA battalion of 500–600 personnel. Decreasing French involvement, Bozize made a separate agreement with South Africa to train the presidential guard, which he still treated as a personal militia. In 2008, FOMUC was renamed the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (MICROPAX) and had around 400 peacekeepers.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the French forces at Birao became part of the EUFOR Chad-CAR in February 2008, which was absorbed into United Nations' MINURCAT in March 2009. On several occasions during 2009, insurgents from the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP) clashed with FACA around Ndele. Led by former Patasse regime prime minister and failed 2005 presidential candidate Charles Massi, the CPJP was the only CAR rebel group not to have signed the 2008 global peace deal. With the departure of UN forces in November 2010, the CPJP attempted to derail upcoming presidential elections by seizing Birao, but in December, the town was retaken by Chadian forces on behalf of the CAR government. Massi had been arrested in Chad in June 2009 and transferred to Bangui, where he was tortured to death in January 2010. Bozize won a second presidential term during January 2011 elections and in August 2012, the CPJP joined the peace process. However, in December 2012, a rebel alliance called Seleka (meaning coalition) that included the UFDR, FDPC, and CPJP—citing Bozize's failure to implement previous agreements—abruptly seized most northern towns; advanced south, taking the diamond mining center of Bria; and continued toward the capital with FACA unable to hold them back. While France increased its garrison at the Bangui airport from 250 to 600 troops to protect French civilians, newly elected

president Francois Hollande rejected Bozize's pleas for assistance, as did the United States. However, ECCAS mobilized its Multinational Force for Central Africa (FOMAC) to reinforce its existing complement of 560 peacekeepers in CAR with 360 troops from Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, and Cameroon; 400 from Chad; and some from Angola supplemented by 400 from South Africa which had mining interests in the country. With about 700 ECCAS troops defending Damara, the last town on the rebels' route to Bangui some 70 kilometers away, Gabonese FOMAC commander General Jean-Felix Akaga warned the insurgents that further advance risked conflict with the 10-state regional grouping. Consequently, the rebels halted, dropped their demand for President Bozize's resignation, and accepted the appointment of a new prime minister and coalition government. However, they would continue to hold the captured towns until a new election. In late March 2013, Seleka rebels claimed that the Bozize regime was not honoring the cease-fire and resumed their advance on Bangui, killing 13 South African soldiers and injuring 27. Seleka forces, including child soldiers, seized the capital where its leader Michel Djotodia, a founder of UFDR, declared himself president and Bozize fled to Cameroon.²²

THE MILITARY AND VIOLENCE IN THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE

The Republic of Congo, with its capital of Brazzaville, was ruled by a series of left-wing military regimes, including that of Marien Ngouabi from 1968 to 1977 and Denis Sassou Nguesso from 1979 to 1992 that cultivated good relations with both the Soviet Union and France. While comparatively poorly educated northerners had long supplied the rank and file of the Congo-Brazzaville army, under northerners Ngouabi and Nguesso they began to dominate the officer corps as well. Conflicts between northerners and southerners in the officer corps contributed to the assassination of Ngouabi in 1977 and by the mid-1980s, the army was completely controlled by northerners. Nguesso promoted officers from his own Mbochi ethnicity into positions of power and in 1989 established a 400-strong northern-based paramilitary force. He imported Cuban personnel to supervise the southerners who remained in the internal security services and to train an elite and well paid presidential guard consisting entirely of northerners from his home area. By 1990, with the Cuban departure from Angola, the Cubans in Congo-Brazzaville were replaced by several hundred Moroccan security personnel.

The restoration of multiparty democracy in Congo-Brazzaville in 1992 resulted in the rise of ethnic political parties with their own armed militias. Newly elected president Pascal Lissouba packed the re-created presidential guard and a new paramilitary police with his fellow southerners, and purged the army of northern officers, many of whom joined Nguesso's Cobra militia. When France rejected a request to retrain the army, Lissouba hired a private security company from Israel. Between July 1993 and July 1994, militia violence in Brazzaville claimed over 2,000 lives. Despite a 1995 truce that involved disarmament, the militias kept most of their weapons. Militia leaders were motivated by their desire to control revenue from the country's oil industry, and the overthrow of the long-standing Mobutu regime in Kinshasa in 1996–1997 spread instability across the Congo River to Brazzaville. On June 5, 1997, government forces surrounded the Brazzaville home of Nguesso, who planned to run as a presidential candidate, and attempted to arrest two of his militiamen for earlier violence. This led to a battle between the Cobras and Lissouba's army and his Cocoye, Zulu, and Mamba militias that spread across the city, which was devastated by artillery and mortar bombardment by both sides. Bernard Kolelas, the city's mayor and head of his own Bakongo militia called the Ninjas, tried to mediate. France declared neutrality in the conflict and sent 1,200 troops to Brazzaville in June to evacuate 5,000 foreigners. However, Nguesso was favored by Paris and funded by French oil company Elf-Aquitaine because Lissouba had wanted to open the country to other oil producers. Both sides enlisted foreign fighters, with Nguesso's militia including former FAR from Rwanda and Chadian troops dispatched by Paris. Lissouba's group included former members of Mobutu's DSP and Serbians from the defunct White Legion. Lissouba began to receive assistance from UNITA rebels recently driven out of DRC who wanted to secure their diamond smuggling operation on the north side of the Congo River. As a result, several thousand Angolan troops supported by tanks and MiG fighters invaded from the Cabinda enclave in early October, and quickly took Brazzaville and the oil center of Pointe-Noire. Angola's ruling party had a long relationship with Nguesso, who had been a fellow Soviet client during the Cold War. Because his outgunned fighters did not offer much resistance, Lissouba fled, and Nguesso took power. Some 8,000 people had been killed in the four-month conflict.

Nguesso restored many Mbochi former officers and recruited northern militiamen to the army. While the new president announced that he would convene a national convention to draft a new constitution

and hold elections within three years, this was delayed by the outbreak of rebellion in the south by the defeated militia groups in late 1998 that caused destruction and loss of life; displaced 800,000 people; and blocked the road between the capital and Pointe-Noire. In November and December 1999, Gabon's President Bongo, Nguesso's son-in-law, facilitated an agreement between Brazzaville and the rebel National Resistance Council, which ended hostilities, granted amnesty for war-related crimes, restored state administration in southern Congo, and began the integration of qualified militia members into state forces. Now led by messianic Pastor Ntumi (whose real name was Frederick Bintsamou), the Ninjas attacked the railway in the southern Pool region during 2002 and 2003. Ensuing army operations against the rebels involved Mi-24 attack helicopters that indiscriminately bombed communities and forced thousands of civilians to flee. Although the Ninjas signed a treaty with the Nguesso administration in 2007 that gave Bintsamou a government position, they continued to be involved in banditry.²³

CONCLUSION

Central Africa remains the continent's most unstable and violent region. With little state control, vast stretches of anarchic CAR and eastern DRC are home to numerous rebel and bandit groups that abuse civilians, rule small fiefdoms and smuggle valuable resources to the world market. Most Central African state militaries, distracted by the seemingly endless postconflict integration and re-integration of former combatants, remain ineffective and ill disciplined, prey on civilians they are meant to protect, and appear incapable of benefiting from foreign assistance. The exception is the large and efficient military of present-day Rwanda, which—despite or perhaps because of its lack of foreign advisors since 1994—punches far above its tiny geographic size in the region though, like most of its neighbors, it lacks serious air combat and transport ability and has been accused of atrocities and theft in eastern DRC. Although a robust UN mission in the early 1960s suppressed Katanga separation from Congo, subsequent and sometimes very large UN forces have done little to end conflict in this troubled and desperately poor region. An important factor is that Central Africa lacks its own relatively strong regional power, like South Africa in Southern Africa and Nigeria in West Africa, to form the core of regional peace building initiatives.

Chapter 5

Southern Africa, 1963–

During the Cold War era, Southern Africa was the continent's most conflict-plagued region. While the rest of Africa became independent under African governments, the Portuguese colonial rulers of Angola and Mozambique refused to decolonize, the minority white settler regimes of Southern Rhodesia (today's Zimbabwe) and South Africa tenaciously clung to power, and South Africa occupied South West Africa (today's Namibia). In these territories, African nationalists frustrated by increasingly deadly state violence abandoned passive resistance and embarked on armed insurgencies. The Cold War context of the time meant that Portugal, Rhodesia, and apartheid South Africa presented themselves as anticommunist champions and were backed by the Western powers, and the nationalist movements adopted socialist revolutionary rhetoric and received assistance from the Eastern bloc. Southern Africa was militarized as state security forces were expanded through conscription and specialized in counterinsurgency, and liberation movements infiltrated across borders from sympathetic African-ruled countries, cultivated support from black communities, and conducted guerrilla wars. After the independence of Angola and Mozambique in 1974 and Zimbabwe in 1980, besieged apartheid South Africa developed a "total strategy" to mobilize its combined political, economic, and military resources against what it saw as a Soviet-inspired "total onslaught." South Africa used

conventional and covert military operations to weaken the ability of neighboring black-ruled states to support antiapartheid groups. Many Southern African countries were devastated by decades of warfare that ranged from limited urban bombings to Africa's largest conventional battle since World War II. The few Southern African countries not directly embroiled in these conflicts (for example, Botswana and Lesotho) were impacted as insurgents sought sanctuaries, counterinsurgency forces conducted pursuit operations across frontiers, and the residents of these small states were caught in the middle. While the end of the Cold War brought about the collapse of the last bastion of white supremacy in South Africa, the protracted civil war in Angola continued for many years. The end of what were in effect Africa's last anticolonial wars resulted in the amalgamation of former state forces and insurgents in new military structures.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE (SADF)

During the 1960s and 1970s, with the rise of the antiapartheid armed struggle, South African military authorities began to rethink the policy of an all-white SADF. On visits to France and the United States, South African officers were exposed to counterinsurgency theories inspired by the wars in Algeria and Vietnam. In the early 1960s, SADF officer Magnus Malan attended a command and staff course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in the United States where he learned these concepts and implemented them as head of the army from 1973 to 1976 and head of the SADF from 1976 to 1980. This new approach held that while a military campaign could delay an insurgency, it could be defeated only by nonmilitary measures designed to win over the population. Within this context, indigenous soldiers with intimate knowledge of local language and culture were important. The establishment of South Africa's own military academy allowed these counterinsurgency theories to circulate among the emerging officer corps of the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, manpower shortages caused by maintaining an all-white defense force in a country where whites constituted a minority and the prospect of conventional warfare with African-ruled states made recruitment of black soldiers attractive. The experience of Portuguese and Rhodesian counterinsurgency in neighboring territories, both of which employed armed black troops, was also influential. Because the Cape Coloured (mixed race)

community had a long and well-known history of military service prior to 1950, the SADF re-created the South African Coloured Corps in 1963 as its first extension of military service beyond whites, though at the time it was assigned a noncombat role. Renamed the South African Cape Corps (SACC) in 1972, it became part of the permanent force and increased to 2,000 men, of whom some were members of an infantry battalion. The Cape Corps sent its first detachment of 190 men on counterinsurgency duties in South West Africa in November 1975 followed by another larger force in August 1976, and they became a regular feature of combat operations. Building on the success of the Coloured experiment, the South African Navy established the Indian Service Battalion in January 1975, with its members given the same training as white sailors, including firearms instruction. Coloured sailors were deployed on a number of operational vessels and in 1977, separate sleeping and eating facilities were removed from all ships.

In November 1973, General Malan, chief of the army, authorized the creation of the South African Army Bantu Training Centre located at a prison guard school to conceal the fact that black South Africans were undergoing conventional military instruction. In December 1975, the center was transformed into 21 Battalion, a multiethnic unit of black South African soldiers armed and paid the same as white troops. In mid-1977, 21 Battalion began training an infantry company and in March 1978, it was sent to South West Africa and thrust into combat just three days after arrival. Other black units were sent to the operational area on a regular basis. During the late 1970s, instructors from the SACC and 21 Battalion trained black infantry battalions for the defense forces of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda ethnic homelands. From 1977 into the early 1980s, a series of ethnically and regionally oriented black infantry battalions were created that could theoretically join homeland armies. However, in practice, most remained in the SADF. These included the Swazi 111 Battalion established in 1977 in the Eastern Transvaal, the Zulu 121 Battalion formed in 1978 in northern Natal, the Shangaan 113 Battalion formed in 1979 in the northern Transvaal, and the northern Sotho 116 Battalion created in 1984 and also based in northern Transvaal. Military employment of Coloured, Indian and black personnel was so successful that in 1980, their period of voluntary national service was extended from 12 to 24 months. While whites amounted to almost 100 percent of permanent force and voluntary national service personnel in the early

1970s, by the second half of the 1980s, whites made up around 60 percent and blacks just under 40 percent.

South African defense authorities quickly realized that the combat deployment of nonwhite personnel meant the inevitability of them advancing in rank, including commissioning as officers. The third operational company of 21 Battalion sent to South West Africa in the late 1970s had black platoon sergeants. It was accepted that black combat soldiers would perform more effectively under their own officers. After 1 month at the Military Academy and 21 months training with the SACC, the first seven Coloured officers were commissioned in May 1975. In 1978, the navy commissioned its first Indian officers, and the number of Coloured and Indian naval officers increased during the 1980s. Very few black officers were commissioned by the SADF between 1984 and 1990 because the larger number of black officers in homeland armies, given their foreign status, were not subject to racial discrimination when training with the SADF, but South African black officers had to live, sleep, and eat in separate facilities.¹

In the late 1960s as African nationalist insurgency spread across the region, SADF authorities began to desire a special forces element that could undertake sensitive and covert missions often in other countries. In 1968, volunteers from part-time Citizen Force units around Johannesburg formed the Hunter Group as an unofficial elite counter-insurgency force. Beginning in 1970, Commandant Jan Breytenbach (who had just returned from leading a small South African military assistance mission to Biafra) was instructed to form an embryonic special forces unit that was trained at Oudtshoorn in the Cape with help from the Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS). In 1972, the new unit—training in both airborne and seaborne operations—was renamed Reconnaissance Commando (or Recces). Eventually, five such units were established, each with specific expertise. 1 Recce was based in Durban and focused on advanced parachuting, 2 Recce was located in Pretoria and became a Citizen Force unit originating partly from the old Hunter Group, and 4 Recce was stationed at Saldanha and specialized in amphibious operations and diving. Sited at Phalaborwa in the eastern Transvaal, 5 Recce performed “pseudo-terrorist” operations using former insurgents to infiltrate guerrilla groups. What had once been 3 Recce was, by the mid-1980s, turned into Project Barnacle (or the Civil Cooperation Bureau [CCB]), a highly secretive unit technically made up of civilians that collected intelligence and performed assassinations of opposition leaders and sympathizers both inside

and outside South Africa. In 1981, the Recce units and other special forces elements were removed from army control and reorganized as an independent structure reporting directly to SADF command.²

Insurgent campaigns and the independence of neighboring African countries prompted South African military expansion during the 1960s. In the 1950s, white compulsory military service was conducted through a ballot where a limited number of young men were selected for 3 months of initial training followed by three 21-day training camps. By the early 1960s, almost all those with ballots were selected for 9 months of training and 5 camps. From 1968, all 18-year-old white males were required to complete 1 year of national service. The SADF permanent force was increased from 9,000 in 1960 to 15,000 in 1964, and at the same time the number of national servicemen trained annually grew from 2,000 to 20,000. Simultaneously, South Africa spent more than US\$800 million on major military purchases, including frigates from Britain, three submarines from France, and reconnaissance aircraft. The need for a quick reaction air mobile capacity prompted the SADF, in 1961, to form a Parachute Battalion made up mostly of white national servicemen who would jump from recently acquired C-130 transports. The creation of two Citizen Force parachute battalions, consisting of reservists who had completed their national service in the first battalion, during the first half of the 1970s led to the organization of South Africa's 44 Parachute Brigade in 1978 with a number of airborne support elements. In 1968, the SADF held its first large exercise, Operation Sibasa, to test its reaction to insurgent intrusion from Mozambique. Involvement in regional conflicts (discussed later in this chapter) led to further SADF growth in the 1970s and 1980s. The number of personnel on active duty increased from 50,000 in 1970 to 150,000 in 1980 and 200,000 in 1985. In 1978, the period of compulsory national service for white males was extended from 12 to 24 months with a subsequent annual call-up of potentially 3 months. In addition to economic stress, this led to the 1983 formation of the End Conscription Campaign by white conscientious objectors. Military expenditure rose from R257 million in 1970–1971 to R2.4 billion in 1980–1981 to R4.8 billion in 1985–1986. At least half the annual defense budget was spent on manufacturing weapons and equipment or foreign purchase of sophisticated aircraft that could not be produced locally.³

In 1968, the South African government established the Armaments Development and Production Corporation (Armcor) to facilitate local manufacture of weapons, military equipment, and munitions that

were difficult to obtain externally because of the country's increasing international isolation. Through the 1970s and 1980s, South Africa produced foreign-designed weapons systems under licence, such as Belgian and Israeli small arms, French armored cars and missiles, and Italian trainer jets. French Mirage fighters were assembled in South Africa from imported parts. Armscor increased its efforts in the late 1970s given a compulsory UN arms embargo and conventional warfare in Angola. An Israeli kit was used to upgrade British-made Centurian tanks renamed Olifant, and a Belgian design influenced a new South African armored infantry fighting vehicle called Ratel. Collaboration with a U.S.-Canadian firm resulted in the production of the long-range 155-millimeter (mm) G-5 howitzer, and a copy of a Taiwanese multiple rocket launcher system was manufactured as the South African Valkiri. With its counterinsurgency operations of the 1970s and 1980s, South Africa became a leading designer and producer of mine-protected vehicles such as the Buffel and Casspir. In 1977, South Africa conducted a nuclear test in the south Atlantic and during the 1980s, the country produced six or seven small nuclear bombs. A deterrent to foreign invasion and a diplomatic bargaining chip, South African nuclear weapons were dismantled in the early 1990s with the negotiated end of apartheid. Responding to a perceived threat from Soviet-supplied chemical weapons in Angola and the need for riot control within South Africa, the government authorized the military, in 1981, to develop a chemical and biological weapons program known as Operation Coast. By 1990, this project had produced irritant gases for crowd control, poisons and biological agents for assassinations, and addictive drugs. There have been allegations that the SADF used chemical and biological weapons in South West Africa, Angola, and Mozambique and that these were tested on insurgent prisoners. As with nuclear weapons, South African chemical and biological agents were destroyed during the early 1990s.⁴

THE ANTIAPARTHEID ARMED STRUGGLE, 1964–94

From 1964, the South African antiapartheid African National Congress (ANC) and its armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) became exiled organizations. In 1963–1964, training shifted from Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco to the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries, where recruits learned urban guerrilla warfare. Between 1963 and 1965, there were 328 MK fighters trained in Odessa,

with others undergoing instruction near Moscow and in the Crimea.⁵ By 1965–1966, MK had around 500 trained fighters in four military camps in Tanzania—Kongwa, Mbeya, Morogoro, and Bagamoyo. Morale in these rural camps declined given poor living conditions, squabbling among leaders, and lack of operational activity. During the 1960s, MK had two main problems in continuing its armed struggle. First, many of its founding leaders were imprisoned in South Africa. Second, MK lacked a base from which to infiltrate South Africa because all adjacent territories were either allied to Pretoria (such as Southern Rhodesia and Portuguese Mozambique) or small and weak newly independent African states economically dependent upon the apartheid regime (Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho). Although Botswana was a favorite route for exiles leaving South Africa, the newly independent government was pressured by Pretoria to tighten its borders and attempts by MK, in 1966 and 1967, to infiltrate operatives back home were foiled by Botswana security forces. Proposals to infiltrate ANC personnel through South West Africa and Mozambique were rejected by liberation movements in those territories because of the difficult military situation.

The Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Britain in 1965 by Prime Minister Ian Smith's white minority regime in Rhodesia led to an alliance between the ANC and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), with its military wing the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). This seems to have begun in 1966 at the Kongwa camp in Tanzania, where both groups received Soviet military support, and was encouraged by the governments of Tanzania and Zambia. MK leaders were looking for a new avenue through which to infiltrate South Africa, and ZIPRA commanders believed that insurgency south of the Limpopo River would distract South African security forces from assisting Rhodesia. On the night of July 30–31, 1967, a combined MK-ZIPRA force crossed the Zambezi River, 15 kilometers below Victoria Falls, into Rhodesia. The MK members, called the Luthuli Detachment after the recently deceased ANC president, intended to travel south along the Botswana border and enter South Africa. The combined unit totalled 80 men, with John Dube of ZIPRA in command and Chris Hani of MK as political commissar. Upon reaching the Wankie Game Reserve on August 2, the unit split with 57 men, including Dube and Hani, heading south toward South Africa and another 23 men moving to Rhodesia's northeastern Matabeleland to prepare for more operatives arriving

from Zambia. On August 13, the smaller detachment was engaged by Rhodesian security forces at the Nyatuwe River and within a week, all were killed or captured. News of an MK presence in Rhodesia encouraged Pretoria to dispatch South African Police—50 personnel, 10 armored cars, 4 helicopters, and 2 spotter planes—to assist the Smith regime. Between August 20 and 23, the larger MK-ZIPRA detachment fought running battles with Rhodesian security forces, and—low on ammunition—they split into small groups and withdrew across the Botswana border, where they were arrested. Accounts of casualties in the Wankie campaign vary considerably, though it appears between 30 and 47 insurgents were killed, mostly MK members, and 20 to 30 were captured with 8 security force deaths.

In Zambia, ANC and ZAPU leaders tried to distract Rhodesian–South African forces from Wankie, called the western front, by opening up an “eastern front” in the Sipolilo area. Better equipped than the Luthuli Detachment, three MK-ZIPRA groups of around 100 men each crossed the Zambezi in December 1967, February 1968, and July 1968, respectively. These units remained in the bush south of Lake Kariba, where they prepared for guerrilla warfare by building camps and contacting local people. Between mid-March and July 1968, security forces detected these units, either by finding their tracks or locals informing on them, which were then scattered in a series of skirmishes. A few of those captured changed sides to become agents of Rhodesian or South African intelligence. It seems likely that 23 MK members and 8 security force personnel, including 1 South African, were killed in the Sipolilo campaign. Although all the MK-ZIPRA units were eliminated, Rhodesian and South African security forces were surprised by their discipline, training, and weapons. Criticism of ANC leaders for sending MK soldiers on a suicide mission at Wankie and ignoring the plight of prisoners in Rhodesia and South Africa led to the temporary suspension of Chris Hani and six other members from the movement in 1969, and widespread dissatisfaction within MK camps in Tanzania. In 1970, South Africa increased its security force presence along the 800-kilometer Zambezi River frontier. Although MK units had failed to infiltrate South Africa and establish a presence in Rhodesia, news of the fighting around Wankie and Sipolilo inspired imprisoned and underground activists within South Africa and encouraged some to join the ANC in exile.⁶

Because the main problem of the Wankie and Sipolilo operations involved lack of sympathy from rural people, the ANC, at the 1969

Morogoro Conference in Tanzania, decided to better integrate political and military actions, and to build popular support before embarking on revolutionary warfare. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, MK infiltrated individual agents such as Chris Hani into South Africa to re-create underground structures. In 1969, the Tanzanian government expelled all MK members for security reasons, and they spent the next year in the Soviet Union.⁷ The military culture of MK evolved in exile as a combination of Soviet practices concerning drill, weapons handling, training, and a political commissar system, and guerrilla army traditions of self-sufficiency, minimal rank structure, and mission oriented command. As with many armies, MK soldiers tended to look down on ANC civilians.

Following the Soweto Uprising of 1976, which reinvigorated the antiapartheid struggle, thousands of young black South Africans left the country and joined the exiled ANC. At MK camps in newly independent Angola, new instructional programs were developed, including basic training, communications, intelligence, engineering, and artillery. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, hundreds of MK operatives infiltrated South Africa to build covert networks and engage in select military missions called armed propaganda that targeted police stations, railway lines, and other state institutions to motivate mass action campaigns. An MK special operations unit was established to conduct high-profile missions and for security, it was placed under direct command of Oliver Tambo, president of the ANC. Examples of these operations include a June 1980 oil refinery bombing that caused R66 million damage, an August 1981 rocket attack on the Voortrekkerhoogte military base outside Pretoria, a 1982 bombing of the Koeberg nuclear plant outside Cape Town, and the May 1983 car bombings of South African Air Force (SAAF) and Military Intelligence headquarters in Pretoria. While some within the ANC criticized these actions as distracting from the main aim of fostering mass resistance, Tambo and others felt that it was important for MK to undertake specific military operations deep within South Africa. The special operations unit assumed an increasingly important role in shaping MK strategy, which alienated MK rank and file as well as MK commander Joe Modise.⁸

Between 1976 and 1991, the ANC ran military training camps in Angola where MK members, from 1979, were trained by Soviet specialists in conventional and guerrilla warfare, and received large shipments of Soviet weapons and ammunition. From 1983 to 1989, MK

units, eventually equipped with heavy weapons such as 122-mm rocket launchers and 81-mm mortars, fought against South African-sponsored National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents in what was called the northern front. This campaign had been initiated to defuse tensions caused by the slowness to infiltrate operatives into South Africa and to gain combat experience that might be useful later. Although ANC leaders justified these operations against UNITA in terms of that organization's support from South Africa and the United States, many MK members believed this was not their fight. Inspired by Army Commissar Chris Hani, who took part in the fighting, the MK soldiers deployed some 40 to 60 kilometers from their camp at Malanje in north-central Angola and conducted de-mining, ambushes, raids, and patrols, which compelled UNITA to withdraw beyond the Kwanza River. Although Hani opposed the continued pursuit of UNITA as no reconnaissance had been conducted across the Kwanza and they lacked appropriate maps, he was replaced by Lennox Lagu who led MK troops across the river and broke them up into small detachments supporting various Angolan army units. Many problems developed by December 1983. MK members fell into an ambush in which five were killed and the survivors accused their Angolan colleagues, who had run from the fight, of leading them into a trap. One hundred four MK soldiers were sent to reinforce Angolan troops around the village of Kagandala in Malanje Province where they conducted patrols, but discipline soon collapsed with dagga smoking, drunkenness, and abandoning of positions at night. After one of their comrades was killed by a UNITA landmine, MK fighters at the Musafa camp terrorized local civilians by randomly firing their weapons into the air. As a result, 60 MK soldiers were removed from the operational area and returned to Viana camp in Luanda followed by another 40 who deserted and refused to give up their weapons, citing fear of the ANC Security Branch. Disillusionment created by fighting a perceived foreign war in Angola rather than combating the apartheid regime back home in South Africa, poor living conditions, abuse and corruption by commanders, hatred of MK army head Modise, general boredom, and possible manipulation by apartheid agents led to a series of mutinies in MK's Angolan camps in January and May 1984 that were crushed by loyalist units. Many mutineers were imprisoned and some publically executed.⁹

In 1983, MK commanders and commissars held a conference in Luanda, Angola, where they decided to develop military structures

within South Africa to facilitate continuous military action rather than isolated operations. As a result, grenade squads began secret training in Botswana with the intention of infiltrating South Africa, where they would organize small cells (called suicide squads) to attack black municipal officials. Because this violated their definition of a legitimate state target, ANC political leaders disassociated from the attacks. At this time, Botswana became a transit point for MK arms smuggling into South Africa.¹⁰ With the declaration of a state of emergency in South Africa in the mid-1980s and mutinies in Angola, the ANC's 1985 Kabwe Conference in Zambia identified three critical issues: (1) operations had focused too much on urban areas, which had allowed the apartheid state to organize counterrevolutionary ethnic structures in rural homelands; (2) MK had to shift from armed propaganda to pursue a broader people's war; and (3) the conflict should be taken into white areas, including use of land mines in white farming areas and killing white farmers active in the security force. MK operations increased in the late 1980s, and the special operations unit conducted a May 1987 car bombing of the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court that killed four policemen and a 1989 mortar attack on the SAAF Satellite Radar Station at Klippan in western Transvaal. Frustrated by taking casualties from SADF cross-border raids into Lesotho, Mozambique, and Botswana, some MK operatives ignored ANC policy and specifically targeted white civilians such as the Christmas 1985 bombing of a Natal shopping center and the July 1988 explosions at Ellis Park in Johannesburg and a restaurant in Pretoria. In the late 1980s, MK created a military intelligence division that successfully infiltrated the SADF and provided analysis of its upcoming operations. Problems in coordinating increasing mass protest and specific military activities prompted the ANC to launch Operation Vula in 1986 to infiltrate senior MK leaders (for example, Sphiwe Nyanda, Mac Maharaj, and Ronnie Kasrils) into South Africa to better organize covert structures, infiltrate the SADF and homeland security forces, and smuggle more weapons into the country. This operation orchestrated a military coup in Transkei, which led to that ethnic homeland becoming a liberated zone from which ANC-MK could mount activities in the rest of South Africa.¹¹

After the failure of the Poqo uprising in the early 1960s, antiapartheid Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) members fled to Lesotho, where OAU funds were used to send some of them for military training in Congo, Ghana, and Algeria. In 1966, some attended the Nanking

Military Academy in China. At the 1967 PAC conference held in Moshi, Tanzania, which the OAU had insisted on as a condition for continued funding, acting president P. K. Leballo outlined the organization's new Maoist strategy, which would begin with a guerrilla war by impoverished and landless blacks in the South African countryside and eventually extend to the cities. It appears that veterans of Poqo, who valued immediate action over revolutionary theory, did not fully understand or support the new approach. In 1968, the PAC officially renamed its 200-strong armed wing the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) with a training camp at Senkobo in southern Zambia. Under OAU pressure to act militarily, the PAC allied with the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO), a rival of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), in 1968 and launched Operation Crusade, which aimed at moving a 12-man APLA unit through Mozambique and into South Africa to establish bases and organize a protracted people's war. This group was involved in a month of fighting with Portuguese security forces around Vila Peri, in Lorenzo Marques; was then blocked from crossing the border by the SADF conducting Operation Sibasa; and it seems likely that a few of its members were later executed by FRELIMO as counterrevolutionaries. After the failure of Crusade, the PAC's military committee directed APLA to seize the initiative by operating in all parts of South Africa, attacking when least expected, and developing a disciplined people's army. However, none of this actually happened. Zambian authorities, under pressure from South Africa, expelled the PAC, and APLA moved to Tanzania, where members were scattered among Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) camps until 1970, when they were given their own base at Chunya. In the early 1970s, Zambia allowed APLA to attempt infiltration of South Africa through Botswana but in 1973, Lusaka once again expelled the group because one of its members was arrested for assault.

During the 1970s and 1980s, conflicts among PAC factions, particularly in Tanzania, limited its ability to orchestrate a military campaign against South Africa. Older African nationalist veterans clashed with the newly arrived and younger followers of Black Consciousness who had left South Africa from 1976. The emergence of a Marxist-Leninist group seeking to concentrate on the black urban working class as the basis of revolution led to conflict with the peasant-focused Maoists. PAC dissidents in military camps in Tanzania were

subject to detention, beating, and execution. In 1977, Leballo instigated an uprising of new recruits at the Itumbi camp in southern Tanzania against the old guard APLA high command. In 1979, Tanzanian soldiers suppressed a rebellion at the PAC's Chunya camp, killing 11 and wounding another 40. During the mid-1970s, one hundred PAC members trained in Gaddafi's Libya, and others went to Amin's Uganda and Pol Pot's Cambodia. Another problem that APLA faced was lack of access to infiltration routes because the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) refused to let them use the strategic Caprivi Strip. In the late 1970s, APLA began smuggling weapons into South Africa. Attempts by the PAC in the early 1980s to reorganize and wage war within South Africa failed because of further internal quarrels. In 1985, Lesotho expelled 23 PAC members after a skirmish between APLA and Lesotho security forces.

The first attacks by APLA in South Africa happened from December 1986 to February 1987 when the Scorpion Gang in Alexandria, part of greater Johannesburg, wounded two soldiers and two policemen, and killed a shop owner during a robbery. Three APLA insurgents were killed in a car chase with police. By 1988, APLA had become established in the western Transvaal and within two years had a significant national presence. In the late 1980s, APLA attacked police stations and established a special "robbery unit" to acquire funds. During the 1980s, there was disagreement between PAC leaders who wanted to target apartheid police and soldiers regardless of race, and the APLA rank and file who were determined to go after white farmers to repossess African land and establish Maoist-style rural guerrilla bases. After the PAC was legalized in South Africa in February 1990, it refused to enter negotiations and continued armed struggle. During the early 1990s, Transkei-based APLA conducted numerous attacks on white civilians in the Cape, including at a golf club, hotels, and a Cape Town church.¹²

In the late 1970s, the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA) launched its own armed struggle with the creation of the Azanian National Liberation Army (AZANLA). Among the initial members were some who had already received military training from the ANC and PAC. Connections were made with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Iran, and Yugoslavia. In 1986 and 1987, AZANLA members trained in Libya and with the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). AZANLA had trouble acquiring weapons as the Libyan government was willing to provide them, but none of

the Southern African countries where the exiles were based would accept shipments for fear of South African retaliation. In 1988, AZANLA members in Botswana, preparing for an offensive against the apartheid state, were arrested and deported to other countries. By 1990, AZANLA had a few hundred trained fighters and had organized small cells across South Africa that gathered information and coordinated resistance.¹³

INDEPENDENCE WARS IN PORTUGUESE MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA, 1961–74

While most European powers were granting independence to their African colonies in the late 1950s and 1960s, the autocratic regime of Antonio Salazar in Lisbon maintained that its African territories of Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau were overseas provinces of Portugal. In reality, Portuguese colonial rule had been particularly oppressive and exploitive, and frustrated African nationalists in all three territories turned to armed struggle to achieve independence. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Portugal was supported directly and indirectly by the West.

In June 1960, Portuguese security forces massacred 500 demonstrators at Mueda in northern Mozambique. In 1962, three African nationalist groups from Mozambique, exiled in newly independent and sympathetic Tanganyika (later Tanzania), combined to form FRELIMO under American-educated Eduardo Mondlane. Given increasing Portuguese repression at home, FRELIMO launched a guerrilla war in 1964 using Tanzania as a staging area to infiltrate northern Mozambique. FRELIMO received Soviet and Chinese military assistance, its humanitarian programs were funded by Scandinavian countries, and it was also aided by the anticolonial OAU. In the late 1960s, FRELIMO expelled Portuguese forces from Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces, where they created “liberated zones” with an alternative state providing medical care and education, and established cooperative agriculture by usurping chiefs and landlords. From 1968, FRELIMO moved through friendly Zambia to infiltrate Tete province and outflank the Portuguese in central Mozambique. With about 8,000 fighters in the field, FRELIMO conducted guerrilla warfare in the forests of northern Mozambique, with small units harassing and ambushing Portuguese forces, demoralizing the enemy through use of land mines, and gaining logistical support and recruits from rural communities. In the late




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1960s, the massive Cabora Bassa dam project on the Zambezi River became a focus for insurgent operations, though it was not attacked directly because of potential economic importance after independence. Within the liberation movement, African nationalists with a racial agenda clashed with Marxists inspired by the Vietnam War who believed in a global anti-imperialist and anticapitalist struggle.

In 1969, Mondlane was killed by a parcel bomb sent to him in Tanzania by Portuguese security forces and after an internal struggle, he was succeeded by Marxist and pro-Soviet Samora Machel. For six months in 1970, 35,000 Portuguese troops under General Kaulza de Arriaga staged Operation Gordian Knot, which was a massive offensive that employed helicopter-borne troops and artillery barrages, copied from U.S. tactics in Vietnam, to try to block FRELIMO's infiltration routes from Tanzania and destroy its bases within Mozambique. The Portuguese also crossed into Tanzania in hot pursuit operations. Although FRELIMO suffered 650 fatalities and had 1,800 insurgents captured, heavy rains and politically problematic Portuguese casualties limited the operation's effectiveness. During the early 1970s, the Portuguese Africanized their security forces, built "strategic hamlets" to separate civilians from insurgents, and focused on small search and destroy operations. A FRELIMO offensive in Tete province, where they were allied with the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) infiltrating the northeast of white-ruled Rhodesia, led to Portuguese reprisals, including the 1972 massacre of several hundred civilians around Wiriyaumu. At the same time, FRELIMO began operations in southern Mozambique, where most of the movement's leaders originated. In turn, Portuguese morale declined. By 1974, FRELIMO controlled a third of the country and was using Soviet-supplied ground-to-air missiles to threaten hitherto complete Portuguese air superiority.¹⁴

In 1961, a series of rebellions broke out against oppressive Portuguese rule in Angola. In January, a dissident Christian group led by Antonio Mariano, angry over forced labor, destroyed European crops and property on the central plateau and was brutally crushed by the Portuguese army in what would be called the War of Maria. In February, a Portuguese cruise liner was hijacked at sea and although the hijackers planned to sail it to Luanda to challenge the regime there, they ultimately went to Brazil. Likely anticipating the cruiser's arrival, several hundred supporters of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) used rifles and machetes to attack a Luanda police headquarters and a prison hoping to free nationalist prisoners. They were defeated by police and European vigilantes, with 36 Africans and 8 police killed. A third and much more serious revolt erupted in the north, where the Bakongo had land grievances and objected to Portuguese involvement in appointing their traditional king. Based in neighboring Congo, the Union of Peoples of Angola



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(UPA) was led by Holden Roberto (who obtained arms from Joseph Mobutu, his brother-in-law who headed the new Congolese army) and infiltrated small groups of insurgents into Angola. On March 15, insurgent groups with a total strength of 4,000–5,000, attacked coffee plantations in the north, primarily in the San Salvador area along the border and in the Dembos Mountains, and moved south. In the

first day of the rebellion, 200 Portuguese and many more of their Ovimbundu and mixed race loyalists, including women and children, were killed with many tortured, blinded, skinned alive, buried alive, and crucified. Inspired by Belgian withdrawal from the Congo, UPC insurgents believed that they could force the Portuguese to quickly leave Angola. They captured the town of Bembe and besieged the district capital of Carmona. Caught unprepared, all of the 3,000 Portuguese troops in the colony were based in Luanda, almost all were Africans, and there were only two trained battalions. With a small number of military aircraft, the Portuguese pressed some civilian planes into service. While the rainy season delayed the movement of Portuguese soldiers to the north, the Portuguese Air Force offered limited support as Portuguese farmers and their African allies fortified their plantations and formed a militia that conducted cruel reprisals on captured insurgents, and burned and massacred whole villages suspected of involvement. Portuguese reinforcements, including parachute and special forces units, began to arrive in Angola by May and restored order in the north by recapturing more than 100 small administrative posts, defending plantations, and retaking Bembe. Although the army stopped settler atrocities, it employed dramatic measures such as aerial bombing with napalm and forcing the African civilian population into concentrated villages. The poorly armed and trained insurgents adopted guerrilla tactics against the Portuguese army such as ambushes, and use of mines and booby traps, and fled into the safety of Congo when pursued. Using artillery and air-dropped napalm, the Portuguese army took the three main insurgent strongholds after heavy fighting in August and September, which broke the back of the rebellion. A few surviving insurgents fled deep into the Dembos to continue the struggle, but their anticipated supplies from Congo did not arrive, and for the next two years, rebel activity remained ineffectual. During the campaign, some 2,000 Europeans and 50,000 Africans, mostly Bakongo, were killed, and thousands of refugees escaped to Congo. While the Portuguese embarked on some labor and administrative reforms, and provided social services to the resettlement camps, significant political changes were not forthcoming.

During the first half of the 1960s, the Angolan nationalist movement experienced divisions that facilitated Portuguese control. In 1962, Roberto's UPA joined with another group to form the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), which established a government in exile in Leopoldville (today's Kinshasa) with Mobutu's continued

support and recognition from the OAU. Under Agostino Neto, the MPLA continued to gain most of its support from mixed race people and Mbundu around Luanda, and was expelled from Congo. In 1966, Jonas Savimbi, who had split from the UPA two years before, established UNITA among the Ovimbundu of the south. Furthermore, in 1963, three groups advocating independence for oil-rich Cabinda merged to form the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC).

In 1963, the MPLA formed an armed wing known as the People's Army for the Liberation of Angola (EPLA) and adopted Maoist revolutionary theory that advocated preparing a rural base to support guerrilla operations. An EPLA attempt to infiltrate Cabinda from Congo-Brazzaville failed because the group's Mbundu and mixed race leaders were rejected by the local Bakongo, who favored FLEC. Consequently, the MPLA moved to Zambia and in 1966 began armed operations against the Portuguese in southern and eastern Angola, which led to some fighting between EPLA and FNLA in this area. With Cuban training based in Congo-Brazzaville and Eastern bloc weapons that included light mortars, small rocket launchers, and land mines, the 2,000 EPLA fighters staged short-term raids across eastern Moxico province into central Bie province. In June 1966, Cuban and MPLA personnel suppressed an attempted coup by elements of Brazzaville's army and a year later, Neto moved his headquarters to Zambia to focus on the eastern front in Angola and distanced his organization from Cuba. During the late 1960s, the Portuguese considered the EPLA their most serious military threat. However, by 1970, the MPLA/EPLA made the mistake of trying to expand operations across the whole country rather than liberating specific areas and began employing units of up to 250 men that were easy for Portuguese intelligence to locate, particularly considering they had to march six or more weeks from Zambia to target areas in Angola. In the north, the MPLA/EPLA was attacked by both the Portuguese army and Roberto's FNLA, sometimes in cooperation, and escape routes into Congo were blocked. Although the number of EPLA fighters increased to 5,000 at this time, only a small portion could be maintained within Angola. In late 1971, a large EPLA offensive that involved several thousand insurgents aimed at destroying Savimbi's UNITA and attacking the Portuguese completely failed because the latter inflicted heavy casualties on them. During the following year, a series of large Portuguese–South African offensives in Moxico drove EPLA fighters back to Zambia and Congo-Brazzaville. In 1973, following the

collapse of the MPLA's eastern front, local commander Daniel Chipenda split from the organization and founded the Eastern Revolt, which was briefly backed by the Soviet Union until Moscow saw that Neto's MPLA were likely to take power after the sudden Portuguese withdrawal of 1974. Chipenda and his followers then joined FNLA. In the early 1970s, the FNLA, armed by China and possibly with some secret financial support from the United States, had around 4,000 insurgents based in Zaire (Congo) who would undertake small raids across the border to harass Portuguese soldiers, kidnap loyalists, and attack plantations. They also maintained 200–300 fighters in the Dembos, where they tied down many Portuguese troops, and another 300 along the eastern border to counter MPLA. Roberto's authoritarian leadership and favoritism of the Bakongo led to a 1971 mutiny that was suppressed with the help of Zairean soldiers. Upon its formation, UNITA was based in Zambia, from where it launched attacks on Portuguese posts within Angola. However, in 1967, Zambia expelled UNITA after it attacked the Benguela railway along which that country exported its copper. Lacking foreign sanctuary, UNITA did not grow much beyond 500 fighters mostly in the eastern highlands where Savimbi tried to conduct a Maoist guerrilla campaign with some Chinese support. UNITA and FNLA did not fight each other because they had an agreement to combat MPLA.

By 1970, Portugal had 60,000 troops (one third of whom were local Africans) in Angola, which was divided into four operational zones with most military resources devoted to the north and Cabinda. Portuguese intelligence created special small units called *Flechas* ("arrows") consisting of captured and turned insurgents as well as minority Khoisan (Bushmen) who specialized in tracking and infiltrating insurgent forces. The Portuguese cooperated with South African forces in South West Africa, which sometimes entered Angola in pursuit of SWAPO insurgents and used its navy to patrol the coast. While the Portuguese saw counterinsurgency as a combination of intelligence and gaining local support through economic, social, and medical assistance, the military did not have the time or training to win "hearts and minds." Portugal's greatest military advantage in Angola was its unchallenged control of the air with, by the early 1970s, 3,000 air force personnel with 51 ground strike aircraft, over 50 reconnaissance planes, 16 transports, and more than 60 light helicopters. The air force supplied long-range ground patrols, destroyed insurgent crops, evacuated casualties, sprayed defoliant to reduce

bush cover, provided combat support, and transported soldiers. The Portuguese tarred many roads to make it impossible to plant land mines and built special vehicles to detect them. Copying French counterinsurgency from Algeria, where they had sent observers, the Portuguese divided Angola into grids, each occupied by a garrison, and conducted sudden sweeps using elite forces parachuted or flown into remote areas. Many fortified villages were created, particularly in the east and south-east, and by 1973, a million people had been often brutally forced into them, which created food shortages and undermined psychological operations. While Portuguese operations in Angola were more successful than in their other two African territories, the heavy financial and human cost contributed to the 1974 coup in Lisbon.¹⁵

SOUTH WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) AND ANGOLA'S CIVIL WAR, 1966–2002

Frustrated by state repression, African nationalists of SWAPO went into exile and formed an armed wing in the early 1960s to fight against South African occupation. Eventually named the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), this group was based in the west of newly independent Zambia, from where it infiltrated insurgents into northern South West Africa. Marking the start of Namibia's war of independence, in August 1966, South African paratroopers and police destroyed a PLAN camp, including underground shelters, at Omgulumbashe. In September 1966, PLAN attacked the border town of Oshikango and in March 1967 ambushed a police patrol in Western Caprivi. PLAN commander in chief Tobias Hainyeko in May 1967 was killed in a skirmish with police. In October 1968, two large PLAN groups moved across the border but by the end of the year, 178 had been killed or captured. Consequently, PLAN utilized smaller groups, targeted local headmen and chiefs, and began planting land mines. PLAN accelerated its activities in 1973, which led to the deployment of more South African military resources in northern South West Africa and in April 1974, the SADF took command from the police. While the SADF initially used medical services and development projects to win over black South West Africans, South African counterinsurgency became increasingly brutal as the war expanded.¹⁶

Years of warfare in its African territories led to a military coup in Portugal in 1974, which resulted in the independence of Angola and

Mozambique the following year. In Angola, a civil war developed between MPLA around Luanda, FNLA mostly in the north near the Zaire border and UNITA based in the south. With control of the capital and Cuban military assistance, it appeared that MPLA would seize the Angolan state. This concerned South Africa because Angola would then likely offer formal support to SWAPO/PLAN, and the United States worried about Angola's oil falling into Soviet hands. Direct South African military intervention began on August 9, 1975, when SADF infantry and armored cars moved from South West Africa and occupied the Angolan border towns of Calueque and Ruacana to secure an important hydroelectric plant. During August and September, SADF personnel, concealing their identity by wearing special green rather than the usual brown uniforms, supplied and trained FNLA and UNITA soldiers. At this time the MPLA, with armored vehicles from Cuba and the Soviet Union, was conducting a successful offensive and taking control of many parts of the country from the other two organizations. In late September, the South African government approved Operation Savannah, a military invasion of Angola in support of UNITA and FNLA. On October 5 at Balombo, a UNITA force supplemented by 19 South Africans operating three armored cars and several land rovers fitted with missile launchers attempted to halt an MPLA advance on the town of Nova Lisboa (Huambo) but were thrown back. As a result, the MPLA occupied the entire coast down to the Namibian border and most towns in southern Angola. Surprised by the effectiveness of MPLA forces, South Africa prime minister John Vorster increased the SADF presence in Angola by dispatching a contingent of no more than 2,500 men and 600 vehicles. On October 14, Task Force Zulu, a South African-led column of around 1,000 black FNLA and former Portuguese colonial soldiers, crossed into southwestern Angola, easily drove MPLA forces north, and captured Perreira de Eca within a few days. A purely South African column of infantry and armored cars supported by mortars followed Zulu, captured Rocardas on October 20, and joined with Zulu to continue the advance. On October 24, Zulu took Sa da Bandeira (Lubango) and on October 28 captured the port of Mocamedes (Namibe). At the town of Catengue, 70 kilometers south of Benguela, MPLA forces with 35–40 Cuban advisors tried unsuccessfully to stop Zulu's advance. Zulu took the major coastal centers of Benguela and Lobito on November 6 and 7, respectively. Its rapid advance can be explained in terms of superior firepower,

aerial supply, effective training and leadership, and the delay of the rainy season. In mid-October, South African transport planes had lifted 100 SADF soldiers and 22 armored cars to Silva Porto (Kuito), UNITA headquarters in central Angola. Known as Task Force Foxbat, this group received South African reinforcements and brought UNITA troops which the South Africans had trained under its command.

Further north, in late October and early November 1975, FNLA forces supported by troops from Zaire, CIA-sponsored Portuguese mercenaries, and several South African-supplied and -operated heavy artillery pieces were trying to break through MPLA lines at Quifangondo to take the nearby capital. In early November Cuban leader Fidel Castro, without consulting Moscow, ordered a 650-strong special forces battalion flown to Luanda followed by an artillery regiment transported by ship. On November 10, the day of Angola's independence, FNLA leader Roberto ignored warnings from his South African and Portuguese officers, and ordered a frontal attack along the road to Quifangondo that was surrounded on both sides by swamp. A preliminary air strike by South African Canberra bombers was ineffective because they flew too high to avoid identification. Funnelled down a narrow path, FNLA troops were slaughtered by recently arrived Cuban BM21 multiple rocket launchers and 120-mm heavy mortars. After the subsequent FNLA rout, 26 South African artillerymen were picked up along the coast by a South African frigate, and their two heavy guns were towed into Zaire.

To the south, Task Force Zulu overcame some MPLA delaying actions and on November 13 captured the town of Novo Redondo (Sumbe). Just after the victory over FNLA at Quifangondo, two Cuban special forces companies went south to deal with the South Africans and made their stand, along with about 400 MPLA soldiers, on the Queve River, where they demolished bridges on major roads to Luanda. By this time, Task Force Foxbat had moved north to capture Cela, where an airfield allowed South African reinforcements to be airlifted from South West Africa. On the morning of November 23, as Foxbat's SADF armored cars and UNITA infantry were pressing north toward Quibala, they were ambushed by Cuban and MPLA forces while trying to cross a bridge near the village of Ebo. Cuban rockets did most of the damage and although accounts vary, it appears that the Cubans and MPLA suffered no casualties, as many as 90 South African and UNITA troops were killed or wounded, and 7 or 8 SADF armored cars were lost. The South African advance was halted,

allowing time for more Cubans—there were 3,500–4,000 in Angola by late December compared to around 3,000 South Africans—and Soviet weapons to arrive and with the beginning of the rains, the South African armored cars were now restricted to roads. On December 12, South African forces advanced north from Cela and penetrated Cuban-MPLA defenses on the Nhia River at Bridge 14 but a few kilometers further they were stopped by a determined Cuban stand. On December 31, Cuban forces took the Morros de Medunda, two prominent hills between Quibala and Cela, and defeated a South African counterattack by calling artillery on their own position. Far to the east, Task Force X-Ray, consisting of UNITA troops and 370 South Africans, tried to control the Benguela railway up to the Zaire border but after capturing Luso on December 11, it proved impossible to press further east.

Manpower problems in Angola prompted South Africa, in mid-December 1975, to extend the duty of some national servicemen by one month and citizen force tours of the operational area from the usual three to twelve weeks. Reports of the South African invasion of Angola in the Western press, made more convincing by the public parading of four South African prisoners by MPLA, impelled the United States to withdraw support from the operation. The South Africans began to move south, leaving Cela on January 16, 1976, and after some skirmishing, Cuban forces entered Novo Redondo on January 25. By early February, 4,000–5,000 SADF personnel were holding a roughly 80-kilometer-deep strip of Angolan territory along the South West African border. Lacking South African support, UNITA collapsed and in mid-February, Cuban and MPLA troops took Huambo, Lobito, and Benguela. Extended Cuban-MPLA supply lines and the SADF use of land mines led to a political solution to the crisis. With assurances from the new Angolan MPLA government that it would respect the South West African border and protect the Calueque-Ruacana hydroelectric project, South Africa withdrew its forces in late March. Defeat in Angola greatly damaged the military prestige of the apartheid state and partly inspired the uprising by black students in Soweto in June 1976.¹⁷

As the new internationally recognized government of Angola, the MPLA allowed SWAPO/PLAN to establish training and operational bases in its southern region, which increased insurgent activity on the other side of the border. Building up military forces in South West Africa, the South African state was eager to restore its martial

reputation after the Operation Savannah disaster. Inhibiting PLAN infiltration, the South Africans created a one-kilometer-wide depopulated strip along the border that was mined and patrolled for tracks. The flat and vast bush-covered terrain of the area and the fact that indigenous people on both sides of the frontier were ethnic Ovambo facilitated penetration by small PLAN units. Trained in revolutionary warfare, PLAN operatives used persuasion and coercion to gain support and recruits from local people, occasionally launched raids against the white farming community further south, planted mines, and fled to the safety of Angola when discovered. Insurgents were more active during the summer as rains covered their tracks and mud restricted cross-country movement of security force vehicles. In 1977, the South African government reported that during the previous two years, 231 insurgents, 33 security force personnel, and 53 civilians had been killed in northern South West Africa and that 300 PLAN insurgents were operating in South West Africa at any time, with 2,000 more in Angola and another 1,400 in Zambia. The war intensified as engagements, mostly small skirmishes, between PLAN and security forces averaged about 100 a month. Across the border in southern Angola, South African intelligence estimated that there were 11,000 MPLA soldiers, now referred to as the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA), and 2,000 Cubans organized into three conventional infantry brigades with armor, artillery, and antiaircraft support. These forces combated the remaining UNITA presence in southern Angola, assisted SWAPO/PLAN and deterred South African invasion.

During the late 1970s, South Africa increased its military presence in northern South West Africa, including the construction of numerous command and logistical bases. In 1977 and 1978, there were around 6,000–7,000 South African military personnel in the region, which was divided into two military areas. With its headquarters at Rundu, 1 Military Area (1MA) consisted of Kavangoland and Western Caprivi. Though technically part of 1MA, SADF units in Eastern Caprivi operated as a separate command. Ovamboland and the Kaokoveld fell under the authority of 2 Military Area (2MA), which was commanded from the growing air base at Oshakati. Responsible for the most populous part of South West Africa, 2MA consisted of four infantry battalions along with engineer, armored car, and antiaircraft elements made up of national servicemen or reserve Citizen Force/commando members on three-month rotation in the

operational area. 2MA also had a paratrooper company serving as a quick reaction force deployed by helicopter and transport plane. The newly formed 32 Battalion, a large special unit of black Portuguese-speaking Angolans who could be disguised as UNITA members, and special forces dispatched small patrols across the border to harass SWAPO/PLAN but had limited impact.

In 1980, the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF) was formed to give the impression that the counterinsurgency effort was being passed to local authorities and that local people were playing a role in defending their communities. However, the SADF retained overall command, and many SADF members were seconded to the SWATF. The SWATF consisted of seven permanent force infantry battalions, most oriented around a specific African ethnic group such as the Bushmen or Ovambo, and 27 part-time, multiracial battalions. The SWATF eventually numbered around 22,000–25,000 personnel. Around the same time, the South West African Police (SWAPOL) took over a paramilitary police unit called Koevoet (Afrikaans for “crow-bar”), which developed from a nucleus of Ovambo special constables in the late 1970s and grew to more than 2,000 men, including former insurgents. With mine-protected cross-country vehicles called Casspirs, platoon-sized teams would track and eliminate PLAN insurgents and if necessary, pursue them across the Angolan border. Over a decade, Koevoet cultivated a ruthless reputation as it fought 1,615 engagements and killed or captured 3,225 alleged insurgents which was more than any other security force unit. 160 Koevoet members were killed and 950 wounded, which was the highest casualty rate of a South African unit since World War II. Among Koevoet’s founding white officers was Eugene de Kock, who had fought in Rhodesia during the 1970s and went on to command a police death squad in South Africa during the late 1980s and early 1990s, which later resulted in a 200-year prison term.¹⁸

By 1978, both SWAPO/PLAN and the South African state were competing to regain the initiative in South West Africa. Seeking to undermine a Western-sponsored scheme for independence, SWAPO began assassinating black political leaders working within the existing system and attempted to create liberated zones in the north. The South Africans realized that they had to do more than simply respond to the latest insurgent incident and take bold action to destroy SWAPO logistics and command. A disastrous special forces airborne raid on a SWAPO base at Eheke in late October 1977, where poor intelligence

and air navigation had caused the death of seven operators and the wounding of many others, made South African authorities more determined to seize the initiative and show the West that it was an effective anticommunist force engaged in a global struggle. At the start of May 1978, Prime Minister John Vorster authorized Operation Reindeer, which was a three-part SADF offensive against SWAPO/PLAN bases in Angola that would open with a large airborne raid on Cassinga some 250 kilometers inside that country and continue with an overland and helicopter attack on PLAN forward operating bases within about 25 kilometers of the border at Chetequera and Dombondola. From the SADF perspective, the mining town of Cassinga represented an important SWAPO/PLAN headquarters and training center, but SWAPO would later maintain that it was a camp for noncombatant refugees. Operation Reindeer began on the morning of May 4 with an aerial bombardment of Cassinga base followed by the dropping of four companies of mostly citizen force paratroopers, under Colonel Breytenbach, with supporting antitank and mortar platoons. According to SADF sources, the paratroopers encountered heavy resistance from entrenched PLAN defenders employing antiaircraft guns against ground targets. Reports from SAAF pilots of the approach of a Cuban mechanized battalion, including tanks, from Techamutete led to the extraction of the disorganized paratroopers by helicopter that afternoon. As the last contingent of paratroopers waited for pickup, Cuban armored vehicles entered Cassinga but were funnelled down a road where they were ambushed by the South African antitank platoon and then hit by SAAF warplanes. In South Africa's first conventional airborne operation, the SADF lost 3 killed, 1 missing, and 18 injured. Around 600 SWAPO camp residents were killed. The SADF claimed that most were insurgents, and blamed civilian deaths on SWAPO for using human shields. SWAPO maintained that most were innocent refugees, including many women and children. Cuban casualties remain unknown.¹⁹

On the same day, an SADF mechanized battle group called Juliet consisting of 2 South African Infantry Battalion equipped with the new Ratel infantry fighting vehicles and supported by armored cars, crossed the border and hooked around the entrenched SWAPO base at Chetequera, attacking it from the rear after a preliminary aerial bombardment. Despite some problems caused by tall maize fields obstructing vision, Juliet took the position, killing 248 insurgents and capturing 200 while suffering only 2 of its own killed and

10 wounded. At the same time, two smaller SADF combat groups with some artillery support crossed the border and attacked various SWAPO positions south of Chetequera, known as the Dombondola complex. On May 6, with the other Operation Reindeer units back in South West Africa, 32 Battalion conducted cross-border helicopter assaults on SWAPO camps around Omepepa-Namuidi-Henhombe, finding some abandoned and sometimes overcoming stiff resistance. The SADF considered Operation Reindeer a success as in total around 1,000 SWAPO/PLAN members had been killed and a great deal of equipment captured with the loss of only 6 South African personnel. SWAPO responded by moving its bases closer to protective FAPLA-Cuban units and constructing more elaborately camouflaged positions.²⁰

In 1977, South Africa had resumed support for UNITA, which quickly took over the southeastern corner of Angola and by 1980 had ventured into the central part of the country and captured the town of Mavinga, which became its main forward base. This distracted FAPLA and Cuban forces from the border with South West Africa and the Angolan government demanded that SWAPO contribute to the fight against UNITA. Savimbi's group was further bolstered by renewed U.S. support by the Reagan administration in the 1980s. In March 1979, the SADF launched raids on SWAPO bases in western Zambia, which resulted in the insurgents' expulsion from that country, and others at Muongo, Oncua, Henhombe, and Heque in Angola. Launched in June 1980, South Africa's Operation Sceptic (also known as Smoke Shell) was a sudden mechanized assault by three battle groups on a SWAPO command and logistics complex around Chifufua in southern Angola, and represented the first incident of direct combat between the SADF and FAPLA, as well as the first time SWAPO mechanized units were employed. After a number of hard-fought encounters, the base was destroyed, the SADF captured a large number of Soviet-made vehicles, and 380 PLAN and FAPLA soldiers along with 17 South Africans were killed. SWAPO reacted by withdrawing its forward bases from the border and integrating its logistical system with FAPLA. Responding to increased skirmishes between infiltrating PLAN units and security forces, the SADF embarked on Operation Carnation in June and July 1981 in which 32 Battalion and 44 Parachute Brigade, along with elements of other units, destroyed enemy logistical centers between the border and Cuvelai.

In late August 1981, the SADF launched Operation Protea, which aimed at gaining control of south-central Angola and eliminating FAPLA's logistical support of SWAPO. Involving four battle groups totalling 4,000 personnel, this was the largest South African mechanized action since World War II and with 138 aircraft in support, it was also one of the biggest air operations of the border conflict. The specific objectives of Protea were the SWAPO regional headquarters at Xangongo and logistical base at Ongiva, both some 50 kilometers inside Angola. A three-pronged South African mechanized force surrounded Xangongo to prevent counterattack by nearby FAPLA and Cuban units. Feigning a frontal attack, the SADF assaulted the rear and flanks of the well-prepared and concealed SWAPO and FAPLA defensive position made up of trenches, bunkers, and some dug-in tanks. With the collapse of resistance at Xangongo, the South Africans advanced on Ongiva, where they assaulted an entrenched SWAPO/FAPLA force and after two days of fighting took the town. The capture of a Soviet advisor was offered as proof to the West of the communist onslaught facing South Africa. The SADF claimed to have killed around 1,000 SWAPO and FAPLA members, and captured or destroyed almost US\$250 million worth of Soviet-supplied military equipment. On November 1, 1981, the SADF decided to exploit the success of Protea with a mechanized attack some 240 kilometers over the border on a SWAPO headquarters at Chitequeta in southeastern Angola. Called Operation Daisy, this raid represented the deepest SADF penetration of Angola and although around 1200 SWAPO personnel escaped, 71 were killed, and the organization's command and control were seriously disrupted.²¹

South African cross-border raids continued throughout 1982. Early that year, 75 soldiers from 32 Battalion conducted a helicopter assault on a SWAPO staging area near the small town of Iona 22 kilometers from the border in southwest Angola. The insurgents were surprised, and 201 were killed, compared to only 3 members of 32 Battalion. During July and August, the SADF orchestrated a series of air attacks on SWAPO command centers, killing 345 insurgents and destroying the organization's east front headquarters at Mupa. In early 1983, PLAN stepped up its infiltration efforts by sending 1,700 men, divided into small groups, across the border. In the subsequent fighting, 309 insurgents and 27 security force members were killed. By this time, SWAPO had reoccupied its bases around Xangongo and Ongiva under the protection of a nearby FAPLA brigade at Cuvelai. In early

December 1983, the SADF mounted Operation Askari, which involved four mechanized battle groups of around 500 men each advancing against SWAPO positions as far north as Cuvelai and an attack by 32 Battalion on Cassinga. On January 3, 1984, SADF units attacking a SWAPO position near Cuvelai clashed with FAPLA's 11 Brigade and two Cuban battalions, which suffered 324 deaths and were driven off. Twenty-one South Africans were killed.

The success of Operation Askari led to the Lusaka Agreement of February 1984, which stipulated that South African forces withdraw from southern Angola and the Angolan government ensure that SWAPO and Cuban units did not occupy that area. By April 1985, the South Africans had moved south of the border but SWAPO, not bound by the agreement, quickly returned to the frontier zone. In late June 1985, South African units crossed into southern Angola following the tracks of SWAPO insurgents to their camps, which were then destroyed. In 1985, there were 656 reported insurgent incidents in South West Africa and in 1986, there were 476, with 644 PLAN operatives killed by security forces. In January 1987, SWAPO insurgents became active in the white farming areas for the first time in four years.²²

After the failure of a 1984 FAPLA offensive against UNITA, Soviet commanders/advisors in Angola began planning a new and much larger operation for 1985 that involved a two-pronged attack on Cazombo and Mavinga. The Soviets intended to drive UNITA out of the central-eastern Moxico Province, confining them to the southeast, where Mavinga would be taken before a final assault on Jamba. The Soviets overruled concerns from Angolan FAPLA commanders about splitting their forces and Cuban worries about possible South African intervention. Assembling the largest FAPLA force to date, the Soviets organized at least 20,000 men into 20 brigades supported by T-62 tanks, MiG-23 and Su-22 fighter-bombers, and Mi-24 helicopter gunships. Soviet advisors were deployed at battalion level and despite denials from Havana, it seems likely that Cuban soldiers were involved in artillery, air defense, and air support. Dubbed Operation Congresso II, the offensive was launched from Luena and Cuito Cuanavale in late July 1985. Lacking artillery and armor, and fighting on two fronts, 30,000 lightly armed UNITA troops delayed but could not halt the FAPLA advance that, in early September, was closing in on both Cazombo and Mavinga. The SADF opened Operation Mag-neto, which provided UNITA with artillery and medical personnel,

as well as airlifts of UNITA troops from Mavinga to Cazombo. On September 19, Savimbi withdrew his forces from Cazombo to concentrate on the defense of Mavinga. Responding to desperate pleas from UNITA, the SADF launched Operation Wallpaper in late September. For South Africa, the destruction of UNITA in southern Angola would mean an increase in SWAPO activity in South West Africa. SAAF transport planes brought thousands of UNITA men back to Mavinga, and South African multiple rocket launchers as well as Mirage and Impala fighter-bombers inflicted terrible casualties on FAPLA units that had crossed the Lomba River and were just 32 kilometers from Mavinga. Ten Soviet officers sent to salvage the offensive were killed when their transport aircraft was downed by a South African Mirage. In early October, the Soviets withdrew FAPLA formations to Cuito Cuanavale. FAPLA had suffered almost 2,500 casualties and lost more than a dozen aircraft, 32 armored vehicles, and over 100 trucks. Fifty-six Cubans were killed and another 60 wounded, and UNITA lost 500 killed and 1,500 injured.

Determined to renew offensive operations in 1986, the Soviets sent over 1,000 advisors and more than US\$1 billion worth of military equipment, including anti-aircraft missiles and aircraft, to Angola. By May 1986, more than 20,000 FAPLA; 7,000 SWAPO; and 900 MK fighters had been assembled around Luena and Cuito Cuanavale for another drive against UNITA. The operation began in late May with two armored columns advancing from Luena and a third waiting at Cuito Cuanavale for fuel. UNITA, which had just received U.S. Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and the SADF disrupted the offensive by breaking down its logistical support. On the night of June 5–6, South African special forces divers raided the port of Namibe, destroying two full fuel storage tanks and damaging another, and sinking a Cuban freighter and damaging two Soviet ones. The loss of this fuel together with UNITA ambushes on FAPLA supply columns delayed the advance from Cuito Cuanavale until late June, when FAPLA units in Moxico Province were becoming bogged down because of UNITA resistance. A surprise raid on Cuito Cuanavale on August 9 by 4,000 UNITA fighters, supported by 200 SADF members operating artillery, damaged ammunition dumps, and anti-aircraft and radar infrastructure which forced the airfield to close temporarily. Simultaneously, a South African special forces team partly destroyed the only bridge across the Cuito River just after some FAPLA units had crossed it, which meant that they were now cut off from their base. By late

August, the Soviets had cancelled the offensive, withdrawn all FAPLA columns (including those in Moxico), and planted mines south and east of Cuito Cuanavale to discourage counterattack.

Planned for 1987, Operation Saluting October represented the last Soviet-led initiative against UNITA based in Mavinga and Jamba. Another US\$1.5 billion worth of Soviet military equipment was brought into Angola, including 150 T-55 and T-62 tanks, helicopter gunships, and heavy artillery. Desperately needing a military victory to bolster deteriorating support for the war at home, Castro authorized the front-line employment of Cuban soldiers—mostly tank crews, pilots, and artillerymen—in the new offensive and sent massive arms shipments to Luanda. Soviet officers made no contingency plans for a South African intervention despite warnings from senior MK commander Ronnie Kasrils, who was getting information from agents within the SADF. In May 1987, UNITA, responding to SADF warnings of a FAPLA build-up, organized attacks on FAPLA supply lines around Cuito Cuanavale. With an upcoming election and a state of emergency at home, the South African government was initially hesitant to get involved and dispatched just two small liaison teams to assist UNITA. However, by mid-June, Pretoria realized Savimbi needed more support and authorized the use of SADF antitank and artillery units as well as air transport for UNITA soldiers. Of the eight FAPLA brigades assembled at Cuito Cuanavale by early July, four protected supply routes and four (16, 21, 47 and 59) began an advance on Mavinga. However, when these FAPLA units were delayed by UNITA resistance just 32 kilometers east of Cuito Cuanavale, the Soviet commanders ordered them to temporarily halt to await reinforcements and supplies.

Because it became obvious to Pretoria that Savimbi's men could not hold, on August 4, 1987, the SADF launched Operation Modular in which the 700 men of 20 Brigade, consisting of five motorized infantry companies from 32 Battalion with supporting artillery and antiaircraft elements, were sent to assist UNITA. In late August, this was supplemented by the arrival of 61 Mechanized Battalion Group (61 Mech), which included two motorized infantry companies from 101 Battalion supported by a battery of G-5 howitzers and another of heavy mortars. Never exceeding a total of 3,000 men, these SADF units were expected to confront a much larger enemy while remaining covert and were not given clear instructions on when to withdraw or whether to capture Cuito Cuanavale. From mid-August, the advance of FAPLA's 47 and

59 brigades toward the Lomba River, the last obstacle en route to Mavinga, was slowed by South African artillery fire and late in the month an SADF special forces team damaged the Cuito River Bridge to delay the arrival of enemy reinforcements and supplies. By the end of August, FAPLA's 47 and 59 brigades had moved southeast and west just three kilometers north of the Lomba River. FAPLA's 21 Brigade moved east toward the Lomba, and 16 Brigade swept further east to approach Mavinga from the north. FAPLA's 47 Brigade then hooked west around the source of the Lomba to secure a bridgehead on the river's south bank, and 59 Brigade moved east along the north bank of the river attempting to link up with 21 Brigade so that they could cross the river together. This separation of FAPLA forces, aggravated by many rivers and marshes, allowed the South Africans to isolate and destroy each brigade.

The Battle of the Lomba River began on September 2, 1987, as SADF heavy artillery and rockets bombarded FAPLA's 21 and 59 brigades moving along the north bank. On September 9, Combat Group Bravo of the SADF's 20 Brigade, consisting of one mechanized infantry company and four antitank Ratel armored vehicles, engaged FAPLA's 21 Brigade as it was attempting to cross the Lomba River on a mobile bridge. After an exchange of artillery by both sides, two troops of South African armored cars arrived, and FAPLA abandoned the crossing, leaving behind more than 100 dead and 6 destroyed tanks. Bravo then moved west and on September 13 engaged FAPLA's 47 Brigade on the south bank of the Lomba River. Several hundred FAPLA infantry were surprised in a dry riverbed and shot down. Nevertheless, when the wheeled South African Ratels became stuck in enemy trenches, a counterattack by FAPLA tanks caused the SADF to pull back at dusk. Bravo lost eight men killed, four wounded, and three Ratels destroyed. With four hundred men dead along with five tanks and all its bridging equipment ruined, FAPLA's 47 Brigade relented on the plan to join 59 Brigade for a river crossing. An SAAF air strike against 47 Brigade on September 16 was followed by a ground attack by SADF Combat Group Alpha, another part of 20 Brigade, in which armored vehicles became stuck and the force had to withdraw under enemy mortar and machine gun fire.

On September 17, another attempt by FAPLA's 21 Brigade to cross the Lomba was disrupted by South African artillery, which inflicted serious casualties. In late September, South African president P. W. Botha ordered the SADF to destroy all FAPLA units east of the Cuito

River before the beginning of the rainy season. On October 3, part of the SADF's 20 Brigade, a squadron of antitank Ratels and three mechanized infantry companies supported by artillery and rockets, attacked FAPLA's 47 Brigade, which was still on the south bank of the Lomba River attempting to build an improvised bridge. Despite stiff resistance from FAPLA tanks, the South Africans staged several assaults that broke FAPLA morale and led to a slaughter as men and vehicles attempted to flee. In this one-sided battle, a single South African was killed and 5 wounded while more than 600 FAPLA soldiers were killed, and 127 FAPLA vehicles (including tanks) were destroyed or captured. The SADF seized a Soviet SAM-8 surface-to-air missile system, the only one ever taken intact by pro-Western forces, and shipped it to South Africa over protests from UNITA leaders who had promised it to their American sponsors. On October 5, FAPLA, having suffered more than 4,000 casualties in the failed Operation Saluting October, began withdrawing the remnants of its units to Cuito Cuanavale. The next day, the SADF reinforced 20 Brigade with the 4th South African Infantry Battalion Group (4 SAI), which included antiarmor Ratels along with the first Olifant tanks and G-6 self-propelled artillery sent into Angola. South African forces pursued fleeing FAPLA units, keeping pressure with air strikes and artillery.²³

The siege of Cuito Cuanavale began on October 14 when South African artillery shelled a FAPLA forward command post, killing 25 soldiers and beginning seven months of bombardment that would close the town's airstrip to jets and heavy transport. The humiliating FAPLA defeat at the Lomba River prompted the Soviets to reduce their military role and encourage a negotiated settlement. During early November 1987, around Cuito Cuanavale, the South Africans killed 500 FAPLA soldiers and destroyed or captured 33 tanks and 110 logistical vehicles. This impelled a desperate Angolan government to request direct Cuban intervention. In mid-November, Castro took control of Angolan operations and ordered 3,000 Cuban troops—including an armored brigade, self-propelled artillery, and anti-aircraft units—to defend Cuito Cuanavale, and Cuba's top fighter pilots were sent to Angola. Simultaneously, Cuban forces moved into southwestern Angola to threaten the border with South West Africa and by January 1988, some 3,500 members of Castro's elite 50th Division were in Cunene Province. Castro pursued a double strategy of putting military pressure on the South Africans to gain concessions from them in international negotiations. In late November, FAPLA's

21 Brigade, which crossed the Chambinga River Bridge, fought a delaying action against advancing South African forces, buying time for the Cubans to prepare the defenses of Cuito Cuanavale. Several factors proved incompatible with the SADF mission of destroying FAPLA east of the Cuito River. Condemnation of the South African military presence in Angola by the UN Security Council made Pretoria hesitant to send reinforcements, and white South African disapproval of the war led to political pressure on SADF commanders to avoid casualties.

By December 1987, Cuito Cuanavale was protected by a three-tier defense with 4,000 men; 45 tanks; 65 armored cars; and 10 multiple rocket launchers. Representing the first tier was FAPLA's 25 Brigade guarding the Chambinga River Bridge with 59 Brigade on its left flank and 21 Brigade three kilometers north at the Cuatir River. The second tier focused on the Tumpo Triangle, the area between the Cuito, Tumpo, and Dala Rivers, with 66 Brigade securing the Cuito River Bridge and 16 Brigade nearby. Based at Cuito Cuanavale itself, the third tier consisted of FAPLA's 13 Brigade, 40 Cuban special forces advisors, and most of the Cuban antiaircraft and artillery elements. Each FAPLA brigade constructed trenches, bunkers, and minefields, and were assisted by Cuban detachments. On January 13, 1988, South African artillery pounded FAPLA's 21 Brigade in preparation for an attack by 4 SAI, with 61 Mech and UNITA in support that saw intense tank versus tank combat. Despite Cuban air strikes, South African tanks penetrated FAPLA minefields and destroyed bunkers. By the next day, a mauled FAPLA 21 Brigade withdrew southwest. FAPLA had suffered over 250 killed and 9 tanks destroyed or captured, while the South Africans had 1 casualty and 2 damaged Ratels. The SADF units retired to prepare for further attacks, but an outbreak of hepatitis delayed this for a month, which gave Cuban officers time to reorganize. The Cuban Tactical Group, consisting of one battalion each of tanks, mechanized infantry, and artillery, was immediately sent to Cuito Cuanavale. FAPLA units were moved closer to the Cuito River to reduce the perimeter. Most Cuban artillery was positioned on high ground west of the river, which offered an excellent view of the battlefield beyond the range of South African guns. During late January and early February, UNITA attacks against FAPLA proved ineffective, and FAPLA's 21 Brigade reoccupied its former position. On February 14, UNITA launched another assault on 21 Brigade while South Africa's 4 SAI and 61 Mech advanced between the positions of FAPLA's 21

and 59 brigades, attacking both. Combining firepower and mobility, a mixed force of Olifants and antitank Ratels overran 59 Brigade's defenses and defeated an armored counterattack. Preventing the South Africans from seizing the Cuito Bridge, seven Cuban manned tanks launched another counterattack in which all but one was destroyed. The first tier of Cuito Cuanavale's defenses collapsed as FAPLA units withdrew to the Tumpo Triangle, having suffered over 500 Angolans and 32 Cubans killed, and 17 tanks and 18 other vehicles destroyed. While UNITA casualties were heavy, only 4 South Africans were killed and 7 wounded.

In late February 1988, Castro initiated a new defensive plan in which all units would be withdrawn west of the Cuito River except FAPLA's 25 Brigade and the Cuban tank battalion that would guard the bridge and the Tumpo Triangle. Cuban engineers laid minefields along every approach to Cuito Cuanavale to slow down the anticipated South African advance and reveal their position to Cuban artillery on the western highlands. On February 19, an attack by 4 SAI on a battalion of FAPLA's 59 Brigade north of the Dala River was aborted when the South African Ratels and Olifants were hit by more than 30 Cuban air strikes and struck antitank mines. Just as FAPLA's 59 Brigade was beginning its extraction west of the Cuito River on February 25, it was attacked by the tanks and mounted infantry of 61 Mech, which linked up with 32 Battalion and UNITA. However, the South African advance faltered due to minefields as well as intense artillery and air strikes. At sunset, the South Africans withdrew east of the Tumpo River, allowing FAPLA's 59 Brigade to complete its departure and 25 Brigade to dig in just east of the Cuito Bridge. Although 172 FAPLA and 10 Cuban soldiers had been killed and 7 tanks destroyed, the defeat of the South African assault greatly boosted the morale of the Cuito Cuanavale garrison. The South Africans had lost 2 men killed, several dozen wounded, and 4 Olifants and 1 Ratel seriously damaged. Only 17 out of 28 South African tanks were operational, but another attack was mounted because the national service period of many of the SADF's 20 Brigade members was about to expire. On the night of February 29 to March 1, an attack on FAPLA's 25 Brigade by South Africa's 61 Mech, supported by 32 Battalion and UNITA, was abandoned because of minefields, Cuban artillery, and mechanical problems with the remaining tanks. Within a few days, the SADF's 20 Brigade began to demobilize and was replaced by 82 Brigade, which took two weeks to arrive because of flooding in South Africa.

Moving into southeast Angola in March 1988, the SADF's 82 Brigade consisted of two mechanized infantry battalions, two squadrons of Olifant tanks and one of antitank Ratels, a battery of G-5 howitzers and mortar, rocket, and anti-aircraft elements. During the lull in the fighting, FAPLA and the Cubans had improved the defenses of Cuito Cuanavale with more minefields designed to funnel attackers into gaps covered by artillery. Preparing for an offensive called Operation Packer, South African air strikes repeatedly hit FAPLA's 25 Brigade over two days, and UNITA staged diversionary attacks. Launched on March 23, the assault by 82 Brigade stalled because of minefields, artillery, and air strikes, and by the end of the day, the SADF had withdrawn, abandoning three Olifants. To the north, UNITA attacks on FAPLA's 36 Brigade were also repelled. With this last failure, the South African government realized it could not expel FAPLA west of the Cuito River without suffering politically unacceptable casualties. South Africa's 82 Brigade was quickly demobilized, and Combat Group 20—consisting of 1,500 men—organized to protect SADF engineers as they laid minefields between the Dala and Tumpo Rivers to thwart a possible FAPLA counteroffensive against UNITA.²⁴

By mid-March 1988, with Cuito Cuanavale secure, Castro sent the Cuban 40 Tank Brigade into southwestern Cunene Province to reinforce FAPLA and SWAPO positions at Cahama, Xangongo, Mupa, and Cuvelai. In late March, the Cubans upgraded several airstrips to extend their air power into South West Africa, and 150 SAM-8 missile batteries finally ended South African air superiority in southern Angola. The first major engagement between South Africans and Cubans in Angola's southwest happened on April 18 when a SWATF unit pursuing SWAPO insurgents was ambushed by 200 Cubans near Chipeque, 30 kilometers south of Xangongo. Two South Africans were killed and 11 wounded. On May 4, a combined FAPLA-Cuban company ambushed a mechanized force from 101 Battalion on its way to Donguena. Fifty-four Cubans were killed, while the South Africans lost 7 men and 4 vehicles. By the end of May, there were 2 full Cuban divisions—some 12,000 men and 200 tanks—in southwestern Angola, 3 new 500-man mixed SWAPO-Cuban battalions had been formed, and the SWAPO training camp at Tchipa was reinforced so that it was defended by over 2,000 men with 30 tanks. Three companies from South Africa's 32 Battalion were deployed to screen Tchipa and soon clashed with SWAPO and Cubans. The South Africans responded by creating a new task force, code named Zulu, comprising a battle group

from 32 Battalion, 3 companies from 101 Battalion, 61 Mech, and batteries of artillery, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers. On June 22, Cuban forces attempted to push south from Tchipa but ran into a company of 32 Battalion, and both sides retired. At the end of June, the SADF opened Operation Excite, which involved a massive artillery barrage of Tchipa meant to draw the Cubans into a South African ambush. Refusing to take the bait, the Cubans organized an offensive by 3 armored detachments, each consisting of 600 men and dozens of tanks that drove south toward Calueque, which was simultaneously hit by Cuban air strikes. On June 27, the advance of Cuban ground forces was stopped by South African Ratels and Olifants from Task Force Zulu. Around 300 FAPLA troops and probably 10 Cubans were killed in addition to 2 tanks, 2 armored personnel carriers, and 8 trucks destroyed. The South Africans lost 2 Ratels, and 1 man was killed. However, news of a large Cuban tank unit coming from Tchipa encouraged Task Force Zulu to move south across the border while harassed by Cuban air strikes. That same day, Cuban MiGs bombed Calueque, 11 kilometers north of the border, damaging the hydroelectric facility and killing 11 South African soldiers. This illustrated Cuban air superiority over the Angola–South West Africa border, prompting the South Africans to destroy a major bridge over the Cunene River, the boundary between the two countries, to forestall a FAPLA-Cuban ground offensive.

The casualties suffered on June 27, 1988 were politically disastrous for the South African government, which ordered the SADF to withdraw from confrontation with FAPLA and the Cubans. In mid-July, South Africa's 10 Division was deployed along the border to defend against possible invasion from Angola. While the Cubans increased their total force in Angola to 65,000 and planned an invasion of South West Africa, they were also concerned about the political consequences of casualties and avoided conflict with the South Africans. These factors ultimately led to the success of U.S.-facilitated negotiations between Cuba, South Africa, and Angola. In a staged plan, South African forces withdrew from southern Angola and all of South West Africa in 1989, the Cubans pulled out of southern Angola around the same time and left the country in 1991, and Namibia became independent in 1990. The last SADF combat operation in South West Africa occurred in April 1989 when 1,500–1,800 PLAN fighters crossed from Angola to establish a military presence before the upcoming November elections. With SWAPO in violation of the cease-fire and a UN

peacekeeping force about to arrive, the United Nations authorized the departing SADF and the South West African Police, including Koevoet, to eliminate the insurgents. In the subsequent fighting, SWAPO lost 250 troops (and by May, they had returned to Angola), and 26 South Africans were killed and 145 wounded. In October 1989, South Africa bowed to UN pressure to disband Koevoet because of accusations that its armored columns were intimidating voters and according to the settlement, police were supposed to be lightly armed. Between April 1989 and March 1990, the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), with 4,500 military personnel (including an operational brigade with battalions from Kenya, Finland, and Malaysia), supervised disarmament and elections. SWAPO won the election and became the first government of independent Namibia. Many black Namibians and Angolans who had served in South African security forces were resettled in squalid conditions in South Africa. Despite postapartheid South Africa's strict antimercenary legislation, many white and black veterans of the Border War began working as private security contractors in other countries, including Sierra Leone, Angola, Iraq, and Afghanistan.²⁵

Assisted by the Kenyan battalion that stayed on for three months after UNTAG's departure and a 57-man British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT), a new 10,000-strong Namibian Defence Force (NDF) with five motorized infantry battalions, a presidential guard battalion, a combat support battalion, an artillery group, and support elements was created. Two thirds of the NDF consisted of former PLAN personnel and one third former SWATF. With the fast departure of white SADF and SWATF officers, ex-PLAN head Lieutenant General Jerobeam Dimo Hamaabo became NDF chief of staff, and most other top positions were filled by former insurgents. In 1999, the NDF crushed a separatist insurgency by the small Caprivi Liberation Army and from 1999 to 2002, it pursued UNITA into Angola. In 1998, the NDF—to protect the country's fishing industry—created the nucleus of a maritime force with personnel trained in Brazil and a converted Fisheries Ministry vessel, and in 2004, it received its first warship which was donated by Brazil (with which Namibia shares the same Atlantic waters). While a tiny NDF air wing was created in the early 1990s, Namibia's experience of fighting in the Second DRC War (1998–2002) prompted it to found the Namibian Air Force in 2005 at Grootfontein Air Base with a dozen Chinese-made Chengdu fighters-ground attack jets purchased over the next few years.²⁶

In late December 1989, with South Africa no longer threatening its southern border, the Angolan government launched an offensive against the UNITA-held town of Mavinga in the southeast, which involved 20,000 personnel; 400 armored vehicles; MiG-23 and MiG-25 jets; and Mi-35 attack helicopters. By late March 1990, after heavy fighting, the situation around Mavinga stalemated. In May and June, a UNITA counteroffensive drove government forces from Mavinga; in February 1991, the insurgents took the northern oil port of Ambriz; and in April, they attacked Luena in the country's center. Given the winding down of the Cold War, the United States and the soon to collapse Soviet Union pressured their Angolan clients, UNITA and MPLA respectively, to negotiate. After MPLA abandoned socialism and agreed to accept a multiparty political system in late 1990, the government and UNITA engaged in a long series of talks that resulted in the Bicesse Accords at the end of May 1991. The agreement stipulated that a UN verification mission would oversee a cease-fire, release of prisoners, the transition to multiparty democracy, elections within a year and the demobilization of the country's 150,000 fighters and the incorporation of 50,000 into a new Angolan Armed Forces (FAA).

In late September 1992, Savimbi rejected the first round of presidential elections, in which he had finished second, and heavy fighting erupted in Luanda and other cities between MPLA and UNITA. In late November and early December, UNITA resumed hostilities in the north and captured Uige and the important Negage air base. By mid-January 1993, fighting had spread to 15 of Angola's 18 provinces, and UNITA launched a major national offensive in which, over the next few months, it captured many key towns across the country and threatened the oil-rich Cabinda enclave where FLEC was still fighting. For example, in early January, UNITA began a 55-day siege and bombardment of Huambo, the country's second largest city, which was abandoned by government forces in March. The UN Security Council blamed UNITA for the war's resumption and imposed an arms embargo on it. Although the Clinton administration ended long-standing U.S. support for UNITA, Savimbi turned to his old friend Mobutu in Zaire, who provided supplies and a conduit for a diamonds for weapons smuggling operation. During 1994, the government FAA embarked on a series of offensives that reduced the amount of Angola controlled by UNITA from 70 to 40 percent, and in November recaptured Huambo. Consequently, in mid-November, UNITA was pressured into signing another peace agreement with the

MPLA in Lusaka, Zambia, in which the parties pledged to stop fighting, form a coalition government, grant amnesty to all combatants, halt arms acquisition, send foreign mercenaries home, and integrate the insurgents into state forces. To oversee the process, a commission was created with officials from the Angolan government, UNITA, United Nations, Portugal, the United States, and Russia.

In violation of the Lusaka Agreement, UNITA continued exchanging diamonds for weapons from Bulgaria, China, Zaire, South Africa, and former Soviet republics such as Belarus. The Angolan government also bent the rules by hiring South African-based Executive Outcomes to supply 400–500 mercenaries, mostly ex-SADF personnel who had fought against SWAPO and FAPLA in the 1980s, but pressure from the United States forced Luanda to terminate the contract in January 1996. The cease-fire was not well respected by either side, with UNITA shooting down a UN helicopter in March 1995 and the FAA launching an offensive in northwestern Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces in September that was halted because of diplomatic pressure. Throughout 1996, both sides maintained aggressive patrolling that resulted in small attacks and ambushes, and in December, the FAA captured a number of UNITA-held villages in the northwest. It should be noted that the FAA, to cut off UNITA supply routes, invaded Zaire in 1997 to assist in the overthrow of Mobutu, intervened in the Congo-Brazzaville civil war later the same year, and sent forces back to the renamed Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC; formerly Zaire) in 1998 to support the Laurent Kabila government (see Chapter 4). The number of cease-fire violations increased in 1997 as both sides stopped food aid from being delivered to contested areas and prevented civilians from moving to the other side's territory. Between June and September 1997, UNITA mounted attacks on government positions in Lunda Norte and delayed demobilization of some of its troops located in strategic areas near Uige and Huambo. In two weeks of hard fighting in June, the FAA captured 10–15 percent of UNITA's diamond-producing area in the Dundo to Luena corridor. At the start of December 1998, the FAA launched an offensive in central Angola, including air attacks on Bailundo and Mungo. However, UNITA counterattacked, inflicted heavy casualties on government forces, and pushed them back but were unable to fully exploit the victory because their mechanized units ran out of fuel. Violence spread across the country, with both sides planting land mines and UNITA indiscriminately shelling Malanje, Kuito, and Huambo.

In January 1999, Angolan president Jose Eduardo Dos Santos declared that peace could be achieved only by defeating UNITA in war. Around the same time, UN observers left UNITA areas, and two UN planes were shot down (with both sides denying culpability). Increased international sanctions and the removal of external allies such as Mobutu took a toll on UNITA. In October 1999, the FAA captured long-held UNITA areas such as Bailundo and Andulo, and in November, they took the group's headquarters at Jamba. During these operations, government forces captured many of UNITA's heavy weapons, and many rebels deserted or surrendered. In June 2001, Savimbi declared that UNITA would resort to guerrilla warfare. The MPLA responded by driving the rural population of many areas into provincial capitals, which created a humanitarian catastrophe but deprived UNITA of food, shelter, and recruits. In late February 2002, Savimbi was killed in an FAA ambush in Moxico Province and, as a result, the remnants of his organization agreed to return to the UN-monitored Lusaka process in April. Some 81,000 UNITA fighters and 350,000 dependants entered demobilization camps, and the group became a political party. In 2003, just over 4 million Angolans (one third of the population) were internally displaced; the United Nations began returning 400,000 refugees from neighboring countries; 80 percent of Angolans lacked basic medical care; more than two thirds did not have access to running water; 30 percent of children would die before the age of five; most children had never attended school; and the average life expectancy was less than 40 years. Furthermore, the country's infrastructure was largely destroyed, and much of its agricultural land had been rendered extremely dangerous by hundreds of thousands of land mines (which have made many Angolans amputees). In what some call a negative peace, the MPLA retained a firm grip on power, winning a much-criticized 2008 election.

Today, the 87,000-strong FAA represents one of Africa's largest militaries maintained by two-year conscript service. Given the ground combat nature of the long civil war, the FAA is dominated by an army of 70,000 soldiers with many obsolete and poorly maintained Soviet-made tanks and armored vehicles. The Angolan Air Force has 6,000 personnel supporting a fleet of Soviet-made aircraft comprising around 80 fighters and fighter-bombers, including a few newer Su-27s bought from Russia or Belarus in 2000, 24 various transports, 12 Mi-24 attack helicopters, 30–40 transport helicopters, and 12 Brazilian-made prop-driven ground attack planes. While Angola's

navy is very small with just 4 patrol boats and a 700-man marine battalion with several amphibious warfare ships, the need to secure the fishing industry and off-shore oil production has prompted a modernization program with 3 new Dutch-made fisheries surveillance vessels delivered in 2012.²⁷

ZIMBABWE'S LIBERATION WAR/RHODESIAN BUSH WAR, 1965–1980

After World War II, Southern Rhodesia's ruling white minority expected Britain to grant them dominion status, a form of autonomy, along the lines of Canada or Australia. This was to be facilitated by the 1953 Central African Federation, which brought together Southern Rhodesia with the mining economy of Northern Rhodesia and the black labor reservoir of Nyasaland. Britain initially supported the federation, as it was looking for a new regional ally after the election of the republican-minded Afrikaner Nationalist Party in South Africa in 1948 and the introduction of apartheid. Because the tiny European population controlled the federal government, African nationalists in all three territories protested against the federation, which seemed counter to the emerging continental desire for independence and majority rule. In Southern Rhodesia, a series of progressively more radical African nationalist groups was banned in the late 1950s and early 1960s—the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (SRANC), National Democratic Party (NDP), and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Increasingly violent street protest and state repression led to the breakup of the federation in 1963 and the British, now eager to decolonize Africa, granted independence to Northern Rhodesia as Zambia and Nyasaland as Malawi in 1964. The bulk of federal military resources including warplanes, helicopters, and armored cars supplied by Britain during the 1950s were taken to Southern Rhodesia, where the Rhodesia Front of Ian Smith came to power to protect settler interests. Disagreement over strategy split the African nationalist movement—the established ZAPU under Joshua Nkomo wanted to mobilize international sanctions from exile, and a splinter group called the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) under Ndabaningi Sithole was determined to confront the regime at home. Most of the top leadership of both organizations were arrested and spent the next decade in detention. An impasse developed between

the Smith regime (which demanded immediate dominion status) and Britain (which wanted Smith to acknowledge the eventuality of majority rule). In November 1965, Smith unilaterally declared independence from Britain and although finances were frozen and limited sanctions imposed, London did little to suppress the rebellion. Since Britain had recently intervened militarily to suppress army mutinies in its former East African colonies, newly independent African governments were outraged at the obvious double-standard.

Realizing that nonviolent protest was futile, both ZAPU and ZANU formed military wings for armed struggle against settler-ruled Rhodesia. Now based in neighboring Zambia, ZAPU formed the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), and ZANU created the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). Smith's Rhodesia gained military, economic, and diplomatic support from adjacent apartheid South Africa as well as the Portuguese colonial rulers of Mozambique (who were fighting similar insurgencies), and they received limited covert assistance from Western powers that saw Rhodesia as an anticommunist bastion. Both Zimbabwe liberation movements welcomed Eastern bloc support and embraced socialist revolutionary rhetoric. During the first phase of the war in the late 1960s, ZIPRA and ZANLA dispatched armed groups from Zambia into Rhodesia to prepare for revolutionary war. The natural obstacle of the Zambezi River border, the semiopen nature of the Zambezi Valley, and lack of support from rural people led to the tracking down and elimination of all these groups by Rhodesian security forces. In April 1966, a group of 21 ZANLA insurgents that had infiltrated from Zambia into Rhodesia to cut telephone lines and attack white farms was eliminated by security forces at Sinoia (today's Chinhoyi) in what is remembered as the first battle of Zimbabwe's War of Independence. In the late 1960s, ZAPU allied with the exiled ANC of South Africa and embarked on joint military operations. In 1967 and 1968, as discussed earlier in this chapter, combined MK-ZIPRA insurgent groups of around 100 men each penetrated Rhodesia, where they were detected by security forces. After battles around the Wankie and Sipolilo areas, all were killed, captured, or driven into neighboring countries. The main problem for ZIPRA and MK was that they had not previously mobilized rural people, who informed on them; their large units were easily detected; and the campaign prompted apartheid South Africa to send security forces to assist Rhodesia.

During the 1970s, the Zimbabwe liberation groups developed along different lines. Remaining in Zambia, ZAPU-ZIPRA gained Soviet support and adopted a Leninist strategy to develop a compact professional army that could invade Rhodesia at a critical moment. As such, ZIPRA established a conventional Soviet-style brigade in Zambia complete with armored vehicles that was meant to invade Rhodesia when it had been sufficiently weakened by small groups of guerrillas operating within the country and international sanctions. However, the natural obstacle of the Zambezi River with few bridges and natural crossing, as well as Lake Kariba, represented a major dilemma with this approach, and ZIPRA did not work closely with the host Zambian military (which stayed out of the conflict). ZIPRA insurgents were less concerned with politicizing the masses than their ZANLA counterparts. Within Rhodesia, ZIPRA focused on building support by relying on ZAPU's existing political networks and directly engaging and often defeating security forces and establishing liberated zones. With their main staging areas in Zambia and eventually Botswana from around 1974, most ZIPRA recruits tended to be ethnic Ndebele, Kalanga, or Sotho, and the movement gained popularity in Rhodesia's southwestern Matabeleland region, which was Nkomo's home.

ZANU and ZANLA retained a close relationship as in 1969 when ZANU established the *dare re chimurenga* (Shona for "council of the struggle") that directed the war and therefore ZANLA. The *dare* was dominated by politicians until 1973, when it was transformed into a primarily military body by the appointment of Josiah Tongogara as secretary of defense. ZANU-ZANLA gained Chinese sponsorship and adopted Maoist revolutionary strategy that emphasized politicizing the rural masses and fighting a guerrilla conflict that would lead to a takeover of centers of power. Throughout the 1970s, ZANLA worried less about fighting Rhodesian security forces and more about using persuasion and intimidation to gain support from rural people. Among the most popular methods of political indoctrination was an all-night meeting called *pungwe* in which insurgents would lead local people in revolutionary songs and statements, as well as denunciation of traitors (who would often be tortured and killed). Throughout the 1970s, villagers were expected to provide food, information, and recruits to ZANLA insurgents or face reprisals. Furthermore, ZANLA tried to identify with rural people by emphasizing grievances over land and employing traditional Shona spirit mediums, including the

famous Nehanda, an earlier incarnation of who had been prominent in the 1896–1897 rebellion called the First Chimurenga (First Struggle for Independence). Seeking legitimacy through association with historic resistance, ZANLA portrayed itself as champion of the Second Chimurenga. ZANLA developed a highly organized structure and employed very small insurgent cells that, for security reasons, did not know about one another. Although ZANU and ZANLA promoted women's emancipation as a socialist goal of the struggle, in practice, female insurgents performed traditional women's jobs such as cooking and carrying supplies, which tended to reinforce established gender roles.

The second phase of the conflict began in 1972 when ZANLA, under Tongogara's leadership, moved to Mozambique's Tete province, where it developed a close alliance with FRELIMO (which had been fighting Portuguese colonial forces for a decade). While the problem with staging areas in Zambia was the natural obstacle of the Zambezi River, ZANLA insurgents in Tete more easily entered the forests and hills of northeast Rhodesia. This was the most important strategic move of the war because the insurgency was relaunched and escalated. When the Portuguese suddenly withdrew from Africa and FRELIMO took over Mozambique in 1975, the conflict in Rhodesia intensified as ZANLA began using the entire eastern border as a staging area. As such, ZANLA developed an increasingly Shona ethnic character as recruits came mostly from Rhodesia's eastern Mashonaland region. In late 1974, Thomas Nhari, a Soviet-trained member of ZANLA's general staff, led a mutiny in Zambia and Mozambique by those disillusioned over lack of supplies and weapons as well as poor camp conditions. Eventually, the rebellion was crushed, with Nhari and many others executed. Following the 1975 assassination of ZANU leader Herbert Chitepo in Zambia, which was blamed on internal disputes but was likely carried out by Rhodesian agents, ZANLA moved entirely to Mozambique. Given the expanded insurgency, Rhodesian forces mounted lightning strikes against ZANLA camps in Mozambique, where they inflicted serious casualties such as at Nyadzonya in 1976 and Chimoio in 1977. In Botswana, ZIPRA operated secretly because the government there, while sympathetic to African nationalism, was under pressure from Rhodesia and South Africa (on which it was economically dependent and militarily vulnerable) to curtail insurgents. Rhodesian forces conducted cross-border raids against ZIPRA camps in both Zambia and Botswana in which civilians were

killed. Responding to the expansion of ZANLA insurgency in Rhodesia's east after Mozambique's independence, ZIPRA launched an offensive in the west from 1976 that included abducting African children from schools near the border and bringing them to camps in Botswana to swell the movement's numbers. In 1978 and 1979, ZIPRA—now commanded by Lookout Masuku with Dumiso Dabengwa as intelligence chief—used Soviet ground-to-air missiles to shoot down two Rhodesian civilian airliners, which severely damaged white Rhodesian morale. In 1979, ZIPRA infiltrated 3,000 insurgents into Rhodesia to prepare for a conventional invasion that never took place. This was countered by an incursion of mostly Shona ZANLA fighters into the predominantly Ndebele southwest, where they clashed with ZIPRA and Rhodesian forces.

Losing control of the countryside, Rhodesian security forces employed counterinsurgency methods learned in 1950s Malaya. To prevent them from supplying insurgents, rural people were herded into foul "protected villages" where they were subject to a curfew and abuse from guards. Large tracts were declared "free fire zones," meaning anyone caught inside was considered an insurgent and killed. During the early 1970s, the Selous Scouts was formed under Lieutenant Colonel Ron Reid Daly to employ "turned terrorists" (captured insurgents who changed sides) to infiltrate insurgent cells and call in air mobile units called "fire forces" to eliminate them. The Selous Scouts were officially a specialist tracking unit, but this was a cover for their real function. A typical fire force consisted of a helicopter-borne commander circling the suspected enemy position, several four-man teams landed by helicopter to block likely insurgent escape routes, and a larger unit of perhaps platoon strength parachuted from an airplane at dangerously low altitude and then sweeping toward the target. Communication problems between Selous Scouts on the ground and commanders in the air, as well as the insurgent practice of fleeing in all directions (called bombshelling) when they heard approaching aircraft, meant that fire forces often failed to locate the enemy, but on occasion, they trapped and killed many. At first, the fire forces were manned by the exclusively white Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), but as the war spread, the white-officered but primarily black Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) was given parachute training and assigned this duty. In addition, Rhodesian security forces tried to kill insurgents by circulating poisoned clothing and tinned food as well as transistor radios containing bombs in the rural areas

where they were hiding which led to more civilian deaths. Rhodesian counterinsurgency stressed racking up an insurgent body count, which was accelerated in dramatic but internationally condemned cross-border raids on guerrilla bases in neighboring countries. However, many rural noncombatants were killed by mistake, which pushed the increasingly brutalized rural people toward the insurgent cause. Although the core of the professional Rhodesian security forces were African soldiers and police, the Rhodesian Front government hesitated to expand its armed African personnel until the late 1970s, by which time it was too late. Additionally, the first black army officers were commissioned in the late 1970s when the war was almost over. Chronically short of manpower, Rhodesian forces relied on young white national servicemen (conscripts) and white reservists who were called up for increasingly long periods of obligatory service, mostly as infantry in the Rhodesia Regiment. Direct South African support for Rhodesia included South African Police counterinsurgency forces sent to the Zambezi border in the late 1960s and South African special forces (Recces) that participated in Rhodesian operations, particularly with the Selous Scouts and Special Air Service (SAS).

After the Portuguese departure, both sides came under pressure to negotiate. A failed attempt at talks in late 1974 led to the release of long-detained top nationalist leaders such as Nkomo and Sithole. It was at this point that Robert Mugabe, also released from a decade in detention, assumed leadership of ZANU because Sithole had allegedly renounced the armed struggle while in prison. International sanctions and increasing "call-ups" of whites were damaging the Rhodesian economy. South Africa, which the Smith regime was entirely dependent upon for key imports such as oil, experienced a surge of internal African protest from 1976 and saw the Rhodesian conflict as a threat to its new policy of dominating black-ruled neighbors through economic strength. The OAU and the Zambian government were concerned that the war was crippling the Zambian economy, which depended on copper exports through Rhodesia and South Africa. In 1978, in what was called the internal settlement, South Africa and Smith arranged for the installation of a new pro-Western government under moderate black leader Bishop Abel Muzorewa in which whites retained considerable power. However, this proved unacceptable to the liberation movements, and the war continued. At the British-sponsored Lancaster House talks in 1979, an agreement was reached in which Zimbabwe would formally gain independence in 1980 with universal adult

suffrage. However, concessions to the white minority included no forced land redistribution for the first decade of independence. During the 1970s, several OAU-sponsored attempts to unite the Zimbabwe liberation movements had failed, such as the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) and the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). After the last abortive attempt to combine ZAPU and ZANU as the Patriotic Front (PF), the latter would be known as ZANU-PF. Under Commonwealth supervision, insurgents reported to assembly areas for planned absorption, along with former Rhodesian personnel, into a new Zimbabwe security force structure. In December 1979, shortly after Lancaster House, the popular Tongogara was killed in an automobile accident, which quickly became the subject of numerous conspiracy theories. Winning the subsequent elections, ZANU-PF formed the government, with Mugabe becoming the first prime minister of independent Zimbabwe. Many former Rhodesian security force members moved south to enlist in the SADF.²⁸

With the election of ZANU-PF and the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, former ZANLA insurgents came to dominate the new Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) and Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP). While the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) that assisted with the integration wanted to create a professional apolitical military, Mugabe preferred a Chinese-style party militia engaged in production. Disillusioned white former Rhodesian officers quickly left the integration process, beginning with Joint High Command head Lieutenant General Peter Walls and air force commander Alexander McIntyre. Consequently, ZANLA's Lieutenant General Rex Nhongo (whose real name was Solomon Mujuru) became head of the ZDF, with ZIPRA's Lookout Masuku as his deputy. Following a failed assassination attempt on Mugabe, a dedicated presidential guard was created in February 1981. Mugabe visited North Korea in October 1981 and obtained the services of 1,000 North Korean military instructors under Brigadier Sim Hyon Dok that founded and equipped the ZDF's mechanized 5 Brigade in 1983 (see later in this chapter) and the 20,000-strong Zimbabwe People's Militia (ZPM), which rooted out political opposition. Furthermore, in 1981, Zimbabwe upgraded its air force by purchasing eight Hawk MK-60 ground attack aircraft, worth US\$45 million, from Britain followed by five more in 1992. After South African agents bombed Gweru's Thornhill Airbase in 1982, the Zimbabwe Air Force (ZAF) was quickly Africanized, with temporary personnel brought in from Pakistan, China, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia, and former ZANLA senior

army officers were transferred to the air force, including Deputy Army Commander Major General Josiah Tungamirai, who became a pilot and air marshal. By 1986, the ZDF consisted of 46,000 troops organized into six infantry brigades; three specialized battalions of commandos, paratroopers and mechanized infantry; a presidential guard and support elements; along with a 4,000-member air force. Despite terrible economic problems, Zimbabwe acquired expensive military aircraft during the 2000s. This was informed by involvement in the Second Congo War of 1998–2002, renewed relations with China and a desire to maintain the image of a regional power. The ZAF received a few Soviet-made Mi-24 attack helicopters and began to replace its aging Hawks with Chinese-made aircraft including a dozen Hongdu JL-8 trainer/ground attack jets and perhaps two dozen Chengdu F-7 fighters which are copies of the Soviet MiG 21.

Delays in the integration process, poor camp conditions, favoritism of former ZANLA members affiliated with the governing ZANU-PF, and rumors that former ZIPRA personnel were disappearing once taken into the ZDF prompted a 1981 rebellion by ZIPRA veterans at Entumbane in Bulawayo in Matabeleland. This was suppressed by former Rhodesian units such as the white-led RAR and police paramilitary Support Unit. After arms caches were discovered in Matabeleland, ZAPU leaders were arrested or fled the country, and some former ZIPRA fighters deserted the army and returned to the bush as dissidents. A South African attempt to destabilize independent Zimbabwe by sponsoring a group called Super-ZAPU, a similar strategy to that pursued by Pretoria in Mozambique, failed to attract the support of genuine ZIPRA insurgents but created paranoia within Mugabe's ZANU-PF government. Overreacting, the state dispatched North Korean-trained 5 Brigade, consisting almost entirely of ethnic Shona former ZANLA fighters, which imposed a reign of terror on rural Matabeleland. Ndebele and Kalanga people were forced to attend all night *pungwes* where they sung Shona songs praising ZANU-PF, their crops and houses were destroyed, they were subjected to curfew and collective punishment, and they became victims of public beatings and executions. Commanded by Colonel Perence Shiri, 5 Brigade's official motto was the Shona phrase "*Gukurahundi*" meaning "the rain that washes away the rubbish," and it was likely that the rural Ndebele people began to think "rubbish" referred to them. Some 20,000 people died in what has been called a genocide. This oppression lasted until the 1987 Unity Accord between ZAPU and ZANU-PF leaders in which the former, including Nkomo and

Dabengwa, agreed to be absorbed by the latter and received high government positions under Mugabe, who was transformed into an executive president. Given national cost-cutting, the ZPM was disbanded in 1991. In the context of Zimbabwe's economic catastrophe of the 2000s, ZDF officers benefitted from rapid redistribution of confiscated white commercial farms and diamonds smuggled from the DRC (see Chapter 4). While Zimbabwe has never had a formal military regime, its security force heads are former ZANLA insurgents whose power and wealth is tied to ZANU-PF remaining in office. During the March 2002 presidential elections, ZDF head Major General Vitalis Zvinavashe and ZAF head Air Marshal Perence Shiri announced that they would reject a political leader who had not fought in the independence war, which ruled out opposition candidate Morgan Tsvangirai.²⁹

REGIONAL DESTABILIZATION

After the sudden departure of the Portuguese in 1974, FRELIMO established a one-party Marxist-Leninist state in Mozambique, eliminated political rivals, and embarked on an ambitious socialist development program. Although it was successful in improving education, health, and equality of women, FRELIMO's autocratic manner, emphasis on industrialization, and collective agriculture alienated some rural people. Committed to revolution in neighboring settler states, FRELIMO allowed ZANLA to use its entire territory as a staging area for the infiltration of white-ruled Rhodesia, which expanded the insurgency there and hosted exiled ANC agents working against apartheid South Africa. In retaliation, Rhodesian agents organized former soldiers of the Portuguese colonial army and other dissidents into the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), which sought to destabilize the FRELIMO state by guerrilla warfare. With the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 and the election of Mugabe's ZANU-PF, South Africa took over the sponsorship of RENAMO, which—at the time—had about 2,000 fighters in Mozambique. The SAAF airlifted 250 RENAMO personnel from their base in Zimbabwe to Phalaborwa in the eastern Transvaal, where a new training and logistical center was established. In June 1980, FRELIMO overran RENAMO's Mozambican base at Gorongozo in the mountains north of the Zimbabwe-Beira road and discovered evidence of South African assistance: ammunition containers, equipment, and

parachutes. RENAMO soon recaptured Gorongosa and by February 1981, it had grown to 10,000 trained insurgents.

In Operation Altar and later Operation Mila, South African special forces began training, advising, and supplying RENAMO, along with conducting their own raids in Mozambique. While South African Recce teams and supplies were initially brought into Mozambique by helicopter or parachuted from airplanes, when RENAMO expanded its operations into Inhambane Province in 1981, South African naval vessels landed huge amounts of equipment on the coast. At Phalaborwa, South Africans trained RENAMO recruits, some of whom had arrived via the Kruger National Park, and played a central role in planning RENAMO operations, which in the short term were meant to damage Mozambique's economy so that it could not escape dependence on South Africa and in the long term overthrow FRELIMO. In January 1981, South African Recces raided ANC houses in Maputo, killing 13 ANC members and 1 bystander. During November, South African special forces attacked two bridges near Beira and destroyed marker buoys in Beira harbor. In December 1982, a South African Recce team blew up the Zimbabwe government's oil storage facilities in Beira. Pretoria was undermining attempts by the Frontline States, neighboring black-ruled countries, to reduce their economic dependence on South African ports by shifting export and import to Mozambique. South African warplanes, in May 1983, struck an MK facility at Maputo, killing 41 MK operatives, 17 FRELIMO soldiers, and 7 civilians. In October, an SADF Recce team infiltrated Maputo by sea, planted a bomb in an ANC safe house that injured several people and might have killed 2, and returned home overland.

In October 1981, Zimbabwe's ZANU-PF and Mozambique's FRELIMO, signed a security pact to counter South African destabilization of the region's black-ruled countries. As a result, in 1982, an initial contingent of 600 Zimbabwean troops went to Mozambique to assist in the fight against RENAMO. Some former Rhodesian soldiers, within the newly integrated ZDF, were sent to pursue their erstwhile clients. This operation also represented a continuation of the ZANLA-FRELIMO alliance of the 1970s and an effort by Harare to take a leading role in the Frontline States. In the 1980s, RENAMO threatened the transport corridor from the Mozambique port of Beira to the Zimbabwean border town of Mutare through which Harare's oil supplies arrived without going through South Africa. In 1984, RENAMO's insurgency pressured Mozambique into signing the

Nkomati Accord in which it agreed to expel South African antiapartheid activists and South Africa promised to abandon RENAMO. Although FRELIMO expelled many ANC members from Mozambique, which denied MK an important infiltration route into South Africa, Pretoria continued to secretly supply and assist RENAMO, often through Malawi, until 1989. In October 1986, Samora Machel, president of Mozambique, died in an airplane crash in the eastern Transvaal that many suspected had been orchestrated by South Africa.

The FRELIMO-RENAMO war continued. In June 1985, at a meeting in Harare, the leaders of Zimbabwe and Tanzania promised to support Mozambique against RENAMO. Zimbabwe's military efforts were expanded from guarding the Beira Corridor to mounting search and destroy operations. In August, Zimbabwean forces captured a large RENAMO base and several smaller ones, and discovered evidence of continued South African sponsorship that was supposed to have ceased with the Nkomati Accord. Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Malawi entered a joint security agreement in 1985 that resulted in Zimbabwean troops securing the road from northeast Zimbabwe to southern Malawi that passes through the Mozambican town of Tete, where an important bridge crosses the Zambezi River. The Tete road had been plagued by RENAMO ambushes. Indeed, Zimbabwe and Mozambique came close to conflict with Malawi, which—given its previous support for the Portuguese regime—harbored RENAMO rebels and acted as a conduit for South African support. While the three battalions of the Malawi Rifles conducted joint railway patrols with FRELIMO and often clashed with RENAMO, Life President Hastings Kamuzu Banda directed his Israeli- and Taiwanese-trained paramilitary Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) to assist the insurgents. In 1986 and 1987, Zimbabwean, Tanzanian, and Mozambican forces thwarted a RENAMO offensive meant to cut Mozambique in half. In 1987, Zimbabwean, Tanzanian and Mozambican soldiers seized five towns in northern Mozambique from RENAMO, which began to shift its activities south. By 1988, 15,000 Zimbabwean personnel were operating in Mozambique and in 1990, 8 Zimbabwean battalions were protecting roads and railways. Within Zimbabwe, the Mozambican deployment had become unpopular by the late 1980s with criticisms, including from within the ruling party, about cost, casualties, and army corruption, and RENAMO had begun revenge attacks within Zimbabwe.

The end of the Cold War and South African apartheid during the early 1990s prompted FRELIMO to accept multiparty democracy and free market economy, and both FRELIMO and RENAMO entered negotiations. Furthermore, democratization in Malawi, where the frustrated army disarmed Banda's MYP in December 1993, removed RENAMO's last ally. In a massive reconstruction effort, 92,000 combatants were demobilized, land mines cleared, infrastructure repaired, and almost 4 million internally displaced people and refugees resettled. A new roughly 10,000-strong Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique (FADM) was established in 1994 with personnel from FRELIMO and RENAMO. It was a mostly ground force with extremely limited air and naval resources. Zimbabwe began to reduce its military activities in Mozambique, contributed to training Maputo's new integrated security force, and completely withdrew in April 1993, making way for the 6,600 peacekeepers of the UN Operation in Mozambique (UNUMOZ). Security in the critical Beira Corridor was assigned to 1,000 Italian troops, the mission's most self-sufficient contingent, but reports of widespread employment of child prostitutes led to their withdrawal. The Tete Corridor was secured by a 743-strong battalion from Botswana, in the south Maputo was guarded by a Zambian battalion and Inhambane by an unprepared Uruguayan battalion, and the northern region assigned to a battalion from Bangladesh. Under Joaquim Chissano's leadership, FRELIMO won the first democratic elections in 1994, though Afonso Dhlakama's RENAMO emerged as a strong parliamentary opposition, and UNUMOZ disbanded the next year.³⁰

From the 1960s, Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere had given sanctuary to many African liberation movements, including FRELIMO, ANC, and PAC. In 1972, the Tanzanian port of Dar-es-Salaam was rocked by bomb blasts that had been set by a South African special forces team landed by submarine. While the aim of the operation, to instil fear that a local dissident group had turned violent, proved initially successful, a follow-up seaborne raid on the harbor's oil storage facility was cancelled by the South African Navy because underwater coral would endanger submarines. During the mid- to late 1970s, South Africa sponsored an insurgent separatist group active in western Zambia. Led by Adamson Mushala, who was later killed by the Zambian army in 1982, around 200 fighters were trained by South African Reccees in the Caprivi Strip. In the 1970s, the government of Lesotho quietly allowed the ANC to use its small territory as a stepping-stone for those going to exile and for MK infiltration of South

Africa. From 1979 into the 1980s, the South African state sponsored the Lesotho Liberation Army, supposedly the military wing of the opposition Basotho Congress Party, which operated forward bases in the QwaQwa and Transkei homelands, from where they mounted attacks inside Lesotho. In 1980 and 1981, Chris Hani, MK leader in Lesotho, survived several South African attempts to assassinate him by car bomb. In early December 1982, some 70 mostly black South African Recce operators infiltrated Lesotho and raided numerous ANC houses in Maseru before being extracted by helicopter. It appears that 42 people were killed in the attack, including 27 ANC members and 7 women and children. In 1982, South Africa and Swaziland signed a secret security pact prompted by Pretoria's promise to cede ethnic Swazi homelands to the conservative kingdom. Although MK and the PAC had operated there since the 1960s, the pact led to a series of South African abductions and assassinations of exiled antiapartheid activists in Swaziland and increased border patrols by the Swazi military during the 1980s. Assisted by Kenya, Swaziland had launched a military in 1973 from a nucleus of traditional regiments and World War II veterans. By the 1980s, this force had evolved into a 3,000-strong brigade sponsored by pro-Western pariahs Israel, Taiwan, and South Africa. In 1987 Pretoria helped found the Swazi Defence Intelligence School.

With South African military pressure on Lesotho and Mozambique reducing ANC safe havens in the region, in the mid-1980s, Botswana became the main staging area for MK penetration of South Africa. While Botswana prohibited the ANC and PAC from using its territory for military purposes, it had granted sanctuary to South African refugees, many of whom were involved in underground military operations. According to South African Police, between August 1984 and June 1985, MK agents in Botswana had been responsible for 36 acts of violence in South Africa in which 5 people had been killed. On June 14, 1985, South African Recces raided some suspected ANC houses in Gaborone, killing 9 ANC members, 2 local women, and a Somali refugee. In Zimbabwe, South African agents bombed ZANU-PF headquarters in Harare in early 1981, and destroyed a quarter of the ZAF's combat aircraft at Gweru in July 1982. During the mid-1980s, MK operatives based in Zimbabwe made forays across the border to plant land mines around the white farms of the northern Transvaal. As a result in May 1986, the SADF—targeting ANC facilities—launched simultaneous special forces raids in Harare and Gaborone, and an air raid on Lusaka.³¹

Regional conflict prompted Botswana to create a military. When it was granted independence from Britain in 1966, impoverished Botswana declined to form its own military, opting to have its paramilitary Police Mobile Unit fill the defense role. However, the many incursions into Botswana by Rhodesian forces during the 1970s in which Botswana citizens were victimized led to public outcry for the government to defend the country. Therefore, in April 1977, the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) was established with former deputy police commissioner Major General Mompoti S. Meraphe as commander. Within a year, the force consisted of 600 men organized in five light infantry companies, a reconnaissance company, and support elements, and an Air Arm with several British-made transport aircraft. In late February 1978, a 33-strong BDF platoon in several light vehicles drove into a Rhodesian ambush at Lesoma in the northeast that resulted in 15 fatalities. This humiliating defeat, along with South African raids in 1985 and 1986, prompted Botswana's government to expand and improve its new military financed by the country's emerging diamond industry. By 1988, the BDF had grown to 6,000 personnel with two combat brigades, one located at Gaborone in the south and the other at Francistown in the north; a Commando Squadron (formerly Reconnaissance Company) of 100 highly trained special forces operators; and U.S.- and Soviet-made light armored vehicles. The Air Arm now included British attack jets, U.S. utility helicopters, and Spanish light transport aircraft. Military professionalism was enhanced by British forces conducting joint exercises with the BDF in Botswana; BDF officers going to Britain, the United States, Canada, and India for training; and the posting of a team of Indian advisors to the country. Beginning in 1987, the BDF began ultimately successful operations against well-armed poachers in the country's vast national parks. In 1989, Sandhurst trained Ian Khama, son of Botswana's first president who himself became president in 2008, took command of the BDF and initiated construction of Thebeaphatshwa Airbase near Molepolole 50 kilometers northwest of the capital. During the 1990s, Khama's BDF expanded to 9,000 members and acquired its first modern combat aircraft, 15 Canadian CF-5A/D Freedom Fighters, 3 U.S. C-130 transport aircraft, a dozen 105-mm howitzers and 20 Scorpion light tanks from Britain, and 50 light tanks from Austria. From 1992 to 1994, the BDF conducted its first international deployment by sending contingents to the American and UN interventions in Somalia, where it was unusual in supplying its own troops by

regular flights from Botswana. This led to contributions to other international missions such as in Rwanda and Mozambique. Like Botswana itself, which is considered an unusually stable and successful African country, the BDF acquired a reputation as a well-led, disciplined, and effective force that can be explained by all recruits having graduated high school, regular and systematized training, good pay and benefits, and professional contacts with Western militaries.³²

THE POSTAPARTHEID SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY

By the end of the 1980s, South Africa's apartheid regime was untenable. International sanctions were crippling the economy, fears of communist conspiracy disappeared with the end of the Cold War, many parts of the country were in a state of unrest, and long-occupied Namibia was becoming independent. In February 1990, President F. W. de Klerk, who had recently replaced P. W. Botha, legalized the anti-apartheid movements and released political prisoners. Under de Klerk, the SADF lost the political influence it had gained under Botha, yet anxiety over a potential military coup proved groundless. Despite threats and continued violence from disenchanted groups such as right-wing Afrikaners, Zulu nationalists, and the PAC, subsequent negotiations between the ANC and the Nationalist Party led to a non-racial constitution. South Africa's first democratic elections in late April 1994 brought an ANC-led national unity government to power, and Nelson Mandela became the country's first black president.

A new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was created as an amalgamation of the SADF (90,000 personnel); the homeland armies of Transkei, Boputhatswana, Venda, and Ciskei (11,500); and the liberation forces of MK (28,000) and APLA (6,000). Because conscription and compulsory call-ups were eliminated after the 1994 election, the new military would consist of voluntary full-time and reserve personnel. Given their administrative skills and conventional military experience, SADF officers dominated the planning process during 1993 and ensured that SADF structures and traditions would morph into the new SANDF. From an entirely land-based force, MK officers contributed little to discussions on the new navy or air force. In practice, the old SADF would absorb the other forces. When the SANDF was established in early 1994, most influential command and staff positions went to former SADF officers. Many former

liberation movement officers attended compulsory courses to confirm their SANDF rank, which meant they were delayed in assuming posts. Seeing themselves as senior partners, some former SADF members displayed racism to their new colleagues and excluded them by continuing to use Afrikaans in instruction and communication. By September 1994, the SANDF had taken command of homeland forces that were easily adsorbed given their structural similarity to the old SADF. The absorption of MK and APLA personnel was considerably more difficult because of their historical antagonism toward the SADF, the lack of relevance of their insurgent skills to a large conventional force, and the dearth of standardization in their training (which had taken place in many different countries).

In June 1994, members of the liberation forces began returning from exile and reported to assembly areas where boards, made up of SANDF officers of various backgrounds and British military adjudicators, determined their ranks, salaries, and additional training needs. About 90 percent of inductees were assigned to the army. A demobilization package was accepted by about 10,000 of those not wishing to continue military service or those who were prevented from doing so because of age, ill health, or lack of education. In October 1994, thousands of former MK members went absent without leave in protest over poor living conditions and treatment in the camps, they were given seven days to return by President Mandela, and 2,000 were subsequently dismissed. Eventually, camp conditions improved. By 1996, there were 6,421 former APLA members and 14,791 former MK members that had been adsorbed into the SANDF. A major transition occurred in early 1998 when SANDF chief General Georg Meiring warned the president of an anticipated coup by prominent figures within the ANC. The report was rejected, and Meiring forced to resign. As a result, a number of conservative former SADF officers left key positions and were replaced by former MK officers just returned from training, including General Sphiwe Nyanda, who became the new SANDF head.³³

After 1994, several contradictory motives shaped the role of South Africa's military. With a pressing need to address internal problems such as poverty and lack of obvious external threats, defense spending has not been a priority. However, some believe that South Africa, as a regional power with a history of struggle against oppression, should help promote democracy and human rights in other parts of Africa and that the damage done by the apartheid regime to neighboring

countries makes this obligatory. Emerging from isolation, South Africa is an important member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU), both of which are involved in international security issues, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping. The desire to find African solutions to African problems has meant that South Africa, wealthier than most African countries, contributed to various international missions. In 1998, the SANDF and BDF, acting under the auspices of SADC, intervened in Lesotho to reverse a military coup. From the late 1990s, the SANDF has participated in AU and UN peacekeeping operations in Burundi, DRC, Sudan, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. Internally, the SANDF has been employed to secure South Africa's borders from illegal immigration, smuggling of drugs and guns, and poachers invading national parks. In 1996, SANDF personnel were deployed in Qumbu in the Eastern Cape to suppress stock theft violence and in 2008, SANDF units assisted police responding to a wave of xenophobic attacks on immigrants in the provinces of Gauteng, Mpumalanga, and Kwa-Zulu/Natal. As explained in chapter 4, the death of 13 SANDF troops in Central African Republic in 2013 prompted criticism from the South African media and political opposition that the ANC government had sent its troops to prop up a failing dictator in order to secure mineral interests.

In 1999, South Africa embarked on an ambitious US\$4.8 billion arms purchase scheme to replace aging apartheid-era weapons systems, particularly 4 naval corvettes, 3 submarines, around 24 fighter and trainer jets, and 30 light helicopters, which were required to secure the country's coastal waters and airspace as well as participate in regional peacekeeping. The project became mired in controversy and accusations of corruption. Simultaneously, the SANDF announced plans to reduce costs by decreasing its total permanent force from 93,000 to 70,000. Following the unionization of police and prison services in the early 1990s, the South African National Defence Union (SANDU) was successful in its 1999 court bid to strike down a prohibition on military unions. With a total regular strength of 67,000 in 2012, the largest SANDF branch is a 39,400-strong army with 15 infantry battalions, including 2 mechanized, 8 motorized, and 1 parachute, a tank and an armored car regiment, and various artillery, air-defense, engineering, and other support elements. The SAAF's 11,000 personnel operate 26 new Swedish-made Gripen multirole fighters, 24 new British-designed South African-assembled Hawk jet trainers,

nine 50-year-old C-130 transports, a dozen new South African-made Rooivalk attack helicopters, and many upgraded or new transport helicopters. Given budget cuts, the SAAF struggles to maintain its reputation as one of Africa's most effective air forces. The 7,500 sailors of the South African Navy maintain 4 frigates, 6 mine-laying vessels, 3 submarines, 7 patrol boats, and a supply ship. In 2010, South Africa began a regular antipiracy patrol of the Indian Ocean's Mozambique Channel with 1 frigate and various aircraft. Unusual among African militaries, the SANDF has a 9,000-strong medical service with 3 large military hospitals in urban centers, several medical institutes, and mobile field formations. Although it was launched as the Union Defence Force (UDF) in 1912 with an all-white policy, the SANDF now consists of over 70 percent black South African personnel.³⁴

CONCLUSION

Southern Africa has gone from being one of the most conflict-plagued parts of the continent during the Cold War to arguably one of its least war-torn, though poverty and crime remain dire problems. While South Africa was once an outcast and source of destabilization for most of the region and beyond, it joined SADC in 1994 and became a key partner in promoting security cooperation. SADC members entered a Mutual Defence Pact in 2003, but military cooperation fizzled with the group's failure to prevent Zimbabwe's slide into chaos. In 2007 in Zambia, SADC launched a multinational SADC brigade, theoretically consisting of 6,000 troops with 4 infantry battalions and support elements, as part of a larger AU stand-by force to deal with crises. The brigade held several exercises in 2009, and missed its 2010 readiness deadline. However, in February 2013 SADC, at the invitation of leaders from Africa's troubled Great Lakes region, decided to mobile its multinational brigade with battalions from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi to intervene aggressively against armed groups in eastern DRC though this was later brought under UN command (see chapter 4). While South Africa, Botswana, Angola, and Zimbabwe have some airlift capability, budget pressures may limit this in the future, which will slow the potential deployment of the SADC brigade and make it reliant on Western transport. Furthermore, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has had a particularly heavy impact on the region's military personnel, and a 2008 court ruling has forced the SANDF to accept recruits who are HIV positive and remove any restrictions on their deployment or promotion.³⁵

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Index

- VII Corps, United States, 12
- 1 Marine Expeditionary Force
(1 MEF), United States, 12
- 1 Military Area (1MA), South West
Africa, 251
- 1st Armoured Brigade, Armed
Forces of Zaire, 169
- 1st Battalion, Parachute Regiment,
Britain, 62
- 1st Cavalry Division,
United States, 12
- 1st Infantry Division,
Nigeria, 50–52
- 1st National Democratic
Alliance (NDA) Unified Brigade,
Sudan, 121
- 1st Parachute Regiment of Marines
(1 RPIMA), France, 218
- 1st Revolutionary Liberation Army,
Ethiopia, 81
- 2 Commando, Belgian
Para-Commando
Regiment, 185
- 2 Military Area (2MA), South West
Africa, 251
- 2 South African Infantry
Battalion, South African
Defence Force, 253
- 2nd Airborne Battalion, Armed
Forces of Zaire, 164
- 2nd Division, Ethiopia, 95
- 2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment
(2 REP), France, 166, 167, 172
- 2nd Infantry Division, Nigeria, 50,
51, 52
- 2nd Revolutionary Liberation Army,
Ethiopia, 82
- 3rd Division, Ethiopia, 91
- 3rd Marine Commando Division,
Nigeria, 51–53
- 3rd Mechanized Division, Egyptian, 11
- 3rd Parachute Regiment of Marines
(3 RPIMA), France, 172, 186, 211,
218, 222
- 4th Armored Division, Egyptian, 11
- 4th South African Infantry Battalion
Group (4 SAI), South African
Defence Force, 260–62
- 5 Brigade, Zimbabwe Defence
Force, 275–76

- 5 Commando, Congolese National Army, 159–61
- 6 Commando, Congolese National Army, 159–60
- 6th Brigade, Congolese Armed Forces, 206
- 6th Fleet, United States, 16
- 8th Parachute Regiment of Marines (8 RPIMA), France, 180, 186, 218
- 10 Commando (Leopard Battalion), Congolese National Army, 159–161
- 10 Division, South African Defence Force, 264
- 10th Brigade, Congolese Armed Forces, 202
- 11 Brigade, Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola, 256
- 11th Brigade, Kaymanyola Division, Armed Forces of Zaire, 164, 169
- 12th Brigade, Congolese Armed Forces, 202
- 12th Brigade, Kaymanyola Division, Armed Forces of Zaire, 169
- 13 Brigade, Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola, 261
- 13th Division, Sudan People's Liberation Movement, 119
- 13th Infantry Brigade, Armed Forces of Zaire, 129
- 14th Brigade, Kaymanyola Division, Armed Forces of Zaire, 165, 166, 169
- 16 Brigade, Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola, 261
- 20 Brigade, South African Defence Force, 258–60, 262
- 20th Commando Regiment, Egyptian, 11
- 21 Battalion, South African Defence Force, 229, 230
- 21 Brigade, Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola, 259–62
- 21st Division, Ethiopia, 97
- 21st Infantry Brigade, Armed Forces of Zaire, 169
- 22nd Light Infantry Brigade, Armed Forces of Zaire, 169
- 24 Brigade, British, 85–86
- 25 Brigade, Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola, 261–63
- 29th Mechanized Brigade, Ethiopia, 97
- 31st Parachute Brigade, Armed Forces of Zaire, 168–69
- 32 Battalion, South African Defence Force, 252, 254–56, 258, 262–64
- 32nd Parachute Brigade, Armed Forces of Zaire, 169
- 36 Brigade, Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola, 263
- 40 Tank Brigade, Cuba, 263
- 41st Commando Brigade, Armed Forces of Zaire, 169
- 42 Commando, Royal Marines, 62
- 44 Parachute Brigade, South African Defence Force, 231, 254
- 47 Brigade, Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola, 258–60
- 50th Division, Cuba, 260
- 59 Brigade, Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola, 259, 261, 262
- 61 Mechanized Battalion Group (61 Mech), South African Defence Force, 258, 261, 262, 264
- 66 Brigade, Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola, 261
- 82 Air Force, Kenya, 87
- 82 Brigade, South African Defence Force, 262–63
- 82nd Airborne Division, United States, 166
- 99th Infantry Brigade, India, 156–57
- 101 Battalion, South West African Territorial Force, 258, 263, 264
- 105th Battalion, Sudan People's Defence Force, 113
- 111 Battalion, South African Defence Force, 229

- 113 Battalion, South African Defence Force, 229
- 116 Battalion, South African Defence Force, 229
- 121 Battalion, South African Defence Force, 229
- 133rd Infantry Battalion, Armed Forces of Zaire, 165–66
- 201 Brigade, Tanzania, 136
- 208 Brigade, Tanzania, 136
- 311th Airborne Battalion, Armed Forces of Zaire, 165, 166, 168
- 391st Commando Battalion, Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 210, 215
- A-4 Skyhawk attack jets, 6, 90
- Abacha, General Sani, Nigerian military ruler, 54, 59
- Abd al-Hakim Amir, Field Marshall, Egyptian officer, 2, 6
- Abd al-Rahman Sa'id, Lieutenant General, Sudan rebel leader, 119
- Abd al-Wahid al-Nur, Darfur rebel leader, 132
- Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algerian president, 27–29
- Abdul Mohsen Murtagi, lieutenant general, Egyptian officer, 5
- Abdullah al-Sallal, colonel, Yemeni officer, 2, 3
- Abu Musab AbdelWadoud, Algerian rebel leader, 29
- Abu Qurun, major general, "Our Hitler," Sudan officer, 115
- Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Nigerian prime minister, 49
- Abuja Accords (1995), 59, 63
- Aburi Conference (1967), 49
- Abyei, South Sudan, 127
- Acholi, 90, 134, 139, 140, 142–44, 146, 147
- Adekunle, Colonel Benjamin, Nigerian officer, 52
- Aden, 2, 85
- Afabet, Battle of (1986), 97, 99
- Afewerki, Isaias, Eritrean leader, 96, 98
- Afghanistan, 21, 26, 70, 122, 131, 265
- African National Congress, South Africa, 232–37, 277, 279–81
- African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), 55–58, 68–69
- African Standby Force, xiv
- African Union (AU), xiv, 127, 131, 132, 149, 193, 285, 286
- African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), 193
- African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 108, 109, 146
- African Union Mission to Sudan (AMIS), 131, 132
- African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), 132
- Agacher Strip, 70
- Aguiyi-Ironsi, Major General Johnson, Nigerian officer, 44, 49, 155, 157
- Agwai, General Martin Luther, Nigerian officer, 132
- Ahmad ibn Yahya (Imam), Yemeni leader, 2
- Ahmad Ibrahim Diraig, Darfur rebel leader, 132
- Ahmad Ismail Ali, General, Egyptian defense minister, 7
- Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, Sierra Leone president, 61
- Ahmed Ben Bella, Algerian leader, 22, 23
- Ahmed Dlimi, Moroccan general, 35
- Ahmed Reda Guedira, Moroccan politician, 30
- Ahmed Sekou Toure, Guinean president, 45–47, 55, 57
- Airborne Division, Armed Forces of Zaire, 164

- Akaga, General Jean-Felix,
 Gabonese officer, 224
 Akol Ajawin, Lam, Sudan rebel
 leader, 117, 120, 123
 Alao, Colonel Shittu A., Nigerian
 officer, 45
 al-Badr (Imam), Yemeni leader, 2, 3
 Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
 (AQIM), 29, 55, 74
 Al-Qaeda terrorist network,
 28, 54, 146
 Al-Shabaab, Somalia, 108,
 109, 146
 Alexander, Major General H.T.,
 British officer, 42
 Algeria, 1, 2, 19, 21–29, 32–33, 36, 47,
 52, 68, 70–73, 95, 158, 159, 162, 168,
 170, 228, 232, 237, 247
 Algeria-Morocco Border War (1963),
 32–33
 Algerian Air Force, 22, 24
 Algerian Civil War (1992–2002),
 25–29
 Algerian Navy, 22, 24, 28
 Ali, Brigadier Moses, Ugandan rebel
 leader, 137
 Ali Malhi, Somali interim
 president, 105
 Alier, Abel, Southern Sudan
 regional president, 113
 Alliance for the Restoration
 of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
 (ARPCT), 107
 Alliance of Democratic Forces for
 the Liberation of Congo (AFDL),
 197–200
 Allied Democratic Forces (ADF),
 Uganda, 145, 198, 201, 203, 204
 Alouett helicopters, 57
 Amadou Sanogo, Captain, Malian
 officer, 73
 Amadou Toumani Toure, Malian
 president, 73
 Amari Saifi, Algerian rebel
 leader, 28
 Amin, Idi, Uganda officer and ruler,
 89–91, 111, 134–37, 141, 145, 177,
 204, 239
 Amisi, General Gabriel,
 Congolese rebel, 208
 Amuka (Rhino) Groups,
 Uganda, 146
 AMX-30 tanks, 15
 Anan, Kofi, UN secretary
 general, 131, 185
 Andom, General Aman Mikael
 (Lion of Ogaden), Ethiopian
 officer, 91
 Angola, xiii, xv, 56, 61, 91, 94,
 157, 162–65, 167, 168, 198, 199,
 202–210, 224–28, 232, 235, 236, 240,
 242–65, 286
 Angolan Air Force, 268
 Angolan Armed Forces (FAA),
 203–209, 266–69
 Angolan Civil War (1975–89), 247–65
 Angolan Civil War (1989–2002),
 266–69
 Angolan Invasion of Congo-
 Brazzaville (1997), 225
 Angolan Navy, 268–69
 Ankrah, Brigadier Joseph A.,
 Ghanaian officer, 42, 155
 Ansar Dine (Defenders of
 the Faith), 73, 74
 Antar Zouabri, Algerian rebel
 leader, 28
 Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU),
 Liberia, 63
 Antonov transport aircraft, 22, 122,
 130, 187, 204, 206
 Anwar Sadat, Egyptian leader, 7–10
 Anyanya, 109–113, 125
 Anyanya II, 114–116
 Anyanya National Armed Forces
 (ANAF), 110
 Anyidoho, Brigadier Henry Kwami,
 Ghanaian officer, 185
 Aouzou Strip, 171–76
 Arab Gathering, 128

- Arab Islamic Front of Azawad (FIAA), 71
- Arab League, 105, 131
- Arab Maghreb Union, 36
- Arab Spring, 2, 17, 18, 21, 36, 37
- Arab-Israeli War (1967), Six Days' War, 4–6, 14, 22, 89, 110
- Arab-Israeli War (1973), Yom Kippur War, October War, 7–9, 15, 22, 31
- Arab-Israeli Wars, xiii, 1
- Aringa, 137, 145
- Armaments Development and Production Corporation (Armscor), 231–32
- Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique (FADM), 280
- Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA), 251, 254–65
- Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), 58–59, 62–65
- Armed Forces of Zaire (FAZ), 163–170, 194–200, 202, 208, 210
- Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), 146, 148, 149, 209–216
- Armed Forces of the North (FAN), Chad, 127, 172–74
- Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), Sierra Leone, 61
- Armed Islamic Group (GIA), 25–28
- Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR), 200, 201, 205, 206, 212
- Army of National Liberation (ALN), Algeria, 22–24, 26
- Arrow Boys, 146
- Arrows Groups, Uganda, 143, 144
- Arusha Accords (1993–94), 184, 185
- Auma, Alice, Ugandan rebel leader, 141–43
- Australia, 43, 139
- Austria, 36, 155, 282
- Ayene, Brigadier Asefa, Ethiopian officer, 80
- Azanian National Liberation Army (AZANLA), 239–40
- Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), 238, 239, 283, 284
- Azawad, 70, 74
- Baganda, 134, 138, 139, 145
- Bagaza, Colonel Jean-Baptiste, Burundi leader, 190, 191
- Bagosora, Colonel Theoneste, Rwandan officer, 185, 186
- Bahigwa, Dieudonne Amuli, Congolese officer, 209
- Baingana, Peter, Ugandan-Rwandan officer, 179
- Baka Regiment, Congolese National Army, 162
- Bakassi Peninsula, 54, 55
- Bakongo, 152, 225, 242–46
- Bakongo Alliance (ABAKO), 152
- Balante, 55
- Bamuze, Major General Ali, Ugandan rebel leader, 145
- Banda, Hastings Kamuzu, Malawi president, 279, 280
- Bangilima Militia, 195
- Bangladesh, 15, 211, 212, 280
- Bangui Accords (1997), 219
- Banjo, Brigadier Victor, Biafran officer, 50
- Banyamulenge, 194–202, 205, 208, 213
- Banyingana, Major Peter, Ugandan-Rwandan officer, 180
- Banza, Captain Alexandre, Central African officer, 216
- Baqqara, 115, 121–23, 127, 128, 129
- Bar Lev Line, 6, 7
- Baril, Paul, French mercenary, 219
- Barre, Said, Somali leader, 84, 85, 93–94, 103–105
- Battle Group Juliet, 253, 254
- Beja Congress, 121
- Belarus, 122, 267

- Belgium, x, xi, 106, 151–67, 181, 185, 186, 188, 193, 210, 211, 232
- Bemba, Jean-Pierre, Congolese rebel leader, 203–209, 220–22
- Benghazi, Libya, 16–18
- Bentiu, South Sudan, 116, 122, 127
- Biafra, 50–55, 230
- Bicesse Accords (1991), 266
- Bin Laden, Osama, 121
- Binaisa, Godfrey, Ugandan leader, 137
- Binda, Major General Sipho, South African officer, 193
- Bisesero, Rwanda, 188
- Bizerte Crisis (1961), 19
- Bizimungu, General Augustin, Rwandan officer, 186
- Bizimungu, Pasteur, Rwanda president, 188
- Black Arrows, Angola, 163
- Black Consciousness, 238
- Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA), 239
- Black Diamond, Colonel, Liberian rebel, 64
- Black Hawk Down Incident (1993), 106
- Black Hawk helicopters, 106
- Blah, Moses, Liberian transitional leader, 64
- Blahyi, Joshua Milton (General Butt Naked), Liberian rebel, 59
- Blair, Tony, British prime minister, 62
- BM21 multiple rocket launchers, 249
- Bobozo, General Louis, Congolese officer, 162
- Bokassa, Jean Bedel, Central African officer, 216–18
- Boko Haram, 29, 54, 55
- Bolivia, 209
- Bongo, Omar, Gabon president, 221, 226
- Bophuthatswana, 229, 283
- Bor Massacre (1991), Sudan, 117
- Border War, South West Africa/Angola (1966–89), 247–65
- Botha, P. W., South African president, 259, 260, 283
- Botswana, 202, 208, 228, 233, 234, 237, 238, 240, 271–73, 280, 281, 286
- Botswana Defence Force (BDF), 282, 285
- Bozize, General Francois, Central African officer and president, 220–24
- Brazil, 242, 265, 268
- Brazzaville Accords (1976), 164
- Breguet Atlantique long-range reconnaissance aircraft, 34
- Breytenbach, Jan, South African officer, 51, 230, 253
- Britain, ix, 42–44, 51, 62, 79, 84–87, 89, 91, 94, 109, 123, 125, 131, 139, 163, 167, 211, 213, 231, 265, 269, 270, 275, 282, 284
- British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT), 265, 275
- Bryant, Charles Gyude, Liberian transitional president, 64, 65
- Buffel mine-protected vehicle, 232
- Bulgaria, 122, 267
- Bunyenyenzi, Major Chris, Ugandan-Rwandan officer, 179, 180
- Burkina Faso (Upper Volta), 48, 60, 63–65, 70, 132, 219
- Burundi, 108, 158, 181, 184–94, 196, 198, 201, 204, 206, 285
- Burundian Armed Forces (FAB), 190–93
- Bush, George W., U.S. president, 107, 131, 208
- Buyoya, Major Pierre, Burundi leader, 190–92
- C-47 transport aircraft, 80
- C-119 transport aircraft, 80
- C-130 transport aircraft, 20, 24, 29, 34, 35, 72, 122, 134, 159, 162, 165, 166, 130, 231, 282, 286

- Cabinda Enclave, Angola, 164, 203, 225, 245, 246, 266
 Cabora Bassa dam project, 241
 Cabral, Amilcar, Guinea-Bissau rebel leader, 55–57
 Cabral, Luis, Guinea-Bissau president, 57, 68
 Cambodia, 180, 239
 Cameroon, 42, 54, 55, 224
 Cammaert, Major General Patrick, Dutch officer, 213
 Canada, 41, 42, 44, 73, 88, 106, 109, 121, 139, 155, 156, 197, 232, 282
 Canadian Airborne Regiment, 106
 Canberra Bombers, 157, 249
 Cape Verde, 55, 57
 Caprivi Liberation Army, 265
 Caprivi Strip, 239, 280
 Carter, Jimmy, U.S. president, 164, 166, 167
 Casamance Conflict, Senegal, (1982–2013), 39, 67–68
 Cassinga, Raid on (1978), 167, 253, 254. *See also* Operation Reindeer
 Casspir mine-protected vehicle, 232, 252
 Castro, Fidel, 94, 167, 249, 258, 260, 262, 263
Centaur, HMS, 85
 Central African Armed Forces (FACA), 216, 221–23
 Central African Empire, 216
 Central African Federation, 229
 Central African Republic (CAR), xiv, 144, 147–49, 160, 167, 175, 177, 180, 186, 204–206, 216–24, 226, 249, 285
 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), United States, 107, 152, 158, 161, 162, 168, 170
 Centurion tanks, 5, 6, 232
 CF-5A/D Freedom Fighters, 282
 Chad, 15, 28, 29, 74, 127–33, 152, 168, 170–77, 187, 204, 211, 218–25
 Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT), 128, 129, 174–76
 Chadli Benjedid, Colonel, Algerian leader, 23–25
 Chand, Major General Dewan Prem, Indian officer, 157
 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, Algeria, 28
 Chemical warfare, 3, 232
 Chengdu F-7 fighters, 204, 265, 276
 Chevron, 114
 Child soldiers, xiii, 59, 61, 115, 139, 143, 193, 199, 200, 204, 212, 224
 China, People's Republic, xi, 22, 42, 43, 46, 47, 88, 89, 96, 109, 121, 122, 125, 132, 158, 165, 169, 199, 216, 238, 240, 246, 267, 271, 275, 276
 Chinese Navy, 109
 Chinook helicopters, 176
 Chipenda, Daniel, Angolan rebel leader, 246
 Chirac, Jacques, French president, 66
 Chissano, Joaquim, Mozambique president, 280
 Chitepo, Herbert, Zimbabwe liberation leader, 272
 Chollet, Lieutenant Colonel Gilles, French officer, 181
 Christmas Massacres (2008), 148
 Christmas War (1985), 70
 Chuel, William Abdullah, Sudan militia leader, 114
 Ciskei, 283
 Citizen Force, South African Defence Force, 230, 251, 253
 Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB), Project Barnacle, South Africa, 230–31
 Civil Guard, Zaire, 130
 Clinton, Bill, U.S. president, 106, 107, 202, 266
 Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR), Rwanda, 183
 Cobra Militia, Congo-Brazzaville, 225

- Cold War, xi, 2, 39, 47, 51, 77, 80, 151, 154, 194, 218, 225, 227, 228, 266, 280, 283, 286
- Combat Group Alpha, 20
Brigade, South African Defence Force, 259
- Combat Group Bravo, 20 Brigade, South African Defence Force, 259
- Combat Group 20, South African Defence Force, 263
- Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), 102
- Commando Division, Ethiopia, 100
- Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), 69
- Community of Sahel Saharan States (CEN-SAD), 220, 221
- Compaore, Blaise, Burkina Faso president, 63, 64
- Congo, Post–2002 conflict, 209–216
- Congo Crisis (1960–68), 42–44, 52, 110, 152–62
- Congo War, First (1996–97), 145, 194–200
- Congo War, Second (1998–2002), Africa's World War, 145, 146, 151, 200–209, 265, 276
- Congo-Brazzaville, 94, 157, 158, 160, 187, 200, 204, 206, 207, 221, 224–26, 245, 267
- Congolese Air Force, 158–60
- Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), 200–209
- Congolese National Army (ANC), 152–62
- Congolese National Movement (MNC), 152
- Conte, Lieutenant Colonel
Lansana, Guinean officer and president, 47, 63
- Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), CAR, 223
- Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), 39, 42, 48, 51, 53, 58, 59, 64–67, 74, 167, 211
- Cote d'Ivoire Civil War (2002–04), 65–66
- Cote d'Ivoire Civil War (2010–11), 66–67
- Counterinsurgency: Angola, 268; Burundi, 191; Ethiopia, 101; Kenya, 91–92; Portuguese in Angola, 244, 246, 247; Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau, 55–57; Portuguese in Mozambique, 242; Rhodesia, 273–74; Rwanda, 200–201; Senegal, 68; South West Africa, 247; Uganda, 140–44
- Cuba, xi, 15, 32, 46, 47, 56, 57, 81–83, 87, 94, 96, 139, 158–63, 165, 167, 168, 224, 245, 248–65
- Cuito Cuanavale, Battle of (1987–88), 260–63
- Cyrenaica, 14
- Cyrenaica Defence Force (CDF), 14
- Cyrenaica Police Force, 14
- Czechoslovakia, 46, 56, 84
- Dabengwa, Dumiso, Zimbabwe liberation leader, 273, 277
- Dacko, David, Central African president, 216, 218
- Dallaïre, Lieutenant General Romeo, Canadian officer, 184–85
- Darfur, 15, 115, 123, 127–33, 149, 173, 176, 177, 223
- Darfur Liberation Front (DLF), 130
- Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) (2006), 132
- Davidson, Basil, journalist/historian, 97
- De Arriaga, General Kaulza, Portuguese officer, 242
- De Gaulle, Charles, 51, 170
- De Klerk, F. W., South African president, 283
- De Kock, Eugene, South African police officer, 252
- De Spinola, General Antonio, Portuguese officer, 56, 57

- Deby, Idriss, Chadian leader, 128, 129, 131, 133, 176, 177, 220
- Delta Force, 106
- Demafouth, Jean-Jacques, Central African politician, 220–21
- Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC), Mali, 72, 73
- Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), 212–15
- Democratic Front for the Central African People (FDPC), 221–23
- Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), former Belgian Congo and Zaire, xiii, xiv, 89, 90, 112, 119, 134, 136, 137, 140, 144–45, 147, 148, 151–70, 173, 174, 181, 184, 187–89, 191, 193, 194–216, 221, 225, 226, 237, 242–48, 266, 267, 277, 285, 286
- Denard, Bob, mercenary, 159, 160, 162
- Depooter, Colonel Rik, Belgian officer, 166
- Desta, Rear Admiral Iskendar, Ethiopian officer, 80
- Dhlakama, Afonso, Mozambican rebel leader, 280
- Diallo, Major General Mountaga, Senegalese officer, 209
- Dien Bien Phu, Battle of (1954), 97, 166
- Dinka, 111, 114–17, 120–23
- Djamous, General Hassan, Chadian officer, 175–76
- Djibouti, 91, 102, 104, 105, 108, 220
- Djogo, General Negue, Chadian officer, 174
- Djotodia, Michel, Central African rebel leader, 224
- Doe, Master Sergeant Samuel, Liberian soldier and president, 58, 64
- Dok, Brigadier Sim Hyon, North Korean officer, 275
- Dos Santos, Jose Eduardo, Angolan president, 268
- Driss Basri, Moroccan politician, 37
- Dube, John, ZIPRA member, 233
- East Germany, 83, 88
- Eastern Revolt, Angola, 246
- Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 220, 221, 224
- Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), xiv, 39, 47–48, 58–59, 64, 66, 69, 73, 74
- Economic Community of West African States Mission to Liberia (ECOMIL), 64–65
- ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 48, 58–60, 62, 63, 69
- Effiong, General Phillip, Biafran officer, 53
- Egypt, xiii, xiv, 1, 2–13, 15, 17, 19, 22, 32, 38, 79, 89, 112, 127, 132, 158, 165, 170, 173, 181, 186, 232
- Egypt-Libya Border War (1977), 9–11
- Egyptian Air Force (EAF), 4, 5, 7, 8
- Egyptian intervention in Yemen civil war (1962–67), 2–4, 10
- Egyptian Navy, 8
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., U.S. president, 156
- Eland armored car, 36
- Elf-Aquitaine Oil Company, 225
- End Conscription Campaign, 231
- El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed (El Wali), POLISARIO leader, 34
- Entebbe, Israeli Raid on (1976), 134–35
- Eritrea, 77, 80, 81, 82, 93–98, 101–103, 108, 111, 114, 121, 132, 149, 285
- Eritrean Air Force, 103
- Eritrean Defence Force (EDF), 103
- Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), 94–96, 98
- Eritrean Navy, 103
- Eritrean People's Liberation Army (EPLF), 78, 95–99, 103, 239

- Erulin, Colonel Philippe, French officer, 166
- Ethiopia, 43, 52, 77–84, 91–105, 107–111, 113, 114, 116–19, 121, 127, 132, 139, 149, 155, 167, 183, 193, 285
- Ethiopia-Eritrea War (1998–2000), 101–102
- Ethiopian Air Force (Imperial Ethiopian Air Force), 44, 80–82, 97, 101, 103, 157
- Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF), 102–103
- Ethiopian Navy, 80–83, 102–103
- Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), 100, 102
- European Union, xi, 47, 62, 108, 109, 131, 149, 211, 223
- European Union Force (EUFOR), 177, 223
- Executive Outcomes (EO), 61, 267
- Eyadema, Gnassingbe, Togo president, 168
- F-4 Phantom fighters, 6, 11, 90
- F-5 fighter-bomber, 14, 20, 29, 31, 34–36, 80, 87
- F-14 Tomcat fighters, 16, 17
- F-16 fighter, 11
- F-86 Sabre jet fighters, 80, 157
- F-111 fighter-bombers, 17
- Fadlallah Burma Nasr, Sudan minister of defense, 115
- Federal Army of Darfur, 128
- Firefly fighter-bombers, 80
- Flechas, 246
- Flintlock 2005, 29
- Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD), Burundi, 191–93, 198, 204, 206, 207
- Force Publique Mutiny (1960), 152
- Former Uganda National Army (FUNA), 137, 144, 145
- Fouga Magister trainer/ground attack jets, 89, 156
- France, involvement in postcolonial Africa, ix, x, xiv, 34, 35, 44, 47, 51, 52, 65–67, 74, 87, 106, 109, 131, 151, 154, 156, 158, 159, 164–67, 169, 170–77, 180–88, 196, 199, 211, 216–25, 228, 231, 232, 247
- Franco, Francisco, 31, 33
- Free Libyan Air Force, 18
- French Foreign Legion, 52, 166, 167, 170, 172, 188
- French Union, 45
- Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), 190–93
- Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), Uganda, 134, 137, 138, 177
- Front for the Liberation and Independence of Portuguese Guinea (FLING), 56
- Front for the Liberation of Air and Azaouak, 71
- Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC), 245, 266
- Front for the National Liberation of Congo (FNLC), 163–68
- Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), 136, 137, 238, 240–42, 272, 277–80
- Front for the Liberation of Tamoust, 71
- Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), 275
- Frontline States, 278
- Fur people, 127–33
- G-5 howitzer, South Africa, 232, 258, 263
- G-6 self-propelled gun, 260
- Gabon, 51, 167, 186, 218, 219, 221, 224, 226
- Gaddafi, Muammar, 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 14–18, 36, 63, 70, 73, 91, 127–37, 141, 171–77, 204, 216, 220, 221, 239

- Gafsa Raid (1980), 20
 Gahutu, Remy, Burundi
 rebel leader, 190
 Gai Tut, Samuel, Sudan
 rebel leader, 114
 Gamal Abd al-Nasser, 1–7, 14, 79
 Gambella People's Liberation Front (GPLF), 114
 Gambia, 63, 67, 68, 132
 Garamba National Park, 145, 147, 148
 Garang de Mabior, John, Sudan
 rebel leader, 113–25
 Gatkuoth, Gatwic, Sudan militia leader, 120
 Gatsinzi, Colonel Marcel, Rwandan officer, 185
 Gaza Strip, 5, 13
 Gazelle helicopters, 35
 Gbagbo, Laurent, Ivorian president, 65–67
 Gbenye, Christopher, Congolese rebel leader, 157
 General Services Unit (GSU), Kenya, 86, 87
 Germanos, General Raymond, French officer, 187
 Ghana, 41–43, 58, 61, 63, 64, 84, 155, 184, 185, 188, 209, 237
 Ghana Military Academy, Techie, 41
 Ghana Regiment (formerly Gold Coast Regiment), 41
 Ghanaian Air Force (GAF), 41
 Ghanaian Army, 41–43
 Ghanaian Navy, 41
 Gichuru, Colonel Dedan, Kenyan officer, 86
 Gizenga, Antoine, Congolese deputy prime minister, 154, 157, 158
 Global and Inclusive Accord (AGI), Democratic Republic of Congo (2002), 209
 Golan Heights, 6, 8
 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 100
 Gowon, Lieutenant Colonel Yakuba, Nigerian officer and ruler, 49–53
 Green March (1975), 33
 Gripen multirole fighters, 285
 Guatemala, 147
 Guei, Robert, Ivoirian military ruler, 65
 Guevara, Che, 160–61
 Guinea, 39, 45–47, 55–61, 63, 68, 69, 155
 Guinea Democratic Party (PDG), 45–47
 Guinea-Bissau, xiii, 39, 46, 48, 55–58, 67–69, 187, 240
 Guinea-Bissau Independence War (1961–74), 55–58
 Gulf of Sirte (Gulf of Sidra) Conflict (1981–89), 16–17
 Gulf War (1991), 48, 199
 Habib Bourguiba, Tunisian president, 18–20
 Habre, Hissene, Chadian leader, 127–29, 172–76
 Hainyeko, Tobias, Namibian rebel leader, 247
 Hamaabo, Lieutenant General Jerobeam Dimo, Namibian officer, 265
 Hamid Idris Awate, Eritrean rebel leader, 95
 Hammarskjöld, Dag, UN secretary general, 156
 Hansen, Lieutenant Colonel David, Ghanaian officer, 42
 Hassan al-Amri, General, Yemeni officer, 4
 Hassan Hattab, Algerian rebel leader, 27, 28
 Hassan II, King of Morocco, 30, 35, 36
 Hausa-Fulani, 49
 Habyarimana, Agathe, 186
 Habyarimana, Major General Juvenal, Rwanda president, 177–86, 190

- Hani, Chris, ANC leader, 233–36, 281
- Hawk fighter, 204, 275, 276, 285
- Heglig, Sudan, 122, 127
- Hema, 206, 208, 210–12
- HIV/AIDS pandemic, 286
- Hoar, General Joseph P., U.S. marine officer, 106
- Hoare, Mike, mercenary, 159–61, 199
- Hollande, Francois, French president, 224
- Holy Spirit Mobile Force (HSMF), 141, 142
- Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), 141, 142
- Hongdu JL-8 trainer/ground attack jets, 276
- Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian officer, 4, 7, 9, 12
- Houari Boumedienne, Colonel, Algerian officer, 22, 23
- Houphouet-Boigny, Felix, Cote d'Ivoire president, 65
- Hirsi, Colonel Daud Abdulle, Somali officer, 83
- Hunde, 194–96, 201
- Hunter aircraft, 87
- Hunter Group, South Africa, 230
- Hussein Mohamed Farrah, Somali warlord, 107
- Hutu, 180–201, 206, 212
- Hutu Power, 177, 183–88, 196
- Iala, Kumba, Guinea-Bissau president, 69
- Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, Malian Tuareg rebel leader, 72, 73
- Idris, Sayyid Amr Muhammad, Libyan king, 14
- Ifni Conflict (1957–58), 31, 32
- Igbo, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53
- Ikela, Battle of (1999), 206
- Il-76 transport aircraft, 17
- Ilyushin 28 bomber, 5, 29, 51
- Impala aircraft, 257
- Imperial Guard, Ethiopia, 79, 81
- Impuzamugambi Militia, 183
- Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), 58–59
- India, 41, 43, 44, 109, 151, 155, 157, 212, 213, 215, 282
- Indochina, 52, 68, 159, 166, 168, 216
- Inienger, General John, Nigerian officer, 59
- Intagoheka Militia, 191
- Inter-African Commission to Monitor Implementation of the Bangui Accords (MISAB), 219
- Interahamwe Militia, 183–88, 196, 199–201, 204, 206–209, 212
- Inter-African Forces, xiv, 167, 173, 219
- Interim Emergency Multi-national Force (IEMF), 211
- International Court of Justice, 176
- International Criminal Court, The Hague, 65, 67, 133, 147, 212, 215, 216, 221, 222
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), 182
- Iran, 3, 8, 68, 80, 122, 239
- Iraq, 11, 12, 17, 21, 22, 62, 95, 116, 122, 131, 265
- Ireland, 155, 156
- Isberg, Brigadier General Jan-Gunnar, Swedish officer, 213
- Islamic Arab Legion, Libya, 15, 70, 127–29, 135, 173
- Islamic Armed Movement (MIA), 25–27
- Islamic Courts Union (ICU), 107, 108
- Islamic Militancy, xi, xii, 2, 7, 9, 20, 24–29, 37, 74, 107, 133, 193
- Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), 27
- Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), Algeria, 25–27
- Ismailiya Pass, Battle of (1967), 6
- Israel, xi, xiii, 1, 4–9, 11, 12, 35, 38, 41, 60, 79, 81, 88–91, 95, 110–12,

- 134–35, 162, 163, 169, 170, 225, 232, 279, 281
- Israeli Air Force (IAF), 5, 6, 20
- Italy, 15, 28, 36, 37, 41, 78, 80, 84, 91, 94, 106, 123, 155, 163, 167, 186, 232, 280
- Ituri, 197, 198, 206, 208, 210–12
- Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West (MPIGO), 65
- Izamo, Colonel Jean, Central African officer, 216
- Ja'afar Muhammad Numayri, Colonel, Sudan ruler, 112–14, 127
- Jaden, Aggrey, Sudan rebel leader, 110
- Jadotville, Siege of (1961), 156
- Jaguar aircraft, 34, 172, 174, 175, 187
- Jammeh, Yahya, Gambia president, 67
- Jamus Battalion, Sudan People's Liberation Army, 114
- Janjaweed, 129, 130, 131, 132
- Janssens, General Emile, Belgian officer, 152
- Japan, 109
- Jasiri, KNS, 87
- Joffe, Abraham, General, Israeli officer, 5
- Johnson, Roosevelt, Liberian rebel leader, 59
- Johnson Sirleaf, Ellen, Liberian president, 65
- Jordan, 3–5, 116
- Juba Declaration (2006), 125
- Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), 130–33
- Kabarebe, James, Rwandan officer, 200–202
- Kabila, Joseph, DRC leader, 208–216, 221, 267
- Kabila, Laurent, DRC leader, 145, 160, 168, 197–208
- Kabwe Conference (1985), 237
- Kadogo (child soldiers), 199, 200
- Kagame, Paul, Rwanda president, 137, 145, 177–88, 196
- Kagnew Battalions, Ethiopian Army, 79
- Kagnew Station, 80, 81
- Kahtz, Colonel Gerhard, West German officer, 44
- Kakuji, Colonel, Congolese officer, 159
- Kakwa, 90, 137
- Kalenjin, 85
- Kalonji, Albert, Congolese rebel leader, 152
- Kamajors, 60, 61
- Kamba, 85
- Kamina Air Base, Democratic Republic of Congo, 159, 167–69, 205
- Kandji, Major General Elhadji Mouhamedou, Senegalese officer, 177
- Kanyarengwe, Colonel Alexis, Rwandan officer, 181
- Kasai, 152, 154, 155, 203, 204, 207
- Kasavubu, Joseph, Congolese president, 152, 154, 158, 159, 161
- Kasrils, Ronnie, ANC leader, 237, 258
- Katanga (Shaba), 152–70, 198, 201, 204–207
- Katanga Air Force, 156, 157
- Kayibanda, Gregoire, Ugandan-Rwanda president, 177
- Kayitare, Captain, Rwandan officer, 181
- Kaymanyola Division, Armed Forces of Zaire, 163–65, 169
- Kayonga, Lieutenant Colonel Charles, Rwanda officer, 186
- Keita, Modibo, Malian president, 69, 70
- Kenge, Battle of (1997), 199
- Kennedy, John F., U.S. president, 157

- Kenya, 84–87, 91, 105, 108, 110, 123, 125, 134, 142, 149, 177, 265, 281
- Kenya Rifles, 85
- Kenyan Air Force (KAF), 87
- Kenyan Army, 86
- Kenyan Navy, 87, 108
- Kenyatta, Jomo, president of Kenya, 85, 86
- Khaled Nezzar, Algerian general, 25
- Khama, Ian, Botswana president, 282
- Kifwa, Celestin, Congolese officer, 202
- Kigali, Battle of (1994), 187
- Kiir Mayardit, Salva, South Sudan president, 125
- Kikosi Maalum, 134
- Kikuyu, 85, 86
- Kilo class submarines, 28
- Kimaro, Colonel J. C. J., Kenyan officer, 86
- King's African Rifles (KAR), 85–87, 89, 136
- Kisangani, Battle of (1999), 205
- Kivu (North and South), 145, 146, 148, 155, 157, 158, 168, 191, 192, 194, 196–98, 201, 206, 208, 212, 213, 215
- Koevoet, 252, 265
- Kolelas, Bernard, Brazzaville mayor, 225
- Kolingba, General Andre, Central African officer, 218, 220
- Kong Cuol, Gordon, 117
- Kony, Joseph, Ugandan rebel leader, 143–44, 146–49
- Kordofan, 115, 127, 128
- Korean War (1950–53), 79
- Koromah, Major Johnny Paul, Sierra Leone officer, 61
- Kouchner, Bernard, French politician, 51
- Kromah, Alhaji, Liberian rebel leader, 59
- Kuanyin Bol, Kerubino, Sudan rebel leader, 113, 118–20
- Kurubo, Lieutenant Colonel George, Nigerian officer, 45
- Kuwa, Yusif, Sudan rebel leader, 115, 116
- Kuwait, 11, 12, 199
- Kwilu Rebellion (1963–64), Congo, 157, 158, 162
- Lafourade, General Jean-Claude, French officer, 187
- Lagu, Colonel Joseph, Sudan rebel leader, 110–13
- Lagu, Lennox, ANC leader, 236
- Lake Albert, 160
- Lake Kariba, 234, 270
- Lake Kivu, 197
- Lake Mwelu, 207
- Lake Tanganyika, 158–61, 168, 169, 170, 207, 208
- Lake Victoria, 90, 135, 136, 141
- Lancaster House Agreement (1979), 274, 275
- Land mines, 3, 56, 68, 72, 111, 116, 139, 140, 236, 237, 240, 243, 247, 250, 251, 258, 261, 262, 263, 267, 268, 280, 281
- Langi, 90, 134, 139, 140, 146, 147
- Larbi Belkheir, Algerian general, 25
- Laurent, Colonel Charles, Belgian officer, 159
- Leballo, P. K., PAC leader, 238, 239
- Sendu, 206, 208, 210–12
- Leninism, 238, 271
- Lesoma Ambush (1978), 282
- Lesotho, 228, 233, 237, 239, 280, 281, 285
- Lesotho Liberation Army, 281
- Liamine Zeroual, Algerian general, 26
- Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), Darfur, 133
- Liberia, xii, 39, 48, 58–60, 62–65, 67, 74, 155

- Liberian Civil War (1989–1997), 58–60
- Liberian Civil War (1999–2003), 62–65
- Liberian Peace Council (LPC), 59
- Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), 63, 64
- Libya, 1, 2, 8–11, 13–20, 28, 33, 36, 38, 58, 63, 70–73, 90, 91, 104, 116, 127–38, 141, 168, 170–77, 204, 216, 220, 221, 239
- Libyan Arab Forces (LAF), World War II, 13, 14
- Lissouba, Pascal, Congo-Brazzaville president, 225
- Local Defence Units (LDUs), Uganda, 139, 143, 144
- Lockerbie, Scotland, 176
- Lohure, Father Saturnino, Sudan rebel leader, 110
- Lomba River, Battle of (1987), 259, 260
- Lome Peace Accord (1999), 61, 62
- Lord's Army, Uganda, 142, 143
- Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), 77, 120, 121, 143–49, 210, 222
- Luanda Agreement (2002), 208–209
- Luba, 154, 155, 156
- Lubanga, Thomas, Congolese rebel leader, 211, 212
- Lukoya, Severino, Ugandan rebel leader, 142, 143
- Lukuya, Battle of (1979), 136
- Lule, Yusuf, Ugandan transitional leader, 137
- Lulua, 155
- Lumumba, Patrice, Congolese prime minister, 152–56
- Lunda, 165
- Lundin Petroleum Company, 122, 123
- Lundula, Major General Victor, Congolese officer, 152
- Lusaka Agreement (1984), 256
- Lusaka Agreement (1994), 267, 268
- Lusaka Agreement (1999), 206, 208
- Luthuli Detachment, 233, 234
- Luwero Triangle, Uganda, 138–41
- M1AI Abrams main battle tank, 11
- M47 Patton tanks, 6
- M48 Patton tanks, 36
- M60 main battle tank, 11, 12, 20, 37
- M109 self-propelled howitzers, 12
- M113 armored personnel carriers, 12, 20, 36
- Maada-Bio, Brigadier Julius, Sierra Leone officer, 61
- Maaten al-Sarra, Raid on (1987), 176
- Mabe, General Mbuza, Congolese officer, 213
- Machar Teny-Dhurgon, Riek, Sudan rebel leader, 117, 119, 120
- Machel, Samora, Mozambique leader, 242, 279
- Maharaj, Mac, ANC leader, 237
- Mahe, Firmin, Ivorian bandit, 66
- Mahele, General Donat Lieko, Zairean officer, 166, 181, 199, 200
- Mai Mai Militia, 201, 205–207, 209, 210, 212, 214, 215
- Makenga, Colonel Sultani, Congolese rebel leader, 215
- Malan, Magnus, South African officer, 228, 229
- Malawi (Nyasaland), 215, 229, 279, 280, 286
- Malawi Rifles, 279
- Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP), 279, 280
- Malaysia, 107, 121, 155, 255, 273
- Mali, 15, 28, 29, 39, 46, 65, 69–75, 155, 183, 219
- Malian Patriotic Movement (Ganda Koi), 71
- Malire Regiment, Uganda, 90
- Malloum, General Felix, Chadian leader, 172
- Malu, Major General Victor, Nigerian officer, 59, 63

- Mandela, Nelson, 81, 192, 283, 284
- Mane, Brigadier Ansumane, Guinea-Bissau officer, 68–69
- Mantion, Lieutenant-Colonel Jean-Claude, French officer, 218
- Maoism, 96, 238, 239, 245, 271
- March 23 Movement (M23), 215, 216
- Mariano, Antonio, Angolan rebel leader, 242
- Marwa, Major General Mwita, Tanzanian officer, 136
- Marxism, 241, 242, 277
- Masalit, 129, 130
- Mashonaland, 272
- Masire, Ketumile, Botswana president, 208
- Massawa, Battle of (1990), 98
- Massi, Charles, Central African rebel leader, 223
- Masuku, Lookout, Zimbabwe liberation leader, 273, 275
- Masunzu, Patrick, Banyamulenge leader, 205, 208
- Mata, Lieutenant General Liwanga, Congolese officer, 209
- Matabeleland, 233, 271, 276
- Matip, Paulino, Sudan militia leader, 120, 125
- Mauritania, 29, 32–34, 36, 187
- Mbeki, Thabo, South African president, 208
- Mbochi, 224, 225
- Mbuki, Major Sylvain, Congolese officer, 202, 209
- Mbumba, Nathaniel, Katanga/Shaba rebel leader, 163
- Mbundu, 158, 245
- McIntyre, Alexander, Rhodesian Air Force officer, 275
- Medecins sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders), 51
- Meiring, General Georg, South African officer, 284
- Mella, Lieutenant General Paul Ignace, Tanzanian officer, 132
- Mengistu Haile Mariam, Colonel, Ethiopian ruler, 93–101, 104, 114, 117
- Merafhe, Major General Mompoti S., Botswana officer, 282
- Mercenaries, Congo, 154–62, 199
- Mers el-Kebir naval base, Algeria, 22
- Mgwebi, Major General Derrick, South African officer, 193
- Mi-17 transport helicopters, 203
- Mi-24 attack helicopters, 24, 29, 61, 122, 125, 176, 199, 201, 204, 226, 256, 268, 276
- Mi-35 attack helicopters, 266
- Mi-171 transport helicopters, 28
- Micombero, Captain Michel, Burundi leader, 188–90
- MiG-15, 45, 89
- MiG-17, 22, 29, 45, 46, 51, 80, 88, 89, 91, 135
- MiG-21 jet fighter, 5, 22, 24, 84, 91, 134, 135, 276
- MiG-23 fighter, 10, 15, 17, 24, 203, 256, 266
- MiG-25 fighter, 15, 266
- MiG-29 fighter, 28, 103
- Milan guided antitank missiles, 175
- Military coups and regimes, xii
- Minnawi, Minni Arku, Darfur rebel leader, 132
- Mirage fighters, 5, 8, 10, 11, 15, 35, 166, 168, 170, 174, 187, 222, 232, 257
- Miskine, Colonel Abdoulaye (Martin Koumtamadi), Chadian/Central African rebel, 219, 221
- Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (MICROPAX), 223
- Mitla Pass, Battle of (1967), 6
- Mitterrand, Francois, French president, 175
- Moba, Battles of (1984–85), 168

- Mobutu, Joseph (Mobutu Sese Seko), 145, 152–70, 181, 188, 194–200, 225, 243, 244, 266–68
 Modise, Joe, ANC leader, 235, 236
 Mogadishu, First Battle of (1993), 106
 Mogadishu, Second Battle of (2006), 107
 Mohamed Abdelaziz, POLISARIO leader, 34
 Mohamed Boudiaf, Algerian president, 25
 Mohamed Farrah Aidid, Somali warlord, 105–107
 Mohamed Harbi, Algerian academic, 21
 Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Field Marshall, Egyptian officer, 12
 Mohamed Lamari, Algerian general, 26
 Mohamed Morsi, Egyptian politician, 12
 Mohammed V, king of Morocco, 30
 Mohammed VI, king of Morocco, 35, 37
 Momoh, General Joseph, Sierra Leonean officer and ruler, 59, 60
 Mondlane, Eduardo, Mozambique rebel leader, 240, 242
 Monkoti, Colonel, Zairean officer, 164
 Morocco, 1, 2, 9, 19, 22, 24, 28–37, 106, 155, 164, 165, 167, 200, 209, 224, 232
 Morogoro Conference (1969), 235
 Mosala-Monja, Captain, Zairean officer, 166
 Mosambay, Brigadier Singa Boyenge, Zairean officer, 164
 Mou Mou, Bernadino, Sudanese rebel leader, 110
 Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), 64
 Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP), 65
 Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), 29, 55, 74
 Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), 54
 Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), 54
 Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), 203–209, 220, 221
 Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), 54
 Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC), 67, 68
 Mozambique, 56, 88, 135–37, 180, 193, 227, 231–33, 237, 240–42, 248, 270, 272, 273, 276, 277–80, 282
 Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), 277–80
 Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO), 238
 Mugabe, Robert, Zimbabwe president, 203, 274–77
 Mugunga Refugee Camp, 197
 Muhammad Husayn, Prince, Yemeni leader, 3
 Mulamba, Colonel Leonard, Congolese officer, 158, 159
 Mulele, Pierre, Congolese rebel leader, 157, 158, 162
 Muller, Siegfried, mercenary, 159
 Multinational Force for Central Africa (FOMAC), 224
 Multi-National Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC), 221, 223
 Murahiliin militia, 115, 116, 121–23
 Murtala Mohammed, Nigerian officer, 49–52
 Murwanashyaka, Ignace, FDLR chairman, 213
 Musa Hilal, Darfur Arab leader, 129
 Museveni, Yoweri, Ugandan leader, 121, 134–49, 177, 179, 181, 184
 Mushala, Adamson, Zambian rebel leader, 280

- Musuguri, Major General David,
Tanzanian officer, 136
- Mutebutsi, Colonel Jules, Congolese
rebel leader, 213, 214
- Mutesa, Sir Edward, king of
Buganda, 90
- Mutiny, East Africa (1964), 85
- Muzorewa, Bishop Abel,
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia
leader, 274
- Mwakibolwa, Brigadier General
James, Tanzanian officer, 215
- Na Waie, General Tagme,
Guinea-Bissau officer, 69
- Nabil Sahraoui, Algerian rebel
leader, 28
- Namibia (South West Africa), 61,
202–209, 227, 229, 230, 232, 233,
246, 283
- Namibian Air Force, 265
- Namibian Defence Force (NDF), 265
- Nanking Military Academy, China,
237, 238, 265
- Nash, Lieutenant General Patrick,
Irish officer, 177
- National Army of Liberation (ANL),
Chad, 174
- National Commission for
Demobilization and Reinsertion
(CONADER), DRC, 209–210
- National Congress for the
Defense of the People (CNDP),
DRC, 214, 215
- National Council for the Defence of
Democracy (CNDD), Burundi,
191–93
- National Defence Force (FDN),
Burundi, 192
- National Democratic Alliance
(NDA), Sudan, 119, 121
- National Democratic Party (NDP),
Southern Rhodesia, 69
- National Forces of Liberation (FNL),
Burundi, 190–93
- National Front for the Liberation of
Angola (FNLA), 163, 164, 168,
244–49
- National Islamic Front (NIF), 116,
128, 129
- National Liberation Army (NLA),
Libya, 18
- National Liberation Council (CNL),
Congo, 157, 158
- National Liberation Front (FLN),
Algeria, 22–29, 95
- National Liberation Front
(FROLINA), Burundi, 191
- National Liberation Front of Chad
(FROLINAT), 170–72
- National Military Academy,
Guinea, 46
- National Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad (MNLA),
73, 74
- National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL), 58–61
- National Redemption Front (NRF),
Darfur, 132
- National Republican
Movement for Democracy and
Development (MRNDD),
Rwanda, 183
- National Resistance Council
(Congo-Brazzaville), 226
- National Resistance Movement/
Army (NRM/A), Uganda, 78,
137–49, 177, 179, 180
- National Security Force (NSF),
Libya, 14
- National Transitional Council
(NTC), Libya, 18
- National Union for the Total
Independence of Angolan
(UNITA), 164, 168, 198, 199,
202–205, 207, 225, 236, 245, 246,
248, 249, 250, 252, 254–58, 261–63,
265–69
- Nationalist and Integrationist Front
(FNI), DRC, 212, 215

- Ndadaye, Melchior, Burundi
 president, 190
 Ndayizeye, Domitien, Burundi
 president, 192, 193
 Ndebele, 271, 273, 276
 N'Djamena, First Battle of (1979),
 172, 173
 N'Djamena, Second Battle
 of (1980), 173
 N'Djamena, Third Battle (2008), 177
 Ndolo, Brigadier Joseph, Kenyan
 officer, 86
 Nduguta, Stephen, Ugandan-
 Rwandan officer, 179, 181
 Nepal, 211, 212
 Netanyahu, Lieutenant Colonel
 Yonatan, Israeli officer, 135
 Neto, Agostinho, Angolan leader,
 164, 245, 246
 Netherlands, 193, 213
 Neutral Military Observer Group
 (NMOG), Rwanda, 183
 New Forces, Cote d'Ivoire, 66, 67
 New Kush Battalion, Sudan
 People's Liberation Army, 116
 New Sudan Brigade, Sudan People's
 Liberation Army, 121
 Ngbandi, 168, 169
 Ngouabi, Martin, Congo-Brazzaville
 leader, 224
 Nguesso, Denis Sassou, Congo-
 Brazzaville president, 221, 224–26
 Nhari, Thomas, Zimbabwe
 liberation fighter, 272
 Nhongo, Lieutenant General Rex
 (Solomon Mujuru), Zimbabwe
 liberation leader, 275
 Niger, 15, 28, 29, 39, 42, 70–74, 187
 Nigeria, xiii, xiv, 29, 43–45, 47, 48, 57,
 58, 60, 61, 63–65, 68–70, 84, 105,
 106, 108, 112, 131, 132, 155, 173,
 183, 214, 226, 275
 Nigeria, NNS (*Obuma*, NNS), 44
 Nigeria Regiment (Queen's Own
 Nigeria Regiment), 43, 87
 Nigerian Air Force, 44, 45
 Nigerian Army, 43–45
 Nigerian Civil War (1967–70), 39,
 48–55
 Nigerian Defence Academy, 44
 Nigerian Navy, 44, 51, 54
 Nigeriens' Movement for Justice
 (MNJ), 72, 73
 Nindaga, Masasu, Rwandan-
 Congolese soldier, 200
 Ninja Militia, Congo-Brazzaville,
 225, 226
 Nkomati Accord (1984), 279
 Nkomo, Joshua, Zimbabwe
 liberation leader, 269, 271, 274, 276
 Nkrumah, Kwame, 41–43, 155
 Nkunda, Colonel Laurent,
 Congolese rebel, 208, 213–15
 Nkurunziza, Pierre, Burundi
 president, 192, 193
 Noronha, Brigadier R. S., Indian
 officer, 157
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 (NATO), 18, 88, 156, 240
 North Korea, 15, 82, 137, 139, 140,
 163, 206, 275, 276
 North Mali Tuareg Alliance for
 Change (ATNMC), 72
 Norway, 80, 123
 Ntaganda, General Bosco "The
 Terminator," Congolese rebel
 leader, 214–16
 Ntaryamira, Cyprien, Burundian
 president, 185, 190
 Ntibantunganyu, Sylvestre, Burundi
 president, 191
 Ntumi, Pastor (Frederick
 Bintsamou), Congo-Brazzaville
 rebel leader, 226
 Nuclear weapons, South Africa, 232
 Nuer, 111, 112, 114, 116–18,
 120, 121, 123
 Numbi, John, Congolese officer, 209
 Nyamvumba, Lieutenant General
 Patrick, Rwandan officer, 132

- Nyamwasa, Colonel Kayumba,
Rwandan officer, 200
- Nyanda, General Sphiwe, South
African officer, 237, 284
- Nyerere, Julius, Tanzania president,
87–88, 135, 141, 280
- Nzeogwu, Major Patrick Chukwuma
Kaduna, Nigerian officer, 49
- Obama, Barack, U.S. president, 149
- Obasango, Olusegun, Nigerian
officer and president, 53, 214
- Obote, Milton, Uganda prime
minister, 89, 90, 111, 134, 137, 139,
140, 177, 179
- Odong Latek, Brigadier Justine,
Ugandan rebel leader, 143
- Odongi, Major General Emedio
Tafeng, Sudan rebel leader, 110
- Ogaden Liberation Front (OLF), 91
- Ogaden War (1977–78), 80–82, 85,
91–95, 99, 103, 167
- Ogole, Lieutenant Colonel John,
Ugandan officer, 140
- Ogoni people, Nigeria, 54
- Ojukwu, Lieutenant Colonel
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu,
Nigerian officer and leader of
Biafra, 49–53
- Okello, Brigadier Basilio Olara,
Ugandan officer, 140
- Okello, Major General Tito,
Ugandan officer, 136, 137, 140
- Olenga, Nicholas, Congolese rebel
leader, 158
- Olifant tank, 232, 260, 262–264
- Omgulumbashe, Raid on (1966), 247
- Operation Almandin II (1996), 219
- Operation Altar, 278
- Operation Amaryllis (1994), 186
- Operation Artemis (2003), 211
- Operation Askari (1983), 256
- Operation Attain Document I, II,
and III (1986), 16
- Operation Badr, 7
- Operation Barracuda (1979), 218
- Operation Barras (2000), 62
- Operation Black Fox (1997), 119
- Operation Boali (2003), 221
- Operation Bonanza (1982), 139
- Operation Bright Star, 11
- Operation Carnation (1981), 254
- Operation Coast, 232
- Operation Congresso II (1985), 256–57
- Operation Crusade (1968), 238
- Operation Desert Shield (1990), 11
- Operation Desert Storm (1991), 11
- Operation Dragon Noir (1964),
159–60
- Operation Dragon Rouge (1964),
159–60
- Operation El Dorado Canyon
(1986), 17
- Operation Epervier (1986), 175
- Operation Excite (1988), 264
- Operation Falcon Sweep (2005), 213
- Operation Fenkil (1990), 97, 98
- Operation Gothic Serpent
(1993), 106
- Operation Gordion Knot (1970), 242
- Operation Grand Slam (1962), 157
- Operation Green Sea (1970), 57
- Operation Houari Boumedienne
(1979), 34
- Operation Iron Fist (2002), 146
- Operation Iron Fist (2004), 147
- Operation Iron Fist (2005), 213
- Operation Kimia (1996), 195
- Operation Leopard (1978), 166
- Operation Lightning Thunder
(2008), 148
- Operation Linda Nchi (2012), 108
- Operation Magneto (1985), 256–57
- Operation Manta (1983), 174
- Operation Mbata (1996), 196
- Operation Mila, 278
- Operation Modular (1987), 258–59
- Operation Morthor (1961), 156
- Operation Mount Hope III
(1988), 176

- Operation Night Flash (2005), 213
- Operation No Living Thing (1999), 61
- Operation Noroit (1990), 180, 185
- Operation North (1991), 143, 144
- Operation North Night Final (2005), 146
- Operation Packer (1988), 263
- Operation Palliser (2000), 62
- Operation Protea (1981), 255
- Operation Rezzou (1989), 129
- Operation Red Bean (1978), 166
- Operation Reindeer (1978), 253
- Operation Restore Hope (1992), United Task Force or UNITAF, 105, 106
- Operation Rudia (2008), 148
- Operation Rudia II (2009), 148
- Operation Rum Punch (1961), 156
- Operation Saluting October (1987), 258–60
- Operation Savannah (1975), 248–51
- Operation Sceptic (Smoke Shell) (1980), 254
- Operation Serval (2013), 74
- Operation Sibasa (1968), 231, 238
- Operation Silverback (1994), 186
- Operation Tacaud (1978), 172
- Operation Tewodros (1991), 100
- Operation Thunderbolt (1976), 134–35
- Operation Thunderbolt (1997), 119
- Operation Turquoise (1994), 187–88
- Operation Unicorn (2002), 65–67
- Operation Walleligne (1991), 100
- Operation Wallpaper (1985), 257
- Operation White Giant (1964–65), 160
- Operation Wooden Leg (1985), 20
- Operation Violettes Imperiales (1965), 160
- Operation Virunga Clearance (2005), 213
- Operation Vula (1986), 237
- Opolot, Brigadier Shaban, Ugandan officer, 89, 90
- Organization of African Unity (OAU), xiv, 33, 48, 57, 70, 90, 91, 101, 105, 168, 173, 174, 176, 183, 184, 238, 240, 245, 274, 275
- Oris, Colonel Juma, Ugandan rebel leader, 145
- Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), 100, 101, 102, 114
- Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization (OPDO), 100
- Otti, Vincent, Ugandan rebel leader, 147
- Otu, Major General Stephen J. A., Ghanaian officer, 42
- Ouagadougou Accords (1995), 71
- Oueddei, Goukouni, Chadian leader, 172, 173, 174, 175
- Ovambo, 251, 252
- Ovimbundu, 245
- Oyite-Ojok, Lieutenant Colonel David, Ugandan officer, 136, 137, 139
- Pakistan, 3, 15, 43, 105–107, 109, 211–13, 275
- Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 20, 91, 239
- Palestinians, 5, 9, 13, 15, 16, 35, 70, 134
- Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), South Africa, 237–39, 280, 281, 283
- Pan-Somalism, 91
- Para-Commando Regiment, Belgium, 159, 166, 167, 185, 186
- Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU), 190–93
- Patasse, Felix, Central African president, 218, 219, 220, 221
- Patriotic Movement of Cote d'Ivoire (MPCI), 65
- Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS), Chad/Darfur, 128, 129, 176

- Peacekeeping, xiv, 42, 48, 58,
64–65, 107, 132, 151, 154, 168, 173,
184, 193, 197, 209, 213, 215, 224,
280, 285
- People's Armed Forces (FAP), 172,
173, 175
- People's Army for the Liberation of
Angola (EPLA), 245
- People's Army of Guinea, 45–47
- People's Defence Force (PDF),
Sudan, 117–22, 131
- Peoples' Front for Democracy and
Justice (PFDJ), Eritrea, 98
- People's Liberation Army (PLA),
Zanzibar, 87–88
- People's Liberation Army of
Namibia (PLAN), 247–65
- People's Militia, Tanzania, 88
- People's National Army (ANP),
Algeria, 22–29
- People's Revolutionary Party (PRP),
Zaire, 168
- Petrov, General Vasili,
Soviet officer, 94
- Poland, 122
- Poncet, General Henri, French
officer, 66, 186
- Popular Army for the Restoration
of Democracy (APRD),
CAR, 221, 222
- Popular Front for the Liberation of
Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro
(POLISARIO), 33–37
- Popular Militia, Guinea, 46
- Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA),
163, 164, 242–47, 248–50, 266–69
- Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad (MPLA), 71
- Popular Resistance Forces, Libya, 15
- Poqo, 237, 238
- Portugal, ix, xiv, 46, 47, 51, 55–58, 67,
69, 88, 163, 227, 228, 233, 238,
240–47, 267, 270
- Portuguese Air Force, 244, 246
- Portuguese coup (1974), 247–48, 272,
274, 277
- Prakash, Lieutenant General
Chander, Indian officer, 215
- President's Own Guard Regiment
(POGR), Ghana, 42–43
- Pretoria Accord (2002), 208, 212
- Price, Lieutenant Colonel Rollo,
British officer, 155
- Pseudo-terrorist operations, 230, 273
- Puntland, 107, 109
- Puntland Maritime Police Force, 109
- Pweto, Battle of (2000), 207
- Qatar, 133
- Quattara, Alessane, Ivoirian
president, 65–67
- Quifangondo, Battle
of (1975), 163, 249
- Rachid Ammar, General, Tunisian
officer, 21
- Radio-Television Libre des Mille
Collines (RTL), 184
- Raja, Brigadier K. A. S., Indian
officer, 156
- Rajputana Rifles, 157
- Rally for Congolese Democracy
(RCD), 202–210, 213
- Ranger Strike Force, Kenya, 87
- Ratel Infantry Fighting Vehicle, 36,
232, 253, 259, 260–64
- Reagan, Ronald, U.S. president, 16,
175, 254
- Reconnaissance Commando
(Recces), South African Special
Forces, 230, 231, 257, 259,
274, 278, 280, 281
- Red Star Campaign, Ethiopia, 96, 99
- Refugees, xiv, 49, 51, 59, 60, 104, 116,
117, 128, 129, 139, 165, 177, 179,
180, 184, 187, 190, 193, 194, 196,
198, 207, 244, 253, 268, 280, 281
- Reid Daly, Lieutenant Colonel Ron,
Rhodesian officer, 273

- Relief Society of Tigray (REST), 99
- Republican Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (RFCI), 67
- Revolutionary United Front (RUF),
Sierra Leone, 60–64
- Rhodesia, 51, 88, 154, 158, 159, 161,
162, 227, 228, 233, 234, 242, 252,
269–75, 282
- Rhodesia Regiment, 274
- Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR),
273, 276
- Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), 273
- Rhodesian War (1965–80), 269–75
- Rice, Susan, American official, 204
- Richards, Brigadier David, British
officer, 62
- Roberto, Holden, Angolan rebel
leader, 163, 168, 243, 244, 246, 249
- Romedan Mohamed, Eritrean rebel
leader, 96
- Rooivalk attack helicopters, 286
- Royal Air Force, Britain, 41
- Royal Air Force, Morocco, 29, 35, 37
- Royal Armed Forces (FAR),
Morocco, 29–37
- Royal Libyan Army, 14
- Royal Marines, Britain, 85
- Royal Navy, Morocco, 29, 37
- Royal West African Frontier Force
(RWAFF), 41, 44
- Ruhengeri, Raid on (1991), 182
- Russia, 26, 28, 102, 109, 125, 187, 267
- Rwanda, xv, 101, 131, 132,
134, 139, 140, 145, 151, 158,
160–62, 168, 177–91, 194–209,
211–16, 226, 282
- Rwanda, genocide of Tutsi, 151,
185–88, 194
- Rwanda, invasion by Rwandan
Patriotic Front (1990–94), 177–88
- Rwanda Armed Forces (FAR),
180–88, 196, 199, 200, 201, 204,
206–209, 212, 225
- Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF),
212–15
- Rwandan Alliance for National
Unity (RANU), 177, 179
- Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA),
196–209, 212
- Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), 168,
179–88, 196, 214
- Rwarakabije, General Paul,
Rwandan officer, 213
- Rwasa, Agathon, Burundian rebel
leader, 193
- Rwigema, Fred, Rwandan rebel
leader, 137, 140, 177, 179, 180
- SA-5 surface-to-air missiles, 16
- SA-6 surface-to-air missiles, 24
- Saab aircraft, 80, 157
- Sadiq al-Mahdi, Sudan President,
115, 116, 127–29
- SAM-3 missiles, 6
- SAM-7 missiles, 57, 115
- SAM-8 missiles, 260, 263
- Saharan Liberation Army, 32
- Saint Cyr French Military
Academy, 21
- Salafist Group for Preaching and
Combat (GSPC), 27, 28
- Salamayi, Colonel Mampa Ngakwe,
Zairean officer, 164
- Salazar, Antonio, Portuguese
ruler, 240
- Saleh, Salim, Ugandan
officer, 138, 141
- Sandhurst, Royal Military Academy,
45, 52, 79, 86, 88, 282
- Sankara, Captain Thomas, Burkina
Faso officer, 70
- Sankoh, Foday, Sierra Leone rebel
leader, 60–62
- Sanussi, 1, 14
- Sarakikya, Brigadier Sam Hagai,
Tanzanian officer, 87
- Sara-Wiwa, Ken, Nigerian author
and activist, 54
- Saudi Arabia, 3, 4, 11, 35, 90, 116,
134, 137, 165

- Savimbi, Jonas, Angolan rebel leader, 245, 246, 254, 257, 258, 266, 268
- Schramme, Jean "Black Jack," mercenary, 159–62
- Schulz, General Arnaldo, Portuguese officer, 56
- Schwarzkopf, General Norman, 12
- Scorpion Gang, 239
- Scorpion light tanks, 282
- Selassie, Haile, Ethiopian emperor, 79, 81, 91, 93, 95, 111
- Seleka Rebel Alliance (CAR), 223, 224
- Selous Scouts, 273, 274
- Senegal, 39, 48, 56, 57, 67–69, 132, 155, 167, 173, 183, 187, 209, 219
- Senghor, Father Augustin Diamacoune, Casamance leader, 67–68
- Senghor, Leopold, Senegalese president, 57, 67
- September 11, 2001, terrorist attack, xii, 2, 11, 17, 20, 28, 37, 63, 77, 123, 146
- Serbian mercenaries, 199, 200, 225
- Shaba Invasions (1977–78), Shaba I and II, 163–68
- Shaiqiya, 113
- Sharon, Ariel, Israeli officer, 5, 6, 9
- Sherman tanks, 89
- Shifta War (1963–67), 86, 91, 92
- Shilluk, 115, 120, 123
- Shiri, Air Marshal Perence, Zimbabwean officer, 276, 277
- Shona, 271–73, 276
- Sierra Leone, 39, 48, 59–65, 132, 265
- Sierra Leone Army (SLA), 60–62
- Sierra Leone Civil War (1991–2002), 59–62, 74
- Simba rebels, 110, 158–62, 194
- Sinai Desert, 4–9
- Sinoia, Battle of (1966), 270
- Sino-Soviet Rivalry, xi, 165
- Sinziyoheba, Colonel Firmin, Burundi minister of defense, 191
- Sipolilo campaign (1968), 234, 270
- Sirte Accords (2007), 221
- Sithole, Ndabaningi, Zimbabwe liberation leader, 269, 274
- Smith, Ian, Rhodesian prime minister, 233, 234, 269, 270, 274
- Sollum, 10
- Somali National Army (SNA), 83–85, 91–94, 105, 108
- Somali National Front (SNF), 105
- Somali National Movement (SNM), 104, 105
- Somali Navy, 109
- Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), 104
- Somali piracy, 87, 109, 125, 149, 286
- Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), 104, 125
- Somalia, 77, 81, 83–86, 91–94, 97, 100, 102–109, 146, 149, 185, 193, 282
- Somalia Civil War (1978–2013), 103–109
- Somalia Syndrome, 107
- Somaliland Republic, 105, 107
- Soumialot, Gaston, Congolese rebel leader, 157, 158
- South Africa, xiv, 36, 51, 63, 132, 154, 158, 159, 161, 163, 164, 182, 193, 202–210, 212, 215, 223–40, 245–65, 267, 269, 270, 272, 274, 276–86
- South African Air Force (SAAF), 235, 237, 253, 257, 259, 277, 285, 286
- South African Army Bantu Training Centre, 229
- South African Cape Corps (SACC), 229, 230
- South African Defence Force (SADF), 228–32, 237, 238, 247–65, 275, 283, 284

- South African Military Academy, 228, 230
- South African National Defence Force (SANDF), 283–86
- South African National Defence Union (SANDU), 285
- South African Navy, 229, 246, 278, 280, 286
- South African Police (SAP), 234, 274, 281
- South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD), Burundi, 192
- South Sudan, 123, 125, 127, 133, 147, 148, 149
- South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF), 120
- South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A), 118, 119, 120
- South Sudan Unity Movement/Army (SSUM/A), 120
- South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), 203, 239, 246–58, 263–65
- South West African Police (SWAPOL), 252
- South West African Territorial Force (SWATF), 252, 263, 265
- Southern African Development Community (SADC), xiv, 202, 285, 286
- Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (SRANC), 269
- Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), 111, 112
- Southern Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG), 110, 111
- Soviet Union, xi, 1, 3–11, 15–17, 22, 24, 26, 33, 36, 41–43, 45–47, 51, 56, 57, 70, 71, 77, 79, 80–84, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94, 96, 97, 100, 154, 156, 158, 165, 224, 225, 232, 233, 235, 240, 242, 246, 248, 250, 254–60, 266, 271–73
- Soweto Uprising (1976), 250
- Spain, 2, 29, 31–33, 37, 161, 282
- Spanish Legion, 31, 32
- Special Air Service (SAS), British, 62
- Special Air Service (SAS), Rhodesia, 230, 274
- Special Boat Service, British, 62
- Special Boat Service, Nigerian Navy, 54
- Special Operations Force, Kenya, 86, 87
- Special Presidential Division (DSP), Armed Forces of Zaire, 169, 181, 194, 196, 197, 225
- Special Presidential Security Group (GSSP), DRC, 210
- Stanleyville, Battle of (1964), 159. *See also* Operation Dragon Rouge
- Steiner, Rolf, German mercenary, 52, 111
- Stevens, Ambassador J. Christopher, 18
- Stevens, Saika, Sierra Leone ruler, 59
- Stinger anti-aircraft missile, 257
- Strasser, Captain Valentine, Sierra Leone officer, 60, 61
- Submarines, 28, 41, 231, 280, 285, 286
- Sudan, xiv, 77, 89, 90, 96, 99, 109–125, 127–34, 137, 140, 144–46, 149, 160, 173, 176, 177, 204, 220–22, 285
- Sudan African Nationalist Union (SANU), 109, 110
- Sudan Civil War (1955–72), 109–112
- Sudan Civil War (1983–2005), 113–25, 147
- Sudan Defence Force (SDF), 109
- Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA), 132
- Sudan Liberation Army/Group 19 (SLA/Group 19), Darfur, 132
- Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), Darfur, 130–32
- Sudan People's Armed Forces (SPAF), 112–27

- Sudan People's Liberation
 - Army–Bahr al-Ghazal (SPLA–Bahr al-Ghazal), 119, 120
- Sudan People's Liberation Army–Nasir (SPLA–Nasir), 117, 118
- Sudan People's Liberation Army–United (SPLA–United), 118, 120
- Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), 114–27, 129, 132, 133, 144–47, 203, 204
- Sudan–South Sudan Conflict (2011–13), 125, 127
- Sudanese Revolutionary Front, 127
- Sumbeiywo, Lieutenant General Lazarus, Kenyan officer, 123
- Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), Egypt, 12
- Su-7, 22
- Su-20 aircraft, 10
- Su-22 aircraft, 15, 174, 256
- Su-24 ground attack jets, 28
- Su-25 ground attack jets, 66
- Su-27 fighter, 268
- Su-30MKA multirole fighters, 28
- Suez Canal, 1, 5–8, 10
- Super Mystere fighters, 5
- Super-ZAPU, 276
- Swaziland, 233, 281
- Sweden, 80, 154, 155, 157, 211, 213, 285
- SWIFT boats, 161, 170
- Syria, 4–8, 15, 22, 95
- T-28 ground support aircraft, 158
- T-33 jet trainers, 80
- T-34 tanks, 84, 91
- T-54/55 tanks, 6, 33, 84, 91, 122, 135, 258
- T-59 tanks, 88
- T-62 tanks, 24, 33, 88, 256, 258
- T-72 tanks, 24, 125
- T-90 tanks, 28
- Taiwan, 279, 281
- Tal, General Abraham, Israeli officer, 5
- Tamanrasset Accords (1991), 71
- Tambo, Oliver, 235
- Tana Brigade, Sudan People's Liberation Army, 119
- Tanganyika, 44, 85, 87, 240
- Tanganyika Rifles, 85
- Tanzania, 48, 51, 87–88, 132, 134–37, 139, 141, 158, 160, 161, 168, 181–83, 186, 188–91, 197, 204, 215, 233–35, 238, 239, 240–42, 275, 279, 280, 286
- Tanzania African National Union (TANU), 87–88
- Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF), 87–88, 90, 135–37
- Task Force Foxbat, South African, 249
- Task Force X-Ray, South African, 250
- Task Force Zulu, South African (1975–76), 248, 249
- Task Force Zulu, South African (1988), 264
- Tavernier, Colonel Christian, Belgian mercenary, 199
- Taylor, Charles, Liberian leader, 48, 58–65
- Taylor, Chuckie, Liberian leader's son, 63
- Technicals, 104
- Thonier, Brigadier General Jean-Paul, French officer, 211
- Ticonderoga*, USS, 16
- Tigray, 82, 93, 96, 97–102
- Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF), 99–101
- Tigres, 198, 200, 202
- Tiguentourine Attack (2013), Algeria, 29
- Tinyefuza, Lieutenant General David, Ugandan officer, 143
- Tobruk, 10, 14
- Togo, 167, 168, 219, 221
- Tombalbaye, Francois, Chad president, 170, 171

- Tongogara, Josiah, Zimbabwe liberation leader, 271, 272, 275
 Total strategy/Total onslaught, 227, 228
 Toyota War (1987), 175, 176
 Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Somalia, 107–109
 Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT), Chad, 173–175
 Transkei, 229, 237, 239, 283
 Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), 29
 Traore, Dioundounda, Malian president, 73
 Traore, Lieutenant Moussa, Malian officer, 70, 71
 Tripolitania, 17
 Tshipola, Colonel Ferdinand, Congolese officer, 162
 Tshombe, Moise, Congolese prime minister, 152–62
 Tsvangirai, Morgan, Zimbabwe opposition leader, 277
 TU 16 bomber, 5
 TU-22 bomber, 135, 174, 175
 Tuareg, 15, 29, 33, 39
 Tuareg Rebellion, Mali (1962–64), 70
 Tuareg Rebellion, Mali (2011–13), 73
 Tuareg Rebellion, Mali and Niger (1990–95), 71
 Tuareg Rebellion, Mali and Niger (2006–09), 72
 Tungamirai, Air Marshal Josiah, Zimbabwe liberation leader, 276
 Tunisia, 1, 2, 17–22, 29, 36, 155, 209
 Tutsi, 139, 151, 158, 177–201, 203, 213, 214
 Type 96 tanks, 125
 Uganda, 15, 48, 77, 85, 89–91, 108, 110, 111, 119–21, 127, 134–49, 160, 177, 179–82, 184, 194–211, 220, 222, 239
 Uganda, insurgency in the north, 141–49
 Uganda, invasion by Tanzania (1978–79), Kagera War, 135–37
 Uganda Air Force, 89
 Uganda Civil War (1981–86), 137–41
 Uganda National Liberation Front/Army (UNLF/A), 135–42, 145
 Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), 137, 144, 145
 Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II), 145, 146
 Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF), 144–48, 197–209
 Uganda Peoples' Democratic Army (UPDA), 141–43
 Uganda People's Democratic Christian Army (UPDCA), 143
 Uganda Rifles, 85
 Ukraine, 103, 125, 187, 201
 Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, Sudan president, 116, 119–21, 123, 129–33
 Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), 232–37, 257, 258, 270, 278, 279, 281, 283, 284
 Umma Liberation Army, 121
 Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), 211, 212, 214
 Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), CAR, 222–24
 Union of Peoples of Angola (UPA), 242–45
 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 83, 109
 United Arab Republic (UAR), 2, 7
 United Democratic Salvation Front, Sudan, 120
 United Liberian Movement for Democracy (ULIMO), 58–65
 United Nations, xiv, 4, 6, 18, 33, 36, 41, 48, 57, 63–65, 67, 74, 94, 98, 105–107, 131, 132, 151, 152, 154, 155–57, 184–86, 193, 197, 205, 208, 212–15, 223, 226, 232, 261, 264–68, 282, 285, 286

- United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), 184–88
- United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), 127
- United Nations Mission for the Central African Republic (MINURCA), 219
- United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), 146–48, 206, 209–215
- United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), 102
- United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 65
- United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), 177, 223
- United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), 62
- United Nations Observer Mission to Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), 184
- United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), 215–16
- United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (ONUCI), 66
- United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNUMOZ), 280
- United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), 105–107
- United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), 154–57
- United Nations Peace Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 193
- United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), 265
- United Somali Congress (USC), 105
- United States, xi, 1, 2, 7, 8, 11, 28, 29, 35–37, 42, 43, 47, 48, 51, 54–56, 58, 63, 64, 73, 77, 79–81, 84, 86, 87, 93, 95, 101, 102, 104–109, 113, 123, 125, 127, 131, 146, 148, 149, 154, 157–59, 162–67, 170, 173, 174, 176, 186, 193, 194, 199, 202, 208, 210, 213, 215, 224, 228, 232, 236, 242, 246, 248, 250, 260, 264, 266, 267, 282
- United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), xii, 210
- United States Air Force, 155, 159, 167
- United States Army Rangers, 106
- United States Marines, 64, 64, 106
- United States Navy SEALs, 106
- United States Special Forces, 149, 176
- Uruguay, 209–212, 280
- Uwazuruike, Ralph, Nigerian activist, 54
- Uwilingiyimana, Agathe, Rwanda interim prime minister, 185
- Valkiri rocket launcher, South Africa, 232
- Vandewalle, Colonel Frederic, Belgian officer, 158, 159, 160
- Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Lands (Ansaru), 55
- Venda, 229, 283
- Vickers tanks, 86
- Vieira, Joao Bernardo "Nino," Guinea-Bissau president, 68–69
- Vietnam, 56, 228, 241, 242
- Virunga National Park, 181, 182, 214, 215
- Volcan Army, 128, 173
- Volcano Battalion, Sudan People's Liberation Movement, 115
- Von Rosen, Carl Gustav, Swedish mercenary pilot, 52, 80
- Vorster, John, South African prime minister, 248, 253
- Walls, Lieutenant General Peter, Rhodesian officer, 275
- Wamala, Major General Katumba, Ugandan officer, 145, 146
- Wankie campaign (1967), 234, 270
- War of Maria (1961), 242
- War of the Tribes (1988), Darfur, 128

- Warrior Refugees, xiii
- Welby-Everard, Major
General Sir Christopher, British officer, 44
- West Germany, 36, 44, 45, 47, 84, 86, 88, 170
- West Nile, Uganda, 90, 134, 137, 144–46
- West Nile Bank Front (WNBf), 119, 145, 146
- West Side Boys, Sierra Leone, 62
- Western Sahara (Spanish Sahara), 2, 24, 29, 32–37
- Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), 93, 94
- White Legion, 199, 225
- World Bank, 143
- Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace, 64
- YAK-130 training aircraft, 28
- Yakoma, 218, 220
- Yassine Mansouri, Moroccan politician, 37
- Yemen, 2–4, 93, 95, 105
- Yoruba, 43, 49, 50
- Yugoslavia, 41, 239
- Zacharia, General Damane, Central African rebel leader, 222
- Zaghawa, 129, 130, 133
- Zaire. *See* Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
- Zaire Air Force, 169–70
- Zairean Navy, 170
- Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia), 51, 156, 165, 170, 198, 207, 233, 234, 237, 238, 240, 245, 246, 251, 254, 267, 269–72, 274, 275, 280, 286
- Zanzibar, 87
- Zenawi, Meles, Ethiopian prime minister, 100–101, 107
- Zimbabwe, 106, 183, 202–209, 227, 278, 281, 286
- Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), 242, 270–77
- Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), 238, 269–75
- Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF), 275–78
- Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), 233, 234, 269–76
- Zimbabwe Air Force (ZAF), 199, 203, 275, 276, 281
- Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF), 203–209, 275, 276–80
- Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI), 199, 203
- Zimbabwe Liberation War (1965–80), *See also* Rhodesian War, 269–75
- Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA), 275
- Zimbabwe People's Militia (ZPM), 275, 277
- Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), 233, 234, 270–76
- Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), 275
- Zine al-Abdine Ben Ali, Brigadier, Tunisian ruler, 20–21
- Zvinavashe, Major General Vitalis, Zimbabwe officer, 277

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